Dlamini, S. Nombuso - The Construction, Meaning and Negotiation of Ethnic Identities in KwaZulu Natal

Social Identities, V olum e 4, N um ber 3, 1998
T he C on struc tion , M e a ning a n d N e gotia tion o f

E thn ic Ide ntitie s in K w a Z u lu N a tal
S . N O M BU SO D L A M IN I
U nive rsity of P re toria
Introduction and B ackgroun d
In attem pting to examine how ethn ic iden tities are constructed, ne gotiated and
m aintained in any given context, it is important to de® ne satisfactorily w hat is
meant by ethnicity as a conceptual tool for the dism antlin g and unde rstanding
of societies. Ethn icity has provide d w ays of talkin g about a group of people
w ithout bein g precise about the criteria used to ide ntify that group. For all its
vagueness, in this paper, ethn icity refers to the w ay ind ivid uals ide ntify
them selve s, or are iden ti® ed by others, collectively, and act according to those
iden tities. W hat remains unclear in social scien ce studies is the nature of the
m aterial that holds these ide ntities together; that is, w hat constitutes the ties
that unde rlie ethn ic groups, and how these ties w ork to in clude and exclude
people from group membersh ip. This paper is an exam ination of the ties that
underscore Zulu ide ntity in Kw aZulu/N atal, as well as w ays in w hich these
ties are used to legitim ise certain practices located in the social and political
context of a changin g South A frica.
I begin by examining, in ge neral, the developmen t of Zulu iden tity and the
differen t ties of ide nti® cation genera lly used to de® ne Zulus. It exam ines
the manner in w hich Zulu ide ntity inte rsects w ith formal politics, encom pass-
in g the actions of political partie s and other intere st groups in competition for
access to power in a post-aparthe id state, and interpersonal politics, that is, the
ne gotiation of relations of power and solid arity between individuals in interac-
tion. The last part of the paper presen ts a case study of youth experien ces in
the tow nsh ips that surround the city of D urb an in Kw aZulu/N atal. The
purpose of this case study is tw ofold. The ® rst is to demonstrate how people’ s
sen se of ide ntity sh ifts desp ite legitim ised group ties, and that the complexity
of ide ntity construction is a result of the juxtaposition of criteria used to de® ne
in dividuals and groups. In this w ay, I dem onstrates sources and consequences
of the processes and practices that violate normalise d w ays of constructing and
ne gotiating ethnic iden tities. The second purpose is to illus trate that, w hile the
doctrines of political organisations do have great im pact on people’ s live s, w ho
people experie nce them selve s to be cannot be dictated from above.
Issues discusse d in the second part of this paper are substantiated by data
collected in 1993 on youth groups from differen t tow ns hips in Durban. The
data w as collected over a period of eight months w ith a variety of participants
w ho can be arran ge d into compressed circles by degree of acquaintance. From
1350-4630/98/030473-25 $7.00 Ó 1998 C arfax Publish ing L td
474 S. N om buso D lam ini
these tow nsh ips, I developed about ten key close relationsh ips w ith people
w ho made up the ® rst circle and w hom I refer to as key participants. The
second circle w as made up of twenty or more people w ith w hom I had reg ular
relations . The data in this paper w as draw n from the ® rst circle of participants.
The data varied from formal and recorded intervie w s and discussions, to brie f
comments people made regard ing w hat w as going on in the region at that
time . Speci® cally, I w as in teres ted in the w ay people spoke about the political
con¯ ict that eng ulfed Kw aZulu/N atal durin g this period and especially how
they situated them selve s in the con¯ ict. In this reg ard, I w as interested in
statemen ts that indexe d or displayed the iden tity of eithe r speake r or others
she /he knew . In addition to stateme nts of iden tity, I observe d everyd ay
practices of the key informants, and of other people close to them . In these
observ ations, I looked speci® cally at behaviour, particularly practices of lan-
guage use and how these positione d people w ithin the categories Zulu,
Ink atha, or A N C w hose meaning s are explaine d in the follow ing section. I also
looked at social/cultural practices, and again the m anner these positione d
people w ithin the three categories of Zulu, Inkatha and A N C. In most of these
observ ations, I asked people w ho were inv olved in these practices to clarify
w hy they were involved in them how such practices positioned them in the
then ongoing strugg le. In addition, I observe d public political activities ,
speci® cally those of the A N C , w hich he lped to inform me of the contradictions
between w hat people said they did and their actual practices.
The re is a vast amount of literature that analyses Zulu history, particularly
the history of Shaka and the Zulu kingd om (see for example, M arks and
A tmore, 1980; M arks and Rathbone, 1982; and Guy, 1979, 1980). Recen tly, some
research and ide as have even led to a revision of the M fecane story, and thus
also of the relative `gre atness’ of Shaka (see, for example, C obbing 1993). The se
resources are im portant for a conceptualisation of some of the historical issues
addres sed in this paper. Given space lim itations, however, I have decided to
focus m ore on the contemporary situation than the historical background to the
events discusse d here. In cases w here Zulu history is discusse d, I have relie d
upon my ow n know led ge of this history w hich I learnt in a varie ty of w ays and
from a variety of sources w hile grow ing up in Zulu society. Sim ilarly , discus-
sions about Zulu social and cultural practices, as well as practices of political
partie s stem from m y ow n experie nces and observ ation before, durin g and
after data collection. The discussion in this paper is designe d to stand as an
illustration, as opposed to a model, of cultural res istance and group
iden ti® cation in changin g political societies. I am lim ited here to a com parison
w ithin a few tow nsh ips in South Africa. W hile broader genera lisations require
broader bases of com parison, I hope that the framew ork I provide m ight be
useful for future unde rtakings on youth, culture, and iden tity construction in
South Africa and else w here.
Ethnicity and the Politics of Ide ntity in K w aZ ulu/N atal

