Evidence Digests 2

Augustin v.
Ziemer 2
Lechugas v. CA 3
Martin v. Setter 5
Robles v. Lizarraga Hermanos 7
Mitchell v. Lath 10
Laureano v. Kilayco 11
Yu Tek vs Gonzales (1915) 13
Palanca v. Fred Wilson & Co. 15
ACI Phil. Inc. v. Coquia 17
Sea Oil Petroleum v. Autocorp Group 19
Marquez v. Espejo 21
Lequin v. Sps. Vizconde 23
Washington v. Texas 25
United States v. Looper 27
People v. Tuangco 28
People v. Golillim 30
People v. Canete 32
People v. Zheng Bai Hui 35
Sunga-Chan v. Chua 37
Sanson v. CA 40
ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

BATCH 2017 1 ATTY. EUGENIO VILLAREAL
AUGUSTIN V. ZIEMER
221 Minn. 565, May 3, 1946
Digest Author: Klark Garcia
DOCTRINE
‣ The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not apply to a mere receipt unless they are
of a contractual nature. An ordinary receipt, which is nothing more than a written admission and not contractual in
character, may be varied or supplemented by oral evidence.
PARTIES
‣ Petitioner: Arnold W. Augustin
‣ Respondent: Alfred A. Ziemer
FACTS
‣ Alfred A. Ziemer and his wife own a tract of land in Austin.
‣ Arnold W. Augustin and Ziemer allegedly entered into an oral contract wherein Augustin will construct a
residence upon the land and thereafter Ziemer will convey such land to him. Augustin will pay Ziemer $500 per
acre plus the actual cost of improvements and interest on unpaid balances. The payment was to be made in
monthly installments.
‣ Augustin made the improvements but Ziemer refused to convey the land, arguing that his relationship with
Augustin is that of landlord and tenant and not of vendor and vendee.
‣ After completion of the construction of the residence, Augustin came into possession of said land. He paid for
work to improve the brooder house, yard, driveway, and garage of the land. He also planted trees and 200 berry
plants, finished the carpentry work, eradicated weeds, installed extra wiring, made plumbing repairs, etc. Augustin
also paid the monthly instalments to Ziemer.
‣ Ziemer claimed that such payments were for rent as evidenced by the 24 receipts presented. One of the receipts is
worded as follows:
‣ No. 25 Jan 1st, 1943 ”Received of Arnold C.W. Augustin Thirty-three . . . . . dollars Rent of Jan. . . . No. . . .
1608 South River St. Street From Jan. 1st to Feb. 1st, 1943… ”$33.00 A.A. Ziemer”"
‣ Augustin offered the receipts for evidence and testified that he actually called the attention of Ziemer when he
saw that the receipts were marked rent. According to him, Ziemer had no other receipt book then and told him that
"it didn't make so much difference anyway." He was made to believe by Ziemer that as long as he makes his
payments, everything will be alright.
‣ Ziemer objected to the question eliciting the testimony of Augustin regarding why said receipts were marked
rent. It argued that it was an endeavor to vary the terms of a written instrument by parol evidence.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the rule that parol evidence may not vary or contradict a written document is applicable to Augustin's
testimony. – NO. In this case, the receipts given by Ziemer to Augustin were mere receipts and not a contract.
RATIO
‣ The parol evidence rule does not apply to receipts unless they are of a contractual nature. Hence, the receipts
issued by Ziemer, being ordinary receipts which are nothing more but written admissions and not contractual in
character, may be varied or supplemented by oral evidence (i.e. Augustin's testimony).

LECHUGAS V. CA
G.R. No. L-39972 & L-40300, August 6, 1986
Digest Author: Bel Gervasio
DOCTRINE
‣ Parole evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the
other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in
question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff/Petitioner – Victoria Lechugas
‣ Defendants/Respondents – Marina Loza, Salvador Loza, Isidro Loza, Carmelita Loza, David Loza, Amparo Loza,
Erlinda Loza and Alejandro Loza
FACTS
‣ Lechugas filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages against the Lozas. He alleged that the Lozas
unlawfully entered Lots A and B, corresponding to the middle and northern portion of her lot and refused to
surrender the same.
‣ The complaint was dismissed. Lechugas appealed to the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.
‣ While the appeal was pending, Lechugas instituted another action before the CFI Iloilo for recovery and
possession of the same property against the Lozas.
‣ The two cases were tried jointly.
‣ Victoria Lechugas testified that she bought a land from Leoncia Lasangue as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale. She took possession of the land through her tenants.
‣ Lechugas’ declaration was corroborated by her tenant Simeon who testified that he worked on the land subject of
the complaint.
‣ According to Simeon, while he was plowing Lot A, the Lozas entered the land and forced him to stop his work.
They told Simeon that if he would sign an affidavit recognizing them as his landlords, they would allow him to
continue plowing the land. On that occasion, the Lozas were carrying unsheathed bolos, which made Simeon
very afraid, so he reported the matter to Lechugas who went to the Chief of Police. Still, the Lozas refused to
surrender the possession of Lot A.
‣ Simeon further declared that the Lozas entered Lot B of the land in question, situated on the northern portion, and
cut the bamboo poles growing thereof. They refused to leave.
‣ Simeon also declared that the Lozas, not contented with just occupying Lots A and B, grabbed the whole parcel
containing 6 hectares to the damage and prejudice of Lechugas.
‣ The Lozas, on the other hand, maintained that the land which Lechugas bought from Leoncia Lasangue is
different from the land subject of the action.
‣ To prove this point, the Lozas called as their first witness Lechugas herself, to elicit from her the reason why
although her vendor Leoncia Lasangue was also residing at the municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, Lechugas did
not care to call her to the witness stand to testify regarding the identity of the land which she bought.
‣ Lechugas countered that she had tried to call her vendor, but the latter refused, saying that she had already
testified in Lechuga's favor in the forcible entry case.
‣ The Lozas’ evidence showed that Hugo Loza, predecessor-in-interest of the Loza heirs, purchased a parcel of land
from one Limor as evidenced by the deed "Venta Definitiva”. This land was bounded on the north by Ramon
Lasangue, and on the south by Emeterio Lasangue. Immediately after the sale, Hugo Loza took possession of the
said parcel of land and declared the same in his name.
‣ Hugo Loza bought from Emeterio Lasangue the parcel of land adjoining the land he had earlier bought from
Limor. These two parcels of land were consolidated and designated.
‣ The Lozas claimed that the lot bought by Lechugas from Leoncia Lasangue is situated south of the land now
subject of this action.

‣ Leoncia Lasangue, Lechugas’ vendor, testified for the Lozas, declaring that during his lifetime, her father,
Emeterio Lasangue, owned a parcel of land containing an area of 36 hectares.
‣ Emeterio Lasangue sold a part of 4 hectares of this property to Hugo Loza. Other sales were made to other
persons, leaving only some 12 hectares out of the original 36.
‣ These 12 hectares were transferred by her parents in her name, and that she sold 6 hectares of her inherited
property to Victoria Lechugas under a public instrument which was prepared at the instance of Lechugas and
thumbmarked by Lasangue herself.
‣ Lasangue refuted Lechugas’ contention that the land sold to the latter is the very land under question.
‣ Q. But Victoria Lechugas declared here that, by means of this document, Exhibit 'A', you sold to her this very
land in litigation; while you declared here now that this land in litigation was not included in the sale you
made of another parcel of land in her favor. What do you say about that?
‣ A. I only sold 6 hectares to her.
‣ Q. And that was included in this land in litigation?
‣ A. No.
‣ After trial, the court rendered judgment, dismissing the complaints and declaring the Lozas as owners and lawful
possessors of the land with all the improvements thereon.
‣ Lechugas appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter sustained the dismissal.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the CA had legal justification to subject the true intent and agreement to parole evidence over the objection
of Lechugas. – YES, CA had legal justification to subject the agreement to parole evidence.
RATIO
‣ CA acted correctly in upholding the trial court's action in admitting the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue.
‣ Parole evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either party to the litigation against the
other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in
question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby.
‣ Horn v. Hansen:
‣ As between parties to a written agreement, or their privies, parole evidence cannot be received to contradict
or vary its terms. Strangers to a contract are, of course, not bound by it, and the rule excluding extrinsic
evidence in the construction of writings is inapplicable in such cases; and it is relaxed where either one of the
parties between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written agreement, and does not claim under or
through one who is party to it. In such case the rule is binding upon neither.
‣ Lechugas’ reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is
between one of the parties to the document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue
in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually sold is between Lechugas and the Lozas.
‣ In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she really intended to sell
and to be the subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale was a different Lot, but not being able to read and write and
fully relying on the good faith of Lechugas, her first cousin, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper
which Lechugas told her was the document evidencing the sale of land. The deed of sale described the disputed
lot instead.
‣ Lasangue did not intend to sell as she could not have sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to the
predecessor-in-interest of the Lozas.
‣ The fact that vendor Lasangue did not bring an action for the reformation of the Deed of Absolute Sale is of no
moment. The undisputed fact is that the Lozas have timely questioned the validity of the instrument and have
proven that, indeed Deed of Absolute Sale does not reflect the true intention of the vendor

MARTIN V. SETTER
184 Minn. 457, 239 N.W. 219, 80 A.L.R 471 (1931)
Digest Author: Clarence Tiu
FACTS
‣ Milton Setter and plaintiffs entered a tentative agreement to trade farms, Setter owning 1,600 acres in Canada
with equipment of horses and machinery, and plaintiffs owning 360 acres partly in Dakota and partly in Scott
counties, this state, with a dairy herd, horses, and machinery. In the deal, Denny was plaintiffs' agent and A. J.
Rieger was agent of defendant Mr. Setter.
‣ However, before the transaction was reduced to writing defendants married. After plaintiffs had seen the Canada
farms, the trade was consummated by the signing of another contract, but Mrs. Setter did not sign
‣ Mr. Setter was to reduce the incumbrances on the Canada farms to a certain sum, was to pay overdue interest
thereon and unpaid taxes, but was unable to do so; and subsequently, by a writing signed by all the parties to the
suit, the contract, was modified, and moneys were advanced by plaintiffs to permit Setter to accomplish what he
agreed to do. Plaintiffs were also directed to transfer the property to Mrs. Setter in place of Mr. Setter.
‣ The moneys advanced amounted to around $5,900 for which defendants gave their note secured by mortgage upon
the property which they received.
‣ There was a default in the payment of this note and this action was brought to obtain possession of the property in
order to foreclose.
‣ Defendants counterclaimed for $45,000 damages for alleged misrepresentations, chiefly as to the market value of
the Dakota and Scott county farm and the feasibility of draining a pond thereon.
‣ There was a jury trial and a verdict rendered for $17,500 in favor of defendants.
‣ Thereafter plaintiffs pleaded as a defense to the counterclaim that defendants, after instituting an action to recover
damages of their agent, through a document signed by Setter and Rieger, settled said cause of action and
dismissed it with prejudice and fully released Rieger from every liability growing out of the misrepresentations.
‣ Later, the defendants' attorneys delivered them to Rieger's attorney and turned over to defendant the $4,000 note
and the release of the property securing the same. No doubt by these instruments the cause of action defendants
had or asserted against Rieger was settled and he was forever discharged. And it would follow that any other
person whose acts caused or participated in the tort which damaged defendants was also discharged.
‣ That such such is the law is not disputed by the defendants, but defendants, over objections, were permitted to
prove by Setter that he did not intend to settle or compromise his cause of action, but that what he received for the
settlement and release from Rieger was to apply upon his cause of action against plaintiffs. Was parol evidence
competent to vary or contradict these documents?
‣ Note that Setter executed a compromise agreement with Rieger the co-joint tortfeasor of plaintiffs. However
according to law, such release or settlement also releases the other co-joint tortfeasors who are plaintiffs here. The
settlement was in a written contract signed by plaintiffs and defendants. Now, defendant Setter claims that he
should be allowed to produce parol evidence to prove that he merely intended to release Rieger, not the plaintiffs.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N parol evidence is permitted to prove that defendant Setter did not intend to settle the cause of action against
plaintiffs but merely only against Rieger - NO
RATIO
‣ The rule is as stated, with this limitation, however that the right in the latter class of cases to vary a written
contract by parol is limited to rights independent of the instrument. As to rights which originate in the relation
established by the written contract, or are founded upon it, the rule against varying it by parol applies.’
‣ In the instant case the right to the defense asserted originated by law in the discharge of Rieger by virtue of the
release
‣ As the document in the eye of the law is the contract between the parties, it must be accepted as final for the
measurement and adjustment of all rights and obligations which rise out of it. Strangers to the contract may also
be strangers to the relation created and controlled by it. But whoever comes within the purview of the relation
cannot be permitted to vary or contradict the terms of the memorial which is the sole and final embodiment of the
legal act. To this rule there are no exceptions.’

