Evidence Digests 3

Ziegler v.
Moore 2
Zulueta v. CA 4
People v. Francisco 6
Regala v. Sandiganbayan 8
People v. Sandiganbayan 9
Barton v. Leyte Asphalt & Mineral Oil Co. 12
Mercado vs Vitriolo 14
Krohn v. CA 18
Gonzales v. CA 20
Almonte v. Vasquez 22
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability 23
Per Curiam Supreme Court Decision in connection with the letter of the House
Prosecution Panel to subpoena Justices of the Supreme Court 26
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board 28
Air Philippines v. Penswell 31
Hoffman v. United States 33
Gutang v. People 35
People v. Invencion 38
Lee v. Court of Appeals 40
People v. Gaudia 42
People v. Lising 44
People v. Muit 47
Republic v. Bautista 49
People v. Sabagala 51
People v. Satorre 52
Boston Bank v. Manalo 53
People v. Bernal 55
Dallas Railway and Terminal v. Farnsworth 58
People v. Villacorta Gil 60
People v. Erguiza 64
Tamargo v. Awigan 65
Lejano v. People/ People vs Webb 68
ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

BATCH 2017 1 ATTY. EUGENIO VILLAREAL
ZIEGLER V. MOORE
71 Nev. 91 (1059)
Digest Author: Angeline Ibuna
DOCTRINE
‣ The purpose of the Dead Man’s Rule is to prevent the living from obtaining unfair advantage because of death of
the other. Nor shall the living be entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and
unexplained account of what transpired beyond possibility of contradiction by the decedent.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff: Zeigler – one who’s car got hit at the rear
‣ Defendant: Christ – one who hit Zeigler’s car
FACTS
‣ Zigler sued Al Christ for damages alleging that her automobile was struck in the rear by a car negligently operated
by Christ in August 1955 on Highway 40.
‣ Christ answered, denying negligence but admitting a collision between the two cars. He also pleaded Zeigler’s
contributory negligence.
‣ Christ died in May 1957 and Robert Moore (Robert) was substituted as his administrator before trial. At the trial
the court excluded under the dead man's rule certain testimony of Zeigler and of Zeigler’s witness, sheriff Delbert
Moore (Delbert).
‣ An insurance adjuster had taken statements from both Ziegler and the decedent, which statements were written
in longhand by the adjuster and signed by the parties.
‣ Zeigler moved under Rule 34 for an order for the production of these documents so that the same might be
inspected and copied, and assigns error and prejudice in the denial of such motion. (But court said the nature
and contents of the documents were part of court records so a denial of her motion would not be prejudicial to her.
Therefore, discussion on her assigned error is unnecessary)
‣ (It should be noted that Zeigler had been permitted to read the copies of the statements into the record for the
purpose of making an offer of proof. She then offered the copy of her own statement in evidence. An objection was
sustained on the ground that if her direct testimony was inadmissible under the dead man's rule her extrajudicial
statement was, a fortiori, inadmissible.)
‣ Delbert, sheriff of Humboldt County, testified that Christ, after the accident, had come to the office and made an
"accident report" and, in his conversation in making the report, talked to the witness "about how the accident
happened." He was then asked: "What did he tell you?" Objection on the ground "that this witness is rendered
incompetent under the dead man’s rule. This objection was sustained.
‣ The dead man's rule now appears, in pertinent part, in our codes as NRS 48.010 and 48.030, as follows:
‣ "48.010 1. All persons, without exception, otherwise than as specified in this chapter, who, having organs of sense,
can perceive, and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others, may be witnesses in any action or
proceeding in any court of the state. Facts which, by the common law, would cause the exclusion of witnesses, may
still be shown for the purpose of affecting their credibility. No person shall be allowed to testify:
1. When the other party to the transaction is dead.
2. When the opposite party to the action, * * * is the representative of a deceased person, when the facts to be proven
transpired before the death of such deceased person; * * *
‣ 48.030 The following persons cannot be witnesses: 3. Parties to an action * * * against an executor or administrator
upon a claim or demand against the estate of a deceased person, as to any matter of fact occurring before the death
of such deceased person."
‣ The error assigned in sustaining the objection to the testimony of sheriff Delbert as to statements made to him by
the decedent is well taken. The statutory exclusion of the testimony of witnesses under the sections above quoted
has been consistently held by this court not to apply to disinterested third persons. (Zeigler alleged that court
erred in sustaining the objection against Delbert’s Testimony under the Dead Man’s Rule. This court said the rule
does not apply to 3rd persons – in this case, Delbert).

‣ Robert contends that even if the order excluding Delbert’s testimony was error, it could not possibly have
prejudiced Zeigler because the testimony of Delbert would have only established the fact that an accident occurred
without any inference of negligence.
‣ However, the court held that while it is true that this fact (fact of accident - Christ colliding with the rear of
Zeigler’s car) alone would not necessarily establish negligence on Christ's part, there can be no doubt that it would
constitute a part of such proof. The exclusion of the evidence was therefore prejudicial. New trial must be
ordered.
‣ Robert claims that at the trial, Zeigler was called as a witness in her own behalf to testify to the facts of the
accident and says that the question presented is “whether the survivor of an automobile accident can give
uncontradicted testimony as to the manner in which the collision occurred when the lips of the other party were
sealed by death.”
‣ Zeigler’s testified that at no time prior to the time of collision did she cause the brakes to be applied in a sudden
manner, nor did she indicate that she was going to make either a left or right turn, that her car was suddenly and
without warning hit from the rear.
‣ This offer of proof was objected to in its entirety and likewise denied in its entirety.
‣ Zeigler adds that her testimony is not an attemp to testify that Christ’s car was driven in a reckless manner or that
she is attempting to fix the blame or attach fault to anyone. She is merely testifying that she was driving down the
highway in the proper lane, at reasonable speed when he car was struck in the rear.
‣ Zeigler insists first in this respect that she is not precluded from testifying under NRS 48.010 (1) (a) because the
decedent cannot be said to be "the other party to the transaction" inasmuch as no "transaction" was involved; that
a tort action is not a transaction.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ WN Zeigler is precluded from testifying under the Dead Man’s Rule – NO.
RATIO
‣ Overwhelming weight of authority supports the rule that the dead man's statute applies to actions ex delicto and
that such actions are embraced within the statutory use of the word "transactions."
‣ In Warren v. DeLong, this court there held that the term "transaction" was broader than "contract" and broader
than "tort" and that it might include either or both.
‣ If then we apply the statute to tort actions as well as personal transactions between the parties the testimony of
the plaintiff was properly excluded under the holdings of this court in earlier cases, defining the purpose and
extent of the rule with reference to those matters which the decedent could have contradicted of his own
knowledge.
‣ By the same token, Zeigler’s testimony as to her medical bills, her pain and suffering and matters of like nature
which the decedent could not have contradicted of his own knowledge, was clearly admissible and the rejection of
such testimony was prejudicial error.
‣ Those items were entirely beyond the operation of the reasons for the rule of exclusion repeatedly enunciated by
this court: To prevent the living from obtaining unfair advantage because of death of the other. Nor shall the living
be entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of what transpired
beyond possibility of contradiction by the decedent.
‣ The whole object of the code provision is to place the living and dead on terms of perfect equality, and, the dead
not being able to testify, the living shall not.
‣ In Bright v. Virginia and Gold Hill Water Co. The court here explained, the object of the statute is to prevent one
interested party from giving testimony when the other party's lips are sealed by death.
‣ Exception was given in Goldsworthy v. Johnson, But when the above stated reasons for the rule do not appear, this
court has not hesitated to admit in evidence the testimony of an interested party.
‣ Therefore the rule would not preclude plaintiff 's description of her own actions and the road conditions prior to
the point when within limitations of time or space the decedent could have contradicted her testimony of his own
knowledge.

ZULUETA V. CA
G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996
Digest Author: Lizzie Lecaroz
DOCTRINE
‣ The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff/Private respondent: Alfredo Martin
‣ Defendant/Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta
FACTS
‣ Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin.
‣ On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic
and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were
seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
‣ Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering
Cecilia Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay
him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the
suit.
‣ The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys
and representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in
question.
‣ On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the papers and documents are inadmissible in evidence-YES
RATIO
‣ Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable is no less applicable simply because it
is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced.
‣ The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order from a court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
‣ The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of
the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage,
does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or to her.
‣ The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the
marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received
in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.
‣ Petitioner cited the case of Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., where the Court ruled that the documents and papers
were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner’s attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute
malpractice or gross misconduct.

‣ In this case however, when respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial
Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the
documents Annex A-I to J-7.
‣ Having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining order on
aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of
this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner to admit the genuineness and authenticity of the subject
annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice.
‣ Notably, Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes. At that point in
time, would it have been malpractice for Felix to use Martin’s admission as evidence against him in the legal
separation case pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
‣ Significantly, Dr Martin’s admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such
verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Martin became
bound by his admission.
‣ Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his
use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martins admission as to their genuiness and
authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the
decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
‣ If Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial
court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial
court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the
prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

PEOPLE V. FRANCISCO
G.R. No. L-568. July 16, 1947
Digest Author: Elwell Mariano
PARTIES
‣ Accused: Juan Francisco
FACTS
‣ Francisco, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery was held as a detention prisoner in Mindoro.
‣ He requested permission from the chief to go home to see his wife about procurement of a bail. THis was
granted.
‣ Francisco was allowed to go home with sergeant Pacifico Pimintel to guard him.
‣ When the reached the house, sergeant Pimintel allowed Franciso to see his wife while sergeant remained at the
foot of the stairs.
‣ After a few moments, sergeant Pimintel heard the scream of a woman so went inside the house.
‣ He saw the wife of Francisco bleeding in her right breast. He also saw Francisco lying down with his little son
Romeo, aged one year and a half, lying in his breast.
‣ Francisco was wounded on his belly while his son was wounded and his back and is already dead.
‣ The prosecution, in recommending the capital punishment upon the accused, relies mainly on the:
1. Affidavit which is the virtual confession of the accused (exhibit C)
‣ This is signed and sworn to by Francisco
‣ It contains his admission that he stabbed his son and wife using a scissor and later on stabbed himself as
well. When he entered the house, he lost his senses because he remembered that his uncle told him that his
uncle would order someone to kill him.
2. The record made by the justice of peace of the arraignment where the defendant plead guilty. (Exhibit D)
3. The rebuttal testimony of the wife of Francisco
‣ Sergeant Pimintel testified that the accused confessed to him.
‣ The voluntariness and spontaneity of the confession contained in exhibit C was testified by the justice of the peace
and sergeant Pimintel.
‣ Furthermore, the statements of Francisco in said Exhibit C were corroborated by the testimony of his wife or
rebuttal.
ISSUE/HELD
1. W/N Exhibit C be given weight to convict Francisco- YES
2. W/N the testimony of Francisco’s wife is admissible despite the prohibition of sec. 26 (d) of Rule 123.- YES
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ As we construe the evidence, we believe that Exhibit C contains the truth, as narrated by the accused himself who,
at the time of making it, must have been moved only by the determination of a repentant father and husband to
acknowledge his guilt for acts which, though perhaps done under circumstances productive of a diminution of the
exercise of willpower, fell short of depriving the offender of consciousness of his acts.
‣ It was only after almost 1 year that Francisco repudiated his confession. As we find the confession to have been
given voluntarily, we feel justified in concluding that its subsequent repudiation by the accused almost a year
after must have been due to his fear of its consequences to himself, which he not improbably thought might cost
him his own life.
‣ Francisco said that his testimony on the said confession was only extracted from him through force but the Court
did not find sufficient evidence to destroy the categorical testimony of the justice of peace that Exhibit C was
signed by Francisco voluntarily and with full understanding.

RATIO FOR ISSUE 2
‣ The rule contained in section 26 (d) of Rule 123 is an old one. Courts and textwriters on the subject have assigned
as reasons therefor the following:
1. Identity of interest;
2. The consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law which deems it necessary to guard the security and confidences of private life even at the
risk of an occasional failure of justice, and which rejects such evidence because its admission would lead to
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and,
4. Because where a want of domestic tranquility exists, there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.
‣ However, as all other general rules, this one has its own exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and
in criminal cases for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the exceptions are backed by
sound reasons which, in the excepted cases, outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the
marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In such a case
identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidences of private life which the law aims at protecting will be
nothing but ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home.
‣ It will be noted that the wife only testified against her husband after the latter, testifying in his own defense,
imputed upon her the killing of their little son. By all rules of justice and reason this gave the prosecution, which
had theretofore refrained from presenting the wife as a witness against her husband, the right to do so, as it did in
rebuttal; and to the wife herself the right to so testify, at least, in selfdefense, not, of course, against being
subjected to punishment in that case in which she was not a defendant but against any or all of various possible
consequences which might flow from her silence, namely: (1) a criminal prosecution against her which might be
instituted by the corresponding authorities upon the basis of her husband's aforesaid testimony; (2) in the moral
and social sense, her being believed by those who heard the testimony orally given, as well as by those who may
read the same, once put in writing, to be the killer of her infant child.
‣ By his said act, the husband—himself exercising the very right which he would deny to his wife upon the ground
of their marital relations—must be taken to have waived all objection to the latter's testimony upon rebuttal, even
considering that such objection would have been available at the outset.
‣ Waiver of Incompetency
‣ Objections to the competency of a husband or wife to testify in a criminal prosecution against the other may be
waived as in the case of the other witnesses generally. Thus, the accused waives his or her privilege by calling
the other spouse as a witness for him or her, thereby making the spouse subject to crossexamination in the
usual manner.
‣ It is also true that objection to the spouse's competency must be made when he or she is first offered as a
witness, and that the incompetency may be waived by the failure of the accused to make timely objection to
the admission of the spouse's testimony, although knowing of such incompetency, and the testimony
admitted, especially if the accused has assented to the admission, either expressly or impliedly
‣ Wharton (book author yata to na cited by the court)
‣ "Waiver of objection to incompetency.—A party may waive his objections to the competency of a witness and
permit him to testify. A party calling an incompetent witness as his own waives the incompetency. Also, if,
after such incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having knowledge of the
incompetency, the objection will he deemed waived, whether it is on the ground of want of mental capacity or
for some other reason. If the objection could have been taken during the trial. a new trial will be refused and
the objection will not be available on writ of error. If, however, the objection of a party is overruled and the
ruling has been excepted to, the party may thereafter examine the witness upon the matters as to which he
was allowed to testify to without waiving his objections to the witness’s competency
‣ When the husband testified that it was his wife who caused the death of their son, he could not, let us repeat,
justly expect the State to keep silent and refrain from rebutting such new matter in his testimony, through the
only witness available, namely, the wife; nor could he legitimately seal his wife's lips and thus gravely expose her
to the danger of criminal proceedings against her being started by the authorities upon the strength and basis of
said testimony of her husband, or to bear the moral and social stigma of being thought, believed, or even just
suspected, to be the killer of her own offspring.  

REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN

PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. Nos. 115439-41. July 16, 1997 “Previous Ethics case: atty-client privilege”
Digest Author: Rose Anne Sy
DOCTRINE
‣ For the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period to be considered is the date when the privileged
communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime committed in the past or with
respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future.
‣ The privileged confidentiality does not attach with regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter
or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer’s advice.
FACTS
‣ Respondents in the case:
1. Ceferino Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur then Governor of the same
province, and is at present a Congressman.
2. Atty. Generoso Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as counsel for Paredes in several instances
pertinent to the criminal charges involved in this case.
3. Mansueto Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court in
Agusan del Sur.
‣ Paredes applied for a free patent over a lot of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was
approved and, pursuant to a free patent granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for
that lot which is situated in the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.
‣ The Director of Lands filed an action for the cancellation of Paredes’ patent and certificate of title since the land
had been designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned subdivision survey.
‣ TC: nullified patent and title after finding that Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent
misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.
‣ An information for perjury was filed against Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Provincial Fiscal was,
however, directed by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of
prescription, hence the proceedings were terminated. In this criminal case, Paredes was likewise represented by
Sansaet as counsel.
‣ Nonetheless, Paredes was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on the charge
that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials to
favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act). For the third time, Sansaet was Paredes’ counsel of record.
‣ A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan charging Paredes with a violation of Section 3(a)
of RA 3019. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later granted and the case was dismissed on the
ground of prescription.
‣ Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against Paredes, sent a letter to the
Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents for falsification of public documents.
‣ He claimed that Honrada, in conspiracy with his co respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain
documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken
during the arraignment of Paredes on the perjury charge. These falsified documents were annexed to Paredes’
MR of the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention
that the same would constitute double jeopardy.
‣ In support of his claim, he attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received
by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a certification
of Presiding Judge that said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action thereon
was suspended pending the review of the case by the DOJ.
‣ IMPT: Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated
the submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications, Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary investigation
dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it that the perjury case had been dismissed by the trial
court after he had been arraigned therein.

‣ For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were prepared
and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of Paredes. To evade responsibility for his own
participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement of Paredes. This was
intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in the consolidated cases, as in fact a motion
therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.
‣ The Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges against all the respondents. The proposal for the
discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal
position:
‣ Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of deliberate intent to
conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel for the accused in those criminal
cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory and the evidence which the defense was going to present.
Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty. Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged communication between
the lawyer and his client which may be objected to, if presented in the trial.
‣ The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution and decided to file separate informations for falsification
of public documents against each of the respondents. Thus, three criminal cases were filed in the graft court.
However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
‣ A motion was filed by the People for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness. It was submitted
that all the requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, were satisfied insofar as
respondent Sansaet was concerned.
‣ The basic postulate was that, except for the eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no
other direct evidence to prove the confabulated falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and
Paredes.
‣ Unfortunately for the prosecution, Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege adverted
to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents in their opposition to the prosecutions
motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on this ratiocination:
‣ From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer relationship existed
between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged in the information. In
view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other confidential matter must have been
disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer in his professional capacity. Therefore,
the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the offense charged in the information is privileged.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client
privilege - No.
RATIO
‣ As already stated, Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship which existed between herein
respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other
confidential matters must have been disclosed by Paredes, as client to Sansaet, as his lawyer. Accordingly, it found
no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness against accused Paredes
without the latter’s consent.
‣ The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof
and the actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule.
‣ It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in
connection with the criminal cases for falsification, and this may reasonably be expected since Paredes was the
accused and Sansaet his counsel. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called to witness the preparation of the falsified
documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a communication, if not more, than verbal statements being
made to him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is significant that the evidentiary rule
on this point has always referred to any communication, without distinction or qualification.
‣ In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no particular mode by
which a confidential communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined to
verbal or written communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information
communicated by the client to the attorney by other means.
‣ Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing relations, no word at all
passed between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is
the undisputed fact that documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the MR in

the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan. Also, the acts and words of the parties
during the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since Paredes would not
have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions of secrecy and
confidence.
‣ A distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes already committed, and
future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the announced intention of
a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound to respect.
‣ The CA appears, however, to inaccurately believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime, and that
respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of Paredes and Honrada that have already been
committed and consummated. For the application of the attorney-client privilege, the period to be considered is
the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a
crime committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words,
if the client seeks his lawyer’s advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is
given the protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by
the attorney without the clients consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with
regard to a crime which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he
seeks the lawyer’s advice.
‣ Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who
committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream
of judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the clients
contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of privileges ordinarily
existing in reference to communications between attorney and client.
‣ In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansaet as state witness are the communications
made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Paredes at the time he and Honrada, either with the
active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents
which were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in
respondent Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to
Sansaet were for purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed
in the past by Paredes but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having
been made for purposes of a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client
privilege.
‣ Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes
and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order that a communication
between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful
end. The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. In fact, it has also been pointed
out to the Court that the prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under
the guise of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a
conspiracy or attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain
circumstances may be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice.
‣ It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful
communications intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-
called mantle of privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later
committed pursuant to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the
worst travesties in the rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.
Other stuff about State Witnesses:
‣ The Court is reasonably convinced that the other requisites for the discharge of Sansaet as a state witness are
present and should have been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
‣ Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification charged in the criminal
cases pending before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the formidable task of establishing the
guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their innocence. There
is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute necessity for the
testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said respondent has indicated his
conformity thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his projected
testimony in his Affidavit of Explanations and Rectifications.