I see ethn icity in Kw aZulu/N atal as a boundary phe nomen on constructed
w ithin speci® c and competing discursive sites and w ith com peting and
Eth nic Identities in K w aZ ulu N atal 475
con¯ icting practices. O ne site w here the ethnic bound ary is constructed is
w ithin the political arena, w he re, as Bell (1975) has noted, ethn icity is now a
central factor in the consolid ation of groups for strategic purposes. Since ethn ic
groups are both expressive and instrumen tal, the ethnicity in Kw aZulu/N atal
has to be unde rstood as one used to consolid ate people in relation to certain
political af® liations, at the same time allow ing such consolid ation to be ex-
pres sed not just in political term s but in lifestyles and in everyd ay social
practices. The latter are the second site w here the ethnic boundary gets
constructed. The refore, the signi® cance of ethn icity in this reg ion, and that of
the boundary that safeguard s it, is both historic and contem porary, w ith the
latter ¯ ow ing from the kind s of political and social change s that are taking
place. A s a result, ethnicity has come to be the focus of group ide ntity,
m obilisation and action.
The nature of the ethnic boundary in Kw aZulu/N atal has alw ays been
constituted of a multiply of m arkers including history, lang uage and culture
and birthp lace. But, like all other boundarie s and the ethn ic marke rs that they
safeguard , this bound ary has tw o side s to it, and the w ay it is de® ne d on the
one side m ay be different from the w ay it is de® ne d on the other. Each group
selects a differentiating feature. M oreover, even w ithin the bound ary, compet-
in g notions of how that boundary migh t be understood and w hat it means
exist. For ins tance, the history of the political consolidation of the Zulu
kingd om under Shaka is one that is full of complexities and am biguities that
in dividuals w ho w ant to use history as a differen tiating feature have to deal
w ith. First, w ithin the Zulu group, there are groups that were actually con-
quered by the Zulu under Shaka and were then consolid ated into the Zulu
Kin gd om. Curren tly, the Zulu people are prese nted by the state, the
Zulu monarchy, and some African nationalist leaders as a uni® ed group,
w hich, in itself, suppresses or ign ores the prese ntation of the history of other
groups in Kw aZulu/N atal (and else w he re) w ho were dominated and de-
stroyed by the Zulu w arriors. W hat this means is that history as a differen tiat-
in g marke r is complex. As Barth (1969) points out, group boundarie s are
constructed and at the same time mysti® ed. This paper, then, is an examination
of w ays in w hich youth dealt w ith the complexity of this ethn ic boundary, as
well as a demonstration of how ethnic iden tities are not static but change over
time , depend ing on political and other conse quen ces.
Zulu iden tity in Kw aZulu/N atal centre d around four criteria of
iden ti® cation: birthp lace, desce nt, lang uage , and history. In addition to these
criteria , w hat I w ill call `conven tionalised ’ w ays of ide nti® cation, the familiar
and understood w ays of behaviour, existed . C onvention al w ays of being
in cluded the practice of hloniph a (literally, to respe ct) and of ukuk honza (literally ,
to w orsh ip) w hich are customarily associated w ith Zulu people. Operating
along side, and often in con¯ ict w ith, these Zulu cultural practices were those
commonly associated w ith western m odernisation and industrialisation. The
association of ind ustrialisation w ith the urban sectors of the com munity, and
w ith modern ity and economic progre ss, resulted in Zulu cultural practices to
be associated w ith the rural areas, poverty and backw ard ness, creating a
rural-urban or modern -backw ard dichotomy, w hich added com plexity to an
already diverse setting . M oreover, the four criteria of iden ti® cation, practices
associated w ith industrialisation and weste rn m odern ity, and the Zulu cultural
practices were given meaning in and by practices in form al politics, w hich in
turn created dif® culty for individ uals to eng age in eithe r set of practices
w ithout assuming or being lin ke d to existin g political organisations .
In addition, we kn ow that the social iden tity bestowed on differen t racial
groups in South Africa by the N ationalist govern men t, w hich captured state
power in 1948, w as not acceptable to those groups. The N ationalis t Party
govern ment’ s philosophy of apartheid w as prem ise d upon the nationalist belief
that racial, lin guistic, and cultural differen ces sh ould be fund amental organis-
in g principles in society. According to aparthe id, different types of people
should be ke pt separate. Each `group’ sh ould have its ow n national territory
and infrastructure including schools, governm en t, media, and cultural bodies.
A partheid policy divide d South Africa into ten black `nations’ and three
non-black nations. In sh ort, sin ce w hite s constituted a m inority of South
A frica’s population, the m ost effective w ay to rule w as to prevent the 75%
black-African population from cohering into a uni® ed group. A ke y means of
achievin g this w as an active state-controlled and sponsored encouragem en t
of A frican tribalis m in South A frica. Thus, the focal characteristic of aparthe id
w as the creation of trib al political `Bantustans’ , later know n as homelands, each
tied to a separate black `nation’ w ith its ow n lang uage and bureaucratic
structure. A ll this w as met w ith resistan ce from black political groups, and
although the structures of aparthe id were impleme nted, their implem en tation
w as not a sm ooth process (for details on black res istance to apartheid , see for
example, Dlam ini, 1996).
In the early stage s of the struggle for sociopolitical inde penden ce, it w as
possible to de® ne the strugg le as one of blacks agains t w hites, and to ign ore,
to a large extent, w hat being black actually meant. A s the strugg le intensi® ed,
and as it became important to de® ne the character of the post-apartheid state,
the groups that m obilise d for action were draw n from a different grid . W ith the
w hites in the backgroun d, fuellin g divisions between anti-apartheid groups
w ith the hope of prolonging the life of aparthe id, the struggle focussed on
con¯ ict between Zulu and Xh osa people, or between the African N ational
C ongre ss (A N C) and Ink atha. But w ho exactly w as inv olved in this con¯ ict,
and w hat were the criteria used to iden tify them ?
Sim plistically, it could be said that the con¯ ict w as between A N C and
Ink atha supporters, the tw o leading political parties in the reg ion, and in volved
youths w ho were believe d to m ake up the majority of A N C followers in
Kw aZulu/N atal, and adults, w ho, it w as believed, constituted the majority of
Ink atha membersh ip. The A N C and Inkatha differed in the strategie s they
employed to ® ght against w hite domination. This difference in strategies
became increasingly articulated in the last stages of apartheid and , there fore, in
de® ning the character of a post-aparthe id state. To the A N C , a post-apartheid
state meant a South A frica that realise d equality for all groups, a `non-racial’
democratic state. Ink atha, however, en visione d a post-apartheid state or-
ganised according to ethn ic constituen cies, accommodating group righ ts and
group vetoes. For Inkatha, a post-apartheid state organise d around ethn ic
constituen cies ensured that the Zulus maintaine d control over the resources
that they were allocated unde r the aparthe id state through the Kw aZulu
homeland. As Lowe (1991, p. 81) notes: `big capitalists and the state even now
rew ard Inkatha’s aspirant accumulators for their pro-capitalis t stance w ith
access to capital and join t investm en t schemes; ethn o-regionalis m w ould also
allow Inkatha’ s chiefs to retain their ne o-traditional authoritarian powers and
means of accumulation’.
To the AN C , however, such a state w ould be a duplication of aparthe id
methods of governin g w hich w ould divide people into racial/ethnic groups.
To m obilise in the region, therefore, the AN C had to convince the Zulus that
their righ ts both as Zulus and as South A fricans w ould not be eroded if it came
to power. Inkatha, on the other hand, went on a m iss ion to paint the A N C as
anti-Zulu, an agen t of the Xhos a ben t on the gen ocide of the Zulu. The con¯ ict
centred around differences between ethnic politics perpetuated by Ink atha, as
opposed to a pluralistic state politics of the A N C , in the struggle against
apartheid and for control over post-aparthe id South Africa. It is these differ-
ences that were playe d out in the politics of iden tity in Kw aZulu/N atal,
in ¯ uencing the w ays individuals positioned themselves politically /
ling uistically and ethn ically, and contributing to the form ation of the political
economic character of a post apartheid state. It w as in such political con¯ ict
that, I w ill argue, the activities of youths can be unde rstood as challen ging
normalise d w ays of being Ink atha, Zulu and AN C .
C rite ria for Ide ntifying Z ulu Ide ntity
H istory
There is a very com plex history of political consolidation unde r Shaka, the
great Zulu leader, w ho orchestrated armed resista nce to British colonialism in
the late 1800s, and the ex iste nce of the Zulu kin gd om w ith its successful and
contin ued resista nce to colonial domination. A s a res ult of this history , the
name and the house of Shaka and the term `Zulu kingd om ’ were historical
concepts that individ ual Africans, as well as A frican politicians , continued to
draw on as a w ay of constructing their ow n ide ntity and of de® ning and
legitim isin g their sociopolitical and economic strug gles. H owever, w ithin the
use of this historic resource, complexities and ambiguities emerge d that
in dividuals had to ne gotiate.
Initially, the AN C w as formed in 1912 as a political organisation looking
after the intere sts of all black South Africans, w hile Inkatha origin ated in the
1920s as a cultural movement takin g care of Zulu cultural inte rests that seem ed
to be depreciated by industrialisation and other socioeconomic change s of the
early twen tieth century. Although there w as no direct ne xus between these tw o
organisations, both used the sy mbols of the Zulu monarchy and its history in
legitim isin g their aims. The se organisations also drew on the same member-
ship, and had the same effect of ® ctionalisin g Kw aZulu/N atal w ithin Zulu
nationalist and class-b ased m ovemen ts. Later, begin nin g in the 1950s, the same
sym bols and histories used to construct the Kw aZulu nation gave form to a
ne w relation between the AN C and Inkatha, and were utilised by these

organisations in the strugg le against apartheid .
From the m id-1960s onw ards African nationalis t leaders focussed on gain-
in g state recognition for the Zulu monarchy and territo rial, political and
cultural rig hts for the Zulu people. The se nationalist leaders included C hief
Buthelezi, w hose leadership of the then Zulu C ultural M ovemen t, Inkatha, w as
problem atically recognised by both the South African state and liberatory
organisations such as the A N C. It w as to such nationalist leaders that the ide a
of the Kw aZulu homeland appeared attractive and w orth embracing. To
pursue and legitim ise the existe nce of Kw aZulu and their participation in it, it
became im portant for these leaders to presen t the Zulu people as a hom oge-
ne ous and well-de® ne d lin guistic and cultural group. To some extent, these
politicians viewed Kw aZulu as a strategy for the establish ment of democratic
political institutions to addres s the sociopolitical and economic nee ds of the
population in the region, w hich could not be done w ithin the larger South
A frican structures. But Kw aZulu w as to respond only to the political and
economic need s of the population, not to cultural reconstruction. To these
politicians, a speci® c Zulu iden tity, centrin g around the Zulu m onarchy and its
history, w as alre ady in place. The presen tation of Zulu history by these African
politicians w as, in itse lf, full of contradiction. The ® rst contradiction had to do
w ith the prese ntation of the Zulu people as a uni® ed group, w hich ign ored or
suppresse d the prese ntation of the history of other sub-groups in Kw aZulu/
N atal (and else w he re) that were dom inated and des troyed by the Zulu
w arriors . A second contradiction related to the issue of leadersh ip. W ere the
Zulu king and the Zulu royal house the legitim ate represen tatives of the Zulu
people, or were politicians and their organisations Ð some of w hom were
closely related to Zulu royalty Ð the leg itim ate leaders?
The inven tion of Kw aZulu added complexity in the use of this history by
political organisations. First, it resulted in the claim by the Kw aZulu authority
that they were the legitim ate òwners’ of this history. This, in turn, meant that
only those political partie s such as Ink atha, w hich supported and were sim ul-
taneously supported by Kw aZulu, had the leg itim ate righ t to use this history.
A second complexity arose w ith regard to ind ivid uals w ho saw them selve s as
in he ritors of this history but did not belong to the Kw aZulu supported political
organisations, nor to any other political organisation for that matter. Did this
mean that these individuals were no longer of Zulu herita ge? Since this history
w as also used to disting uish Zulus from non-Zulus, to w hich historical group
did such individ uals belong?
Language
In addition to history, language w as also high ly idealise d and controversial in

