A Strategic Triangle of ‘Two and a Half Powers’

Fall 1979

By William R. Kintner

The late William R. Kintner was president of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (1969-
1973 and 1975-1982), taking leave to serve as the United States Ambassador to Thailand (1973-
1975). He also edited Orbis and coauthored, with John F. Copper, A Matter of Two Chinas: The
China-Taiwan Issue in U.S. Foreign Policy (FPRI, 1979).

Abstract: This year marks the 40th anniversary of President Jimmy Carter’s decision to normalize
relations with the Peoples’
’s fRepublic of China. Many scholars at the time were perplexed at the seeming
haste of the decision. The Foreign Policy Research Institute’s former president, William R. Kintner,
wrote of the problems of “strategic innocence,” as well as the potential unintended consequences of
“Carter’s China Gamble.” His article, originally published in Fall 1979, reminds readers how
perilous international relations were at the time and how high the stakes for were for future U.S.-
Soviet relations, as well as the precarious position of Taiwan. Time has validated the prescience of his
observations.

Editor’s Note: It is interesting to note that at the time Dr. Kintner’s Orbis article
appeared in print, FPRI’s Senior Fellow June Teufel Dreyer was raising many of the
same concerns in the Journal of Atomic Scientists. She wrote: “Although candidate Jimmy
Carter campaigned against secrecy in international relations, his China policy was as
stealthy as Nixon’s, while lacking the Nixon-Kissinger finesse. Carter announced on
December 15, 1978—just after Congress left for its holiday recess—that diplomatic
normalization would begin January 1. Diplomatic relations with the Republic of China
would be terminated and the Mutual Security Treaty abrogated. The administration
failed to consult with Congress, and it acted with such haste that it made no
arrangements regarding Taiwan's future. Further, the normalization announcement
came little more than a week after Congress had passed a resolution that recognition
of the People’s Republic of China should not come at the expense of the Republic of
China on Taiwan. While normalization was widely considered desirable in Congress,
the circumstances under which it was achieved were bitterly criticized by Republicans
and Democrats alike.”

© 2019 Published for the Foreign Policy Research Institute by Elsevier Ltd.

Spring 2019 | 281

doi: 10.1016/j.orbis.2019.02.008
KINTNER

President Carter welcomes Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping to the

United States in January 1979. (Photo: Carter Library.)

A Strategic Triangle of ‘Two and a Half Powers’

S trategic realities suggest that President Carter’s recognition of China in December

1978 is likely, rather than contributing to world peace, to usher in a period of
intensified world turmoil. The recent Chinese invasion of Vietnam, for instance,
appears to have been a deliberate, albeit poorly executed, move to provoke a Soviet
attack on China. But why would China want to antagonize the Soviet Union at a time
when the Soviets’ ability to intervene in potential crisis areas is perceived by all to be
superior to that of the Chinese?
Chinese strategy draws upon two sources: 1) the traditional wisdom of Sun
Tzu, and 2) a recent history of close interaction between the Chinese leadership and
Soviet strategists, first as allies and, since the early 1960s, as adversaries. China sees
the initial targets of Soviet expansion to be Middle Eastern oil and the neutralization
of Western Europe. At the same time, the Chinese believe that the Soviets are
attempting to encircle China by putting pressure on Pakistan and India, allying with
Vietnam and dominating North Korea.
Convinced that they understand the Soviet strategic plan, the Chinese
Communists are confident they can design an effective strategic riposte. The Soviet
Union clearly is unsettled by the Chinese approach. Recent visitors to Moscow find
that the lesson learned by the Soviets from the Chinese-Vietnamese clash is that the
Chinese will try again. The Soviet message, in the event of an invasion in the Chinese
1979-1980 dry season, has been that Soviet forces will respond.1 A review of shifting
strategic relations on the Eurasian land mass will provide clues to the rationale behind
China’s deliberately provocative behavior toward the Soviet Union.