BARTON V. LEYTE ASPHALT & MINERAL OIL CO.
“Kalaban got a letter between the lawyer and client, and used it against them.” GR No. L-2137
Digest Author: Johnny T
DOCTRINE
‣ The preservation of secrecy of communication is entirely in the hands of the client, when it comes to an atty -
client relationship. Thus those who are bound by this are under a duty not to violate it. BUT this DOES NOT extend
to 3rd persons - even if they surreptitiously (sneaky sneaky) read or obtained possession of it.
PARTIES
‣ Barton – US citizen, who resides in manila
‣ Leyte – Defendant Corporation with valuable deposit of bituminous limestone and other asphalt products, located
on the Island of Leyte and known as the Lucio mine.
FACTS
‣ Leyte Asphalt Company. is the owner of a valuable deposit of asphalt products, located on the Island of Leyte. On
April 21, 1920, the company, addressed a letter to Barton, authorizing him to sell their products in Australia and
New Zealand
‣ On April 21, 1920, William Anderson, as president and general manager of the Leyte addressed to Barton,
authorizing the latter to sell the products of the Lucio mine in the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand
upon a scale of prices indicated in said letter. The letter stated that Barton would be the sole an exclusive sales
agency for bituminous limestone.
‣ After this contract was executed, Barton also asked to be the exclusive sales agent in Japan. The Company replied
that they would give him the same commissions as those that he is making in Australia, BUT it would not give him
exclusive agency since there were others that were saying that they could also sell in Japan.
‣ Meanwhile Barton had embarked for San Francisco and upon arriving at that port he entered into an agreement
with Ludvigsen & McCurdy, of that city, whereby said firm was constituted a subagent and given the sole selling
rights for the bituminous limestone products of the defendant company for the period of one year from November
11, 1920
‣ Barton alleges that during the life of the agency indicated in Exhibit B, he rendered services to the Leyte in the way
of advertising and demonstrating the products and expended large sums of money in visiting arious parts of the
world for the purpose of carrying on said advertising and demonstrations, in shipping to various parts of the
world samples of the products of Leyte, and in otherwise carrying on advertising work. For these services and
expenditures Barton sought to recover the sum of $16,563.80. Which he claims to recover as expenses.
‣ During trial, the Company offered in evidence a carbon copy of a letter dated June 13, 1921, written by Barton to
his attorney, Frank Ingersoll about his profits. In this case he said that his profits should be 85 cents per ton
(which was less than what he was claiming). The authenticity of this city document is admitted, and was offered
in evidence by the attorney of Leyte company.
‣ The counsel of Barton then announced that he had no objection to the introduction of this evidence if counsel for
the Company would explain where this copy was secured. Upon this the attorney for the Company informed the
court that he received the letter from the former attorneys of the Barton without explanation of the manner in
which the document had come into their possession.
‣ The lawyer of Barton then threatened that unless there was explanation of how such letter came into the
possession of the company, they would object to its introduction on the ground of the attorney-client privilege. As
the counsel for the company failed to explain, the counsel of Barton objected to the introduction, and was
sustained by the trial court judge. ( So the letter was not admitted)
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the court in error for EXCLUDING the document? YES (Note: The lower court excluded the document on the
ground that it was privileged communication.)
RATIO
‣ We are of the opinion that this ruling was erroneous; for even supposing that the letter was within the privilege
which protects communications between attorney and client, this privilege was lost when the letter came to the
hands of the adverse party. And it makes no difference how the adversary acquired possession. The law protects
the client from the effect of disclosures made by him to his attorney in the confidence of the legal relation, but

when such a document, containing admissions of the client, comes to the hand of a third party, and reaches the
adversary, it is admissible in evidence.
‣ The law provides subjective freedom for the client by assuring him of exemption from its processes of disclosure
against himself or the attorney or their agents of communication. This much, but not a whit more, is necessary for
the maintenance of the privilege. Since the means of preserving secrecy of communication are entirely in the
client's hands, and since the privilege is a derogation from the general testimonial duty and should be strictly
construed, it would be improper to extend its prohibition to third persons who obtain knowledge of the
communications. One who overhears the communication, whether with or without the client's knowledge, is not
within the protection of the privilege. The same rule ought to apply to one who surreptitiously reads or obtains
possession of a document in original or copy.
‣ Although the precedents are somewhat confusing, the better doctrine is to the effect that when papers are offered
in evidence a court will take no notice of how they were obtained, whether legally or illegally, properly or
improperly; nor will it form a collateral issue to try that question.
‣ Digest Author’s Note: The main facts of the case detail various international transactions that Barton did on behalf of
Leyte. There is a super long and complicated discussion of this in the original. I did not add it here kasi its more
international commercial transactions than evid.  

MERCADO VS VITRIOLO
A.C. No. 5108 May 26, 2005
Digest Author: Clarence Tiu
DOCTRINE
‣ Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the
communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently
protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor except the protection be waived.
‣ Factor of the Rule on Attorney-Client Privilege
1. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of

this relationship that the client made the communication.
2. The client made the communication in confidence
3. The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity
PARTIES
‣ Complainant: Rosa Mercado, a client of the respondent
‣ Respondent: Atty. Julito Vitriolo, a Deputy Executive Director of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
FACTS
‣ Mercado is a Senior Education Program Specialist of the Standards Development Division, Office of Programs and
Standards while respondent is a Deputy Executive Director IV of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
‣ Mercado's husband filed a case for annulment of their marriage with the RTC of Pasig City.
‣ Later, the counsel of Mercado, died. Thus, Atty. Vitriolo entered his appearance before the trial court as
collaborating counsel for complainant.
‣ Eventually, this annulment case had been dismissed by the trial court, and the dismissal became final and
executory
‣ Atty. Vitriolo filed a criminal action against Mercado before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City for
violation of Articles 171 and 172 (falsification of public document) of the RPC.
‣ Vitriolo alleged that Mercado made false entries in the Certificates of Live Birth of her children and allegedly
indicated in said Certificates of Live Birth that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez, when in truth,
she is legally married to Ruben G. Mercado and their marriage
‣ In her defense, Mercado denied the accusations of Vitriolo against her. She denied using any other name than
"Rosa F. Mercado." She also insisted that she has gotten married only once, to Ruben G. Mercado. She also cited
other charges against Vitriolo that are pending before or decided upon by other tribunals
1. Libel suit before the Office of the City Prosecutor, Pasig City 
Administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
pursuit of private business, vocation or profession without the permission required by Civil Service rules and
regulations, and violations of the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," before the then Presidential
Commission Against Graft and Corruption
2. Complaint for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service before
the Office of the Ombudsman, where he was found guilty of misconduct and meted out the penalty of one
month suspension without pay
3. The Information for violation of Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, as amended, otherwise known as the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees before the Sandiganbayan
‣ Also, Rosa F. Mercado filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment
from the practice of law with the Supreme Court. The complainant alleged that respondent Vitriolo maliciously
instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential
information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
‣ Mercado alleged that said criminal complaint for falsification of public document disclosed confidential facts
and information relating to the civil case for annulment, then handled by Vitriolo as her counsel. This
prompted complainant Mercado to bring this action against respondent. She claims that, in filing the criminal

case for falsification, respondent is guilty of breaching their privileged and confidential lawyer-client
relationship, and should be disbarred.
‣ Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss where he alleged that:
1. The complaint for disbarment was all hearsay, misleading and irrelevant because all the allegations leveled
against him are subject of separate fact-finding bodies
2. The pending cases against him are not grounds for disbarment, and that he is presumed to be innocent until
proven otherwise.
3. The decision of the Ombudsman finding him guilty of misconduct and imposing upon him the penalty of
suspension for one month without pay is on appeal with the Court of Appeals. He adds that he was found
guilty, only of simple misconduct, which he committed in good faith.
4. His filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate
the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case
are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence
taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to
him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged
falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the
Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.
‣ The SC referred the administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation
‣ The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set two dates for hearing but complainant failed to appear in both. The
Investigating Commissioner thus granted respondent's motion to file his memorandum, and the case was
submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted by the parties.
‣ Subsequently, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report of investigating commissioner Datiles, finding the
respondent guilty of violating the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client, and
recommending his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.
‣ Complainant, upon receiving a copy of the IBP report and recommendation, wrote Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.,
a letter of desistance. She stated that after the passage of so many years, she has now found forgiveness for those
who have wronged her.
ISSUES/RATIO
1. W/N the complainant’s letter of desistance is a ground to absolve the respondent from guilt- NO
2. W/N the respondent violated the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client when he filed a
criminal case for falsification of public document against his former client- NO, the complaint was
unsubstantiated
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ The Court is not bound by any withdrawal of the complaint or desistance by the complainant. The letter of
complainant to the Chief Justice imparting forgiveness upon respondent is inconsequential in disbarment
proceedings.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ Discussion on the nature of the relationship between attorney and client and the rule on attorney-client privilege
that is designed to protect such relation
‣ In engaging the services of an attorney, the client reposes on him special powers of trust and confidence. Their
relationship is strictly personal and highly confidential and fiduciary.
‣ The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public
interest.
‣ Only by such confidentiality and protection will a person be encouraged to repose his confidence in an
attorney. The hypothesis is that abstinence from seeking legal advice in a good cause is an evil which is fatal to
the administration of justice.Thus, the preservation and protection of that relation will encourage a client to
entrust his legal problems to an attorney, which is of paramount importance to the administration of justice.
‣ One rule adopted to serve this purpose is the attorney-client privilege: an attorney is to keep inviolate his
client's secrets or confidence and not to abuse them.Thus, the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's secrets
and confidence outlasts the termination of the attorney-client relationship, and continues even after the
client's death.

‣ It is the glory of the legal profession that its fidelity to its client can be depended on, and that a man may safely
go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with absolute
assurance that the lawyer's tongue is tied from ever disclosing it.With full disclosure of the facts of the case by
the client to his attorney, adequate legal representation will result in the ascertainment and enforcement of
rights or the prosecution or defense of the client's cause.
‣ On the rule of Attorney-Client Privilege, . Dean Wigmore cites the factors essential to establish the existence of the
privilege: “Where legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, the
communications relating to that purpose, made in confidence by the client, are at his instance permanently protected
from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor except the protection be waived.”
‣ In fine, the factors are as follows:
1. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by

reason of this relationship that the client made the communication
‣ Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication
even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment.
‣ The reason for this is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer
without fear that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be
equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.
‣ On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on
account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged.
‣ Instructive is the case of Pfleider v. Palanca,where the client and his wife leased to their attorney a 1,328-hectare
agricultural land for a period of ten years. In their contract, the parties agreed, among others, that a specified
portion of the lease rentals would be paid to the client-lessors, and the remainder would be delivered by counsel-
lessee to client's listed creditors. The client alleged that the list of creditors which he had "confidentially" supplied
counsel for the purpose of carrying out the terms of payment contained in the lease contract was disclosed by
counsel, in violation of their lawyer-client relation, to parties whose interests are adverse to those of the client.
As the client himself, however, states, in the execution of the terms of the aforesaid lease contract between the
parties, he furnished counsel with the "confidential" list of his creditors. We ruled that this indicates that client
delivered the list of his creditors to counsel not because of the professional relation then existing between them,
but on account of the lease agreement. We then held that a violation of the confidence that accompanied the
delivery of that list would partake more of a private and civil wrong than of a breach of the fidelity owing from a
lawyer to his client.
2. The client made the communication in confidence
‣ The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must
intend the communication to be confidential.
‣ A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between

attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.
‣ Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a
lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-
offer for settlement, or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not
privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.
3. The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity
‣ The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the
purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must
have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
‣ If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the
privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose
‣ Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate
complainant's allegations, as shown by the following:
1. The complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All
her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity.

2. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal
action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating
to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which
will determine the merit of her complaint.
3. Complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP.
‣ Without any testimony from the complainant as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged
by respondent without her consent, it is difficult, if not impossible to determine if there was any violation of
the rule on privileged communication. Such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach
of the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the
attorney-client privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies is placed upon the party asserting
the privilege The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the
complainant must prove.

KROHN V. CA
G.R. No. 108854; June 14, 1994
Digest Author: Helen Toledo
PARTIES
‣ Petitioner - Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn
‣ Respondents - Court Of Appeals and Edgar Krohn, Jr.
FACTS
‣ A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial court in a petition for
annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the report is the husband
who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report.
‣ The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged communication
between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents of the report.
‣ In 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married. They had three children. Their blessings
notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent
psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile until
they finally separated in fact.
‣ Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and signed by Drs.
Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. In 1978, presenting the report among others, he obtained a decree
("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma.
Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of
the wedding and thereafter." The decree was later confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite."
‣ Meanwhile, the then CFI (now RTC) of Pasig, Br. II, issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership.
‣ In 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial court. In his
petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely denied in her Answer as
"either unfounded or irrelevant."
‣ At the hearing, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the Confidential Psychiatric
Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on privileged communication
between physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection"
to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physician-patient privileged communication rule,"
and thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal basis
whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim 'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being
completely false, fabricated and merely an afterthought."
‣ The trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report in evidence and ruling
that respondent did not object thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged communication between patient
and physician but rather that it was irrelevant.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ Whether or not the Report is admissible – YES, since the prohibition does not apply to the husband.
RATIO
‣ Petitioner argues that since Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court prohibits a physician from testifying on
matters which he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON
should be third person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report, findings or evaluation
prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential and privileged relation with a
patient."
‣ She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation report "will
set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in preserving the
sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician and his patient." Her thesis is that what cannot be
done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly.
‣ Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition applies
only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar where the person
sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and not the physician of the

petitioner." In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony considering that a husband may testify
against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other.
‣ Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by the person entitled thereto,
and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her unconditional consent to the use of the psychiatric evaluation
report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which took it into account among
others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void. Private respondent further argues that
petitioner also gave her implied consent when she failed to specifically object to the admissibility of the report in
her Answer where she merely described the evaluation report as "either unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate,
failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest opportunity to the evidence presented on privileged matters
may be construed as an implied waiver.
‣ The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication between physician and
patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making communications between
physician and patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to make a
full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition. Consequently, this prevents the physician from
making public information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to the patient.
‣ Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the
requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked:
1. The privilege is claimed in a civil case;
2. The person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics;
3. Such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
4. The information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and,
5. The information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation (formerly character) of the
patient.
‣ In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document executed
by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition. Neither can his
testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot have the force and
effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report.
‣ Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground that it
was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court, he invoked the rule on privileged communications but
never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the testimony on the
ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and, consequently, the evidence
offered may be admitted.

GONZALES V. CA
G.R. No. 17740, October 30, 1998
Digest Author: Irvin Velasquez
PARTIES
‣ Petitioners: Abad Gonzales, Dolores Abad, and Cesar Tioseco – Siblings of the deceased Ricardo
‣ Private Respondents – Honoria Empaynado (common law wife of deceased Ricardo), Cecilia H. Abad – Child of
Honoria with the deceased Ricardo, Marian H. Abad – Child of Honoria with the deceased Ricardo
‣ Jose Libunao, not a party, deceased legitimate husband of Honoria, claimed to be the father of Cecilia and Marian,
by the petitioners
‣ Dolores Saracho, not a party, mother of Rosemarie Abad
‣ Rosemarie S. Abad – Another child of the deceased from another woman
FACTS
‣ Petitioner Abad Gonzales, Dolores Abad, and Cesar Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their
brother (Ricardo Abad), before the CFI Manila
‣ They claim that they were the only heirs of Ricardo Abad as he allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or
ascendants
‣ The petitioners executed an extra-judicial settlement of the estate of their late mother (Lucila de Mesa). They
managed to cancel TCT’s and caused them to be transferred to their names. They also executed Real Estate
Mortgages on these properties.
‣ The private respondents (Honororia Empaynado, Cecilia, Marian, Rosemarie Abad) charge the petitioners for
deliberately concealing the existence of three children fathered by the deceased
‣ They filed a motion to set aside proceedings and for leave to file opposition in the petition for settlement of the
intestate estate of Ricardo Abad (the deceased brother of the petitioners) where they allege that Honoria
Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo for 20 years before his death and that they had two
children (Cecilia and Marian). They also disclosed the existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly
fathered by Ricardo with another woman (Dolores Saracho).
‣ The respondents later on discovered that petitioners had managed to cancel TCT’s by extra-judicially partitioning
their mother’s estate. Thus, they also filed a motion to annul the said extra-judicial partition, the TCT’s that they
caused to be transferred in their names, and the real estate mortgages that they caused to be annotated therein.
‣ The CFI ruled that Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie to be acknowledged natural children of the deceased, and named
them as the only surviving legal heirs. The court also annulled the TCT’s the petitioners obtained after extra-
judicial settlement of their mother’s estate.
‣ The petitioners filed for an MR, which was denied, as well as two notices of appeal both denied for being filed out
of time. They filed for a petition for certiorari before the CA but was denied lack of merit.
‣ Arguments of Petitioners:
‣ They submit that Cecilia and Marian are not the illegitimate children of Ricardo, the decased, and Honoria, but
the legitimate children of the spouses Jose Libunao (now deceased) and Honoria Empaynado
‣ Petitioners in contesting Cecila, Marian and Rosemarie Abad’s filiation, submit that the husband of Honoria
(Jose Libunao) was still alive when Cecilia and Marian were born (Cecila born 148, Marian born 1954). They
claim that Jose died sometime in 1971
‣ THEIR EVIDENCE:
1. Applications for enrolment at Maputa Institute of Technology of children of Honoria Empaynado with her
late husband Jose which were accomplished in 1956 and 1958.
2. They claim that had Jose been dead during the time when said applications were accomplished, the
enrolment forms would have stated so. Thus they conclude that Jose must have still been alive in 1956 and
1958
3. They also presented joint affidavit of two persons who stated their knowledge of Jose’s death in 1971

4. They also presented an affidavit of a doctor declaring that in 1935, he had examined the deceased (Ricardo)
and found him to be infected with gonorrhea and that he had become sterile because of the disease (thus he
could not have fathered the alleged natural children)
‣ Arguments of Respondents:
‣ They claim that Jose died sometime in 1943 (before the alleged natural children were born)
‣ They claim that Ricardo acknowledged the children as his natural children
‣ THEIR EVIDENCE:
1. Individual income statements and assets of Ricardo and
2. Individual tax returns where he declared his legitimate wife (Honoria) and his legitimate dependent
children (Cecila and Marian, and Rosemarie Abad)
3. Insurance for Cecilia, Marian
4. Trust fund payable to Marian and Cecilia
5. Bank deposits for Cecilia and Marian
‣ As to the Doctor’s affidavit (about the gonorrhea), the same was objected to by private respondents as being
privileged communication under Section 24 (c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES/HELD
‣ Whether or not the pieces of evidence as presented by petitioners are conclusive evidence to establish a
presumption that the children are the legitimate children of Honoria and Jose? NO. The evidence presented by
petitioners to prove that Jose died in 1971 are far from conclusive.
RATIO
‣ Failure to indicate on an enrolment form that one’s parent is “deceased” is not necessarily proof that said parent
was still living during the time said form was being accomplished.
‣ The the joint affidavits presented by petitioners as to the supposed death of Jose Libunao in 1971 is not competent
evidence to prove the latter’s death at that time, being merely secondary evidence. Jose Libunao’s death certificate
would have been the best evidence but they failed to present the same, although there is no showing that said
death certificate has been lost or destroyed as to be unavailable as proof of Jose Libunao’s death. More telling, while
the records of Loyola Memorial Park show that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971,
this person appears to be different from Honoria Empaynado’s first husband, the latter’s name being Jose Santos
Libunao. Even the name of the wife is different. Jose Bautista Libunao’s wife is listed as Josefa Reyes while the wife
of Jose Santos Libunao was Honoria Empaynado.
‣ As to the Doctor’s affidavit, the same is inadmissible in evidence. (Rule 130 Sec 24 (c)) The rule on confidential
communications between physician and patient requires that:
1. The action in which the advice or treatment given or any information is to be used is a civil case;
2. The relation of physician and patient existed between the person claiming the privilege or his legal
representative and the physician;
3. The advice or treatment given by him or any information was acquired by the physician while professionally
attending the patient;
4. The information was necessary for the performance of his professional duty; and
5. The disclosure of the information would tend to blacken the reputation of the patient.
‣ Petitioners do not dispute that the affidavit meets the first four requisites. They assert, however, that the finding
as to Ricardo Abad’s “sterility” does not blacken the character of the deceased.
‣ Petitioners conveniently forget that Ricardo Abad’s “sterility” arose when the latter contracted gonorrhea, a fact
which most assuredly blackens his reputation. In fact, given that society holds virility at a premium, sterility
alone, without the attendant embarrassment of contracting a sexually-transmitted disease, would be sufficient to
blacken the reputation of any patient. We thus hold the affidavit inadmissible in evidence. And the same remains
inadmissible in evidence, notwithstanding the death of Ricardo Abad.

