International Journal of Intelligence and

CounterIntelligence

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ujic20

Taking the Fight Abroad: The FBI’s Legal Attachés

and Chinese Intelligence

Darren E. Tromblay

To cite this article: Darren E. Tromblay (2023) Taking the Fight Abroad: The FBI’s Legal Attachés
and Chinese Intelligence, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 36:1,
260-270, DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2021.1928862

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/08850607.2021.1928862

Published online: 26 Jul 2021.

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International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 36: 260–270, 2023
# 2021 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 0885-0607 print/1521-0561 online
DOI: 10.1080/08850607.2021.1928862

PERSPECTIVE

DARREN E. TROMBLAY

Taking the Fight Abroad: The FBI’s

Legal Attache s and Chinese
Intelligence

During the first several decades of the Cold War, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) faced a formidable challenge: an intelligence threat that
did not have a formal U.S. presence that the bureau could target. The threat
was the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC), which the United States did not
acknowledge as representing China, opting instead to afford Taiwan with this
recognition. In order to overcome the obstacle, the FBI leveraged its presence
abroad—the legal attache (legat)—program, which dated to the Second
World War. This arrangement illustrated the false dichotomy of foreign
versus domestic intelligence because information about what was occurring
within the FBI’s domestic area of responsibility had to be obtained through
its presence abroad.

IDENTIFYING THE THREAT

The communist creation of the PRC in 1949 created a significant geopolitical
shock. From early on, the U.S. response included an FBI component. In late
1949, FBI headquarters advised field offices that several underground

Darren E. Tromblay is the author of The FBI Abroad (Lynne Rienner,

2020). He earned his M.A. at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the
George Washington University, his M.S. from the National Defense
Intelligence College, and his B.A. from the University of California, Riverside.
The views expressed in this article are entirely his own and do not reflect the
position of any U.S. government agency.

AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 36, NUMBER 1 260

PERSPECTIVE 261

representatives of the Chinese communist government had entered the United

States and planned to take control of Chinese diplomatic, consular, and
United Nations posts. Furthermore, the FBI expected that these
representatives would endeavor to recruit Chinese students and others into
the Communist Party.1
However, the U.S. government did not recognize Beijing as representative
of China and instead, until 1979, treated the government in Taipei, Taiwan
(i.e., Formosa) as carrying China’s mantle. As the FBI would later note, this
arrangement meant that the Beijing regime carried out its intelligence
through representatives in third countries. Furthermore, the PRC
government had an opportunity to seed agents with intelligence assignments
into the flow of Chinese immigrants to the United States.2
This forced the FBI to develop an approach to Chinese counterintelligence
that differed from how it dealt with Soviet bloc threats that maintained
official presences on U.S. soil, where they could station intelligence officers
under diplomatic cover. In May 1965, the FBI launched its
Counterintelligence Operations against Chinese Communist Intelligence
Activities in the United States (CHICOIN) program. CHICOIN involved
creating situations and placing informants in contact with Chinese
communists located abroad, with the hope that the Chinese operatives would
recruit these bureau-controlled individuals.3 The resulting double-agent
operation would help to better understand Beijing’s objectives, methodology,
and tradecraft.
Since it was apparent that the China challenge had a significant
international component, it is not surprising that the FBI incorporated its
legats into its countering of the threat from Beijing. This is indicated by a
1968 report, documenting an inspection of the FBI’s Domestic Intelligence
Division, which noted that legats worldwide should be made aware of
Chinese intelligence activities.4 The posts in Hong Kong, Ottawa, Tokyo, and
Mexico would ultimately carry out significant portions of the program to
counter Beijing-sponsored spying.

ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL ATTACHÉ PROGRAM

The FBI’s legat program traces its origins to the Second World War. In 1940,
at the direction of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, J. Edgar Hoover
established the Special Intelligence Service (SIS) within the FBI in order to
provide intelligence coverage throughout Latin America.5 The SIS was not
simply an extension of the bureau’s domestic investigative work. Instead, it
answered requirements across the government by providing information to
U.S. government agencies, including the State Department, the Department
of the Navy, the Department of War, the Department of the Treasury, and

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262 PERSPECTIVE

the Office of the Coordinator of Information (which would become the

Office of Strategic Services).6
As the SIS—the United States’ first civilian intelligence service—took
shape, it organized around the legat concept. Initially, the SIS used FBI
agents who operated under a variety of commercial covers—including a
bureau-established import/export company—to gather information.7
However, the FBI assessed this approach to be less than optimal. According
to a 1942 bureau memorandum, it had “determined definitely from
experience that the value of undercover representatives is quite limited in all
instances” because the undercover agents had to “work their covers, which
[meant] that they really collect[ed] intelligence information only incidentally
and in their spare time.”8 In 1948, looking back at the SIS operations, bureau
officials concluded that it was

definitely a mistake to undertake the establishment of intelligence

coverage solely on the basis of clandestine operations. Representation
should have been set up in the beginning in the various embassies and
strategic consulates with complete staffs organized along the lines of
Bureau domestic field offices.9

In light of the apparent inefficacy of nonofficial-cover agents, the FBI—

with the approval of the State Department—assigned representatives to
embassies in Latin America. The State Department gave the FBI the
exclusive use of the term “legal attache” to describe these positions. By 1942,
the bureau had representatives in all U.S. embassies throughout the vast
majority of Latin America. The FBI also established liaison positions outside
of the SIS’s Latin American jurisdiction. In 1942, it assigned agents to
Ottawa, Canada (where the position was called a liaison officer), and
London, United Kingdom.10 In June 1945, the bureau assigned personnel to
Paris, France (where they were known simply as attaches).11
The legat position, during the SIS era, was nothing less than a chief of
station, which is the senior U.S. intelligence representative in a given
country.12 According to a bureau assessment, the majority of U.S.
ambassadors were impressed with the work conducted by the legats and at
times instructed the legats to function as the embassy official with
responsibility for coordinating intelligence information.13 In the course of
doing this, the legat was responsible for all bureau activities in the countries
to which the legats were assigned.14 The legat also coordinated work with the
U.S. military and naval attaches at the diplomatic establishments.15 As
described by the FBI’s internal history of the SIS program, “1942 witnessed
the transition of the position of the Legal Attache from that of an interloper
in the intelligence field within the Embassy to that of its foremost
constituent.”16

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In the wake of the Second World War, the United States, in an effort to
prevent another surprise attack, sorted through a variety of options for
developing a global intelligence service. Although the FBI offered the SIS as
an example, the government instead pursued a path that led to the creation
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947. In 1946, Hoover had
cautioned that a division of domestic and foreign intelligence would “create a
‘Pearl Harbor.’”17 The Central Intelligence Group (CIG)—which was the
immediate predecessor to the CIA—used the SIS program as a model.18 In
fact, SIS stations were turned over wholesale to the CIG.19 The SIS ceased
operations in 1947.20
Despite the CIG’s assumption of SIS duties, the FBI did not withdraw
entirely from the foreign field. As early as 1946, when the SIS was winding
down its operations, Hoover noted that certain posts in foreign countries
would continue to function strictly for purposes of police liaison.21 By 1950,
remnants of the SIS program remained in place as liaison positions. Hoover
advised Congress that the FBI had men stationed in London, Paris, Madrid,
Ottawa, Havana, and Mexico City.22 By 1960, the bureau’s foreign presence
had grown to ten offices.23

CHASING CHINA
Legats provided opportunities to reach areas of the world in which the
Chinese government was operating and potentially working against U.S.
interests. In at least one instance—the establishment of a post in Hong
Kong—the FBI explicitly created a legat post in an effort to develop a better
understanding of the threat from China. In addition to simply watching
China, legats also had to assess how their host countries’ relationships with
China were developing, in order to remain cognizant of how the Chinese
footprint might evolve.

Tokyo
The FBI’s legal attache in Tokyo was an early outpost for operations against
Chinese intelligence activities. Between 1945 and 1946, the bureau had
operated an outpost in Tokyo as part of its SIS program.24 Through that
location the bureau obtained a large volume of intelligence material on topics
including the Communist Party of China.25 In 1954, the FBI returned to
Tokyo by establishing a legat in that city.26 This initially created some
interagency contretemps. Upon learning of the bureau’s desire to establish
this new position, several CIA officials voiced objections to this development.
Then–Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles settled the matter, stating
that he personally supported the establishment of the position, since it would

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actually benefit the CIA by alleviating a certain amount of work from

the agency.27
The role of legat Tokyo is suggested by a 1961 FBI communication on the
never-gets-old problem of Chinese student spies. (As of 2020, the FBI would
continue to view China’s exploitation of students as a threat to the United
States.28) The FBI noted its concern about Chinese who were entering the
United States on student visas and indicated that the legat in Tokyo was in
liaison contact with the U.S. Consulate General in the British Crown Colony
of Hong Kong and received background information on these students,
which it provided to the FBI. This effort was in furtherance of stated
objectives, which included identifying Chinese communist agents, obtaining
intelligence information of interest to the FBI and other government
agencies, developing informants and double agents, and making “reputable
Chinese” aware of the FBI’s responsibilities and jurisdiction with regard to
internal security.29
A further indication of the role that Tokyo played in combating Chinese
intelligence surfaced approximately a decade later during an inspection of the
Domestic Intelligence Division. Specifically, in 1973, the inspection noted that the
legat pursue intensified contacts with Japanese authorities in order to develop
intelligence information regarding the activities of Chinese communists in Japan.
This reflected the FBI’s concern about Chinese communist expansion in the far
east.30 Tokyo was not sufficient for countering the threat from China. The need for
a Hong Kong office was indicated—according to Dan Grove, the first Hong Kong
legat—by the reality that approximately 80% of the Tokyo legat’s workload was
actually in Hong Kong.31

Hong Kong
In 1965, the FBI established CHICOIN, and it expanded its China-oriented
presence abroad shortly thereafter by establishing a legat in the British
Crown Colony of Hong Kong. This location officially opened in 1966.32
(Technically, the title of the position was legal liaison officer since the legat
was situated at a U.S. consulate.33) According to Grove, the FBI’s China
desk was in support of a continued presence in Hong Kong.34 In opening a
legat office in Hong Kong, the bureau was explicitly seeking to develop
coverage of Beijing’s activities.35 Indeed, according to a 1973 inspection of
the FBI’s Intelligence Division, the principal focus of the Hong Kong legat
was “to assist the Bureau in its counterespionage efforts directed against
Chinese Communist espionage operations targeted against the US.”36
The FBI’s Hong Kong legat was not only attuned to the needs of the
bureau’s cases but also to the geopolitical realities of Sino–U.S. relations. The
office consistently developed what the FBI referred to as “foreign political
intelligence information” for the White House.37 An indicator of how the

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PERSPECTIVE 265

bureau viewed this post in the context of international relations is indicated

by an acknowledgment in a 1971 Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)
inspection report that stated that “resumption of relations with Communist
China [would make Hong Kong] increasingly important.”38 A 1973 DID
inspection report was even more explicit regarding the role of Hong Kong in
the global context, stating, “China [had] been rapidly emerging from the
period of the Cultural Revolution during which period it had little, if any
contact with the outside world” and the Hong Kong legat, through
intensified liaison with intelligence contacts should seek to develop current
intelligence information regarding Chinese communist activities.39

Formosa Formalities
Although the FBI was greatly interested in the intelligence threat from the
PRC, the United States, until 1979, diplomatically recognized the Chinese
nationalists in Taiwan (Formosa), rather than the regime in the PRC. This
led to complications for the legat program. The United Kingdom, although it
authorized the establishment of a legat in Hong Kong, insisted that the legat
not conduct liaison with Taiwan, in order to avoid disrupting relations
between Beijing and London.40 Legat Tokyo, which had been responsible for
liaison with Taiwan, continued to handle this responsibility. As the United
States began to make overtures to the PRC, the FBI noted that its Taiwanese
contacts viewed this as an unsympathetic move by the U.S. government but
committed to continuing their cooperation.41

Ottawa
Canada’s relationship with China posed a unique challenge to the United
States, as it provided China with an opportunity to target American entities
from a North American diplomatic platform. The FBI had a long-established
relationship with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, reaching back to
1939.42 In 1942, it established an Ottawa-based legat.43 This bilateral
relationship would provide the FBI with insights about how China was
endeavoring to use Canadian soil to target the United States.
The FBI was clearly concerned about—and keeping track of—how the
China–Canada relationship was progressing. A 1965 DID inspection report
noted the presence of a newly organized outpost of the New China News
Agency (NCNA) in Canada.44 (The NCNA—a Chinese state-run media
outlet—is more commonly known as Xinhua.45) During that same year, the
FBI indicated concern about the possibility that Canada would afford
diplomatic recognition to Beijing.46 In 1968, the bureau noted a news item
suggesting that Canada and China were nearing the establishment of formal

AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 36, NUMBER 1

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relations.47 Canada did ultimately afford diplomatic recognition to Beijing

in 1970.48
China’s establishment of a North American beachhead in Ottawa provided
China with new opportunities to target the United States. Through its
relationship with Canadian intelligence, the FBI received an estimate that
approximately 50% of the Chinese intelligence presence at the Ottawa
embassy would focus on American targets.49 As of 1971, the FBI was aware
that nine of the PRC embassy’s twenty-six-person staff were known or
suspected intelligence officers.50
The dividends of the FBI–Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
relationship included the sharing of intelligence regarding PRC matters. In
July 1971, for instance, the DID’s Chinese Unit conferred with its RCMP
counterparts in an exchange that the FBI characterized as “most
rewarding.”51 The results of this conference were sufficiently noteworthy that
Hoover directed the preparation of a memorandum documenting the
outcome be prepared for Henry Kissinger who, according to the FBI,
provided Hoover with a personal letter of thanks.52 Furthermore, the FBI
credited the RCMP with “excellent cooperation” in obtaining the names and
addresses of individuals who were in contact with the Chinese embassy as
well as the NCNA.53

Mexico City
Similar to its monitoring of Chinese–Canadian relations, the FBI indicated
concerns about China’s evolving relationship with Mexico. The FBI first
established a Mexico City presence, as part of the SIS program, in 1940.54
In 1965, the Bureau noted that the NCNA had recently established a
Mexican presence.55 In 1971, Mexico established diplomatic relations with
the PRC. By 1973, the FBI assessed that the recently established Chinese
embassy in Mexico City was one of several challenges which the legat in
that city faced.56

Other Locations
The FBI did not limit its use of legats in Chinese counterintelligence to
Tokyo, Hong Kong, Ottawa, and Mexico City, as indicated by the 1968
FBI’s instructions for legats worldwide. This global awareness served the
purposes of CHICOIN. According to a bureau document describing the
evolution of CHICOIN, it was “essential that visitors to Communist
China and PRC embassies in foreign countries be identified to determine
if they have access to classified material or could be utilized for an
intelligence or espionage assignment upon their return to the
United States.”57

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PERSPECTIVE 267

CHINA: NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC

INTELLIGENCE
The legats’ operations against China serve as a commentary about the nature
of intelligence organization. Despite being a domestically oriented intelligence
service, the FBI had to establish an international footprint in order to
counter the threats in its area of responsibility. The globe-spanning operation
of state and nonstate adversaries and competitors suggests that the continued
paradox of having to go abroad to determine what the threat looks like
domestically remains necessary.
This reality challenges the United States’ assignment of foreign and
domestic intelligence responsibilities and suggests that there is a need for
greater fluidity in which agency is responsible for what. In May 2009,
then–Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Dennis Blair took steps that
had the potential to accomplish this fluidity, when he stated that the DNI
(rather than the CIA) would select the chiefs of station.58 Conceivably, under
this arrangement, the DNI could select a representative from any of the
sixteen intelligence services—including the FBI—for which the DNI was
responsible. Blair’s announcement sparked a turf battle in which the White
House, by late 2009, had taken the side of the CIA.59
Although it may be heretical, Blair’s concept warrants revisiting. The FBI’s
China-focused legats are an illustration of how different agencies bring
unique perspectives to addressing threats. Chiefs of station should not come
from the CIA by default. Instead, the DNI should be authorized to assign
personnel based on the nature of the predominant threats or challenges
associated with the country in question. (For instance, the FBI should take
the lead in locations where regimes primarily advance their strategic interests
through whole-of-government spying—locations where counterintelligence is
the most sorely needed capability.) Allowing the DNI to appoint chiefs of
station from across agencies helps to end the myth of “foreign” and
“domestic” intelligence and emphasizes tools, rather than turf.

REFERENCES
1
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 66-2542. SAC Letter. No. 112. Series 1949.
(A) Communist Party—China; Communist Party—U.S.A. Confidential
informant Coverage, https://ia802703.us.archive.org/20/items/foia_FBI_
Security_Informant_Program_HQ_66-2542-3_HQ-7/FBI_Security_Informant_
Program_HQ_66-2542-3_HQ-7.pdf
2
U.S. Congress, Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary,
and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, Before the
Committee on Appropriations. United States Senate (1971).
3
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-11635. Domestic Intelligence Division
Inspection (1971). https://www.archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-
32989638.pdf

AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE VOLUME 36, NUMBER 1

268 PERSPECTIVE

4
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-149000. W. M. Felt to Tolson. Domestic
Intelligence Division Inspection (1968). https://ia802600.us.archive.org/4/items/
foia_FBI_Domestic_Intelligence_Division-HQ-1/FBI_Domestic_Intelligence_
Division-HQ-1.pdf
5
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-80750 V.P. Keay. Memorandum for Mr.
Ladd Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage. September 1, 1948, https://
ia801304.us.archive.org/14/items/FBI-CIA-Liaison/0368692—62-HQ-80750—
Section013.pdf
6
Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the S.I.S. Division, Volume 1,
https://vault.fbi.gov/special-intelligence-service/SIS%20History%20Part%2001%
20of%2008/view
7
Darren E. Tromblay, The FBI Abroad (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2020).
8
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 64-4104. C.H. Carson. Memorandum for Mr.
Ladd. 9 October 9 1942. National Archives and Records Administration.
Records Group 65.
9
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-80750 V.P. Keay.
10
Ibid.
11
Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the S.I.S. Division, Volume 1;
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 64-4104. Annual Report. Special Intelligence
Service. Federal Bureau of Investigation. United States Department of Justice.
1944–1945. National Archives and Records Administration. Records Group 65.
12
Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence from Secrets to Policy (8th ed.) (Washington,
DC: CQ Press 2020), p. 38.
13
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-80750 V.P. Keay.
14
Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the S.I.S. Division, Volume 1.
15
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-80750 V.P. Keay.
16
Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the S.I.S. Division, Volume 3.
Accomplishment. Mexico–Venezuela, https://vault.fbi.gov/special-intelligence-
service/SIS%20History%20Part%2004%20of%2008/view
17
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-80750, 6 October 1946. https://ia801304.us.
archive.org/14/items/FBI-CIA-Liaison/0368692—62-HQ-80750—Section004.pdf
18
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-80750 V.P. Keay.
19
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-80750. D.M. Ladd to E.A. Tamm. Central
Intelligence Group—Release of Bureau Property, 5 August 1946, https://
ia801304.us.archive.org/14/items/FBI-CIA-Liaison/0368692—62-HQ-80750—
Section003.pdf
20
Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the S.I.S. Division, Volume 3.
21
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-80750. Director, FBI To Attache, Paris,
France. 13 August 1946, https://ia801304.us.archive.org/14/items/FBI-CIA-
Liaison/0368692—62-HQ-80750—Section004.pdf
22
U.S. Congress. Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary
Appropriations for 1951, Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on
Appropriations, United States Senate, 81st Cong. Pt. 1 (1950).
23
U.S. Congress. Departments of State and Justice, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations for 1961, Before the Subcommittee of the Committee
on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Cong. (1960).