1 Interview by the author with Soviet officials in July 1979.

282 | Orbis
 A Strategic Triangle of ‘Two and a Half Powers’

Recognizing Beijing: The Immediate Aftermath

Less than a month after President Carter’s hasty recognition of Beijing, Soviet-
backed Vietnam’s “liberators” captured the Cambodian capital of Phnom Penh. On
January 7, 1979, the Soviet news agency TASS declared that “this news will
undoubtedly be received with profound satisfaction and joy by millions of people in
different parts of the world.” Within a few weeks the People’s Republic began
“punishing” Vietnam, invading across the 400-mile border separating the two
countries. Moscow immediately pledged that the Soviet Union would “honor its
obligations to Vietnam,” but did not reveal what action it would take. The temperature
of the Beijing-Moscow conflict thus began to rise precipitously.
Over the past two years, events along the arc stretching from the Horn of
Africa to the Southeast Asia have convinced the Chinese that America lacks the will to
check Soviet intrusions aimed at effecting a fundamental transformation in the global
balance of power. Before the weakness of the U.S. position became so obvious, it was
believed both in Washington and Beijing that, in the long run, normalization of
relations would serve the purpose of restraining Moscow. Each thought the other
would add strength to its own international position. Since that strengthening has not
taken place, the Sino-American liaison is fraught with potentially serious problems.
These problems arise from two facts: first, the United States has permitted its power
to decline relative to that of the Soviet Union; secondly, it will be many years before
China can stand up militarily against its powerful neighbor—though it may be
sufficiently calculating to provoke a Soviet attack.
Given its unwillingness to respond to Soviet and Cuban intrusions into Africa
and elsewhere, the Carter administration generally appears to assess the projection of
Soviet power with equanimity. It tends to discount Soviet military power far more
than its critics do. In Brzezinski’s words, “Soviet military power, although it has grown
very substantially, it is not enough, I repeat, to dominate the United States (we more
than match them); not enough to dominate the world; but enough to make the
resolution of regional conflicts much more difficult.”2
In almost cavalier fashion, bespeaking strategic innocence, Carter threw away
asset after asset as if America’s strategic posture were so strong that nothing could
threaten it. The decision to withdraw U.S. ground forces from South Korea, the
cancellation of the B-1 bomber, delays in the production of new strategic systems (MX
and Trident), and the halt to production of the “neutron bomb” did not reflect deep
White House concern about America’s declining security position. The free world,
lacking any meaningful U.S. leadership, has been unable to cope with expansionist
Soviet programs. Belated recognition by a few of the Carter people of an impending
massive and unfavorable shift in the global balance of power prompted the U.S.

2Quoted in James Reston, “The World According to Brzezinski,” New York Times Magazine,
Dec. 31, 1978, p. 11.

Spring 2019 | 283

KINTNER

decision to embrace Beijing—a short-run tactic that has had to take the place of a well-
thought-out strategy.