Kw aZulu/N atal. Ling uistic practices playe d a crucial role in the social and
political organisation of the reg ion, as well as in strategies for the res tructurin g
of a post-aparthe id South A frica. To beg in w ith, Zulu is the native lang uage of
almost all black people in this region; that is, it is the lang uage spoken in their
homes and the ® rst learned during child hood. In this sense therefore,
Kw aZulu/N atal has relative lin guistic (and cultural) hom ogeneity. O w ing to
historical factors, particularly the history of the consolid ation of Southern
A frica under Shaka, Zulu is also a language of the broader Southern African
region, though it is associated paradoxically w ith a history of bravery and
resistan ce as well as a history of brutality. It is not surprisin g, there fore, that
m ost people w ho migrate to Kw aZulu/N atal often come w ith a certain
know ledge of the Zulu language and culture; however, they are viewed by
local Zulus as `not real Zulu’ , partly because of the w ay they speak the
lang uage and partly because of from w here they have m igrated.
The association of Zulu language w ith a history of bravery w as highly
controve rsial in the late 1980s and the beginn ing of the 1990s. This controve rsy
w as due to the fact that Inkatha had claimed ow nersh ip of Zulu sy mbolic
resources, including language , w hich then m ade it dif® cult for other organisa-
tions to use the sym bols in pursuing their aims. The use of Zulu lang uage (and
history), therefore, in particular situations, w as con¯ ated w ith Inkatha politics,
resulting in those w ho used Zulu in particular public spaces being labelled
Ink atha members. Such an interpretation in the use of Zulu w as legitim ate if
applied to areas w he re the Zulu language w as not dominant, but ins tead
operated alongside and in com petition w ith other languages. These were areas
such as the Transvaal province and other homeland s. In Kw aZulu/N atal,
however, the con¯ ict that existe d set Zulu speake rs against Zulu speake rs, and
yet each side attempted to discred it the other by projecting malevolen t pictures
of anothe r lin guistic group onto its Zulu brothers. Zulus aligned w ith the A N C
were calle d age nts of the Xhosas, and Zulus aligne d w ith Ink atha were seen as
age nts of apartheid . Take n together w ith other cultural materials, language
accent became important. Those w ho spoke Zulu w ith a slang dialect kn ow n
as `Tsotsitaal’ or `Johannes burg Zulu’ were suspected of being supporters of
the A N C , w here as those w ho spoke Zulu w ith a `deep’ or `rural’ Zulu accent
were marke d as Inkatha. In differen t provinces like the Transvaal, people
sim ply reverted to other languages beside s Zulu to avoid being labelled
Ink atha. For A N C oriented even ts, English, as we w ill see , had long been the
lang uage of politics. The use of En glish then became an AN C idiom , carried
across the country even w he re speake rs were ling uistically hom ogene ous.
Behin d this action w as the AN C desire to stay away from ethnic term s; that is
from referrin g to groups of people as Zulus, Xh osas, Tsw anas and so on, but
rather referrin g to all groups as South A fricans.
Another interpretation of the use of the Zulu language comes from its
association w ith illitera cy and ign orance. This interpretation w as historic, and
a typical example of how British colonisation and a British education sy stem
impacted on language use. W ith colonialism , A frican language s were dow n-
graded, and the lang uage of the colonisin g country , Eng lish , became the
lang uage of commerce, education and an instrumen t w ith w hich to measure
know ledge. In South Africa, English and A frik aans were the tw o of® cial
lang uages.
Each of these languages , however, occupied different position s in black
communities. In Kw aZulu/N atal, as in all other black areas, En glish w as the
lang uage of schooling, and from the point of view of the A N C and its af® liates,
of politics. Afrikaans . on the other hand , w as view ed as the language of

oppression , of the N ationalist Party govern ment w ith its m ost resen ted struc-
tures of apartheid . In this paper, by contrast, I argue that the dominant
perceptions about the use of these languages were not alw ays in tune w ith
in dividual practices, nor w ith w hat operated in groups in the tow nsh ips. For
example, the dominant (AN C ) notion that black studen ts hated the use and
study of Afrikaans w as in contradiction w ith the practices of the dominant
group of A N C studen ts in this study. These studen ts studied and used
A frikaans because it provided them w ith altern ative places of employme nt.
M ore importantly, these students saw A frik aans as a potential lang uage w ith
w hich to ® gh t intern ational lin guistic domination, and argued that other
countrie s w ould be m ore inclined to learn A frikaans than an A frican language
such as Zulu for comm unicating w ith South Africa, sin ce these countries
conside red A frik aans a w hite language , and, therefore , a lang uage of power.
M oreover, they argued that sin ce Afrikaans is ìndigen ous’ to South Africa, `we
w ould be the only ones to tell the w orld w hat is w rong or correct A frik aans,
w hils t w ith English, the Britis h are the ones w ho set the standard ’ . It is w orth
noting that this inte resting and new view point w as not well received by those
people still intereste d in the A N C ’s version of students ’ attitude tow ards
A frikaans. Durin g the data collection period , I w as invited by the ling uistic
departme nt of the University of N atal, Durban campus, to speak about my
research and the kin ds of data I w as ge tting from the tow nsh ips. W he n I spoke
about this view point, some w hite professors expresse d disbelief, and de-
m anded to know the names of the schools these students attended , because, as
they stated, they themselves had been conducting resea rch in tow nsh ip schools
for a number of ye ars, but had neve r receive d such response s. It is perhaps my
ow n position as an ìnside r’ that is to be credited for the nature of data this
paper prese nts. But it is most likely that the sociopolitical change s that were
takin g place in these tow nsh ips and in South A frica as a w hole were, to borrow
from Gal (1988), mirrore d in the view s that people had about lang uage and
also in patterns of lang uage use. To w hat degree these view s were `realistic’ , as
some of these professors righ tly pointe d out, is beyond the scope of this paper.
The politics of language and iden tity, there fore, can be understood to have
centred around the differen t and often contradictory position ing or valuing of
lang uages. Firs t, Zulu w as positione d as: (a) a `neutral’ local lang uage ;
(b) represen ting ethn ic, Inkatha politics; and (c) indicating ignorance and
illitera cy. Second, English w as positione d as: (a) colonial; (b) `neutral’; and
(c) a language of politics and education. Third , A frik aans w as positione d as:
(a) aparthe id; and (b) an instru ment for accessin g econom ic resources. The
m ultiple ling uistic practices of ind ivid uals were hallmarks of the formation of
their ide ntitie s w ithin this high ly ling uistically politicised region. The use of
lang uage then resulted in emergen t, rather than convention al, associations w ith
political organisations, and theref ore, individ uals rede® ne d their live s through
lang uage use.
As I w ill demonstrate in this paper, individ uals were not ready to give up
their ethnic ide ntities, irre spective of w hether or not they were AN C support-
ers. I argue that A N C Zulu youths were proud of their Zulu he ritage , despite
its association w ith Inkatha politics, and that their use of the Zulu language
w as in many w ays in contrast to the AN C political agen da of a non-racial
post-aparthe id state. This paper, theref ore, is an assertion of their lin guistic,
ethn ic/cultural Zulu autonomy, and is critical of the practices by political
organisations aime d at creating political and economic unity out of lin guistic,
ethn ic/racial disparity. The practices of the youth in this paper demonstrate
that Zulus in the AN C did not w ant to m ove aw ay from their Zulu cultural/
ethn ic ide ntity, and that lang uage and other cultural material were used not to
escape the label Zulu, but rather to af® rm it.
Birthplace and D escent
In its esse nce, this criterion require s one to have been born and raised in
Kw aZulu/N atal, or to have paren ts w ho were born there and had maintained
ties w ith the region in quite unde® ned w ays. Descen t refers to the manne r in
w hich in dividuals trace their ancestry to the region, even if they were not born
in Kw aZulu/N atal. For instance, it w as possible for ind ivid uals to use oral
history and ge t information that lin ked their ancestry to the reg ion of
Kw aZulu/N atal, and if they desired , to re-establish ties and even tually settle
w ith their tribes through the chiefs. People were , and are, able to trace their
Zulu ancestry because the tribes of Zulu-speake rs are mostly kn ow n by the
fam ily or clan names (izibong o) of their chiefs. A few exceptions may occur Ð
for example, am aN gw ane Ð w hich em brace the w hole tribe. Tribal names
consisting of izibong o do not ne cessarily re¯ ect the actual com position of the
tribes (just as the name Zulu did not and still does not re¯ ect the actual
composition of those people iden ti® ed as Zulu). For exam ple, w hile a tribe
m ight be know n as abakw aM panza (Mpanza’s people or M panza’ s des cendants)
there may be twen ty or ® fty differen t clan names (izibong o) represented w ithin
that tribe. W hat this actually means is that it w as Mpanza w ho at one stage
consolid ated that tribe and his descen dants, and w ho came to inherit the
leadership role. M panza, however, w ould be referred to as the `father’ of these
people and be used as proof of the profundity of these people’s (Zulu) ide ntity.
This w as basically the method used to categorise people. Furthermore, the
process of uk ukh onz a, `passing’ , allowed for people coming from other parts of
(southern ) A frica to take up Zulu iden tity through among other thin gs laying
claim to the clan name. Integrating into the clan did not res ult in the loss of
one’s isibong o, w hich largely re¯ ected the person ’ s place of origin and, often,
time of integration . In pre-colonial society, the process of being inte grated into
Zulu society and keep ing your isibong o (`si’ 5 singular; `zi’ 5 plural) did not
presen t a problem, as long as one participated in the cultural practices of that
clan and subsequen tly of the Zulu kingd om . This process of clan-tribal-
kingd om association w as maintaine d by colonial powers, and even though its
purposes and structures were signi® cantly changed it continues to date.
In addition to the know led ge of one’ s ancestry, ge nerally, Zulu child ren are
brought up w ith information about their desce nt, and the roles their ancestors
played in the Zulu w ars of conquest and strug gle agains t British colonialism .
Thus, phrases like uw uZulu Z u, uZ ulu w oqobo (you are Zulu Zu or you are a
real Zulu), are comm only used in Kw aZulu/N atal to de® ne those Zulu of
`historic’ origin from those w ho migrated into the area, especially after 1879.
Thus, those w ho can trace their ancestors to the period of the Zulu kingd om
acquire some high status (Zulu Zu) and, indee d, long des cent lines are used not
only to dem onstrate the profund ity of one’ s Zulu iden tity but also to disq ualify
others from claiming full Zulu iden tity.
Usin g the aforemen tione d criteria of ide nti® cation (history, lang uage , and
birth place/descent), the state, Inkatha and the A N C were able to construct and
formalise certain practices as Zulu, and by so doing, de® ne the Zulu people.
State De® nition
A t the begin nin g of the twentie th century, alternative pattern s of govern ment,
labour and economic distribution, and land occupation were establishe d and
were to be given extreme expression unde r aparthe id. A parthe id brought about
m assive population removals, racial separation, political exclusion, labour
exploitation and concom itant repression of the vast m ajority of the country ’s
people. Under aparthe id, a legal de® nition of Zulu w as constructed. The South
A frican N ationalist Party govern men t ins tituted a leg al structure that divide d
people along racial line s, and allocated these state-de® ne d groups resources
depending on the race to w hich they belonged . Of® cial segre gation under
apartheid also included ge opolitical areas, allocated along racial and ling uistic
line s. Kw aZulu w as one such geopolitical structure w ithin the apartheid state,
created as a home for those people de® ne d by the N ationalist Party govern -
men t lin guistically and racially /ethn ically as Zulu and theref ore as making up
a Zulu `nation’ . The leg al de® nition of Zulu at this time referred to those black
people w ho inh abited the reg ion of Kw aZulu/N atal and w hose ® rst language
w as Zulu.
Ink atha De® nition
The creation of Kw aZulu, however, added another dime ns ion to this state-
de® ne d `Zulu’ iden tity. It meant that being a black Zulu speaker and residen t
of Kw aZulu/N atal w as not enough for people to qualify as `Zulus’ in the
region. On top of these de® nin g criteria, people had to show alle giance to the
Kw aZulu `state’ and to Inkatha for them to be iden ti® ed as Zulus. Show ing
alle giance to Kw aZulu and Inkatha involved, inter alia, participating in Inkatha
political activities, as well as in Inkatha based /organise d cultural events such
as the celeb ration of Zulu ethn ic sym bols, including Shaka Day. This adde d
criterion of iden ti® cation w as an important one because it became a prerequi-
site for individuals w ho w anted to access those economic resources controlle d
by Kw aZulu homeland authority. The focus of Inkatha-de® ne d Zulu ide ntity
w as on a politicised ethnic nationalism.
A N C De® nition
O perating alongs ide this Ink atha de® ned and controlle d `Zulu’ iden tity w as the
A N C version of a `non-racial/ethn ic democratic’ South A frica. W ithin this