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24
Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the S.I.S. Division, Volume 1.
25
Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the S.I.S. Division, Volume 2.
Accomplishment Argentina–Japan, https://vault.fbi.gov/special-intelligence-
service/SIS%20History%20Part%2003%20of%2008/view
26
U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attache
Program (Washington, DC, 2004), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0418/
final.pdf
27
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-80750 R.R. Roach to A. H. Belmont.
Assignment of Bureau Representative to Tokyo, Japan, 27 July 1954, https://
ia801304.us.archive.org/14/items/FBI-CIA-Liaison/0368692—62-HQ-80750—
Section036.pdf
28
Christopher Wray, The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the
Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United
States, 7 July 2020, https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-
chinese-government-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-
national-security-of-the-united-states
29
Federal Bureau of Investigation, SAC Letter. No. 61-47. 9/5/61, https://www.
archives.gov/files/research/jfk/releases/docid-32989528.pdf
30
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-149000. Inspection—Intelligence Division.
23 October 1973. https://ia902709.us.archive.org/28/items/foia_FBI_Domestic_
Intelligence_Division-HQ-5/FBI_Domestic_Intelligence_Division-HQ-5.pdf
31
Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, Interview with Former Special
Agent of the FBI Daniel A Grove (1955–1979), 12 November 2009, http://
www.nleomf.org/assets/pdfs/nlem/oral-histories/FBI_Grove_interview.pdf
32
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-561. H. L. Child, Jr. to Mr. Tolson. Re:
The Legal Attache Program, 23 May 1969. (O&C file collection.)
33
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-149000. Inspection.
34
Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, Interview with Former Special
Agent of the FBI Daniel A Grove.
35
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-149000. Domestic Intelligence Division
Inspection. 17 August–9 September 1971, https://ia802709.us.archive.org/8/
items/foia_FBI_Domestic_Intelligence_Division-HQ-3/FBI_Domestic_
Intelligence_Division-HQ-3.pdf
36
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-149000. Inspection.
37
Ibid.
38
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-149000. Domestic Intelligence
Division Inspection.
39
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-149000. Inspection.
40
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-561. H. L. Child, Jr. to Mr. Tolson.
41
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-149000. Domestic Intelligence
Division Inspection.
42
Raymond Batvinis, The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2007), p. 76.
43
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-80750 V.P. Keay.

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270 PERSPECTIVE

44
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-57045. W. M. Felt to Tolson. Inspection—
Domestic Intelligence Division, 20 May 1965. (FOIA release of Joseph Sizoo
personnel file.)
45
Peter Mattis, “A Guide to Chinese Intelligence Operations,” War on the Rocks,
18 August 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/08/a-guide-to-chinese-
intelligence-operations/
46
Federal Bureau of Investigation,. 67-57045. W. M. Felt to Tolson. Inspection—
Domestic Intelligence Division.
47
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 100-41353 SAC, Chicago to Director FBI
(100-442715), 15 August 1968. (Pierre Trudeau FOIA release.)
48
Government of Canada, Canada–China Relations, https://www.
canadainternational.gc.ca/china-chine/bilateral_relations_bilaterales/index.
aspx?lang=eng
49
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-428100. W. M. Felt to Tolson.
Inspection—Domestic Intelligence Division; Inspector E. S. Miller. 8 January–6
February 1971. 10 February 1971. (FOIA release of C. D. Brennan
personnel file.)
50
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-57045. J. K Ponder to Tolson.
Inspection—Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) 17 August–9 September
1971. 27 September 1971. (FOIA release of Joseph Sizoo personnel file.)
51
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-116395. Inspection. Domestic Intelligence
Division, 17 August–9 September 1971, https://www.archives.gov/files/research/
jfk/releases/docid-32989638.pdf
52
Ibid.
53
Ibid.
54
Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the S.I.S. Division, Volume 1.
55
Federal Bureau of Investigation. 67-57045. W. M. Felt to Tolson, 20 May 1965.
Inspection—Domestic Intelligence Division. (FOIA release of Joseph Sizoo
personnel file.)
56
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 67-149000. Intelligence Division Inspection, 23
October–9 November 1973.
57
Federal Bureau of Investigation, 62-116395. Inspection. Domestic
Intelligence Division.
58
Mark Mazzetti, “Turf Battles on Intelligence Pose Test for Spy Chiefs,” New
York Times, 8 June 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/us/politics/
09intel.html
59
Mark Mazzetti, “White House Sides with C.I.A. in Turf Battle,” New York
Times. 12 November 2009, https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/us/politics/
13intel.html

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE