Tromblay, D. E. (2019) - From Old Left To New Left The FBI and The Sino-Soviet Split. International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence

International Journal of Intelligence and
CounterIntelligence
ISSN: 0885-0607 (Print) 1521-0561 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujic20
From Old Left to New Left: The FBI and the

Sino–Soviet Split
Darren E. Tromblay
To cite this article: Darren E. Tromblay (2019): From Old Left to New Left: The FBI and
the Sino–Soviet Split, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, DOI:
10.1080/08850607.2019.1670207
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2019.1670207
Published online: 18 Dec 2019.
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International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 0: 1–22, 2019
# 2019 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1521-0561 print/0885-0607 online
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2019.1670207
DARREN E. TROMBLAY
From Old Left to New Left: The FBI and

the Sino–Soviet Split
The dichotomy between foreign and domestic intelligence is a false one.

Drawing jurisdictional distinctions between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI; the intelligence service within the United States) and the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA; the intelligence service outside of U.S.
borders) contributes to scholars’ and journalists’ misinterpretation of the
FBI’s operations during the Cold War. Although the FBI did, at times,
engage in certain investigative excesses— especially against the Left—its
activities make greater (and less nefarious) sense within the context of
developing geopolitical awareness, in furtherance of U.S. strategic interests
rather than within the context of policing.
Two FBI operations—SOLO and the Ad Hoc Committee (AHC)—
demonstrate the FBI’s role as an integral contributor to the United States’
awareness of and interaction with the Cold War world. Through these two
operations, the FBI responded not simply to Cold War espionage but to the
Sino–Soviet split, a development that required a strategic-level U.S. response.
Darren E. Tromblay served as an intelligence analyst with the U.S.

government for more than a decade. He is the author of Spying: Assessing
U.S. Domestic Intelligence Since 9/11 (Lynne Rienner, 2019), Political
Influence Operations (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), and coauthor of
Securing U.S. Innovation (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). He holds an M.A.
from the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington
University, an M.S. from the National Intelligence University, and a B.A.
from the University of California. Mr. Tromblay has been a member of the
editorial advisory board for the International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence since 2018. The author can be reached at
Tromblay@gwu.edu.
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 0, NUMBER 0 1

2 DARREN E. TROMBLAY
Perhaps this is only recognizable through a postmodern lens. The FBI’s

development of both SOLO and AHC occurred within the context of its
counterintelligence mandate (i.e., determining the tactical level details of
clandestine foreign activities in the United States). However, as these
operations progressed, they evolved toward nothing less than the FBI seeking
to control how foreign governments interacted with the United States.
The FBI was not completely a blind squirrel that happened to find an
intelligence nut. It did understand—if not always articulate—how its work
related to U.S. strategic interests. Hoover made this point explicit in 1946,
when, commenting on the creation of what become the CIA, he noted, “[a]nd
yet the powers that be think it practical to divide domestic & foreign
intelligence. Such a move will create a ‘Pearl Harbor.’”1 Similarly, SOLO and
AHC—which were both influenced by the legacy of a single Special Agent—
demonstrated that the FBI could situate its operations within the context of
shifting geopolitics and ideologies. Unfortunately, the FBI has not always
captured the important lessons from such efforts once the dust has settled,
treating them as historical oddities rather than successes that inform
its evolution.
TOPLEV
In the wake of revelations about Soviet spies in Washington, DC, and the
Soviet Union’s detonation of an atomic device in 1949, the FBI revised its
collection activities directed against the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA).
The CPUSA, as multiple historians—notably Harvey Klehr and John Earl
Haynes—have conclusively demonstrated, took its direction and support
from the Soviet Union, making it a proxy for a foreign power.2 In September
1951, the FBI initiated its Development of Top Level Security Informants
(TOPLEV) program.3 TOPLEV was a human intelligence initiative, under
which Special Agents (SAs) received specialized training and were then
assigned to interview high-level communists, with the objective of recruiting
those communists as informants.4 The initial complement of thirty-five
TOPLEV SAs came from fourteen field offices.5
TOPLEV also portended the FBI’s next step in combatting the CPUSA. In
1954, FBI official F. J. Baumgardner assessed that TOPLEV “has had a
tremendous effect upon the [CPUSA] as a disruptive tactic and has caused
much confusion on all levels in the Party.”6 The FBI initiated a focused
effort to assess this confusion, specifically the CPUSA’s factionalism. On 27
August 1956, the FBI directed the twelve offices, which covered
approximately 88% of CPUSA members to determine the CPUSA factions
that existed within those offices’ territories.7
However, the FBI was not simply going to watch the party founder
in its own ideological maelstrom. On 22 August 1956, FBI official
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE

THE FBI AND THE SINO–SOVIET SPLIT 3
William C. Sullivan telegraphed the next phase of the FBI’s stance vis-

a-vis the CPUSA when he recommended the rapid preparation of a
monograph that would analyze “the present-day weaknesses, needs, and
reasoning” of the party; this monograph would “serve as a type of text
or guide or source book for carrying out a program of disruption.”8
Then, on 6 September 1956, the FBI directed those twelve offices to
select informants who could further the disruption within the CPUSA.
The informants would “seize upon any good opportunity to raise
controversial questions and doubts as to the success of a proposed plan
of action by the CPUSA leadership. … ”9 This was the beginning of
the Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO)–CPUSA.10
TOPLEV and COINTELPRO–CPUSA were intertwined initiatives and
they were perhaps intertwined nowhere so closely as in the FBI’s Chicago
field office. This was due in no small part to the work of SA Carl Freyman.
Chicago had two SAs who focused full time on TOPLEV.11 Freyman had
been one of these since the program’s inception.12 Under the auspices of
TOPLEV, Freyman developed CG-5824-S, who would become an essential
part of the FBI’s SOLO operation.13 Following his TOPLEV duties,
Freyman took charge of the Chicago office’s COINTELPRO–CPUSA
efforts at the program’s outset.14
Freyman’s effectiveness in these roles was amplified by two factors. First,
his superiors recognized his unique expertise. In 1955, Freyman, according to
his performance appraisal, had “an excellent knowledge of theories of
Marxism-Leninism and is thoroughly versed in Communist ideology.”15 (It is
amusing to read the vociferously anti-Communist FBI’s lauding an
employee’s knowledge of Marxism-Leninism.) The Special Agent in Charge
(SAC) of the Chicago office once characterized Freyman as “one the most
informed agents in the entire FBI on Marxist principles.”16 The second
element that made Freyman an important figure in the FBI’s campaign
against the CPUSA was his bureaucratic and, more importantly, intellectual
leadership. By 1955, Freyman was the full-time supervisor of the Chicago
squad that covered the basic revolutionary groups and front organizations.17
As of early 1956, he oversaw twenty-eight SAs and approximately 300
cases.18 Freyman’s 1958 personnel rating noted that he passed along his
“unusual knowledge of the theories of Marxism-Leninism” in training other
SAs in security work.19 This ability to impart understanding would lead to
the initiation of a remarkable operation known as the Ad Hoc Committee for
a Marxist Leninist Party.
SOLO
The basics of the long-running SOLO operation have been covered
elsewhere.20 SOLO is understood as the endeavor that helped to develop
AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 0, NUMBER 0