How the Soviets See the New Strategic Relationship

The potential benefits of bringing the PRC into some kind of tacit alliance
with the United States, Japan and NATO seemed a painless way of conveying a
willingness to defend our global position. Yet, that move could easily yield adverse
results, and therein lies Carter’s China gamble. Depending on the Soviet estimate of
how fast the PRC can become a modern military state, the Soviets may accelerate their
timetable for dealing with China, or they may be provoked by Beijing into premature
action.
The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia signifies some Soviet acceleration; the
Chinese “punishment” of Vietnam suggests deliberate provocation of the Soviet
Union. How the Soviets will act depends upon how the Kremlin perceives the
implications of the new U.S.-Chinese relationship for Soviet security. On the eve of
announcing U.S. recognition of the PRC, National Security Adviser Zbigniew
Brzezinski called in Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to tell him of the decision,
as to ask him to convey to Mr. Brezhnev the assurance that the United States’ action
was not directed against the Soviet state. A few days later, Brezhnev responded with
a personal message that Carter labeled “very positive in tone.” On December 21, 1978,
the Soviet news agency challenged President Carter’s interpretation, pointing out that
Brezhnev’s response included a negative side: displeasure with the word “hegemony”
(Peking’s code word for Soviet imperialism) in the U.S.-PRC communique of
December 15.
Soviet foreign-policy experts have continued to focus on the Sino-American
relationship as the most destabilizing factor in the contemporary international
environment. Georgi Arbatov,3 in a November 1978 interview, expressed his concern
over the formation of an incipient anti-Soviet alliance comprising the United States,
Japan, the People’s Republic and NATO. Arbatov asserted that the 1978 Sino-
Japanese friendship treaty has produced strains on America’s relations with the
Japanese. He then noted that the West’s pursuit of short-term gains might become the
cornerstone of a dramatic new set of international relationships. Among his concerns:
“One—which I hope will not materialize—is for China to become some sort of
military ally to the West, even an informal ally. Then the whole situation would look
different to us. We would have to reanalyze our relationship with the West.”
In early January 1979, several U.S. senators visited Moscow to gather
information relating to the anticipated SALT II agreement. Afterward, Senator S.I.
Hayakawa commented on the fact that both Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders were
terribly concerned about the U.S. recognition of the People’s Republic: “The Soviets
see it as a plot against them or are afraid it might be. There’s no question the Soviets
are very much disturbed by the recognition of the People’s Republic by the Carter
administration.”4 Prior to his visit to the United States in January 1979, Vice-Premier

3 London Observer, Nov. 12, 1978.

4 New York Times, Jan. 11, 1979.

284 | Orbis
 A Strategic Triangle of ‘Two and a Half Powers’

Deng Xiaoping told Hedley Donovan that “if we really want to be able to place curbs
on the Polar Bear, the only realistic thing for us is to unite.”5
On July 24, 1979, the annual White Paper of the Japanese Defense Agency
was issued, stressing the need for Japan to build up its defense capability to cope with
the “colossal military reinforcement by the Soviet Union.” Particularly in the Far East,
“this compels the Western allies to institute a serious restudy of the present military
balance between the superpowers.” On August 27, Vice President Mondale delivered
a speech in Beijing in which he stated: “Despite the sometimes profound differences
between our two systems, we are committed to joining you to advance our many
parallel strategies and bilateral interests. Thus, any nation which seeks to weaken or
isolate you in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American interests.” Taken
together, the two statements may well be seen by the Soviets as an effort to tighten a
vice around them.
Rightly or wrongly, the Soviets believe that the addition of China to the
cooperative arrangements that America has forged with Western Europe and Japan is
a threat to them. Yet, President Carter and his national security adviser seem to believe
that our closer link with the Chinese will be accepted by the USSR as a contribution to
world peace. President Carter’s failure to place himself in Breshnev’s strategic shoes
is reflected in the growing apprehension expressed by Soviet leaders over the stabilizing
impact of American policy in Asia.

Some Parenthetical History

A striking parallel with the present international systems is to be found in the

international structure and diplomatic pattern preceding the First World War. Soviet
perceptions of the strategic meaning of Washington’s new ties with Beijing are
comparable to Berlin’s perception of diplomatic developments in the years before the
outbreak of war in 1914.
Early in this century, six major powers in Europe were grouped into two
opposing alliance systems: the Triple Alliance of Imperial Germany, the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and Italy and the Triple Entente of Great Britain, France and
Russia. For the Triple Entente to become more effective as a restraining coalition
against Germany, it was essential for Great Britain to end its competition with Russia
along the arc stretching from the Persian Gulf to India. The Anglo-Russian
Convention of 1907 proved to be diplomatic crossroads. It was professed to be a
settlement of British and Russian differences, not the initiation of a stronger
combination hostile to Germany; but Berlin read it differently. The Anglo-Russian
Convention induced in Germany a fear of encirclement. Berlin suspected that the new
concord was not an end in itself, but a means to an end: the formation of a stronger
diplomatic combination on the part of England, France and Russia. The Triple
Entente—if it grew in cohesion—could outmatch the Triple Alliance in economic
resources and in military strength.

