Simple Algorithms RaFSA Estimation Method Based

on IEC61850
Mike Mekkanen*, Reino Virrankoski*, Mohammed Elmusrati* and Erkki Antila**
* University of Vaasa, Department of Computer Science, Communications and Systems Engineering Group
** University of Vaasa, Department of Electrical Engineering and Energy Technology
P.O. Box 700, FI-65101 Vaasa, Finland
mmekka@student.uwasa.fi, {reino.virrankoski, mohammed.elmusrati, erkki.antila}@uwasa.fi
distribution function. System reliability can be determined by
Abstract—Reliability estimation of electricity generation, taking the integral to it, which represents the area under the
transmission and distribution plays an important role based on curve of the probability density function [3].In references [4,5]
assessment of past performance and using the estimating data for reliability of different system architecture, reliability and
future predictions. There are two traditional basic approaches to probability of failure for breaker failure protection function
estimate the reliability and probability of failure, one based on
(BPF) in reference [6], These literatures provide reliability
the analytical calculation and the other based on stochastic
simulation. This paper discusses about the estimation of system block diagram (RBD) method based on their calculation.
reliability and the probability of failure simple algorithms Markova state model has shown in reference [7] for reliability
(RaFSA) existing in one protection IED, general protection investigation for different substation bus configuration.
function and the breaker failure protection (BFP) function. The With this motivation, this paper discusses about the
RaFSA estimations are implemented over a practical small estimation of system reliability and the probability of failure
transmission substation T1-1. Different practical configurations simple algorithms RaFSA existing in one protection IED,
are considered. Stochastic simulation approach is the way that general protection function and the breaker failure protection
RaFSA estimations are implemented with. RaFSA provides BFP function. The RaFSA estimations are implemented over a
specific benefits such as: easy to implement, handle huge amount
practical small transmission substation T1-1. Different
of data, different tools and parameters can be used, ability to
analyze different input data without major modifications in the practical configurations are considered. Stochastic simulation
underlying process. approach is the way that RaFSA estimations are implemented
with. RaFSA provides specific benefits such as; it can be
Keywords—RaFSA; IEC61850; Next-Genration substation; implemented in different PC softwares. Support different kind
substation architectures;Reliability; Probability of failure. of probability distribution models, not only the exponential
one. It can handle a huge amount of input data. Furthermore,
I. INTRODUCTION other analyzing tools and parameters such as repairing time,
The future of distributed automation systems (DAS) faces a load flow, reconfiguration, optimization, etc. can be
harder demand on their technical solution. These demands are considered. Lastly, changing input data can easily be applied
based on new requirements for the electricity generation, through RaFSA without major modifications in the underlying
transmission, distribution, laws, taxes and deregulation. Loss process. This paper arranges such as in section II BFP function
of load, unnecessary payment and fees will occur if an reliability and probability of failure estimation methods based
interruption happened. Therefore, one of the most dominating on IEC61850 has been presented. Section III shows substation
considerations in the current and future DAS design is bus topology types under study. In section IV RaFSA
reliability and availability which needs performing the estimation processes have been presented. Section V
vulnerability analysis and stating the risk [1]. However, concludes the work.
accuracy measurements for the estimating reliability must be
associated in which that depends on the amount of data II. RELAIBILITY AND PROBABILITY OF FAILURE FOR BFP
available and the result of observations. Observations and FUNCTION ESTIMATION
analysis of available test data related to performance under Reliability and probability of failure can be estimated based
either actual or simulated condition are the boundaries that on two conventional methods direct analytical techniques or
must be used to assess reliability. The commonly meaning of stochastic simulations. Both approaches have advantages and
the used term reliability indicates the required function can be disadvantages. The analytical technique has a fairly short
performed by the entity based on stated condition for a stated solution time and it always gives the same numerical results
period successfully [2]. Other parameter where the reliability for the identical models and identical input data, whereas the
can be described with is probability of failure or a meantime to simulation technique has long solution time depends on the
failure (MTTF). number of iteration in which that gives different output for
each iteration. However, all outputs shear the same
characteristic that they have a tendency towards the true
The mathematical representation of the data can be values. Moreover, the simulation techniques can handle a huge
implemented by one of specific statistical probability amount of input data with different kinds of probability
distribution models. Therefore, this paper proposes the BPU