irrefutable documentation of Soviet funding to the CPUSA and that developed

early insights about the Sino–Soviet split. However, SOLO was something
more than the sum of the valuable intelligence that it yielded. It provided the
U.S. government control over the conduit between Moscow and its American
proxy. SOLO’s predecessor, SASH, had similarly targeted international
connections between communist parties by using NY-694-S as a courier
between the CPUSA and the Canadian Communist Party.21 After learning, in
1956, that the Soviet Union and the CPUSA both desired better means of
communication the FBI carefully maneuvered CG-5824-S into a position
where he was selected by CPUSA leader Eugene Dennis as the party’s official
representative.22 Gus Hall, who succeeded Eugene Dennis, sent CG-5824-S to
Moscow, as the chairman of the CPUSA delegation to the November 1960
meeting of international communist parties where he was able to completely
cover “[t]he proceedings at these meetings in plotting world domination.”23
There are indicators that the FBI also hoped to establish the SOLO
operation as the conduit through which the FBI could also control contact
between Communist China and elements within the United States. During
the first SOLO trip, in 1958, CG-5824-S and his wife spent two months in the
Soviet Union and another twelve days in China.24 The FBI, upon the
conclusion of this trip, assessed that CG-5824-S had “arranged for
communications between CPUSA and Russia and China to pass through
him.”25 During the third SOLO trip, CG-5824-S met with multiple Chinese
officials, including Mao Tse-Tung, head of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP).26 Furthermore, the third SOLO trip revealed that China was willing
to provide the CPUSA with $100,000 within the next six months of the trip’s
11 November 1959 conclusion.27
However, the developing Sino–Soviet split derailed the potential for SOLO
to control both the Soviet Union’s and China’s inroads to the United States.
The July 1960 SOLO mission was supposed to have included all Soviet
satellite nations and China.28 However, Moscow directed CG-5824-S to
return to the United States, rather than continuing onward to China.29
Sino–Soviet relations had reached a boil at the Third Congress of the
Communist Party of Romania.30 The CPUSA subsequently passed a
resolution in favor of the Soviet position.31 Although the SOLO operation
would continue to run successfully against the Soviet Union for
approximately another two decades, it was no longer a viable means for
controlling the relationship between China and entities within the
United States.
THE AD-HOC COMMITTEE FOR A MARXIST–LENINIST PARTY

The FBI, in the formative stages of COINTELPRO–CPUSA, had not simply
sown disruption within the party. Instead, one approach that it employed

was to pit competing political movements against each other. In October

1956, the FBI identified the conflict between the CPUSA and the Socialist
Workers Party (SWP) as one means by which to weaken the CPUSA.
Founded in 1938, on Marxist–Leninist–Trotskyist principles, the SWP had,
according to the FBI’s assessment, been “outspokenly critical of the
CPUSA” and had “referred to members of the CPUSA as Stalinists.”32
Nikita Khrushchev, in his “secret speech” during the 20th Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956, had critiqued
Stalin’s cult of personality.33 The FBI assessed that Khrushchev’s criticism
had handed the SWP “a psychological propaganda weapon to use against
members of the CPUSA.”34 According to the FBI, the SWP had initiated
“an ambitious program of trying to recruit leaders and active members of the
CPUSA into the SWP by capitalizing on the confusion existing inside
the CPUSA.”35
Having taken note of the SWP–CPUSA conflict, the FBI decided to assist
the SWP in undermining the CPUSA. According to an 10 October 1956
communication from FBI headquarters, fifteen field offices were supposed to
employ tactics such as furnishing information about CPUSA leaders to SWP
branch leaders, via SWP informants; taking out subscriptions to The
Militant, an SWP-connected publication, in the name of CPUSA leaders; and
providing the location of future CPUSA meetings to SWP leaders so that
SWP members would be prepared to distribute SWP literature to CPUSA
members in attendance.36 Of course, any gains that the SWP might have
made thanks to the FBI’s help were offset by the disruption program that it
initiated against the SWP in October 1961.37
The Chicago office, which was one of the offices handling both
CONINTELPRO–CPUSA and the SWP disruption program, incorporated
elements of both of these campaigns into an operation that would ultimately
attempt to pick up where SOLO had left off with China. This operation,
which began as the Ad-Hoc Committee for a Scientific Socialist Line, was
initially part of COINTELPRO–CPUSA.
Both FBI headquarters (HQ) and the Chicago office had recognized the
value of international schisms in the communist movement as tools with
which to disrupt the CPUSA. HQ, in a 8 November 1962 letter, “instructed
that all offices participating in the counterintelligence program be alert to
take advantage of recent international events to frustrate the Communist
Party.”38 Chicago, on November 20, submitted plans to HQ for what would
become the AHC operation. Specifically, the office would produce a
statement titled “Whither the Party of Lenin” which it would prepare on
plain white bond paper, mimeograph in a “home-spun” style, and mail
anonymously to the local faction of the CPUSA.39 The statement—which
would include intentional typographical errors for verisimilitude—focused on

“the shameful retreat of the revisionist Khrushchev” from the Caribbean,

which “left the heroic Cuban people naked in the face of Yankee
provocations and aggression” and the intensification of the Indo-Chinese
conflict.40 In conclusion, the statement would exhort “comrades” to “throw
off the shackles of revisionism and return to the Revolutionary Principles of
Lenin, Stalin and Mao.”41
During November 1962, SA Herbert K. Stallings, who had assumed
responsibility for the Chicago office’s COINTELPRO–USA operations while
assigned to Freyman’s squad, developed the putative AHC.42 Stallings
intended to create the impression that the Illinois District of the CPUSA had
fragmented along Sino–Soviet lines and that a clandestine group within the
party adhered to the Chinese interpretation of Marxism–Leninism.43 HQ
approved mailing of the statement, via a November 30 communication,
which instructed Chicago to use plain, unmarked paper similar to that used
by the Communist Party, employ a standard typewriter to create the stencil,
and mail the statement in commercially purchased envelopes addressed on
the same typewriter that Chicago used to prepare the stencil.44
The Chicago office, through the AHC, hoped to produce ideological
fragmentation within both the local and national CPUSA. Chicago had noted
that CPUSA leaders had repeatedly required party members to be able to
explain the party’s position on any questions or controversies to members of
the public. Opening discussion of international developments would disrupt
party unity as there were “many comrades in Illinois who are ‘pro-Chinese’
and who believe that Khrushchev and the Soviets have ‘watered down’
Marxism-Leninism to the point where it has lost its revolutionary character.”45
By prompting discussion of these contentious issues, Chicago hoped to “reopen
the factional struggle” in order to keep the party in a state of disunity but also
embarrass the local CPUSA leadership—who would appear incapable of
controlling the local members—in the eyes of the party’s national leadership.46
Freyman, according to the SAC of the Chicago office, deserved credit for
helping to establish the AHC. He had, for a number of years, been
recognized for his ability to confer knowledge on less experienced agents and,
as the SAC pointed out, he had selected “outstanding counterintelligence
agents to handle this program over a period of years.”47 Furthermore,
Freyman’s familiarity with the Sino–Soviet split, which his informant, CG-
5824-S, had helped to identify, clearly informed the material of the Bulletin.
One of the items of intelligence derived from the third SOLO mission, in
1959, had been the Chinese doctrine of “[d]o not give the imperialist a
respite.”48 This doctrine became the crux of a subsequent AHC publication,
which claimed to take a Marxist–Leninist approach to the Kennedy
administration and criticized the Soviets’ approach of peaceful coexistence
with the administration as “revisionist.”49

The SAC of the Chicago office reported that the office had directed the
AHC publication to eighteen party members—in secondary leadership
positions—on 30 November 1962.50 Through the distribution of the initial
statement, the FBI rattled the regional party apparatus. Party leadership
wondered whether the anonymous faction that had produced the Bulletin had
received assistance from the SWP.51 This was ironic, as the FBI was indeed
attempting to pit the SWP against the CPUSA but, in this case, had created
its own (notional) ideologues. The Chicago office followed up this initial
AHC statement in February 1963 with first issue of a publication titled the
Ad Hoc Bulletin.52
Acting out of shock, the CPUSA actually boosted awareness of the
Bulletin. The FBI had mailed out thirty-eight copies of the first Ad Hoc
Bulletin.53 However, at a meeting of the CPUSA Illinois State Board, a party
official decided it was necessary to circulate 750 copies of an article by Gus
Hall that countered the Bulletin’s ideological line.54 The same official also
proposed taking the Ad Hoc Bulletin to each CPUSA club and calling on the
club to repudiate the publication.55 Even while the official—whose name is
redacted from the FBI’s file—was inadvertently publicizing the Bulletin’s
contents well beyond its initial circulation, he asked the board to take action
against anyone who circulated the Bulletin’s line, even as he did just that.56
The Illinois CPUSA State Board ultimately settled on a response to the
Bulletin that unintentionally further advanced the FBI’s objectives. Through
an informant, the FBI obtained a 29 March 1963 CPUSA document
addressed to “All Members” and called on them to repudiate and denounce
the AHC Bulletin’s line.57 To the FBI’s apparent amusement, “[t]he Party
instructions that the Ad Hoc Bulletin be discussed in the clubs and that
individual club members reaffirm the correct Marxist-Leninist line of the
Party were meeting with unexpected results.”58 After one club rejected the
party’s statement, a member of the club who served on the CPUSA District
Board decamped from the meeting to a local bar, downed three shots of
bourbon, and sat with his head in his hands, drowning in a complete state of
dejection.59
Chicago saw both immediate and longer-term implications for the AHC.
The Chicago SAC, in 1964, noted that “[a]s in any factional fight, the
structure of the leadership and its efforts is diminished, and the wounds that
such a fight cause are difficult, even impossible to completely head. It is
hoped that these wounds will continue to remain open and that future
utilization of this bulletin will assist in this matter.”60 However, there was
intimation that the AHC might have ramifications beyond the Chicagoland
area. In a 1964 communication, the SAC of the Chicago office suggested that
the bulletin had the potential to sow national-level fragmentation and
disruption.61

EXPLICITLY ALIGNING WITH CHINA

While the early AHC Bulletin might have been an opportunistic use of the
schism-du-jour to rattle the CPUSA, the Bulletin’s architects continued to
develop a pro-China line, to the point of providing a mouthpiece for certain
elements of Chinese propaganda. For instance, the subsequent, April 1963,
issue of the AHC Bulletin reprinted a statement originally published by
Renmin Ribao (i.e., Peoples’ Daily), the official publication of the CCP,
responding to the CPUSA’s criticism of the CCP.62 The Bureau indicated its
specific interest in exploiting the opportunities that geopolitical rivalry had
created to advance its domestic agenda. In a 1964 assessment of the AHC
operation, the SAC of the Chicago office noted that the contents of this issue
were “particularly pointed” and in furtherance of the office’s
counterintelligence efforts focused on “the Sino-Soviet conflict.”63 The sixth
edition of the AHC Bulletin picked up on China’s exploitation of racial
tensions in the United States. It alluded to an article in the 16 August 1963
issue of the Peking Review—China’s English-language weekly—regarding
“the American Negro.”64 Furthermore, the AHC Bulletin, according to the
FBI, “tied the Negro question in the United States to the Soviet-Chinese
ideological dispute.”65
The FBI proceeded to develop the AHC from a notional entity into a full-
fledged intelligence operation. According to a 5 January 1965 FBI
communication, they had changed the AHC’s name to the “Ad Hoc
Committee for a Marxist Leninist Party, USA.”66 A May 1965 report on an
inspection of the Domestic Intelligence Division at FBI Headquarters noted
that the “Ad Hoc Operation has developed numerous domestic and foreign
Chinese contacts including known intelligence sources.”67 In 1966, the
Chicago office indicated that an informant, CG-6547-S, described the AHC
as existing within the CPUSA.68 The informant’s description aligns the Ad
Hoc Committee for a Marxist Leninist Party USA with the legend of the
AHC Bulletin.
CONNECTING TO CHINA
The FBI, through its AHC, pursued contacts with the Peoples’ Republic of
China by engaging several domestic and international intermediaries. These
included the Progressive Labor Party and the Revolutionary Union within
the United States. Furthermore, informants associated with the AHC
traveled abroad to make contacts with multiple pro-China political entities in
Europe. Finally, representatives of the AHC attempted to work through the
Albanian government to develop contact with China.
Following its transformation from notional publication to an operation
staffed by live informants, the FBI quickly dispatched an AHC emissary

abroad. During the summer of 1966, informant CG-5908-S traveled

throughout Western Europe, ostensibly as a representative of the AHC. CG-
5908-S was able to develop multiple contacts involved with pro-Chinese
Communist (Chicom) activity in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Italy.69
The FBI attempted to leverage the relationship between Albania and
China to the advantage of the AHC’s development. As early as 1962, the FBI
was aware—thanks to CG-5824-S, one of the SOLO informants—that the
Albanian Party of Labor served as a mouthpiece for the CCP.70 This
understanding provided the context for AHC efforts to develop Albanian
contacts. In 1965, CG-5908-S traveled to Albania.71 Then, in July 1968, the
FBI sent CG-6328-S and CG-5851-S to New York with an itinerary which
included contacting the Albanian mission to the United Nations (UN) with a
formal request from the AHC for Albania to introduce a UN resolution
requesting “world support for the liberation struggle for the Afro-American
people.”72 This emphasis on African-American militancy aligned with
China’s support to militant African-American elements. For instance, in
1966, China welcomed Robert F. Williams, who had advocated violence in
lieu of a more pacifist civil rights movements during the late 1950s and early
1960s.73 From China, Williams authored propaganda for—and made anti-
American broadcasts from—Beijing.74 The AHC had started to establish
itself in this milieu of Black militancy when it published the sixth edition of
the Bulletin in 1963. Following the informants’ New York trip, the FBI
indicated that the trip—including the contact with the Albanian mission—
had been “in line with the objective of [the AHC operation] to develop
intelligence relating to pro-Chicom and Chicom activity.”75
Circa late 1964–early 1965, the FBI began to enhance the stature of the
AHC operation by pursuing contacts in the New Left. By running
advertisements in the National Guardian, a New York–based “progressive
newsweekly,” the AHC attracted correspondence from approximately
twenty-five individuals who had written to request copies of the AHC
Bulletin and information about the AHC.76 A number of these individuals
also provided funds.77 Through its field offices, the FBI determined that a
large percentage of these correspondents had a “radical left background.”78
The AHC similarly attempted to advertise its existence through People’s
World, a West Coast communist publication.79
The FBI attempted to leverage its existing knowledge of pro-China
elements of the CPUSA and the splinter Progressive Labor Movement/
Progressive Labor Party to introduce AHC-affiliated informants into China-
related intelligence activities within the United States. In 1961, the CPUSA
expelled Milton Rosen and Mortimer Scheer for the two individuals’ criticism
of Soviet “revisionism.”80 By 1962, Rosen and Scheer had formed the
Progressive Labor Movement (PLM).81 The PLM organized itself into the

Progressive Labor Party (PLP) during its April 1965 national convention.82
Both the PLM and PLP championed Mao Tse-tung’s interpretation of
Marxism–Leninism.83 In August 1964, the FBI had indicated that it intended
to use the PLM as a lever for disrupting the CPUSA.84 This hearkened back
to the FBI’s efforts nearly a decade earlier to pitch the SWP and CPUSA
against each other.
Susan Heiligman Frank (aka Sue Warren) was a key figure in both
settings. Frank was, among other things, responsible in 1943 for recruiting
playwright Arthur Miller into the CPUSA.85 However, by the late 1950s,
Frank was aligning herself with the Chinese interpretation of communism.
From 1959 until 1961 she and her husband, Richard Cyril Frank, resided in
China where they worked for the English-language edition of the Peking
Review (the same publication for which the AHC would serve as a vehicle).86
This Sino sojourn had, ostensibly, been done with the concurrence of the
CPUSA.87 However, as of 1963, at least one high-ranking CPUSA officials
suspected that Susan Frank was functioning as an agent of the Chinese
government.88
Susan Frank was, in reality, what the AHC presented itself as, a pro-China
member of the CPUSA. According to NY-694-S, one of the SOLO informants,
Frank functioned as the CPUSA contact with a group of secret Chinese party
members and collected the dues from this group.89 In August 1962, CG-5824-S
believed that Sue Warren might be in contact with “Chinese comrades” since
the Far East was her specialty and because she had previously worked on a
CPUSA subcommittee on the topic.90 By the late 1960s, the CPUSA’s Gus
Hall believed that Frank was the “Chinese paymaster” in the United States.91
However, Frank denied having ever formally been a member of the PLP but
admitted that she had written articles and spoken on its behalf.92
FBI interest in Franks spanned both her connections to the “Old Left”
and the “New Left.” The FBI, as part of the TOPLEV program, had
attempted to interview Frank in 1953, 1955, and 1956. On all three of these
occasions Frank refused to speak with the agents.93 After Frank returned
from China, the FBI again attempted to contact her as part of the TOPLEV
program. SAs, on 26 June 1962, surveilled Frank and, at an appropriate
moment, one of them approached her, and encountered “her usual cold,
aloof refusal to converse” before the SA claimed to simply be in the area on a
criminal matter.94 The same SAs attempted to follow up on this contact. On
18 July 1962, one SA approached her in New York’s Sheridan Square and
asked whether her inability to assist with criminal matters meant that she also
could not assist with “other matters? Security matters.”95 Frank smiled and
answered, “Oh, no” in response.96 The agents tried again in December and
this time Frank insisted, “I don’t want to talk to you, and have nothing to
say to you—let’s leave things as they are.”97