5 Time, Feb. 5, 1979.

Spring 2019 | 285

KINTNER

The new U.S. ties with China may likewise be perceived by Moscow as a major
alliance-building measure, rather than a contribution to peace. Although history never
repeats itself exactly, there are parallels today with the pre-1914 period. In the early
1900s, Germany was contesting Great Britain for naval supremacy; today, the Soviet
Union is challenging its most technologically advanced rival, the United States, for
strategic and naval superiority. The Soviets also possess superiority in conventional
ground and air forces over all the countries located on their security periphery. Though
the Soviet policy is cloaked under professions of peaceful coexistence, Soviet power
and expansionist diplomacy have by now managed to stir deep-seated fears in the
minds of West European, Japanese and Chinese leaders. Those fears are aggravated
by the perception among America’s allies that U.S. military power is waning. If U.S.
power is seen to be getting smaller than Russia’s, then our allies’ citizens will grow
increasingly nervous about the value of American protection. That nervousness could
crack the Atlantic Alliance.

Soviet Options

Many experienced and knowledgeable Americans believe that the world

balance of power favors the Soviet Union. In a recent public letter, 170 retired U.S.
admirals and generals asserted that “Russia has quietly passed us in military strength
and is moving aggressively in Africa, the Mideast, and elsewhere.”6 Vice-Premier
Deng, in an interview with Hedley Donovan, commented, I have read their letter
myself and very much approve of it.”
The Soviets, however, are less concerned with their favorable present than
with an uncertain future. They appear to fear that they could one day be encircled by
a combination of China, Japan, Western Europe and the United States. Except for
regional actors, such as India and Cuba, the USSR lacks friendly relations with any
significant powers. Ties with Vietnam and Cuba cannot erase the Soviet sense of
psychological isolation; only Czechoslovakia sided with Moscow in the UN Security
Council’s condemnation of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Moreover,
although Paul Warnke believes that the Soviets are “a bruised and lonely people who
fear nuclear war, who in their singular way are searching for their place in the family of
man,”7 this is true only of the average Russian man in the street, not the top party,
military and police officials. In such a context, at a time when the Soviet Union enjoys
significant all-around military superiority in the Eurasian land mass, how will Moscow
deal with the incipient combine of the United States, China and Japan?
There is little chance that Moscow will stand by and watch a potential Chinese
threat mature. The Soviets will feel compelled to engage in disruptive actions and can
be expected to accelerate their penetration of what Brzezinski calls an “arc of
instability” from Bangladesh to Aden—and on into Ethiopia and the Sudan. Iran’s
disintegration has already had some deleterious effect in nearby oil-producing states,
particularly Saudi Arabia. Additional Soviet successes along the “arc of instability,”
however, require that the image of Soviet invincibility remain intact; and the Chinese

6 New York Times, Jan. 21, 1979.

7 Hugh Sidey, “On Trusting the Soviets,” Time, Jan. 29, 1979.

286 | Orbis
 A Strategic Triangle of ‘Two and a Half Powers’

invasion of Vietnam may have been designed to shatter that image. Had China’s
military operation been more convincing, they might have forced the Soviet Union to
give more than verbal and logistical support to its Vietnamese ally. One such “quick
fix” military option might have been a conventional attack against Manchuria.
The odds against the PRC in any confrontation on the border, where the
Soviets have quadrupled their forces since 1968, are formidable. Soviet ground forces
comprise some 45 divisions, the bulk of which are massed along a line around
Manchuria stretching from Outer Mongolia to the Pacific Ocean. By invading
Manchuria—a limited but explosive move—the Soviets could gain control of the long-
cherished warm-water ports of Dairen and Port Arthur, seize a good deal of the PRC’s
industrial base, and deal a demoralizing blow to the newly formed U.S.-Chinese-
Japanese combine. Whether the Soviet Union would exercise this, or some other,
option depends on the Soviet assessment of how rapidly the United States and its allies
have been building up the PRC. We must be aware that the trump card in the
Kremlin’s hand is a military one. Under such conditions, why would Beijing
deliberately provoke a Soviet counter against China?