ALMONTE V. VASQUEZ 

NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Digest Author: Marisse Aldeza
PARTIES
‣ Petitioner- Romulo Neri, former NEDA Director General
‣ Respondent - Senate Committee in Accountability of Public Officers, Trade and Commerce and National Defense
and Security
FACTS
‣ DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment
and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of approximately P16 Billion Pesos.
The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
‣ Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet
officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to appear and testify
on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the September 26 hearing, claiming
he was out of town during the other dates.
‣ Neri appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about (11) hours on matters. He disclosed that then
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He
further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
‣ However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege."
‣ To be specific, he refused to answer questions on:
1. Whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project
2. Whether or not she directed him to prioritize it,and
3. Whether or not she directed him to approve it.
‣ Respondent Committees persisted in knowing his answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear and
testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to
respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground of executive
privilege.
‣ On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President
invoking executive privilege citing the case of Senate v. Ermita.
‣ On November 29, 2007, in petitioner’s reply to respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to
be covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new
matters to be taken up. He just requested that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify.”
‣ In addition, he also stated that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President and the said
conversation is dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the
impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of
foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines.
‣ Respondent committees cited him in contempt after having found the explanation unsatisfactorily. They opined
that Neri’s testimony is material and conducted in aid of legislation and no basis for invoking executive privilege.
‣ On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking EO 464 (prevents cabinet
members and officials and such others as may be determined by the President to attend congressional hearings) and
Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.
ISSUES/HELD
1. W/N the communications elicited by the 3 subject questions are covered by executive privilege - YES
2. W/N the claim of executive privilege is properly invoked - YES

INITIAL DISCUSSION BY SC:
‣ At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita becomes imperative. Senate draws in bold strokes
the distinction between the legislative and oversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under Sections 21 and
22.
‣ Section 21 relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation. On the other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
‣ Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives
are different.
‣ This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in Section
21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Courts pronouncement in
Senate v. Ermita is clear:
‣ “...In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission”
RATIO 1
‣ The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by Executive Privilege
‣ The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done
in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.
‣ The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of
executive privilege.
‣ At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our concept of
executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The most recent of these is
the case of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this
regard, it is worthy to note that Executive Ermitas Letter limits its bases for the claim of executive privilege to
Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez, and Chavez v. PEA. There was never a mention of E.O. 464.
‣ The Court discussed the concept of executive privilege by citing U.S. cases establishing the broad contours of the
presidential communications privilege.
‣ In United States v. Nixon, the U.S. Court recognized a great public interest in preserving the confidentiality of
conversations that take place in the Presidents performance of his official duties. It thus considered
presidential communications as presumptively privileged. The privilege is said to be necessary to guarantee
the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those who assist him with freedom to
explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would
be unwilling to express except privately.
‣ In In Re: Sealed Case, the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds of executive
privilege; one is the presidential communication’s privilege and, the other is the deliberative process
privilege.
‣ Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications privilege

applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-making of
executive officials.
‣ The presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and
post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones. The privilege is meant to encompass only those
functions that form the core of presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as
quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power (such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and
removal power, the power to grant pardons and reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and
other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties, etc.)
‣ The Court after the lengthy discussion on foreign jurisprudence regarding executive privilege went on the
application of the above doctrines under our jurisdiction:
‣ Chavez v. PCGG- Court held that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters

‣ Chavez v. PEA- There is also a recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences,
and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.
‣ Senate v. Ermita- the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully discussed.
‣ All the cited cases somehow provide for the element of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1. The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2. The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the
President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
‣ Using the above elements, the Court is convinced that the communications elicited by the 3 questions are covered
by the presidential communications privilege.
‣ First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to
enter into an executive agreement with other countries;
‣ Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet; and
‣ Third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and
of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
‣ The record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent Committees to show a compelling or critical
need for the answers to the 3 questions in the enactment of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the
exercise of the legislative oversight function under Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same
Article.
‣ Senate v. Ermita ruled that the the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. In the present case, Executive Sec. Ermita
categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential communications privilege in relation
to Pres. Arroyo’s executive and policy decision- making process and diplomatic secrets.
‣ (Not impt. for evid) Right of the people to information on matters of public concern v. Right of Congress to obtain
information in aid of legislation. Senate v. Ermita said:
‣ “While Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a highly qualified
sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to information.”
RATIO 2
‣ The Claim of Executive Privilege is Properly Invoked
‣ The Letter Sec. Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly
states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v.
Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly. That is more than enough compliance.
‣ In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.
‣ With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, the Court find the grounds relied upon by Executive
Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the requested
information could be classified as privileged.
‣ The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an allegation be made whether the information demanded involves
military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified.
The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive.
‣ The Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel
disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate
and co-equal department. 

PER CURIAM SUPREME COURT DECISION IN CONNECTION WITH THE LETTER OF THE HOUSE
PROSECUTION PANEL TO SUBPOENA JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT
Digest Author: Aziza Bacay
DOCTRINE
‣ To summarize these rules, the following are privileged documents or communications, and are not subject to
disclosure:
1. Court actions such as the result of the raffle of cases and the actions taken by the Court on each case included
in the agenda of the Court’s session on acts done material to pending cases, except where a party litigant
requests information on the result of the raffle of the case, pursuant to Rule 7, Section 3 of the IRSC;
2. Court deliberations or the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters pending before
the Court;
3. Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in nature, in particular, documents and other
communications which are part of or related to the deliberative process, i.e., notes, drafts, research papers,
internal discussions, internal memoranda, records of internal deliberations, and similar papers.
4. Confidential Information secured by justices, judges, court officials and employees in the course of their
official functions, mentioned in (2) and (3) above, are privileged even after their term of office.
5. Records of cases that are still pending for decision are privileged materials that cannot be disclosed, except only
for pleadings, orders and resolutions that have been made available by the court to the general public.
6. The principle of comity or inter-departmental courtesy demands that the highest officials of each department be
exempt from the compulsory processes of the other departments.
7. These privileges belong to the Supreme Court as an institution, not to any justice or judge in his or her
individual capacity. Since the Court is higher than the individual justices or judges, no sitting or retired justice
or judge, not even the Chief Justice, may claim exception without the consent of the Court.
PARTIES
‣ Sender of the letter – Hon. Joseph Abaya, in behalf of House Impeachment Panel
FACTS:
‣ During the impeachment proceedings against Chief Justice Corona, the Prosecution Panel manifested in a
COMPLIANCE dated January 27, 2012 that it would present about 100 witnesses and almost a thousand
documents, to be secured from both private and public offices.
‣ The list of proposed witnesses included Justices of the Supreme Court, and Court officials and employees who will
testify on matters, many of which are, internal to the Court.
‣ The letters asked for the examination of records, and the issuance of certified true copies of the rollos and the
Agenda and Minutes of the Deliberations, as above described, for purposes of Articles 3 and 7 of the
Impeachment Complaint. These letters specifically focused on the following:
‣ With respect to the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.
case1 (presently pending on the merits), the examination of the rollo of the case and the issuance of certified
true copies of the Agenda and the Minutes of the case;
‣ With respect to Navarro v. Ermita or the Dinagat case (still pending on the merits), the examination of the
rollo of the case; Notice of Resolution - 7 - February 14, 2012
‣ With respect to Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al. (a
closed and terminated case), the examination of the rollo of the case; and
‣ With respect to League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP) v. COMELEC, 4 (a closed and terminated case) the
examination of the rollo of the case.
‣ House Impeachment Panel requested the Impeachment Court for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum for the production of records of cases, and the attendance of Justices, officials and employees of the
Supreme Court, to testify on these records and on the various cases mentioned above.
‣ Presiding Senator-Judge Juan Ponce Enrile issued an Order denying the request as to the testimony of the Supreme
Court Justices since their attendance is under compulsory process making the matter moot and academic.

Nonetheless, the clerk of Supreme Court was ordered to appear and bring the original and certified true copies of
the documents requested.
ISSUES/HELD
1. W/N the Justices should be required to testify – NO, principle of separation of powers; independence of the
judiciary
2. W/N the documents requested should be given to the House Impeachment Panel – NO, they are privileged
documents
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ Court discussed the independence of the judiciary and principle of comity or the practice of voluntarily observing
inter-departmental courtesy in undertaking their assigned constitutional duties for the harmonious working of
the government
‣ Justices of the Court cannot be compelled to testify on matters relating to the internal deliberations and actions of
the Court, in the exercise of their adjudicatory functions and duties. This is to be differentiated from a situation
where the testimony is on a matter which is external to their adjudicatory functions and duties
‣ For example, where the ground cited in an impeachment complaint is bribery, a Justice may be called as a witness
in the impeachment of another Justice, as bribery is a matter external to or is not connected with the adjudicatory
functions and duties of a magistrate. A Justice, however, may not be called to testify on the arguments the accused
Justice presented in the internal debates as these constitute details of the deliberative process.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ NO. As regards Court Records:
‣ General Rule: Policy of transparency under the right to information and access to official records and documents
pertaining to official acts, transactions, decisions, government research data (Art. III, Sec. 7, 1987 Constitution).
‣ The right to information, by its very nature and by the Constitution’s own terms, is not absolute. On the part of
private individuals, the right to privacy, similarly inviolable, exists. Institutions also enjoy their own right to
confidentiality, that, for governmental departments and agencies, is expressed in terms of their need to protect
the integrity of their mandated tasks under the Constitution and the laws; these tasks, to state the obvious, are
their reasons for their being.
‣ Notably, the rule grants access to court records to any person, subject to payment of fees and compliance with
rules; it is not necessary that the request be made by a party to the case. This grant, however, is not as open nor as
broad as its plain terms appear to project, as it is subject to the limitations the laws and the Court’s own rules
provide. As heretofore stated, for the Court and the Judiciary, a basic underlying limitation is the need to preserve
and protect the integrity of their main adjudicative function.
‣ Exception: When confidential: Specifically, the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC) prohibits the
disclosure of (1) the result of the raffle of cases, (2) the actions taken by the Court on each case included in the
agenda of the Court’s session, and (3) the deliberations of the Members in court sessions on cases and matters
pending before it
‣ Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged communication.
‣ The privilege against disclosure of these kinds of information/communication is known as deliberative process
privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of reaching a decision. “Written advice from a variety of
individuals is an important element of the government’s decision-making process and that the interchange of
advice could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose those recommendations;” the privilege is
intended “to prevent the ‘chilling’ of deliberative communications.”
‣ Such privileged communication can also be exercised by the Senators by invoking the legislative privilege about
information gathered during an Executive session of the Senate’s legislative inquiry in aid of legislation.
‣ A document is “predecisional” if they were made in the attempt to reach a final conclusion.
‣ A material is “deliberative,” on the other hand, if it reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process. The key
question in determining whether the material is deliberative in nature is whether disclosure of the information
would discourage candid discussion within the agency.
‣ Court records which are “predecisional” and “deliberative” in nature are thus protected and cannot be the subject
of a subpoena if judicial privilege is to be preserved.

BANCO FILIPINO V. MONETARY BOARD
G.R. No. L-70054. July 8, 1986
Digest Author: Ellen Buenaventura
DOCTRINE
‣ On Rule 130, Sec 21, par (e) a public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by
disclosure: This privilege is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the protection of public
interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, the privilege is not applicable.
PARTIES
‣ Petitioner is Banco Filipino (BF)
‣ Respondents are the Monetary Board (MB) and the Central Bank (CB) [they are the respondents in the MAIN case
but in this Resolution, they are the ones who filed the petition to set aside an Order issued by the RTC].
FACTS
‣ Quick Background: The main dispute in this case is actually the Monetary Board’s decision to place Banco Filipino under
receivership and liquidation, basically closing said bank. Banco Filipino is assailing the regularity and impartiality of
the said decision. Somewhere along the way, Banco Filipino filed a motion invoking Rule 27 of the Rules of Court for the
production of the documents and records pertaining to the administrative proceedings and meetings held by the
Monetary Board in arriving at the assailed decision. The RTC granted said motion and ordered the respondents to
produce said documents and records.
‣ The present petition filed by the Monetary Board and the Central Bank prays that the SC set aside an Order to
produce documents. Said Order was issued by RTC Makati upon Banco Filipino’s motion for the production,
inspection, and copying of certain papers and records.
‣ The said documents are allegedly needed by the Banco Filipino for the preparation of its comments, objections,
and exceptions to the Conservator's report and Receiver's Report.
‣ The documents now asked to be produced, inspected, and copied are the following:
1. Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its
meetings;
2. Copies of the letter and reports of first conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the MB and to Central Bank
Governor Jose Fernandez;
3. Papers showing computations of all the interests and penalties charged by the CB against BF;
4. Schedule of recommended valuation of reserves per Mr. Tiaoqui's report
5. Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr. Tiaoqui's report;
6. Annexes"A","B",and"C"of the joint report of Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and Mrs. Valenzuela;
7. Schedule of devaluation of CB premises of Paseo de Roxas of same report;
8. Schedule of BF's realizable assets from P5,159.44 B to P3,909.23 B
9. Documents listed in BF's letter to Mrs. Carlota Valenzuela dated October 25, 1985.
‣ In issuing the challenged order, RTC reasoned that the Supreme Court's resolution referring to it the matters
relative to the bank's closure does not preclude the petitioner from availing of this mode of discovery as an
additional means of preparing for the hearing. Further, RTC considered the documents sought to be produced as
not privileged because these constitute or contain evidence material to the issues into by the Court. The trial
court saw no reason why said documents should be thus concealed.
‣ Respondents take exception to the said order and pray in their petition before this Court for the reversal and
setting aside of said order on the ground that the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are
confidential pursuant to Secs 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.
‣ The invoked provisions say Any member of the Monetary Board or officer or employee of the Central Bank who
willfully violates this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties shall be held liable for
any loss or injury suffered by the Bank as a result of such violation or negligence. Similar responsibility shall apply
to the disclosure of any information of a confidential nature about the discussion or resolutions of the Monetary
Board, except as required in Section 13 of this Act…”

‣ Banco Filipino on the other hand says that the respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the
Central Bank records because it is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality. BF cites U.S. vs. Nixon
which states that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal
case is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental demands
of due process of law.”
‣ Respondents replied that U.S. vs. Nixon and the other decisions cited by petitioner are inapplicable because said
cases refer only to a claim of privilege based only on the generalized interest of confidentiality or on an
executive privilege that is merely presumptive. On the other hand, the so-called MB deliberations are
privileged communications pursuant to Section 21, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court because statements and
opinions expressed in the deliberation of the members of the MB are specifically vested with confidentiality
under Secs. 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act. The "public interest" requirement for non-disclosure is evident
from the fact that the statute punishes any disclosure of such deliberations.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ Should the Order for Production of Records be set aside? NO (Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing such order? NO
RATIO
‣ The general rule is that a party is ordinarily entitled to the production of books, documents and papers which are
material and relevant to the establishment of his cause of action or defense." The test to be applied by the trial
judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of reasonableness
and practicability.
‣ On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of books and papers do
not authorize the production or inspection of privileged matter, that is, books, papers which because of
their confidential and privileged character could not be received in evidence. In passing on a motion for
discovery of documents, the courts should be liberal in determining whether or not documents are relevant
to the subject matter of action. Likewise, any statute declaring in general terms that official records are
confidential should be liberally construed, to have an implied exception for disclosure when needed in a
court of justice.
‣ No grave abuse of discretion was committed by the court below in granting petitioner's motion for the production
of the documents enumerated herein. The documents are not privileged. Also, they constitute or contain
evidence material to the issues being inquired into by the Court.
‣ With respect to Items Nos. 3 to 9, these are the annexes to the Supervision and Examination Sector, Dept. II
(SES) Reports which were taken into consideration by said respondents in closing petitioner bank. A copy of
the SES Reports was furnished to the petitioner. There is therefore no proper reason why the annexes thereto
should be withheld. Petitioner cannot adequately study and properly analyze the report without the
corresponding annexes. Pertinent and relevant, these could be useful and even necessary to the preparation by
petitioner of its comment, objections and exceptions to the Conservator's reports and receiver's reports.
‣ Regarding copies of the letter and reports of first Conservator Estanislao, to the MB and the CB Governor
Fernandez (Item No. 2) these appear relevant as BF has asserted that Estanislao had in fact wanted to resume
normal operations of Banco Filipino but then he was thereafter replaced by Mr. Gilberto Teodoro. The letter and
reports could be favorable or adverse to the case of petitioner but whatever the result may be, petitioner should
be allowed to photocopy the same.
‣ As to the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino and its
meetings (Item No. 1), respondents contend that "it is obvious from the requirement (Secs 13 and 15 of the
Central Bank Act) that the subject matter of the deliberations, when resolved. . . shall be made available to the
public but the deliberations themselves are not open to disclosure but are to be kept in confidence." SC
disagreed. The deliberations may be confidential but not necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no
specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely
the courts from conducting an inquiry on said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a
matter subject of a suit pending before it. The disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for
personal gain. There is no indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the
bank or to third parties. Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it considers
as information useful and indispensably needed by it to support its position in the matter being inquired to by
the court below.
‣ Respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of Court which states: The following persons cannot testify as to
matters learned in confidence in the following cases: (e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of
office or afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the
public interest would suffer by disclosure.

‣ But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection of public officers but for the
protection of public interest. Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced, this invoked rule
will not be applicable. The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him
in official confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by
the disclosure question.
‣ In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the disclosure of the
papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank was already closed for a while, any
disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports, and transcripts at this time pose no danger or peril to our
economy. Neither will it trigger any bank run nor compromise state secrets. On the contrary, public interests will
be best served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only the banks and its employees but also its numerous
depositors and creditors are entitled to be informed as to whether or not there was a valid and legal justification
for the petitioner's bank closure. Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in which the
public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected.
NOTE: SYLLABUS says relate to RA 1405 (Prohibiting Disclosure of Deposits with Banking Institutions) this makes
deposits with banks absolutely confidential. I don’t know why this is related to this case because there are no deposits nor
bonds involved in this case. Plus, the statute contemplates a situation where someone, i.e. a govt official, wants to inquire
into or examine the deposits in a bank. Here in this case, it’s the bank that is asking for the production of the records from a
government official. Weird.