version, politicised ethnic nationalism w as view ed as dange rous, a threat to the
imagined non-racial South A frica. To the AN C , therefore , Zulu ethnicity
became constructed as an im agine d concept: a creation of Inkatha politics. Yet
the position that Zulu ethn icity w as im agined did not mean that it w as not
socially real. Durin g this time, ethnicity involved visib le local comm unities
based on sig nals of dialect, kins hip, status, relig ion and magical practices, and
the more powerful forces of in tim acy produced by fear of poverty and rural
isolation. Also, economically, three and a half decades of `separate develop-
men t’ had created ethnically -based netw orks of patronage and resource distri-
bution, of coercion and control that were not to disappear w ith the arriv al of
democracy. A more pressin g issue for the A N C , then, w as how to deal w ith the
issue of a politicised ethnicity in the face of an im agined non-racial comm unity,
w ithout the binding forces of ethnicity and lang uage .
C onvention alised Zulu Practices, U rb an C ultures and Form al Politics
Like the Zulu history and its sy mbols, Zulu cultural practices became valuable
resources for politicians to use in pursuing their goals. C ultural practices that
had previously been sh ared and unde rstood were re-exam ined , questione d and
given new meanin g. One such practice w as uk uh lonipha. In ge ne ral, ukuhlonipha
refers to any practice of respect, be it performative or lin guistic. M ost often,
ukuhlonipha applie s to situations w here verb al practices m ay shift from being
respectful to confrontational and argum en tative or to practices w here a young
person has to let a person older than he rself kn ow that she is w rong . U sually,
in Zulu household s, child ren are brough t up w ith a strong emphasis on
ukuhlonipha abadala (respect for adults) and on non -confrontational w ays of
disagreeing w ith adults.
It is, ® rst, im portant to note that in Zulu there is no distinction between the
concept of èlderlin ess’, such as in àn elder siste r’ (one year olde r than me),
and that of àdulthood’ , meaning a m ature ind ivid ual. Both are referre d to as
badala (adults). Thus, in Zulu, a six ye ar old is an adult to a ® ve-year-old, and
there fore an elem en t of respect is alw ays expected from the ® ve-year-old, even
in cases w here the six-year-old is w rong. If a conversation develops into an
argument, it is expected that w here tw o people of different age s are inv olved ,
the younger person w ill back off and the olde r person ’s statement w ill be the
last. Being the last to speak does not necessarily mean that the olde r person is
righ t, but is sim ply in terpreted as hlonipha. In fact, w hat normally happens
is that the younger person w ould rem ove herse lf from the scene, as a w ay of
demonstrating her disagree men t. Situations w here the younger person arg ues
w ith the adult are interprete d as disrespe ct (ukun gahloniphi), no m atter how
corre ct the younge r person m ight be.
Political organisations were at the forefront in de® nin g that w hich w as Zulu
culture, how it had to be practised and by w hom. For example, questions were
asked w ith regard to how and to w hom the conventional Zulu practice of
ukuhlonipha applied , and, m ore importantly, w hat happened to those w ho
refused to em brace this practice. Interpre tations and applications of this prac-
tice varie d in form al politics as well as in interpersonal politics.
W ith regard to formal politics, Inkatha w as at the forefront in the practices
that legitim ise d and convention alised the rede® nition of ukuh loniph a. To
Ink atha, uk uh lonipha w as a culture that had to be observe d by youths w ith
regard to elde rly people as well as people in position s of power. The structure
of Inkatha w as such that people in positions of pow er were m ainly chiefs and
their electives. The se were the people view ed by Inkatha as dese rving of
hlonipha, and w hose view s, as according to hlonip ha, could not be openly
challe nged by any subordinates, w hether they were subordinate in term s of age
or status. A lso, as stated earlier, Inkatha had alw ays m aintained a negotiation
approach in dealing w ith the apartheid govern ment, and viewed the leadership
of the org anisation as the mouthpiece for such ne gotiations. This leadership
w as also above challen ge s, and those w ho openly questione d it were rem inded
of this Zulu practice. Bes ide s Inkatha’ s stance on respect for authority , in
genera l, Inkatha, as in uk uh lonipha, privilege d the view s of elderly people over
those of the young, such that very often the people w ho were in its top
leadership came from any w he re but the youth brig ade. In a nutshe ll, to
Ink atha, the practice of hlonipha applied to youths ® rst, w ho were subordinates
m ainly because of age , and then to those w ho did not have any status w ithin
its structures. Those people were to follow and not question w hat Inkatha
planned , such as celebrating Shaka Day at design ated Inkatha spaces. Those
w ho questione d the structuring of Shaka D ay celeb rations around Inkatha’ s
activities (m ainly because they had other ide as about how and w here to
celebrate) were often told that they were not Zulu because they had questioned
authority. They did not have hlonipha.
Inkatha’ s inte rpre tation of ukuh lonipha w as in contradiction to the teachings
and the practices of the United Democratic Fron t (UD F), and later the AN C .
There is a particular history here: U DF strategies of the 1980s focusse d on acts
of de® ance against the aparthe id state and its structures, including Kw aZulu.
It is also important to remem ber that because of the strategies of de® ance and
ungovernability , the UDF w as able to nurture the militant interests of the
youth. For example, the UD F prom oted situations w he reb y youths were
actively inv olved in destroyin g governm en t property, stopping people w ho
in sisted on goin g to w ork durin g U DF/C ongres s of South A frican Trade
U nion s (COSA TU) w orke rs’ strikes , and many others. In instances w he re
youths stopped w orke rs from goin g to w ork, m any of the people stopped were
in fact adults, w ho, because of their age, dese rved inhlonipho. Those youths w ho
forced adults out of their cars and back to their homes were often told by these
adults ànisahloniphi’ [you no longer respect (adults)]. The UDF’s strategies of
de® ance were interpreted by Inkatha to mean that those youths w ho were in
de® ance against Inkatha were not only challen gin g its practices, but Zulu
culture itself, w hich meant that these youths were no longer Zulu in practice.
The result of these differen ces in political practices w as that those w ho did
hlonipha were associated w ith Inkatha, and those w ho did not hlonipha, but
in stead challen ged and questione d authority and adults in genera l, were
associated w ith the UD F. C onsequen tly, since Zulu culture prim arily took
meaning in Ink atha practices, those w ho embraced them were labelle d Zulu
and there fore Inkatha, and those w ho did not were though t of as UDF/A N C
and not Zulu.
Along side Zulu cultural practices existed practices that were associated
w ith urb anisation and industrialisation, practices that took form as a result
of ne w economic and social conditions. W hat w as important though w as
not necessarily just any every day practices, but the w ays in w hich
urban practices were evaluated against Zulu cultural practices, and were
sim ultane ously associated w ith political organisations. For example,
ukung ahlonip hi, to disres pect, w as basically view ed as an urb an practice, not
ne cessarily because this didn’t happen in the rural areas, but mainly
because disrespectful practices were nourished during the U DF era, w hose
m ain base w as the tow nsh ips. The U DF strategies of challe ngin g authority
developed into a discourse w he re youths questioned and verbally confronted
not just authority ® gures such as teachers and politicians but also ordin ary
adults in the streets. The latter actions were in opposition to the Zulu practice
of uk uh lonipha.
I have already pointe d out that, to Ink atha, youths w ho en gage d in the UD F
strategies of de® ance against the apartheid state and its structures, and w ho
actively destroye d govern men t property and forced adults out of their cars in
attempts to prevent them from going to w ork durin g strike s, were though t to
be disre spectful. Other ge ne ral practices of disre spect included the use of
lang uage, and the manne r in w hich these uses were conne cted to the practices
of political organisations. For example, the use of Tsotsitaal and not Zulu w as
conside red disrespectful. Tsotsitaal w as associated w ith the urban areas mainly
because it is an urb an inven tion, used only by those w ho align themselves w ith
the urban centres. It is often claimed that in practice Tsotsitaal is a language
that is usually used to m ark off those considered to be urb an from those
conside red to be rural. The associations of Tsotsitaal are ne verthele ss w ider
than this sim plistic description since they are tied up w ith age , gen der,
ne tw ork , and in-group lang uage practices. That is, Tsotsitaal is mainly used by
young men w ho see them selve s as belong ing to the same social group. It is
uncomm on for Tsotsitaal to be used in a conversation w ith adults, this is
conside red to be a rude practice. Basically, the use of Tsotsitaal in the prese nce
of adults is conside red to mean that the speake rs view them selve s as more
urban and therefore better than the (rural) non-Tsotsitaal speaker. Durin g this
era, however, the use of Tsotsitaal also came to be associated w ith non-Zulu
speakers. In other w ords, the use of Tsotsitaal w as take n to mean that the
speakers did not kn ow Zulu, were not Zulus, and therefore were most likely
not to be Ink atha but AN C .
Given this complex interconnection between the òf® cial’ policies
and histories that underline d w ho the Zulu people w ere and continue to
be, how were these boundarie s that sign i® ed and de® ned social
iden tities m anage d, trans cended or ne gotiated? In the follow ing section
I use youth groups to illus trate the ambiguous and complex nature of Zulu
iden tity.
Y ou th, Ide ntity and Politics
Tsatsatsa
The name tsatsatsa w as inven ted by the youths because the name sounded
`cool’, and different from any other group names they w ere aw are of, including
am asinyora or am am pansula, w hich were also inven ted names, but ones that
used the Zulu in¯ ectional af® xes. For example, the Zulu af® x `nyo’ (as in
am asinyora) is mainly used to construct names that have associations w ith
snake -like-beh aviour. Theref ore the name sinyora illum inates the nature of the
practices of this group. The name tsatsatsa, on the other hand, does not indicate
any sem antic relation nor any grammatical information about the group itself.
In fact, I w as told that, for a long time, tsatsatsa had to explain this term to those
w ho he ard it but failed to determ ine or guess its meaning on the basis of any
of the languages they kne w .
In this paper, I use tsatsatsa to ind icate a sin gle group culture, and use
m atsatsatsa to refer to the individuals w ho m ade up the group. `M atsatsatsa’ is
actually the term that group mem bers use to refer to them selve s. O thers
referre d to them as well by this term . I suspect that the use of `m a’ to pre® x
tsatsatsa w as borrowed from the Zulu w ay of referrin g to groups of people. For
example, in Zulu, you do not talk about the Zulus, Sw azis or Ven das to
in dicate plurality of the people w ho m ake up these groups, but rather talk of
am aZ ulu, am aSw azi and am aVend a res pectively. But it is com mon to ® nd in the
w ritten form an `s’, sim ilar to Eng lish , used to indicate plurality. A lso, the use
of `m a’ to ind icate the `groupness’ of people seem s to sugge st an absen ce of a
singular state of being . I say this because `m a’ as a plural pre® x is used only
w ith uncountable nouns such as am anzi, w ater, am asi, yogh urt, am a® nyila,
m ucus, etc (a 5 the). Thus, it is possible that they used `m a’-tsatsatsa sim ply
follow ing the Zulu w ay of referring to a group of people.
Tsatsatsa are comprise d of groups of boys and girls w hose live s were
affected by the U DF/Ink atha con¯ ict w hich had erupted into violen ce by 1985.
M any of these individuals had lost their familie s and frien ds during this era,
and were living w ith relatives. The members of the tsatsatsa group w ho
participated in this study, at one stage had been in volved w ith the U DF and
some had been at the forefront in organising UDF activities. At the time of the
study, however, these tsatsatsa participants were now mem bers or supporters
of the AN C , m ainly because the UDF had disbanded. It does appear, however,
that before the U DF disb anded, some tsatsatsa participants had left the UD F
m ainly because they did not agree w ith some of its vigila nte practices. The
unbann ing of the AN C in 1990 rescued those ind ivid uals w ho were alre ady
critical of some of the UD F practices but had no other political parties w ith
w hom to associate themselves. (I am not sure and w hether I could say that the
formation of tsatsatsa served the political `vacuum’ that individ uals experie nced
after leaving the U DF, but before join ing the A N C , since it w as still in exile).
D urin g the U DF era, m ost tsatsatsa participants had changed schools during
their secondary education, and some had even dropped out of school for a
number of years but later decided to go back. All tsatsatsa participants had a
strong com mitmen t to ® nish ing high school and to going into post-secondary
education. There fore, comin g from broke n familie s, participation in party