‣ It seems clear that when for a consideration defendants settled and compromised their cause of action for damages
against Rieger and the release was executed and delivered it, at once discharged not only Rieger but his joint
tort-feasors, the plaintiffs, from the same cause of action pending against them and parol evidence was
inadmissible to vary the legal effect of that stipulation and release as to any one already discharged thereunder.
‣ It is commonly said that the parol evidence rule, in the present aspect, is binding only those persons who
are parties to the document. This form of statement suffices in most instances to reach correct results; but it
is not sound on principle. The theory of the rule is that the parties have determined that a particular
document shall be made the sole embodiment of their legal act for certain legal purposes. Hence, so far as
that effect and those purposes are concerned, they must be found in that writing and nowhere else, no
matter who may desire to avail himself of it.
‣ The truth seems to be, then, that the rule will still apply to exclude extrinsic utterances, even against other
parties, provided it is sought to use those utterances for the very purpose for which the writing has
superseded them as the legal act. But where the issue in dispute, even between third parties, is what are the
obligations of A and B to one another, and those obligations are stated in a written contract, the parol
evidence rule is applicable. The written contract represents the truth and the whole truth of the contractual
obligations of A and B in whatever way and between whatever parties an inquiry as to such obligations may
become important.
‣ To admit parol evidence to the contrary which would not be admitted as between the parties, except for the
purpose of showing either fraud against the third person, or some invalidating facts which would be
available to the parties themselves, is to permit facts to be shown which have no relevancy to the issue of
what is the contract between A and B.
‣ The rule that written agreements cannot be varied by parol operates in favor of those not parties to the
instrument as fully as in favor of those who were parties to it, whenever it was executed by the latter as the
final embodiment of their agreement, and the parol evidence is offered to vary the legal effect of the terms
in which it is expressed. The only purpose of such evidence can then be to give a new and unwarranted
character to a past act.
‣ We feel compelled to hold that the stipulation and release here pleaded discharged not only Rieger but also, at the
moment they were delivered, plaintiffs for the same tort. There is no claim that fraud, deceit, mutual mistake, or
any other ground exists for invalidating the stipulation, or release. And there could not well be, for defendants’
attorneys (not any of the attorneys who appear in this appeal) held the documents in their office for weeks, and
their integrity and professional stand- ing cannot be questioned.
‣ The stipulation and release in law disposed of defendants' cause of action against plaintiffs the moment they
settled and released the same cause of action against the joint tortfeasor, Rieger, there being no claim of fraud,
mutual mistake, or other good ground for invalidating or setting aside the stipulation and release. And in the
absence of such grounds, parol evidence is inadmissible and incompetent to change the legal effect of the written
instruments. That being so, the plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict in their favor for the relief demanded in the
complaint should have been granted notwithstanding the verdicts for defendants. 

ROBLES V. LIZARRAGA HERMANOS
G.R. No. L-26173, July 13, 1927
Digest Author: Lizzie Lecaroz
DOCTRINE:
‣ The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the
admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the
parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any
reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity.
PARTIES
‣ Petitioner: Zacarias Robles
‣ Respondent: Lizarraga Hermanos
FACTS
‣ The hacienda "Nahalinan," situated in the municipality of Pontevedra, Occidental Negros, belonged originally to
the spouses Zacarias Robles and Anastacia de la Rama, parents of the present plaintiff, Zacarias Robles.
‣ Upon the death of Zacarias Robles, Sr., several years ago, his widow Anastacia de la Rama was appointed
administratrix of his estate; and as widow and administratrix, she leased the hacienda to the plaintiff, Zacarias
Robles, for the period of six years beginning at the end of the milling season in May, 1915, and terminating at the
end of the milling season in May, 1920.
‣ It was stipulated that any permanent improvements necessary to the cultivation and exploitation of the hacienda
should be made at the expense of the lessee without right to indemnity at the end of the term. As the place was in
a run-down state, and it was foreseen that the lessee would be put to much expense in bringing the property to its
productive capacity, the annual rent was fixed at the moderate amount of P2,000 per annum.
‣ Robles Jr. accordingly entered upon the property, in the character of lessee; and, in order to put the farm in good
condition, he found it necessary to make various improvements and additions to the plant.
‣ The changes and additions thus effected were these: Substitution of a new hydraulic press; reconstruction of
dwelling house; construction of new houses for workmen; building of camarins; construction of chimney;
reconstruction of ovens; installment of new coolers; purchase of farming tools and many head of carabao, with
other repairs and improvements.
‣ All this expense was borne exclusively by the lessee, with the exception of some fees for the reconstruction of the
dwelling house.
‣ The firm of Lizarraga Hermanos was well aware of the nature and extent of these improvements, for the reason
that the lessee was a customer of the firm and had purchased from it many of the things that went into the
improvements.
‣ 3 years before the lease was to expire, Anastacia de la Rama died, leaving as heirs Zacarias Robles (the plaintiff),
Jose Robles, Evarista Robles, Magdalena Robles, Felix Robles, Jose Robles, and Evarista Robles acquired by
purchase the shares of their coheirs in the entire inheritance; and at this juncture Lizarraga Hermanos came
forward with a proposal to buy from these three all of the other properties belonging to the Robles estate (which
included other properties in addition to the hacienda “Nahalinan").
‣ In course of the negotiations, an obstacle was encountered in the fact that the lease of Zacarias Robles still had
over two years to run. It was accordingly proposed that he should surrender the last two years of his lease and
permit Lizarraga Hermanos to take possession as purchaser in June, 1918.
‣ Zacarias alleges and the trial court found that, in consideration that the plaintiff should shorten the term of his
lease to the extent stated, the defendant agreed to pay him the value of all betterments that he had made on the
hacienda and furthermore to purchase from him all that belonged to him personally on the hacienda, including the
crop of 1917-18, the cattle, farming implements and equipment, according to a valuation to be made after the
harvest. The plaintiff agreed to this; and the instrument of conveyance by which the three owners, Zacarias, Jose
and Evarista Robles, conveyed the property to Lizarraga Hermanos was accordingly executed on November 16,
1917.
‣ No reference is made in this conveyance to the surrender of the plaintiff's rights as lessee, except in fixing the
date when the lease should end; nor is anything said concerning the improvements or the property of a personal
nature which the plaintiff had placed on the hacienda.

‣ The plaintiff says:
‣ When the instrument was presented to him, he saw that it was declared that the plaintiff's lease should subsist
only until June 30, 1918, instead of in May, 1920, which was the original term, while at the same time the
promise of the defendant to compensate for him for the improvements and to purchase the existing crop,
together with the cattle and other things, was wanting; and he says that upon his calling attention to this, the
representative of the defendant explained that this was unnecessary in view of the confidence existing between
the parties, at the same time calling the attention of the plaintiff to the fact that the plaintiff was already debtor
to the house of Lizarraga Hermanos in the amount of P49,000, for which the firm had no security. Upon this
manifestation the plaintiff subsided; and, believing that the agreement with respect to compensation
would be carried out in good faith, he did not further insist upon the incorporation of said agreement
into this document. Nor was the supposed agreement otherwise reduced to writing.
‣ On the part of the defendant:
‣ It is claimed that the agreement with respect to compensating the plaintiff for improvements and other
things was never in fact made. After the sale of the hacienda had been effected, the plaintiff offered to sell
the defendant firm the crop of cane then existing uncut on the hacienda, together with the carabao then in use
on the place. This propositon was favorably received by the defendant; and it is admitted that an agreement
was arrived at with respect to the value of the carabao, which were taken over for the agreed price, but it is
claimed with respect to the crop that the parties did not come into accord.
‣ This action was instituted in the CFI of Occidental Negros by Zacarias Robles against Lizarraga Hermanos, a
mercantile partnership organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, for the purpose of recovering
compensation for improvements made by the plaintiff upon the hacienda "Nahalinan" and the value of
implements and farming equipment supplied to the hacienda by the plaintiff, as well as damages for breach of
contract.
‣ Upon hearing the cause the trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of
P14,194.42, with costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Zacarias is entitled to recover compensation for improvements made by him from Lizarraga Hermanos.-YES
RATIO
‣ The preponderance of the evidence supports the contention of the plaintiff — and the finding of the trial court —
to the effect that, in consideration of the shortening of the period of the lease by nearly two years, the defendant
undertook to pay for the improvements which the plaintiff had placed on the hacienda and take over at a fair
valuation, to be made by appraisers, the personal property, such as carabao, tools and farming impliments, which
the plaintiff had placed upon the hacienda at his own personal expense.
‣ The plaintiff introduced in evidence a letter (Exhibit D), written on March 1, 1917, by Severiano Lizarraga
to the plaintiff, in which reference is made to an appraisal and liquidation. This letter is relied upon by the
plaintiff as constituting written evidence of the agreement; but it seems to us so vague that, if it stood alone, and a
written contract were really necessary, it could not be taken as sufficient proof of the agreement in question. But
we believe that the contract is otherwise proved by oral testimony.
‣ When testifying as a witness of the defense, Carmelo Lizarraga himself admitted — contrary to the statement of
defendant's answer — that a few days before the conveyance was executed the plaintiff proposed that the
defendant should buy all the things that the plaintiff then had on the hacienda, whereupon the Lizarragas
informed him that they would buy those things if an agreement should be arrived at as to the price.
‣ The case is not one for the reformation of a document on the ground of mistake or fraud in its execution, as is
permitted under section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The purpose is to enforce an independent or collateral
agreement which constituted an inducement to the making of the sale, or part of the consideration therefor.
‣ There is no rule of evidence of wider application than that which declares extrinsic evidence inadmissible either
to contradict or vary the terms of a written contract.
‣ The execution of a contract in writing is deemed to supersede all oral negotiations or stipulations
concerning its terms and the subject-matter which preceded the execution of the instrument, in the absence
of accident, fraud or mistake of fact. But it is recognized that this rule is to be taken with proper qualifications;
and all the authorities are agreed that proof is admissible of any collateral, parol agreement that is not inconsistent
with the terms of the written contract, though it may relate to the same subject-matter).

‣ The rule excluding parol evidence to vary or contradict a writing does not extend so far as to preclude the
admission of extrinsic evidence to show prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreements between the
parties, but such evidence may be received, regardless of whether or not the written agreement contains any
reference to such collateral agreement, and whether the action is at law or in equity."
‣ It has accordingly been held that, in case of a written contract of lease, the lessee may prove an independent
verbal agreement on the part of the landlord to put the leased premises in a safe condition; and a vendor of realty
may show by parol evidence that crops growing on the land were reserved, though no such reservation was made
in the deed of conveyance.
‣ In the case before us the deed of conveyance purports to transfer to the defendant only such interests in certain
properties as had come to the conveyors by inheritance. Nothing is said concerning the rights in the hacienda
which the plaintiff had acquired by lease or concerning the things that he had placed thereon by way of
improvement or had acquired by purchase.
‣ The verbal contract which the plaintiff has established in this case is therefore clearly independent of the main
contract of conveyance, and evidence of such verbal contract is admissible under the doctrine above stated. The
rule that a preliminary or contemporaneous oral agreement is not admissible to vary a written contract appears to
have more particular reference to the obligation expressed in the written agreement, and the rule had never been
interpreted as being applicable to matters of consideration or inducement.
‣ In the case before us the written contract is complete in itself; the oral agreement is also complete in itself, and it
is a collateral to the written contract, notwithstanding the fact that it deals with related matters.

MITCHELL V. LATH
“Oral agreement” “Ugly ice house” 247 N.Y. 377 (N.Y. 1928)
Digest Author: Elwell Mariano
DOCTRINE
‣ See ratio part re the requisites of an enforceable collateral oral agreement
PARTIES
‣ Catherine Mitchell
‣ Charles Lath
FACTS
‣ 1923: the Laths owned a farm which they wish to sell. On the land across the road, they had an ice house which
they might remove.
‣ Mrs. Mitchell looked over the land with a view to purchase it. SHe found the ice house objectionable.
‣ The Laths orally promised and agreed, for and in consideration of the purchase of their farm by Mitchell, to
remove the said ice house.
‣ Relying upon this promise, Mitchell made a written contract to buy such land. After receiving the deed, she
entered into the possession of the land spent a lot in improving the land for use as residece.
‣ Lath did not fulfill their promise to remove the ice house.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the oral agreement may be enforced- NO.
RATIO
‣ This requires a discussion of the parol evidence rule — a rule of law which defines the limits of the contract to be
construed. It is more than a rule of evidence and oral testimony even if admitted will not control the written
contract, unless admitted without objection. It applies, however, to attempts to modify such a contract by
parol. It does not affect a parol collateral contract distinct from and independent of the written agreement.
‣ IMPORTANT: Under our decisions before such an oral agreement as the present is received to vary the written
contract at least three conditions must exist:
1. The agreement must in form be a collateral one;
2. It must not contradict express or implied provisions of the written contract;
3. It must be one that parties would not ordinarily be expected to embody in the writing; or put in another way,
an inspection of the written contract, read in the light of surrounding circumstances must not indicate that the
writing appears "to contain the engagements of the parties, and to define the object and measure the extent of
such engagement." Or again, it must not be so clearly connected with the principal transaction as to be part and
parcel of it.
‣ Mitchel failed to satisfy the third requisite. The written contract between the parties is very detailed. An
inspection of the contract shows a full and complete agreement. Nothing is included about the ice house.
‣ The presence of the ice house, even the knowledge that Mrs. Mitchill thought it objectionable would not lead to
the belief that a separate agreement existed with regard to it. Were such an agreement made it would seem most
natural that the inquirer should find it in the contract. Collateral in form it is found to be, but it is closely
related to the subject dealt with in the written agreement — so closely that we hold it may not be proved.
‣ Our conclusion is that the judgment of the Appellate Division and that of the Special Term should be reversed and
the complaint dismissed, with costs in all courts.