AIR PHILIPPINES V. PENSWELL
G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007
Digest Author: Kevin Bulotano
FACTS
‣ Pennswell delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade covered by several sales invoices. Air Philippines
failed to pay Pennswell over the said goods. Hence, respondent filed a complaint for a sum of money.
‣ Air Philippines said that it was justified in not paying the said obligation because Pennswell defrauded them. The
items sold by Pennswell were misrepresented as new when it fact they were the same old products that Pennswell
sold.
‣ According to petitioner, respondents products, namely Excellent Rust Corrosion, Connector Grease, Electric
Strength Protective Coating, and Anti-Seize Compound, are identical with its Anti-Friction Fluid, Contact Grease,
Thixohtropic Grease, and Dry Lubricant, respectively. Petitioner asseverated that had respondent been forthright
about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the items complained of.
‣ During the pendency of the trial, Air Phil filed a motion to compel respondent to give a list of the ingredients and
chemical products of Pennswell. RTC granted this but reversed itself upon Pennswell’s motion for reconsideration.
CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. Hence, Air Philippines raised the issue of whether or not the respondent’s can be
compelled to give such a list before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N a trade secret is privileged. YES
RATIO
‣ A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner and those of
his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret formula or process not
patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some article of trade having a
commercial value.
‣ A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or compilation of information that: (1) is used in one's
business; and (2) gives the employer an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess
the information. American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors to determine if an information is a
trade secret, to wit:
1. The extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business;
2. The extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;
3. The extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
4. The value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
5. The amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
6. The extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent source
‣ The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondents special lubricants are trade secrets within
the contemplation of the law. The ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondents production and business.
No doubt, the information is also valuable to respondents competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple
respondents business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical composition of respondents
lubricants are opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which its business is founded.
‣ Section 1 Rule 27 of the Rules of Court states that the court may order any party a) to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things WHICH ARE NOT PRIVILEGED, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action; and which are in his possession, custody or control or b) to permit
entry upon designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. In
other words, the thing that can be produced and inspected must not be privileged.
‣ Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a)
communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c) communication
between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public
interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the

following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters may not be
compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information contained in tax census returns; and
(d) bank deposits. (Based on the book of Francisco on Evidence)
‣ Trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction affords to trade
secrets is evident in our laws. The Interim Rules of Procedure on Government Rehabilitation, effective 15
December 2000, which applies to: (1) petitions for rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships, and
associations pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A, as amended; and (2) cases for rehabilitation transferred
from the Securities and Exchange Commission to the RTCs pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as
The Securities Regulation Code, expressly provides that the court may issue an order to protect trade secrets or
other confidential research, development, or commercial information belonging to the debtor. Moreover, the
Securities Regulation Code is explicit that the Securities and Exchange Commission is not required or authorized
to require the revelation of trade secrets or processes in any application, report or document filed with the
Commission. This confidentiality is made paramount as a limitation to the right of any member of the general
public, upon request, to have access to all information filed with the Commission.
‣ In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the Philippines,
in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is true that all
consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall indicate their general
make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not apply to respondent.
Respondents specialized lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric
Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound -- are not consumer products. Consumer
products, as it is defined in Article 4(q), refers to goods, services and credits, debts or obligations which are
primarily for personal, family, household or agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not be limited to, food,
drugs, cosmetics, and devices. This is not the nature of respondents products. Its products are not intended for
personal, family, household or agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of
aircraft propellers and engines.
‣ We do not find merit or applicability in petitioners invocation of Section 12 of the Toxic Substances and
Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, which grants the public access to records, reports or
information concerning chemical substances and mixtures, including safety data submitted, and data on emission
or discharge into the environment. To reiterate, Section 12, of said Act deems as confidential matters, which may
not be made public, those that would divulge trade secrets, including production or sales figures or methods;
production or processes unique to such manufacturer, processor or distributor, or would otherwise tend to affect
adversely the competitive position of such manufacturer, processor or distributor. It is true that under the same
Act, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources may release information; however, the clear import of
the law is that said authority is limited by the right to confidentiality of the manufacturer, processor or
distributor, which information may be released only to a medical research or scientific institution where the
information is needed for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment of a person exposed to the chemical
substance or mixture. The right to confidentiality is recognized by said Act as primordial. Petitioner has not made
the slightest attempt to show that these circumstances are availing in the case at bar.
‣ Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for doing
justice. The court does not, however, find reason to except respondents trade secrets from the application of the
rule on privilege. The revelation of respondents trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the
main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioner received respondents goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure, there are defenses
under the laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest of justice
ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade secrets. If we were to weigh the conflicting interests between the
parties, we rule in favor of the greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from
discovery, because they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the
public. To the mind of this Court, petitioner was not able to show a compelling reason for us to lift the veil of
confidentiality which shields respondents trade secrets.

HOFFMAN V. UNITED STATES
341 U.S. 479, May 28, 1951
Digest Author: Coleen Bunao
DOCTRINE
‣ The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment extends not only to answers that
would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute, but also to those which would furnish
a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.
‣ To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in
which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered
might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.
PARTIES
‣ Mr. Hoffman – petitioner
‣ US Government (federal district court of Philadelphia) – respondent
FACTS
‣ Gist: Mr. Hoffman has been convicted of criminal contempt for refusing to obey a federal court order requiring
him to answer certain questions asked in a grand jury investigation. He raises here important issues as to the
application of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment, claimed to justify his refusal.
‣ The questions he refused to answer pertained to the nature of his present occupation and his contacts and
connections with, and knowledge of the whereabouts of, a fugitive witness sought by the same grand jury and for
whom a bench warrant had been requested. The judge who had impaneled the grand jury and was familiar with
these circumstances found no real and substantial danger of incrimination to petitioner and ordered him to
answer.
‣ A special federal grand jury was convened at Philadelphia on September 14, 1950, to investigate frauds upon the
Federal Government, including violations of the customs, narcotics, and internal revenue liquor laws of the United
States, the White Slave Traffic Act, perjury, bribery, and other federal criminal laws, and conspiracy to commit all
such offenses. In response to subpoena, Mr. Hoffman appeared to testify on the day the grand jury was empaneled,
and was examined on October 3. The pertinent interrogation, in which he refused to answer, follows:
‣ Gist of the Q&A: Has Mr. Hoffman been in the same undertaking since the start of the year (has he been doing the
same thing) and whether or not he knows (he’s known Weisberg for 20 years), has seen Mr. Weisberg (who has a
subpoena issued against him), has talked to him or knows where he is.
‣ "Q. What do you do now, Mr. Hoffman?"
‣ "A. I refuse to answer."
‣ "Q. Have you been in the same undertaking since the first of the year?"
‣ "A. I don't understand the question."
‣ "Q. Have you been doing the same thing you are doing now since the first of the year?"
‣ "Q. Do you know Mr. William Weisberg?"
‣ "A. I do."
‣ "Q. How long have you known him?"
‣ "A. Practically twenty years, I guess."
‣ "Q. When did you last see him?"
‣ "Q. Have you seen him this week?"
‣ "Q. Do you know that a subpoena has been issued for Mr. Weisberg?"

‣ "A. I heard about it in Court."
‣ "Q. Have you talked with him on the telephone this week?"
‣ "Q. Do you know where Mr. William Weisberg is now?"
‣ "A. I refuse to answer. "
‣ It was stipulated that Mr. Hoffman declined to answer on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate
him of a federal offense.
‣ His claim of privilege was challenged by the Government in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, which found no real and substantial danger of incrimination to petitioner and ordered him to return
to the grand jury and answer. Petitioner stated in open court that he would not obey the order, and, on October 5,
was adjudged in criminal contempt and sentenced to five months' imprisonment
‣ He appealed and pending appeal filed for bail which was denied. He then filed a Petition for Reconsideration of
Allowance of Bail Pending Appeal," alleging that:
‣ "He was justified in his refusal to answer the questions as aforesaid, or, in any event, that there is so substantial a
question involved that your petitioner should be released on bail. . . ."
‣ Mr. Hoffman asserted that "He assumed when he refused to answer the questions involved before the Grand Jury, that
both it and the Court were cognizant of, and took into consideration, the facts on which he based his refusals to answer.”
‣ He has since been advised, after his commitment, that the Court did not consider any of said facts upon which he
relied and, on the contrary, the Court considered only the bare record [of the questions and answers as set out
above]. “
‣ Mr. Hoffman also added that: (Gist: He is a known underworld character, in short, he was a known criminal with a
20-year record including imprisonment and drugs)
‣ (a) This investigation was stated, in the charge of the Court to the Grand Jury, to cover 'the gamut of all crimes
covered by federal statute.' . . ."
‣ "(b) he has been publicly charged with being a known underworld character, and a racketeer with a twenty-year
police record, including a prison sentence on a narcotics charge. . . ."
‣ "(c) Affiant, while waiting to testify before the Grand Jury, was photographed with one Joseph N. Bransky, head of
the Philadelphia office of the United States Bureau of Narcotics. . . ."
‣ "(d) Affiant was questioned concerning the whereabouts of a witness who had not been served with a subpoena and
for whom a bench warrant was sought by the Government prosecutor. . . ."
‣ "On the basis of the above public facts, as well as the facts within his own personal knowledge, affiant avers that he
had a real fear that the answers to the questions asked by the Grand Jury would incriminate him of a federal
offense."
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N his conviction of criminal contempt was proper. – NO. Answers to the questions as to his contacts and
connections with the fugitive witness and knowledge of his whereabouts at the time might have exposed petitioner
to peril of prosecution for federal offenses ranging from obstruction to conspiracy.
RATIO
‣ The privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment extends not only to answers that
would in themselves support a conviction under a federal criminal statute, but also to those which would furnish
a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.
‣ To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is
asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be
dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.
‣ In this case, the court should have considered that the chief occupation of some persons involves evasion of
federal criminal laws and that truthful answers by petitioner to the questions as to the nature of his business
might have disclosed that he was engaged in such proscribed activity.

GUTANG V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 135406. July 11, 2000
Digest Author: Ian Canoy
DOCTRINE
‣ This is under testimonial evidence so please check the latter part of this digest in bold for the possible main point of the
case for this topic.
PARTIES
‣ Accused-appellant / Petitioner: David Gutang y Juarez (Gutang Lang nag appeal but 3 others were arrested with
him: Noel Regala , Alex Jimenez, Oscar de Venecia)
FACTS
‣ In connection with the enforceMent of a valid search warrant, David Gutang, along with Noel, Alex and Oscar, was
arrested by PNP NARCOM in his residence in ortigas avenue, Greenhills.
‣ When they were shed the warrant, the guys in the master’s comfort room. During the search, they found the
following on top of a glass table in the master’s bedroom:
‣ Shabu paraphernalia (tooters)
‣ Aluminum foil
‣ 1.4g of suspected marijuana fruiting tops in small white plastic
‣ 0.7g of suspected dried marijuana contained in small plastic container; among others
‣ They also inspected the cars of the suspects and found:
‣ Winchester Rayban Case with suspected shabu residue
‣ Tooters in a black plastic container
‣ Aluminum foil
‣ All these items were brought to the crime lab for tests. The results were positive for marijuana and shabu.
(PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-168-94)
‣ After the suspects were arrested, they were also brought to the crime lab of PNP.
‣ Forensic Chemist De Villa said she received a letter-request for drug dependency test on the four (4) men from PNP
NARCOM.
‣ A certain Mrs. Esguerra of the Crime Lab requested Gutang and his Co-Accused to submit urine samples for drug
testing which they voluntarily complied.
‣ PNP Forensic Chemist De Villa came out with CHEMISTRY REPORT NO. DT-107-94 and PHYSICAL REPORT NO.
DT-107-94 (urine drug test results) showing that the said urine samples all tested positive for the presence of
shabu.
‣ Informations for Illegal use and Illegal Possession were then filed with the court against the four men.
‣ (Case against Oscar was dismissed because he voluntarily submitted himself to rehab and confinement in an
accredited rehab center)
‣ All the others pleaded not guilty.
‣ RTC found them Guilty. CA Affirmed.
ISSUE/HELD
1. W/N the RECEIPTS OF PROPERTY SEIZED (Exhibits I and R) are inadmissible as evidence since Gutang’s signature
in such receipts were obtained without assistance of counsel. YES INADMISSIBLE.
2. W/N the PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT and CHEMISTRY REPORT (results of examination of the seized items) are
inadmissible since they were conclusions drawn from the Receipts above. No. Still admissible.
3. W/N the taking of his urine for drug testing without counsel is in violation of the right against testimonial
compulsion and if the PHYSICAL REPORT and CHEMISTRY REPORT (urine test exam results) are inadmissible. No.
Still admissible.

4. W/N Gutang is still guilty beyond reasonable doubt. YES.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ Gutang argues that the Receipts for Property Seized, which described the properties seized from the petitioner by
virtue of the search warrant, contain his signature. According to petitioner, inasmuch as the said evidence were
obtained without the assistance of a lawyer, said evidence are tantamount to having been derived from an
uncounselled extra-judicial confession and, thus, are inadmissible in evidence for being fruits of the poisonous
tree
‣ Correct. It's inadmissible.
‣ Held in a long line of cases that the signature of the accused in the Receipt of Property Seized is inadmissible in
evidence if it was obtained without the assistance of counsel.
‣ The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the
crime charged for the reason that, in the case at bar, mere unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is
punishable by law.
‣ Therefore, the signatures of the petitioner on the two (2) Receipts of Property Seized (Exhibits I and R) are not
admissible in evidence, the same being tantamount to an uncounselled extra-judicial confession which is
prohibited by the Constitution.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ Gutang contends that since the Receipts were inadmissible, the CHEMISTRY and PHYSICAL SCIENCE REPORTS are
also inadmissible because they are conclusions drawn from the receipts.
‣ Wrong. Still admissible.
‣ Even if the Receipts were inadmissible, the Chem and Physical Sciences Reports are still admissible inasmuch as
the examined materials were legally seized or taken from the petitioners bedroom on the strength of a valid search
warrant.
‣ Since the things were validly seized, the laboratory examinations on such things were validly done as well.
‣ Hence, the said Reports containing the results of the laboratory examinations, aside from the testimonial and
other real evidence of the prosecution, are admissible in evidence and sufficiently proved that the petitioner used
and had the said prohibited drugs and paraphernalia in his possession.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 3

‣ Gutang finally also posits the theory that since he had no counsel during the custodial investigation when his
urine sample was taken and chemically examined, the respective CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICAL REPORTS (urine
drug test results), are also inadmissible in evidence since his urine sample was derived in effect from an
uncounselled extra-judicial confession. Petitioner claims that the taking of his urine sample allegedly violates
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
‣ No. Still admissible!
‣ What the Constitution prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from the
accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence.
‣ An accused may validly be compelled to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done, without running afoul of the proscription
against testimonial compulsion.
‣ The situation in the case at bar falls within the exemption under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since
what was sought to be examined came from the body of the accused; a mechanical act not meant to unearth
undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes by simple observation.
‣ Note, they were not compelled to give their urine but they voluntarily complied.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 4

‣ Still guilty!
‣ ASSUMING ARGUENDO that the urine samples are inadmissible, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial
and documentary, to sustain conviction of Gutang.
‣ Gutang could not explain the Presence in s bedroom of drugs and drug paraphernalia in his bedroom. He only had
a feeble excuse that he was in the restroom -.-

‣ Prosecution Witness Capt. Mabanag, Head of the NARCOM raiding team testified that when he arrested the
accused, he showed signs of being underinfluence of drugs. (Testimonial evidence part)
‣ By Fiscal Villanueva (To the witness)
‣ Q: Mr. Witness, why was a drug defendant (sic) test requested on the persons of David Gutang, Noel Regala,
Alexander Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia?
‣ A: A drug test was made on them because when we held these persons David Gutang, Noel Regala, Alexander
Jimenez and Oscar de Venecia, they showed manifestations and signs that they are under the influence of drugs.
‣ Atty. Arias (defense): That is a conjectural answer. The witness is not authorized to testify on that.
‣ Fiscal Villanueva: We agreed as to the expertise of this witness at the time when I was qualifying him (interrupted)
‣ Court: At any rate, that was only his observation it is not necessarily binding to the court, that is his testimony, let it
remain.
‣ Atty. Arias: But the rule is clear.
‣ Court: That is what he observed.
‣ Fiscal Villanueva: And what is this manifestation that you observed?
‣ Atty. Arias: Precisely, that is already proving something beyond what his eyes can see.
‣ Fiscal Villanueva: That is part of his testimony.
‣ Court: Let the witness answer.
‣ Witness: I observed they are profusely sweating and their lips are dry, I let them show their tongue and it was
whitish and their faces are pale, reason why we made the necessary request for drug test.
‣ Even without the Receipts of Property Seized and the urine test samples, the alleged guilt of the petitioner for the
crimes charged were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
‣ GUILTY. SC AFFIRMS CA.
Others:
The search warrant was only served after months of surveillance by the NARCOM
Presumption of regularity on the part of the Police. Defense did not overcome the presumption as well.

PEOPLE V. INVENCION
G.R. No. 131636, March 5, 2003
Digest Author: Rofil Carpeso
DOCTRINE
‣ Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (filial privilege) is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a
descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to
testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges.
PARTIES
‣ Accused/Rapist – Artemio Invecion
‣ Victim – Cynthia Invencion
‣ Half brother of the victim – Elven Invention (Note: Focus on Elven’s testimony)
FACTS
‣ Artemio was charged before the RTC of Tarlac with 13 counts of rape in separate complaints all dated 17 October
1996, which were consolidated and jointly tried.
‣ At his arraignment Artemio entered a plea of not guilty in each case.
‣ Prosecution presented several testimonies:
1. Elven Invencion (8 yr old and half brother of Cynthia): Sometime before the end of the school year in 1996,
while he was sleeping in one room with his father Artemio, Cynthia, and 2 other younger brothers, he was
awakened by Cynthias loud cries and when he looked at her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia, doing a
pumping motion. After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants. Elven further declared that
Artemio was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining
any of her suitors. Whenever he was drunk, he would maul Elven and quarrel with his stepfather, Celestino
Navarro.
2. Eddie Sicat (40-year-old farmer and neighbor of Artemio): on the second week of March 1996, between 6:00
and 7:00 a.m., while he was passing by the house of Artemio on his way to the field to catch fish, he heard
somebody crying. He then peeped through a small opening in the destroyed portion of the sawali wall of
Artemios house. He saw Cynthia lying on her back and crying, while her father was on top of her, doing a
pumping motion. Eddie observed them for about 15 seconds, and then he left and proceeded to the field to
catch fish. He reported what he had witnessed to Artemios stepfather, Celestino, later that morning.
3. Gloria Pagala (mother of Cynthia and former common-law wife of Artemio): she and Artemio parted ways
permanently. On 30 August 1996, her son Novelito told her that Cynthia was pregnant. Gloria then went to the
house of Artemio and asked Cynthia about her condition. The latter confessed that she had been sexually
abused by her father. Gloria then went to the office of the NBI in Tarlac and reported what Artemio had done to
their daughter Cynthia.
4. Dr. Rosario Fider of Tarlac Provincial Hospital testified that she examined Cynthia on 16 September 1996 and
found that she was six months pregnant and to have incomplete, healed hymenal lacerations at 3, 5, 8 oclock
positions, which could have been caused by sexual intercourse or any foreign body inserted in her private part.
5. Atty. Florencio Canlas (NBI agent): testified that on 18 September 1996, Cynthia, accompanied by her mother,
complained before him and NBI Supervising Agent Rolando Vergara that she was raped by her father Artemio.
She then executed a written statement, which she subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Canlas.
‣ The defense did not present Artemio as a witness, instead, his counsel de parte, Atty. Isabelo Salamida, took the
witness stand and testified for the defense.
‣ He declared that on 24 June 1997 (the same day when he testified before the court), between 10:45 and 11:00
a.m., he and his secretary went to the house of Artemio in Barangay Sapang Tagalog.
‣ The hut was made of sawali. When he went around the house and tried to peep through the old sawali walls on
the front and left and right sides of the hut, he could not see anything inside the room where Artemio and his
children used to sleep. Although it was then about noontime, it was dark inside.
‣ Atty. Salamida then concluded that prosecution witness Eddie Sicat was not telling the truth when he
declared having seen what Artemio did to Cynthia when he peeped through a small opening in the sawali wall
of the house in the early morning sometime on the second week of March 1996.

‣ Rebuttal:
1. Gloria Pagala testified that the when she went to the place again sometime in September 1996 after she was
informed of Cynthias pregnancy, she noticed that the destroyed portions of the huts sawali walls were not
yet repaired.
2. The second rebuttal witness Celestino Navarro (stepfather of Artemio) testified that he is the owner of the
small house at the time when Artemio together with Cynthia were living in that house, the huts old sawali
walls had some small holes in them, thus confirming the testimony of Eddie Sicat. After Artemio was
arrested on the basis of Cynthias complaint before the NBI, Celestino made some repairs in the hut by, among
other things, placing galvanized iron sheets to cover the holes at the destroyed portions of the sawali walls.
‣ RTC convicted Artemio in 1 case but acquitted him in all other 12 cases for lack of evidence.
‣ Artemio’s arguments: Artemio attacks the competency and credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven,
as his son, should have been disqualified as a witness against him under Section 20(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court (filial privilege). Besides, Elvens testimony appears not to be his but what the prosecution wanted him to
say, as the questions asked were mostly leading questions. Moreover, Elven had ill-motive in testifying against
him, as he (Artemio) was cruel to him.
‣ He also argues that since his house had no electricity and was dark even at daytime, it was impossible for Elven
and Eddie to see him allegedly doing pumping motion on top of Cynthia.
‣ On the other hand, Gloria wanted to get rid of Artemio because she was already cohabiting with another man.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ WON the court should consider the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses – YES
RATIO
‣ As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court (filial privilege).
‣ This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to
testify against an ascendant.
‣ The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly
observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial
privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio.
‣ Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only to tell the truth.
‣ Neither can Artemio challenge the prosecutions act of propounding leading questions on Elven. Section 10(c) of
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court (leading and misleading question) expressly allows leading questions when the
witness is a child of tender years like Elven.
‣ As observed by the OSG, Elven, who was of tender age, could not have subjected himself to the ordeal of a public
trial had he not been compelled by a motive other than to bring to justice the despoiler of his sisters virtue.
‣ There is no indication that Elven testified because of anger or any ill-motive against his father, nor is there any
showing that he was unduly pressured or influenced by his mother or by anyone to testify against his father.
‣ The rule is that where there is no evidence that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his testimony is entitled to full credence.
‣ As to the alleged variance in the time that rape was committed, the court ruled that the exact time or date of the
commission of rape is not an element of the crime. What is decisive in a rape charge is that the commission of the
rape by the accused has been sufficiently proved.
‣ Inconsistencies and discrepancies as to minor matters irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be
considered grounds for acquittal.
‣ In this case, we believe that the crime of rape was, indeed, committed as testified to by Elven and Eddie.
‣ As to the defense of Artemio that they don’t have electricity hence it was impossible for Elven and Eddie to have
witnessed the crime, the court ruled that Elven could not have been mistaken since he had known Artemio for a
long time and that he was only 2 meters away from them when the crime was commited.
‣ The alleged ill-motives on the part of Gloria and Celestino were not sufficiently proved.