reliability and probability of failure simple algorithms RaFSA S

estimation based on the stochastic simulation techniques. The
TS
proposed RaFSA for the BFP function have been carried out
BIED MU
considering a typical small transmission substation under
varies configuration architectures. Since the other functions in
substation are mostly a subset from BFP function with the TS MU BPU BIED
S
interlocked paths equal to one (n=1) [6,7].
However, the proposed algorithm RaFSA estimation can be Figure 2. General bay protection function IEDs and RBD.
implemented for different kind of systems, functions and
reasons. Cascaded architecture, a typical cascading configuration
illustrated in Fig. 3 that all six bays are connected in chain
According to the BFP function configuration the local bay based on open loop configuration. It is simple and less
is where the BFP function resides, protection unit (PU), expensive, while it has a high latency and less reliability since
control unit (CU). In case of non-operation of the local circuit it requires that all switches must work successfully.
breaker, or unexpected of the measurement values (CTs/VTs), NCC

distributed trip signal from BFP to adjacent n bays must be Station

pc

reached in order to execute the BFP function. Based on (T1-1) server

architecture it consists of four circuit breakers that each

connected with a single bay Ethernet switch as illustrated in ES MU

Fig. 1. Within a successful execution of the function current

measurement from MU in the local bay to the PU in the path
(MU-SS-PU), and trip signal to other bays in paths (PU-SS- IED

(SS-BIED) n) are initiated. Hence the trip signal to initiate the

BFP function might be initiated from different protection 2 series
ES PU ES ES
4 series 4 series
MU ES BIED
functions within or outside the protection terminal, based on
the concept of distributed functions that assigned by IEC61850 Figure 3. Cascaded architecture and RBD for BFP function.
[6]. Redundant ring architecture, in case of achieving higher
level of redundancy we connect each IED with two redundant
220 kV ring networks. These rings are connected with a common HMI
which is often used with the protection function and it is the
case already now [8] as illustrated in Fig. 4. Based on this
configuration all IEDs have tow paths within two separated
ring-networks. It is complicated and high expensive. However
it has high reliability. The RBD of the ring architecture based
132 kV on the rapid spanning tree protocol (RSTP) that provides
automatic pickup paths in case of failure in active link.
Circuit
Breaker
Therefore, four switches out of five are required to execute the
Switch BFP function successfully.
T1-1