The Strategic Process

Whether in business or in politics, it is an old strategic rule that the value of a

new alliance is determined by the intentions of your new partner. This was not
understood by U.S. leaders. The hasty friendship with China was not a well-conceived
strategic act, but some sort of “last straw” move. The Chinese are not natural allies of
the United States; despite the historical romanticism surrounding Sino-American
relations, the two countries have little in common. China’s Marxist-Leninist regime is
diametrically opposed to America’s capitalist economic system and democratic
government. Their only mutual interest lies in coping with the Soviet build-up of
military might, which endangers them both.
During his January 1979 visit to the United States Vice-Premier Deng must
have been as much impressed by the strategic security in Washington as he was by the
United States’ tremendous technological and industrial power. He must also have been
amazed at Carter’s confused approach to the Soviet challenge. One must conclude
that Deng was determined to set matters straight upon his return to Peking.
The Carter administration saw some advantage in moving closer to China, but
it did not anticipate the stormy weather that followed U.S. recognition of Beijing.
Quite likely, the vulnerability of NATO influenced the United States government to
enlist a “half-power” as an ally in the East Asian balance. Theoretically, the strategic
reasoning underlying the U.S.-Chinese move is correct: if the Russians face a danger
of a “second front,” their ability to threaten Western Europe will be restricted. In
reality, however, the danger posed to the USSR by the new alliance is not now very
great. The Soviets answered the U.S.-Chinese link-up with classic strategic
countermoves: they formed a possible second front to China by backing the
Vietnamese attack on Cambodia, and they built up the garrisons on two islands close

Spring 2019 | 287

KINTNER

to Northern Hokkaido claimed by the Japanese, thus suggesting to Tokyo that perhaps
it would be unwise to move closer to China.
China knows that the Soviets now hold the upper hand. Put another way, if
Russia were contemplating a military operation against Western Europe, a second front
along the Chinese border would not, at this time, be a major consideration in their
decision to implement such plans. China can endanger only a small and relatively
noncritical area of the USSR; Soviet actions in Europe would be far more damaging to
the Western alliance than anything China could do to Russia by attacking Siberia. The
Chinese are thus forced into a tactic of undermining Moscow’s strategic time frame.
Contrary to Western strategic thinkers who believe that temporary stability is the
highest goal of strategy, the classical military planner who has read Sun Tzu knows that
any action forcing an adversary to undertake a plan of action prematurely constitutes
a sound strategic move.
China, which foresees a long-term Soviet threat, needs the United States more
than the United States needs China. The strategically minded Chinese believe they
know what needs to be done is to shake the United States out of its lethargy. Their
operation against Vietnam was a device aimed at triggering some Soviet move against
them, and Beijing will demand some price from Hanoi to settle its score with Vietnam.
If the Soviet Union permits Hanoi to acquiesce in the Chinese demand, the Soviet
reputation for ruthless political exploitation of its military power will evaporate. In the
struggle between China and Russia, both sides know the Soviet Union can severely
damage, but cannot conquer, its immense adversary. But, whatever the outcome of a
Soviet attack on China, it would serve to end the U.S.-Soviet détente. Observing, but
not understanding the relentless struggle between the master strategist of Moscow and
Beijing, President Carter declared in Atlanta on February 20, 1979, that the United
States would stand aloof from the Communist conflict in Asia.
Again, why would China risk provoking a war that it would most likely lose
and that might result in the loss of part or all of Manchuria? The Chinese know that
the Soviets are weakest where they are strongest—in manpower. If the Chinese have
sufficient time to mobilize and arm that strength, they will one day be able to deal with
the Soviet threat. Hence, they are willing to accept a serious, but not mortal, defeat
now in order to gain a future victory. As Marxist-Leninists, they know that in 1918
Lenin relinquished much of Russia to Imperial Germany in order to consolidate
Bolshevik control over the remainder of Russia. Seen in this light, the Chinese move
into Vietnam is an elegant strategic masterpiece. Should the Soviets fail to find some
way of punishing China for its attack on their ally, then the momentum of the Soviet
power drive will stop. Should they move against China, then U.S.-Soviet détente will
be shattered, and a Western mobilization will likely take place.
The Chinese failure to achieve a decisive victory over the Vietnamese
permitted Moscow to temporize. After the Chinese announced their intended
withdrawal, both Hanoi and Beijing claimed victory. A TASS political commentator
wrote that the Vietnamese “are staunchly defending against the interventionists, their
homes, their freedom and independence.” The Soviets can claim that their airlift to
Hanoi and their naval deployments in the Gulf of Tonkin were all the support the
Vietnamese needed to defend themselves. By thus exhibiting restraints, and reiterating
their desire to sign a SALT II agreement, the Soviets were able to present an image of