LEE V. COURT OF APPEALS
“Stepmother testifying”; G.R. No. 177861; July 13, 2010
Digest Author: Amber Gagajena
DOCTRINE
‣ The parental and filial privilege stated in Sec 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence cannot apply to the stepmother
because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.
A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiffs: Lee-Keh’s children
‣ Defendant: Emma Lee
FACTS
‣ Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from
China. They had 11 children (herein referred to as Lee-Keh children).
‣ In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The
respondent Lee-Keh’s children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee
nearby, and had a relation with him.
‣ Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh’s children learned that Tiu’s children with Lee (herein referred to as
Lee’s other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh.
‣ This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the NBI to investigate the matter. After conducting such an
investigation, the NBI concluded in its report:
‣ “It is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger
woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a
quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8
children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second family and secure their
future.”
‣ On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them is a Special
Proceeding for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other
children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name.
‣ The Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to
compel Tiu, Emma Lees presumed mother, to testify in the case.
‣ The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lees stepmother.
‣ The RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was already
very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lee’s
mother.
‣ The CA reversed.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry- YES
RATIO
‣ Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking
Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads:
‣ SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct
ascendants, children or other direct descendants.
‣ The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal
cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions,
whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants.
‣ But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The
privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to direct ascendants and descendants, a family tie
connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.

‣ Article 965 thus provides:
‣ The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend
from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends.
‣ Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.

PEOPLE V. GAUDIA
G.R. 146111, Feb 23, 2004
Digest Author: Alvin Garces
DOCTRINE
‣ Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence
provided three requisites concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
‣ For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances must be consistent with
each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
PARTIES
‣ ROLENDO - accused of rape
‣ REMELYN - rape victim
‣ AMALIA - mother
‣ MIK - neighbor
FACTS
‣ Information was filed against Rolendo Gaudia (ROLENDO) for the crime of rape committed against Remelyn
Loyola (REMELYN), a minor
‣ Prosecution:
‣ Remelyn’s mother – Amalia, testitfied that:
‣ she left her two children Remelyn (3 1/2 y.o.) and Kimberly (1 y.o.) at their house in Clib, Hagonoy, Davao del
Sur to gather pigs’ food at Bulatukan.
‣ At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato.
‣ At about 4:00 in the afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water
and proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her any
information.
‣ On her way home, she shouted and called out Remelyn’s name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard Remelyn
calling out to her, "Ma, I am here," from a grove of ipil-ipil trees. Amalia rushed toward the place, but was met
by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30) meters from their house.She found Remelyn crying, naked,
nagbakaang (walking with her legs spread apart) and with fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves
clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed
her. Upon closer inspection, she found a whitish mucus-like substance coming from Remelyn’s private organ.
‣ The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring, a quack
doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and parents of the Rolendo.
‣ The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in Remelyn’s vagina, and told Amalia, "Hoy!
Amalia, your daughter was being (sic) raped.
‣ At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had seen the appellant pass by
her house and take Remelyn. At this point, the parents of Rolendo told Amalia, "Mal, let us talk about this
matter, we will just settle this, we are willing to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son
committed." Police officers came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the
police precinct of Hagonoy for investigation. Amalia’s statement was taken.
‣ Remelyn was then brought to Hagonoy Health Center in Davao to undergo genital examination. Results: No
contusions, fresh hymenal lacerations, physical virginity lost
‣ Remelyn’s neighbor – Tulon Mik, also testified that: he and his wife were on their way home after registering at
the COMELEC office. They saw appellant carrying a small girl in his arms. He identified the little girl as

Remelyn Loyola, daughter of Amalia Loyola. Appellant and Remelyn were on their way toward the ipil-ipil
trees.
‣ Defenses:
‣ Alibi: he was in COMELEC with his brother-in-law in the afternoon and at night, he was carrying DAYLEN, the
younger sister of Remelyn, because DAYLEN was crying. That he just stayed home that night.
‣ Trial Court convicted Rolendo based on circumstantial evidence
‣ IMPORTANT FACTS RELATED TO THE TOPIC:
‣ Amalia, mother of the rape victim, testified that there were 2 offers of compromise:
1. That the parents of Rolendo Gaudia (accused) offered a compromise to her
2. That Rolendo also offered a compromise to Amalia's husband (father of victim)
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the offer of compromise may be taken as evidence against Rolendo (accused) - NO
‣ W/N conviction based on circumstantial evidence is proper - YES
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ As to the 1st offer, followong the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of his parents
cannot prejudice the appellant-accused because he was not a party to the conversation. (in other words, it was not
him, the accused, that offered the compromise so it should not be taken against him)
‣ As to the 2nd offer, Amalia's testimony is as to the alleged compromise between Rolendo and her husband is only
hearsay because she is not a party to the conversation.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence
provided three requisites concur:
1. There is more than one circumstance;
2. The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
3. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
‣ The ruling case law is that for circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all circumstances
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.
‣ The first circumstantial evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik that at
4:00 p.m. on 24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the direction of the ipil-ipil grove, some 130
meters from her house. As a neighbor and relative of Remelyn’s stepfather, Mik had sufficient familiarity with the
child Remelyn. The possibility that he could have been mistaken in identifying the victim is nil.
‣ The second circumstantial evidence against the Rolendo is Amalia’s testimony that Remelyn emerged naked from
the same ipil-ipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead. Remelyn was crying and walking with her
legs spread far apart. Remelyn’s private organ was bleeding and excreting a white mucus-like substance.
‣ The third circumstantial evidence against Rolendo is Remelyn’s statement to her mother that it was appellant who
had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove and forced her to do something against her will.
‣ There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane, the Municipal
Health Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh vaginal lacerations.
‣ From these, the culpability of the Rolendo can be inferred with moral certainty. All the aforementioned
circumstances have been indubitably proven, both by the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution, and by the inability of the Rolendo to discredit their veracity.
‣ Rolendo also tried to argue that Remelyn never said that it was him that raped her, but the court did not believe
Rolendo because Remelyn called the appellant “Buang” or crazy and also said “iya kong lugos” which clearly
convened that Rolendo forced her to do something.

PEOPLE V. LISING
G.R. No. 106210-11, January 30, 1998
Digest Author: Bel Gervasio
DOCTRINE
‣ Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the rule that
the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This is based
upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations were true. A
man’s act, conduct and declarations wherever made, provided they be voluntary, are admissible against him, for
the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth and it is his fault if they are not.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff Appellee – People of the Philippines
‣ Accused Appellants – Roberto Lising, Rodolfo Manalili, Felimon Garcia, Enrico Dizon, Robin Manga
FACTS
‣ Ernesto Bernabe II, or Cochise, and Ana Castaos, or Beebom, were gruesomely killed.
‣ Manalili, a businessman, asked Garcia, his townmate, if he knew somebody who could effect the arrest of Herrera,
the suspect in the killing of his brother.
‣ Garcia informed Manalili that he already contacted a policeman to help him.
‣ They proceeded to a carinderia where they would meet Lising.
‣ Garcia introduced Lising, Dizon and another man to Manalili. During the meeting, Manalili gave them P2k and
instructed them to go and see his employee Nabua who will point to them the person to be arrested.
‣ They conducted a surveillance on the Castaos’ residence in the hope of seeing Herrera. They failed to do so, and
resumed the next day.
‣ The group was alerted after allegedly spotting Herrera entering the Castaos’ residence.
‣ Later, the group saw a man and a woman who happened to be Cochise and Beebom leave the Castaos’ residence in a
Lancer car. The group followed the Lancer car.
‣ The Lancer car went to a restaurant where the couple intended to have dinner. Alighting from the car, they were
stopped by Dizon and Manga who were both carrying firearms. Amidst protestations, Dizon poked his gun at
Cochise, and shoved him and Beebom into the back of the car.
‣ The couple’s failure to go home that night and the next day alarmed their parents, so a search was then initiated by
close friends and relatives.
‣ After about two months, a break came when 2 security guards working in a Warehouse had information
concerning Cochise. The two guards were interviewed by CAPCOM.
‣ The two guards told the CAPCOM that their friends were employees of Lising. They informed them that Lising
killed a mestisuhin man and a woman in their warehouse.
‣ The body of Cochise was exhumed. An autopsy was conducted where the finding was: Cause of Death: Multiple
Stab Wounds
‣ The next day, Beebom’s body, was exhumed from a shallow grave, two kilometers from where Cochise’s body was
found.
‣ After evading arrest the previous days, Lising was finally apprehended. In a Sworn Statement, he implicated
Garcia and Manalili. A manhunt for Garcia and Manalili began.
‣ Garcia surrendered and was brought to the NBI. He named Dizon as the companion of Lising when Cochise and
Beebom were kidnapped. He refused to make a statement or give further information until Manalili was arrested.
‣ Dizon was turned over by his superiors to the NBI. He named a certain Manga as one of their companions and
owner of the car they used when Cochise and Beebom were kidnapped. Thus, Manga was also picked up.
‣ Manalili, who was in Australia at that time was fetched by the NBI Director after proper representations were
made with the Australian police.
‣ Garcia executed a statement revealing that:

‣ He was requested by Manalili to look for persons who could help in arresting Herrera, the suspect in the killing
of his brother. He contacted Lising, a policeman, to help in the arrest. He together with Lising and Dizon went
to Quezon City but Nabua, Manalili’s employee, failed to spot Herrera. Nabua finally told them that Herrera was
at a house near the Camelot. After a few minutes of surveillance Nabua approached them and told them to
follow the car driven by a man with a woman companion. X X X Lising told him to bring Cochise and Beebom to
a warehouse where Cochise was killed by Lising. Thereafter Beebom was forced by Dizon and Manga to board
the car which left the warehouse.
‣ Rodolfo Manalili, on the other hand, manifested:
‣ That he met Lising through Garcia whom he requested to look for some police officers who could help in the
arrest of the accused in the killing of his brother. He gave them a sketch of Herrera. He told Garcia to postpone
their plan against Herrera due to his forthcoming travel to Germany. However, Garcia came to his office and
informed that they have already arrested Herrera with a lady companion. They proceeded to Valle Verde Hotel
and brought him to Room 213 where he saw a man slumped on the floor with his eyes and mouth covered with
tape. The lady companion sitting on the bed had her eyes also taped. He told Lising that the man is not Herrera.
He pleaded to Lising and companions to release them. He was told that Beebom and Cochise would be released.
He left for Germany. While still in Germany his wife and househelps received threatening calls from Garcia
who gave the telephone to Lising who asked for P60,000.00, otherwise he will kill him or implicate him in the
crime.
‣ Two Informations were filed against Lising, Manalili, Garcia, Dizon, Manga, and Fausto for Carnapping and
Kidnapping with Double Muder.
‣ All the accused pleaded not guilty.
‣ In building up their case, the prosecution presented two vital witnesses: Olimpia, who witnessed the abduction of
the young couple at Dayrit’s Ham and Burger House; and Morales, the pahinante who testified on the killing of
Cochise.
‣ Olimpia testified in court that he was at his post. There was a Lancer car which parked in front of the Dayrit’s Ham
and Burger House carrying a man and a woman. Then a black car with no license plate parked behind the green car
and two men alighted from it carrying guns. They announced that they were policemen. These men went towards
the Lancer and handcuffed its driver. He only heard the man being handcuffed retort “Bakit?” He said that his
attention was more focused on the handcuffing incident and just later noticed that the woman was already seated
at the back of the car.
‣ Morales stated that he had been working for Fausto and Lising as a pahinante or truck helper. He was awakened by
a knock at the gate of the warehouse. When he opened the gate, two cars came in: a Lancer car driven by Lising,
with Garcia seated in front, a man and a woman at the back seat of the car; and a black car with Dizon and Manga.
After the two cars entered the premises, he saw Lising go behind their sleeping quarters and get a wire. Lising and
Dizon then brought Cochise to an area in the middle of the warehouse while Manga led Beebom to another end. He
heard the woman plead: Uncle, maawa po kayo sa amin, while Manga was tying Beebom’s hands with the wire.
Garcia, after going inside the warehouse, was handed a knife by Lising which he used to stab Cochise on the chest.
‣ On the basis of the testimonies of the above witnesses, plus the confessions made in the extrajudicial statements
executed by Lising, Garcia, and Manalili, the prosecution presented their version of the incident.
‣ In their defense, the accused policemen claimed that there was insufficient evidence to sustain their conviction.
‣ Trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Murder
qualified with treachery and aggravated by evidence premeditation and abused of public position by Lising,
Manga and Dizon. The Court also found accused Lising, Dizon and Manga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Slight Illegal Detention.
ISSUE/HELD
1. W/N the extrajudicial statements of Manalili, Garcia and Lising are admissible. – Yes, admissible.
2. W/N the prosecution witnesses Olimpia and Morales are credible. Yes, credible.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective declarants, pursuant to the rule
that the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. This
is based upon the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless such declarations
were true. A man’s act, conduct and declarations wherever made, provided they be voluntary, are admissible
against him, for the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth and it is his fault if
they are not.

‣ There is no question that their respective extrajudicial statement of Manalili and Garcia were executed voluntarily.
They were assisted by their counsel and properly sworn to before a duly authorized officer. They merely relied on
their extra-judicial statements and did not take the witness stand during the trial.
‣ Lising, on the other hand, claims that he was coerced and tortured into executing the extrajudicial statement but
nothing appears on record that such extrajudicial statement was made under compulsion, duress or violence on
his person. Lising did not present himself for physical examination, nor did he file administrative charges against
his alleged tormentors.
‣ There are in fact indicia of voluntariness in the execution of his extra-judicial statements, to wit:
1. It contains many details and facts which the investigating officer could not have known and could have
supplied, without the knowledge and information given by Lising himself;
2. It bears corrections duly initialed by him;
3. It tends to explain or justify his conduct and shift the blame to his co-accused Manalili.
‣ The rule that an extrajudicial statement is evidence only against the person making it, also recognizes various
exceptions. One such exception worth noting is the rule that where several extrajudicial statements had been
made by several persons charged with an offense and there could have been no collusion with reference to said
several confessions, the facts that the statements are in all material respects identical, is confirmatory of the
confession of the co-defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein. They are also
admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated therein to show the probability of the latter’s
actual participation in the commission of the crime and may likewise serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear
from other facts and circumstances that other persons had participated in the perpetration of the crime charged
and proved. These are known as interlocking confessions.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ Nonetheless, the trial court’s decision, in convicting all the accused was based not on the aforesaid extrajudicial
statements of the accused alone but mainly on the eyewitness account of the two witnesses, Olimpia and Morales,
which the trial court gave weight and credence as bearing the chime of truth and honesty. Well-established is the
rule that the trial court’s evaluation of the credit-worthiness of the testimony given before it by witnesses should
be accorded great respect.
‣ The defense would discredit Morales alleging that he was not a credible witness considering that there were
inconsistencies and improbabilities in his testimony. To them, he was a rehearsed witness, since he was taken
from the NBI to the residence of Governor Remullas’ son, a good friend of Cochise, as sanctuary during the trial of
this case.
‣ Some of the inconsistencies pointed out are as follows: (1) in the sworn statement, Morales claimed that the black
car driven by Lising entered the compound ahead followed by the green car driven by Garcia while he stated in his
testimony in court that the green Lancer car was first to enter, driven by Lising with Garcia in the passenger seat
followed by the black car with Manga and Dizon on board; (2) in his statement, Morales indicated that he did not
see the actual killing of Cochise since the victim was brought out, while he testified in court that Garcia and Lising
stabbed the victim inside the compound; (3) Morales made mention of a total of five persons, including the two
victims, while in court, he identified the five accused seen with the two victims.
‣ It has been held that inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimony referring to minor details and not upon
the basic aspect of the crime do not impair the witness credibility. These inconsistencies even tend to strengthen,
rather than weaken, the credibility of witnesses as they negate any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.
‣ It bears emphasis that a sworn statement or an affidavit does not purport to be a complete compendium of the
details of the event narrated by the affiant. It is a matter of judicial experience that a sworn statement being taken
ex parte is almost always incomplete and often and often inaccurate. There is no rule of evidence to the effect that
omission of certain particulars in an affidavit or sworn statement would estop an affiant in making an elaboration
thereof during the trial. Whenever there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and testimony of the witness,
the latter commands greater weight.

PEOPLE V. MUIT
G.R. No. 181043, October 8, 2008
Digest Author: Bea Gutierrez
DOCTRINE
‣ The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it recognizes exceptions. One
of them is called interlocking confessions: Where there is several extra judicial statements made by several
persons charged with an offense, and there could have been no collusion between these confessions, and if the
statements are in all material respects identical, then this is confirmatory of the confessions of the co-defendants
and is admissible against other persons implicated therein.
PARTIES
‣ Plaintiff Appellee: People of the Philippines
‣ Accused Appellant: Muit (with co-accused Pancho, Dequillo, Romeo, Ferraer)
FACTS
‣ Muit, along with other persons were charged with kidnapping for ransom with homicide and carnapping. Ferraer
was discharged as an accused since he became a state witness.
‣ Background (details of the crime, dispense with if necessary):
‣ Muit and others were introduced to Ferraer as they will use Ferraer’s house as a safehouse.
‣ Ferraer was told that he should not worry because they are not killers, they’re just kidnappers for ransom. They
agreed that they would share the money that they would get from their victim equally.
‣ They planned their kidnapping operation. Romeo would be the informant; Ferraer and Pancho would be
guarding the victim.
‣ When Romeo informed them that their victim is already at the construction site, they proceeded with their
plan. Muit, along with other persons proceeded to the site.
‣ The victim was kidnapped and was put in a Pajero (owned by the victim) and drove away in the Pajero.
‣ Unfortunately, they were flagged down and a cross-fire ensued. Muit was arrested. Other accused (Romeo,
Pancho and Ferraer) were arrested also, although they were not among those who were apprehended in the
Pajero.
‣ Pancho and Dequillo, with the assistance of Atty. Malleare, executed their own extra judicial confessions. Muit
also executed two extra judicial confessions assisted by a lawyer and uncle. (Romeo did not execute one).
‣ The prosecution used these extra judicial confessions as documentary evidence, along with the testimony of
Ferraer and other witnesses.
‣ The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of Pancho, Dequillo and Muit. They gave their alibis,
and denied having participated in the crime. They claimed that the extra judicial confessions were acquired
through torture.
‣ RTC and CA held them guilty, stating that the extra judicial confessions were sufficient evidence to hold them
guilty.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Muit & Dequillo should be given credence against them and Romeo
(note that Romeo did not execute an extrajudicial confession). – YES, the confessions should be given credence.
RATIO
‣ The extra judicial confessions of Pancho, Jr., Dequillo, and Muit strengthened the case against them. There is
nothing to support their claim that they were coerced and tortured into executing their extra judicial confessions.
‣ The fact that their confessions contain details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known
is an indicia of their voluntariness.
‣ The appellants were assisted by their lawyers when they executed their statements.
‣ The claim of torture is not supported by medical certificates.