Figure 1. Small transmission substation NCC

Station ES MU
pc
III. SUBSTATION BUS TOPOLOGIES UNDER STUDY modem

The basic substation bus topology types are star cascaded server

and ring. Quite often mixed solutions, such as star-ring IED

topology, can be implemented to achieve the best

performance. In star topology, all substation devices are
connected directly to a common Ethernet switch as illustrated
in Fig. 2 which shown the general bay protection function.
This type of topology easily meets the standard IEC61850
requirement of transmission delay less than 4ms. However, 4 out of 5
ES ES
since all devices are connected to common switch, a single 2 series
ES
4 series
PU
failure in the switch may take down the whole system. This MU BIED
4 out of 5
ES
leads to less reliability value compared to ring topology. ES
ES
Figure 4. Redundant ring and RBD architecture.
 IV. RELIABILITY AND PROBABILITY OF FAILURE SIMPLE
ALGORITHMS (RAFSA)
To better understand the proposed RaFSA estimation
method single IED has been considered firstly and we assume
the failure rate distribution function is based on exponential
distribution (useful life) region II form the bath-tub curve Fig.
5 [2]. The reliability and probability of failure based on
analytical calculations for n identical IEDs within the same
environment are identical. Whereas the behavior patterns for n
identical IEDs in real world will all be different. These
differences can exist in varying functionalities, including the
surviving time, number of failures, the time between failure,
restoration time etc. Therefore, the strongest point of the
proposed RaFSA has been considered since it intended to
examine and predict the actual behavior pattern for each IED
in the system. These examination and prediction features are
provided based on the nature through the process that involved
within the RaFSA is random.
Figure 5. Bath tube curve
A. Single IED
According to the RaFSA steps, we generate a set of uniform
pseudo-random numbers based on a deterministic algorithm.
The generated numbers are distributed randomly over the
interval (0,1).
(1)
Where A (the multiplier), B (the modulus) and C (the
increment) are all non-negative integer.
After generating the sequence of pseudo-random numbers,
an uniform random number can be found from dividing the
generated numbers over the modulus as follows,
(2)
The uniform input data can be converted into another
distribution by using one of the converting methods. The main
procedure that used for conversion is inverse transform
method, composition method and acceptance rejection
method. Within the proposed RaFSA we used inverse
transform method. It is the most efficient converting method,
but it can be used only if the distribution can be inverted
analytically. This method is suitable for the exponential
distribution what we assumed for the failure rate distribution
function for proposed IED model. Therefore, the converted
operation time for IEDi based on the inverse transform method
can be achieved from the formula as follows [2],
(3)
Where T is the operation time (times-to-failure) based on
exponential distribution and λ is the failure rate.
Classical modeling of the system IEDs is based on two state
probability models “operate” and “failed”. Transitions
between states are defined based on the probability
distributions of time to fail (TTF) and time to repair (TTR).
The next step, we need to examine the IED unit is in its
operative state or in its failure state. This task can be
performed by comparing the operation time with the assumed
mission time. In order to define the success events we need to
concern the operating time, in which a unit remains in its up or
operating state before it fails. Then if the operating time is
greater or equal to the mission time we sign these events as
successes events (reliable). If the operating time is less than
the mission time, we sign these events as failure events. By
counting the success and failure events we are able to estimate
the value of the reliability and the probability of failure as it
explained in Fig. 1. Fig. 6 shows the flowchart of the RaFSA
estimation process, more practical use of RaFSA estimation is
in reference [6,10]
START
Generate Uniform
N pseudo-random
numbers Ui and
assign λi
Converting to another
distribution
Ti=-1/λi*ln(Ui)
No
Failure events = F
Is the converted time
Ti ≥ mission time
Yes
Calculate the
probability of Success events = S
failure Q=F/N
Calculate the
Reliability
R=S/N
Output Q and R
End
Figure 6. Flow chart of the RaFSA estimation process single IED.
B. General bay protection function START

In this subsection the general bay protection function in SAS

has been considered. According to IEC61850 standard SAS Generate Uniform N Generate Uniform N
pseudo-random pseudo-random
functions have been distributed to more than one IED based on numbers Ui and assign numbers Ui and assign
λ1 λ2
some real time requirements. According to the general bay
protection function architecture, it consist of single Ethernet Converting to another
Converting to another
switch, breaker protection unit (BPU), breaker control unit distribution
Ti1=-1/λ1*ln(Ui)
distribution
Ti2=-1/λ2*ln(Ui)
(BCU), merging unit (MU), breaker IED (BIED) and time
synchronization (TS) Fig. 2. Regardless the substation
No
configuration the general bay protection function is identical in Failure events = F
Is the converted time Is the converted time
No
Failure events = F
Ti1 ≥ mission time Ti2 ≥ mission time
which that it needs the same set of IEDs for all configurations.
Therefore, the bay protection function always needs IEDs that Yes Yes

interlocked in a bath such as (TS-MU-BPU-ES-BIED) based

Success events = S Success events = S
on successful implementation of the protection function.
Besides, all IEDs must work successfully. Within this
interlocking paths and successful IEDs working condition, the Collect the success and
failure events as rows (for
underlying network for all these IEDs are connected in series. each IED) in a matrix

The same procedure within RaFSA can be followed as in case

one (single IED). However in this case two failure rates (λ1,
No
λ2) need to be assigned and another check condition (type of Failure events = F
Is every elements in each column are
equals to S
(Series connection)
the IEDs connection) need to be considered. By counting the
success and failure events we are able to estimate the value of Yes
the reliability and the probability of failure as it explained in
Success events = S
Fig. 7 which shows the flowchart of the RaFSA estimation
process for general bay protection function,
Calculate the
Calculate the Reliability
probability of failure
R=S/N
Q=F/N

Output Q and R

End

Figure 7. Flow chart of the RaFSA estimation process general bay protection
function.

