Pregnancy Discrimination- Cleveland Bd of Educ v LaFleur

Facts Issues Presented Rule Holding

Teachers brought suit Do the interests advanced in
under two state laws support of the School Boards
placing fixed cutoff Rules justify the particular
dates for mandatory procedures adopted?
maternity leave and
establishing set Do the particular means chosen
requirements prior to to achieve the School Boards’
return. objectives unduly infringe upon
the teachers’ constitutional
liberty?
Pregnancy Discrimination California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra
The Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires
such rules must not
needlessly, arbitrarily, or
capriciously impinge upon
the vital area of a
teacher’s constitutional
liberty.
The School Boards’ rules requiring maternity leave at
a specific date for all pregnant individuals is overly
broad and violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Cleveland return rule
is arbitrary and irrational, and therefore serves no
legitimate state interest. The Chesterfield return rule
serves a legitimate state purpose and is
constitutional.
The medical requirements and the requirement to not
return to work until the next semester following birth
are narrowly drawn and constitutional. The semester
requirement serves the legitimate state interest of
continuity in education. However the Cleveland rule
requiring the mother to wait until the child reaches
the age of three months prior to return is arbitrary
and serves no reasonable objective.

Facts Issues Presented Rule Holding

Title VII as amended by Does Title VII of the Civil Rights A state law may provide The majority found that Title VII as amended by the
the PDA prohibits Act of 1964, as amended by the more protection than a PDA created a base requirement that pregnant
discrimination on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of similar federal law so long workers be treated equally as other workers are
basis of pregnancy. 1978, pre-empt a state statute as the state law is not treated. They found that the California statute was an
Petitioner brought suit that requires employers to inconsistent with the acceptable expansion of a pregnant worker’s rights
claiming that a provide leave and reinstatement purposes of the federal not inconsistent with the purposes of the federal
California law requiring to employees disabled by law. statute.
employers to make a pregnancy.
good faith effort to
rehire workers after
maternity leave treated
pregnant workers
disproportionately to
other workers and was
pre-empted by the
federal law.
Facts
Peggy Young (plaintiff)
worked as a delivery
driver for United Parcel
Service, Inc. (UPS)
(defendant). When Young
became pregnant, her
doctor told her not to lift
more than 20 pounds, but
UPS required delivery
drivers to be able to lift 70
pounds. UPS said Young
could not work with a
lifting restriction, even
though UPS
accommodated other
workers with lifting
restrictions for other
reasons. Young brought a
disparate-treatment claim
under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act (PDA),.
Young v. United Postal Service
Issues Presented
Did the employer’s policy and the
way in which it burdened pregnant
women show that the employer
engaged in intentional
discrimination?
The burden of producing evidence
shifts from the claimant to the
opposing party, with the claimant
bearing the final burden of
persuasion.
Rule Holding
Does the burden of First, the claimant has the initial burden of producing
producing evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. A prima facie
shift from the claimant case under the PDA requires the claimant to belong
to a protected class (pregnancy or related
to the opposing party,
with the claimant conditions) and request accommodation that the
bearing the final employer refuses despite accommodating others
burden of persuasion? with similar work abilities. Second, if the claimant
makes that showing, the burden shifts to the
employer to produce a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory explanation for treating the
employee differently. Claiming simply that it is more
expensive or less convenient to accommodate
pregnant women is not enough. Third, if the
employer offers a valid reason, the employee has
the burden of persuading the fact finder that the
offered explanation is merely a pretext for
discrimination. Evidence that the employer’s policies
significantly burden pregnant workers without
sufficiently strong justification creates an inference of
intentional discrimination, which is enough to reach a
jury. Showing that the employer accommodates large
numbers of nonpregnant workers, but not pregnant
ones, creates a genuine issue of material fact

Facts
Title VII as amended by the
PDA prohibits discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy.
Petitioner brought suit
claiming that a California
law requiring employers to
make a good faith effort to
rehire workers after
maternity leave treated
pregnant workers
disproportionately to other
workers and was pre-
empted by the federal law.
Intimate Violence-Castle Rock v. Gonzales
Issues Presented
Does a person who receives
a restraining order have a
property interest in police
enforcement of that order
where enforcement is
discretionary?
Rule
A restraining order does
not grant a property
interest in its enforcement
on the obtaining party for
purposes of the Due
Process Clause when
police enforcement is
discretionary.
sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Holding
To have a property interest in a benefit, a person must
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Claims of
entitlement to a benefit come from existing rules or
independent sources, such as state law, and do not exist
when officials have the discretion to either grant or deny the
benefit. In this case, the state statute that laid out law
enforcement duties in enforcing restraining orders did not
make enforcement mandatory. Enforcement is within police
discretion, as is the longstanding custom. If the statute
wanted to make enforcement mandatory, it would use
stronger language than directing the use of “every
reasonable means to enforce a restraining order” or
directing the officers to “arrest . . . or . . . seek a warrant.”
Under this language, a police officer would likely have the
discretion to decide that even with probable cause to
believe there was a violation, the circumstances weigh
against enforcement in a particular instance. The need for
such discretion is apparent in this case, where the location
of the restrained party was unknown. The language of the
statute requires only that police seek a warrant. Plaintiff
does not specify which means of enforcement—arrest or
warrant—she was entitled to and this uncertainty weights
against finding the duty to be mandatory. Even if the police
were required to arrest, or if impracticable, seek a warrant,
the issue is that seeking an arrest warrant is procedural.
Procedure alone cannot support a property interest. Even if
the statute made enforcement mandatory, Plaintiff would
still not necessarily have a legitimate claim of entitlement
because laws making government action mandatory can
serve legitimate purposes other than granting a benefit on a
specific class of people. Finally, even if Plaintiff had a

Facts
The Missouri Division of
Corrections (DOC) (defendant)
forbid prison inmates from
marrying unless permitted by
the prison superintendent for
a “compelling reason.”
Missouri inmates (plaintiffs)
filed a class action seeking an
injunction against the
regulation and damages. The
DOC contended that the
regulation was necessary to
maintain prison security and
to carry out rehabilitative
objectives.
Turner V. Safely Marriage
Issues Presented
Is a state regulation that
forbids prison inmates from
marrying unless permitted by
the prison superintendent
because of a compelling reason
constitutional?
Rule
Prison inmates have a
constitutional right to marry
unless they are sentenced to
life with a ban on marriage
constituting part of their
punishment.
legitimate entitlement to enforcement of the restraining
order, this would not necessarily create a property interest
for due process purposes. 
Holding
Marriage is a fundamental right protected by the United States
Constitution. Although inmates are subject to substantial
restrictions, they are guaranteed those constitutional rights that
are not inconsistent with their status as inmates or legitimate
penological purposes.
Missouri’s justification of the restriction—security and
rehabilitation—is scanty. The restriction is not reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests. First, any security
concerns arising from speculative “love triangles” are no less
likely to occur with respect to unmarried inmates. The
rehabilitation rationale is directed at female inmates who seek
to marry other inmates or convicted felons. The state’s
justification for limiting such marriages is paternalistic and
unevenly applied. It cannot serve as a legitimate rationale.
“A private realm of family life which the state has no right in
interfering with.”
Factors
1 connection between prison regulation and legitimate
government interest, the government interest must be
illegitimate neutral, and it goes on to evaluating whether there
are alternative means of exercising that right. The third
consideration is the impact that the accommodation of the
constitutional right to marriage will have on guards and other
inmates. And then finally, The first one, I think Lindsay kind of
touched on there must be a rap about basketball connection
between prison regulation and legitimate government interest,
the government interest must be illegitimate neutral, and it goes
on to evaluating whether there are alternative means of
exercising that right. The third consideration is the impact that

Facts
Wisconsin statute that
prohibited the issuance of a
marriage
license to a person with child
support obligations until
he could show: (1) proof of
compliance with his support
obligations,
and (2) that his children were
not then and were
unlikely in the future to
become public charges
Facts
n the case of social security
benefits, classification to deny
Zablocki v. Redhail
Issues Presented
Whether a statute that
prevents certain residents from
marrying without first
obtaining a court order
granting permission to marry
violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Califano v jobst
Issues Presented
Wether a child with disabilities
with a disability who was a
Rule
The right to marry is a
fundamental right, and any
legislative attempts by a
state to limit that right are
unconstitutional unless they
are narrowly-tailored to the
accomplishment of an
important governmental
purpose.
Rule
that so viewed, the
exception was valid
the accommodation of the constitutional right to marriage will
have on guards and other inmates. And then finally, um I don't
fully understand this final point. So I'm going to stop talking now.
That's that's fine. Does someone else want to chim
Holding
strict
scrutiny was appropriate since the statute violated the
fundamental
right to marry’
The right to marry is a fundamental right and strict scrutiny is
appropriate for evaluating the constitutionality of any state
statutes limiting the right to marry. The right to marry among
interracial couples was first discussed in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), but subsequent Court decisions extended the right
to marry to all persons as part of their fundamental liberty
interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution. Additionally, marriage is part of the fundamental
“right of privacy” implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. The right of marriage is legally on the same level
of importance as other decisions involving procreation,
childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships. Reasonable
regulations that do not actually interfere with the ability of a
person to marry are not subject to strict scrutiny and can be
legitimately imposed
Holding
The court did not find the argument
for strict scrutiny tenable, nor did it wish to create a
disabled recipients who marry
disabled non-recipients
continued benefits is OK and
constitutional. (Deals with
benefits, not marriage itself).
dependent of their parents,
whether they should lose Social
Security by a when they marry
someone else who also is
dependent and disabled. And
the court decided, if you marry,
you are choosing to no longer
be a dependent.
and constitutional. It was
simple to administer, and
the general
rule was a reliable
indicator of economic
hardship even
though certain individual
cases might not fit into the
categories
established by Cong
new substantive right." Further, the court found it
unnecessary
to use the stricter standard since in its view the statute
in question could not stand even under the more lenient
rational basis te
Because Congress had no antagonism toward any class of
marriages or any type of marriage partner but merely
recognized
that marriage brings changed responsibilities, "the
favored treatment of marriages between secondary
beneficiaries
does not violate the principle of equality embodied in
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."
 Moreno-Family

Facts Issues Presented Rule Holding

An amendment to the Food
Stamp Act prevented
households made up of
unrelated individuals from
participating in the program.
A class action suit was
brought, and the District
Court found a Due Process
violation.
Does a law that terminates A state regulation that The majority finds the amendment to violate the Due
food stamp benefits for a arbitrarily creates two Process clause, while the concurrence finds a constitutional
class of persons comprised classes of persons and violation based upon freedom of association. The dissent
of unrelated people living in deprives one class of would find a rational relation to a legitimate state interest in
the same households violate government benefits the amendment..
the Due Process Clause of violates the Equal Protection
the Fifth Amendment? Clause and Due Process
Clause of the Fifth
Amendment because it is
based on a mere legislative
preference for one class that
is not rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas

Facts Issues Presented Rule Holding

 Belle Terre had a zoning
ordinance which restricted land
use to one-family dwellings, with
“family” being defined as persons
related by blood, adoption, or
marriage, or two unmarried
cohabitating people. The Village of
Belle Terre (defendant) cited the
Dickman house for a violation of
this ordinance because the six
students living in the house were
Is a zoning ordinance Zoning regulations may be Economic and social regulations are generally upheld against
which prohibits groups used to enhance and equal protection challenges where the law is reasonable and
of unrelated persons preserve public welfare. bears a rational relationship to a proper state objective. The
from sharing quarters government’s police power to enact zoning restrictions applies
an appropriate use of not only to its efforts to eliminate filth and unsanitary
the government’s police conditions, but extends also to enact restrictions designed to
power? further positive goals such as fostering an environment
conducive to families and childrearing. In this case, the
ordinance was not arbitrary because it was designed to reduce
noises and traffic, and to provide quiet and open spaces for
children to play.
not a “family.” The Dickmans and
their tenants (plaintiffs) brought
suit alleging that the ordinance
violated their equal protection
rights.
Facts
The ordinance narrowly defined the
term “family” as encompassing only a
few categories of related individuals.
Inez Moore (defendant) lived in East
Cleveland in a home with her son and
two grandsons. Under the housing
ordinance, this arrangement was
outside the legal definition of
“family.” Moore received a notice of
violation of the ordinance from the
CEC and when she refused to modify
her living arrangement, Moore was
charged with criminal penalties.  Amendment?
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)
Issues Presented Rule Holding
Does a housing The right of related family Distinguishable from Belle Terre because the Belle
ordinance that limits the members to live together is Terre ordinance expressly allowed all who were related by
occupancy of a dwelling fundamental and protected “blood, adoption, or marriage” to live together. It prevented
unit to members of a by the Due Process Clause, only unrelated individuals from living together, while the CEC
single family, and and necessarily ordinance limits blood relatives from living together. When a city
narrowly defines the encompasses a broader attempts such an intrusive regulation of family as that present in
term “family” to include definition of “family” than the CEC ordinance, the court must carefully examine the
only a few categories of just members of the nuclear importance of the government's objective and the extent to
related individuals, family. which the objective is advanced by the ordinance. CEC seeks to
violate the Due Process justify its ordinance as a means of preventing overcrowding,
Clause of the minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an
Fourteenth undue financial burden on the CEC’s public school system.
Although these are all legitimate public purposes, the housing
ordinance serves them only marginally and is not necessary to
their accomplishment. The right of family members to live
together is fundamental and protected by the Constitution. The
CEC’s argument that this right extends only to nuclear family
members is rejected.
 Prenups Simione

Facts Issues Presented Rule Holding

o unemployed nurse marries a 39 yo
neurosurgeon. Their prenup limits
her right to spousal support to
$200/week of $25K. after the
divorce, she argues the payments are
not reasonable; ct upholds
agreement
I: whether the prenup is valid? Is a
prenup entered into after full
disclosure binding, regardless of
whether it was reasonable or
understood by both parties ?
Whether contract was Prenuptial agreements are
valid K’s & should be evaluated
under the same criteria as
are applicable to other type
of K’s; Traditional K
defenses apply (fraud,
misrepresentation, or
duress). Spouses should be
bound by the terms of their
agreements. A prenup
entered into after full
disclosure is binding,
regardless of whether it
was reasonable or fully
understood by both parties
where an agreement provides that full disclosure has been
made, theres a presumption of full disclosure; spouse
attempting to rebut this presumption must prove fraud &
misrep by clear & convincing evid. It is not enough to
show that the agreement was presented last minute giving
the party little or no time to contemplate the ramifications.
C: must have full financial disclosure. Here ct says that
there isn’t a req that both parties have counsel at the
signing; & even if she didn’t understand the details, she is
still bound
 

Shanks

Facts Issues Presented Rule Holding

the IOM report required that the
agreement be deemed to be
voluntary in order for it to be what
was meant by that. So if something if
the contract wasn't voluntarily
signed, it was either there's undue
influence at play, which is where one
party overpowers the others freewill
and duress is also a form of
involuntary agreement. And how you
hether or not the
agreement was Any agreement that was not
executed voluntarily. entered into voluntarily is
Whether the agreement not enforceable.
was unconscionable, but Some tests for voluntariness
it was executed. And if Issue of duress
before the execution of Undue influences-subrules
the agreement. The Unconcioubaility analysis
person was provided Substantive is it harsh or
very reasonable approssive
work the test for whether or not their
situation is one where there's direct.
So it's where a party makes a
wrongful threat, and the other has no
reasonable alternative but to enter
the agreement. So again, these are
like rules within your we know that
under I was law, Iowa, PA, that that
an agreement, a financial agreement
has to be barred. And then the way
that we tell us if it's voluntary is if
there's not duress or undue
influence. And the way we tell if
there's duress or undue influence are
exactly what you were telling us.
Access to an attorney
Rule about waivers knowing what your giving up
Financial dislosure or
Spousal support modification elimination.
disclosure of property, and procedural aspect of it.
How far in advance , is there
technical language
sophistication of parties.
So my understanding is
about procedural.
unconscionability is that it
has to do with the
procedure of their contract
formation itself to some
degree. They start off on
page 517. The primary focus
of the procedural
unconscionability inquiry is
the advantage to parties
exploitation of the
disadvantaged parties, lack
of understanding or unequal
bargaining power. So my
understanding of those,
basically how they go about
actually formalizing the
difference in power,
UPA Act
Substantial hardship /imperial change