‣ With regard to Romeo, the extrajudicial confessions of Pancho, Dequillo and Muit also strengthened the case
against Romeo.
‣ The rule that an extra judicial confession is evidence only against the person making it recognizes exceptions.
One of them is called interlocking confessions:
‣ Where there is several extra judicial statements made by several persons charged with an offense, and there
could have been no collusion between these confessions, and if the statements are in all material respects
identical, then this is confirmatory of the confessions of the co-defendants and is admissible against other
persons implicated therein.
‣ These interlocking confessions are also admissible as circumstantial evidence against the person implicated
therein to show the probability of his actual participation in the crime.
‣ It can also serve as corroborative evidence if it is clear from other facts and circumstances that other persons
participated in the crime charged and proved.
‣ Hence, in convicting Romeo, the court relied on the extrajudicial confessions of his co-defendants (and also on
Ferraer’s testimony).

REPUBLIC V. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 169801 September 11, 2007
Author: Angeline Ibuna
DOCTRINE:
‣ Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules on Evidence - the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may
be given in evidence against him. This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration
against himself, unless it is true.
PARTIES
‣ Petitioner – DOH
‣ Respondent – Bautista (owner of security agency)
FACTS
‣ Department of Health (DOH), represented by its then Regional Director, Dr. Ricardo T. Trinidad, engaged the
services of Rescue Security Services (Rescue Security), owned by respondent Donatilla Bautista, to guard the DOH
premises against theft, pilferage, robbery, arson and other unlawful acts of strangers
‣ Dr. Trinidad and Elena Palma, the Branch Manager of Rescue Security, signed a Contract of Security Services
effective from Jan 1-Dec 31, 1996.
‣ 8 April 1996, DOH personnel discovered that the ceiling of Storeroom No. 1 was forcibly detached.
‣ This was reported to the police authorities, they then conducted an inventory and discovered that medicines
worth P4,244,385.32 were missing. (But the Criminal Investigation Group of the Philippine National Police
reported the loss at P6,369,837.04.)
‣ DOH repeatedly notified Rescue Security about the loss. The last of such notification was on 5 July 1996 through a
letter sent by Dr. Trinidad thereafter, On 9 August 1996, DOH sent Rescue Security a notice of termination of the
contract of services.
‣ Rescue Security refused to pay the total amount of loss, prompting petitioner to institute an action for damages
against respondents based on Rescue Security’s contractual undertaking that it would guarantee the payment of
any loss or damage to petitioner’s property.
‣ During trial, respondent Palma:
‣ denied the loss of the medicines and that they were never placed under the custody of Rescue Security or any of its
security guards
‣ that no notification was made within 48 hours from discovery of the loss in violation of Paragraph 6 of the
Contract of Security Services
‣ TC: (dismissed complaint) While TC found that the medicines were indeed lost, they held, however, that
petitioners failed to establish that the medicines had been placed inside the storeroom when the robbery took
place and that the medicines had been placed under the control and protection of Rescue Security since the latter
was not furnished with an inventory of the medicines. (Note: The RTC Decision did not cite the specific evidence
on which it relied in concluding that petitioner failed to immediately notify Rescue Security.)
‣ CA: upheld the decision of the TC however, as regards the issue of whether an inventory of the medicines was a
requirement before they could be considered placed under the control or custody of Rescue Security, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the petitioner and Rescue Security were in agreement that as long as the medicines were
placed within the DOH premises, they were already considered to have been placed under the control of the
security guards and any loss that may occur shall be the responsibility of the latter.
‣ Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of petitioners complaint because of petitioners failure to notify Rescue
Security of the fact of loss within 48 hours from the incident.
ISSUE/HELD
1. W/N the CA was correct in concluding that petitioner failed to comply with the 48-hour notice requirement – NO,
notice was given.
2. W/N the notice was sufficient under the Contract of Services? – YES, notice was sufficient.
3. W/N Rescue Security may be held liable under the contract – NO, failed to prove negligence.

RATIO FOR ISSUE 1
‣ The Court of Appeals overlooked relevant testimonial evidence, which, if properly appreciated, would justify a
different conclusion.
‣ As pointed out by petitioner, Rescue Security’s own personnel officer, Oliver Liangco, testified that in the morning
of 8 April 1996, he went to the DOH premises after he received at work a phone call from a certain Lourdes
Macabulos, Planning Officer of DOH-Region 3. According to Liangco, Macabulos informed him about the incident,
prompting him to proceed to the DOH premises and make an ocular inspection of the storeroom. Furthermore,
Liangco testified that Macabulos accompanied him when he inspected the storeroom and even verbally conveyed
to him that the drugs inside the storeroom were missing
‣ This fact alone is sufficient proof that Rescue Security had been informed of the loss through its personnel, Oliver
Liangco.
‣ Under Rule 130, Section 26 of the Rules on Evidence, the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him. This rule is based upon the notion that no man would make any declaration
against himself, unless it is true.
‣ On cross-examination, respondent Palma likewise testified that Liangco reported to her about the inspection he
had conducted on the DOH premises on the day of the alleged loss. Her testimony corroborated Liangcos
testimony that on the day of the discovery of the loss, Liangco was summoned to the DOH premises where the
reported loss took place.
‣ The CA sweepingly brushed aside Liangcos testimony and was persuaded by Macabulos rebuttal testimony
denying that she had spoken to Liangco about the incident. The rule is that the positive and categorical assertions
of witnesses generally prevail over bare denials. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence that cannot be given
greater weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters. Liangcos testimony
that he was informed about the incident must be upheld.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ Unfortunately, the Contract of Security Services does not define the requisite notice. Neither does it specify the
manner of reporting the loss, whether it should be written or verbal, or the employee responsible should convey or
receive the notice. The contract plainly states that the loss or damage should be reported to Rescue Security within
48 hours from its occurrence as a condition for the payment of the loss of property.
‣ Thus, the reportorial requirement should be construed in its plain and literal import. The Court cannot further
qualify the requisite or read into it any other meaning not expressed in the contract. Accordingly, as long as
Rescue Security is informed in any manner whatsoever about the loss of the property, the requisite notice should
be deemed satisfied. In the case at bar, Liangco received the information, not only once but twice, in his capacity
as an officer of Rescue Security. The notice to Liangco was notice to Rescue Security.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 3

‣ In civil cases, the party bearing the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto
‣ From a reading of the Contract of Security Services, it can be fairly deduced that the fact of negligence on the part
of Rescue Security cannot be presumed in the event of loss. Thus, in order to impute liability to Rescue Security in
case of loss, it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove that Rescue Security and or its security guards were guilty of
negligence in performing the security services it undertook to provide under the contract which include shielding
the DOH premises from robbery and other unlawful acts.
‣ After a painstaking review of the records of the case, the Court finds that petitioner failed to present preponderant
evidence showing that the negligence or carelessness of the security guards was the proximate cause of the loss of
the medicines.
‣ A perusal of their testimonies reveals that the security guards posted at petitioners premises during the period
that the robbery took place had performed their duties in the manner reasonably expected of them under the
circumstances. Petitioner failed to present proof to rebut this evidence. It is possible that there were security
lapses during the long holidays on the occasion of which the loss was thought to have occurred. However, absent
any evidence showing a direct link between the loss and the conduct of the security guards, the Court cannot make
Rescue Security answerable for the loss.

PEOPLE V. SABAGALA 

PEOPLE V. SATORRE 

BOSTON BANK V. MANALO
G.R. No. 158149 February 9, 2006
Digest Author: Pearl Simbulan
DOCTRINE
‣ Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other fact.The offering party must establish
the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a
given manner.
PARTIES
‣ Boston Bank (previously Commercial Bank of Manila) as owner eventual owners of the subdivision
‣ Perla and Carlos Manalo – “buyers” of the lot
FACTS
‣ Xavierville Estate, Inc. (XEI) was the owner of parcels of land in Quezon City, known as the Xavierville Estate
Subdivision, which was divided into residential lots for sale
‣ XEI, through its General Manager, Antonio Ramos sold to The Overseas Bank of Manila (OBM) some residential
lots in the subdivision, including Lot 1, Block 2, evidenced by a Deed of Sale of Real Estate
‣ XEI president Emerito Ramos, Jr. contracted the services of Engr. Carlos Manalo, Jr. who was in business of drilling
deep water wells and installing pumps to install a water pump at the Ramos’ residence in Katipunan
‣ Manalo, Jr. then proposed to XEI, through Ramos, to purchase a lot in the Xavierville subdivision, and offered as
part of the downpayment the P34,887.66 (payment for installation of pump) that Ramos owed him. Ramos
agreed.
‣ Manalos chose Lots 1 and 2 of Block 2
‣ In a letter to Perla Manalo, Ramos confirmed the reservation of the lots
‣ Pegged the price of the lots at P200.00 per square meter with a 20% down payment of the purchase price
payable on or before December 31, 1972
‣ But if the selling operations of XEI resumed after December 31, 1972, the balance of the downpayment would
fall due then, and the spouses would sign the aforesaid contract within five (5) days from receipt of the notice
of resumption of such selling operations.
‣ It was also stated in the letter that the spouses may introduce improvements thereon
‣ Manalos took possession of the property constructed a house thereon, and installed a fence around the perimeter
of the lots.
‣ Manalos were notified of the resumption of the selling operations of XEI. However, they did not pay the balance of
the downpayment on the lots because Ramos failed to prepare a contract of conditional sale and transmit the same
to Manalo for their signature.
‣ Spouses Manalo refused to pay the balance and the interest of the downpayment of the purchase price
‣ XEI turned over its selling operations to OBM, including the receivables for lots already contracted and those
yet to be sold
‣ Commercial Bank of Manila (CBM) acquired the Xavierville Estate from OBM
‣ CBM requested Perla Manalo to stop any ongoing construction on the property she had no permission for such
construction. When asked to prove that they had a contract with OBM, she promised to send the documents to
CBM but later failed to do so despite repeated demands.
‣ CBM filed a complaint for unlawful detained against the Spouses Manalo with MTC QC.
‣ In the meantime, the CBM was renamed the Boston Bank of the Philippines.
‣ The Manalos then filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the bank before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City
‣ Manalos alleged that they had always been ready, able and willing to pay the installments on the lots sold to them
by the defendants remote predecessorininterest, as might be or stipulated in the contract of sale, but no contract
was forthcoming

‣ Alleged that Manalos and Ramos had intended to incorporate the terms of payment contained in the three
contracts of conditional sale executed by XEI and other lot buyers in the corresponding contract of
conditional sale,which would later be signed by them.
‣ Boston Bank alleged that the letter agreement between XEI and the plaintiffs was not binding on it; and it had no
record of any contract to sell executed by it or its predecessor
‣ RTC favored the Manalos and ordered the bank to deliver a Deed of Absolute Sale after receiving payment from the
Manalos.
‣ Letter agreement between XEI and the Manalos is a complete contract to sell over the lots, and that they had
already partially consummated the same.
‣ CA affirmed.
‣ Boston Bank argues that the records do not reflect any schedule of payment of the 80% balance of the purchase
price and insists that unless the parties had agreed on the manner of payment of the principal amount, including
the other terms and conditions of the contract, there would be no existing contract of sale or contract to sell.
ISSUE/HELD
1. W/N Boston Bank or its predecessorsininterest, the XEI or the OBM, as seller, and the Manalos, as buyers, forged a
perfect contract to sell over the property - NO
2. W/N Manalos can rely on the terms of the contract between XEI and other buyers to show that the terms of
payment are settled - NO
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ No perfected contract to sell. Letters sent by XEI showed that terms of payment have yet to be agreed upon, so
there is not cause of action for specific performance.
‣ There is no evidence on record to prove that XEI or OBM and the respondents had agreed, after December 31, 1972,
on the terms of payment of the balance of the purchase price of the property and the other substantial terms and
conditions relative to the sale.
‣ In a contract to sell property by installments, it is not enough that the parties agree on the price as well as the
amount of downpayment. The parties must, likewise, agree on the manner of payment of the balance of the
purchase price and on the other terms and conditions relative to the sale. Even if the buyer makes a downpayment
or portion thereof, such payment cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ Manalos failed to allege and prove that, as a matter of business usage, habit or pattern of conduct, XEI granted all
lot buyers the right to pay the balance of the purchase price in installments of 120 months of fixed amounts with
pre computed interests, and that XEI and the respondents had intended to adopt such terms of payment relative to
the sale of the two lots in question
‣ Under Section 34, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, evidence that one did a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did the same or similar thing at another time, although such evidence may be received
to prove habit, usage, pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties.
‣ Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove
that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent
or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like.
‣ Habit, custom, usage or pattern of conduct must be proved like any other fact.The offering party must establish
the degree of specificity and frequency of uniform response that ensures more than a mere tendency to act in a
given manner but rather, conduct that is semiautomatic in nature.
‣ It is only when examples offered to establish pattern of conduct or habit are numerous enough to lose an inference
of systematic conduct that examples are admissible. The key criteria are adequacy of sampling and uniformity of
response or ratio of reaction to situations.
‣ There are cases where the course of dealings to be followed is defined by the usage of a particular trade or market
or profession. As expostulated by Justice Benjamin Cardozo of the United States Supreme Court: Life casts the
moulds of conduct, which will someday become fixed as law. Law preserves the moulds which have taken form
and shape from life.
‣ But here usage was not proven

PEOPLE V. BERNAL
G.R. No. 113685, June 19, 1997 – Kidnapping Case
Digest Author: Rose Anne Sy
PARTIES:
‣ Accused-Appellant- Theodore Bernal who allegedly kidnapped Openda, Jr. with the help of two unknown men
‣ Victim- Bienvenido Openda, Jr.
FACTS
‣ On August 5, 1991, around 11:30 in the morning, while Roberto Racasa and Bienvenido Openda, Jr. were engaged
in a drinking spree, they invited accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, who was passing by, to join them. After a
few minutes, Bernal decided to leave both men, apparently because he was going to fetch his child.
‣ Thereafter, two men arrived, approached Openda, Jr., and asked the latter if he was Payat. When he said yes, one of
them suddenly pulled out a handgun while the other handcuffed him and told him not to run because they were
policemen and because he had an atraso or a score to settle with them. They then hastily took him away.
‣ Racasa immediately went to the house of Openda, Jr. and informed the latter’s mother of the abduction. Until now
(1997), Openda, Jr. is still missing.
‣ Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with
the crime of kidnapping.
‣ PROSECUTION: 4 witnesses were presented. One of which is Salito Enriquez who testified that Openda, Jr. had an
illicit affair with Bernal’s wife Naty and this was the motive behind the former’s kidnapping.
‣ DEFENSE: Only Bernal testified for his defense. The defense asserts that Openda, Jr. was a drug-pusher arrested by
the police and hence, was never kidnapped.
‣ The court found Bernal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping for the abduction and
disappearance of Openda under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N Enriquez’ testimony is admissible to prove the motive of the accused - Yes
RATIO
‣ The Court notes that up to this day, neither the victim nor his body has been found. This, however, does not
preclude the Court from ruling on the merits of the case. In kidnapping, what is important is to determine and
prove the fact of seizure, and the subsequent disappearance of the victim will not exonerate an accused from
prosecution therefor. Otherwise, kidnappers can easily avoid punishment by the simple expedient of disposing of
their victim’s bodies.
‣ ART. 267 of the Revised Penal Code. - Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.
‣ For the charge of kidnapping to prosper, the deprivation of the victim’s liberty, which is the essential element of
the offense, must be duly proved. In the case at bar, Bernal indisputably acted in conspiracy with the two other
unknown individuals as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of
purpose. The prosecution has proffered sufficient evidence to show that Bernal, together with his two
companions, abducted Openda, Jr.
‣ Testimonies presented by the prosecution:
1. Adonis Sagarino (childhood friend and neighbor of the victim) testified that he saw Bernal at the billiard hall
at about 11:00 a.m. with his two companions and overheard him dispatching one of them to Tarsings Store to

check if a certain person was still there. This person later turned out to be Openda, Jr. He added that after
Openda’s presence was confirmed, the three men left the billiard hall. Minutes later, Openda already
handcuffed, passed by the billiard hall with Bernal’s companions.
2. Roberto Racasa (resident of Bucana, Davao City who knew both Bernal and the victim, Bernal being his
neighbor and compadre) He narrated that he and Openda were drinking at Tarsings Store on that fateful day
when Bernal passed by and had a drink with them. After a few minutes, Bernal decided to leave, after which,
two men came to the store and asked for Payat. When Openda, Jr. confirmed that he was indeed Payat, he was
handcuffed and taken away by the unidentified men.
3. Salito Enriquez (a tailor and a friend of Openda) testified that Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernal’s
wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr. money which they used to pay for a
motel room. He advised Naty not to do it again because she (was) a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wife’s
infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
4. Teresita Openda (mother of Openda, Jr.)
‣ MAIN DOCTRINE: Motive is generally irrelevant, unless it is utilized in establishing the identity of the
perpetrator. Coupled with enough circumstantial evidence or facts from which it may be reasonably inferred that
the accused was the malefactor, motive may be sufficient to support a conviction.
‣ Openda’s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal’s wife is admissible in evidence,
pursuant to Section 38, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence,:
‣ Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the
interest of the declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to
declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the declaration unless he
believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third
persons.
‣ With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is safe to assume that
declaration against interest has been expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral
or even penal.
‣ A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites:
1. That the declarant is dead or unable to testify;
2. That it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant;
3. That at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary to his
aforesaid interest; and
4. That the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.
‣ Openda having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez,
definitely a declaration against his own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible
in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to his own detriment.
(Not so important) Other points of the defense rebutted by the Court:
1. Bernal highlighted inconsistencies in Sagarino’s testimony. He alleges that the latter could not have seen the
actual handcuffing because Tarsings Store could not be seen from the billiard hall. Sagarino’s testimony
shows that after Bernal and two others left the billiard hall, the latter came back with Openda, Jr., already
handcuffed.
‣ Q The three of them together?
‣ A Yes, sir.
‣ Q And what about you, where did you stay?
‣ A I just stayed in the billiard hall.
‣ Q While you stay (sic) in the billiard hall, after a while, what did you see next?
‣ A The two came back.
‣ Q Who were these two whom you said who (sic) came back?
‣ A The companions of Bernal.

‣ Q And what did these two men do?
‣ A They apprehended Jun-jun Openda.
‣ From this proceeding, Bernal wrongly inferred that Sagarino actually saw Openda, Jr. arrested. Sagarino has
not said that he saw the actual handcuffing of Openda, Jr. at the Tarsing or Tarcing store. On the contrary,
he says that he had not known who the person was that Bernal referred to when he requested one of this two
companions to go see if that person was still there at the store, and that he came to know that he was Openda,
Jr. only after he saw Openda, Jr. pass by the billiard hall already handcuffed, with the two unidentified
companions of Bernal with him, on their way out to the main road.
‣ If one had a direct view of Tarsings Store from the billiard hall, Bernal would not have requested his companion
to check if Openda, Jr. were still there drinking with Racasa. Another discrepancy pointed out by Bernal arose
from the testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino. Racasa, on cross-examination, stated:
‣ "Q After Theodore Bernal left you have seen him also returned with his child, is that correct? A Yes, sir,
because I was still in the store.
‣ On the other hand, Sagarino averred that:
‣ "Q When Theodore Bernal left the place, how long were you able to see him again?
‣ A Quite a time, sir, because when they left, his two companions came back and proceeded to Tarcing
Store and arrested Jun-jun Openda. When these two men brought out Jun-jun Openda, fifteen minutes
later, Bernal came.
‣ Q Do you know where this Bernal from?
‣ A He was coming from outside.
‣ Q He has with him his son?
‣ A He was with nobody, sir
‣ The testimonies of Racasa and Sagarino are not absolutely inconsistent with each other as to be irreconcilable.
Considering the proximity of the store from the billiard hall, there is a possibility that when Racasa saw Bernal
with his son at the store, the latter could have already brought home his son before proceeding alone to the
billiard hall where he was seen by Sagarino.
2. Bernal would like the Court to dismiss Sagarino’s testimony by imputing revenge as his motive for testifying.
He alleges that six days before the alleged kidnapping, 5 policemen arrived at Kasilak, Bucana on board a patrol
car asking for Openda, Jr., Sagarino, Joseph Mendoza, Dansoy Madelo and Dagoy Balagan. He replied that they
were residents of the place and staying at the billiard hall and mahjong house. The policemen departed and
went to the places he mentioned.
‣ Bernal’s position is that no abduction or kidnapping ever took place but that an arrest was made by pursuing
policemen. This contention is quite improbable, if not highly preposterous. The trial court correctly
appreciated the testimony of Sagarino, it being free from any ill-motive against Bernal. If the latter’s
allegations were true, then Sagarino should have been arrested by the police at the time he gave his testimony
in court. No such arrest was, however, made.
‣ The court committed no error in finding the testimonies of Enriquez, Racasa and Sagarino sufficient to convict
Bernal. The court said that Sagarino’s forthright answers to the questions of the prosecutor and defense
counsel clearly establish the participation of Bernal in the abduction or kidnapping of Openda, Jr. Evidence, to
be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must be credible in itself.