C. Cascaded system architecture

In this subsection we consider the RaFSA estimation of the
BFP function for the cascaded small transmission substation
(T1-1) architecture Fig. 3. We assume that the system is
synchronous. The BFP function based on successful
implementation in cascaded architecture, it needs that all six
bays are connected in a chain upon open loop configuration.
Therefore, it requires that all switches, related PIEDs and
BIEDs are working successfully (series connection). The same
procedure can be followed as in the cases above. However in
cascaded system with different failure rate IEDs more than
two, it needs to assign different (λj) failure rates for each IED.
Besides, the IEDs connection needs to be considered. By
counting the success and failure events we are able to estimate
the value of the reliability and the probability of failure as it
explained in Fig. 8 which shows the flowchart of the RaFSA
estimation process for cascaded system architecture,
 START
START
Generate Uniform
N pseudo-random
numbers Ui and Generate Uniform N Generate Uniform N
assign λj pseudo-random pseudo-random
numbers Ui and assign numbers Ui and assign
λj (parallel) λj (series)

Converting to another
distribution Converting to Converting to
Ti,j=-1/λj*ln(Ui) another distribution another distribution
Ti,j=-1/λj*ln(Ui) Ti,j=-1/λj*ln(Ui)

No
Is the converted time No No
Failure events = F Is the converted time Is the converted time
Ti,j ≥ mission time Failure events = F
Ti,j ≥ mission time Ti,j ≥ mission time
Failure events = F

Yes Yes Yes

Success events = S Success events = S

Success events = S

Collect the success and failure Collect the success and failure
Collect the success and events as rows (for each IED) in events as rows (for each IED) in
failure events as rows (for a matrix a matrix
each IED) in a matrix

No
Is any one elements in each Is every elements in each No
Failure events set Failure events set
column are equals to S column are equals to S
F=0 F=0
No Is every elements in each (parallel connection) (series connection)
Failure events = F column are equals to S
(Series connection)
Yes Yes

Yes Success events set S=1 Success events set S=1

Success events = S
Collect the success and Collect the success and
failure events as vectors failure events as vectors

Calculate the probability of Calculate the Reliability

failure Q=F/N R=S/N

Collect the success and failure

events as rows in a matrix

Output Q and R

No
Is every elements in each
Failure events = F column are equals to 1
End (Series connection)

Yes
Figure 8. Flow chart of the RaFSA estimation process cascaded system
architecture
Success events = S

D. Redundant ring system architecture Calculate the

Calculate the
probability of failure
Lastly, the RaFSA estimation for the BFP function of the Q=F/N
Reliability R=S/N

redundant ring architecture has been considered. In order of

achieving higher level of redundancy each IED has been
connected within SAS with two redundant ring configuration
networks. Based on this configuration all IEDs have tow paths
within two separated ring-networks Fig. 4. The same procedure
can be followed as in the cases above. However in redundant
ring system with different failure rate IEDs, it needs to assign
different (λj) failure rates for each IED. The IEDs connections
in each subsystem need to be considered, since we have a
mixed series and parallel IEDs connection. For instance
parallel IEDs a failure in one IED leads to other IED operates
over the fielded one. Moreover, for any other intermediate
situation such as 4-out-of-5 IEDs subsystem can be modeled as
three IEDs in series with two IEDs in parallel [2]. By counting
the success and failure events we are able to estimate the value
of the reliability and the probability of failure as it explained in
Fig. 9 which shows the flowchart of the RaFSA estimation
process for redundant ring system architecture,
Output Q and R
End
Figure 9. Flow chart of the RaFSA estimation process ring system architecture
V. CONCLUSION
The performance of electrical generation, transmission and
distribution is directly related to the reliability of its
components mainly IEDs and the protection systems. Modern
IEDs and protection systems can fail for any reason. As
regards, 100% reliable is impossible. Therefore, to assess the
reliability and stability of the system, actual system behaviour
estimation method is required. This can be implemented by the
RaFSA estimation method.
The proposed RaFSA estimation methods attempts to
examine and predict the actual behavior pattern for each IED
in the system. These examination and prediction features are
provided based on the nature through the process that involved
within the RaFSA is random. RaFSA provides specific
benefits such as: easy to carry out in different PC software
such as Matlab, C, C++, etc. Support different kind of
probability distribution models, not only the exponential one.
It can handle a huge amount of input data. Besides, other
analyzing tools and parameters such as repairing time, load
flow, reconfiguration, optimization, etc. can be considered.
Lastly, changing input data can easily be applied through
RaFSA without major modifications in the underlying process.

Acknowledgment
I would like to thank the DEMVE project University of
Vaasa group for their valuable support to complete this work.
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