However, Frank’s association with pro-Chicom entities meant that the FBI
did not lose interest after having been rejected. With the information in hand
from NY-694-S, the New York office determined, in April 1963, that the
group of Chicoms in New York may be known in China and because Frank
had been active in collecting their dues following her return from China. As
one Bureau document assessed, Frank “may have been asked by the Chicoms
in China to contact this group in New York; further, the possibility exists
that this group of Chinese Communists in New York may receive some
direction from China which [direction] may come through [Franks].”98
Rather than seeking to build a case against Frank, the FBI’s New York
office (NYO) decided to use the lead regarding her Chinese contacts as an
intelligence opportunity. According to the NYO, “an approach to this case
from an intelligence rather than a prosecutive point of view may reveal the
extent of the membership of [the Chicoms] and the identities of its
members.”99 In November 1963 an HQ communication affirmed this
approach, stating, “it is apparent that we may have an excellent opportunity
to obtain information regarding Chinese Communist intelligence operations
in the U.S.”100
The FBI followed up on its decision to treat the Frank investigation as an
intelligence operation by using her unwittingly to build the AHC’s bona
fides. In 1968, the Chicago field office proposed sending two informants—
CG-6328-S and CG-5851-S—to make contact with Frank and furnish her
with the AHC legend.101 Specifically, the informants would emphasize the
AHC’s work with Black Power groups—which, as indicated by the rhetoric
of the Black Panther Party, had adopted Maoist rhetoric—as well as other
fictionalized mass activity.102
If pressed for details about the purpose of the visit, the AHC’s
representatives would indicate their interest in reactivating a New York AHC
chapter.103 Specifically, the informants would mention (an entirely fictional)
member of the CPUSA’s New York State Committee who had contacted the
AHC in anticipation of defecting from the CPUSA and whom the AHC had
convinced to stay in place while the AHC assessed the viability of forming an
AHC chapter around the fictitious fragmentation of the CPUSA’s New York
chapter.104 Although Frank would receive the fabricated story about the
CPUSA, the Chicago office also indicated the existence of an actual AHC
offshoot. According to Chicago, the AHC informants could contact
informant NY-1656-S about correspondence from that informant to the
AHC, while in New York.105
The FBI followed up with Frank during the following year. CG-5851
traveled to New York in May 1969 to attend the CPUSA’s national
convention and took the opportunity to meet with Frank, in the informant’s
capacity as a member of the AHC’s Executive Committee.106 The informant

expanded on the AHC’s objectives, claiming that the AHC was directing its
work in Chicago at “bringing together Blacks and Whites for unity of action
in all areas possible.”107 According to CG 5851-S, the AHC was capable of
doing this because it had individuals in the leadership of both the Black
Panther Party and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).108
Contemporaneous FBI reporting strongly suggests that the ultimate
objective vis-a-vis Frank was not simply identifying Chinese operatives in the
United States but, rather, controlling the channel to China in the same way
that SOLO controlled the CPUSA’s connection with Moscow. In planning
for the contacts between AHC-affiliated informants and Frank, the Chicago
office specifically noted that Frank had a “channel to China.”109 During a
1969 visit with Frank, CG-5851 broached the possibility that the AHC could
serve as a “potential channel for espionage for the Chicoms” and the FBI
explicitly hoped that Frank would pass this information along to “contacts
who are, or who may become, important persons to the success of this
operation.”110
Not only was the FBI attempting to develop contact with China through
Frank but it was also attempting to discredit the PLP—the same group that
it had earlier attempted to pit against the CPUSA—which was in competition
for the China franchise. In advance of the 1969 SDS national council meeting
in Austin, Texas, the FBI’s San Francisco field office assessed that FBI
informants in attendance at the council should support the SDS’s anti-PLP
faction.111 Later that year, the FBI directed its informants attending the SDS
convention in Chicago to vote against the PLP contingent in favor of the
group that would coalesce into the Weatherman faction.112
Ironically, although the FBI was attempting to hijack and discard the PLP,
at least one FBI informant apparently believed that the AHC and PLP were
elements of the same organization. In 1970, the informant told Congress
that he believed the PLP was a front for the AHC.113 Several FBI agents
claimed to have heard of the AHC and encouraged the informant to
contact it.114
There is reason to believe that the AHC may have also attempted to
establish itself as a conduit between the Weatherman faction and Beijing.
There is at least one FBI confirmation of contact between AHC informants
and the SDS/Weather Underground Organization.115 Furthermore, a 30
December 1969 intelligence letter to the White House, which references the
AHC file, reported that “[p]rominent leaders of the Weatherman faction of
[SDS] conferred this month with a representative of a United States based
pro-Chicom organization.”116 This is consistent with information that,
starting in August 1969, a fifty-five-year-old informant who led a pro-
Chinese group in Chicago had contacted Weatherman leaders and advised
that the Chinese government wished to remain informed about Weatherman

plans.117 In November, the same informant offered the Weatherman faction

$500, which ostensibly came from the CCP.118
The AHC, in addition to Frank and, possibly, the Weatherman, appears to
have pursued contacts with another Maoist organization, the Revolutionary
Union (RU). Several key figures in the RU, which surfaced in 1969, had
backgrounds in the CPUSA.119 Most significant among these was Leibel
Bergman, who had founded the RU in 1968.120 Bergman’s background made
him a tempting contact for the AHC. The CPUSA had expelled him in 1959
for promoting an internal policy at variance with the CPUSA’s National
Committee and he had then taken a leadership position in the PLP.121 He
had also spent two years clandestinely in China, from which he returned to
the United States in 1968, with directions to select and recruit youth for
political training in China.122 The RU also benefitted from the FBI’s
campaign against PLP influence in SDS. It was one of the groups competing
within SDS for the claim to the “vanguard” label and, as described by a 1972
Congressional report, had prevented the PLP’s takeover of the
organization.123 In addition to opposing PLP influence, the RU aligned with
the Weatherman faction of SDS. RU representation participated in the
Weatherman faction’s December 1969 “war council.”124
As early as 1969, the AHC was demonstrating interest in the RU. CG-
5851-S referred to “Comrade Leibel [Bergman]” to Frank in May 1969.125 A
1970 FBI HQ inspection report confirmed the association between the RU
and the AHC. According to the report “[i]nvestigation of the RU was closely
coordinated within the complex investigation of the [AHC],” which was in
contact with “militant leftists and black extremists.”126 In at least one
instance, the FBI specifically targeted an AHC informant at Bergman.127
With this as context, the RU’s development aligns with the AHC operation.
In mid-1969, the RU launched a drive for national expansion and, by 1972,
had two collectives in Chicago—where the AHC was ostensibly
headquartered.128 This may not be incidental. Between 1969 and 1971 two
FBI informants infiltrated the RU.129 Whether these informants had a role in
steering the RU toward collaboration with the AHC is unknown.
The Chinese government permitted several RU delegations to travel to
China. On 21 September 1971, an RU delegation arrived in Peking, as guests
of the Chinese government for a six-week stay in China.130 An FBI
informant may have been among this group. In 1975, the New York Times
reported that a woman had confirmed that approximately four years earlier
(i.e., 1971) she had made a month-long visit to China in connection with her
work for the FBI.131 According to the woman, she had been part of a
delegation “made up of American radicals.”132 One RU leader, Bob
Avakian, who had been a member of the SDS national interim committee in
1969, returned from the trip claiming that he had met with Mao Tse-Tung

and that Mao had provided Avakian with a Chinese contact within the
United States.133
CONCLUSION
Traces of the AHC operation fade following its apparent infiltration of the
RU and possible use of that organization as a vehicle for sending an
informant to China. The prosecutions of FBI executives W. Mark Felt and
Ed Miller, over Weatherman-related break-ins during 1972, churned up AHC
reporting, which indicated that the FBI had given the operation a code
name— ALCHEMY.134 This name is distinctly appropriate for the AHC
operation. By mixing its intelligence resources with the unstable elements of
the fracturing Left, the FBI hoped to create something of great value—a
monopoly on the conduit between China and the American Left.
There is an epilogue to the AHC story in a similar operation that has
hallmarks suggesting that it owed its existence, at least in part, to the AHC.
Between 1972 and 1974, the FBI operated an informant, who resided in
Tampa, Florida, and ran the “Red Star Cadre” (RSC)—ostensibly a Marxist
political group but, in actuality, an FBI front.135 Consistent with the AHC
model, the RSC and the associated informant sought to take control of the
Maoist movement. According to the informant, the RSC’s purpose was to
“make other organizations come to us and want to discuss ideology.”136 In
another parallel with the AHC, the FBI considered publishing a fake
newspaper—The Southern Socialist.137 The purpose—establishing an FBI-
controlled channel to China—of the RSC became clear with one FBI
supervisor’s suggestion that the informant could travel to Mexico, walk into
the Chinese embassy, and offer the services of the informant (and the
informant’s organization) to China.138
The RSC also followed the AHC model by seeking to engage existing
groups with connections to China. During travels to Canada, the RSC
informant followed FBI instructions to develop contacts within the pro-
Chinese wing of the Canadian Communist Party.139 According to the RSC
informant, the FBI was specifically interested in whether the Canadian party
was passing funds to Maoist groups in the United States.140 On the other
hand, the RSC informant was aware that the FBI was following the AHC
playbook by seeking to disrupt other organizations that might challenge the
FBI’s bid for the China franchise. According to the RSC informant, FBI HQ
approved, printed, and was responsible for the mailing of a document—
which contained a number of unfounded accusations—to Marxist–Leninist
collectives around the country. The FBI’s intent was to undermine the
emergence of an “Organization of United States Marxist Leninists.”141
There is one more tantalizing piece of circumstantial evidence that the
AHC and RSC operations were shaped by some of the same influences.

While planning the ultimately aborted Southern Socialist, the FBI sent an SA
from the Chicago field office to collaborate with the RSC informant on
developing a prototype edition of the paper.142 Although the name of the
Chicago SA is not known, the RSC informant claimed that the SA had a
reputation as an expert on Marxist philosophy.143 This set of circumstances
suggests that the SA with whom the RSC informant was in contact came
from SA Freyman’s intellectual and operational lineage.
The SOLO and AHC operations highlight several lessons that remain
applicable today. By manipulating groups that were consciously seeking
collusion with foreign governments, the FBI was not focused on disrupting
political thought that it deemed to be subversive but was instead outflanking
established or aspiring foreign proxies, in order to control foreign
governments’ capacity for impacting the United States. Indictments from the
Mueller investigation illuminate that entities seeking to align with foreign
interests as against U.S. national security continue to lurk in the shadows.
This suggests that operations such as the AHC are still necessary. Such
operations may actually be more protective of civil liberties as they focus on
derailing foreign engagement of domestic entities, rather than seeking to
make criminals of Americans who may not always be fully witting of how
foreign threats are exploiting them.
Additionally, the FBI needs to learn from the AHC operation. It is not
clear that the FBI has fully grasped its role in supporting U.S. strategic
interests. The domestic setting, for which the FBI has responsibility, provides
opportunities—such as SOLO and the AHC—to gather foreign intelligence
and even implement U.S. objectives through conduits with a nexus to the
homeland. However, multiple writers have criticized the FBI’s inability to
conceptualize—and build an effective structure to support—its important
role as an intelligence agency operating within the domestic setting.144 Since
11 September 2001, the FBI has, on multiple occasions, drastically
overhauled—to the point of reinvention—its intelligence apparatus.
However, despite these reforms, the FBI has not yet identified how to fully
leverage its unique capabilities in complement to the broader U.S. national
security community.
For scholars and the press to understand the validity of certain measures
that might otherwise be dismissed with the epithet that “COINTELPRO”
has become and for the FBI to create an effective intelligence apparatus, the
United States must reassess how it thinks about foreign and domestic
intelligence. Operations at home may actually be aimed at disrupting foreign
threats, by providing U.S. decision makers with an informational advantage,
as opposed to looking for ways in which to make criminal cases against
Americans. It is not at all certain that the FBI—as long as it retains its law
enforcement and intelligence identities—will ever be able to fully and

effectively (and with the confidence of the American public) leverage the
domestically available opportunities to achieve foreign intelligence victories.
REFERENCES
1
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62-80750, 26 September 1946.
2
See, for example, Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich
Firstov, The Secret World of American Communism (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1996) and Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Kyrill M.
Anderson, The Soviet World of American Communism (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press. 2008).
3
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-3-99. F. J. Baumgardner to A. H.
Belmont. Communist Party, USA; Development of Top-Level Security
Informants (TOPLEV); Internal Security – C. 15 March 1954.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-3-88. Director, FBI to SAC New York.
Communist Party, USA; Factionalism; Internal Security – C. 27 August 1956.
8
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-3-104. W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont.
Current Weaknesses, Reasoning, Needs, and Plans of the Communist Party,
USA; Internal Security – C. 22 August 1955.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-3-99.
12
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-268746. Performance Rating. 9-12-51 to 1-
30-52.
13
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-57045. F. J. Baumgardner to A H.
Belmont. SOLO. August 1958.
14
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-268746.
15
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-268746. Performance Rating - 4/1/54 - 3/
31/55.
16
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-268746. SAC Chicago to Director FBI.
Supervisory Organization; Chicago Division. 2 March 1959.
17
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-268746. Performance Rating - 4/1/54 - 3/
31/55.
18
Ibid.
19
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-268746. Performance Rating. 1 April 1957
to 31 March 1958.
20
See John Barron, Operation Solo: The FBI’s Man in the Kremlin (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2013) and Tim Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI (New
York: Random House, 2012). A curated selection of the primary SOLO
documents is available through the National Security Archive at George
Washington University (https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB375/)

and the FBI has released its files covering approximately the first decade of the
operation (https://vault.fbi.gov/solo).
21
22
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-268746. F. J. Baumgardner to A. H. Belmont.
SOLO; Internal Security; 28 August 1958.
23
Ibid.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid.
26
Ibid.
27
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-268746. F. J. Baumgardner to A. H.
Belmont. Solo. Internal Security. 9 December 1959.
28
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-268746. Recommendation for incentive
award. SAC Chicago to Director. 6 February 1961.
29
Ibid.
30
Ibid.
31
Ibid.
32
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-3-104. A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman.
Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program; Internal Security – C.
10 October 1956.
33
Claire Bigg, “Russia: Khrushchev’s ‘Secret Speech’ Remembered after 50
Years.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Librty. 15 February 2006. https://www.rferl.
org/a/1065804.html
34
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid.
37
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-436291. F. J. Baumgardner to W. C.
Sullivan. Socialist Workers Party; Internal Security – SWP; Disruption
Program. 100-436291. 17 April 1962.
38
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-32864. SAC Chicago to Director, FBI.
Communist Party, USA; Counterintelligence Program; IS-C. 20 November 1962.
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-32864. SAC Chicago to Director,
FBI. Communist Party, USA; Counterintelligence Program; IS-C. 20
November 1962.
41
Ibid.
42
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-268746. SAC Chicago to Director, FBI. 22
January 1964.
43
Ibid.
44
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-3-104. Director FBI to SAC Chicago.
Communist Party, USA; Counterintelligence Program; Internal Security – C.
30 November 1962.
45
Ibid. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-32864. SAC Chicago to Director,
FBI Communist Party, USA; Counterintelligence Program; IS-C. 15
November 1962.
46
Ibid. Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-32864. SAC Chicago to Director, FBI.
Communist Party, USA; Counterintelligence Program; IS-C. 20 November 1962.

47
January 1964.
48
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-57045. Baumgardner to Belmont. SOLO. 9
December 1959.
49
50
51
January 1964.
52
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-32864. Director FBI to SAC Chicago.
Communist Party, USA; Counterintelligence Program. 4 March 1963.
53
January 1964; Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-32864. (SAC Chicago to
Director. Communist Party, USA; Counterintelligence Program; IS-C.
March 1963.
54
January 1964.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid.
66
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-442715. Director to Legat Tokyo. Ad
Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Party, USA, Internal Security – C. 5
January 1965.
67
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-57045. W. M. Felt to Tolson. Inspection –
Domestic Intelligence Division. 20 May 1965.
68
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-442715. SAC Chicago to Director. Ad
Hoc Committee for a Marxist Leninist Party USA IS – C. 5 August 1966,
available at https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-
32339279.pdf
69
Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist–Leninist Party, USA. IS-C. 20 October
1966, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-
32339279.pdf; Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-41353. Director FBI to
SAC Chicago. Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist Leninist Party, USA; Internal
Security – C. 7 November 1966, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/
research/jfk/releases/docid-32339279.pdf
70
Recommendation for Incentive Award. 31 January 1962.