DALLAS RAILWAY AND TERMINAL V. FARNSWORTH
148 Tex. 584, 227 S.W.2d 1017 (1950)
Digest Author: John Tantoco
FACTS
‣ Fransworth, was employed in Sears-Roebuck in Dallas. She, together with her thirty-year-old daughter and three
year old grandson, rode Dallas’ street car to travel from the store on South Lamar Street to the corner of Elm and St.
Paul Streets.
‣ Note; the operator says the distance was a mile, the Farnsworths say it was more 3-4 miles.
‣ The was travelling east on Elm Street, and stopped with it arrived at St. Paul Street. At that point of the tracks, they
no longer go down elm street, rather they turn into St. Paul St.
‣ Although Farnsworth had been a passenger on street cars in Dallas and in other places oftentimes over many
years, she had never been on a street car on Elm Street and did not know that the car turned to the left at St. Paul
Street, and did not look at the tracks ahead of the car, and she had never observed that the rear end of a street car
would swing out as the car went around a curve and did not know that it would.
‣ At the place where the street car stopped there was a safety zone marked for passengers leaving or entering the car.
‣ The safety zone was by the rear of the car and was 49 feet long and 6.7 feet wide.
‣ Beside the safety zone that was set up by Dallas, there was a marking made in brass disks which were meant to
show until where the car would reach.
‣ What would reach here was the overhang.
‣ Eight or ten passengers alighted from the street car at its front door. According to Dallas’ testimony all of the
others were ahead of Farnsworth, her daughter and grandchild, and farnsworth being the last passenger to alight.
She testified that just as she stepped off the street car step within the safety zone the traffic light which she was
facing and in the direction that she intended to go, that is, to the south, changed to red, and that before she had
time to take a step, almost instantaneously, she was struck and knocked down by the street car.
‣ Testimony of a Disinterested Witness
‣ A disinterested witness who was in his automobile directly behind the street car at the time of the accident
testified that he saw the car strike Farnsworth and knock her down as it made the turn. He testified further
that there were from seven to ten people standing in the safety zone and some of them were in front of
Farnsworth, and that there was considerable traffic going both east and west on Elm Street, with a number of
automobiles standing in the passage between the safety zone and the south curb of Elm Street waiting for the
light to change. He testified that he thought the street car started "pretty abruptly" and again that the
movement of the street car was abrupt. He testified that to the best of his knowledge Farnsworth, before she
was struck, had moved approximately 10 feet back from the front door of the street car, that is, to the west,
adding that he could not see the front door of the street car.
‣ Testimony of a Traffic Officer
‣ A traffic officer of the City of Dallas on duty at the intersection of Elm and St. Paul Streets, standing on the
southeast corner, witnessed the accident. He saw the right rear corner of the overhang of the street car strike
Farnsworth as it went around the curve. He testified that the car "was moving rapidly for that intersection";
that he saw the street car start moving forward, saw that Farnsworth was going *1019 to be hit and tried to
stop the car; that the operator of the street car never knew that the accident had occurred until his inspector
informed him of it; that when Farnsworth was struck she was standing in the extreme east end of the safety
zone; that Farnsworth was facing south and a person was standing in front of her, where she could not move
forward on account of the traffic, and another person was standing to her right, and that she could not move to
her left because she was at the extreme east end of the safety zone and "the law says you must stay in the safety
zone until the light changes". He testified further that there were approximately ten seconds between the time
when he saw Farnsworth standing there and the time when the street car struck her.
‣ Testimony of the Street Car Operator
‣ The operator of the street car testified that as he closed the door of the car immediately before starting he
looked to his right, saw that the door was clear, and saw no one within reach of the door or within reach of the

overhang of the street car, and that there was no one "at the point of my front door within the overswing zone";
and that after he closed the door and started the street car he never looked back to his right or to the back of the
street car, his attention being given to watching the traffic traveling west on Elm Street and the pedestrians
who were crossing St. Paul Street. His testimony shows that he knew nothing about the accident until he had
traveled to the end of the line and returned to Elm and Ervay Streets, where he was told of it by the company's
supervisor. He testified further that he was not in a hurry on that particular day and that in making the start
at the corner of Elm and St. Paul Streets he operated the car normally and traveled at approximately 1 to 2
miles an hour around the curve.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the testimony of Farnsworth Liable? - REMAMNDED
Note: In this case kasi there is a law which states that there is a general rule that when the question is whether or not a
person has been negligent in doing, or in failing to a do a particular act, evidence is not admissible to show that he has been
guilty of a similar act of negligence.
RATIO
‣ Respondent was permitted to testify, over objections, that when she entered the streetcar at the Sears-Roebuck
store on Lamar Street the operator started the [**1020] car before she could get to a seat and was in a great hurry,
that he stopped at Lamar and Young Streets and passengers "scarcely got off before he started", and that the same
was true at Lamar and Main Streets.
‣ This testimony when first considered may appear to be forbidden by the general rule announced in that "when the
question is whether or not a person has been negligent in doing or in failing to do a particular act, evidence is not
admissible to show that he has been guilty of a similar act of negligence or even habitually negligent upon a
similar occasion."
‣ The reason for the rule is the fundamental principle that evidence must be relevant to the facts in issue in the case
on trial and tend to prove or disprove those facts, evidence as to collateral facts not being admissible.
‣ There are some modifications of the general rule as applied to particular cases. It has been said that HN2 evidence
of similar transactions or conduct on other occasions is not competent to prove the commission of a particular act
charged, unless the acts are connected in some special way, indicating a relevancy beyond mere similarity in
certain particulars.
‣ “In the case before us testimony that the operator of the streetcar hurried his starting of the car, after making
three stops a short time before the accident in which respondent was injured, tended to prove the state of his mind
or the condition of his nerves, that is, that he was in a hurry, and so was relevant and of some probative value on
the issue as to whether he failed to give respondent an opportunity to get beyond the overhang of the car before
starting it.
‣ The three stops about which respondent testified over objection were made on the same run as that on which she
was injured, and occurred within a distance of one mile, or three or four miles, from the place where she was
injured, and within seven to ten minutes of the time of her injury.
‣ They were not so far removed either in place or in time as to be considered "conduct on other occasions", but were
so closely related to the [***15] occurrence on which this suit is based that they may be considered, as in effect, part
of the conduct of the operator that caused respondent's injury.
‣ We believe that the testimony was relevant and admissible. Since there was evidence to support the issue as to the
operator's negligence in starting the car too quickly, it is not necessary to discuss the finding that he failed to keep
a proper lookout for respondent.
‣ When the question is whether or not a person has been negligent in doing or in failing to do a particular act,
evidence is not admissible to show that he has been guilty of a similar act of negligence or even habitually
negligent upon a similar occasion.
‣ Evidence of similar transactions or conduct on other occasions is not competent to prove the commission of a
particular act charged unless the acts are connected in some special way, indicating a relevancy beyond mere
similarity in certain particulars.
‣ As a general rule evidence is not admissible to show that the operator of a streetcar was negligent on other or
similar occasions unless such occasions were connected in some special way with the accident in question, both as
to time and place, indicating a relevancy beyond mere similarity in certain particulars, and evidence that operator
had hurriedly started his car, after making several stops, only a short time and distance before this accident, and
on the same run, tended to prove the condition of his mind and nerves as one who was in a hurry, and was so
relevant and of such probative value, as to be admissible to show whether the operator failed to give plaintiff
sufficient time to get beyond the reach of the car as it make the turn of the corner 

PEOPLE V. VILLACORTA GIL
G.R. 172468 October 15, 2008
NOTE: I think this case pertains to extra-judicial confessions, I still included the entire case but feel free to read only the
third issue related to the topic
FACTS
‣ Julie V. Gil was charged and convicted of Destructive Arson with Homicide. The information reads:
‣ That on or about March 1, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously, and deliberately set fire on a residential house located at No. 603 Sulucan St., Sampaloc, in
said city, owned by ANGGE ARGUELLES, by then and there pouring kerosene on a mattress placed in a room of said
house then occupied by the said accused and ignited it with a lighter, knowing it to be occupied by one or more
persons, thereby causing as a consequence thereof, damage to the said house and adjacent houses in the amount of
more or less P2,000,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of said owners in the aforesaid amount of P2,000,000.00,
Philippine Currency; that on the occasion and by reason of said fire, one RODOLFO CABRERA, a resident/occupant
of said house sustained burn injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
‣ She pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The pre-trial conference followed and the RTC issued a pre-trial order
which contained the stipulation of facts and issue of the parties as follows:
‣ In the pre-trial today, the parties stipulated that the residential house located at No. 603 Sulucan Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, owned by Angge Arguelles was burned and that the same resulted into the burning of other adjacent houses
causing damage in the amount of more or less Two Million (P2,000,000.00) and the death of a certain Rodolfo
Cabrera. The issue to be resolved is whether the accused is the arsonist and / or responsible for the said fire.
‣ A summary of the evidence adduced by the prosecution:
1. William Lim, a Kagawad of Barangay 395, Zone 41 of the 4th District, Sampaloc, Manila, testified that on March
1, 1998 while eating at their store located at 843 Quezon Boulevard, his former typist in the barangay, Jonah,
called him to tell that a woman wanted to surrender to a barangay official. Jonah brought him to the woman
who introduced herself as Julie Gil. The latter appeared to be a lesbian, drunk and very confused. She felt
bothered by her conscience and admitted that she burned her residence. He called up precinct 4 to report the
incident, and was told that there was indeed a fire that took place in the area. He requested for a mobile and the
accused was brought to fire station No. 4 where she forcibly took the pen from a policeman in order for her to
put in writing the actual incident. At first, Lim was hesitant thinking that her testimony might not be
admissible in court, but since the accused was very insistent, she was allowed to reduce the incident in writing.
2. Ronnie Gallardo declared that he was present during the incident. He and his mother occupied the room next
to that of the accused. On March 1, 1998 at around 12:30 p.m. while lying in bed inside their room, he heard a
thud (kalabog) coming from the room of the accused. He also heard the accused crying. He went out of his room
and when he found the accused door open, he peeped through the door where he noticed the latter standing.
When she saw him, the accused pointed to him the fire on her folding bed made of plastic with foam. At that
time the fire was getting bigger. She then told him xxx pabayaan mo na iyan. Damay-damay na tayo. At hinatak
na niya ako. They went out but he tried to get back to get their belongings. He, however, failed to get anything
from their room because the entire house as well as the other adjacent houses was already burning. With the
help of their neighbors, they tried to put off the fire which lasted for about two (2) hours, while the accused
remained standing, watching it. Since the incident he never saw the accused until the latter appeared in court.
3. Rodolfo Lorenzo, a Kagawad of Barangay 457, Zone 45 which covered the area of Sulucan Street, Sampaloc,
Manila, met the accused two (2) days before the incident at around 9:00 p.m. According to him, somebody
called for his help, informing that the accused was making trouble. He immediately responded by proceeding to
the house of the accused at corner Sulucan and Earnshaw Streets, Sampaloc where he saw the accused in front
of her house. She was drunk, and there were two (2) broken bottles of gin scattered along Earnshaw Street. He
was told by the accused mother that the accused broke the bottles because she had problems with her live-in
partner. He first swept the pieces of broken bottles before approaching the accused and her mother, Aling Lita.
The accused told him that her live-in partner, Trining, wrote her two (2) break-up letters, which obviously she
could not accept. He told the accused to stay calm, but she refused to be pacified. She even told him xxx
manggugulo ako at manununog. He talked to the accused mother who confirmed to him that she had problems
with her live-in partner. Again, the accused told him manununog daw po siya at damay-damay na lang daw po
lahat ng mga kapitbahay niya. To appease, he told her: Julie, baka hindi mo alam ang gagawin mo
magpakahinahon ka. Isipin mo muna ng makasampung beses bago mo gawin ang iniisip mo, hindi basta
bastang kaso iyan. The accused just ignored him. He noticed, however, that her eyes were red and she was

gnashing her teeth. He then thought she was on drugs. The following day at around 11:00 a.m., Rodolfo
chanced upon her near the basketball court. He tried to talk to her and convinced her not to do anything bad,
but again she ignored him. The next day, March 1, 1998 at around noon time, while talking with a neighbor in
the basketball court, his attention was called on the alleged fire that broke near the squatters area. He
proceeded to the place and saw Aling Lita outside her house. He immediately looked for the accused whom he
saw walking very fast along Earnshaw Street going towards Recto or Espaa. He tried to chase her, but she was
very fast. It would seem he was out of his mind as she was even smiling when she saw the fire. She told, xxx
damay-damay na tayo diyan, huwag ninyo ng patayin ang sunog. When he felt that he could no longer chase
her, he stopped chasing her and instead helped put off the fire as he was concerned with his constituents.
‣ Unfortunately, Rodolfo did not give any statement before the police after the incident.
4. It was SFO1 Redentor Alumno who investigated the fire incident. Upon receipt of the alarm, his team
proceeded to the crime scene and conducted on the spot investigation. He talked to witnesses particularly
Amparo Cabrera and Ronnie Gallardo, who gave their respective statements on the incident. At around 1:10
p.m. of the same day, March 1, 1998, Barangay Kagawad William Lim turned-over to their office the accused
informing them that the latter voluntarily surrendered to him (Lim). A letter written by the accused was also
handed to him. After conducting an investigation, SFO1 prepared a Crime Report in connection with the
incident. On March 2, 1998, the accused was subjected to inquest.
5. SFO1 Alumno estimated the damage caused by the fire to be P2 Million Pesos, more or less, as shown by the
pictures he took after the incident. There were more or less 15 to 20 houses destroyed, one (1) man by the name
of Rodolfo Cabrera died, and a certain Marites Cabrera was injured.
6. Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra of the Central Police District Crime Laboratory examined the cadaver of victim
Rodolfo E. Cabrera on April 8, 1998 at around 1000H upon request of the Office of the Barangay Chairman of
Barangay 411, Zone 42. Her examination shows that the cause of the victims death was third degree burn of his
entire body.
7. As a result of the untimely demise of victim Rodolfo Cabrera, his surviving family suffered damages. According
to his surviving spouse, Anacleta Cabrera, during the wake of her husband, she spent P3,175.00 for food. She
also incurred expenses for his funeral and burial amounting to P7,700.00 and P5,475.00, respectively. She also
paid P2,600 for the burial lot. At the time of his death, Rodolfo Cabrera was living in the same house with his
common-law wife, Amparo Cabrera, for almost five (5) years.
8. The written statementexecuted by the accused-appellant admitting responsibility for conflagration before
Kagawad William Lim reads:
‣ Volontary Statement of Julie Gil y Villacorta, 24 years old single, stell bed worker, 1st year high scool 603
Sulucan St., Sampaloc, Manila, given to Kagawad William Lim y Bedor, of legal age, Barangay 395 Zone 41,
Sampaloc, Manila, this 1 March 1998 on or about 1:10 P.M. Ako po ay si Julie V. Gil ay bolontaryong sumuko
kay Kagawad William Lim sa salang Panununog sa inuupahang bahay ko sa No. 603 Sulucan St., Sampaloc,
kaninang mga bandang 12:00 ng tanghali. Sinunog ko po ang tinitirhan ko dahil sa Pambabastos sa akin ng mga
taong kamaganak ng live in partner ko na si Trinidad Domingo 25 y old kaya ang ginawa ko ay kinuha ko ang
kalan di bomba at pagkatapos ibinuhos ko and laman kerosene gas sa kutson perso bago ko sinindihan bumaba
muna ako, at saka ko sila sinabihan na lumabas na sila lahat sa iskinita dahil susunogin ko na at damay damay
na tayo at saka ako uli umakyat upang sindihan ang lighter at saka uli ako bumaba at saka umalis, napadpad
ako sa isang barangay at kusang sumuko sa Kagawad William Lim. Nakokonsensya ako kaya sinabi ko sa kanya
ang aking nagawang kasalanan. Wala ako sa sarili kong pagiisip ng sinunog ko ang aking tinitirhan dahil
nakagamit po ako ng shabo.
‣ Defense:
‣ The accused-appellant relied on her lone testimony in her defense. While she admitted the authenticity of her
above-quoted written confession, she denied on the witness stand that she voluntarily wrote this confession.
The accused-appellant related her version of the fire:
‣ The fire resulted from her defective gas stove which suddenly caught fire while she was boiling water. When the
stove caught fire, she got flustered and poured water on the stove. To her surprise, the fire got bigger. Ronnie, who
was also renting a room next to her with his mother, came and they helped each other to put off the fire. When
their efforts seemed unsuccessful, she told Ronnie: xxx hindi na natin kayang patayin ang apoy, baba na lang po
kami para humingi ng tulong. When they went out, people were already helping each other to contain the fire.
She then left the place passing through an alley. The accused averred that a day prior to the incident she was very
tired. She reported for work as a spring bed maker as early as 6:00 a.m. and went home 2:00 a.m. the following
day, March 1, 1998. Again, she woke up at 6:00 a.m. on the same day to report for work. According to the

accused, it was William Lim who took custody of him for reasons unknown to her. Thereafter, they gave her a
paper with something written on it and they instructed her to copy the same in another paper. Confused, she did
what was told of her because they told her that it would be good for her.
‣ After trial, the RTC convicted the accused-appellant of the crime charged. According to the RTC, the prosecution
had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence, coupled with the written confession of the accused-appellant,
to sustain her conviction of the crime charged.
‣ The RTC admitted the oral and written confessions of the accused-appellant and found the prosecution witnesses
more credible than the accused-appellant.
‣ The accused-appellant assails the conviction on the following grounds:
1. She contends that the circumstantial evidence of the prosecution failed to produce the required
quantum of proof to hold her criminally liable for the charge. She explained that prosecution witness
Ronnie Gallardo saw her mattress already on fire but never saw her deliberately burn her mattress. Ronnie
Gallardo neither saw nor identified any overt act which would suggest that the accused-appellant
intentionally put her mattress on fire. The accused-appellant claimed that Ronnie Gallardo might have
gotten anxious after he saw the raging fire and misunderstood her remark pabayaan mo na yan, damay-
damay na tayo when what she meant to say after all was pabayaan mo na yan, madadamay tayo. She would
not have pulled out Ronnie Gallardo from the burning house had her intention been to cause injury to
others.
2. The accused-appellant also disputed the trial courts reliance on the testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo
Lorenzo that she intentionally burned her residential house because of personal problems. She rhetorically
questioned the credibility of the said prosecution witness when, as a person in authority, he failed to report
to the police his supposed knowledge of what the accused-appellant was planning to do two days prior to
the fire that occurred in their neighborhood.
3. She argues that her written confession is inadmissible in evidence. She claims that she was not assisted
by counsel at the time she executed the same; and that she was merely led to believe, without apprising her
of its legal significance, that it would help her.
ISSUES/HELD
1. W/N the circumstantial evidence of the prosecution failed to produce the required quantum of proof to hold her
criminally liable for the charge- NO, it was sufficient
2. W/N the TC erred in relying on the testimony of witnesses presented by the prosecution- NO, big weight placed on
RTC interpretation of witness and finding of credibility
3. W/N the written confession is inadmissible in evidence- NO, it was made to two persons while the fire was in
progress
RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

‣ The circumstantial evidence of the prosecution consisted of the following:
1. The testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo about the behavior and remarks of the accused-appellant at the
time she caused a public disturbance and threatened to cause chaos and arson and to drag her neighbors into
this turmoil, two days prior to the conflagration
2. The testimony of Ronnie Gallardo that, when he saw the burning mattress in the room of the accused-
appellant, the latter said to him in the vernacular: Pabayaan mo na iyan. Damay-damay na tayo
3. The testimony of Kagawad Rodolfo Lorenzo that, at the time he tried to chase the accused-appellant during the
fire incident, he again heard her utter a nonchalant remark: Damay-damay na tayo diyan, huwag ninyo nang
patayin ang sunog
4. The testimony of Kagawad William Lim that the accused-appellant approached and admitted to him
immediately after the incident that she was the person responsible for the conflagration.
‣ The aforementioned circumstantial evidence would constitute positive identification of the accused-appellant as
the perpetrator of the crime charged, to the exclusion of others. She was the person who had the motive to commit
the crime, and the series of events following her threat to cause chaos and arson in her neighborhood -- the fire
that started in her room, and her actuations and remarks during, as well as immediately before and after the fire--
sufficiently points to the accused-appellant as the author of the said crime.

RATIO FOR ISSUE 2
‣ We are not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of the accused-appellant that the fire was
accidental, and that she was arrested and forced by Kagawad William Lim to copy the contents of her written
confession from a piece of paper handed to her by the said barangay official.
‣ To quote a well-entrenched legal precept, the factual findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of
the witnesses and its assessment of their probative weight are given high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless it
ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if
considered, will alter the outcome of the case and the said trial court is in the best position to ascertain and
measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses through its actual observation of the witnesses' manner of
testifying, demeanor and behavior while in the witness box.
‣ In this case, the trial court found that the prosecution witnesses testified consistently and truthfully. The chain of
events before, during, and after the fire - - as narrated by the prosecution witnesses - - established beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused-appellant committed the acts alleged in the information, which constituted the
crime of arson with homicide. The accused-appellant failed to show any misconstrued, misunderstood or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance that could alter the outcome of the case. She also did
not show any credible motive why the prosecution witnesses testified against her. Thus, this Court finds
conclusive the findings and observation of the trial court that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
candid and trustworthy, and that the testimony of the accused-appellant was not impressed with candor and
honesty.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 3

‣ The extrajudicial confession was she made not only to Kagawad William Lim but also to Kagawad Rodolfo
Lorenzo while the fire was in progress.
‣ Court cited People v. Andan: Under these circumstances, it cannot be successfully claimed that appellant's confession
before the mayor is inadmissible. It is true that a municipal mayor has "operational supervision and control" over
the local police and may arguably be deemed a law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Section 12 (1) and
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. However, appellant's confession to the mayor was not made in response to any
interrogation by the latter. In fact, the mayor did not question appellant at all. No police authority ordered
appellant to talk to the mayor. It was appellant himself who spontaneously, freely and voluntarily sought the
mayor for a private meeting. The mayor did not know that appellant was going to confess his guilt to him. When
appellant talked with the mayor as a confidant and not as a law enforcement officer, his uncounselled confession to
him did not violate his constitutional rights. Thus, it has been held that the constitutional procedures on custodial
investigation do not apply to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but
given in an ordinary manner whereby appellant orally admitted having committed the crime. What the
Constitution bars is the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions. The rights under Section 12
are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit something
false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Hence we hold that appellant's confession to
the mayor was correctly admitted by the trial court.
‣ Moreover, even if the written extra-judicial confession is disregarded, the evidence presented by the
prosecution is more than sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE V. ERGUIZA

TAMARGO V. AWIGAN
G.R. No. 177727 January 19, 2010
DOCTRINE
‣ An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court. This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by
independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession.
‣ Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that:
1. The conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself
2. The admission relates to the common object and
3. It has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
PARTIES
‣ Complainant: Harold V. Tamargo (brother of murder victim)
‣ Victims: Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle
‣ Accused/Respondents: Romulo Awing,Lloyd Antiporda, and Licerio Antiporda
FACTS
‣ Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed along Nueva Street
corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila.
‣ The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an
affidavit. He stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered
killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he told
the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columna.
‣ After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Geron’s affidavit, the investigating prosecutor
issued a resolution finding probable cause against Columna and three John Does. The corresponding Informations
for murder were filed against them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
‣ Columna was arrested in the province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention and
trial.
‣ Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look
out" during the shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan (alias "Mumoy") as the gunman and one
Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd
Antiporda.The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the
killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo was acting as
private prosecutor.
‣ Pursuant to this affidavit, Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated
by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
‣ On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor who subjected him to
clarificatory questions.
‣ Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate for mayor in
Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted by his political opponents in
order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty. Tamargo was their political rival for the
mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo had been defeated twice by Lloyd and once by Licerio. Before the killing,
Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio.
However, they claimed that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections and Licerio
was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.
‣ During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columna’s unsolicited handwritten letter
dated May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna’s jail cell in Manila. In the letter, Columna disowned
the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the
extrajudicial confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the killings.

‣ Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially
repeated the statements in his handwritten letter.
‣ Due to the submission of Columna’s letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to
enable Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing, Columna
categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004
affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the affidavit from him.
‣ Thus, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges. This was approved by the city
prosecutor.
‣ Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, Columna said that he was only forced to
withdraw all his statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life
inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention center.
‣ Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner Harold Tamargo filed an appeal to the Department of Justice
(DOJ).It reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder. The DOJ secretary opined
that the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent recantation and
that there was enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of respondents. Accordingly, the Informations were
filed and the cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC of Manila
‣ But, subsequently, the DOJ Secretary granted the Antipordas’ motion for reconsideration (MR) and directed the
withdrawal of the Informations.This time, he declared that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was
inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence.As
a result, the trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations.
‣ The RTC granted the motion to withdraw the Informations, however, upon MR (the judge who initially ruled on
the motion inhibited and the case was re-assgined to a new judge who reversed it), this was reversed and the TC
ruled that based on the affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause
to hold the accused for trial
‣ Awingan and Antipordas filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
‣ CA ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and
evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in concluding that there
was no probable cause against all the accused. It also held that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was not
admissible against the respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of
evidence presented to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made only after
Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
‣ Tamargo argues that, based on the independent assessment of the TC judge, there was probable cause based on the
earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give credit to Columna’s
recantation.
‣ Awingan and Antipordas counter that the TC Judge committed grave abuse of discretion by limiting her
evaluation and assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause while completely disregarding
contradicting evidence. They also contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible against
respondents because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
ISSUE/HELD
‣ W/N the TC Judge grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against
respondents.-YES, the TC Judge should have not considered the extrajudicial confession as it was not admissible as
evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta
RATIO
‣ It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of lack of probable
cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make
an independent assessment of the merits of the motion.It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation
of the Secretary. Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial court’s duty
and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no
sufficient evidence against the accused
‣ We agree with the CA that the TC Judge (Judge Daguna) limited herself only to the following:
1. Columna’s affidavit dated March 8, 2004 wherein he implicated the respondents in the murders
2. His affirmation of this affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory hearing
3. His letter dated October 29, 2004 and

4. The May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the prosecutor’s recommendation to file the murder charges.
‣ TC Judge erringly completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence such as:
1. Columna’s May 3, 2004 letter to respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him to
admit his participation in the crimes and to implicate the respondents;
2. His May 25, 2004 affidavit where he stated that neither he nor the respondents had any involvement in the
murders and
3. His testimony during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically affirmed his May 3,
2004 letter and May 25, 2004 affidavit.
‣ The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving the motion to withdraw the informations
effectively sidetracked the guidelines for an independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of the case.
Respondent RTC Judge thus impaired the substantial rights of the accused. Instead, she should have made a
circumspect evaluation by looking at everything made available to her at that point of the cases. No less than that
was expected and required of her as a judicial officer.
‣ Moreover, TC Judge failed to consider that Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit
was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.
‣ Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot
be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding
only on the confessant, is not admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.
The reason for this rule is that:
‣ On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon himself, and are
evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but
also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party
ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against
him.
‣ An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court:
‣ Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration.
1avvphi1
‣ This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent
evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession.
‣ Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is
necessary that:
1. The conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself
2. The admission relates to the common object and
3. It has been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.
‣ Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional
right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
‣ In this case, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence
was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or
circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of
Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as
evidence against them.
‣ Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the respondents, it would be unfair
to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt
of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going through a full blown court ca. seWhen, at the outset,
the evidence offered during the preliminary investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated extrajudicial
confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so that the system would be
spared from the unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive litigation. The rule is all the more significant
here since respondent Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of
arrest issued by TC Judge. 

LEJANO V. PEOPLE/ PEOPLE VS WEBB
G.R. Nos. 176389/176864 December 14, 2010
Digest Author: Aziza Bacay
PARTIES
‣ Respondents: Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter
Estrada, Gerardio Biong
FACTS
‣ Vizconde Massacre: On June 30, 1991, Estrelllita Vizconde and her daughters Carmella (19) and Jennifer (7), were
killed at their home in BF Homes Paranaque. Carmela was also raped.
‣ In 1991, the police were able to arrest members of an akyat-bahay gang who extrajudicially confessed that they
entered the Vizconde residence to rob the family, rape Carmela and kill the entire family.
‣ However, in 1995 (four years after), star witness Jennifer Alfaro appeared and testified against Webb et al.
‣ Alfaro’s Story:
‣ On the night of June 29, 1991, she was with her boyfriend Estrada to buy shabu from a certain Ventura. There,
Ventura introduced them to Webb et al. and had their pot session.
‣ Webb approached her and asked her to relay a message to Carmela. They went to Vizconde residence, but
Carmela told her that she still cannot go out and that they should return later. While waiting, the group had
another pot session.
‣ Alfaro went to Vizconde residence again, but Carmela told her to return by midnight. After, she then saw
Carmela leaving the house and eventually dropped off another man. When she returned to Webb et al.’s group,
she informed Webb about the other man and this changed the mood of Webb (na-badtrip).
‣ Webb gave out free cocaine and after 40 minutes, they went to Vizconde residence.
‣ Upon getting there, Ventura loosened the electric bulb in the garage, and they entered the house through the
dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the screen door for them.
‣ Alfaro went outside to smoke. After about 30 minutes, she returned inside the home and saw Ventura
rummaging through a lady’s bag looking for the front door key and car key.
‣ Since they were not able to open the front door, Alfaro returned to the house through the dirty kitchen to go to
the dining area; however, even before getting to the dining area, she heard television sound.
‣ She went to the door, which was the master’s bedroom, and from there she saw Webb on top of Carmela who
was gagged and in tears while Webb raped her. She also saw two bloodied bodies on top of the bed. Webb then
looked at her and told her to prepare an escape.
‣ Alfaro and Webb et al. then drove off to a large house in BF Executive Homes, where they had “blaming session”.
It was only there that Alfaro and the others came to fully know what happened inside. The mother was the first
one killed, Jennifer next and Carmela last.
‣ Webb then called someone to order the clean up of the Vizconde house.
‣ Other Witnesses for the Prosecution:
‣ Dr. Cabanayan: medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy of the cadavers and confirmed that Carmela
was raped.
‣ White, Jr.: security guard of Pitong Daan subdivision, who confirmed that Mike Gatchalian is a resident of that
village and that he saw three cars on convoy at the night of June 29, 1991. He testified that Biong, a police
officer, took his logbook which had the record for that day.
‣ Cabanacan: another security guard of Pitong Daan subdivision who confirmed that during the first week of
June, Webb went to the village to look for Lilet Sy, another resident. He did not record the visitation anymore
because Webb is the son of Paranaque congressman.
‣ Mila Gaviola: laundrywoman of Webb family who testified that at that day, she washed the clothes of Webb
with bloodstains at the stomach area.

‣ Lolita Birrer: ex-boyfriend of Biong who testified that at that night, someone called Biong. Biong left and when
he returned, he cleansed bloodstains in his fingernails. He also had in his pockets some various items
(Carmela’s ATM, drivers license, calling card, etc.)
‣ Lauro Vizconde: the father who was OFW at US at that time, that during Carmela’s lifetime, she told him that
she has turned down a suitor whom she called “Bagyo” who is a son of a politician in Paranaque.
‣ Defense Side:
‣ Webb claims the alibi of being in the United States from March 1991 to October 1992 as his parents wanted
him to learn how to live independently. He presented voluminous documentary evidence (US certification,
passport, payroll, driver’s license) establishing his stay in the United States. There were also 95 other witnesses
testified for Webb declaring meeting him during his stay abroad. (Madami talaga, as in people claiming having
dinner with him on different dates etc.)
‣ Lejano and Gatchalian also raised the defense of alibi claiming that they were at the house of a friend watching
video tapes that night.
‣ They further questioned the credibility of Alfaro’s testimony, claiming that she is NBI asset and is not a true
eyewitness of the incident. They claim that Alfaro, at that time, was working for the NBI from November to
December 1994 who earned her living by fraternizing with criminals so she could sequel them to NBI handlers.
‣ Atty. Sacaguing: former NBI handler of Alfaro testified that she was the darling of NBI for giving them
criminals. However, at a certain time, they teased Alfaro for being unproductive, which made the latter piqued.
Eventually Alfaro went to him claiming to know someone involved in the Vizconde Massacre. Atty. Sacaguing
ask her to produce such witness, but she failed to do so. Alfaro then stated na “papapelan ko nalang yan.”
‣ RTC: Guilty; CA: Affirmed
‣ Webb then asked that the DNA found on the body of Carmela be produced. It was approved by the Supreme Court,
but then DNA is no longer in the custody of NBI.
‣ Webb then appealed that he was deprived of right to due process by the failure to produce the DNA evidence and
that the testimony of Alfaro was not entitled to belief.
ISSUES/HELD
1. W/N Alfaro’s testimony is entitled to belief – NO
2. W/N the presented evidence is sufficient to prove his alibi and rebut Alfaro’s testimony – YES
RATIO
‣ The testimony of Alfaro suffers inherent inconsistencies.
‣ Although Alfaro claims that Webb proposed the gang-rape of Carmela, this was belied by the fact that the group
was staying around under visible street light, having a drinking party, not caring of anyone who would see them.
Thus, such behavior do not exhibit a planned-gang rape.
‣ If Alfaro really hanged out with them and soaked with drugs, how can she then remember all the details so much
that only a drug-free mind can?
‣ Why would Alfaro, a woman, a stranger to Webb before that night, and obviously with no role to play in the gang-
rape of Carmela, lead him and the others into her house? It made no sense. It would only make sense if Alfaro
wanted to feign being a witness to something she did not see.
‣ Someone other than Carmela became conscious of the presence of Webb and others in the house. Alfaro walked
away because, obviously, she did not want to get involved in a potential confrontation. This was supposedly her
frame of mind: fear of getting involved in what was not her business.
‣ There is something truly remarkable about this case: the prosecution’s core theory that Carmela and Webb had
been sweethearts, that she had been unfaithful to him, and that it was for this reason that Webb brought his
friends to her house to gang-rape her is totally uncorroborated. None of Carmela’s friends would testify ever
hearing of such relationship.
RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

‣ Supreme Court had a long explanation on the documentary evidence presented by Webb.
‣ A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime should not automatically cancel
out the accused’s claim that he did not do it. A lying witness can make as positive an identification as a truthful
witness can. The lying witness can also say as forthrightly and unequivocally, "He did it!" without blinking an eye.

‣ The prosecution did not bother to present evidence to impeach the entries in Webb’s passport and the
certifications of the Philippine and U.S.’ immigration services regarding his travel to the U.S. and back.
‣ ACQUITTED.
CONCURRING OPINION: CARPIO-MORALES (IMPORTANT)

‣ Jurisprudence has consistently summoned, however, that for testimonial evidence to be worthy of belief, it must
firstly proceed from the mouth of a credible witness. A person may be credible where he is without previous
conviction of a crime; who is not a police character and has no police record; who has not perjured in the
past;whose affidavit or testimony is not incredible; who has a good standing in the community; and who is
reputed to be trustworthy and reliable. Secondly, the person’s testimony must in itself be credible.
‣ Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself – such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial
cognizance.
‣ By Alfaro’s own admission, she was a habitual drug addict who inhaled and sniffed shabu "every other day" since
December 1990. It was about this time that she met Artemio "Dong" Ventura who provided her with a regular
supply of shabu at the so-called "house of shabu" in Parañaque. In March 1991, she stopped getting her supply of
shabu from Ventura as she instead got it from other sources including Orly Bacquir and Cris Santos and places
such as Quezon City, Makati and Tondo.
‣ The paper of authors Burrus and Marks, "Testimonial Reliability of Drug Addicts," teaches: [W]here the prolonged
use of drugs has impaired the witness’ ability to perceive, recall or relate, impeaching testimony is uniformly
sustained by the courts. Aside from organic deterioration, however, testimony may be impugned if the witness
was under the influence of drugs at the time of perceiving the event about which he is testifying or at the time he
is on the stand. This necessarily follows, for even the temporary presence of drugs affects the functioning of the
body’s organs, and thus bears directly on the credibility of the witness’ testimony…
‣ Evidence derived from the testimony of a witness who was under the influence of drugs during the incident to
which he is testifying is indeed very unreliable. So it has been held that "habitual users of narcotics become
notorious liars and that their testimony is likely to be affected thereby."
‣ We believe it will be admitted that habitual users of opium, or other like narcotics, become notorious liars. The
habit of lying comes doubtless from the fact that the users of those narcotics pass the greater part of their lives in
an unreal world, and thus become unable to distinguish between images and facts, between illusions and realities.
‣ Former National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Epimaco Velasco had a view similar to that of Dr. San
Pedro’s ─ that any information which is being furnished by a drug addict is "not generally reliable" and his
capacity to lie may be "very great."
‣ It should also be noted that there was uncanny similarities of the confession made by the akyat-bahay gang and
Alfaro. Alfaro, being an asset of the NBI can easily access the records therein to make a story that would match the
physical evidence at hand. Furthermore, the case was publicized by the national television that she learned so
much about the physical evidence and made a fitting story for the incident.
DISSENTING OPINION: VILLARAMA JR.

‣ Evidence presented by Webb were either inadmissible, incompetent or irrelevant.
‣ U.S. Certification of Nonimmigrant Information System – the port of entry in Washington did not have such
record
‣ Passenger Manifest of United Airline flight – mere photocopy
‣ United Airline Ticket – mere photocopy
‣ Philippine passport – mere photocopy
‣ Video footage of Webb family in Disneyland on July 3, 1991 – Hubert Webb did not even appear in this video, only
his parents did
‣ Video footage at Lake Tahoe – date of footage is far from the date of the killing
‣ Photograph at Dee Lite Concert – photo taken in April 1991
‣ Webb’s driver’s license – inconsistency in story as to how application was made
‣ Logbook of Payment of Webb’s salary – entries were merely superimposed and could have been easily fabricated

‣ Letters to girlfriend – letters produced only in 1995
‣ Appellant Webb’s travel documents and other supposed paper trail of his stay in the US are unreliable proof of his
absence in the Philippines at the time of the commission of the crime charged. The non-submission in evidence of
his original passport, which was not formally offered and made part of the records, had deprived the RTC, CA and
this Court the opportunity to examine the same. Such original is a crucial piece of evidence which unfortunately
was placed beyond judicial scrutiny.
‣ As regards the DNA evidence, the loss of the semen does not indicate that Webb did not commit the crime as the
commission has been already established by totality of evidence.
NOTE: There was separate concurring opinion of Sereno and supplemental opinion of Brion, but no more explanation
regarding the witness and evidence; they were more of constitutional rights and subjudice rule.


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Evidence Digests 3

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Ziegler v.

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Angeline Ibuna

‣ Defendant: Christ – one who hit Zeigler’s car

1. When the other party to the transaction is dead.

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Lizzie Lecaroz

‣ Defendant/Petitioner: Cecilia Zulueta

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Elwell Mariano

1. Affidavit which is the virtual confession of the accused (exhibit C)

‣ This is signed and sworn to by Francisco

3. The rebuttal testimony of the wife of Francisco

‣ Sergeant Pimintel testified that the accused confessed to him.

RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

2. The consequent danger of perjury;

‣ Wharton (book author yata to na cited by the court)

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Rose Anne Sy

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Other stuff about State Witnesses:

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Johnny T

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Clarence Tiu

‣ Factor of the Rule on Attorney-Client Privilege

1. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of

2. The client made the communication in confidence

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

‣ Respondent filed his Comment/Motion to Dismiss where he alleged that:

RATIO FOR ISSUE 1

RATIO FOR ISSUE 2

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

‣ In fine, the factors are as follows:

1. There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by

2. The client made the communication in confidence

‣ A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

3. Complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP.

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Helen Toledo

‣ Respondents - Court Of Appeals and Edgar Krohn, Jr.

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

1. The privilege is claimed in a civil case;

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Irvin Velasquez

‣ Dolores Saracho, not a party, mother of Rosemarie Abad

‣ Rosemarie S. Abad – Another child of the deceased from another woman

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

1. Individual income statements and assets of Ricardo and

3. Insurance for Cecilia, Marian

4. Trust fund payable to Marian and Cecilia

5. Bank deposits for Cecilia and Marian

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

ATENEO LAW 3-B EVIDENCE DIGESTS

Digest Author: Marisse Aldeza

‣ To be specific, he refused to answer questions on: