Abstract:

In Physica I,8 Aristotle endeavors to show that a long-term Eleatic puzzle about
coming-to-be can be resolved by appealing to his own ontological principles of change
(substratum, privation, and form). In this paper, I posit that the key to Aristotle’s
resolution lies in the introduction of aspectual distinctions within numerical unities.
These distinctions within the terminus a quo and the terminus as quem of coming-to-be
made it possible for Aristotle to maintain, while answering the puzzle, that there is no
coming-to-be ex nihilo and, at the same time, that the product of coming-to-be is
something that did not exist before; i.e. that there is coming-to-be. Finally, I suggest that
this resolution could be seen as an interesting case of the application of conceptual tools
developed in the Sophistici Elenchi, and I analyze the advantages of this resolution over
the Platonic resolution of a similar sort of Eleatic problem.