288 | Orbis
 A Strategic Triangle of ‘Two and a Half Powers’

moderation. Subsequently, they may find an appropriate time to deal with their China
problem.
For the Chinese leadership, the gamble lies in their evaluation of the American
commitment. For China to provoke an attack from the Soviet Union at this time—
and for the Americans and NATO not to aid the Chinese—would not simply be an
embarrassment to American diplomats. It would likely force the replacement of the
present Chinese government with one distinctly pro-Soviet. The United States would
not merely have lost a “half-power” ally; it would have ensured the domination of
Eurasia by the Soviet Union.
Strategy implies a logical analysis of a given conflict situation in order to
maximize the chances of coming out ahead in the end. It is not gambling. The
widespread use of the term “China card” reflects the poor state of U.S. strategic
thinking. Since the end of World War II, major U.S. security decisions have not been
strategically wise. We have seen instead a series of improvisations risking higher and
higher stakes; costs have been great, and wins have been few and of marginal value.
Today, we are faced with the bleak prospect of a war between China and Russia that
our action has helped to generate. According to Prava, China’s leaders “seek modern
weapons and a military alliance between NATO, Japan, and China. . . . What can be
the final result of this policy, other than war, including a nuclear tragedy?”8

Risks and Opportunities

The weakness of American and NATO forces in relation to those of the Soviet
Union leaves us little room for error in the cautious development of a new relationship
with the People’s Republic of China. Realistically, the United States should have made
the move toward Beijing years ago, when the Western allies were stronger vis-à-vis the
Soviet Union. The USSR might have been more seriously threatened at an earlier time,
but it could not have countered that threat as effectively as it can now.
Is President Carter aware of the gamble he is taking? In his major foreign-
policy speech at Georgia Tech, President Carter made a virtue of the fact that “the
United States cannot control events in other countries.” He conveyed no sense that
the United States is being used by China in a calculating power play. That the American
people remain ignorant of foreign policy strategy can be blamed in part on
administrations that talk only of “building a new foundation for a peaceful and
prosperous world”—which will never exist if the Soviets do not soon adopt some
acceptable code of international conduct. The Soviet military leaders responsible for
so much recent Soviet success may, with or without Chinese provocation, advise the
Kremlin to shatter an incipient U.S.-PRC-Japanese-NATO encirclement before it is
too late. A foreign policy that makes confrontation likely, while reducing our power
in Asia and reflecting vacillation and indecision in meeting Soviet forays into the

8Washington Star, Feb. 5, 1978. Such fears will be fueled by revelations of Pentagon
contingency planning for arms sales to, and military cooperation with the PRC. (See the New
York Times, Oct. 4, 1979.)

Spring 2019 | 289

KINTNER

Middle East and Africa, holds little promise for Western security in either the short or
the long run.
The U.S. gamble on China can pay off only if there is a fundamental change
in strategic planning for the defense of the vital interests of the United States and its
apprehensive allies. This will require strategic analysis, evaluating prospective moves
from all perspectives (especially Moscow’s and Beijing’s). Only then can the United
States succeed in its fragile triangular relationship.

290 | Orbis