Labor History

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Agitator ‘Theory’ of Strikes Re-evaluated

Ralph Darlington

To cite this article: Ralph Darlington (2006) Agitator ‘Theory’ of Strikes Re-evaluated, Labor
History, 47:4, 485-509, DOI: 10.1080/00236560600899024

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00236560600899024

Published online: 26 Oct 2006.

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Labor History
Vol. 47, No. 4, November 2006, pp. 485–509

LABOR HISTORY
THEORY AND PRACTICE SERIES

Agitator ‘Theory’ of Strikes

Re-evaluated
Ralph Darlington

This article re-evaluates the so-called ‘agitator theory’ of strikes, the popular (often
media-induced) notion that industrial militancy is the work of a few hard-core militant
shop stewards and/or left-wing political ‘agitators.’ It suggests that while many industrial
relations academics have traditionally refused to accept such a one-dimensional
explanation for strikes, for example in relation to the Communist Party in the post-war
years, many have generally gone too far and fallen into the alternative trap of neglecting
the influence of politically influenced activists and shop stewards. Re-evaluating the
agitator ‘theory’ by an equally critical consideration of six of the counter-arguments
levelled in the past by its academic industrial relations opponents, the article provides
evidence to suggest that, despite exaggeration and distortion, there is clearly an
important element of truth in the thesis; agency in collective workplace mobilization,
in particular the role of leadership by union militants and left-wing activists, can be an
important (although by no means exclusive) variable in an understanding of the
dynamics of workplace industrial action in both contemporary and historical settings.

There has been a renewed emphasis amongst British and North American academics
on the importance of local union leadership to building and sustaining collective
workplace union organization and activity.1 Pioneering insights into the role of shop
stewards and other union activists in some of the classic workplace studies of the
1970s2 have been further developed by scholars bringing mobilization theory into the
mainstream of industrial relations analysis.3 Within this literature a few researchers
have focused particular attention on the role of left-wing political activists in shaping
collective activity and mobilization at the workplace in both historical and
contemporary settings.4

Correspondence to: Ralph Darlington, Salford Business School, University of Salford, Salford MWT 4WT, UK.
Email: r.r.darlington@salford.ac.uk

ISSN 0023-656X (print)/ISSN 1469-9702 (online) ß 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/00236560600899024
486 R. Darlington

This article develops a number of elements within this literature by specifically

re-evaluating the so-called ‘agitator theory’ of strikes. If, for many, the Russian
Revolution of October 1917 can be attributed to a handful of determined Bolsheviks,
then, equally for some, agitators can cause many strikes.5 During the second half of the
twentieth century, many blamed Communist Party shop stewards for the many
unofficial British strikes. When the Labour government was ‘blown-off course’ by the
June 1966 national seamen’s strike, Prime Minister Harold Wilson condemned in
Parliament a ‘tightly knit group of politically motivated men.’ ‘No major strike
occurs anywhere in this country in any sector of industry in which [the Communist
Party] fails to concern itself.’6 A succession of government-sponsored Courts of
Inquiry during the 1960s compiled ‘objective’ evidence of the Communist role in
unofficial strikes.7 On the docks, the Devlin Report8 acknowledged that many of
the unofficial shop steward strike leaders were genuine in their desire to improve
conditions. Nonetheless, it argued that others ‘find industrial agitation a satisfactory
way of life . . . whose concern is to make sure that there is always something to agitate
about.’9
Several national trade union leaders agreed on the need to combat the influence of
Communist shop stewards,10 and even some prominent British industrial relations
academics, such as Roberts and Flanders,11 blamed industrial conflict, in part, on
Communist ‘penetration’ and ‘subversion.’ In their study Shop Stewards, Goodman
and Whittingham conceded,
a small if well-publicized minority of stewards do sometimes persistently disregard
established procedures, perpetuating strike activity as an end in itself in seeking to
disrupt working relations, employment and production. There is evidence of political
groups committed to disruption establishing themselves among stewards . . . There have
been a few well-documented situations where stewards might justly be accused of
manufacturing grievances rather than managing them.12

The assumption that militant shop stewards and political ‘agitators’ fomented
strikes resurfaced during the industrial unrest that swept Britain in the 1970s and
early 1980s. Blame for the high strike rate at the British Leyland Longbridge and
Cowley car plants was placed on Communist and Trotskyist shop stewards’ influence,
dubbed by the tabloid press ‘Red Robbo’ (Derek Robinson) in the former and ‘The
Mole’ (Alan Thornett) in the latter. Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
branded Arthur Scargill and the other leaders of the 1984–85 miners’ strike a furtive
political clique hell-bent on the subversion of the British state.13 Despite the massive
decline in the level of strike action, the weakening strength of trade unionism, and
the demise of the Communist Party in Britain (and elsewhere) since 1980, the
agitator theory continues to have contemporary relevance. For example, recent
strikes by Fire Service and Royal Mail workers were met with tabloid newspaper
claims of ‘Militants exploiting their members’ grievances for their own political
ends.’14 Strikes on the railways and London Underground led to the denunciation of
Rail, Maritime, and Transport Workers’ Union (RMT) General Secretary Bob Crow
as a ‘bloody minded wrecker’ and ‘Marxist militant.’15 Despite the noticeable absence
 Labor History 487

of the Communist Party in these cases, the alleged influence of ‘hard-line left-wing’
groups was highlighted.
It is true that most post-war British industrial relations academics jettisoned the
Cold War right-wing demonology of Communism and have rejected contemporary
versions of such a one-dimensional agitator explanation for industrial conflict. But it
is significant, as some have observed,16 that academics, mostly those from a social-
democratic tradition sympathetic to trade unionism, have generally gone too far in
minimizing the role of political activists and shop stewards (whether from the
Communist Party or other radical left groups) in industrial disputes. The vast
majority of British industrial relations (IR) textbooks since the 1960s have either
ignored their role or referred to it only in passing. With the exception of some of the
1970s workplace studies, there remains a related tendency within the field of IR to
downplay the important role of ‘agitators,’ ‘militants’ or even activists per se in
workplace collective mobilization.
One leading British Marxist scholar, John Kelly, has suggested three ways that
this tendency has manifested: first, by emphasizing the structural causes of conflict
at the expense of agency; second, by recognizing the presence of activists, but
assigning them a delimited role as ‘the instrument not the cause of conflict;’ and,
third, by emphasizing the functional side of shop steward activity, as ‘lubricants
not irritants’ in workplace industrial relations machinery.17 However, recently
there has been rather more systematic theoretical study of leadership from within
the mobilization tradition, much of which is directly relevant to the field of
industrial relations and its analysis of strike activity and workplace union
leadership.18
This article reassesses the so called agitator ‘theory’ of strikes in light of these
considerations by examining a wide range of literature, including both classic and
more contemporary empirical workplace studies, as well as mobilization theory and
other industrial relations literature. The article builds on and extends the Marxist
analysis developed in the author’s own recent studies into the social processes within
workplace industrial disputes to explore shop-floor activists (whether members of
left-wing political organizations, ‘militant’ shop stewards or rank-and-file union
activists) and their influence as strike ‘agitators.’ It concentrates attention on
workplace-based (as opposed to national-level) strike action.
To begin with, the article outlines the main contours of the agitator theory of
strikes. It then proceeds to critically re-evaluate this theory by assessing six of the
main counter-arguments that have traditionally been levelled, implicitly or
explicitly by its academic industrial relations opponents.19 The article suggests that
although the agitator theory exaggerates and presents a distorted picture, there
is clearly an important element of truth in the thesis; agency in collective
workplace mobilization, in particular the role of leadership by union militants and
left-wing activists, can be important in the dynamics of workplace industrial
conflict.
488 R. Darlington