politics, and a strong com mitmen t tow ard s education are but three of the
features that characterise d m atsatsatsa.
Tsatsatsa: Gene ral Social and Political Practices
Genera lly speaking, tsatsatsa social practices are most often compared w ith and
in dee d unde rstood in relation to the social practices of m am pansula. (Like w ith
the tsatsatsa and m atsatsatsa, I use m pansula to refer to the group culture, and
m am pansula to refer to the members w ho form ed the group.) M pansula is a long
establis he d culture that dates back to the 1970s, w hile tsatsatsa culture is still
emerg ing, dating to the begin nin g of the 1990s. In fact, it is safe to state that at
the time of the study, to be m pansula w as some how outdated and w as
conside red by m atsatsatsa to be old-fash ione d. M pansula presen ted a version of
w hat it meant to be a black youth in the 1970s, but this version has been
challe nged by other groups such as tsatsatsa, and no longe r en joys the status it
had in the 1970s.
The disting uish ing characteristics between m am pansula and m atsatsatsa cen-
tre around political ideologies that govern the groups’ w ays of socialising and
of doing (or not doing) politics. The govern ing philosophy of tsatsatsa is that of
the AN C , w hich puts emphasis on the integration of all races and their cultures
as a w ay of resolving or dealing w ith the change s in society. This philosophy
in ¯ uences the sociocultural practices of m atsatsatsa w hich include, for example,
physical appearance, w ays of spend ing free time, and so on. M atsatsatsa are
said to lis ten to w hat is know n as cool m usic such as jazz and some pop, keep
their hair sh ort, and en gage in w hat are considered by many people in the
tow nsh ips as unusual recreational activities such as m odellin g and weight
lifting . Such practices indicate a desire on the part of tsatsatsa to surpass racial
categories w hich manifeste d them selve s even in activities such as sports.
M oreover, tsatsatsa recreational activities are marked by the prese nce of other
races, particularly the prese nce of w hite people. This in itse lf is sym bolic of the
A N C ide ology of cultural integration and `non-racialism ’. A lso, m atsatsatsa are
very careful about their physical appearance, especially the w ay they dress up,
and en sure that it is acceptable to society. In fact, m atsatsatsa are usually
dressed in w hat is considered fashion able at the time, and theref ore, as one
tsatsatsa stated, are seen to adapt to m odern times.
The philosophy of m am pansula, on the other hand , is that of `black
consciousness ’ based on Steve Biko’ s teachings of the 1970s. O f these teachin gs,
m am pansula em phasise the rev italis ation of black history and cultures as a w ay
of dealing w ith changes in society. Basically , m pansula is premise d on a belief
that traditional African practices of pre-capitalism and pre-colonisation are the
answer to existing social problem s. Pre-colonial practices are viewed as
communal in orien tation; that is, there is a belie f that in pre-colonial com muni-
ties A fricans were economically dependent on each other, and sh ared most of
w hat they had. M am pansula arg ue that the revitalisation of these practices w ill
in stil in the youths a sen se of pride reg arding themselve s and their history.
W ho they are is portrayed in practices such as dres s and talk. M am pansula
listen to `Rasta’ (reg gae) m usic, for example, and grow dreadlocks because such
practices are de® ne d as black culture. There is also an element of struggle and
de® ance agains t certain kinds of state-controlle d social practices found among
m pansula. For exam ple, the state practice to control w ho and how marijuana is
used is not accepted by m pansula, w ho argue that pre-colonial societies ow ned
and used `dagga’ (marijuana) and viewed it as a he alin g rather than as a
poisonous grass. It is com mon to ® nd groups of m pansula youths sitting and
smokin g dagga, partly as an act of de® ance against the state, and partly as a
social habit. Another characteristic that distin guishes m pansula from tsatsatsa is
social space. W hile it is comm on to ® nd m atsatsatsa in predominantly w hite
social spaces forming social relations w ith people of differen t races, and to ® nd
them involved in w hite-orien ted leisu re activities such as w eigh t liftin g, m am -
pansula social practices are pred om inantly black. That is, m am pansula do not
socialise across races and avoid those social spaces w here w hites dominate.
In a nutshell, the differences between m pansula and tsatsatsa are black space
vis-aÁ -vis pluralism ; w ays of retrea ting from dom inant (w hite-de ® ne d) society,
vis-aÁ -vis w ays of enterin g mains tream society. It is im portant to note further
that the dichotom y between these tw o groups is not necessarily the past versu s
the presen t, but rather tw o differen t stances tow ard s the prese nt. For instance,
in many cases w hen I asked if, by sayin g that m atsatsatsa adapt to m odern
time s this meant that m am pansula do not, the resp onse I received from tsatsatsa
w as that they do, but not in any sign i® cant w ay. It is corre ct to conclude then
that the differen ces between the tw o are that, on the one hand, m am pansula
(re)prese nt one version of a non-rural, `hip’, sophisticated black person , w hich
gets ex pres sed in politics through the activities of the PAC (Pan African
C ongre ss) and the BC M (Black C onsciousne ss M oveme nt); w hile m atsatsatsa, on
the other hand , (re)presen t an altern ative w orld view of w hat it means to be a
black person (m ale or female), highly in¯ uenced by the A N C ide ology of
a non -racial South A frica. It is also im portant to note that it is com mon to be
m pansula or tsatsatsa w ithout ne cessarily belonging to the BC M or A N C . All
participants involved in this study were members of the AN C .
W hat further disting uishes tsatsatsa from other groups in the tow ns hips is
a strong sen se of purity: a desire to stay aw ay from all kin ds of criminal
activities. These criminal activities m ay be politically-m otivated, such as forc-
in g people to stay aw ay from w ork, or economically -oriented, like stealin g
food. To this extent, m atsatsatsa are sometimes referred to by their peers as
abang cwele (the holy ones). M ost tsatsatsa participants come from economically -
deprive d familie s. H owever, the majority try to assis t their families by getting
part-time jobs such as w orkin g as a packer in a departmen t store or w ork ing
as a car w ashe r in a garage . These economic practices are in m any w ays
connected to tsatsatsa w ays of socialisin g. Through w ork, tsatsatsa participants
are able to learn m ore about and some times participate in `w hite’ culture; to go,
for example, to places w here the young w hite boys, w ith w hom they w ork,
go. A boy named Lunga, for example, w orks as a packer at Pick `n Pay, one of
the large st food shops in the region . At the shop he made frien ds w ith one of
the supervisors, a w hite boy called N ick w ho is almost the same age as him
and also w orks-part time. A s Lung a and N ick got to kn ow more about each
other, Lunga learnt about an athletic club that N ick belonge d to. Lunga had
alw ays been intereste d in weigh t-lifting, but had never been able to do it
because of the lack of sports centre s in the tow nsh ips. A fter makin g his intere st
know n, N ick agreed to take Lunga to the club. (It is important to reme mber
he re that the late 1980s w as also a period in w hich the state attempted some
constitutional reform s. Am ong these reforms w as the openin g up of w hite -des-
ign ated areas to other races.) W hen Lung a became a member of the club, he
in troduced other tsatsatsa mem bers also inte reste d in weight-lifting .
That m atsatsatsa participate in w hite-de® ned social areas is not coinciden tal,
as m ight be sugge sted by Lung a’s case, but is in fact encourage d by m atsatsatsa.
M atsatsatsa encourage each other to establish friend ships w ith their w hite
co-worke rs, in orde r to ® nd out other possible areas of socialis ation. Sizwe, for
example, plays in a jazz band to w hich he w as introduced by a w hite
co-worke r. Thulile often help s her aunt (w ho is also her guardian) w ith some
of her duties in a w hite-ow ne d boutique on weeke nd s. Thulile does not ge t
paid by the ow ne r of the boutique but by he r aunt, since she is helpin g w ith
he r aunt’s duties. For this reason, Thulile does not have to w ork every
weeken d: going to the boutique is depen den t on the amount of housew ork she
has. The ow ne r of the boutique has a daugh ter (Zee) w ho w orks in sim ilar
conditions as Thulile : she is not an employee at the boutique and is not oblige d
to come to the sh op every weeke nd . Thulile men tione d this w hite teenager to
he r tsatsatsa frie nd s w ho immediately encourage d Thulile to establis h a frien d-
ship w ith her (w hich w as conse quen tly going to result in a possible frien dsh ip
w ith the w hole group). H owever, Thulile w as not intere sted in a frien dsh ip
w ith this girl, and had in fact turne d dow n an invitation to go to a lunch-hour
m usic concert w ith her. Thulile’ s frie nd s did not support he r decision and
reminde d her of how she had bene ® ted from their ow n frien dsh ips w ith w hite
co-worke rs (Thulile had auditione d for and even tually got a role in a w hite-
ow ne d play w hich performed at the Playh ouse, D urban’s most popular the-
atre). Finally, not being able to w ithstand the pressu re she received from her
frie nd s, Thulile became frien ds w ith Zee. Despite her perception of it as boring ,
Thulile has maintained her frie nd sh ip w ith Zee so as to keep smooth her
relations hip w ith tsatsatsa. Thulile is high ly depen den t on m atsatsatsa for
support, and talks of he r frien ds as her fam ily. To explain this depe nde ncy,
Thulile stated:
A ng ina m untu phela lam hlabeni ng aphandle kw abo. Bang abantu abayaziyo
im pilo yam i. U -anti uy asebenza futhi une zinto ezining i ezihlale zisenqo nd weni
yakhe. A ng ifuni uk um hlupha. I do not have any body, and these are my
friends w ho understa nd my life. I can talk and be w ith them at any time.
M y aunt is alw ays w orking . She has a lot of thing s on her m ind and I
don’ t w ant to w orry her.
M atsatsatsa do not participate in tow nsh ip events such as soccer, or w atchin g