LAUREANO V. KILAYCO
G.R. No. 10437. March 7, 1916
Digest Author: Rose Anne Sy
DOCTRINE
‣ Oral evidence is admissible to show that a conveyance of real estate and personal property absolute in form was in
fact a mortgage.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff: Jesusa Laureano
‣ Defendant: Eugenio Kilayco
FACTS
‣ Jesusa claims that she executed and delivered to Eugenio a conveyance in writing of certain lands together with
186 shares of common stock of the corporation known as El Hogar Filipino. The consideration stated in the
conveyance was P49,550. Not a cent of the said consideration was ever paid to her.
‣ Allegations of Jesusa: At the time the conveyance was executed and delivered, Eugenio agreed (by oral
agreement) to:
1. Hold and administer the property,
2. To make certain payments for and on behalf of her out of the rents and profits,
3. To reconvey the property on demand, and
4. To make certain payments to be made monthly to El Hogar Filipino for the reduction of the debt which Jesusa
at that time owed to said corporation.
‣ Sometime after the execution and delivery of the conveyance, she demanded a reconveyance of the property but
instead of so doing, Eugenio executed and offered to deliver to her a document entirely different in terms and
tenor from that which he had agreed to execute and deliver and which she had demanded. She refused to accept
such instrument. Eugenio has repeatedly promised to reconvey to her the property as agreed, but has never
complied with his promises.
‣ Eugenio also neglected and refused to make the payments to El Hogar Filipino and that he has collected the rents,
issues and profits of said property and converted them to his own use and benefit in violation of his agreement.
‣ On the trial, Jesusa was asked questions tending to bring out the facts alleged in the complaint but objections were
interposed to such questions on the ground that the evidence offered was incompetent as it would tend to vary or
modify the terms of a written agreement. These objections were sustained and the plaintiff duly excepted.
‣ All evidence tending to establish the cause of action alleged in the complaint having been excluded, the court
found in favor of the defendant and dismissed the complaint on the merits. This appeal was taken from that
judgment and all of the exceptions taken on the trial are presented by that appeal.
‣ Jesusa claims that they entered into an oral agreement at the time of the conveyance that the defendant should
take possession of and administer the properties, secure such income therefrom as circumstances would permit,
and use it to pay the debt which she owed to El Hogar Filipino; and that he should reconvey the property
whenever plaintiff should demand it.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N plaintiff had the right to prove the parol agreement existing between her and the appellee by virtue of which
defendant agreed to reconvey on demand - YES
RATIO
‣ Is parol evidence admissible to prove such an arrangement in view of the fact that the original conveyance
is in writing, is absolute on its face, and contains no conditions whatever? Yes
‣ The question presented for our determination does not involve, strictly speaking, the law relating to the
introduction of parol evidence for the purpose of changing or modifying the terms of a written instrument; and
that the case does not fall within the prohibitive provisions of section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
lays down the law of the Philippine Islands with regard to that subject.

‣ The evidence excluded was not offered for the purpose of varying the terms of the conveyance between the
parties. It was offered, rather, to show a contemporaneous collateral agreement by which the conveyance
could be defeated and terminated. It is a well known principle of law that oral evidence is admissible to
show that a conveyance absolute in form was in fact a mortgage.
‣ It is insisted, on behalf of the defendants, that this question is to be determined by inspection of the written papers
alone, oral evidence not being admissible to contradict, vary, or add to, their contents.
‣ Russel v. Southard: “But we have no doubt extraneous evidence is admissible to inform the court of every
material fact known to the parties when the deed and memorandum were executed. This is clear, both upon
principle and authority. To insist on what was really a mortgage, as a sale, is in equity a fraud, which cannot
be successfully practiced, under the shelter of any written papers, however precise and complete they may
appear to be
‣ In examining this question it is of great importance to inquire whether the consideration was adequate to induce a
sale. When no fraud is practiced, and no inequitable advantages taken of pressing wants, owners of property do
not sell it for a consideration manifestly inadequate, and, therefore, in the cases on this subject great stress is
justly laid upon the fact that what is alleged to have been the price bore no proportion to the value of the thing
said to have been sold.”
‣ It is well settled that the true consideration of a deed may be proved by parol evidence, and that a deed
absolute on its face may be shown to have been executed in fact as a security for money and for that reason
be treated as a mortgage. The rule does not depend upon the manner of statement of the consideration in the
deed. The right is a substantial one, not to be varied or defeated by any form of expression or character of recitals
contained in the instrument itself.
‣ Parol evidence is admissible in equity to show that a deed of conveyance, absolute upon its face, was
intended as a mortgage, and where it is shown that such a conveyance has been executed to secure the
payment of money, equity will treat it as a mortgage. The court looks beyond the terms of the instrument to the
real transaction, or what was intended to be effected by the parties, and any evidence, whether written or oral,
tending to show this, is admissible. The admission of oral testimony for such purpose is not a violation of the rule
which precludes such admission for the purpose of varying or contradicting the terms of a written instrument; that
rule has reference to the language of which the instrument is the repository, but this permits an inquiry into the
objects of the parties in executing and receiving the instrument, and equity exercises its jurisdiction to carry but
such object and to prevent fraud and imposition, and to promote justice
‣ In this connection it has also been held that while prima facie the consideration clause of a deed names the true
consideration, nevertheless, it is always open to explanation for almost every purpose except to defeat the
operative words of the transfer and it has been frequently held that although the deed acknowledged the receipt of
the consideration, parol evidence is admissible to show that it has not, in fact, been received, if the purpose of the
party seeking to introduce the evidence is not to invalidate the deed as a conveyance.
‣ The purpose of the introduction of parol evidence to show a lack of consideration is not for the purpose of
showing the invalidity of the conveyance but is, rather, to reinforce the claim that there was an agreement to
reconvey, it being urged that, if the transfer was utterly without consideration, it would lend more color to the
contention of the appellant that there was an agreement to reconvey.
‣ We are of the opinion that parol evidence should have been admitted to show the contemporaneous oral agreement
between the parties set out in appellant's complaint. We make the suggestion that such amendment to the
pleadings should be allowed, if requested, as will, in the judgment of the Court of First Instance, serve the ends of
justice.
‣ Oral evidence is admissible to show that a conveyance of real estate and personal property absolute in form was
in fact a mortgage.

YU TEK VS GONZALES (1915)
G.R. No. L-9935 February 1, 1915
DOCTRINE
‣ Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parol evidence
is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of
incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff: Yu Tek and Co.
‣ Defendant: Basilio Gonzalez, owner of a sugar plantation
FACTS
‣ The basis of this action is a written contract,t he pertinent paragraphs of which follow:
‣ Mr. Basilio Gonzalez hereby acknowledges receipt of the sum of P3,000 Philippine currency from Messrs. Yu
Tek and Co., and that in consideration of said sum be obligates himself to deliver to the said Yu Tek and Co.,
600 piculs of sugar of the first and second grade, according to the result of the polarization, within the period
of three months
‣ Mr. Basilio Gonzales obligates himself to deliver to the said Messrs. Yu Tek and Co., of this city the said 600
piculs of sugar at any place within the said municipality of Santa Rosa which the said Messrs. Yu Tek and Co.,
or a representative of the same may designate.
‣ In case the said Mr. Basilio Gonzales does not deliver to Messrs. Yu Tek and Co. the 600 piculs of sugar within
the period of three months, referred to in the second paragraph of this document, this contract will be
rescinded and the said Mr. Basilio Gonzales will then be obligated to return to Messrs. Yu Tek and Co. the
P3,000 received and also the sum of P1,200 by way of indemnity for loss and damages
‣ Yu Tek filed an action for breach of contract and damages. It contends that no sugar had been delivered to it under
this contract nor had it been able to recover the P3,000. Plaintiff prayed for judgment for the P3,000 and, in
addition, for P1,200 for damages.
‣ Trial Court ruled in favour of plaintiff but awarded P3,000 only
‣ Defendant Gonzalez argues that:
5. The lower court erred in refusing to permit parol evidence showing that the parties intended that the sugar was
to be secured from the crop which the defendant raised on his plantation, and that he was unable to fulfill the
contract by reason of the almost total failure of his crop.
6. The contract was limited to the sugar he might raise upon his own plantation; that the contract represented a
perfected sale; and that by failure of his crop he was relieved from complying with his undertaking by loss of
the thing due.
ISSUES/HELD
‣ W/N the lower court should have permitted the defendant to present parol evidence- NO
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ This case appears to be one to which the rule which excludes parol evidence to add to or vary the terms of a
written contract is decidedly applicable. There is not the slightest intimation in the contract that the sugar was to
be raised by the defendant.
‣ Parties are presumed to have reduced to writing all the essential conditions of their contract. While parol
evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of written contracts, it cannot serve the
purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned
at all in the writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake.
‣ In an early case this court declined to allow parol evidence showing that a party to a written contract was to
become a partner in a firm instead of a creditor of the firm. Again, in another case, a contract of employment
provided that the plaintiff should receive from the defendant a stipulated salary and expenses. The defendant
sought to interpose as a defense to recovery that the payment of the salary was contingent upon the plaintiff's

employment redounding to the benefit of the defendant company. The contract contained no such condition and
the court declined to receive parol evidence thereof.
‣ In the case at bar, it is sought to show that the sugar was to be obtained exclusively from the crop raised by the
defendant. There is no clause in the written contract which even remotely suggests such a condition. The
defendant undertook to deliver a specified quantity of sugar within a specified time. The contract placed no
restriction upon the defendant in the matter of obtaining the sugar. He was equally at liberty to purchase it on
the market or raise it himself.
‣ It may be true that defendant owned a plantation and expected to raise the sugar himself, but he did not limit his
obligation to his own crop of sugar. Our conclusion is that the condition which the defendant seeks to add to
the contract by parol evidence cannot be considered. The rights of the parties must be determined by the
writing itself.

PALANCA V. FRED WILSON & CO.
G.R. No. L-11310 January 31, 1918
Digest Author: Helen Toledo
DOCTRINE
‣ The Code of Civil Procedure providing that a written agreement shall be presumed to contain all the terms,
nevertheless "does not exclude other evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made, or to
which it relates, or to explain an intrinsic ambiguity."
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff: Song Fo and Co of Manila, and its manager, Carlos Palanca
‣ Defendant: Fred Wilson and Co, supplier of alcohol distiller
FACTS
‣ Song Fo and Co., of Manila, through its manager Carlos Palanca, entered into a contract with Fred Wilson and
Co. for the purchase of a distilling apparatus for P10,000. Wilson and Co. in turn ordered the apparatus from
London. About five months after the machine was installed, Palanca wrote Wilson and Co. that the rectifying
machine was not capable of producing the amount of alcohol stipulated in the contract (6,000 liters). Getting no
satisfaction from the reply of Wilson and Co., action for damages for breach of contract was begun in the CFI of
Manila.
‣ As the culmination of negotiations, Song Fo and Co., of Manila, through its manager Carlos Palanca, entered into
a contract with Fred Wilson and Co. for the purchase of a distilling apparatus for P10,000. Wilson and Co. ordered
the apparatus of Turner, Schon and Co., London.
‣ Later, or about five months after the machine was installed, Palanca wrote Wilson and Co. that the rectifying
machine had been examined by a number of competent persons who stated that the machine was not capable of
producing the amount of alcohol stipulated in the contract. Getting no satisfaction from the reply of Wilson and
Co., action for damages for breach of contract was begun in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila,
praying first that the defendant be ordered to comply strictly with the terms of the contract and second that the
defendant be ordered to pay as damages the amount of P16,713.80.
‣ Fred Wilson and Co answered with a general denial and a cross-complaint asking judgment against the Palanga in
the sum of P5,000, the final installment claimed to be due as the purchase price of the machine.
‣ The lower court ruled in favor of Wilson and Co., ordering Palanca to pay the sum of P5,000 as final installment
claimed to be due as the purchase price of the machine.
‣ It is around the first clause of the contract that all the argument centers. This clause reads:
‣ "Un aparato; 'Guillaume' para la destilacion-rectificacion directa y continua; tipo 'C,' Agricola, de una
capacidad de 6,000 litros cada 24 horas de trabajo, de un grado de 96-97 Gay Lussac, todo segun el grabado
de la pagina 30 del catalogo Egrot, edicion de 1907.
‣ GOOGLE TRANSLATE: “An apparatus , ' Guillaume ' for distillation - rectification direct and continuous ; 'C
, ' Agricola , with a capacity of 6.000 liters every 24 hours, a degree of 96-97 Gay Lussac, all according
engraving page 30 of the catalog Egrot , 1907 edition .
‣ The apparatus in question, while it could treat 6,000 liters of raw material a day, did not produce 6,000 liters a
day, but on the contrary only something over 480 liters a day of rectified alcohol of the required grade. Thus,
Palanca asserts that there has been a breach of the contract in that instead of the machine having a capacity of
6,000 liters for every 24 hours of work, it only had (a producing) capacity of 480 liters for this period of time.
‣ Palanca would require that all the terms of the contract be given effect with special emphasis upon the phrase
"de un grado de 96-97 Gay Lussac."
‣ This last phrase in connection with the previous one "de una capacidad de 6,000 litros cada 24 horas de
trabajo" according to Palanca could not possibly mean that the machine was only to take in 6,000 liters for this
would be improbable in view of the express mention of the grade of the product.
‣ Wilson and Co. on the other hand relies on the ordinary meaning of the word "capacity" as indicating receptivity
and on the preliminary negotiations as explaining the intention of the parties. However, Palanca testified that he
told the agents of Wilson and Co. that he need a machine that would produce at least 6,000 liters of alcohol a day.
The agent of Wilson and Co. squarely contradicted this on the stand and said that Palanca asked him to get on an
apparatus to treat 6,000 liters.

ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the Court may resort to evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made to explain the
intrinsic ambiguity of the contract – YES, it is permitted under the Civil Code (on Contracts) and the Code of
Civil Procedure
RATIO
‣ It is undeniable from the evidence, that the apparatus in question, while it could treat 6,000 liters of raw material a
day, did not produce 6,000 liters a day, but on the contrary only something over 480 liters a day of rectified
alcohol of the required grade.
‣ Beginning anew, in order to reach a proper conclusion as to the meaning of clause one of the contract, we
approach the subject from two directions. Under the first view, we take up the meaning of the words themselves.
Under the second, believing that it is necessary to explain intrinsic ambiguity in the contract, we can go, as we are
permitted to do under the Code of Civil Procedure, to evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement
was made.
‣ The terms of the contract disclose the following essential constituents:
1. A machine Guillaume, type "C" (Agricola) as described on page 30 of the Catalogue Egrot, edition of 1907;
2. Amachine of a capacity of 6,000 liters for every 24 hours of work, and
3. A machine producing alcohol of a grade 96-97 Gay Lussac.
‣ NOTE: Type C (Agricola) as described on pages 30 and 31 of the catalogue mentions the grade of alcohol
guaranteed of 96-97 Gay Lussac, but contains no mention of a capacity of 6,000 liters a day.
‣ Passing the second element for the moment, there is no dispute in the record, or more properly speaking Palanca
did not prove, that the machine did not turn out alcohol of the grade 96-97 Gay Lussac. Predicated therefore on
the description to be found in the catalogue, it is plain that the defendant sold to the plaintiff the machine there
mentioned.
‣ In connection with the distilling of liquor, the word "capacity" may have different meanings unless restricted in
terminology. The ordinary meaning of the word is defined in the English Dictionaries as "ability to receive or
contain; cubic extent; carrying power or space; said of that within which any solid or fluid may be placed, and
also used figuratively; as the keg has a capacity of 10 gallons; the ship's capacity is 1,000 tons." The ordinary
meaning of the Spanish equivalent "capacidad" as disclosed by the Spanish Dictionaries is "ambito que tiene
alguna cosa y es suficiente para contener en si otra; como el de una vasijia, arca, etc. En el vaso se debe atender la
disposicion y capacidad." Both definitions denote that which anything can receive or contain.
‣ There is intrinsic ambiguity in the contract which needs explanation. Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure
providing that a written agreement shall be presumed to contain all the terms, nevertheless "does not exclude
other evidence of the circumstances under which the agreement was made, or to which it relates, or to explain an
intrinsic ambiguity."
‣ Turning, therefore, to the surrounding circumstances, we find the following:
1. Wilson and Co. in their offer to Song Fo and Co. on June 9, 1913, while mentioning capacity, only did so in
express connection with the name and description of the machine as illustrated in the catalogue. They
furnished Song Fo and Co. with plans and specifications of the distilling apparatus; and these describe a
capacity of 6,000 liters of jus (ferment).
2. Wilson and Co.'s order to manufacturer, while mentioning a capacity of 6,000 liters per day, does so again in
connection with the description in the maker's catalogue.
3. Finally, it was stated during the trial, and it has not been denied, that a machine capable of producing 6,000
liters of rectified alcohol every 24 hours from nipa ferment would cost between P35,000 and P40,000.
‣ We are accordingly constrained to hold that the proper construction of clause 1 of the contract, in question
in connection with the conduct of the parties and surrounding circumstances, is that Wilson and Co. were to
furnish Song Fo and CO. a distilling apparatus, type C (Agricola), as described on page 30 of the maker's
catalogue, capable of receiving or treating 6,000 liters every 24 hours of work and of producing alcohol of a
grade 96-97 Gay Lussac. 

ACI PHIL. INC. V. COQUIA
G.R. No. 17466, July 14, 2008
Digest Author: Irvin Velasquez
DOCTRINE
‣ Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. Since an exception to the parol evidence rule was squarely raised as an issue
in the answer, the trial court should not have been so inflexible as to completely disregard petitioner’s evidence.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff: Editha Coquia (a businesswoman)
‣ Defendant” ACI Philippines Inc. – manufacturer of fiberglass
FACTS
‣ ACI Philippines contracted with Editha Coquia for the purchase of 1 lot of flint cullets, consisting of 2.5L to 3K
metric tons at P4.20 per kilo. Several deliveries were accepted and paid by ACI Philippines.
‣ It must be noted that Editha Coquia was the one who sought a contract with ACI Philippines upon learning that
ACI is in need for a supply of flint cullets.
‣ On the reverse side of the purchase order, there were 11 conditions. The 4th of which provides, among others, that
“Any delivery date shown on this order shall be of the essence of any contract arising. Delivery must be made in
stract accordance with the order or delivery schedule…”
‣ However, ACI Philippines demanded the reduction of the purchase price from P4.20 to P3.65 per kilo, which
Coquia agreed to, “albeit allegedly under duress.”
‣ Coquia made the deliveries but ACI Philippines again refused to pay for them demanding that the price be further
reduced to P3.10 per kilo
‣ Coquia then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against ACI Philippines seeking payment for
the deliveries at the negotiated price of P3.65 per kilo. He further demanded that ACI be directed to accept and
pay for the remaining deliveries to complete the 1 lot of flint cullets
‣ 3 days after the complaint was filed, ACI paid for the delivered flint cullets at P3.65 per kilo
‣ ACI Philippines raised the issue that the purchase order fails to express the true intent of the parties – that ACI
entered into a contract with Coquia conditioned upon Coquia’s prompt delivery of flint cullets, in ACI’s Answer
with Counterclaim. Unfortunately the trial court sustained Coquia’s objection based on the PAROL EVIDENCE
RULE
‣ The trial court ruled in favor of Coquia and ordered ACI to accept the deliveries and to pay for them after each
delivery at the unit price of P4.20 per kilo.
‣ CA affirmed ruling that the purchase order for the purchase of 1 lot of flint was a contract of adhesion which must
be strictly construed against ACI Philippines. Moreover, the CA held that the reduction of the price was contrary
to the original agreement for which ACI should ne held liable.
‣ ACI now claims that the CA erred in ruling that the purchase order for the 1 lot of flint cullet was a contract of
adhesion despite the fact that Coquia is an established businesswoman and stresses that the purchase order was
superseded by another purchase order and that in both contracts, it was made clear that Coquia’s assurance of
prompt delivery of the flint cullets motivated the transaction. ACI also argues that it did not use force or
intimidation as claimed by Coquia and assuming that it did, Coquia ratified the voidable contract by delivery of
the cullets and the fact that statements of accounts were sent at the reduced price.
ISSUE/HELD
1. W/N the rule on adhesion contracts apply - No
2. W/N lower courts erred in not allowing petitioner to present parol evidence - Yes
3. W/N petitioner should be compelled to perform under the original purchase order - No, it was already superseded.

RATIO FOR ISSUE 1
‣ No, the rule on contracts of adhesion does not apply in this case. She was, in fact, the one who sought a contract
with petitioner upon learning of the latter’s need for a supply of flint cullers.
‣ Even the conditions of purchase enumerated at the reverse side of the purchase orders do not reveal any hint of
one-sidedness in favor of petitioner. (11 conditions)
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ Yes. It is a cardinal rule of evidence, not just one of technicality but of substance, that the written document is the
best evidence of its own contents. It is also a matter of both principle and policy that when the written contract is
established as the repository of the parties’ stipulations, any other evidence is excluded and the same cannot be
used as a substitute for such contract, nor even to alter or contradict them. This rule, however, is not without
exception.
‣ Section 9, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading the failure of the written agreement to express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. Since an exception to the parol evidence rule was squarely raised as an issue
in the answer, the trial court should not have been so inflexible as to completely disregard petitioner’s evidence.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 3

‣ No, already superseded. The original contract between the parties had been unequivocally novated by a new
purchase order thereby extinguishing the original obligation of ACI to accept deliveries from Coquia until the 3K
metric tons of flint cullets is filled. ACI thus cannot be compelled to accept more deliveries to complete the
quantity originally contracted for. By the same token, ACI cannot be tied down to the P4.20 per kilo unit price
under the original purchase order nor even to the P3.65 purchase order as the subsequent purchase order fails to
state the quantity ACI is willing to accept delivery of and pay for under that price.

SEA OIL PETROLEUM V. AUTOCORP GROUP
G.R. No. 164326 ; October 17, 2008
Digest Author: Kat Ababa
DOCTRINE
‣ Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as proof of verbal agreements which tends to vary the terms of a written
‣ Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of
writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.
‣ The exception to the parol evidence rule obtains only where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in
terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In
such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other,
and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to
enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiffs/ Respondents: Autocorp Group and Paul Rodriguez
‣ DefendantPetitioner: Seaoil Petroleum Corporation
FACTS
‣ Seaoil, purchased one unit of ROBEX 200 LC Excavator, Model 1994 from Autocorp Group
‣ The original cost of the unit was P2.5M but was increased to P3,112,519.94 as it was to be paid in 12 monthly
installments.
‣ The sales agreement was embodied in the Vehicle Sales Invoice and Vehicle Sales Confirmation. Both documents
were signed by Seaoil’s president Francis Yu. It was agreed that despite the delivery of the excavator, its
ownership was to remain with Autocorp until the obligation was fully settled.
‣ In this light, Seaoil’s contractor, Romeo Valera, issued 12 postdated checks. However, Autocorp refused to accept
the checks because they were not under Seaoil’s name. Hence, Yu, on behalf of Seaoil, signed and issued 12
postdated checks for P259,376.62 in favor of Autocorp
‣ The excavator was subsequently delivered by Autocorp and was received by Seaoil in its Batangas depot.
‣ The relationship started to turn sour when the 1st check bounced. It was remedied when Seaoil replaced it with a
good check. The 2nd check was also good when presented for payment. However, the remaining 10 checks were
dishonored by the bank since Seaoil requested that payment be stopped.
‣ Despite repeated demands, Seaoil refused to pay the remaining balance, compelling Autocorp to file a complaint
for recovery of personal property with damages and replevin
‣ Seaoil alleges that they (Seaoil and Autocorp) were only utilised as intermediaries to settle the obligation of one
foreign entity named Uniline Asia in favor of another foreign entity, Focus Point International, Incorporated.
‣ Paul Rodriguez is a stockholder and director of Autocorp. He is also the owner of Uniline. On the other hand,
Yu is the president and stockholder of Seaoil and is at the same time owner of Focus Point.
‣ Allegedly, Uniline chartered MV Asia Property from Focus Point but was unable to settle its obligation.
Hence, Uniline, through Rodriguez, proposed to settle the amount through conveyance of vehicles and heavy
equipment. Consequently, 4 units of Tatamobile pick-up trucks procured from Autocorp were conveyed to
Focus Point as partial payment. The excavator in controversy was allegedly part of the vehicles conveyed.
‣ Seaoil claims that Rodriguez initially issued 12 postdated checks in favor of Autocorp as payment for the
excavator. However, due to the fact that it was company policy for Autocorp not to honor postdated checks
issued by its own directors, Rodriguez requested Yu to issue 12 PBCOM postdated checks in favor of
Autocorp. In turn, the PBCOM checks would be funded by 12 corresponding Monte de Piedad postdated
checks issued by Rodriguez.
‣ Seaoil claims that Rodriguez issued a stop payment order on the 10 checks, constraining the Seaoil to also
order a stop payment order on the PBCOM checks.

‣ To sum, Seaoil claims that the real transaction is that Uniline, through Rodriguez, owed money to Focus Poinr. In
lieu of payment, Uniline instead agreed to convey the excavator to Focus. This was to be paid by checks issued by
Seaoil but which in turn were to be funded by checks issued by Uniline.
‣ RTC: Ruled for Autocorp holding that the transaction between the parties was a simple contract of sale payable in
installments.
‣ CA: Affirmed in toto, holding that the transaction between Yu and Rodriguez was merely verbal. This cannot alter
the sales contract between Seaoil and Autocorp as this will run counter to the parol evidence rule which prohibits
the introduction of oral and parol evidence to modify the terms of the contract. The claim that it falls under the
exceptions to the parol evidence rule has not been sufficiently proven.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the parol evidence rule was mistakenly applied in the CA. NO
RATIO
‣ Seaoil does not question the validity of the vehicle sales invoice but merely argues that the same does not reflect
the true agreement of the parties. However, Seaoil only had its bare testimony to back up the alleged arrangement
with Rodriguez. The Monte de Piedad checks — the supposedly “clear and obvious link” between the
documentary evidence and the true transaction between the parties — are ambiguous at best. There is nothing in
those checks to establish such link. Rodriguez denies that there is such an agreement. Unsubstantiated testimony,
offered as proof of verbal agreements which tends to vary the terms of a written agreement, is inadmissible under
the parol evidence rule.
‣ The parol evidence rule forbids any addition to, or contradiction of, the terms of a written agreement by testimony
or other evidence purporting to show that different terms were agreed upon by the parties, thereby changing the
meaning of the written contract.
‣ Seaoil would have the Court rule that this case falls within the exceptions, particularly that the written
agreement failed to express the true intent and agreement of the parties. This argument is untenable.
‣ Although parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of
writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is
generally not admissible to change, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.
‣ The Vehicle Sales Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a commercial document.
Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or
credit transactions. These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value, but vital pieces of
evidence of commercial transactions. They are written memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts.
‣ The terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200
LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by Romeo Valera. This does not, however, change the fact that Seaoil
Petroleum Corporation, as represented by Yu, is the customer or buyer. The moment a party affixes his or her
signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the terms stipulated therein and is subject to all the legal
obligations that may arise from their breach.
‣ Oral testimony on the alleged conditions which depends exclusively on human memory, coming from a party who
has an interest in the result of the case, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
‣ Thus, Seaoil’s claim that the document falls within the exception to the parol evidence rule is untenable. The
exception obtains only where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual
intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic
evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and
circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make
a proper interpretation of the instrument.