71
Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist–Leninist Party, USA. IS-C. 20 October
1966, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-
32339279.pdf
72
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-41353. SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI,
Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Party – USA, Internal Security –
CH. 18 June 1968. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-
32298591.pdf
73
Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate. 91st Cong. Pt. 3 1262 and 1064 (1969);
Report of the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal
Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws to the Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate. 92nd Cong. 26 (1972).
74
Hearings before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the
Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on
the Judiciary, United States Senate. 91st Cong. Pt. 3 1262 and 1064 (1969).
75
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-442715. Director, FBI to SAC Chicago.
Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Party, USA. Internal Security –
CH. 24 July 1968, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/
releases/docid-32298599.pdf
76
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-32864. “Contacts Made through Ads in
the ‘National Guardian’” [Section of incomplete document. Located in Chicago
COINTELPRO, CPUSA file between documents dated 25 January 1965 and
14 January 1965]; “National Guardian,” available at https://catalog.loc.gov/
vwebv/search?searchCode=LCCN&searchArg=75646823&searchType=1&
permalink=y, last accessed 1 July 2019.
77
78
Ibid.
79
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-3-104. Director FBI to SAC, Chicago.
Communist Party, USA; Counterintelligence Program; Internal Security – C.
12 February 1965.
80
America’s Maoists: The Revolutionary Union; The Venceremos Organization.
Report of the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives. 92nd
Cong. (1972).
81
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-449698. New Left Activity, University of
California, Berkeley, California. 16 July 1968.
82
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-449698. New Left Activity, University of
California, Berkeley, California. 16 July 1968.
83
America’s Maoists: The Revolutionary Union.
84
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-3-104-9. Director FBI to SACs Chicago,
New York. Communist Party USA; Counterintelligence Program; Internal
Security – C (Progressive Labor Movement). 24 October 1964.
85
National Archives and Records Administration. Federal Bureau of
Investigation. 100-339235. 20 June 1957.

86
Investigation. 100-401762. Susan N Frank. 9 January 1970.
87
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-401762. Director, FBI to SACs Buffalo,
New York. Jack Coran. IS-Canada. 16 August 1962, available at https://www.
archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32294082.pdf
88
Investigation. 100-401762. Susan N Frank. 9 January 1970.
89
NARA Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-339235. SAC New York to
Director FBI. Changed; Susan Heiligman Frank. IS-China. 3 April 1963.
90
Investigation. 100-40-34. SAC, Chicago to Director, FBI. Chinese Communist
Activities in the United States—New York; IS-CH. 1962.
91
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-339235. Director, FBI. to SAC New
York. Susan Heiligman Frank.. IS-CH. 27 September 1967, available at
https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32339282.pdf
92
Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist, Party, USA, Internal Security—
CH. 6 May 1969, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/
93
Investigation. 100-339235. Director FB to SAC New York. Communist Party,
USA, TOPLEV; Internal Security – C. 11 January 1962.
94
Investigation. 100-339235. SAC New York to Director FBI. CP, USA
TOPLEV; IS-C. 26 July 1962.
95
Ibid.
96
Ibid.
97
Ibid.
98
NARA Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-339235. SAC New York to
Director FBI. Changed; Susan Heiligman Frank. IS-China. 3 April 1963.
99
Ibid.
100
Investigation. 100-339235. W.R. Wannall to W.C. Sullivan. Susan Heiligman
Frank; Internal Security—China. 11/20/63.
101
Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Party,—USA, Internal Security—
CH. June 18, 1968. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-
32298591.pdf
102
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid.
106
CH. 6 May 1969, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/

107
Ibid.
108
Ibid.
109
Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Party,—USA, Internal Security—
CH. 18 June 1968, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/
110
CH. 6 May 1969. https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-
32301357.pdf
111
Arthur M. Eckstein, Bad Moon Rising (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2016), p. 106.
112
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 100-449698. SAC, San Francisco to Director,
FBI. Students for a Democratic Society; Bay Area Revolutionary Union, IS-
RU, Nationalities Intelligence. 29 March 1969.
113
Testimony of Gerald Wayne Kirk, before the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate. 91st Cong. Pt. 3 (1970).
114
Testimony of Gerald Wayne Kirk, before the Committee on the Judiciary,
United States Senate. 91st Cong. Pt. 3 (1970).
115
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62-118045. Director, FBI to SACs
ALCHEMY Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Society (AHC);
Bufile: 100-442715; U.S. VS W. MARK FELT, ET AL. Trial Damage—
Source Protection. 9/30/80.
116
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 62-73268. FBI Intelligence Letter for the
President. 30 December 1969.
117
Eckstein, Bad Moon Rising, p. 108.
118
Ibid.
119
Report of the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives.
92nd Cong. (1972).
120
Frank Rafalko, MH/CHAOS (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2011).
121
122
Ibid.
123
Ibid.
124
Ibid.
125
CH. May 6, 1969, available at https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/
126
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-149000. Domestic Intelligence Division
Inspection 4/2/70 – 4/17/70.
127
Bufile: 100-442715; U.S. VS W. MARK FELT, ET AL. Trial Damage –
128

129
Rafalko, MH/CHAOS.
130
Report of the Committee on Internal Security, House of Representatives.
92nd Cong. (1972).
131
John M. Crewdson, “U.S. Citizens Used by F.B.I. Abroad,” New York Times.
16 February 1975.
132
Ibid.
133
Central Intelligence Agency. Revolutionary Union Surfaces Its China
Trippers. 15 January 1972. CIA-RDP88-01314R000100610017-0, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp88-01314r00010
0610017-0
134
Bufile: 100-442715; U.S. VS W. MARK FELT, ET AL. Trial Damage –
135
John M. Crewdson, “Ex-Operative Says He Worked for F.B.I. to Disrupt
Political Activities up to ‘74,” New York Times 24 February 1975, available at
https://www.nytimes.com/1975/02/24/archives/exoperative-says-he-worked-for-
fbi-to-disrupt-political-activities.html?searchResultPosition=2
136
Ibid.
137
Ibid.
138
Crewdson, “U.S. Citizens Used by F.B.I. Abroad.”
139
Ibid.
140
Ibid.
141
Ibid. Crewdson, “Ex-Operative Says He Worked for F.B.I. to Disrupt
Political Activities up to ’74.”
142
Ibid.
143
Ibid.
144
See, for instance, Darren E. Tromblay, Spying: Assessing US Domestic
Intelligence Since 9/11 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2019).

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International Journal of Intelligence and

ISSN: 0885-0607 (Print) 1521-0561 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujic20

From Old Left to New Left: The FBI and the

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From Old Left to New Left: The FBI and

The dichotomy between foreign and domestic intelligence is a false one.

Darren E. Tromblay served as an intelligence analyst with the U.S.

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irrefutable documentation of Soviet funding to the CPUSA and that developed

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was to pit competing political movements against each other. In October

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EXPLICITLY ALIGNING WITH CHINA

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abroad. During the summer of 1966, informant CG-5908-S traveled

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