m ovies in a comm unity hall, but rather they spen d their free time in the
ne w ly-opened (multiracial) am usement or recre ational places such as `The
W heel’ . The W heel is a huge casin o-like amusem en t place w ith movie theatres ,
restaurants , shops, and games. It is by far the large st of such places located at
the he art of Durb an, by the beach front, and aw ay from the tow ns hips. People
of all races come he re to spen d time, to meet w ith each other and just to hang
out, as most teen age rs do. Such places are very attractive to m atsatsatsa,
possibly because they provide opportunity for w ide r/inte rnational inte raction
and represe nt the dom inant society’s values.
The fact that m atsatsatsa distance them selve s from social activities of the
tow nsh ips is in part m otivated by the desire to stay clean or uncorrupted.
O ften, comm unity organised even ts ge t polluted and disrupted by crim inal and
political thugge ry. For example, some people attend local even ts in tow nsh ips
not because they are interes ted in soccer or a m ovie, but because they w ant to
hunt dow n political ene mies . Although soccer groups are supposed to be
ne utral, their existe nce make s it possible for people to disguise their agen das
and gain popularity as soccer players . As popular soccer players it then
becomes easy for these individuals to recruit for certain political organisations.
Even wedd ings and funerals are not im mune to politics. In a weddin g party,
for example, the host w ould en sure that she or he invites guests of the same
political orien tation as a w ay of avoiding confrontation.
Beside s the desire to stay clean or uncorrupted by political and criminal
eleme nts , m atsatsatsa are strong ly in ¯ uenced by the A N C vision of a non-racial
democratic South Africa, in w hich South Africans of all races w ill be able to
live together in harm ony. But this `non-racial’ vision comes w ith the bagg age
of elitism ; it means being able to participate in places w here w hites are, spaces
that are there fore conside red elitist. The fact that m atsatsatsa are intere sted in
weigh t-liftin g, for example, speaks to the des ire to improve their status, since
weigh t-liftin g, like golf and tenn is, is considere d a w hite (and by implication),
elitist sport. M atsatsatsa w ould rather travel a half hour distance to lift weigh ts
than jog around the tow ns hip as other residen ts m ight do. This is desp ite the
fact that jogging is conside red a safe activity in the tow ns hips , especially since
people do it in groups. Some people are even know n for belon gin g to iden ti® ed
jogging groups. A sking one non-tsatsatsa participant w hy he though t tsatsatsa
do not like joggin g, he said `Bacabanga ukuthi yinto yoZ ulu, buk a bangenza ng isho
eyabo i club’ [They think it’ s a Zulu thing (meaning `backw ard ’). Look, they can
even start their ow n (tsatsatsa) jogging club]. It is safe, theref ore, to say that on
the one hand tsatsatsa are iden ti® ed as a group of individ uals sym bolisin g
`purity’ : models of how one can live a respectable life in a period of total chaos,
of political and criminal thuggery. On the other hand, tsatsatsa (re)prese nt
elitism : an ide a of w hat blacks migh t be if given a chance to be like w hites.
Speci® c Re presenta tions/Statem entsabout Identity
In addition to w hat the tsatsatsa do, we can also conside r speci® c statemen ts
about the w ays that these youths view them selve s. These statemen ts illuminate
the manne r in w hich tsatsatsa viewed themselves in relation to Zulu ide ntity,
and also in relation to political activities in the tow nsh ip. To begin w ith,
tsatsatsa understood themselves as Zulu, and use Zulu history to de® ne and
legitim ise their practices as Zulu in the making .
For example, history as a criterio n w as used through the calling up of
historic names as illustrated by the follow ing exam ple. At the time of data
collection, the South A frican Congre ss of Teachers’ Union (SAC TU), an A N C
af® liate, calle d for a teachers’ strike to protest against salaries and ge neral w ork
conditions. At Umganga, the school w he re the tsatsatsa study participants
attende d, the ® rst week of protest w as characterised by, on the one hand,
students w ho were in the last level of high school and were concerned about
the time w ithout teachin g, and on the other hand , classe s w ith studen ts w ho
saw this as sort of a holiday, a break from teacher authority . Some classe s went
on as usual, because some teachers did not participate in this strike, eithe r
because they were Ink atha and therefore belonge d to a different teacher
organisation, or because they sim ply did not agree w ith the concept of strikes .
Studen ts w ho were in the last grade of high school took turns teaching each
other, and also ne gotiated, together w ith the prin cipal and w ith those teachers
w ho did not participate in the strike, to help them w ith some of the subjects.
In one of the conversations I had w ith m atsatsatsa they expres sed concern
about the strike and the w ay it w as going to hinder their ability to do well in
the ® nal examin ation. Prese nt in this convers ation were M uzi, Sizwe, Lunga,
Vukani, Thulile and me.
N ombuso: Sinip hethe kanjani lesiteleka? H ow is the strike affecting you?