The Agitator ‘Theory’ of Strikes

Although no fully developed ‘theory’ has been expounded to explain how agitators
would cause strikes, it is possible to extrapolate some central ideological arguments
from a number of right-wing employer-funded organizations in Britain, including
the Economic League and Aims of Industry.
Behind the depiction of agitators as ‘troublemakers’ who cause strikes is a
conservative ideology, the classic ‘unitary’20 approach to industrial relations where the
capitalist organization of work is normal, natural and mutually beneficial.
By emphasizing the common interest between workers and managers, this approach
views strikes as unnatural and unnecessary, at best the result of delusion, at worst
the work of subversives. Whatever their ostensible justification, they are the result of
some sort of conspiracy where ‘militants’ dupe workers into striking or else compel
them to leave work through intimidation.21 Such an ideology continues to underpin
much of the contemporary human resource management (HRM) tradition, which also
denies subordinate employees the right to challenge managerial decisions by striking.
A 1968 pamphlet issued by the Economic League illustrates this approach to
agitators and strikes. In The Agitators: Extremist Activities in British Industry,
the Economic League argues that the statement that ‘every strike has a cause’ is
misleading because it neglects the questions of why workers believe a problem is a
grievance or why grievances lead to strikes. In fact, grievances themselves are rarely
self-evident; instead they usually need pointing out, exacerbating and ultimately
exploiting.22 This, the Economic League argues, is the work of left-wing shop
stewards and ‘agitators’ who foment strikes by ‘applying a match’ to the ‘inflammable
material’ of difficult industrial and economic situations.23
In this approach, ‘subversives’ are also adept at manufacturing discontent and
engineering conflict, stirring up imaginary grievances by manipulating workers with
misleading information, by arousing fears, and by rumour-mongering to disturb
waters that would otherwise be calm. It is, therefore, no coincidence that agitators are
almost invariably to be found in positions of influence at places of work with a
reputation as ‘trouble spots.’ That explains why, despite the apparent nature of the
particular industries, only certain dock areas, factories and building sites are strike-
prone while workers elsewhere, in similar circumstances, are content to settle
problems by peaceful negotiations.24
Agitators do not seek to remedy grievances but to exploit them; feeding the fears,
frustrations and anger of workers at odds with their employer to conduct continuous
workplace class warfare. Their aim is to disrupt industry through repeated strikes and
to convert unions into instruments for the ultimate political objective of a
revolutionary overthrow of capitalism.25 Unlike ordinary trade unionists, they do not
want better pay and working conditions for their own sake; instead they encourage
workers to strike to discredit the capitalist system. A 1970 Aims of Industry
pamphlet, Reds under the Bed?, explained:
The strategy of ‘discrediting the system’ means that the Communists simply do not care
about the current welfare of the working class they are supposed to support. To them,
 Labor History 489

current prosperity can always be sacrificed to produce greater power for the party.
The more impoverished Britain becomes, the more ‘the system’ can be claimed to
have failed.26

Agitators gain influence by camouflaging their covert political aims with mani-
pulative intent. In reply to the question ‘Do the activities of Communist groups
constitute a ‘‘plot’’?’ Bill Carron, right-wing engineering union leader, answered,
If by this one means do the Communists on a given job, in an industry, or a trade
union, regularly met to discuss tactics . . . to begin a strike, or to keep a strike going, the
answer is unequivocally yes! . . . tactics in disputes are discussed in meticulous detail.27

In the same way the Economic League argued,

The fact that a majority at a mass meeting are honest to goodness trade unionists,
Catholics, Protestants, or whatever, does not gainsay the point that a small well-
organized minority can skillfully manipulate such a meeting.28

This agitator theory of strikes provides ideological justification for various agencies
of the British state, such as the Security Service and Special Branch, to utilize spies
and informers against trade unionists and political ‘militants,’ a practice that
continues today.29
Having outlined the central features of the agitator theory, it is now possible to
consider some of the criticisms that have been mounted by industrial relations
academics.

Structural and Institutional Factors?

The first counter-argument to the agitator theory of strikes emphasizes the structural
and institutional causes of strikes, highlighting ‘social structure’ against ‘agency.’
Bean and Stoney, for example, disputed Merseyside’s reputation in the 1960s and
1970s as a strike-prone area by attributing the region’s high strike rate to the high
representation there of strike-prone industries, such as docks and automobile
manufacturing.30 The concentration of workers in large manufacturing plants,
with alienating repetitive assembly-line work and its attendant extensive division of
labour, factory discipline and managerial prerogatives, was identified as a cause of
shop-floor militancy. In other words, distinctive structural and organizational factors
were held responsible for encouraging workers to develop a consciousness of
collective grievance, to form a strong emotional attachment to their union, and
to engage in strikes.
Similarly, other writers have attributed strike propensity to industrial relations
institutional arrangements. This was the position of the 1968 Donovan Commission
which attributed numerous unofficial workplace strikes to Britain’s workplace
collective-bargaining arrangements.31 Clegg used such an analysis to explain strike-
proneness in six countries in his comparative study of industrial conflict.32
Yet such structural and institutional explanations, on their own, are clearly
inadequate, because they fail to explain why the opportunities and limitations they
490 R. Darlington

illuminate become realized on the shop-floor. Nor does such an approach account
for why union solidarity and strike propensity in similar structural and institutional
conditions vary between similar workplaces in the same industry and between
similar industries in different countries.33 This is not to say that such factors are
unimportant; but that structural and institutional characteristics have to be
considered in combination with other factors concerned with how actors actually
intervene within these circumstances. The point is that structural factors create a
more or less favourable environment for the collectivization of the workforce, but do
not, in and of themselves, generate a sense of injustice or collective identity: those
outcomes also have to be constructed by activists and other opinion formers.
But if structuralist explanations downplay agency then the agitator theory goes too
far in downplaying structure and context, neglecting objective material conditions.
Most commentators accept (in principle at least) that, as Marx long ago argued,
structure and agency should not be seen as oppositional; there is a complex interplay
between the two in any given situation.34 One of the best examples of this combined
approach is Kimeldorf’s historical sociological study explaining why dockers on
America’s west coast were radical and led by a committed cadre of Communists and
other leftists in the 1930s, compared with their much less industrially assertive and
more politically conservative counterparts on the east coast. Kimeldorf attributed the
contrast not just to material differences (including workers’ social composition and
the structure of employer ownership), but also to different leadership strategies and
organizing traditions, notably the role played by the left.35

Genuine Grievances?
A second objection to the agitator theory is that it discounts genuine worker
grievances by assuming there would be natural harmony between workers and
management if it were not for the actions of ‘militants.’ In fact, workers do not strike
unless they have a major issue at stake. For example, after studying the causes of the
large number of unofficial strikes within the car industry in the 1960s, Turner et al.
concluded,
the great majority of strikes constitute reactions to, or protests against, some change in
the work context: they are refusals to continue work on the same terms as previously
when the conditions previously assumed no longer apply. As such, they very commonly
amount to a demonstration against some managerial action . . . or against a managerial
assumption that men will continue to work on the same pay and conditions when the
content or context of the job has in some way changed.36

By blaming militants for unofficial strikes, the agitator theory focuses attention
on the effect not the cause of industrial disruption. While it might be possible for
militants to take advantage of rank-and-file workers’ grievances, they cannot
manufacture such discontent. Placing responsibility for strikes at the hands of
agitators overlooks the role of managerial action in stirring unrest, with discontent
manifest long before a walkout actually takes place.
 Labor History 491

The implication of such a critique is that a proper analysis of industrial conflict

has to address the underlying antagonistic social relations between workers and
management within capitalism which gives rise to conflict, rather than the role of
agitators as such. Agitation falls on receptive ears without genuine widespread
grievances and justifiable demands. As Bert Ramelson, the British Communist Party’s
industrial organizer in the 1970s, pointed out,
When you use words like ‘Communist-dominated’ I feel this is almost insulting to the
British worker. It suggests they are simpletons, allowing a tiny minority to dominate
them. If the Communist Party were not saying what the workers felt, they would be
ignored. They make proposals which are not totally removed from reality.37

Adapting a saying of Mao Zedong’s, Cockburn38 has explained that agitators must
‘swim like fishes in the sea’—which necessarily implies there is a sea ready for them
to swim.

‘Spontaneous’ Strikes?
A third counter-argument to the agitator theory is that many strikes are completely
spontaneous. In his classic study Wildcat Strike Gouldner pointed out that managers
could view strikes as either the product of a ‘calculated stratagem’ by the workers—
an impersonal, cold-blooded calculation of the tactical opportunities available—or
an irrational ‘emotional outburst’ that allows workers to ‘blow off steam’ and ‘get it
off their chests.’39 Similarly, Goodman and Whittingham believed unofficial strikes
led by ‘militant’ shop stewards could be ‘a strategic weapon employed consciously
by workplace leaders who assume the mantle of general of conspirators’ or merely a
‘necessary explosion of pent-up frustration, released often by a trivial incident.’40
This suggests that the common stereotype of the strike as a carefully planned
confrontation, a deliberately calculated stratagem (either organized by trade union
officials from above or fanned by shop-floor ‘militants’ or left-wing political
‘agitators’ from below), is not true of all, or even most, disputes. Instead, conflict
often originates in the more or less spontaneous action of workers without
leadership. In Gouldner’s study the plant was described as a ‘powderkeg’ that had
‘blown up’ in the unpredictable manner of a natural eruption—rather than following
some leadership plan to achieve a well-formulated set of union demands.41 Similarly
Knowles argued strikes are rarely ‘carefully planned and premeditated; still less often
are they dictated by considerations of strategy. Most often they are more or less
spontaneous outbursts against ‘‘injustice’’.’42
A number of classic British workplace studies support such an analysis.43 For
example, Lane and Roberts described how a ‘spontaneous’ unofficial walkout in April
1970 at the Pilkington glass factory in St Helens, Lancashire, represented an explosion
of accumulated grievances over wages and conditions. ‘There was no organized plot.’
The strike had not been engineered by a group of subversives who had deliberately
infiltrated the plant. ‘Such script as there was, was made up by people as they went
along: the strike in its beginnings was a genuinely spontaneous movement.’ At first
492 R. Darlington

many workers did not even know why they were striking—it was only during the
process of spreading through the factories that the strike acquired definite objectives,
with the decisive action of a small number of workers pulling others into action.
The strike was viewed as a ‘normal event,’ arising almost naturally out of the
circumstances of the employment relationship itself.44
The contemporary relevance of such an analysis seems to have been confirmed by
the persistent level of unofficial strikes within Royal Mail during the 1990s and
early 2000s. Unplanned, even ‘spontaneous,’ some of these strikes have been initiated
by the members themselves on issues that they feel have been neglected by their
union. Where the union representatives have been contacted, their advice has been
solicited but they have played no direct role in initiating or conducting the strikes.45
So there does appear to be an important element of spontaneity in some strike
activity even without any so-called ‘agitation.’ Somewhere along the line, the
employers’ arbitrary imposition of a change in work organization, possibly minor in
itself, sets off a chain reaction where conditions hitherto taken for granted are
questioned and directly challenged. Some strikes might be ‘spontaneous’ because
the workers feel they must respond quickly to an employer action, for example, the
victimization of a colleague. Or strikers may have laboured under a sense of grievance
for a considerable time until exasperation accumulates to the point of eruption.
Whatever the exact event, ‘something happens,’ a catalyst that leads to a strike
displaying surprising creative energy, resourcefulness and initiative among rank-
and-file workers, activity that only days or even hours before seemed impossible.
All without the contribution of any particular ‘agitator’ or group.
Still, the claim of ‘spontaneity’—particularly when offered as a refutation of the
agitator theory of strikes—is compromised when its proponents ignore the role of
leadership within all forms of strike activity, including those that originate in a
spontaneous outburst. Here we should note the important contribution made by
mobilization theory: namely that grievances are a necessary, but insufficient,
condition for collective action to take place. Thus, the commonsense notion that
anger, bitterness or relative deprivation themselves give rise to popular protest is false.
Even with real grievances, someone (not necessarily conscious ‘agitators’) must
articulate them and suggest practical collective remedies. As Shorter and Tilly have
reminded us, individual workers ‘are not magically mobilised for participation in
some group enterprise, regardless of how angry, sullen, hostile, or frustrated they may
feel. Their aggression may be channelled to collective ends only through the
co-ordinating, directing functions of an organization, be it formal or informal.’46
From this perspective, the very notion of a purely ‘spontaneous’ strike is
misleading because collective action by workers is impossible without some
leadership and organization to bring the actions and demands of a determined
minority to the mass of workers. Paradoxically this is an argument that has in the
past been given due consideration by some IR commentators. Thus, Karsh argued,
Individual unrest, frustration or discontent represents a fluid condition, which has the
potentialities for differing lines of action. Indeed, the unrest is not social until it is
 Labor History 493

organised; expressions of individual dissatisfaction need to be crystallised, defined and

focused. Most of all they need to be communicated and thus shared . . . It is in these
terms that leadership plays a crucial role.47

Similarly, Batstone et al’s study documented the way shop-floor workers’

grievances must be translated into strike action:
Strikes do not just happen. As a form of collective activity they require the development
of a degree of unity amongst those involved. Such organization is not only important
once a strike has begun; it is equally necessary in creating a stoppage of work. Particular
individuals or groups are likely first to introduce the idea of a strike and then to
persuade their fellows of the validity of this course of action. The mobilization of strike
action, then, is a social process involving systems of influence and power.48

Whilst the agitator theory grossly overstates the role of activists in strikes, other
British industrial relations academics over the past 40 years have understated its
significance. As has already been implied, there is a crucial difference between
creating shop-floor discontent and strikes and the leadership role of shop stewards,
militant activists or even political agitators. The latter do not, and cannot, create the
underlying material conditions that lead to conflict. But they can stimulate awareness
of grievances and of the potential for collective action for redress; they can spread
a belief in the desirability and feasibility of strike action; they can take the lead in
proposing or initiating such action; and they can provide cohesion to a general
discontent by generalizing from workers’ specific economic grievances to broader,
even political concerns. Sometimes, left-wing political activists can provide the
ideological, organizational and political leadership that advocates of the agitator
theory of strikes find so alarming, because an awakening to the general character of
the situation can be more explosive than the conflict’s immediate grievance.
Barker et al. have explained the need for, and material foundation of, leadership
within social movements because such movements are never homogeneous.
Participants do not arrive at shared ideas and a collective identity all together.
Instead there are arenas of discussion and argument out of which emerge, unstable
and only provisional forms of collective understanding, organization and action.
Here is where the issue of leadership arises. Leadership in social movements consists
in bringing together these differentiated entities so that they can identify themselves
and act together.
As the early twentieth-century Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci commented, ‘pure
spontaneity does not exist.’49 Leadership is needed even to initiate what appears to be
‘spontaneous’ strike activity because some person or group of individuals has to take
the initiative to walk off the job and lead others to do likewise. Drawing on pre-
existing informal communication networks, an apparently spontaneous action
creates varying levels of conscious leadership and organization. Scott and Homans
looked at so-called ‘unplanned’ and ‘wildcat strikes’ in America, and concluded,
It appears that in almost all instances a wildcat strike presupposes communication and
a degree of informal group organisation. The strike has some kind of leadership, usually
from within the group, and the leaders do some kind of planning, if only but for a few
494 R. Darlington

hours or minutes ahead. Whether this kind of behaviour is ‘spontaneous’ or ‘planned’ is

a quibble. The interesting thing is not the question itself but what it implies about
the people who raise it . . . showing [their] ignorance of informal group behaviour in
industry and elsewhere.50

While this implies that workplace activists (whether they are ‘spontaneously’
thrown up by events or are more established figures) are important catalysts of
strikes, this perspective differs from the agitator theory of strikes because rather than
assuming that activists manufacture discontent it sees them articulating workers’
genuine grievances. But even if we accept that the origin of strikes does not necessarily
depend on the leadership of workplace activists, militants or political agitators,
the overall direction of such strikes once started can be profoundly influenced by
such figures. Thus, although the Pilkington strike seemed to have emerged out of
‘nowhere’ because it was not formally organized, once begun it spread to all six plants
on the site and drew in most workers through the determined efforts of a small
handful of union activists. Such activist leadership was able to shape the definition of
the meanings, purposes and objectives of the strike. The strike’s main objective only
emerged after the stoppage began, when it was articulated by the activist leadership
from the strikers’ pre-existing grievances and aspirations.51
Fantasia has provided a fascinating participant observation study of the internal
dynamics of wildcat strike action in a steel-casting factory in New Jersey. There, too,
it was a small group of the most confident workers who pulled others into action and
a union militant who eventually articulated their discontent with management and
connected it to inaction by the local union leadership. The action was structured to
produce organization that could then lead, plan or harness workers’ spontaneity in a
more systematic way. ‘In posing a dualism between spontaneity and the planned or
rational calculation of collective action, the pretence of the structured elements
within spontaneous action may be missed.’52
Therefore, the attempt to refute the agitator theory by emphasizing the spontaneity
of workers’ strike activity misses the theory’s important, albeit distorted and
exaggerated, element of truth. As Taylor and Bain noted, ‘in the development of
collective organization, leadership prove[s] decisive.’53

Shop Steward Lubricants?

A fourth counter-argument to the agitator theory (and ‘communist-shop-steward-
as-villain’ notion) is that the shop stewards have often worked to prevent strikes
rather than to foment them. Of course, some classic workplace studies of the 1970s
and early 1980s show shop stewards articulating workers’ sense of grievance, targeting
it at employers and organizing strike action.54 One of the most detailed examinations
of the processes through which shop stewards can foster collective organization and
action was provided by Batstone et al.55 They focused on a few shop steward ‘leaders’
who sought to shape a strategic workplace-wide perspective supporting ‘trade union
principles’ of unity and collectivism. Their efforts to prepare the members to act
 Labor History 495

collectively, Batstone et al. made clear, depended, in large part, on the continued
educational role of the stewards’ leadership in channelling and controlling rank-
and-file discontent. This often involves the shop stewards in a protracted process of
communication, ‘mobilization of bias’ and ‘systems of argument’ to reinforce the
collective interests of the group. Because of their influence, shop stewards could,
within limits, determine whether a stoppage occurred or which workers and what
issues would be involved and along what lines a settlement would be reached.
Without denying the role of shop stewards, several important British industrial
relations studies of the 1960s and 1970s also explicitly rejected the assumption made by
the agitator theory of strikes (and the tabloid press) that it was shop steward
‘troublemakers’ who stimulated or provoked unofficial disputes. For example, Clack,56
who worked as a participant observer in a car factory during a period when several
so-called ‘unofficial-unofficial’ strikes occurred, reported that they took place without
the knowledge or against the advice not only of full-time officials but also of the shop
stewards. On the contrary, the stewards were generally a restraining influence,
although they could not afford to get ‘out of touch with the feelings of the shop.’57
This assessment—that stewards often counselled moderation not militancy—was
reinforced by Turner, Clack and Roberts’s broader study of unofficial strikes in the
car industry.58 Rejecting the agitator theory’s notion of irascible shop stewards, they
found ‘no evidence’ for such an inflammatory view of shop stewards: ‘Strikes have
been as common in plants where the stewards’ organization is weak or divided.’
Many stewards were ‘militant’ in some political sense, and many were to the left of
the Labour Party. But they were selected for ‘certain tough-mindedness, for an active,
individual or aggressive temperament,’ and those who remained in office were often
‘necessarily both tenacious and motivated.’ The study concluded that the impact of
left-wing political beliefs on workplace behaviour was minimal: ‘Circumstances
themselves tend to press stewards into courses of action which are as much
moderating as inciting.’59
The 1968 Donovan Commission’s highly respected survey of British industrial
relations also categorically rejected the media’s claim that ‘unofficial strikes are
fomented by shop stewards bent on disruption.’ On the contrary, stewards were
hardworking and responsible people who often acted as mediators to prevent
stoppages. In a much cited statement the Commission concluded,
It is often wide of the mark to describe shop stewards as ‘troublemakers.’ Trouble is
thrust upon them . . . shop stewards are rarely agitators pushing workers towards
unconstitutional action. In some instances they may be the mere mouthpieces of their
workgroups. But quite commonly they are supportive of order, exercising a restraining
influence on their members in conditions which promote disorder.60

And the Donovan Commission quoted from its earlier survey of shop stewards:
There is little evidence that shop stewards are more militant than their members, or
more likely to favour unconstitutional action. For the most part stewards are viewed by
others, and view themselves, as accepted, reasonable and even moderating influences,
more of a lubricant than an irritant.61
496 R. Darlington

Many other studies over the last 30 years (including Goodman and
Whittingham)62 have also suggested that stewards can be a moderating influence
in relation to strike activity. For example, Batstone et al.63 explored how ‘leader’
stewards referred to collective interests not merely to foster strike action, but also to
dissuade groups from action. Some Marxist-inspired writers64 have documented the
way shop stewards display the general contradictory tendencies involved in trade
unionism within capitalist society—characterized by the tension between conflict and
accommodation in their relationship with management. Thus, although sometimes
stewards express rank-and-file members’ grievances through collective action, they
also seek to limit action to forms they can control and which do not jeopardize the
overall bargaining relationship with management. In this way, the stewards’ role can
often be to inhibit or resolve conflict rather than to initiate or to mobilize. Still, the
picture is much more complex than the Donovan Commission’s broad brushstroke
assessment. We can see this in a number of ways.
1. If members perceive that shop stewards do no represent their interests in
negotiations with management, their advice can be ignored, with the rank-and-file
reasserting their control—in the last resort replacing a steward whose competence
they doubt. For example, Gouldner’s Wildcat Strike described how conciliatory union
reps, in a plant with deteriorating labour–management relations, were replaced in
practice, though not formally, by more extreme leaders when members felt a strike
was necessary. This happened during the Pilkington strike, when a number of the
older stewards who tried to prevent the strike were pushed aside and replaced by a
militant Rank-and-File Strike Committee. Rare as they might be in recent years of
union decline, such examples reveal the way in which the ‘elevation’ of individuals
into workplace leadership roles is always, in principle, provisional and situational,
with every leader only as good as their last effort.
2. Although stewards can be a moderating influence, when members reject their
advice, they may try to retain their influence by accepting the majority view, and thus
lead a stoppage they had not initially supported. Darlington’s study of the strike-
prone Ford Halewood plant in the 1970s showed that many sectional stoppages—
over the speed of assembly lines, the movement of labour, and discipline—were
initiated by the rank-and-file and then were supported by stewards acting against
their better judgement out of fear they would otherwise be removed from office.65
3. Workplace union leadership within strike activity is a continuous reciprocal
process between stewards and members. On the one hand, as we have seen, the rank
and file can influence stewards to achieve certain objectives, sometimes constraining
the stewards’ influence and authority. In Social Organisation of Strikes, Batstone et al.
went beyond their earlier study that had demonstrated the importance of ‘leader’
shop stewards to look at the influence of other shop-floor figures, including the
‘griever’ and ‘opinion-leader.’ The ‘griever’ was particularly ‘reward-deprivation
aware.’ Few ‘grievers’ were leftist agitators; most could best be described as either
non-political or more right-wing than the majority of workers. But they had a greater
readiness than others to identify and act upon grievances, even when viewed
 Labor History 497

suspiciously as always ‘moaning.’ The ‘opinion-leader’ usually had more influence

among workers and hence more resources to mobilize. They tended to urge collective
rather than individual solutions, and thereby workers often looked to them to
articulate grievances on their behalf.66
Both of these shop-floor figures play an important role initiating strikes, ‘grievers’
at the level of the work-group and ‘opinion-leaders’ more at the level of the section as
a whole.67 The extent to which stewards could lead was constrained by their
members. The rank and file were never mere puppets in a strike; they were themselves
an active agency, highlighting the need to consider the extent to which members play
an agitational role and influence stewards’ behaviour.68
It is equally important to recognize the central ‘agitational’ role that is often played
by shop stewards and the way they influence members by raising issues and
proposing strategies. As Lane remarked,
A shop steward was not a leader in the military sense that he could give orders and
expect unquestioning obedience. On the contrary, his leadership was always on trial and
open to question. Yet if he could lead only to the extent that the led acquiesced, he was
in a position to influence what it was that the led would find acceptable.69

This position of influence derives from the way that as a representative of workers
whose work situation generates grievances, ‘the steward’s role is always one of
potential conflict.’ They have authority because they share the aspirations of their
members, are personally involved in their experiences and shop-floor grievances and
represent their interests in negotiation with management. Their dedication to
building and sustaining workplace union organization, their bargaining skills and
appreciation of strategy and tactics acquired through previous experience, and their
integration into union networks mean they are usually in a better position than their
members to spell out the causes and consequences of conditions and prospective
action. They are able to situate sectional concerns in the overall context of the
workplace and can judge the effectiveness of a particular proposal. Precisely because
of this relationship with the rank and file shop stewards have often figured
prominently in strikes (sometimes in open defiance of full-time union officials) and
hence the popular appeal of the agitator theory’s portrayal of them as ‘troublemakers’
or ‘agitators.’
As we have seen, this is not to suggest that the members are infinitely manipulable.
But even if their recommendations are sometimes rejected, shop stewards can often
direct the way matters are presented and influence the final outcome. Moreover, once
strike action has been agreed upon, maintaining it requires shop-floor organization,
and stewards play a crucial role in the development and articulation of strategy
to members.
Significantly, despite their identification of the role of ‘grievers’ and ‘opinion-
leaders,’ Batstone et al. also recorded that the third type of influential
shop-floor figure were shop stewards, particularly ‘leader’ stewards, who occupied
a central position in the influence network within the section specifically and
498 R. Darlington

workplace generally. Over the broad pattern of strikes, such stewards were crucial to
successful initiation. In large part this related to their function as stewards and the
prominent ‘gatekeeper’ role this bestowed. Work-group level disputes, if they were
to achieve support from the senior stewards or other sections of workers, had to go
through the steward. And strikes initiated at department or plant level typically
required the stewards’ cooperation if they were to gain broad support. Nonetheless,
pressure for strike action, Batstone et al. noted, typically occurred within the section
itself, and the stewards (and opinion-leaders) played a disproportionate role in this
process.
Even the Donovan Commission admitted that although many unofficial strikes
appeared to be ‘spontaneous demonstrations’ by the workers themselves, the larger
and more important ones were ‘more consciously organised and prepared for in order
to impose pressure and increase the effectiveness of the action.’ Such strikes were
usually led by shop stewards, who had ‘strategically calculated when they would be
most effective.’ Gall’s recent study of shop-floor militancy in Royal Mail confirms that
many unofficial strikes are ‘organized, premeditated and not spontaneous,’ usually by
lay union reps. Clearly, the agitator theory cannot be rebutted merely by stressing that
the shop stewards’ more often try to prevent strikes than to foment them.

Ineffective Political Agitators?

A fifth counter-argument is that political agitators, whether Communist or other,
have been ineffective in promoting strikes. For example, confronting the claim that
Communist stewards were responsible for the strike-prone industrial relations at
Ford Dagenham during the late 1950s, Turner et al. reported that the Jaguar plant
in Coventry had at least as high a strike-incidence despite having no known
Communists among its stewards. Indeed, despite broad complaints of ‘Communist
interference’ made by some companies, several managers privately appreciated the
role of Communist senior shop stewards; one called them ‘an invaluable buffer.’
As for the Communist Party as an organization, the study concluded that it had been
‘dubious in industrial effectiveness.’ It had failed to support a continuing national
body of motor industry shop stewards and there had been almost no sympathy
strikes in the car industry.
The Donovan Commission’s Report and its associated research papers, as well as
Brown’s studies of shop stewards, also made no real attempt to relate industrial
militancy, particularly the strike wave of the early 1970s, to the role of the left,
notably the Communist Party. Neither did Clegg’s standard industrial relations text,
Durcan et al.’s comprehensive study of strikes or Hyman’s pioneering Marxist
analysis of industrial relations.70 In 30 years almost no academic studies have
explicitly explored the political views of activists and shop stewards as a factor
shaping workplace relations.71 Such neglect seems remarkable because the British
Communist Party (CP) during the 1960s and 1970s remained an organization of
between 25,000 and 30,000 members with a network of shop stewards in many
 Labor History 499

industries and unions and may have been influential in many important workers’
struggles.
Mcllroy’s recent research on this hitherto much-neglected area provides substantial
evidence of the prominent role played by the CP with party branches in large, often
strategic, workplaces (notably in the steel, engineering, car manufacture and mining
industries), where they led strikes, developed shop stewards’ organization and
constructed workplace politics.72 Other studies have also shown the pivotal role
played by networks of CP union militants in industrial disputes in the late 1960s and
early 1970s, helping to develop and transform the consciousness of those they
represented and mobilized.73 Nonetheless, during this period the contradiction
between leading independent rank-and-file militancy and cultivating influence
among sympathetic full-time union officials led the CP to subordinate the former
approach in favour of the latter, with the result that its activist role was assumed in
some workplaces by Trotskyist groups.74
During the late 1990s and early 2000s case studies of workplace trade unionism
in Royal Mail, the Fire Service and London Underground75 have also revealed the
importance of shop stewards’ political affiliations. They showed the influence and
leadership that new groups of left-wing activists (including both those affiliated to a
political party and ‘quasi-syndicalists’ emphasizing industrial struggle rather than
political action) with a consistently adversarial attitude towards management can
exert on collective workplace union organization and mobilization.

Pragmatic Respect?
A sixth and final counter-argument is that left-wing shop-floor influence (however
limited) stems not from manipulating workers but from the pragmatic respect they
generate amongst workers.
Of course, there have been cases of manipulation. Notably, Communist full-time
union officials in the ETU (Electrical Trades Union), when in 1961 faced with the loss
of part of their union base after events in Hungary, tampered with ballot returns to
disqualify votes from branches thought to be anti-Communist. However, there is no
evidence that ballot rigging was typical of Communist trade union activists or was
sanctioned by leading bodies of the party.76 More recently, the Trotskyist Militant
Tendency practised deception during the 1970s and 1980s, operating as a separate and
secret political organization inside the Labour Party (with its own programme and
policies, newspaper, full-time political organizers and membership). Eventually the
group was proscribed and their leading figures were expelled from the party. Here, too,
even if the Militant Tendency’s internal organization was semi-clandestine, their
influence amongst workers arose from legitimate public campaigning and activity.
Allegations of manipulation are misconceived because proponents deny the
correspondence of left-wing political ideas of working class defiance to the
aspirations of many workers themselves, assuming the former is an ‘external’
penetration of the latter rather than flowing from genuine indigenous roots.
500 R. Darlington

This reveals a fundamental ignorance of the manner in which workers take action in
opposition to management. If it was true that left-wing militants were unconcerned
with union members’ immediate interests and used strikes for their own ulterior
motives, it seems likely this would soon become apparent to workers themselves,
particularly since employers, government and the media often portray such
‘agitators’ in this light.77
Instead, a number of historians have documented how British Communist Party
industrial militants, despite the Cold War, won respect on the shop-floor by their
commitment to the daily round of trade union activity.78 Often the most
indefatigable organizers and negotiators, fighting for higher pay, better working
conditions and stronger unions, their influence came from their willingness to take
on leadership roles necessary for the basic functioning of a workplace union.
Paradoxically, their Communist politics mattered less than their determination to
pursue shop-floor grievances and uphold workers’ interests against employers and
government.
Sometimes, however, there have been tensions between leftist activists and rank-
and-file workers.79 Some contemporary studies of Trotskyist groups have shown that
although political tolerance can be high, with left-wing convictions no necessary
barrier to election as a steward, such activists can remain an object of suspicion, with
their recommendations scrutinized for any indications of ‘political’ motivation. Any
apprehension they might be seeking to develop strikes into support for demands
reflecting the perspectives of their own organizations can alienate workers, even those
who value the left-wing activists’ ability to provide practical commitment and
guidance.80

The Dynamics of Shop-Floor Leadership

It is now possible to consider in more detail the contribution of mobilization theory
to an understanding of the dynamics of shop-floor leadership and its implications
for the agitator theory of strikes. Kelly has made an important attempt to bring the
contribution of mobilization theory into the mainstream of industrial relations
analysis.81 As an alternative conceptual framework to the dominant pluralist/HRM
perspectives, Kelly’s uses mobilization theory. Drawing on the work of Fantasia as
well as Tilly, McAdam, Gamson, Franzosi and Klandermans, he shows how the
transformation of a set of individuals into a collective actor is normally the work of a
small group of workplace activists.82 First, they carry arguments and frame issues so
as to promote a sense of grievance or injustice amongst workers, persuading them
that what has hitherto been considered ‘normal’ or ‘acceptable’ is in fact unjust.
Second, they encourage group cohesion and identity, encouraging workers to see
their collective interests against management. Third, they urge appropriate collective
action; persuading others is essential because of the costs of such action and the
inexperience of many people with its different forms and consequences. Fourth, they
legitimize such action in the face of counter-mobilization by the employer.
 Labor History 501

All this raises the question of what precisely is meant by the term ‘leadership’?
Within mobilization theory, Barker et al. have offered an analytical framework
for understanding the nature of leadership in collective activity: namely, as
simultaneously a purposive activity and a relationship.83 Considered as a purposive
activity, leadership involves engaging in practical theorization, evaluating concrete
situations and communicating to others practical proposals about appropriate forms
of organization and action concerning ‘what is to be done?’ Lavalette’s case study
refers to a process of ‘strategic planning’ or ‘strategizing’ in which union and political
activists think through the various strategies and tactics open to the workforce and
the potential consequences resulting from each.84 This involves questions to do with
whether the case can be won, the level of support for action, and whether the activists
can convince others.
But as well as a purposive activity, leadership is also a relationship. It involves
‘listening’ as well as talking, anticipating responses as well as making proposals.
In this sense, leadership can be understood as a dynamic activity with other actors,
who themselves are strategically thinking entities, possessing ‘agency.’ From this
perspective, leadership is exercised not only by union activists or agitators but by all
participants inside the workplace with views about union organization and activity
who engage in ‘framing’ issues, translate grievances into a sense of injustice, blame
management, assess opportunities and mobilize their fellow workers. While activists
or ‘agitators’ are often crucial, they are effective only in relation to rank-and-file
workers because issues of strategy and tactics are inherently relational, formed in the
face of the words and actions of both allies and combatants, and are always
necessarily provisional, subject to revision through argument. Listeners are as
significant a participant as speakers in a transforming process of social dialogue: on
both sides we find agency and creativity.85
In other words, being simultaneously a purposive activity and a relationship,
leadership involves identification with workers and ‘projective distance’ from their
immediate situation. Leaders must propound a positive idea, but they must also
compete with aspiring leaders to combat alternative ideas or conceptions. In this
respect, all leadership relations inevitably involve a tension between would-be leaders
and potential followers.
One implication of treating leadership as a relationship is that it suggests that more
attention should be given to the ‘followers’ to whom leadership proposals are
addressed. For example, why and within what limits do workers agree to visions and
practical suggestions articulated by others? Another implication is that more
attention should be paid to the debates involved in deciding what are the most
appropriate ways of ‘framing’ issues around which workers can be mobilized for
action, including different political conceptions between activists and members.
Finally there is the question of the context and opportunity for collective
mobilization. Clearly, activists or ‘agitators’ may be a necessary but are not a sufficient
cause for workers to strike, because there are many cases of activists urging action
without it being taken. To understand how workers decide to accept or reject
suggested strategies we need to consider other influences, including the economic
502 R. Darlington

and political situation, industrial and organizational context, extent of management

provocation, nature of workers’ grievance, state of shop-floor morale, level of
organization and consciousness of workers, degree of self-confidence, and strength
and traditions of solidarity. But it should be remembered how quickly all this can
change, so that an apparent passive workforce can suddenly explode into action
(as happened at Pilkington).

Conclusion
Notwithstanding the serious flaws at the heart of the agitator theory of strikes, it is
clear that agency in collective workplace mobilization—in particular the role of
leadership by union militants and left-wing activists—can be important to the
dynamics of workplace industrial action.
As we have seen, collective action involves actors making practical decisions
concerned with defining their situation, identifying common identities and selecting
strategies to obtain goals. With others, they must identify a common grievance and
from this a shared identity. Assessing their context, they must formulate actions to
resolve their grievance. Finally, they must react to and deal with the activities of
opponents who are involved in similar processes themselves. It is precisely within
such processes that leadership becomes central and, in certain circumstances, the role
of left-wing leadership and agitation can become crucial.
Hyman has argued that, ‘While the notion of politically motivated and tightly knit
agitators is wide of the mark, the romantic concept of absolute spontaneity is likewise
inadequate.’86 It is certainly true that both spontaneity and agitator theories dismiss
working class agency—the former on the basis that it is an impulsive outburst with
little conscious intent, the latter that workers are blindly led by the nose by some
extremists. Neither approach acknowledges that workers themselves can take
collective action for rational and purposive means. On the other hand we should
not throw out the baby with the bathwater and dismiss the role of union activists and
‘politically motivated’ militants and ‘agitators.’
The agitator theory of strikes exaggerates and presents a distorted picture of the
role of such figures. Nonetheless, it retains an important element of truth. Even if
agitators do not in any sense cause the underlying material conditions that lead to
antagonism and strike activity, workplace militancy is usually far from spontaneous
and unorganized. There is always conscious leadership, in whatever limited or
provisional form that may manifest itself. In the process of developing such
leadership, activists or ‘agitators’ can often be central to tapping into members’
concerns, articulating them and agitating around them so that such concerns become
legitimate. They encourage workers to see their grievances as part of a broader class
struggle and urge them to seek redress through strike action. While many activists are
neither militant nor left-wing, politically conscious shop stewards and union activists
with an overtly ideological and solidaristic (rather than instrumental and
individualistic) commitment to trade unionism can play a crucial role in mobilizing
 Labor History 503

workers to take militant strike action.87 Finally, leadership is a dialogue between

leaders and led with many different shop-floor figures involved in argument,
evaluation of the situation, and advocacy of practical proposals for action. Within
this process, the influence of certain key individual ‘agitators’ should not be ignored
or downplayed.

Notes
[1] For example, in the British context see Fosh and Cohen, ‘Local Trade Unionists in Action;’
Fairbrother, ‘The Contours of Local Trade Unionism in a Period of Restructuring;’ Politics
and the State as Employer; ‘Workplace Trade Unionism in the State Sector;’ Darlington, The
Dynamics of Workplace Unionism; Dundon, ‘Post-privatized Shop Steward Organisation;’
Gall, The Meaning of Militancy?; Beale, ‘Engaged in Battle.’
[2] See Beynon, Working for Ford; Nichols and Beynon, Living with Capitalism; Batstone et al.,
Shop Stewards in Action; The Social Organization of Strikes.
[3] Kelly, ‘The Future of Trade Unionism’; Rethinking Industrial Relations; Taylor and Bain,
‘Call Centre Organizing in Adversity.’
[4] Mcllroy, ‘Notes on the Communist Party;’ ‘‘‘Always Outnumbered, Always Outgunned’’;’
‘‘‘Every Factory Our Fortress’’,’ Parts 1 and 2; Mcllroy and Campbell, ‘The High Tide of
Trade Unionism,’ ‘Organizing the Militants;’ ‘Beyond Betteshanger,’ Parts 1 and 2;
Campbell, ‘Exploring Miners’ Militancy;’ Gall, ‘The Prospects for Workplace Trade
Unionism;’ ‘What Is to Be Done with Organized Labour?’ Calveley and Healy, ‘Political
Activism and Industrial Relations in a UK ‘‘Failing’’ School;’ Darlington, ‘The Challenge to
Workplace Unionism in Royal Mail;’ The Dynamics of Workplace Unionism; ‘Shop Stewards’
Organization in Ford Halewood;’ ‘Restructuring and Workplace Unionism at Manchester
Airport;’ ‘Workplace Union Resilience in the Merseyside Fire Brigade;’ ‘Union Militancy and
Left-Wing Leadership on London Underground;’ ‘Shop Stewards’ Leadership, Left-Wing
Activism and Collective Workplace Union Organisation;’ Darlington and Lyddon, Glorious
Summer.
[5] Wrigley, ‘Industrial Protest,’178.
[6] Wilson, The Labour Government.
[7] Cameron Report.
[8] Devlin Report.
[9] Ibid., 42–43.
[10] Wigham, What’s Wrong with the Unions?, 114-30
[11] Roberts, ‘Trade Unions and the Labour Party;’ Flanders, Trade Unions.
[12] Goodman and Whittingham, Shop Stewards, 203
[13] Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, 339.
[14] The Mail on Sunday, 17 November 2002; The Sun, 3 December 2002.
[15] Daily Express, 14 April 2004.
[16] Kelly, Rethinking Industrial Relations; Mcllroy and Campbell, ‘The High Tide of Trade
Unionism;’ Darlington, ‘Shop Stewards’ Leadership, Left-Wing Activism and Collective
Workplace Union Organisation.
[17] Kelly, Review of Nina Fishman, 77.
[18] Della Porta and Diani, Social Movements; McAdam, ‘The Framing Functions of Movement
Tactics;’ McAdam et al., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements; Dynamics of
Contention; Tarrow, ‘States and Opportunities;’ Barker et al., ‘Leadership Matters.’
[19] Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, Report.
[20] Fox, ‘Industrial Relations.’
504 R. Darlington

[21] Samuel, ‘Introduction,’ 4.

[22] Economic League, The Agitators (1968 ed.), 3.
[23] Ibid., 63.
[24] Aims of Industry, The Road to Ruin; Reds under the Bed?
[25] Economic League, Pattern of Trotskyism, 26.
[26] Aims of Industry, Reds under the Bed?, 8.
[27] Economic League, The Agitators (1974 ed.), 2–3.
[28] Economic League, The Agitators (1968 ed.), 58–59.
[29] Milne, The Enemy within.
[30] Bean and Stoney, ‘Strikes on Merseyside.’
[31] Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, Report, 97–108.
[32] Clegg, Trade Unionism under Collective Bargaining.
[33] Eldridge, Industrial Disputes; Edwards, ‘A Critique of the Kerr-Siegal Hypothesis;’ Cronin,
Industrial Conflict in Modern Britain.
[34] Marx, Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 96.
[35] Kimeldorf, Reds or Rackets?
[36] Turner et al., Labour Relations in the Motor Industry, 21–22.
[37] Quoted in Ferris, The New Militants, 78.
[38] Cockburn, Union Power, 79.
[39] Gouldner, Wildcat Strike, 55.
[40] Goodman and Whittingham, Shop Stewards, 94.
[41] Gouldner, Wildcat Strike, 63.
[42] Knowles, Strikes, 6.
[43] By way of example see Clarke and Clements, Trade Unions under Capitalism; Matthews,
Ford Strike; Rogaly, Grunwick.
[44] Lane and Roberts, Strike at Pilkingtons, 86–87, 224, 241.
[45] Gall, The Meaning of Militancy?, 170.
[46] Shorter and Tilly, Strikes in France, 338.
[47] Karsh, Diary of a Strike, 6.
[48] Batstone et al., The Social Organisation of Strikes, 1.
[49] Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, 196.
[50] Scott and Homans, ‘Reflections on the Wildcat Strike,’ 283.
[51] Lane and Roberts, Strike at Pilkingtons, 160–161.
[52] Fantasia, Cultures of Solidarity, 110–11.
[53] Taylor and Bain, ‘Call Centre Organizing,’ 170.
[54] Lane and Roberts, Strike at Pilkingtons; Beynon, Working for Ford; Nichols and Armstrong,
Workers Divided; Nichols and Beynon, Living with Capitalism; Armstrong et al., Ideology and
Shopfloor Industrial Relations; Pollert, Girls, Wives, Factory Lives; Edwards and Scullion,
The Social Organisation of Industrial Conflict.
[55] Batstone et al., Shop Stewards in Action, The Social Organization of Strikes.
[56] Clack, ‘How Unofficial Strikes Help Industry.’
[57] McCarthy, The Role of Shop Stewards, 22.
[58] Turner et al., Labour Relations in the Motor Industry.
[59] Ibid., 330, 288, 289.
[60] Ibid, 28–29.
[61] McCarthy and Parker, Shop Stewards and Workplace Relations, 5.
[62] Goodman and Whittingham, Shop Stewards, 191–99.
[63] Batstone et al., Shop Stewards in Action, 61.
[64] Lane, The Union Makes Us Strong; Hyman, Industrial Relations; Clarke and Clements,
Trade Unions under Capitalism; Darlington; The Dynamics of Workplace Unionism.
[65] Darlington, The Dynamics of Workplace Unionism, 229.
[66] Batsone et al., The Social Organization of Strikes, 1–2, 64.
 Labor History 505

[67] Ibid., 66–7.

[68] Darlington, ‘Shop Stewards’ Leadership, Left-Wing Activism and Collective Workplace
Union Organisation,’ 101.
[69] Lane, The Union Makes Us Strong, 198; Hyman, Strikes, 48; Batstone et al., The Social
Organisation of Strikes, 69–73, 78, 81; McCarthy, The Role of Shop Stewards in British
Industrial Relations, 22; Gall, The Meaning of Militancy?, 166, 168; Turner et al., Labour
Relations in the Motor Industry, 211, 213, 289, 290.
[70] Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations, Report; McCarthy, The
Role of Shop Stewards in British Industrial Relations; McCarthy and Parker, Shop Stewards and
Workplace Relations; Brown, Piecework Bargaining; Clegg, The System of Industrial Relations
in Britain; Durcan et al., Strikes in Post-war Britain; Hyman, Industrial Relations; Strikes;
Political Economy of Industrial Relations.
[71] Beynon, Working For Ford, Foster and Woolfson, The Politics of the UCS Work-in; Spencer,
Remaking the Working Class?
[72] Mcllroy, ‘Notes on the Communist Party and Industrial Politics;’ ‘‘‘Every Factory Our
Fortress’’,’ Parts 1 and 2.
[73] Allen, The Militancy of the British Miners; Mcllroy and Campbell, ‘The High Tide of Trade
Unionism’; ‘Organizing the Militants;’ Darlington and Lyddon, Glorious Summer.
[74] Mcllroy and Campbell, ‘Organizing the Militants;’ Darlington and Lyddon, Glorious
Summer; Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain; Thornett, From Militancy to Marxism;
Inside Cowley; Lyddon, ‘The Car Industry;’ Mcllroy, ‘‘Always Outnumbered, Always
Outgunned;’’ Cliff, A World to Win.
[75] Darlington, ‘The Challenge to Workplace Unionism in Royal Mail;’ ‘Workplace Union
Resilience in the Merseyside Fire Brigade;’ ‘Union Militancy and Left-Wing Leadership on
London Underground;’ ‘Shop Stewards’ Leadership, Left-Wing Activism and Collective
Workplace Union Organisation.’
[76] Eaden and Renton, The Communist Party of Great Britain since 1920, 133.
[77] Cockburn, Union Power, 79.
[78] Stevens, ‘Cold War Politics;’ Callaghan, Cold War, Crisis and Conflict; Eaden and Renton,
The Communist Party of Britain since 1920.
[79] Mcllroy, ‘‘‘Every Factory Our Fortress’’,’ Part 2.
[80] Lavallete, ‘Defending the ‘‘Sefton Two’’;’ Calveley and Healy, ‘Political Activism and
Industrial Relations in a UK ‘‘Failing’’ School.’
[81] Kelly, ‘The Future of Trade Unionism’; Rethinking Industrial Relations.
[82] Fantasia, Cultures of Solidarity; Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution; McAdam,
‘Micromobilization Contexts and Recruitment to Activism;’ Gamson, Talking Politics;
Franzosi, The Puzzle of Strikes; Klandermans, The Social Psychology of Protest.
[83] Barker et al., ‘Leadership Matters,’ 5–11.
[84] Lavalette, ‘Defending the ‘‘Sefton Two’’,’ 117.
[85] Barker et al., ‘Leadership Matters,’ 8.
[86] Hyman, Political Economy of Industrial Relations, 111.
[87] Darlington, ‘Workplace Union Resilience in the Merseyside Fire Brigade,’ 70.

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506 R. Darlington

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