MARQUEZ V. ESPEJO
G.R. No. 168387, August 25, 2010
Digest Author: Marisse Aldeza
DOCTRINE
‣ The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of
a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument.
‣ Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the
intention is the soul of a contract,not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities.
PARTIES
‣ Espejos- original registered owners of parcels of land (Lantap and Murong property)
‣ Salunat Marquez - lessee of the Murong property
FACTS
‣ Espejos mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon
their failure to pay the loans, the mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI.
‣ RBBI eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in the
name of RBBI dated January 14, 1985 for the Murong property (T-62096). Subsequently, a TCT dated June 4,
1985 was issued for the Lantap property (T-62836).
‣ Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in Bagabag Townsite, K-27, without any reference to
either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.
‣ Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed of Sale, however, did not mention the barangay
where the property was located but mentioned the title of the property which title corresponds to the Murong
property.
‣ No evidence, however, that Espejos took possession of the Murong property, or demanded lease rentals from
Marquez (who continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership over
the Murong property.
‣ The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT of Murong property almost a decade later.
‣ Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20 and 21of Republic Act No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Law, executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer in favor of Marquez and Dela
Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property.
‣ Both VLTs described the subject thereof as an agricultural land located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT
No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap property).
‣ When Marquez completed the payment of the purchase price to RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding CLOAs.
Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong.
‣ More than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the Espejos and almost 7 years after the execution of VLTs,
Espejos filed a Complaint before the RARAD of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of petitioners
CLOAs
‣ The complaint was based on theory that the Murong property, was owned by the Espejos by virtue of the 1985
buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers
to TCT No. 62096, which pertains to the Murong property.
‣ RBBI answered that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the buy-back transaction with Espejo s.
‣ OIC-RARAD Decision: The subject of sale was indeed the Murong property and as regards the VLTs referred to
TCT No. T-62836, which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners CLOAs
necessarily refer to the Lantap property.
‣ DARAB Decision: reversed the OIC-RARAD decision and gave more credence to RBBIs claim that Espejos
repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong property.
‣ CA ruled in favor of the Espejos and held the Deed of Sale qualifies under the best evidence rule.

ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the CA erred in using the Best Evidence Rule in determining the subject of the Deeds of Sale and Deeds of
Voluntary Transfer- YES.
RATIO
‣ There is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents
of the documents
‣ It is admitted by the parties that the Espejos’ Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while
Marquez’s Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further
described as located in Barangay Murong.
‣ The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true
intention of the parties.
‣ As to the Deed of Sale, Marquez (and RBBI) maintain that while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties
actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-62836).
‣ Basically, the dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an apparent failure of the
instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to
evidence outside of the instruments.
‣ The CA erroneously applied parol evidence although it cited the application of Best Evidence Rule. The
appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that
would contradict such terms.
‣ When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement
‣ However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place, Espejos
are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and Marquez and they are strangers to the written contracts.
‣ Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as between the parties and
their successors-in-interest.
‣ The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of
a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument
‣ The instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of
Rule 130, Section 9:
‣ However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he
puts in issue in his pleading:
1. An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
2. The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
‣ Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise enlightening:
‣ Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of an instrument, the
circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to
it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to
interpret.
‣ Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property
to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be
seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.

LEQUIN V. SPS. VIZCONDE
G.R. No. 177710 October 12, 2009
Digest Author: Aziza Bacay
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff/Petitioner: Ramon and Virginia Sequin
‣ Defenant/Respondent: Raymond and Salome Vizconde
FACTS
‣ Petitioner Ramon Lequin, husband of petitioner Virginia Lequin, is the brother of respondent Salome L. Vizconde
and brother-in-law of respondent Raymundo Vizconde.
‣ In 1995, Sps. Lequin bought the subject lot consisting of 10,115 square meters from one Carlito de Leon (de
Leon). The sale was negotiated by respondent Raymundo Vizconde. The subject lot is located near the Sto.
Rosario to Magsaysay road in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija. Adjacent thereto and located in between the subject lot and the
road is a dried up canal (or sapang patay in the native language).
‣ In 1997, Sps. Vizconde represented to Sps. Lequin that they had also bought from Carlito de Leon a 1,012-square
meter lot adjacent to petitioners’ property and built a house thereon. As later confirmed by de Leon, however, the
1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents is part of the 10,115-square meter lot petitioners bought from him.
Petitioners believed the story of respondents, since it was Raymundo who negotiated the sale of their lot with de
Leon.
‣ With the consent of Sps. Vizconde, Sps. Lequin then constructed their house on the 500-square meter half-portion
of the 1,012 square-meter lot claimed by respondents, as this was near the road. Respondents’ residence is on the
remaining 512 square meters of the lot.
‣ Given this situation where petitioners’ house stood on a portion of the lot allegedly owned by respondents,
petitioners consulted a lawyer, who advised them that the 1,012-square meter lot be segregated from the subject
lot whose title they own and to make it appear that they are selling to respondents 512 square meters thereof.
‣ This sale was embodied in the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan where it was made to appear that respondents paid
PhP 15,000 for the purchase of the 512-square meter portion of the subject lot. In reality, the consideration of PhP
15,000 was not paid to petitioners.
‣ Actually, it was Sps. Lequin who paid Sps. Vizconde PhP 50,000 for the 500-square meter portion where
petitioners built their house on, believing respondents’ representation that the latter own the 1,012-square meter
lot.
‣ In July 2000, Sps. Lequin tried to develop the dried up canal located between their 500-square meter lot and the
public road. Respondents objected, claiming ownership of said dried up canal or sapang patay.
‣ This prompted Sps. Lequin to look into the ownership of the dried up canal and the 1,012 square-meter lot
claimed by respondents. Carlito de Leon told petitioners that what he had sold to respondents was the dried up
canal orsapang patay and that the 1,012-square meter lot claimed by respondents really belongs to petitioners.
‣ Thus, on July 13, 2001, petitioners filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Contract, Sum of Money and
Damages against respondents with the Regional Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, praying, among others, for the
declaration of the February 12, 2000 Kasulatan as null and void ab initio, the return of PhP 50,000 they paid to
respondents, and various damages.
‣ RTC Ruling: Kasulatan is null and void, as it was a simulated contract and that it was done with vitiated consent
and lack of consideration. It further ordered the return of the P50,000.
‣ CA Ruling: Contract of sale was not simulated and there was no fraud, but they are still ordered to pay back the
P50,000.
ISSUE/HELD
1. W/N or not there is a valid contract of sale – NO, there was fraud
2. W/N or not there was valid consideration as what was written in the Kasulatan - NO, there was no payment of
P15,000

RATIO FOR ISSUE 1
‣ NO.Fraud is "every kind of deception whether in the form of insidious machinations, manipulations,
concealments or misrepresentations, for the purpose of leading another party into error and thus execute a
particular act." Fraud has a "determining influence" on the consent of the prejudiced party, as he is misled by a
false appearance of facts, thereby producing error on his part in deciding whether or not to agree to the offer.
‣ One form of fraud is misrepresentation through insidious words or machinations. Insidious words or machinations
constituting deceit are those that ensnare, entrap, trick, or mislead the other party who was induced to give
consent which he or she would not otherwise have given.
‣ Deceit is also present when one party, by means of concealing or omitting to state material facts, with intent to
deceive, obtains consent of the other party without which, consent could not have been given.
‣ It is clear that actual fraud is present in this case. The sale between petitioners and de Leon over the 10,115
square-meter lot was negotiated by respondent Raymundo Vizconde. As such, Raymundo was fully aware that
what petitioners bought was the entire 10,115 square meters and that the 1,012-square meter lot which he claims
he also bought from de Leon actually forms part of petitioners’ lot.
‣ It cannot be denied by respondents that the lot which they actually bought, based on the unrebutted testimony and
statement of de Leon, is the dried up canal which is adjacent to petitioners’ 10,115-square meter lot. Considering
these factors, it is clear as day that there was deception on the part of Raymundo when he misrepresented to
petitioners that the 1,012-square meter lot he bought from de Leon is a separate and distinct lot from the 10,115-
square meter lot the petitioners bought from de Leon. Raymundo concealed such material fact from petitioners,
who were convinced to sign the sale instrument in question and, worse, even pay PhP 50,000 for the 500 square-
meter lot which petitioners actually own in the first place.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ NO. The Kasulatan was a simulated sale and unsupported by any consideration, for Sps. Vizconde never paid the
P15,000 purported purchase price.
‣ Rule 130, Sec. 9 exceptions (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
‣ The second exception provided for the acceptance of parol evidence applies to the instant case. Lack of
consideration was proved by petitioners’ evidence aliunde showing that the Kasulatan did not express the true
intent and agreement of the parties. As explained above, said sale contract was fraudulently entered into through
the misrepresentations of respondents causing petitioners’ vitiated consent
‣ Moreover, the evidence of petitioners was uncontroverted as respondents failed to adduce any proof that they
indeed paid PhP 15,000 to petitioners.
‣ In the instant case, the record is bereft of any proof of payment by respondents and, thus, their affirmative defense
of the purported purchase of the 512-square meter portion fails.
‣ PhP 50,000 paid by petitioners to respondents as consideration for the transfer of the 500-square meter lot to
petitioners must be restored to the latter. Otherwise, an unjust enrichment situation ensues.

WASHINGTON V. TEXAS
388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019; June 12, 1967
Digest Author: Ellen Buenaventura
DOCTRINE
‣ By virtue of the 6th amendment to the Constitution, the State cannot arbitrarily deny the defendant the right to put
on the stand a witness who was physically and mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally
observed, and whose testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense. The Framers of the
Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of
witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use
PARTIES
‣ Accused/Petitioner: Jackie Washington
‣ Respondent: State of Texas
FACTS
‣ Jackie Washington was convicted in Dallas Texas of murder with malice and was sentenced to 50 yrs
imprisonment
‣ Jackie (then 18yo) dated Jean Carter until the latter’s mother forbade her from seeing Jackie. Jean started seeing
another guy (unnamed so I’ll call him boyfie)
‣ Motivated by jealousy, Jackie along with other boys began driving around the city looking for a gun, eventually
leading them to Charles Fuller who joined the group bringing his shotgun
‣ The group proceeded to Jean’s home were Jean’s family and her new boyfie were having supper
‣ Some of the boys threw bricks at the house and ran back to the car. Petitioner and Fuller were left in front of the
house with the shotgun
‣ Jean’s mother and Jean’s boyfie rushed out to the porch. The shotgun was then fired by either petitioner OR
Fuller, and the new boyfie was fatally wounded. Afterwards, petitioner and Fuller ran back to the car, Fuller was
carrying the shotgun.
‣ Petitioner’s testimony: Fuller, who was intoxicated, had taken the gun from him.
‣ He tried to persuade Fuller to leave before the shooting happened
‣ Fuller insisted that he was going to shoot someone
‣ Petitioner ran back to the car. He saw the mother come out of the house and thereafter he heard the gunshot and he
thought Fuller shot the woman.
‣ In support, he offered Fuller’s testimony. The record indicates that Fuller would have testified that petitioner
pulled at him and tried to persuade him to leave, and that petitioner ran before Fuller fired the fatal shot
‣ While Fuller’s testimony would have been relevant and material to the defense since he, other than the petitioner,
was the only person who knows exactly what happened before the shooting. But Fuller had been convicted of the
same murder and sentenced to 50yrs in prison and was confined at the Dallas county jail.
‣ Two Texas statutes in force at the time of the trial provided that persons charged or convicted as co-participants in
the same crime could NOT testify for one another (although there was no bar to testifying for the State)à On the
basis of these statutes, the trial court sustained the State’s objection and refused to allow Fuller to testify.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the right to compulsory process was (the right of the defendant to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor; guaranteed by the 6th amendment) violated in this case- YES
RATIO
‣ The testimony of Fuller was to the defense not because the State refused to compel his attendance but because a
state statute made his testimony inadmissible whether he was present in the courtroom or not.
‣ A discussion on the right to compulsory process:
‣ Previously, the common-law rule was that in felonies, especially treason, the accused was not allowed to
introduce witnesses in his defense at all. This rule of prohibition was eventually abolished in England, yet the

Framers of the Constitution felt the need to provide defendants means of obtaining witnesses so that their own
evidence might be evaluated by the jury.
‣ Despite the abolition of the prohibition/general disqualification of defense witnesses, the common law retained
a number of restrictions on witnesses who were physically and mentally capable of testifying (and oftentimes
the restrictions had the same effect of suppressing the truth like that of the abolished rule). Defendants and
codefendants were still disqualified on the ground of interest (since they might be tempted to lie).
‣ It was thought that if two persons charged with the same crime were allowed to testify on behalf of each other,
"each would try to swear the other out of the charge." This rule rested on the unstated premises that the right to
present witnesses was subordinate to the court's interest in preventing perjury.
‣ Federal courts follow the above mentioned rule despite the 6th amendment. While the US Supreme Court upheld
this practice in US v. Reid, the ruling has been overruled in a latter case Rosen v US.
‣ The rule disqualifying an alleged accomplice from testifying on behalf of the defendant cannot be defended on the
ground that it rationally sets apart a group of person who are likely to commit perjury. The Court said this logic is
absurd, because the more probable scenario is that such accomplices when called by the State to testify against the
defendant would commit perjury in favor of the prosecuting state (note that codefendants are NOT barred from
testifying for the State, they are only barred from testifying for one another). The Texas law leaves him free to
testify when he has a great incentive to perjury, and bars his testimony in situations where he has a lesser motive
to lie.
‣ We hold that the petitioner in this case was denied his right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor because the State arbitrarily denied him the right to put on the stand a witness who was physically and
mentally capable of testifying to events that he had personally observed, and whose testimony would have been
relevant and material to the defense. The Framers of the Constitution did not intend to commit the futile act of
giving to a defendant the right to secure the attendance of witnesses whose testimony he had no right to use. The
judgment of conviction must be reversed.

UNITED STATES V. LOOPER
419 F.2d 1405, Dec. 12, 1969
Digest Author: Kevin Bulotano
FACTS
‣ Looper was convicted of failure to submit to induction into the Armed Forces of the United States in violation of
law. He appeals before the court claiming that the decision of the lower court should be reversed.
‣ At the lower court, defense counsel advised the court that defendant had two witnesses, of which defendant was
one. In response to this statement, the district judge directed that both be brought forward and sworn
simultaneously. The transcript shows that 'the Clerk administered the affirmation at the request of the
witnesses.' Its text is not set forth. Defendant immediately replied, 'I can't do that,' and when told by the district
judge, 'you're going to take an oath or affirm,' defendant answered, 'I can't if it has God's name in it. If you ask me
if I'll tell the truth, I can say that.'
‣ The district judge rejected defendant's offer because 'that's not the oath,' and a discussion between the district
judge and counsel ensued. Finally, the district judge said that defendant could 'put his hand on the Bible and hold
up his right hand and appeal to God.' Defendant replied, 'I can't hold up my hand, Judge,' whereupon the district
judge declined to let him testify.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N defendant should be allowed to testify for himself - YES
RATIO
‣ A defendant’s right to testify in behalf of himself is a constitutional right. It may not be denied to a defendant if
he chooses to exercise it. The taking of testimony of all witnesses, including the defendant’s if he chooses to
exercise it, is covered by law.
‣ The concept of testimonial qualification formalized in Rule 26 is treated in Moore v. United States, 348 U.S. 966,
75 S.Ct. 530, 99 L.Ed. 753 (1955), which reversed, per curiam, a holding that the testimony of a defendant who
was a member of the Harshmanite Church was properly refused when he declined to use the word 'solemnly' in
affirming to tell the truth. The Court stated succinctly, 'there is no requirement that the word 'solemnly' be used in
the affirmation
‣ Wigmore's views on the subject are in agreement with Moore. Wigmore states that the modern theory of a witness'
oath is the subjective one of impressing on his conscience the necessity for speaking the truth. 'It follows that the
form of the administration of the oath is immaterial, provided that it involves, in the mind of the witness, the
bringing to bear of this apprehension of punishment.'
‣ On the authority of Moore v. United States, and Wigmore, we conclude that the district judge committed
reversible error. The common law, as made applicable by Rule 26, requires neither an appeal to God nor the
raising of a hand as a prerequisite to a valid oath. All that the common law requires is a form or statement which
impresses upon the mind and conscience of a witness the necessity for telling the truth. 3 Thus, defendant's
privilege to testify may not be denied him solely because he would not accede to a form of oath or affirmation not
required by the common law.
‣ If defendant's religious beliefs made repugnant or impossible to him an appeal to God or the raising of a hand as
part of an oath or affirmation (and in this regard, his statement was to be believed), all the district judge need do
is to make inquiry as to what form of oath or affirmation would not offend defendant's religious beliefs but would
give rise to a duty to speak the truth. The district judge could qualify defendant to testify in any form which stated
or symbolized that defendant would tell the truth and which, under defendant's religious beliefs, purported to
impress on him the necessity for so doing.
‣ New trial was granted.

PEOPLE V. TUANGCO
G. R. No. 130331. November 22, 2000
Digest Author: Coleen Bunao
DOCTRINE
‣ A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and
appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate
their ideas through a qualified interpreter.
‣ Other things the Court mentioned in relation to witness qualification:
‣ Even a fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness.
‣ The mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness.
‣ The test to measure the value of the testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in conformity to
knowledge and consistent with experience of mankind.
PARTIES
‣ Adel Tuangco – accused (brothers)
‣ Sonny Tuangco – accused (brothers) alias Baba
‣ Aurea Eugenio – rape and homicide victim
‣ Nelson Pineda Jr. – accused but at large alias Tattoo
FACTS
‣ The naked cadaver of Aurea Eugenio, a bookkeeper employed by the Centro Escolar University Credit
Cooperative in Manila was found lying beside a creek about 50 meters away from the national highway in Apalit.
Her body bore multiple stab wounds and her private parts were bloodied and showed signs of sexual abuse. (The
victim, Aurea, lived in Apalit, Pampanga. She came home to Pampanga after her work in the Centro Escolar
Cooperative. She rode a Victory Liner Bus and alighted in a waiting shed which was about 300 meters away from
her house, but the path going there was surrounded by high grass – think bukid).
‣ Two informations were filed. One for theft (the accused stole the watch, cash worth P3,000, earrings, three rings,
and camera of Aurea) and another for the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
‣ Information for Theft:
‣ “The accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to gain which came as an afterthought to them after executing their primordial intent
to rape and kill victim AUREA EUGENIO, took and carried away her wrist watch, three rings, earrings,
P3,000.00 cash money and camera, the total value of which amounts to P20,000.00, to the damage and prejudice
of her heirs.”
‣ Information for Rape with Homicide:
‣ "That on or about January 3, 1995, between 7:30 to 8:30 in the evening, in Sitio Dalan Baka, Barangay Sulipan,
Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and taking advantage of nighttime, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and with lewd design dragged Aurea Eugenio, reclined her in a tree, opened wide her
thighs, inserted a bottle of Pidol syrup in her vaginal canal and forcibly took turns in having sexual intercourse
with her against her will, after which, and by reason of such rape accused with intent to kill, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stabbed several times Aurea Eugenio in her neck which caused her death.
‣ That the commission of this offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, use
of superior strength, nighttime which was purposely sought by the accused to facilitate and insure its commission.
‣ CONTRARY to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 and Republic Act
No. 411."
‣ The principal evidence against the accused consisted of the testimony of an eyewitness, Silvestre Sanggalan, a
deaf-mute. He gave his testimony through sign language, which was interpreted by a sign language expert.

‣ Testimony of the deaf-mute eyewitness Sanggalan:
‣ On January 3, 1995 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was inside a 'beer house' along the national highway.
He had seven (7) companions at that time. When nighttime came, witness Sanggalan together with three (3) of his
companions left the place and proceeded to a rice field near the highway. Sanggalan described and identified the
said three (3) other persons as a) tricycle driver with tatoos over his body and scars on his arms (NELSON, at
large); b) a person with a long chin and known as 'Baba' (SONNY TUANGCO, the brother of Adel) and c)
accused Adel Tuangco. Sanggalan stepped down from the witness stand and identified accused Adel Tuangco as
one of the three (3) other persons together with whom, he went to the rice field.
‣ They were drinking beer and gin inside the 'beer house'. When night time came, Sanggalan, accused Adel
Tuangco, the person with tatoos over his body and the one with elongated chin proceeded to the rice field where
there was a waiting shed in which they stayed for a while. Inside the waiting shed, the person with tatoos over his
body, known as 'Tatoo', and the one with elongated chin, known as 'Baba', took Pidol cough syrup.
‣ They went to the rice field because they were very drunk. The three, accused Adel Tuangco, 'Baba' and 'Tatoo'
later left the waiting shed and went to the rice field to follow a girl who was wearing a long hair. Through
photographs of the deceased Aurea Eugenio, witness Sanggalan identified her to be the girl whom the three
followed into the rice field.
‣ Tatoo' pushed her. Adel Tuangco got hold of the shoulder bag which the deceased Aurea Eugenio was carrying at
that time. 'Baba' and 'Tattoo' then pushed Aurea against a tree and stabbed her with a knife several times on the
neck. At this point, Adel Tuangco joined the two and also stabbed the deceased. The deceased fell down.
‣ After the deceased fell down on the ground, 'Tatoo' inserted a bottle of Pidol cough syrup into her private parts.
Then 'Baba' pushed the bottle further into the private parts of the deceased. While the bottle was being pushed,
Adel Tuangco was hugging the deceased who at that time was still alive and resisting the assault. Together, the
three removed the blouse, bra, skirt and panty of Aurea Eugenio. Adel Tuangco raped the deceased. 'Tatoo' and
'Baba' likewise successively raped Aurea in that order. (They took turns raping her after inserting a bottle of
cough syrup into her private part).
‣ The accused brothers were convicted (Nelson was still at large at this point). Thus the automatic review.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the witness who was deaf-mute and had no
formal schooling. – No. The Court carefully scrutinized his testimony and noted that the same were made, on
several occasions from July 10, 1995 when he was called for the first time to testify until July 5, 1996 when he
was recalled for the purpose of cross-examination on behalf of accused Sonny Tuangco, in a candid and
straightforward manner.
RATIO
‣ While the Court observes minor inconsistencies in his declarations, these are not reasons to render his testimony
incredible. On the contrary, it is well-established that minor inconsistencies in the testimony of a witness are
indications that the same is not rehearsed and all the more should be considered credible. Thus, discrepancies in
minor details indicate veracity rather than prevarication and only tend to bolster the probative value of such
testimony.
‣ A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and
appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate
their ideas through a qualified interpreter.
‣ Other things the Court mentioned in relation to witness qualification:
‣ Even a fact of prior criminal conviction alone does not suffice to discredit a witness.
‣ The mere pendency of a criminal case against a person does not disqualify him from becoming a witness.
‣ The test to measure the value of the testimony of a witness is whether or not such is in conformity to
knowledge and consistent with experience of mankind.

PEOPLE V. GOLILLIM
G.R. No. 145225 April 2, 2004
DOCTRINE
‣ A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition
not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what
form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still give a fairly
intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to
‣ Modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by
McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person available who knows the facts,
seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence.
‣ Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements
given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate.
PARTIES
‣ Accused/Appellant: Salvador Golimlim
‣ Private Offended Party: Evelyn Canchela, rape victim
FACTS
‣ Evelyn G. Canchela , is a mental retardate. When her mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore to work as a
domestic helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her (Amparo’s) sister Jovita Guban and her
husband Salvador Golimlim at Barangay Bical, Bulan, Sorsogon.
‣ Later Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a certain Rosing, leaving Evelyn with Golimlim. Taking advantage
of the situation, Golimlim instructed Evelyn to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed her and took off
her clothes. As he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into
her vagina. His lust satisfied, he fell asleep.
‣ When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what Golimlim did to her. Jovita, however, did not believe her and in
fact she scolded her.
‣ Sometime in the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyn’s half-sister, received a letter from their mother Amparo
instructing her to fetch Evelyn from Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Novaliches, Quezon City where she
(Lorna) resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to Golimlim's home in Bical, and brought Evelyn with her
to Manila.
‣ A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister was pregnant as she noticed her
growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a doctor at the Pascual General Hospital at Baeza, Novaliches,
Quezon City for check-up and ultrasound examination.
‣ Lorna’s suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn was indeed pregnant. She thus asked
her sister how she became pregnant, to which Evelyn replied that Golimlim had sexual intercourse with her while
holding a knife.
‣ The sisters left for Bulan, Sorsogon for the purpose of filing a criminal complaint against Golimlim. Evelyn,
assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape against Golimlim
‣ Golimlim, on being confronted with the accusation, simply said that it is not true because her mind is not normal,"
she having "mentioned many other names of men who had sexual intercourse with her.
‣ Trial court convicted. It made the following observations:
1. Despite her weak and dull mental state the victim was consistent in her claim that her Papay Badong (accused
Salvador Golimlim) had carnal knowledge of her and was the author of her pregnancy, and nobody else
2. She remains consistent that her Papay Badong raped her only once;
3. That the contradictory statements she made in open court relative to the details of how she was raped, although
would seem derogatory to her credibility and reliability as a witness under normal conditions, were amply
explained by the psychiatrist who examined her and supported by her findings (See: Exhibits F to F-2);
4. Despite her claim that several persons laid on top of her (which is still subject to question considering that the
victim could not elaborate on its meaning), the lucid fact remains that she never pointed to anybody else as the

author of her pregnancy, but her Papay Badong. Which only shows that the trauma that was created in her
mind by the incident has remained printed in her memory despite her weak mental state. Furthermore, granting
for the sake of argument that other men also laid on top of her, this does not deviate from the fact that her
Papay Badong (the accused) had sexual intercourse with her
‣ Golimlim argues that Evelyn’s testimony is not categorical and is replete with contradictions, thus engendering
grave doubts as to his criminal culpability.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Golimlim’s conviction should be affirmed on the basis of the testimony of a victim who is a retard- YES
RATIO
‣ The trial judge’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses’ testimonies is, as has repeatedly been held by this
Court, accorded great respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on its part, it having had the
advantage of actually examining both real and testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses
‣ That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of
truth.
‣ SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. – Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
‣ SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. – The following persons cannot be
witnesses:
a. Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable
of intelligently making known their perception to others;
b. Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which
they are examined and of relating them truthfully.
‣ In People v. Trelles, where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally retarded private complainant’s
testimony irregardless of her "monosyllabic responses and vacillations between lucidity and ambiguity," this
Court held: “A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her
mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now universally accepted that intellectual weakness,
no matter what form it assumes, is not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can
still give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to”
‣ It can not then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what
he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent, the same is admissible in court.
‣ To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a ground to disqualify a witness. As
observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding such a witness who may be the only person available who
knows the facts, seems inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence.
‣ Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused based mainly on statements
given in court by the victim who was a mental retardate.
‣ From a meticulous scrutiny of the records of this case, there is no reason to doubt Evelyn’s credibility. To be sure,
her testimony is not without discrepancies, given of course her feeblemindedness.
‣ By the account of Dr. Chona Cuyos-Belmonte, Medical Specialist II at the Psychiatric Department of the Bicol
Medical Center, who examined Evelyn, although Evelyn was suffering from moderate mental retardation with an
IQ of 46, she is capable of perceiving and relating events which happened to her.
‣ Why do you consider that reliable?“Being a (sic) moderately retarded, I have noticed the spontaneity of her
answers during the time of the testing. She was not even hesitating when she told me she was raped once at
home by her Tatay Badong; and she was laughing when she told me about how it was done on (sic) her. So,
although she may be inappropriate but (sic) she was spontaneous, she was consistent.”
‣ What if the victim is being coached or led by someone else, will she be able to answer the questions? “Yes, she
may be able to answer the questions, but you would notice the inconsistency of the answers because what we
normally do is that we present the questions in different ways, and we expect the same answer. This is how we
try to evaluate the patient. If the person, especially a retarded, is being coached by somebody, the answers will
no longer be consistent.”
‣ Appellant’s bare denial is not only an inherently weak defense. It is not supported by clear and convincing
evidence. It cannot thus prevail over the positive declaration of Evelyn who convincingly identified him as her
rapist. 

PEOPLE V. CANETE
G.R. No. 142930 March 28, 2003
DOCTRINE
‣ A presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in examining witnesses within the course of evidentiary rules.
The presiding judge should see to it that a testimony should not be incomplete or obscure. After all, the judge is
the arbiter and he must be in a position to satisfy himself as to the respective claims of the parties in the criminal
proceedings.
‣ Under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which took effect on December 15, 2000,
child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial court in all
stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of justice. Objections to questions should be
couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child
PARTIES
‣ Accused/Appellant: Kakingcio Cañete
‣ Private Offended Party: Alma Canete, a minor rape victim
FACTS
‣ The spouses Paquito Cañete and Sedaria Cañete had three children, one of whom was Alma. The spouses decided
to live separately. Sedaria resided in Biliran, with some of her children by Paquito. The latter decided to live in
Samar, and brought Alma with him.
‣ Thereafter, Paquito decided to live with his older brother, Kakingcio Cañete, and the latter’s common-law wife,
Alejandra Cañete, whom Alma called Yaya Alejandra, and their children in Leyte.
‣ After some years, Paquito and Alma decided to return to and live in Samar. In the meantime, Paquito became
blind and a paralytic.
‣ Later, January 1996, Kakingcio had Paquito and Alma fetched from Samar, and brought to Leyte, to live with him
and his family. By then, Alma was already twelve years old. She noticed that her uncle Kakingcio was nice and
amiable to her.
‣ Alejandra visited her daughter in Leyte, leaving behind Kakingcio and their two young children and Paquito and
Alma. At about 8:00 p.m., Alma was already asleep. Paquito was sleeping near her feet. The house was dark.
Momentarily, Alma was awakened when she felt someone caressing her. When she opened her eyes, she saw her
uncle Kakingcio who was wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up. He was beside her with his left
palm touching her forehead, down to her face, hand and feet. She could smell liquor from his breath. He poked an
8-inch long knife on her neck and whispered to her: "Ma, don’t tell your yaya because I will do something to you."
Kakingcio then removed his short pants, lifted her skirt and pulled down her panties. He threatened to kill her if
she made a sound. Alma was terrified. Kakingcio then inserted his private organ into Alma’s vagina and made a
push and pull movement of his body. Alma felt pain in her private part and could do nothing but cry as Kakingcio
ravished her. In the process, Alma lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness, it was already 6:00 in
the morning. She was weak and could hardly stand up. She noticed blood in her vagina. By then, Kakingcio had
already left the house. Alma could do nothing but cry. Later, Kakingcio arrived back home after lunch time. Alma
hid from her uncle.
‣ A day later, Alma was asleep in the sala of their house. She was awakened when she felt her pants being pulled
down. She was aghast when she saw Kakingcio beside her pulling down her pants. She resisted and ran out of the
house to escape from Kakingcio. She rushed to the house of a neighbor Ka Caring to whom Alma revealed that
her uncle raped her and that he was about to rape her again. Caring adviced Alma not to return to their house.
Alma slept in the house of Caring. Alma returned to their house the next day. By then, Kakingcio was no longer in
the house.
‣ Another day passes, Alejandra went up the hill to gather camote tops. She was then armed with a bolo. Alma
followed Alejandra to the hills and revealed to her that Kakingcio raped her. Alejandra was livid with rage. She
rushed back to the house and confronted Kakingcio with the charge of Alma. Alejandra and Kakingcio quarreled.
She berated him for having taken advantage of his own flesh and blood. She told him to leave the house.
Kakingcio agreed on the condition that he would bring his personal belongings with him. After Kakingcio left,
Alejandra accompanied Alma to the barangay captain and complained against Kakingcio. The Barangay Captain
wrote a letter to the local police authorities requesting assistance to Alejandra and Alma. The Municipal Health
Officer of Capoocan, Leyte, examined Alma. The doctor prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate on her
examination of Alma.

‣ Subsequently, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Leyte charging Kakingcio with rape
‣ When he testified, Kakingcio denied having sexually assaulted Alma. He interposed the defense of alibi. He
claimed that he was a farmer. He planted root crops such as banana. He said he was in the mountains gathering
coconuts.
‣ The trial court rendered a decision finding Kakingcio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape and imposing on
him the penalty of death in view of the presence of the special qualifying circumstance of the minority of private
complainant Alma and her relationship to Kakingcio and the special aggravating circumstance of use of a deadly
weapon and without any mitigating circumstance in the commission of the crime.
‣ The appellant avers on appeal that the prosecution had a difficulty proving that the appellant raped the private
complainant in light of her testimony that when the appellant mounted her, he still had his short pants on. When
the prosecution tried to elicit from the offended party how appellant’s penis could have been inserted into her
vagina with his pants still on and the appellant’s counsel objected to the question, the presiding judge himself
took the cudgels for the prosecution and propounded questions on the private complainant. The presiding judge
posed leading questions to the private complainant. The presiding judge was biased and partial to the prosecution.
To buttress his contention, the appellant’s counsel cited a portion of the transcript of the stenographic notes taken
during the trial:
‣ PROS. PERIDA:
‣ Q: So, after he laid himself over you with his trouser what else happened?
‣ A: His penis was inserted into my vagina, sir.
‣ Q: Where did he let his penis exit considering that he is then wearing a short pants?
‣ ATTY. DILOY: Objection your Honor! It is leading.
‣ COURT:
‣ Q: How did he manage to have his penis inserted to your vagina?
‣ A: No, sir, because when he placed himself on top of me he pulled down his shorts and thereafter he
inserted his penis into my vagina.
‣ Q: At that time what was your apparel going up from your vagina?
‣ A: I was wearing then a t-shirt and skirt, sir.
‣ Q: About your skirt?
‣ A : He pulled up my skirt, sir.
‣ Q: What about your t-shirt?
‣ A: He did not do anything about my t-shirt.
‣ Q: After placing his penis on your vagina, what else transpired?
‣ A: He keeps on kissing me sir.
‣ Q: At that time he keeps on kissing you, where was his penis in relation to your vagina?
‣ A: It was inside my vagina sir
ISSUE./HELD
‣ W/N the trial court judge was biased and partial to the prosecution as himself took the cudgels for the prosecution
and propounded questions on the rape victim- NO
RATIO
‣ The Court does not agree with the appellant’s submission.
‣ In People v. Ancheta, this Court emphasized that a presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in examining
witnesses within the course of evidentiary rules. The presiding judge should see to it that a testimony should not
be incomplete or obscure. After all, the judge is the arbiter and he must be in a position to satisfy himself as to the
respective claims of the parties in the criminal proceedings.
‣ People v. Zheng Bai Hui: “In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the
defense in an effort to develop the truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has
assisted the prosecution with an evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses for

the defense. The trial judge must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may
be essential to elicit relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges
of both the law and the facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a
miscarriage of justice as a result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop
some material bearing upon the outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the
witness as will enable him to formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell
the truth. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the
credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though
that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against
him if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of
one party.”
‣ The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed by the trial court. Neither are the questions
prejudicial to the appellant or suggestive of any partiality of the trial court.
‣ It bears stressing that from the testimony of the private complainant, the appellant was wearing his short pants
before he mounted her and even when he was already on top of her and managed to penetrate her sexual organ
with his penis.
‣ The public prosecutor wanted the private complainant to explain to the court how the appellant could have
inserted his penis into her vagina considering that he was still wearing his short pants. Although crudely and
ungrammatically phrased, the question of the public prosecutor "where did he let his penis exit considering
that he is then wearing a short pants" was not leading.
‣ The trial court should have overruled the objection and allowed the private complainant to answer the
question. However, the trial court was not precluded from asking questions to avoid further wrangling between
the public prosecutor and the appellant’s counsel which may frightened or unnerved the private complainant, a
minor and who was unused to judicial proceedings.
‣ After all, the trial court was mandated to discover the truth. As it turned out, the private complainant cried
profusely as she testified impelling the trial court to order a continuance. Even the counsel of the appellant
agreed to a continuance.
‣ Parenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which took effect on
December 15, 2000, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by
the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of justice. Objections to
questions should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child:
‣ Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. – The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1)
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the
developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid
waste of time. The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form. 

PEOPLE V. ZHENG BAI HUI
“Identity of Confidential Informant”; G.R. No. 127580; August 22, 2000
Digest Author: Amber Gagajena
DOCTRINE
‣ As a rule, informers are not presented in court because of the need to preserve their cover so they can continue
their invaluable service to the police. Equally strong reasons include the maintenance of the informants’ health
and safety and the encouragement of others to report wrongdoing to police authorities.
‣ Exception: Defense must, before or during the trial, request the production of the confidential informant or his
identification. Also, defendants must show how the identity of the informer is essential to their defense.
‣ The necessity for disclosure depends upon the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the
crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant
factors.
PARTIES
‣ Accused: Carlos and Nelson
FACTS
‣ A police informant code-named Stardust arrived at the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) and informed Police Sr.
Insp. Mabanag of two Chinese nationals who were supposedly big time drug pushers. She claimed to have regular
contact with one of the alleged drug pushers, a certain Carlos Tan Ty. Stardust, the informant, was a woman who
had previously provided the police with information that led to the confiscation of 1 kilo of shabu.
‣ Acting on the information furnished by Stardust, the NARCOM agents organized a buy-bust operation to
apprehend the reputed drug pushers.
‣ Stardust called up Carlos Tan Ty that same morning and introduced SPO3 Santos over the cellular phone.
Pretending to be a pusher-buyer in Paranaque, SPO3 Santos told Carlos that he was willing to buy shabu if Carlos
had any stock. Carlos replied that they had stock that was yellow in color.
‣ SPO3 Santos and Carlos subsequently reached an agreement for the former to buy from the latter one 1 kilo of
shabu for P500,000 and to meet at the Mercury Drug Store in Monumento later that afternoon. Carlos would bring
the shabu and SPO3 Santos the money. Carlos informed SPO3 Santos that he would be wearing a striped T-shirt
and that he would be bringing with him a companion. Per Carlos instructions, SPO3 Santos would come alone.
‣ The suspects arrived at around 6:00 in the evening. Stardust pointed to SPO3 Santos the two Chinese nationals,
later identified as the accused, alighting from a taxi.
‣ SPO3 Santos stepped out of the store and introduced himself to the two Chinese nationals as the person whom
they talked with over the phone that morning. He told the suspects that he brought the money with him, and
showed the accused the boodle money by opening the wrapper and showing half of the bundle with the P500 bill
on top.
‣ He then gave the money to one of the Chinese nationals, later identified as the accused Carlos Tan Ty. The latters
companion, later identified as accused Nelson Hong Ty, in turn handed SPO3 Santos a blue plastic bag with the
marking of SM or Shoemart. The two looked at the money while SPO3 Santos opened the bag handed to him by
Nelson Hong Ty. SPO3 Santos found a yellowish substance sealed in transparent plastic and wrapped in
newspapers. The accused identified the substance as shabu.
‣ Thereupon, SPO3 Santos held Carlos by the hand as the other members of the team came to help him effect the
arrest of the two suspects, who were later brought to Camp Crame.
‣ The accused, in their defense, countered that no buy-bust operation took place. They denied selling any shabu and
accused the police of extortion.
‣ Nelson Hong Ty argues that the failure of SPO1 Jerico Bacani to take an oath before he testified deprived the
accused of their right to due process. It is contended that they are entitled to a new trial.
‣ Also, both accused contend that the trial court erred in sustaining the refusal by Sr. Insp. Mabanag to divulge
the identity of Stardust, the woman who informed the police about the two accused. It is claimed that such
refusal violated the right of the accused to confront and cross-examine said witness.
ISSUE/HELD
1. W/N the failure of a prosecution witness to take his oath invalidates the proceedings before the trial court- NO

2. W/N the non-disclosure of the informer’s identity violated the constitutional right of the accused to confront and
cross-examine the said witness- NO (Main Issue)
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ The failure of a witness to take an oath prior to his testimony is a defect that may be waived by the parties. Nelson
Hong Ty concedes to this rule. He asserts, however, that he did not waive his right to object to the lack of oath,
since the inadvertence was discovered only after the judgment of conviction by the trial court when counsel was
preparing the brief for automatic review by this Court.
‣ The testimony or declarations of any unsworn person, given or made in the presence of the trial judge and of the
parties and their attorneys, under such circumstances that they knew or should have known what the unsworn
individual was doing and saying, may be considered by the jury as that of any sworn witness. Where no objection
is promptly made to such a proceeding, it is too late to urge the objection on motion for new trial.
‣ Defendant and his counsel were present at the hearing of when SPO1 Bacani was presented as a witness. They did
not, however, object to the lack of oath. Nor did they pose any objection when SPO1 Bacani continued his
testimony on a subsequent date; Atty. Puno even cross-examined the witness.
‣ In any event, the granting of a new trial because of said omission would be pointless because even if testimony of
SPO1 Bacani were excluded, it would not materially affect the totality of the evidence for the prosecution. His
testimony is merely corroborative of those other police men and could therefore be dispensed with, without
affecting the prosecution’s case or prejudicing that of the defense.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ As a rule, informers are not presented in court because of the need to preserve their cover so they can continue
their invaluable service to the police. Equally strong reasons include the maintenance of the informants’ health
and safety and the encouragement of others to report wrongdoing to police authorities.
‣ Exception: Defense must, before or during the trial, request the production of the confidential informant or his
identification. Also, defendants must show how the identity of the informer is essential to their defense.
‣ The necessity for disclosure depends upon the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration
the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other
relevant factors.
‣ The SC believes that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for
balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his
defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances
of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the
informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.
‣ Counsel for accused Carlos Tan Ty indeed requested the trial court to compel Sr. Insp. Mabanag, who was then
testifying on direct examination, to reveal the identity of Stardust. (tutal naman kilala na siya ng accused kaya
hindi na importante itago pa identity niya)
‣ The trial court did not compel the witness Mabanag to divulge the identity of the informant for security reason as
alleged by the witness.
‣ Accused nevertheless failed to show at the time of their request how the identity of the informer or her production
was essential to their defense.
‣ The request came from the defendant at the time and in the manner hereinabove set out, and was not in any
fashion thereafter renewed. The defendant, at the time of the request, did not advise the trial court of his proposed
defense of entrapment nor undertake, in any way, to enlighten the trial court as to the materiality of relevancy of
the requested disclosure. The ruling at that particular stage of the proceedings was to the effect that disclosure
would not be required at that time. The door was thus open to subsequent showing and request.
‣ The burden of showing need for disclosure is upon defendants. The necessity for disclosure depends upon the
particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the
possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors. Appellants did not develop any such
criteria with reference to the merits of the case. A mere request during a witness examination indicates speculation
on the relevancy of his testimony; and mere speculation an informer may be helpful is not enough to carry the
burden and overcome the public interest in the protection of the informer. Hence, the trial court did not err in
sustaining the refusal of the witness to reveal the identity of Stardust.

SUNGA-CHAN V. CHUA
G.R. No. 143340 August 15, 2001
DOCTRINE
‣ The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by
death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his
own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction But before this rule can be successfully invoked to
bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of
unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against
person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff: Lamberto Chua
‣ Defendants/Petitioners; Lilibeth and Cecilia Sunga
FACTS
‣ Lamberto T. Chua filed a complaint against Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia Sunga daughter and wife,
respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga for "Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and
Recovery of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" with the Regional Trial Court of
Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
‣ Lamberto alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with Jacinto in the distribution of
Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent and Jacinto
allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER
(Shellite), under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Lamberto allegedly delivered his initial capital
contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart
contribution, with the intention that the profits would be equally divided between them. The partnership
allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, a sister of the wife, Erlinda Sy. As compensation,
Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or remuneration of 10% of the gross profit and Josephine would receive
10% of the net profits, in addition to her wages and other remuneration from the business.
‣ Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977, its business operation went quite
and was profitable. Lamberto claimed that he could attest to success of their business because of the volume of
orders and deliveries of filled Shellane cylinder tanks supplied by Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
While Jacinto furnished him with the merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net worth of Shellite from
1977 to 1989, he however suspected that the amount indicated in these documents were understated and
undervalued by Jacinto and Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.
‣ Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife, Cecilia and particularly his daughter,
petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of Shellite without
Lamberto's consent. Despite his repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal,
winding up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, they failed to comply. Lilibeth allegedly
continued the operations of Shellite, converting to her own use and advantage its properties.
‣ Lamberto claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran out the alibis and reasons to evade his demands, she
disbursed out of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000.00 and partially paid the same to respondent.
Lilibeth allegedly informed him that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the latter's share in the
partnership, with a promise that the former would make the complete inventory and winding up of the
properties of the business establishment. Despite such commitment, they allegedly failed to comply with their
duty to account, and continued to benefit from the assets and income of Shellite to the damage and prejudice
of Lamberto.
‣ Lilibeth and Cecilia Sunga filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) in Manila, not the Regional Trial Court in Zamboanga del Norte had jurisdiction over the action.

‣ They contend that they are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and
attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction
over the case. As counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
‣ The trial court finding the complaint sufficient in from and substance denied the motion to dismiss.
‣ Later, on trial, Lamberto presented his evidence while the defendants were considered to have waived their right
to present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled date for reception of evidence despite notice. The trial
court ruled in favour of plaintiff. It ordered the defendants to:
1. Render an accounting in acceptable form under accounting procedures and standards of the properties, assets,
income and profits of the Shellite Gas Appliance Center Since the time of death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from
whom they continued the business operations including all businesses derived from Shellite Gas Appliance
Center, submit an inventory, and appraisal of all these properties, assets, income, profits etc. to the Court and
to plaintiff for approval or disapproval
2. Return and restitute to the partnership any and all properties, assets, income and profits they misapplied and
converted to their own use and advantage
3. Wind up the affairs of the partnership and terminate its business activities pursuant to law, after delivering to
the plaintiff all the ½ interest, shares, participation and equity in the partnership, or the value thereof in money
or money's worth
‣ The defendants question the correctness of the finding of the trial court that a partnership existed between
Lamberto and Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written document to show such
partnership between respondent and Jacinto, they argue that these courts were proscribes from hearing the
testimonies of Lamberto and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's
death. To support this argument, the defendants invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under
Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
‣ SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. – Parties or assignors of parties to a
case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person, or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
‣ Defendants thus implore the SC to rule that the testimonies of Lamberto and his alter ego, Josephine, should not
have been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by the
defendants.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the testimonies of Lamberto and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain
claims against a deceased person based on the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule”- NO, it was correctly
admitted (W/N the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render inadmissible Lamberto's testimony
and that of his witness, Josephine.
RATIO
‣ The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by
death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his
own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction But before this rule can be successfully invoked to
bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of
unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against
person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind."
‣ Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case.
1. First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer before the trial
court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from
the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute"

‣ Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates that
sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the
deceased to defeat the counterclaim.
‣ Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of
facts occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the
estate or representatives of the deceased.
2. Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason
that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted."
‣ Records show that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the
partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of
respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a
cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has
arisen.”
‣ Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.
‣ We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony lacks probative value because she was
allegedly coerced coerced by respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor, Josephine merely declared in
court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that if she were not requested to do so she would not
have testified. We fail to see how we can conclude from this candid admission that Josephine's testimony is
involuntary when she did not in any way categorically say that she was forced to be a witness of respondent.
‣ Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not diminish the value of her testimony
since relationship per se, without more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses.
‣ The petitioner’s reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat respondent's claim cannot prevail over the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between respondent
and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and
the Court of Appeals considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the formation of partnership,
albeit an informal one. Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during trial.

SANSON V. CA
G.R. No. 127745, April 22, 2003
Digest Author: Bel Gervasio
DOCTRINE
‣ Dead Man’s Statute renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a
case is prosecuted. The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to
disqualify persons not mentioned therein.
‣ What the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before
the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of
Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases
of said checks.
PARTIES
‣ Petitioners – Felicito Sanson, Celedonia Sanson, Angeles Montinola, Eduardo Montinola
‣ Respondent – Melecia Sy, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Juan Bong Fing Sy
FACTS
‣ Felicito Sanson, in his capacity as creditor, filed before the RTC of Iloilo a petition for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased Juan Bong Fing Sy. Sanson claimed that Sy was indebted to him and to his sister Celedonia.
‣ Eduardo Montinola and his mother later filed separate claims against the estate, alleging that the deceased Sy also
owed them an amount of money.
‣ During the hearing of the claims, Felicito Sanson and Jade Montinola, wife of Eduardo, testified on the
transactions that gave rise to their claims.
‣ The administratix Melecia Sy, surviving spouse of the deceased, raised her objection invoking Section 23 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court known as the Dead Man’s Statute.
‣ SEC. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse party. Parties or assignors of parties to a
case, or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
‣ Sanson, in support of the claim of Celedonia, testified that the latter had a transaction with the deceased Sy
evidenced by six checks. Before Sy died, Celedonia tried to enforce settlement of the checks from the deceased’s
son who told her that his father would settle them once he got well but he never did. When the deceased died,
Celedonia presented the checks to the bank for payment but were dishonored due to the closure of his account.
‣ Celedonia, in support of the claim of her brother Sanson, testified that she knew that the deceased Sy issued five
checks to Sanson in settlement of a debt; and after the death of the deceased, Sanson presented the checks to the
bank for payment but were returned due to the closure of his account.
‣ Jade Montirola, in support of the claims of her husband Eduardo and mother-in-law, testified that on separate
occasions, the deceased borrowed amounts of money as shown by three checks issued by the deceased. Before the
deceased died, they advised him that they would be depositing the checks, but he told them not to as he would pay
them cash, but he never did. After the deceased died, they deposited the checks but were dishonored. Hence, their
legal counsel sent a demand letter addressed to the deceased’s heirs but the checks have remained unsettled.
‣ The administratrix objected to the admission of the checks-exhibits offered in evidence by the claimants Sansons
and Montinolas upon the ground that the witnesses who testified thereon are disqualified under the Dead Man’s
Statute.
‣ With respect to the checks-exhibits identified by Jade, the administratrix asserted that they are inadmissible
because Jade is the daughter-in-law and wife of claimant Montinolas, hence, she is covered by the rule on
disqualification.
‣ After the claimants rested their case, the administratrix filed four separate manifestations informing the trial court
that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against their claims.

‣ Finding that the Dead Man’s Statute does not apply to the witnesses who testified in support of the subject claims
against the estate, the trial court rendered a decision ordering administratix Sy to pay the creditor-claimants.
‣ Court of Appeals set aside the Order of the trial court.
ISSUE/HELD
1. W/N the CA erred in finding that the testimony of Jade Montinola is insufficient to prove the claims of claimants
Montinola. – YES, the CA erred.
2. W/N the CA erred in finding that Claimant Sanson is disqualified to testify on the claim of Celedonia Sanson and
vice versa. – YES, the CA erred.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ The administratrix Sy contends that because Jade had identical and unitary interest with her husband and mother-
in-law, her testimony was a circumvention of the Dead Man’s Statute.
‣ Administratix Sy’s contention does not lie. Relationship to a party has never been recognized as an adverse factor
in determining either the credibility of the witness or subject only to well recognized exceptions none of which is
here present - the admissibility of the testimony. At most, closeness of relationship to a party, or bias, may
indicate the need for a little more caution in the assessment of a witness testimony but is not necessarily a
negative element which should be taken as diminishing the credit otherwise accorded to it.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ The administratrix’s invocation of the Dead Man’s Statute does not likewise lie. The rule renders
incompetent:
1. Parties to a case;
2. Their assignors; or
3. Persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.
‣ The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not
mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from
testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active
part therein.
‣ Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being
prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar,
the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due
to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to
prove the transactions.
‣ The Sansons argue that their testimonies as witnesses to each other’s claim against the deceased are not covered
by the Dead Man’s Statute; besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined
them.
‣ The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals:
‣ Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in
his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law
speaks of parties or assignors of parties to a case. Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia on
each other’s behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition.
‣ But Sansons and Celedonia’s claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third
party with respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sansons claim. One is not
thus disqualified to testify on the others transaction.
‣ In any event, what the Dead Man’s Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which
arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since the
separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be
prosecuted on the bases of said checks.
‣ In fine, as the claimants have, by their evidence, substantiated their claims against the estate of the deceased, the
burden of evidence had shifted to the administratrix who, however, expressly opted not to discharge the same
when she manifested that she was dispensing with the presentation of evidence against the claims.
‣ Decision of the Court of Appeals SET ASIDE.


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Augustin v.

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

RATIO FOR ISSUE 3

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

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