Vukani: H ayi m ina ng ithi ziqhudelene N kom bose kababa. Kade sasiteleka
basibone kun gathi asiphili em akhand a. A ke bazabalaze nabo bezwe ukuthi
kunjani. I say let them ® gh t each other. We [students] have long been
struggling on our ow n and they (teachers) have been looking at us as
though we are crazy. Let them strugg le and feel how it is. [N kombose
kababa, literally , my father’s N kombose, is a name of a bird in a Zulu
legen dary story about a kind family w ho used to sh are even the last
of their dinne r w ith strangers. It is said that one day the family had
to go w ithout dinner w hen a bird ¯ ew in and dem onstrated its
magical powers and produced the m ost delic ious dish of am asi and
up huthu (a traditional dish made out of sour milk and corn ¯ our). The
family named the bird N kombose, and belie ved that the bird had been
sent by the god of harve st. The story goes on to relate how , because
of greed and evil deed s, the family lost this bird , and how it w as later
retrieve d because those w ho had comm itted the evil acts repented and
were therefore forgiven by the gods. Overall, the phrase N kom bose
kababa came to sym bolise life and survival. So in ge ne ral this phrase
is used to ind icate good intent, or the power of the gods, or the
relationsh ip between good and evil.]
Lunga: N om a kunjalo, yithi esizofa ekugcineni. Se ng ithi nje kung cono kulokhu
ng oba no m a ng ingafeyila, akungenxa yam i. Even if that’ s the case, we are
the ones w ho w ill even tually suffer. I some times console myself by
thinkin g that even if I fail this year, at least it w on’ t be my fault.
M uzi: M ina ng isovalw eni. N githi um a ng icabang a iM aths, kuthi m ang ikhale.
N gizibona kulonyaka ozayo ng iphinda iclass seng im dala kang aka. As for
me, I am in fear. W he ne ver I think of math, I feel like crying . I picture
myself repeating the same class ne xt ye ar, old as I am.
Sizwe: A w u m ina ngeke ingehlule. A ngihlulw a yinto engakh ulum i. N gim funge
uC etshw ayo avuke, ng izophasa lony aka. N ot me, I w on’ t fail math. I have
never been defeated by anyth ing that doesn’ t talk. [This is a Zulu
sayin g w hich expresses the power of individuals over non-linguistic
objects, or, precisely, over non-living thing s]. I sw ear in the name of
Cetshw ayo, I w ill pass this ye ar [literal translation is: Cetsh w ayo w ill
rise from the dead, if I do not pass this year].
Thulile: K usho ukuthi eyang ony aka odlule i-M aths yayino m lom o, yikho nje
w ayifeyila? D oes this mean that last ye ar’ s math could speak and that’ s
w hy you failed it?
We all laughe d
Sizwe: N g iyanibona nje nina nicabanga ukuthi ng iyadlala. N giw uzulu m ina ,
ang ihlulw a lutho. N om angingayifeilain m aths, kodw a ngizophasa lony aka. I
see. You thin k I am joking . I am Zulu, nothin g defeats me. Even if I
fail math, I w ill not fail [the entire exam ].
Sizwe’ s highligh ted statemen ts above indicate that to swear in the name of
Cetshw ayo is to vow to do the righ t, im possib le, heroic and valued thin g. Yet
the victory w on by the Zulu under Cetsh w ayo in 1879 w as short-live d as the
Britis h staged another battle of U lundi in w hich they claimed m ilitary victory
and ex iled Cetshw ayo. But tsatsatsa participants do not talk about this battle
because it is of no sign i® cance to them , and after all, as they rem inded me,
`leyom pi eyalelandela i-Sand lw ana yayekw a ng oba uZ ulu ethem bisw a izwe, hayi ng oba
ehluleka’ [the peace that followed Ulund i w as only attaine d by prom isin g the
Zulu people that they w ould retain possess ion of their land if they laid dow n
their arm s].
Tsatsatsa also spoke about their birthp laces to de® ne them selves as Zulu or
not Zulu. For example, in classroom discussions, tsatsatsa participants, w he n
directly asked if they are Zulu, unanim ously used the birth place to ide ntify
them selve s as Zulu. In the other informal discussions they shifte d tacitly to
other criteria of ide ntity or to a different ide ntity. In one of our classroom
discussion s about the Zulu language, I aske d the question : w hy is it that Zulu
people do not learn Sotho even w he n they w ork in places such as Johannes-
burg w he re Sotho is dominant? The discussion started in Englis h, but later
developed in Zulu. Vukani w as ® rst to respond to this question (this discussion
w as recorded and the Englis h language mistake s are those of the speakers):
Vukani: Zulus don’t w ant to learn it because they thin k they are big.
M uzi: N ot that they think, sibakhule vele. A sifuni ukuk hulum a nje ng am azizim -
bane . N ot that they think , we are real big. We don’t w ant to speak like
m azizim bane [a term that im plies that someone is not real hum an/is
anim al like ].
Some people in the class laugh.
Vukani: uy abona , abantu abafanana ni abaham be besh aya abantu ngezagila ngo
nithi bang am azizim bane . You see, it’s people like you w ho go around
beating people up w ith kn obke rrie s because you say they are m azizim -
bane .
N ombuso: A w usitshele Ze thu. A m aZulu ababizelani abantu ng am azizim bane .
Tell us Zeth u, w hy do Zulu people call non-Zulus am azizim bane [I
directed this question to he r because she w as among those w ho had
laughe d at M uzi’ s statement.]
Zeth u: Phedula M uzi. W uw e loqale lend aba yam azizim bane .Respond M uzi. You
are the one w ho started this w hole m azizim bane issue.
M uzi: (ecabanga) H ayi angazi. Y into nje yoZulu leyo. M ina abazali bam i
baqham uk a eSw azini. A ng izazi ezinye izinto zoZulu. (Though tfully ) I don’ t
really know . That’ s just some thin g that’s for Zulus. I don’ t kn ow because
my paren ts migrated from Sw aziland. So I don’ t kn ow such Zulu thing s.
[But M uzi, w ho is tsatsatsa, had earlie r ide nti® ed him self as Zulu because,
as he said, Ì speak Zulu’.]
N hlanh la: A w usho M bong i Zulu om khulu. Tell us M bongi, the (real) Zulu.
[Mbongi w as well kn ow n in the school because of his ability to recite the
praise songs of the Zulu kin gs from Shaka to the prese nt kin g. He became
popular during the school arts week w he re students chose projects to
prese nt to the entire school. In this class, the students had decided
to perform the Zulu drama ùk ufa kuk aSh aka’ (the death of Shaka) w hich
w as also part of their syllabus. M bongi had assumed the role of Shaka’ s
praise singer know n in Zulu as im bong i.]
M bongi: H ayi nam i ang izazi izinto zoZ ulu ng oba um aw am i ow aseM alaw i.K usho
uk uthi ng iw um Z ulu ng anx anye ngiw um M alaw i. N o, I do not know Zulu
things because my mother is M alaw ian. This means I am partly M alaw ian
and partly Zulu.
In earlier discussion s, some of these youths had iden ti® ed them selves as
Zulu because of their kn ow ledge of the Zulu language, even though some later
men tione d that at home they used a differen t lang uage , usually that of the
place of their paren ts’ orig in. Some were also kn ow n as Zulu because of their
beh aviour, such as M bongi, in the above example. H owever, in discussions that
were critical of Zulu social practices, these young people categorically refused
to be iden ti® ed as Zulu, and uttered statemen ts like: `my paren ts came from
Sw aziland’ or, `m y father is Zulu but my mother is M alaw ian, so that makes
me partly Zulu and partly M alaw ian’ , as indicated by the above exam ple. In
fact, at one stage of discussin g sy mbols in politics, the discussion ende d w ith
all participants having sy stem atically den ied their Zulu herita ge, a he ritage
that, in other contex ts, is the pride of most.
Another available criterion of ide nti® cation w as descent, and this criterion
m ade it possible for tsatsatsa to view them selve s not just as Zulu, but Zulu Zu
or Zulu of historic origin. For example, Lunga told us about how his gre at-
grandfather had participated in the w ars that led to the Zulu people taking
over control of the land around Bergv ille w hich borders Lesotho and South
A frica in the north east. He therefore conside red him self as Ìnz alo yam aqhawe’
[a product of he roes] because of his ancestors’ inv olvem en t in these w ars of
conquest. But like all other criteria, des cent also has its ow n com plexities. An
in teres ting case is that of the tsatsatsa-borde r study participant nicknamed

`N dabezitha’ [one of the w ords of praise and respe ct used to acknow ledge
loyalty to Zulu royalty]. This w as a name given to him by his classmates
because he had been in the habit of dem anding respect for him self as royalty
since his great-grand father w as Sibiya, w ho w as Shaka’ s chief ministe r.
Because the even ts that had res ulted in the nickname were actually hum orous,
`N dabezitha’ didn’t mind the nickn ame and, in fact, liked it so much that he
m arked all his school books The tha N DA BEZITH A Sibiya. He could easily
have refuted its use if he had not like d it.
In another session, we sh ared ideas about how other groups migh t feel
about the use of Zulu as a national language, especially in the lig ht of the
ongoin g Zulu-Xhosa con¯ ict w hich characterise d the Transvaal provin ce at that
time . Some participants stated that they had felt uncomfortable using Zulu in
the Transv aal because the lang uage sin gled them out as Zulus and theref ore
Ink atha, and m ade them open to attack by non-Zulu speake rs. `Why is this so?’
I asked .
Lunga: ang ithi uG atsha (Buthelezi) ufuna sonke sibew oZulu sithathe am aw isa
siyolw a na bantu bakithi uk uze sitsheng ise uk uth i singam aqhawe. It’ s all
because of Gatsh a w ho w ants us to be Zulu. He w ants us to take up
kn obkerries and go and ® ght our ow n brothers to sh ow that w e are
brave.
Sizwe: U thini N dabezitha? U thi ung akhulum a nje na bakini ebukhosini
bayiyeke lento? W hat do you say, N dabezitha. Do you think you can
approach your relative in royalty to stop this?
We all laughe d.
N dabezitha responde d by tellin g us that in actual fact he w as not

royalty:
N dabezitha: em peleni uk hokho [in reality my great-grandmother] came

from C ape Tow n, and m arried Sib iya ow ayeyi [w ho w as a] Bush man,
and w ayengeke abe ind una kaShaka [could not have been Shaka’s C hie f
min ister] because we all kn ow that the Zulu had minim um contact
w ith the Bush men.
W hat we also knew , but did not talk about, w as that many of Shaka’ s chief
m inisters and advisers were com moners w ho had come to the fore through
their exceptional m ilitary ability rather that through royal birth . It is also
in teres ting to note in this conversation N dabezitha’ s sh ift of ide ntity through
deny ing his Zulu desce nt, and also sh ifts in language use. Because of the
homogeneity of the reg ion, lang uage on its ow n did not alw ays play an
important role, but w as alw ays used in conjunction w ith other criteria.
Thus, the question remains: how w as it that a distin ction existed between
Zulu and non -Zulus if, depe nd ing on the situation, one could eithe r be a Zulu
of high status (Zulu Zu), or not Zulu at all, as demonstrated by N dabezitha?
C on clus ion
The above examples inform us about a number of things. The ® rst is that
tsatsatsa used history, birth place, lang uage, and desce nt as criteria for ide ntify -
in g them selve s as Zulu, and in fact, uttered stateme nts to this effect. The
second is that the situatedne ss of these statemen ts and criteria were dependent
on context, place and also involved in the conve rsations. In fact, from these
examples, it is clear that tsatsatsa used Zulu history and sym bols to ide ntify
them selve s, as well as to legitim ise some of their practices, such as dete rm i-
nation to pass an exam. In instances w he re Zulu practices were calle d into
question, tsatsatsa either den ied being Zulu or denie d being eng aged in these
practices. In sum, theref ore, the character of these youth groups, together w ith
their everyd ay practices, can be unde rstood to challe nge institutionalised
meanings of Zulu iden tity. Des pite the of® cial political attem pts to place people
in to ne at categories, the practices of youths in this paper indicate that iden tities
are complex sin ce they are constructed from everyd ay, chang ing and often
contradictory practices.
This paper posits questions about the uniform ity of cultures and practices
that constitute the ethnic boundary and the position each of these cultures, and
the individ uals w ho participate in them, occupy w ithin broader state institu-
tions. It is clear, for instance, that w hile the Zulu group w as considered by the
state and political organisations as a well-de ® ned homogene ous group,
the cultures of those w ho m ade up this group pointed otherw ise . At the same
time , it is clear that it w as institutionalised cultures of the Zulu, as de® ne d by
Ink atha, that had legitim acy in the eyes of the state w ith res pect to de® nin g
w ho the Zulu people actually are. It is also clear that youth cultures were not
viewed as part of the features that made up the Zulu nation and that youths,
in gene ral, occupied m argin al position s w ithin the state. Yet desp ite this
cultural margin ality youth were a strong force in de® ning the character of
post-aparthe id South Africa and of w ho the Zulu people are. Strong partici-
pation in political activities and in socio-cultural events made it dif® cult for the
state and political organisations to ignore w ays that youth w anted to be
de® ne d.
An interes ting source of rese arch, especially for education practitione rs is,
to investigate the w ays in w hich ethn ic bound ary shifts as dem onstrated by, for
example, N dabezitha, migh t impinge on the education of these youth. It is
clear, for example, that w hile these youths have kn ow led ge of and embrace
part of the history of the Zulu kin gd om, there exist moments w he rein they
have to disassociate them selve s from it. H ow , for instance, such m oments
m ight in ¯ uence classroom participation and critical pedagogies rem ains to be
uncovered . Similarly, give n the nature of educational constrain ts on and
concerns about youth practices, it w ould be interes ting to examine w hy , in the
face of the social and political uphe aval (that resulted in the murder of many
of the tsatsatsa parents and guard ians) some youth rem ain pure w hile others
become criminals.
The foregoing discussion impacts our understanding of collective ide ntity
and of the concept of nationalis m and liberation. Lookin g at the construction of

nations, Anderson sugge sts three paradoxes of nationalism:
[1] The objective modern ity of nations to the historian’ s eye vs their
subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists; [2] the formal unive rsality
of nationality as a socio-cultural concept Ð in the m odern w orld
everyone can, should, w ill `have’ a nationality, as he or she `has’ a
gen der; [3] the `political power of nationalism s vs their philosophical
poverty and even incohere nce. (1991, p. 5)
A nde rson captures the w ay in w hich the construction of nations has assumed
self-eviden tial proportions, and has lost its historicity. N ational iden tity, na-
tional alleg iance and nation have become central parts of everyd ay lives.
This paper posits questions about the myth of the nation and how it has
played a m ajor and sometimes positive role in liberation struggles . Liberation
m ovemen ts, such as those addresse d in this study, are very often dominated by
nationalist leaders w ho prem ise their practices prim arily on an unquestionable
nation as the unity of liberation. Assertions of other loyalties are often con-
side red disruptive and disloyal to the cause of liberation and unity. Indeed ,
liberation struggles, especially in A frica, have been framed in term s of the
nation, such that strugg les that thre aten the construction of a nation are seen
as random or contrary, biased and disruptive. They are viewed as not involv-
in g national loyalty and as addres sin g a construct other than that of the nation.
It is also common to ® nd these strugg les referred to as region al, that is, not
nation-w ide, and subversive or threatening the fund amental national spirit.
One of the issues raise d in this paper rem ains an inte resting source for
research centres in term s of represen tation in liberation struggles . At the ® rst
level of represe ntation, this paper has raised points for discussion about some
of the con¯ icts that result from the use of ethnicity to frame liberation
strugg les. In the South African struggle, for example, it is clear that part of the
con¯ ict w as a result of the failure to deal w ith the multiplicity of ethn icities that
m ade up this nation state, and the w ays in w hich each of these ethnic groups
viewed it as legitim ate to de® ne themselves in order to ® ght apartheid .
U nde rly ing question s rem ain about the position each of these ethn ic groups
occupied w ithin the broader South African state, and about the w ays in w hich
such position ing enh anced or lim ited a liberation struggle w hose foundation
w as an unquestionable black nation. This paper dem onstrates that issues of
diversity w ithin a nation state can no longe r be ignore d in liberation struggles.
Liberation movemen ts cannot continue to refer to these groups as rand om ,
disruptive and subvers ive. The se groups are, in fact, the core of liberation itself.
H ow and w hen liberation movemen ts w ill begin to deal positively w ith the
issue of nationalism and lack of uniformity in the face of ìmagined ’ liberated
nations remains to be see n.
S. N om buso D lam ini m ay be contacted at the D ep artm ent of Ling uistics, G .W . 15± 2 8,
U niversity of Pretoria, Pretoria 0001, South A frica.
R e fe re nce s
A nde rson , B. (1983) Im agine d C om m unities, London: Verso.

Barth , F. (1969) Ethnic G roup s and Bound aries, London: George O wen and
Unw in.
D lam ini, S. (1996) `Lang uage , Social Practices and the Politics of Iden tity in
South Africa’ , doctoral thesis, O ntario Institute for Studies in Education,
University of Toronto.
G al, S. (1988) `The Political Econom y of C ode C hoice’, in M . Heller (ed.)
Codesw itching: A nth ropolog ical and So ciolinguistic Perspectives, Berlin:
M ounton Gruyter.
G uy, J. (1979) The D estruction of the Zulu K ingdom : The C ivil W ar in Z ulula nd ,
1879± 1884, London: Longm an.
G uthrie , G . and S. H all (1987) Ìntrod uction’ , in H . Trueba, G. Guthrie and
K. Au (eds) C ulture and the Bilingua l C lassroom . Studies in C lassroom
Ethno graphy, Row ley: New bury H ouse.
Lowe, C . (1991) `Buthele zi, Inkatha and the Problem of Ethn ic N ationalism in
South A frica’ , in J. Brow n (ed.) H istory from South A frica: A lterna tive V isions
and Pe rspective, Philadelphia: Temple University Press .
M cAll, C . (1990) C lass, Ethnicity and So cial Ine quality, M ontre al and Kingston :
M cGill-Q ueen s U nive rsity Press.
O gbu, J. (1995) `Cultural Problem s in M inority Education: their Interpretations
and C onsequen ces Ð Part Tw o: C ase Studies’ , The U rban Review , 27 (4):
271± 97.

Dlamini, S. Nombuso - The Construction, Meaning and Negotiation of Ethnic Identities in KwaZulu Natal

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Dlamini, S. Nombuso - The Construction, Meaning and Negotiation of Ethnic Identities in KwaZulu Natal

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Social Identities, V olum e 4, N um ber 3, 1998

T he C on struc tion , M e a ning a n d N e gotia tion o f

Introduction and B ackgroun d

Ethnicity and the Politics of Ide ntity in K w aZ ulu/N atal

C rite ria for Ide ntifying Z ulu Ide ntity

ne w relation between the AN C and Inkatha, and were utilised by these

In addition to history, language w as also high ly idealise d and controversial in

of politics. Afrikaans . on the other hand , w as view ed as the language of

Birthplace and D escent

State De® nition

Ink atha De® nition

A N C version of a `non-racial/ethn ic democratic’ South A frica. W ithin this

C onvention alised Zulu Practices, U rb an C ultures and Form al Politics

Y ou th, Ide ntity and Politics

education. There fore, comin g from broke n familie s, participation in party

Tsatsatsa: Gene ral Social and Political Practices

M atsatsatsa do not participate in tow nsh ip events such as soccer, or w atchin g

Speci® c Re presenta tions/Statem entsabout Identity

N ombuso: Sinip hethe kanjani lesiteleka? H ow is the strike affecting you?

Some people in the class laugh.

in teres ting case is that of the tsatsatsa-borde r study participant nicknamed

N dabezitha responde d by tellin g us that in actual fact he w as not

N dabezitha: em peleni uk hokho [in reality my great-grandmother] came

and of the concept of nationalis m and liberation. Lookin g at the construction of

A nde rson , B. (1983) Im agine d C om m unities, London: Verso.

You might also like