A Call To Conscience - The Anti-Contra War Campaign

A CALL TO
CONSCIENCE
THE A NTI – CONTRA WAR C AM PAIG N
ROGER PEACE
VISIT…
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A Call to Conscience
a volume in the series
Culture, Politics, and the Cold War
Edited by Christian Appy
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James Peck, Washington’s China: The National Security World, the Cold War, and the Origins of Globalism
Edwin A. Martini, Invisible Enemies: The American War on Vietnam, 1975–2000
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Patrick Hagopian, The Vietnam War in American Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the Politics of Healing
Jeremy Kuzmarov, The Myth of the Addicted Army: Vietnam and the Modern War on Drugs
Robert Surbrug Jr., Beyond Vietnam: The Politics of Protest in Massachusetts, 1974–1990
Larry Grubbs, Secular Missionaries: Americans and African Development in the 1960s
Robert A. Jacobs, The Dragon’s Tail: Americans Face the Atomic Age
Andrew J. Falk, Upstaging the Cold War: American Dissent and Cultural Diplomacy, 1940–1960
Jerry Lembcke, Hanoi Jane: War, Sex, and Fantasies of Betrayal
Anna G. Creadick, Perfectly Average: The Pursuit of Normality in Postwar America
Kathleen Donohue, ed., Liberty and Justice for All? Rethinking Politics in Cold War America
Jeremy Kuzmarov, Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation Building in the American Century
The Anti–Contra War Campaign
Roger Peace
University of Massachusetts Press Amherst and Boston

Copyright ¹ 2012 by University of Massachusetts Press
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
LC 2012007997
ISBN 978-1-55849-932-4 (paper) ISBN 978-1-55849-931-7 (library cloth)
Designed by Sally Nichols

Set in Arno Pro
Printed and bound by Thomson-Shore, Inc.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Peace, Roger C. (Roger Craft), 1952–

A call to conscience : the anti/Contra War campaign / Roger Peace.
p. cm. — (Culture, politics, and the cold war)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-55849-932-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-1-55849-931-7 (library cloth : alk. paper)
1. Peace movements—United States—History—20th century. 2. Nicaragua—Politics and
government—1979–1990. 3. Contra Program (Central Intelligence Agency) 4. Solidarity—United
States—History—20th century. 5. Solidarity—Nicaragua—History—20th century. 6. United
States—Politics and government—1945–1989. 7. Christianity and politics—United States—
History—20th century. 8. Americans—Nicaragua—History—20th century. 9. Nicaragua—
Relations—United States. 10. United States—Relations—Nicaragua. I. Title. II. Title: Anti/
Contra War campaign.
JZ5584.U6P46 2012
327.730728509′04–dc23
2012007997
British Library Cataloguing in Publication data are available

In memory of Fr. Álvaro Argüello (1933–2010), an exemplary
educator who used his intellectual gifts in service to humanity
Contents
Acknowledgments ix
List of Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
1. U.S.-Nicaragua Relations, the Sandinista Revolution, and the Contra War 7
2. An Overview of the Contra War Debate 29
3. Origins of the Anti–Contra War Campaign 53
4. Expansion of the Anti–Contra War Campaign, 1983–84 81
5. Organizational Dynamics of a Decentralized Campaign 114
6. The Politics of Transnational Solidarity 145
7. Meeting the Political Challenge, 1985–86 177
8. Sustaining the Anti–Contra War Campaign, 1987–90 208
Conclusion 245
Notes 247
List of Personal Interviews and Communications 289
Index 293
[ vii ]
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to the many individuals who shared their experiences

and insights with me via interviews and communications. It was
an adventure to gather their stories and I regret that not all can be included
here. I am especially indebted to three people. Max Paul Friedman, a mentor
and friend, set me on the path of scholarly pursuits and offered valuable advice
on early drafts of this book. Father Joe Mulligan, in addition to inspiring me
with his life of service, was instrumental in arranging interviews in Nicaragua.
Anne Meisenzahl, my wife and intellectual partner, shared my eight-year jour-
ney from conception to completion of this book, reading innumerable drafts
along the way. I would also like to thank the archivists and staff persons who
guided me to organizational and governmental resources, and the following
individuals: Harvey Williams and Penn Garvin, for setting up interviews in
Nicaragua; Valerie Jean Conner, Matt Childs, and David F. Johnson, for cri-
tiquing an early version of this project; Robert Surbrug and Andrew Hunt, for
bringing their knowledge of movement history to bear in advising me on a later
version; and Christian Appy, Clark Dougan, and Carol Betsch of the University
of Massachusetts Press, for guiding this book to the finish line and making the
final lap a pleasant one.
[ ix ]
Abbreviations
ACWC anti–Contra War campaign

AFL-CIO American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial
Organizations
AFSC American Friends Service Committee
AMNLAE Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan
Women (Asociación de Mujeres Nicaraguenses Luisa
Amanda Espinoza)
APSNICA Architects and Planners in Support of Nicaragua
CALA Community Action on Latin America (Madison, WI)
CAOP Central America Organizing Project (Philadelphia, PA)
CAPC Central America Peace Campaign
CAWG Central America Working Group
CEPAD Evangelical Committee for Aid and Development (Consejo
Evangélico Pro-Ayuda al Desarrollo), Nicaragua, known in
the United States as the Council of Protestant Churches
CISPES Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador
CITCA Carolina Interfaith Task Force on Central America
(Durham, NC)
CNFP or CNFMP Coalition for a New Foreign [and Military] Policy
CNSP or CNASP Nicaraguan Committee in Solidarity with the Peoples
(Comité Nicaragüense de Solidaridad con los Pueblos),
changed in 1987 to Nicaraguan Committee for Friendship,
Solidarity, and Peace (Comité Nicaragüense de Amistad,
Solidaridad y Paz), Nicaragua
[ xi ]
[ xii ] Abbreviations
COSEP Superior Council for Private Enterprise (Consejo Superior

de la Empresa Privada), Nicaragua
CUSCLIN Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua
DRI Directorate of International Relations (Dirreción de las
Relaciones Internacionales) of the FSLN party, Nicaragua
EPICA Ecumenical Program for Interamerican Communication
and Action; changed in the mid-1980s to Ecumenical
Program on Central America and the Caribbean
FDN Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democrática
Nicaragüense), the contra guerrilla force based in
Honduras
FMLN Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (Farabundo
Martí para la Liberación Nacional), El Salvador
FCPJ Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice
FOR Fellowship of Reconciliation
FSLN Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente Sandinista de
Liberación Nacional), Nicaragua
IFCO Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization
IPS Institute for Policy Studies
IRTFCA Inter-Religious Task Force on Central America
LACASA Latin American and Caribbean Solidarity Association
(Miami, FL)
LASA Latin American Studies Association
MFS Mobilization for Survival
MINREX Ministry of Foreign Relations (Ministerio de Relaciones
Exteriores), Nicaraguan government
NACLA North American Congress on Latin America
NAM New American Movement
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NED National Endowment for Democracy (U.S. government-
supported agency)
NISGUA Network in Solidarity with the People of Guatemala
NJCAN New Jersey Central America Network
NLC National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and
Human Rights in El Salvador
OAS Organization of American States
PACCA Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America
PCASC Portland Central America Committee on Latin America
(Portland, OR)
PJEC Peace and Justice Education Center (Rochester, NY)
POR Pledge of Resistance
Abbreviations [ xiii ]
ROCLA Rochester Committee on Latin America (Rochester, NY)

RTFCA Religious Task Force on Central America
SANE Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy
SCLC Southern Christian Leadership Conference
S/LPD U.S. State Department Office of Public Diplomacy for
Latin America and the Caribbean
UDEL Democratic Liberation Union (Unión Democrática de
Liberación), Nicaragua
UNO National Opposition Union (Unión Nacional Opositora),
Nicaragua
USIA U.S. Information Agency (U.S. government)
VFP Veterans for Peace
VPC Veterans Peace Convoy
VOA Voice of America (U.S. government)
WCCN Wisconsin Coordinating Council on Nicaragua
WFP Witness for Peace
WOLA Washington Office on Latin America
WNYPC Western New York Peace Center (Buffalo, NY)
Introduction
B ill Gandall was eighteen years old when he first set foot on
Nicaraguan soil in 1927. He was part of an expeditionary force of
three thousand United States Marines sent to put down an anti-U.S. rebellion
led by Augusto Sandino. Ordered by his superiors to obtain information about
Sandino “by any means possible,” Gandall and his fellow marines routinely used
torture on local residents to extract the requisite information. “We committed
a lot of atrocities, of which I was a part,” reflected Gandall sixty years later. “I
was just the same as the rest of them.” Over time, however, he said, “I began to
see the fallacy of what I had been involved in. And I slowly began to change, to
become a better human being because I was developing a conscience.”
Gandall’s conscience led him back to Nicaragua in 1985, at the age of seventy-
six, to witness firsthand the Sandinista government’s reform program and the ill
effects of the U.S.-sponsored Contra War. The leftist Sandinistas had come to
power through a popularly supported revolution in July 1979. Soon after, former
national guardsmen of the deposed Somoza government formed guerrilla units
under the guidance of Argentine special forces. The Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) began working with these counterrevolutionaries, or “contras,” in early
1981 and assumed full control the following year. Operating out of bases in
Honduras, Costa Rica, and within Nicaragua, the contras destroyed economic
assets, attacked rural villages, and killed or kidnapped civilians deemed pro-
Sandinista. The CIA also undertook military actions on its own, bombing oil
[1]
[2] Introduction
storage tanks and mining Nicaraguan harbors. Gandall regarded these actions
as another egregious U.S. intervention and vowed to do what he could to stop
it. For the next five years, he traveled across the U.S., speaking to students, com-
munity groups, and the media; joining demonstrations and civil disobedience
actions; and raising funds for humanitarian aid, including eleven ambulances
sent to the Sandinista government.1 With a patch over one eye and a repertoire
of war stories, he was one of the more sought after speakers on the antiwar lec-
ture circuit. His activities elicited a letter from Nicaraguan ambassador Carlos
Tünnermann on December 7, 1987: “I believe you are doing such an important
job informing people about what really has been going [on] in the armed
American interventions and what happens to people of small countries like
ours,” wrote Tünnermann. “We commend you for your courage in speaking the
truth and sincerely believe that you are serving your country in doing this . . . I
wish you much success.”2
Many other U.S. citizens felt the pull of conscience regarding their govern-
ment’s proxy war against Nicaragua. In April 1983, Rep. Berkley Bedell (D-IA)
remarked during a House debate on U.S. aid to the contras, “If the American
people could have talked with the common people of Nicaragua, whose women
and children are being indiscriminately kidnapped, tortured and killed by ter-
rorists financed by the American taxpayers, they would rise up in legitimate
anger and demand that support for criminal activity be ended.”3 Episcopal
Bishop Paul Moore Jr. of New York, after visiting Nicaragua in early 1984, used
his Easter sermon to decry U.S. intervention as “illegal, inconsistent, ill-advised,
and immoral. . . . We simply cannot go around the world shooting and killing
innocent men, women, and children as part of our national policy.”4
Other critics made their views known by offering aid and comfort to “the
enemy.” On July 27, 1984, a Norwegian ship docked at the port of Corinto and
presented the Sandinista government with a cargo of medicines, school sup-
plies, fertilizer, and rolls of newsprint. On board were four Nobel laureates,
Adolfo Pérez Esquivel of Argentina, Betty Williams of Northern Ireland, and
George Wald and Linus C. Pauling of the United States. Pauling, awarded the
Nobel prize for chemistry in 1954, explained why he had come. “It’s a crime,” he
said, “a great mistake and ethically very wrong for our Government to be inter-
vening in Latin America in such a way as to cause suffering to people.”5
Unlike the U.S.-engineered coups in Guatemala (1954) and Chile (1973),
the Reagan administration’s attempt to bring down the Sandinista government
was not allowed to proceed quietly. A heated debate over U.S. support for the
Introduction [3]
Salvadoran government was already underway when the covert war against
Nicaragua was revealed in the press in early 1982. According to the political sci-
entist Cynthia Arnson, “Reagan’s policy of backing the contras gradually took
the place of El Salvador on the agenda in Washington, developing into the single
most divisive and bitterly fought foreign policy issue since the war in Vietnam.
Reagan devoted more speeches to Nicaragua than to any other single topic.”6
The Reagan administration’s efforts to garner public and congressional support
for contra aid was countered by the tenacious, grassroots-based anti–Contra
War campaign (ACWC)—the subject of this study. Those who participated in
this campaign interpreted the “call to conscience” through different intellectual
and experiential frameworks—religion, socialism, pacifism, anti-imperialism,
human rights, democratic citizenship, previous military experience, and per-
sonal connections in Central America—that generally aligned with a broad
liberal-left challenge to the rightist “Reagan revolution” in foreign policy.
The ACWC endured for eight years, from the first surge of contra attacks in
March 1982 until February 1990, when the Sandinistas were voted out of office
and the U.S. government called off the war. No single leader or organization
directed this decentralized campaign. Instead, there were overlapping networks
of religious, leftist, and peace groups—and smaller numbers of labor, veteran,
feminist, and civic groups—working on common “days of action,” educational
activities, legislative lobbying, and transnational initiatives. The main politi-
cal goals of the campaign were to end U.S. aid to the contras and prevent a
direct U.S. invasion of Nicaragua. Many groups also sought to directly aid the
Nicaraguan people and end the U.S. embargo against Nicaragua, instituted in
May 1985.
Transnational activities were crucial to the overall functioning of the
ACWC, as they energized and informed local activism. Activist groups sent
peace witnesses to rural Nicaraguan communities under attack by the contras,
organized work brigades to assist in coffee harvests, raised millions of dollars
for humanitarian aid, established more than eighty United States–Nicaragua
sister city partnerships, and facilitated hundreds of study tours. An estimated
100,000 U.S. citizens traveled to Nicaragua during the 1980s.7 Given that no U.S.
troops were directly involved in the Contra War, the ACWC necessarily went
beyond appeals to self-interest (e.g., bring the troops home, resist the draft) to
focus on the costs of the war to the Nicaraguan people, attempting to cultivate
empathy and understanding across national borders and identities.
The ACWC was part of a larger Central America movement that included
[4] Introduction
campaigns to halt U.S. aid to the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala,

based on human rights concerns, and the Sanctuary Movement, which aided
refugees from these countries. While related, each campaign had such different
sets of international conditions, political challenges, and movement dynamics
that separate studies are warranted.8 Historically, the anti–Contra War campaign
is linked to a long, if erratic, series of antiwar and anti-interventionist move-
ments dating back to the Anti-Imperialist League of 1898 and encompassing
opposition to the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua in the 1920s and the Vietnam
War. The ACWC was a direct beneficiary of the anti-interventionist legacy of
the Vietnam War. A majority of U.S. citizens, fearing “another Vietnam,” reg-
istered their opposition to contra aid in opinion polls from the outset. Many
citizens who had conscientiously opposed the Vietnam War were active in the
Central American movement of the 1980s.
A question often asked about social change movements is whether they
were effective in changing government policy. In assessing the political
influence of the anti–Vietnam War movement, the historian Melvin Small
noted the difficulty of making any exact measurements, given that numerous,
mutually reinforcing factors affect policymaking.9 In the case of the ACWC,
its quest to cut off U.S. aid to the contras was reinforced by the cautionary
lesson of the Vietnam War; the diplomatic efforts of Latin American leaders
to achieve a peace settlement; the military strength of the Sandinista gov-
ernment, which precluded the contras’ success; and congressional outrage
over the Reagan administration’s illegal actions, particularly the unauthor-
ized mining of Nicaraguan harbors in early 1984. The latter factor tipped
the balance of votes in Congress, resulting in an official cutoff of contra aid
in October 1984. This victory for the ACWC was short lived, however, as
Congress reversed itself and approved “nonlethal” aid for the contras in mid-
1985, then full military aid in mid-1986. Factors influencing the latter shift
included President Ronald Reagan’s landslide reelection in November 1984,
the administration’s all-out media and lobbying campaign, and a trip to the
Soviet Union by Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega in the spring of 1985,
which some members of Congress viewed as an affront to the United States.
The momentum shifted again in 1987, this time aided by the Iran-Contra
affair (in which the administration illegally sold arms to Iran and used the prof-
its to illegally supply arms to the contras) and the Esquipulas accords, a peace
agreement signed by five Central American presidents in August that required
the cessation of all outside support for guerrilla forces in the region. From 1987
Introduction [5]
on, Congress appropriated only “nonlethal” aid for the contras, a compromise
representing partial defeat for both sides. The main role of the ACWC in this
political battle was to educate the public and mobilize grassroots opposition
to contra aid, counteracting the influence of the Reagan administration and
rightist groups. Another role was to raise the political cost of a potential U.S.
invasion of Nicaragua, which it did by preparing for mass protests and civil dis-
obedience actions. A contingency invasion plan drawn up by Lt. Col. Oliver
North in 1985 listed as the first obstacle to overcome, not the Sandinista army,
but domestic opposition.10
This study provides a comprehensive historical account of the anti–Contra
War campaign and its Nicaraguan connections. Much has been written about
the Contra War, the Reagan administration’s foreign policies, and develop-
ments within Sandinista Nicaragua, but U.S. citizen opposition to the Contra
War has received only limited treatment. Few of the roughly 280 books on the
Contra War discuss domestic opposition beyond congressional debates and
public opinion polls; and the small number of scholarly studies on the Central
America movement provide only partial accounts of anti–Contra War activ-
ism.11 This study also incorporates sociological approaches, addressing in three
separate chapters the framing of issues in the Contra War debate (chapter 2),
the organizational design of the ACWC, including local case studies (chapter
5), and the campaign’s transnational connections, including how those con-
nections were viewed and addressed by the Reagan administration and by the
FSLN government (chapter 6).
Other chapters in the study proceed chronologically. Chapter 1 offers a con-
cise history of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations, with sections on earlier U.S. interven-
tions in Nicaragua, the Sandinista Revolution, and the Contra War. Chapter
3 explores the origins of the ACWC in various progressive U.S. sectors with
connections to Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s, leading to the formation
of the Nicaraguan solidarity campaign in 1979, the Central America move-
ment in 1980, and the ACWC in 1982. Chapter 4 tells the story of the ACWC
in the expansive years of 1983 and 1984, describing its educational, protest,
political, and transnational activities. Preference is given to those activities that
were widely promoted and cooperatively undertaken. Chapter 7 resumes the
chronological story of the ACWC, highlighting the intense political battles over
contra aid in 1985 and 1986 along with escalating protests. Chapter 8 charts the
development of the campaign from its height in 1987 to its surprising end in
1990.
[6] Introduction
In telling the story of the anti–Contra War campaign, I have kept the focus
on new developments and introduced new organizations along the way. Short
biographies of individuals are provided in order to show the range of activist
motivations and backgrounds—and to not lose sight of the individual in the
movement-building process. My sources of information include interviews and
correspondence with eighty-seven individuals, including leaders of national
organizations, local volunteers, U.S. citizens living in Nicaragua, and Nicaraguan
religious and governmental leaders; informal conversations with other partici-
pants; records and publications of activist organizations; relevant U.S. govern-
ment documents; newspaper articles from across the U.S.; and secondary litera-
ture on the subject.12 I have written this account with both the interested public
and scholars in mind, particularly historians of peace movements, American
foreign relations, and the Reagan era, and social scientists specializing in social
movement organizations and transnational advocacy networks.
My interest in writing about the anti–Contra War campaign stems from my
belief that it was on the right side of history and that it represented the best
of the United States. My sympathy for the ACWC, however, does not exclude
a critical assessment of its deficiencies and problems. By way of example, the
peace historians Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, in An American
Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (1990), identified numerous
problems within the anti–Vietnam War movement, including bitter feuds over
political demands (negotiations versus immediate withdrawal), tactics (con-
ventional versus confrontational), and styles (radical versus mainstream). The
ACWC likewise had its share of problems, although some lessons were argu-
ably learned from the anti–Vietnam War movement.
It is my hope is that Americans in the future will want to remember and
identify with the opponents of the Contra War, no less than Americans today
identify with the abolitionists of the antebellum era, and perhaps with the
opponents of imperialism at the turn of the twentieth century. It would be
entirely appropriate in my view for a U.S. president to belatedly apologize to
the Nicaraguan people and offer reparation payments “for all injury caused to
Nicaragua,” as required by the International Court of Justice ruling on June 27,
1986.13 Although the anti–Contra War campaign was a dissident movement in
the U.S., it was in accord with international law and most world opinion.
CHAPTER 1
U.S.-Nicaragua Relations, the Sandinista

Revolution, and the Contra War
T he United States looms large in the history of Nicaragua. In

1904, one year after acquiring the Panama Canal Zone through
“gunboat diplomacy,” President Theodore Roosevelt announced that the
United States would henceforth act as an “international police power” in the
Western Hemisphere. Operating under this vague mandate, the Taft administra-
tion dispatched 400 U.S. Marines to Nicaragua in 1909. Their mission, however,
was not to uphold law and order but to aid a Conservative insurrection against
the Liberal government of José Santos Zelaya. Three years later, a contingent
of 2,700 marines was sent to buoy up the weak Conservative government of
Adolfo Díaz. Some 100 marines remained as a legation guard until August 1925.
The marines had hardly departed before a new round of fighting began
between Liberals and Conservatives in Nicaragua. By December 1926 the
two factions had set up rival governments. Once again the United States rec-
ognized the Conservative government led by Díaz, while Mexico recognized
the Liberal government of Juan Bautista Sacasa. The Coolidge administration
viewed Mexico’s position as an affront to the United States. Secretary of State
Frank Kellogg warned of a “Mexican-fostered Bolshevist hegemony inter-
vening between the United States and the Panama Canal.”1 On December 23,
with Congress in recess, President Calvin Coolidge ordered U.S. warships and
marines to Nicaragua to bolster the Díaz government.
[7]
[8] CHAPTER 1
Undersecretary of State Robert Olds candidly explained the reason for this
intervention in a memorandum dated January 2, 1927: “There is no room for any
outside influence other than ours in this region. . . . Until now Central America
has always understood that governments which we recognize and support stay
in power, while those which we do not recognize and support fall. Nicaragua
has become a test case.”2 Public rationales were not so explicit. On January
10 President Coolidge told Congress that “disturbances and conditions” in
Nicaragua “seriously threaten American lives and property, endanger the stabil-
ity of all Central America, and put in jeopardy the rights granted by Nicaragua
to the United States for the construction of a canal.”3
Six months into the occupation, U.S. officials mediated an agreement be-
tween Liberal and Conservative leaders. The agreement called for elections in
November 1928 and required both sides to disarm. The elections were held as
planned, under the watchful eye of 4,500 U.S. Marines, but one Liberal general,
Augusto César Sandino, refused to disarm. Sandino vowed that he and some
400 followers would not lay down their arms until the U.S. Marines left his
native land. For the next five years, the marines scoured the rugged country-
side in search of the “bandit” Sandino but were unable to capture or kill him,
despite the use of airplanes fitted with machine guns and bombs to attack his
camps. All told, the U.S. war against Sandino cost the lives of an estimated 3,000
Nicaraguans and 136 U.S. Marines.4
Most Latin American leaders and much of the European press condemned
the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. At the Sixth International Conference of
American States in Havana in 1928, representatives from El Salvador intro-
duced a resolution stating that “no state may intervene in the internal affairs of
another.”5 The U.S. delegate promptly vetoed the measure. Within the United
States, opposition was voiced by anti-imperialists such as Scott Nearing,
peace advocates such as Jane Addams, civil rights leaders such as W. E. B. Du
Bois, and at least a dozen progressive senators led by Burton K. Wheeler of
Montana and George Norris of Nebraska. Almost as soon as the U.S. troops
had departed for Nicaragua, Wheeler demanded their return, along with the
dismissal of Secretary of State Kellogg. Two Senate bills were introduced call-
ing for the removal of U.S. troops from Nicaragua; they failed by votes of 52–22
(April 25, 1928) and 48–32 (February 23, 1929).6 Nearing, a socialist econo-
mist, and the journalist Joseph Freeman provided theoretical underpinning
for the eclectic anti-intervention movement in Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in
American Imperialism (1925), which explained that private business interests
U.S.-Nicaragua Relations, the Sandinista Revolution, and the Contra War [9]
were leading the U.S. government to extend its sovereignty “over populations
that had expressed no desire for its presence.”7
Two religious peace groups, the Fellowship of Reconciliation and the Amer-
ican Friends Service Committee, attempted to mediate the conflict by arrang-
ing for Episcopal minister John Nevin Sayre and a small group of Americans to
travel to Nicaragua to meet with Augusto Sandino. Sayre was unable to make
direct contact with him but left a message with Sandino’s wife, which read in
part, “We wish you to know that we are against imperialism and in favor of inde-
pendence, freedom, peace and happiness for Nicaragua.”8 Carleton Beals, a
reporter for The Nation, did find Sandino and interviewed him. The interview
was published in a six-issue series in February–March 1928, providing Sandino
with a forum to speak directly to the U.S. public.
The Communist Party USA also took part in the Nicaragua anti-intervention
movement, forming the All-American Anti-Imperialist League in 1928. Based
in New York City, the group raised money for Sandino and organized speaking
tours for his half-brother, Sócrates Sandino, a carpenter by trade and resident of
Brooklyn since 1926. Outside the United States, the Communist International
promoted Augusto Sandino as an exemplary anti-imperialist, making him known
to revolutionary groups and national liberation movements worldwide.9
The arguments of the anti-interventionists in the 1920s were similar in many
respects to those of Contra War opponents in the 1980s. The earlier anti-interven-
tionists charged that the intervention was illegal, as Congress had not been prop-
erly consulted; that Nicaragua presented no risk to Americans or to U.S. security;
that evidence of arms transfers (from Mexico) was sketchy; that the administra-
tion offered a changing list of explanations for the intervention; that the interven-
tion isolated the United States from world opinion; that diplomacy rather than
military intervention should be employed; and that the media was being manipu-
lated by the administration. Sayre expressed his anguish over the affair in a letter
to Senator Norris in 1928, writing, “I cannot understand how any intelligent, patri-
otic citizen can remain silent without protesting, while our President is carrying
on an unauthorized and indefensible war against Nicaragua. . . . [F]or certainly,
if the President of the United States can carry on war in Nicaragua, without the
consent of Congress, he can do the same thing with many other countries.”10
Ending U.S. intervention in Nicaragua proved frustratingly slow. President
Herbert Hoover, in his first State of the Union address on December 3, 1929,
declared his intention to remove some 1,600 marines in Nicaragua, as “we do not
wish to be represented abroad in such manner.”11 Yet the troops remained. On
[ 10 ] CHAPTER 1
January 5, 1931, five days after eight marines had been killed in an ambush, the
Senate gave the president a push by approving a nonbinding “sense of the Senate”
resolution calling for American forces to be immediately withdrawn from
Nicaragua. A year later, with still no withdrawal, Congress passed a bill prohibit-
ing the administration from transporting additional U.S. troops to Nicaragua.
The Hoover administration finally got the message and withdrew all U.S. troops
in January 1933, leaving in their place the U.S.-trained Nacional Guardia.
With the departure of the marines, Sandino quickly negotiated a peace agree-
ment with the newly elected Sacasa government. The fighting ceased, but ani-
mosity remained between Sandino and the U.S.-approved commander of the
National Guard, Anastasio Somoza García. In February 1934, just after Sandino
had dined with President Sacasa, Somoza’s men seized and executed Sandino
and his top commanders. This was followed by a massacre of Sandino’s men at
a farm cooperative where they lived. Unpunished, Somoza maneuvered his way
into the presidency in 1937, the beginning of a forty-three-year family dynasty in
which political power was passed from father to son to brother through a series
of manipulated elections and coups.
In the United States, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Nicaragua was fol-
lowed by a declaration in December 1933 forswearing U.S. military intervention
in Latin America—the Good Neighbor Policy. The principle of noninterven-
tion was later written into the United Nations Charter in 1945 and the Charter
of the Organization of American States in 1948. With the advent of the Cold
War, however, the United States began a new round of interventionism in Latin
America, often carried out covertly through the CIA. Concerns in Washington
in the 1940s regarding Somoza’s undemocratic methods melted away in the
1950s, as Somoza made himself an indispensable ally of the United States in the
Cold War. The Somoza government provided logistical support for the over-
throw of the Arbenz government in Guatemala in 1954, and for the expatriate
invasion of Cuba in 1961. The United States rewarded the Somoza family regime
with military and economic aid, underwriting its dictatorial rule.
The Sandinista Revolution
The Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was founded in 1961 by Carlos
Fonseca, Silvio Mayorga, and Tomás Borge. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution,
Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and the anti-imperialist example of Sandino, the
U.S.-Nicaragua Relations, the Sandinista Revolution, and the Contra War [ 11 ]
three Nicaraguans embarked on the Herculean tasks of bringing down the

Somoza government and replacing it with a socialist government that would pre-
sumably serve the people. From its inception until 1974, the FSLN had no appre-
ciable military or political influence. This situation changed on December 27,
1974, when FSLN guerrillas invaded the house of a prominent supporter of
President Anastasio Somoza during a Christmas party and held the guests hos-
tage. Somoza was compelled to give in to FSLN’s demands: the release of eigh-
teen Sandinista prisoners, the transfer of a half million dollars to the Sandinistas,
and the broadcast of two FSLN messages to the public. The FSLN’s outrageous
action showed Nicaraguans that Somoza was not invincible. Somoza responded
by clamping down on political rights. The repression, which lasted thirty-three
months, hindered the FSLN’s operations but served the larger revolutionary
goal of inciting popular resentment against the Somoza government.
Opposition to Somoza’s rule within Nicaragua had been growing since a mas-
sive earthquake struck Managua on December 23, 1972, killing 18,000 people
and leveling the center of the city. Much of the international aid that poured into
Nicaragua in the aftermath was diverted into Somoza’s profit-making businesses.
This brazen act of greed alienated Nicaraguans of all classes. Even the elite private
enterprise alliance, the Superior Council for Private Enterprise (COSEP), came
out against Somoza’s candidacy for president in 1974. Somoza was nevertheless
reelected in what was commonly regarded as another fraudulent election.
Political opposition coalesced under the Democratic Union for Liberation
(UDEL), formed on December 15, 1974. Led by Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, the
well-known publisher of La Prensa, UDEL brought together mainstream busi-
ness interests, unions, and political parties. In October 1977, just after martial
law was lifted, UDEL issued a manifesto calling for the “democratization” of
Nicaragua. Published in La Prensa, the manifesto declared that “the present
violent situation” was due to “the dictatorship’s institutionalized violence,” and
“that peace can be established only by initiating a process of political change
that will convert Nicaragua into a truly democratic society . . . built upon admin-
istrative honesty, socioeconomic justice, and respect for all human rights.”12
UDEL was the leading political voice for change at this time.
The Somoza government was also challenged by the Catholic church, both
the hierarchy and the recently emerged “popular church.” Beginning in 1977,
Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo wrote a series of pastoral letters denounc-
ing the Somoza government’s abuses. The popular church in Nicaragua went
further, with some Christian base communities and priests providing safe
[ 12 ] CHAPTER 1
houses for FSLN rebels. The popular church emerged in Nicaragua in the late
1960s in conjunction with the Catholic church’s new mission to liberate the
poor, as set forth by Pope John XXIII (1958–63), the Vatican Council (1962–
65), and Latin American bishops at meetings in Medellín, Colombia, in 1968,
and in Puebla, Mexico, in January 1979. At the Medellín conference, the bish-
ops affirmed the Vatican’s “preferential option for the poor” and called for con-
scientización, social education, and the building of “Christian base communi-
ties.”13 The consciousness-raising aspect of this mission was further developed
by Latin American theologians into a comprehensive “liberation theology,”
which mixed Christian values with Marxist critiques of power and wealth. In
January 1969, some two hundred Nicaraguan priests and nuns met in Managua
to discuss and promote the Catholic church’s new mission of liberation. Under
pressure, Obando y Bravo and the Nicaraguan church hierarchy endorsed the
Medellín principles.14 During the 1980s, however, with the support of a more
conservative pope in Rome, Obando y Bravo denounced the popular church as
contrary to traditional beliefs and practices.
The murder of Pedro Joaquín Chamorro on January 10, 1978, presumably by
Somoza’s thugs, marked the beginning of an eighteen-month insurrectionary
period that ended with the triumph of FSLN revolutionary forces. The Carter
administration, hoping to avoid a Sandinista victory, put pressure on Somoza
to negotiate with his moderate political opponents, but Somoza avoided this,
calculating that the United States would continue to support him if the only
alternative was the FSLN. With political compromise stymied, the challenge
moved to the battlefield, where the FSLN was leading the charge.
In early 1979 the FSLN united its three contentious factions (distinguished
by their different strategies for achieving revolutionary victory) and established
a nine-person directorate led by Daniel Ortega. Between February and July 1979,
FSLN fighters increased in number from about 2,500 to 5,000 and proceeded to
“liberate” towns and regions. The National Guard, aided by Argentine security
forces, responded with greater force, at times indiscriminately attacking civil-
ian populations. The FSLN launched its final offensive in late May. On July 17,
1979, Somoza left the country, and two days later Sandinista guerrillas marched
into Managua amidst cheers and celebration. The revolution that had taken the
lives of some 50,000 Nicaraguans was finally over.15 The dictator was gone and a
revolutionary group that claimed to have the well-being of the masses in mind
was now in charge.
The Sandinistas in Power

For the Sandinista leadership, only half the battle had been won. The great revo-
lutionary task ahead was to turn popular hopes for a better life among two and
a half million Nicaraguans into active support for the FSLN’s socialist-oriented
reform program and the FSLN itself. With these goals in mind, the FSLN
undertook a highly successful, five-month literacy campaign, from March to
August 1980. Coordinated by Fr. Fernando Cardenal, a Jesuit priest, the cam-
paign involved over 100,000 volunteers who taught some 400,000 people to
read and write. The country’s illiteracy rate dropped from 50 to 13 percent of
the population.16 “During those first five months,” said Fr. Cardenal, “Nicaragua
was a single huge school, with part teaching and the other part learning.”17
The literacy campaign drew many middle and upper-class youths into the
FSLN program and connected them with the rural poor. It also provided
the FSLN with an opportunity to promote itself. One writing exercise in a
Sandinista “Education Notebook,” for example, began with the sentence “The
FSLN is the vanguard organization of the Nicaraguan people.”18 Minister of
Education Carlos Tünnermann, who later became the Nicaraguan ambassador
to the United States, explained that “literacy work, like all education, is con-
nected to a political process. There’s no such thing as a neutral education.” The
Literacy Crusade provided information about FSLN programs in agriculture,
health, and education, and it furthermore assured people that the FSLN govern-
ment “completely recognizes freedom of worship,” according to Tünnermann.19
The most daunting and immediate problem facing the new Sandinista
government was an impoverished economy devastated by war. With the trea-
sury left bankrupt by the Somoza government, the FSLN appealed for inter-
national assistance and encouraged Sandinismo, a spirit of cooperation and
volunteerism in rebuilding the country, at home. FSLN leaders were intent
on creating a socialist-oriented economic system that would meet the basic
needs of the majority, but they did not regard the Soviet Union, Eastern bloc
countries, or Cuba as appropriate economic models. Sandinista Nicaragua
was to be a new socialist experiment, allowing for individual ownership
and private enterprise. Daniel Ortega later claimed that “it is the Sandinista
Revolution which invented perestroika,” the reform model adopted by the
Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev in the latter half of the 1980s.20 The
FSLN directorate, being of mixed class origin itself, was decidedly pragmatic
in its approach to reform. 21
On July 19, 1981, before half a million people gathered in the central plaza of
[ 14 ] CHAPTER 1
Managua to celebrate the Revolution’s second anniversary, Ortega announced

a new agrarian reform law. The law called for the distribution of available land
to over 100,000 campesinos, while also protecting the property rights of large
landholders who were producing needed crops. The fact that an estimated 20
percent of arable acreage had been abandoned by Somoza and his allies meant
that it was unnecessary to expropriate the land of large landowners, although
limitations were later placed on the amount of land a single family could own.
The FSLN government also began, in 1981, a major public health campaign
consisting of sanitation measures, mass vaccinations, nutritional programs,
encouragement of breast-feeding, the training of more doctors, and health edu-
cation. The health campaign was organized along the lines of the Literacy Crus-
ade, with some 25,000 volunteers mobilized as health workers, or about 1 percent
of the population. As a result of the campaign, infant mortality was dramatically
reduced within a few years, earning praise from the United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Partly because of better
health care, Nicaragua’s population increased rapidly, from 2.5 million in 1978 to
3.2 million in 1985, a 28 percent increase, which further strained the economy.22
The contribution of Nicaraguan women to health and education programs
was significant. According to political scientist Lorraine Bayard de Volo, women
“constituted 60% of the literacy brigades, 70% of the brigades for the popular
health campaign, 95% of those working in health programs, and 68% of the coor-
dinators of adult education programs.”23 Women had played an important role
in the revolutionary upheaval against Somoza, providing an estimated 30 per-
cent of FSLN fighters and a few notable commanders.24 Following the triumph,
the all-male FSLN Directorate enlisted women’s continuing participation in the
reconstruction of the country through the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association
of Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE), a Sandinista mass organization. AMNLAE
recruited women to participate in projects while also advocating for women’s
rights in FSLN assemblies and public venues.
In August 1979 the FSLN directorate issued a fundamental statute that pro-
vided a framework for full equality between the sexes. “Toward its goal of eco-
nomic, political, and cultural equality for women,” wrote de Volo, “the FSLN
abolished prostitution, banning advertising that exploited women’s bodies, insti-
tuted equal pay for equal work, provided health care for mothers and children,
built day-care centers, and expanded literacy.”25 For Vilma Nuñez de Escorcia,
however, the first woman to serve on the Nicaraguan Supreme Court of Justice,
the passage of such laws was not enough. “You can be a revolutionary politically
and ideologically,” she said, “but your normal behavior can still be machismo.
And that’s the way it was with the FSLN.”26 An independent women’s movement
did not emerge until the end of the Sandinista era in 1990.
A key demand of the Nicaraguan people in the wake of Somoza’s ouster was
free and fair elections. FSLN leaders were well aware of this demand but reluc-
tant to subject themselves to a popular vote before their reform programs could
prove their value. In the meantime, they sought to assure their supremacy in the
new Council of State, which opened on May 4, 1980, by reserving a majority of
seats for representatives of FSLN mass organizations. This action prompted two
members of the five-member Junta (the official governing body in Nicaragua)
to resign in protest—Alfonso Robelo, a businessman who later became a con-
tra political leader, and Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, wife of the martyred pub-
lisher. In August 1980 the FSLN directorate announced that national elections
would be held for the presidency and national assembly in five years (the date
was later moved up to November 1984). FSLN leaders thereupon embarked on a
two-track strategy of building democratic institutions from the ground up while
also promoting their socialist vision as the ultimate form of democracy. Council
of State President Carlos Nuñez, speaking before the council on December 4,
1982, declared that “democracy is the economic regime that assures men and
women of their basic needs: food, work, housing, education, and health.”27 True
democracy, in other words, lies in a government that serves the people.
Despite misgivings, FSLN leaders proceeded to create a multiparty politi-
cal system in which their leadership and program were not guaranteed. The
process involved three steps, according to Fr. Álvaro Argüello, a Jesuit priest at
the Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica in Managua. The first
step was to develop what became the comprehensive Law of Political Parties,
based on Western European multiparty models. In November 1981 Argüello
was serving in the Council of State as a representative of the religious sector
(Association of Nicaraguan Clergy) when council president Nuñez appointed
him to a fourteen-member commission assigned this task of drafting the law.
“Remember that in the revolution all the institutions were banished, disap-
peared,” said Argüello. “It was up to the revolution to create new institutions.” It
took twenty-one months before the commission completed its final draft of the
law, which the Council of State approved on August 17, 1983. “This was the first
step in the democratic process,” said Argüello.
The second step was “the creation of an electoral process in order to have elected
members of the government and to create a new Nicaraguan Assembly.” A second
[ 16 ] CHAPTER 1
commission was formed in late 1982 for the purpose of creating a comprehensive
election law. The Council of State approved a new election statute on March 15,
1984. These laws, said Argüello, were “important to the faith of the Nicaraguan peo-
ple because in fact they were going to see that we were trying to beef up democracy,
the participation of people of different political parties. . . . Let the people choose
their leaders.” After national elections for National Assembly seats and president
were held on November 4, 1984, “the third step to democratize the country was
to write down a Constitution,” said Argüello. A new Nicaraguan constitution was
ratified in January 1987. “I was part of that first step,” he reflected.28
The FSLN leadership diverged from the Cuban model in more ways than
establishing a mixed economy and democratic institutions. It also outlawed the
death penalty and set a maximum prison term of thirty years, and it embraced
religious freedom. Regarding the latter, the FSLN National Directorate issued
an official communiqué on religion on October 7, 1980. The statement guaran-
teed the inalienable right of citizens to profess their religious beliefs and the
right of churches to operate schools and conduct their activities free of gov-
ernment interference. It furthermore assured FSLN members that their reli-
gious beliefs would be respected within the party.29 Obando y Bravo was not
appeased by this declaration, however, believing that the FSLN was intent on
undermining the Church hierarchy and expanding the popular church.
The Sandinista leadership did not expect a counterrevolutionary war at the
outset, despite the fact that some three thousand former national guardsmen
had fled to nearby countries in the last days of the revolution. The official report
of the first FSLN organizational meeting after the revolution, held in Managua
on September 21–23, 1979, stated: “Though we do not wish to downplay the
need for a strong army to take care of national defense, we would point out
that at present there is no clear indication that an armed counterrevolution by
Somozist forces beyond our borders is going to take place and jeopardize our
stability.”30 In May 1980 that assessment changed radically. Defense minister
Tomás Borge announced the existence of thirty-two counter-revolutionary
camps in Honduras. The Argentine security forces that had aided Somoza in
his final days were on hand in Honduras and Guatemala to help the contras
get organized. In November COSEP leader Jorge Salazar was killed by FSLN
security personnel in circumstances allegedly involving gun-running to the
contras.31 The “honeymoon” period was clearly over. The FSLN government
began to take a harder line toward its political opponents, fearing conspiratorial
ties with the contras or the CIA.
As tension grew within the country, divisions within the educated class
became sharper. In the case of the famous Chamorro family, the eldest son of
the deceased publisher, also named Pedro Joaquín Chamorro, opposed the FSLN
and eventually became part of the contra directorate. He moved to Costa Rica
in late 1984 and began publishing Nicaragua Hoy, a four-page newspaper highly
critical of the FSLN government. A second son, Carlos Fernando, served as editor
of the pro-Sandinista newspaper, Barricada, the “official organ of the Sandinista
National Liberation Front.” Sister Cristiana worked for La Prensa, an indepen-
dent newspaper that received funding from the U.S. government and was peri-
odically shut down by the FSLN government. Another sister, Claudia, served as
Nicaragua’s ambassador to Cuba and to Costa Rica. “Those were tough times.
The family was divided,” Claudia later reflected. “I was still a Sandinista and my
brother was leading demonstrations in Costa Rica against my embassy. We all
thought we wanted what was best for Nicaragua.”32 The mother of this prominent
family, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, after resigning from the Junta in April 1980,
became a prominent critic of the Sandinistas, although not a contra supporter.
She was elected president in February 1990, marking the end of the Sandinista era.
Initial U.S. Responses to the New Sandinista Government

On August 23, 1979, thirty-five days after the Sandinista triumph, U.S. ambassa-
dor to Nicaragua Lawrence A. Pezzulo sent a twelve-page memorandum to the
State Department, assessing the FSLN government and recommending U.S.
actions. The long telegram gave no indication that the new Sandinista govern-
ment constituted a threat to the United States; indeed, quite the contrary:
The Nicaraguan Revolution gives every evidence of being an authen-

tic Nicaraguan phenomenon. Its leaders come from a wide spectrum
of Nicaraguan society. . . . The Sandinista movement represents a
societal consensus that a radical change was needed in Nicaragua. . . .
The broad outlines of “Sandinismo” have already been defined by its
leaders. It includes a commitment to a democratic form, a compas-
sionate attitude toward its enemies, defense of human rights, respect
for private property, a commitment to allow the private sector to be
part of a mixed economy, a commitment to freedom of expression
and of the press and, in foreign policy, a desire to have good rela-
tions with all countries while pursuing a non-aligned posture. . . .
It includes a strong Christian element which may explain the very
compassionate approach taken toward former enemies.
[ 18 ] CHAPTER 1
Regarding the influence of Cuba, Pezzulo observed, “There is no reason to

believe that the Cuban model is more attractive than any other. . . . Cuba will be
influential in Nicaragua only insofar as its contributions are acceptable to the
Nicaraguans.” He noted that “Cuban involvement thus far publicly has been lim-
ited to the supply of medical personnel and equipment” and other humanitarian
assistance. On the issue of human rights, Pezzulo wrote, “We are not aware of any
press reports of systematic violations of human rights of the new government. On
the contrary, most stories expressed wonderment at the peacefulness of the tran-
sition.” Pezzulo described in detail the “grave economic crisis” in the country,
including “an enormous foreign debt” inherited from the Somoza government
and a business community “bereft of funds and suffering serious losses during the
insurrection.” He concluded his report with a recommendation to assist the strug-
gling FSLN government: “Realistically, we face only one option: to continue our
economic and political support to the Nicaraguan people and government so that
they can pursue their own destiny in a peaceful and democratic manner. We wel-
come the repeated assurances from the GRN [Government of National
Reconstruction] of their willingness to establish close and friendly relations with
the U.S. We have no moral alternative but to reciprocate generously with a helping
hand to a friendly people in economic distress.”33
The Carter administration only partly embraced Pezzulo’s recommenda-
tions. It provided $20 million in emergency aid and economic assistance to the
new Sandinista government, but at the same time secretly authorized covert aid
to dissident political groups within Nicaragua. In May 1980 Congress approved
a $75 million aid package that included $70 million in loans, of which 60 per-
cent was reserved for the private sector.34 The aid package was designed as a car-
rot to encourage economic moderation (limited state control of property and
business enterprises), political pluralism, and ties with the West rather than the
Soviet bloc. In June 1980, House majority leader Jim Wright (D-TX) traveled to
Nicaragua at the behest of President Carter. After meeting with Junta members
Daniel Ortega and Arturo Cruz, a businessman who replaced Alfonso Robelo,
and other Nicaraguan leaders, Wright noted that prospects for democracy and
moderate reform in Nicaragua looked promising.35 In January 1981 three liberal
Democratic members of Congress, Gerry Studds of Massachusetts, Barbara
Mikulski of Maryland, and Robert Edgar of Pennsylvania, toured Nicaragua
and met with FSLN leaders. A follow-up report written by Studds stated that
the Sandinistas’ main “accomplishment has been to create within Nicaragua a
universal commitment to greater social equity and concern for the country’s
multitude of poor, ill-clothed, ill-fed and sick people. There is a fully shared
sense the revolution is necessary and just.”36
In the spirit of establishing friendly relations, the Carter administration in-
vited the military chiefs of staff of the Sandinista Popular Army to tour four U.S.
military bases in South Carolina and Georgia in November 1979. Returning from
the trip, Comandante Donald Mendoza observed, “The Military Staff of the
Sandinista Forces was very impressed and pleased with the cordiality and hospi-
tality bestowed upon them by the officers of the several military bases they visited
and they look upon this exchange as a symbol of a deep new friendship that can
be cultivated between the new Nicaragua and the United States of America.”37
Relations between the two countries took a downturn in mid-January 1981
when the Carter administration received reports of arms transfers from Nica-
ragua to Salvadoran guerrillas. The administration suspended further distribution
of the $75 million aid package to Nicaragua pending an investigation. On February
14 Ambassador Pezzulo met with Junta leaders Daniel Ortega and Sergio Ramírez
to discuss the issue. According to a cable from Pezzullo to Secretary of State
Alexander Haig on February 18, the FSLN leaders told Pezzulo that the Nicaraguan
government had not authorized any arms transfers, but that unauthorized trans-
fers may have taken place. Ortega said that a firm decision had been taken by the
FSLN Directorate to “not permit use of our territory for the transit of arms to El
Salvador” and that orders had been given to all units to interdict any such arms
traffic. Ortega added, “We understand your concerns about El Salvador and we
will not risk our revolution for an uncertain victory in El Salvador.”38
The Reagan Administration’s War against Nicaragua
What set the United States against Sandinista Nicaragua had less to do with
arms transfers than with changes in U.S. administrations. Reluctant acceptance
of the FSLN government by the Carter administration gave way to vehement
rejection by the Reagan administration. The Republican Party platform of
1980 deplored “the Marxist Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua and the Marxist
attempts to destabilize El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.” It implicitly
endorsed the idea of ousting the Sandinistas, asserting that “we will support the
efforts of the Nicaraguan people to establish a free and independent govern-
ment.”39 President Ronald Reagan, upon entering the White House in January
1981, set out to implement the Republican platform irrespective of Sandinista
[ 20 ] CHAPTER 1
efforts to accommodate U.S. security concerns. On March 9, 1981, he signed a

secret presidential finding authorizing the CIA to organize an anti-Sandinista
guerrilla force, ostensibly to interdict weapons transfers from Nicaragua to El
Salvador.40 The House Committee on Intelligence secretly approved this opera-
tion, but expressly forbade the CIA from spending U.S. funds “for the purpose
of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua or provoking a military exchange
between Nicaragua and Honduras.”41
The Reagan administration continued to accuse the Sandinistas of transfer-
ring arms despite a paucity of evidence to back the charge. Speaking for the
State Department, William J. Dyess told the New York Times (April 2, 1981),
“The response [of the Sandinistas] has been positive. We have no hard evi-
dence of arms movements through Nicaragua during the past few weeks, and
propaganda and some other support activities have been curtailed.”42 A later
report by the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation
in September 1982 concluded that administration claims of arms transfers were
“flawed by several instances of overstatement and overinterpretation.”43 David
MacMichael, a CIA analyst specializing in the Western Hemisphere from 1981
to 1983, resigned from the CIA rather than falsify reports alleging Sandinista
arms transfers. A year after leaving, MacMichael went public. “I think Congress
and the public should know that within the C.I.A. there is pressure to bend
information to fit policy,” he told the New York Times in July 1984. His analysis
of the information he received led him to conclude that “the Administration
and the C.I.A. have systematically misrepresented Nicaraguan involvement in
the supply of arms to Salvadoran guerrillas to justify its efforts to overthrow the
Nicaraguan Government.” At interagency meetings, he further noted, “there
was hardly any discussion of the arms traffic. I couldn’t understand this failure
until months later when I realized, like everyone else, that arms interdiction had
never been a serious objective.”44
The Contra War

In August 1981 Duane R. Clarridge, the new division chief for CIA operations
in Latin America, met with contra leaders and their Argentine advisers in
Honduras to formally establish the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the
main contra fighting force. Led in the field by former national guardsman Col.
Enrique Bermúdez, the contras were the centerpiece of the Reagan administra-
tion’s strategy to oust the Sandinistas. The FDN, along with recruiting former
national guardsmen, recruited peasants from the northern highlands. Some
joined for pay, generously provided by the U.S. government; some, because
of religious fears regarding the Marxist Sandinistas; and some, because of the
FSLN economic policies, mainly the government’s “price and market con-
trols . . . and the coercion needed to implement them,” according to Arial C.
Armony.45 Some were also kidnapped by the contras and forced to serve, fear-
ing retribution against their families. Traditional religious rejection of “godless
communism” was perhaps the strongest motivating factor.
One FDN recruit, Eduardo López Valenzuela, a former farmer of corn and
beans in Wiwilí, described in a 1985 interview how his contra unit had rejoiced
after ambushing a German physician (Dr. Albrecht Pflaum) and thirteen oth-
ers (two nurses, three civilian government technicians, four other civilians, and
four Sandinista reservists) on a rural road near Wiwili on April 30, 1983: “We
were happy and shouted again and again, ‘With God and patriotism we will
overthrow Communism. Viva the FDN!’” All of the victims were shot through
the head and bayoneted.46 According Clarridge, some of the contras “were
former members of the National Guard. A lot of them were peasants from the
mountainous areas between Honduras and Nicaragua who had been at war with
somebody forever. And in many respects were like a bunch of cattle rustlers.”47
On the Atlantic Coast, a separate wing of the contra movement formed
among Miskito, Sumu, and Rama ethnic communities. These Afro-Caribbean
cultures had long been at odds with the “Spaniard” majority to the west, and
some leaders saw an opportunity for independence, or at least political auton-
omy, in the aftermath of the Sandinista Revolution. The situation was compli-
cated by the presence of the CIA, which sought to exploit the divide. A contra
attack on a Sandinista military outpost in the Rio Coco region near Honduras
in December 1981 prompted the FSLN government to relocate some 8,500
Miskitos and Sumus to a resettlement camp fifty miles south of the border—an
action that FSLN leaders later came to regret. The forced removal along with
FSLN security sweeps, arrests, and unauthorized extrajudicial killings in 1982
led to open war. The FSLN government belatedly recognized its errors and
began a series of negotiations in late 1983 that eventually led to the return of
indigenous peoples to their lands in 1985, and to the Autonomy Statute, enacted
in September 1987, which established a large measure of self-rule for the peoples
of the Atlantic Coast.48
Another contra faction emerged to the south. Sandinista military hero Edén
Pastora Gómez, known as Comandante Cero, defected in July 1981 and was
recruited by the CIA. In April 1982 he announced via radio that he was at war
[ 22 ] CHAPTER 1
with the Sandinistas. His small band of guerrilla fighters based in Costa Rica
remained independent of the larger, Honduran-based FDN, despite repeated
attempts by Washington to bring the two factions together. Pastora abandoned
the fight in 1986 and returned to Nicaragua in 1989.
The FDN, the main contra force, rarely engaged the FSLN military directly.
Its preferred method of “warfare” was to attack weakly defended rural com-
munities deemed pro-Sandinista and kill government civilian workers—doc-
tors, nurses, educators, and local officials. Such tactics were utterly repugnant
to the vast majority of Nicaraguans, as noted by the new U.S. ambassador to
Nicaragua, Anthony Quainton. In a memo dated August 13, 1983, regarding “alle-
gations of a contra massacre,” the ambassador informed the State Department
that Nicaraguan newspapers were full of photographs and eyewitness accounts
of a recent contra ambush of a bus carrying eighteen civilians near the town of
Jinotega two days earlier. Quainton commented, “Incidents such as this in which
unarmed civilians, including women and children, are victims provide invalu-
able grist for the Sandinista propaganda mill. Reports of such activities revive
memories of the brutality of Somoza’s National Guard.”49 Yet contra attacks on
civilians were not occasional incidents but rather the main “war” strategy. As
explained by former contra leader Edgar Chamorro, who left the FDN in the fall
of 1984, in a letter to the New York Times in January 1986: “During my four years
as a ‘Contra’ director, it was premeditated policy to terrorize civilian noncom-
batants to prevent them from cooperating with the Government. Hundreds of
civilian murders, tortures, and rapes were committed in pursuit of this policy, of
which the ‘Contra’ leaders and their C.I.A. superiors were well aware.”50
In addition to arming and directing the contras, the United States conducted
a series of military exercises in the region and constructed military bases and
airfields in Honduras in what appeared to be preparation for a direct U.S. inva-
sion. The Pentagon’s Big Pine II, a six-month military exercise lasting from
September 1983 to February 1984, involved five thousand U.S. soldiers, nine-
teen ships, and over two hundred jet fighters. In early 1984, the United States
employed CIA operatives to destroy oil storage facilities and mine Nicaraguan
harbors, resulting in damages to seven vessels owned by six different nations.
Private U.S. mercenary groups also engaged in attacks. On September 1, 1984,
two members of the paramilitary group Civilian Military Assistance were
killed when their Hughes 500 helicopter was shot down during an attack on a
Nicaraguan military training school in Santa Clara, located between Jalapa and
Ocotal, near the Honduran border. The assault, which reportedly killed four
children, also involved Cessna O-2A airplanes supplied by the CIA. The Reagan
administration disclaimed any responsibility.51
The illegal mining of Nicaraguan harbors prompted an angry Congress to
cut off all aid to the contras in 1984, but the contras nevertheless remained
active in the field through the administration’s illegal fundraising and supply
network, later revealed in the Iran-Contra hearings of 1987. Operating out of the
basement of the White House, Lt. Col. Oliver North and company tapped hid-
den Pentagon funds, sold arms to Iran and used the profits to purchase arms for
the contras. Administration officials also solicited money from other nations,
including $32 million from Saudi Arabia between July 1984 and March 1985.52
Illegal arms supplies notwithstanding, by late 1984 it was clear to adminis-
tration officials that the contras could not oust the FSLN government by
themselves. In a memo to CIA director William Casey in December 1984,
CIA deputy director for intelligence Robert Gates stated that “the contras,
even with American support, cannot overthrow the Sandinista regime.” He
recommended to his superior that the United States initiate air strikes against
Nicaragua and recognize the contras as a government in exile.53 Lt. Col.
North devised a more elaborate contingency plan in July 1985, envisioning a
scenario in which the contras would entice the Sandinista army to chase
them into Honduras, thus providing the necessary justification for a direct
U.S. military response. North deemed U.S. public opposition to such a U.S.
invasion the number-one stumbling block, but not an insurmountable prob-
lem. “The American people currently consider U.S. full-scale military involve-
ment in Nicaragua as unacceptable,” he wrote, but “acceptance of a U.S. inva-
sion of Nicaragua could change drastically should the Sandinista military
invade either Honduras or Costa Rica.”54
As it turned out, plans for direct U.S. military action were kept on the back
burner while the administration pursued a less controversial strategy that com-
bined sustained military pressure by the contras with increased economic pres-
sure and support for internal opposition groups. On May 1, 1985, the Reagan
administration announced an economic embargo against Nicaragua, cutting off
all U.S. trade. Although the embargo hurt private business owners in Nicaragua,
the administration calculated that it would further depress the Nicaraguan
economy and thus undermine popular support for the Sandinistas. As Casey
explained the strategy, speaking before the University Club in Washington,
D.C., on September 18, 1986, “History shows that a combination of nag-
ging insurgent military pressure and progressive withdrawal of domestic and
[ 24 ] CHAPTER 1
international support is what brings down or alters an unpopular government.

. . . The process is already underway in Nicaragua.”55
Casey’s long-term strategy ultimately succeeded, as war and economic hard-
ship made it impossible for the FSLN to deliver on its promises to improve
life for the masses. In February 1990, the Sandinistas were voted out of power,
ironically through the very election machinery they had created during the
1980s. The costs of the eight-year Contra War on Nicaraguans were substan-
tial: approximately 30,000 Nicaraguans killed, thousands more maimed and
wounded, 350,000 internally displaced, and $9 billion in economic damages.
“By any measure,” wrote sociologist Lynn Horton, “Nicaragua’s armed conflict
of the 1980s took a devastating human and economic toll.”56
Scuttle Diplomacy
The Reagan administration had ample opportunity to resolve its security con-
cerns through negotiation, but peaceful coexistence with Sandinista Nicaragua
was not its goal. Ambassador Pezzulo’s last attempt at diplomacy before leaving
his post in August 1981 involved setting up talks between Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders and Sandinista officials in
Managua on August 12–13. The two negotiating parties succeeded in establish-
ing an equation in which Nicaragua would guarantee an end to arms transfers
to Salvadoran guerrillas and limit the size of its armed forces in exchange for a
pledge of nonintervention from the United States. Nicaraguan foreign minis-
ter Miguel d’Escoto proposed a joint international patrol along the Honduras-
Nicaraguan border to verify that no arms were being transferred. Senior Reagan
administration officials, however, would have nothing to do with either the
Enders agreement or d’Escoto’s practical suggestion, as they were organizing
the contras into military units at that very time.
Nor was the administration interested in a proposal by Mexican president
José López Portillo in February 1982 that followed along the same lines as the
Enders talks and required the closing of contra camps. The European Parliament
endorsed the Mexican proposal and over one hundred members of the House of
Representatives signed a letter to President Reagan urging acceptance; but the
hard-liners in the Reagan administration, according to Latin American special-
ist William M. LeoGrande, “sought to delay the talks as long as possible, insist-
ing, as they had the previous summer, on an agenda of demands the Sandinistas
would reject.”57 These demands included imbalanced security proposals, such
that the Sandinistas would disarm while the United States would only consider
altering its interventionist policies, and requirements that the Sandinistas nego-
tiate power-sharing with the contras. According to political scientist Kenneth
E. Sharpe, the Reagan administration was opposed to any negotiated settlement
“that recognized the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan government. By destroying
all other alternatives, the contras were made to seem the only alternative.”58
In January 1983 the foreign ministers of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and
Panama launched a regional peace initiative known as Contadora, named for
the island off Panama where the diplomats met. In September 1984 a break-
through occurred when five Central American presidents agreed to a draft
treaty that required the cessation of all outside support for “irregular forces
and armed bands” (e.g., U.S. support for the contras) and banned foreign
military bases, schools, and exercises in the region.59 FSLN leaders signed the
treaty on condition that Washington support it without change. “Prospects for
the treaty seemed excellent at first,” noted political scientist Peter H. Smith.
“The United Nations, the OAS, and the European Community all expressed
their strong support.” Caught off guard, the administration sent Secretary of
State George Shultz to the capitals of Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, and
Guatemala to pressure the respective leaders to modify the treaty. As Smith put
it, “Washington set out to scuttle the plan.”60 Administration officials ultimately
succeeded in persuading Honduras to insist on adjustments to the treaty, which
effectively destroyed it.
A renewed effort to advance the Contadora peace process began in July 1985,
when Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, and Peru formed the Contadora Support
Group. Together with the original Contadora nations, the eight governments
represented 85 percent of the population of Latin America. Diplomatic nego-
tiations eventually led to a peace treaty signed by five Central American presi-
dents at Esquipulas, Guatemala, on August 7, 1987. Costa Rican president Oscar
Arias played a key role in pressuring all sides to compromise. The agreement
required a cessation of all outside support for guerrilla forces and stipulated
that the Sandinistas hold talks with the contras. The Reagan administration,
caught off guard again, could not undo this treaty but nevertheless managed to
sabotage it by not complying with the requirement that it cease support for the
contras. According to Rep. James M. Jeffords, a moderate Republican congress-
man from Vermont who lobbied the White House to support the Arias peace
plan, “Our government undermined that agreement almost immediately.”61
Washington’s scuttle diplomacy was accompanied by an Orwellian public-
ity campaign that proclaimed the administration’s ardent desire for a peaceful
[ 26 ] CHAPTER 1
settlement and blamed the Sandinistas for any lack of progress at the negotiat-
ing table. This public performance was largely designed to convince Congress
to continue appropriating contra aid. At a meeting of the National Security
Planning Group on June 25, 1984, President Reagan expressed the view that “if
we are just talking about negotiations with Nicaragua, that is so far-fetched to
imagine that a communist government like that would make any reasonable
deal with us, but if it is to get Congress to support the anti-Sandinistas, then
that can be helpful.”62
FSLN leaders, for their part, believed that they had made reasonable con-
cessions. They had guaranteed that there would be no arms transfers from
Nicaragua and called for joint border patrols; they had pledged not to allow
any Soviet or Cuban bases on Nicaraguan soil; and they had refrained from
importing Soviet warplanes. Beyond these concessions, however, they asserted
the right to defend themselves against a foreign-supported insurgency operat-
ing out of bases in neighboring states. Foreign Minister d’Escoto quipped that
the U.S. position amounted to “You drop dead or else I kill you.”63
When, at times, negotiations progressed despite administration intransi-
gence, U.S. officials fell back on the fail-safe argument that the Sandinistas could
not be trusted to carry out any agreement. As Assistant Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs Elliot Abrams said in August 1985, “It is preposterous
to think we could sign a deal with the Sandinistas and expect it to be kept.”64
Again, in January 1988 a State Department official remarked, “Our basic strategy
doesn’t change. It is to persuade Congress that Ortega cannot be trusted and
there is a need to maintain [contra] aid as an insurance policy.”65 Negotiations,
in short, would never be allowed to undermine U.S. support for the contras.
Internal Intervention
The Reagan administration’s strategy for ousting the Sandinistas depended in
part on encouraging and manipulating opposition groups within Nicaragua.
Subsidies to opposition groups were provided through the CIA and the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED). NED was created in late 1983 for
the ostensible purpose of promoting democracy in Nicaragua, thus allowing
Congress to openly fund the agency. Between 1984 and 1988 NED provided
about $2 million in grants to Nicaraguan opposition groups, with La Prensa
receiving the largest amount. Funds were channeled through various U.S. orga-
nizations and institutes, including the AFL-CIO’s American Institute for Free
Labor Development, then became difficult to trace in Nicaragua, as recipient
groups did not want it known that they were receiving money from the U.S.
government.66 Cardinal Obando y Bravo denied receiving any U.S. funds, but
Fr. Frederico Argüello, a priest close to Obando, acknowledged the receipt of
substantial sums from unnamed sources “to help the church and the poor.”67
The Reagan administration also provided Nicaraguan radio stations with
anti-Sandinista programming through the Voice of America (VOA). A VOA
report in July 1983 noted that the agency “regularly supplies programming based
on VOA broadcasts and taped package programs to 14 Nicaraguan radio sta-
tions, 12 of which are in Managua. Radio Catolica is regularly supplied with
seven package programs and with Correspondents’ Feed material.”68 Whether
this VOA programming won any hearts and minds in Nicaragua is another mat-
ter. After listening to VOA broadcasts on February 6 and 16, 1985, Spanish writer
Teófilo Cabestrero remarked on the surreal quality of hearing President Reagan
describe the contras as “fighters for freedom and democracy” amidst almost
daily news reports of contra murders, kidnappings, and rapes.69
The Reagan administration’s efforts to foment opposition from within and
counterrevolution from without had a predictable effect in pushing the FSLN
government to clamp down on opposition groups and the press. On March 15,
1982, the Junta decreed a state of emergency that limited habeas corpus rights
and suspended freedom of the press, the right to strike, and the right to organize
anti-Sandinista demonstrations. Some FSLN cadres went further and took it
upon themselves to root out suspected subversives. In August 1982, for example,
Sandinista activists occupied local churches they believed to be “part of a CIA-
orchestrated campaign of ideological subversion of the revolution.”70 In July
1984 the FSLN government loosened restrictions on public activities in order to
allow for political campaigning. Diplomatic historian Mark T. Gilderhus, sum-
marized the Sandinistas’ mixed human rights record: “During the contra war
the Sandinistas refrained from systematic repression of the opposition but not
from periodic harassment. Their government compiled a mixed record: It cen-
sored the main opposition newspaper, La Prensa, and also radio broadcasts put
on by the Roman Catholic Church, yet opposition parties ran candidates in the
1984 elections and also participated in writing the new constitution. And their
wartime restrictions on civil liberties never resulted in the wholesale abuses so
common in El Salvador, Guatemala, and formerly in Somoza’s Nicaragua.”71
In the Nicaraguan national elections held on November 4, 1984, seven political
parties participated. The FSLN won 63 percent of the national vote and sixty-one
of ninety seats in the national assembly. Three non-Marxist parties won a total
[ 28 ] CHAPTER 1
twenty-nine seats, and the three socialist and communist parties (not associated
with the FSLN) won a total of six seats. Some 1,000 foreign journalists and 450
official observers from thirty-five countries were on hand to observe the elec-
tions.72 Among the official observers were fifteen U.S. scholars affiliated with the
Latin American Studies Association (LASA). LASA delegates met with repre-
sentatives of all political parties, electoral officials, government officials, and lead-
ers from different sectors of society during their week-long stay. The final LASA
report concluded, “Clearly, the Nicaraguan electoral process in 1984 was manipu-
lated, as the U.S. Government so often charged. However, the manipulation was
not the work of the Sandinistas—who had every interest in making these elec-
tions as demonstrably fair, pluralistic, and competitive as possible—but of the
Reagan Administration, whose interest apparently was in making the elections
seem as unfair, ideologically one-sided, and uncompetitive as possible.”73
The Reagan administration attempted to sabotage the elections in part
by pressuring its favored presidential candidate, Arturo Cruz, to pull out of
the race, which he did.74 On the very day of the elections, the administration
“revealed” to the press that Soviet fighter planes were arriving in Nicaragua.
The charge was baseless but nonetheless served to divert U.S. media attention
from the elections. Administration officials also declared on that day that “any
agreement on security issues must be linked to moves toward democratic rule,”
implying that no democratic elections were taking place.75 In the final analysis,
the Reagan administration’s support for “democracy” in Nicaragua, like its sup-
port for diplomatic negotiations, was a chimera, as its single-minded goal was
the removal of the Sandinistas from power. As Alejandro Bendaña, an official in
the Nicaraguan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1984–1990), described it, “The U.S.
would support the results of a ‘free’ election only if its own side won.”76
CHAPTER 2
An Overview of the Contra War Debate
U . S. aid to the contras began in secret, but once exposed in the

media, the Reagan administration went to great lengths to win
public and congressional approval. President Reagan delivered three nationally
televised addresses on Central America or Nicaragua (April 27, 1983, May 9, 1984,
and March 16, 1986)—apart from three more on the Iran-Contra affair—and
twenty-two radio addresses with a major focus on Nicaragua. Top administra-
tion officials also spoke out, the State Department issued a series of background
papers, and two new agencies were created in 1983 to promote administration
views far and wide: the White House Outreach Group, headed by Faith Ryan
Whittlesey, and the State Department Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin
America and the Caribbean (S/LPD), headed by Otto Reich. The rationale
for the creation of these agencies was set forth in a confidential strategy paper
dated May 5, 1983. “Our Central American policy is facing an essentially apa-
thetic and in some particulars hostile U.S. public,” the report stated. The cause
of this apathy and opposition was traced to the news media, which was report-
ing “on the alleged U.S.-backed ‘covert’ war against the Sandinistas” rather than
on “the repression of pluralism by the Sandinistas.” It was thus necessary “to
shift the focus of public debate,” the report concluded.1
Nineteen months later, the Office of Public Diplomacy was able to report
progress: “S/LPD has maintained a considerable and sustained media educa-
tion program through briefings and backgrounders, which attained a significant
[ 29 ]
[ 30 ] CHAPTER 2
measure of success and are extremely well received by the media,” stated a
December 1984 report. “On several occasions S/LPD has ‘killed’ erroneous
news stories by providing correct data or information about events before major
news networks have broadcast.” The report also noted that between October
1, 1983, and November 23, 1984, S/LPD had sponsored 1,870 speaking engage-
ments and interviews in over 1,000 U.S. cities and towns and had distributed
information to private organizations so as to create “a multiplier effect for the
distribution of our message.”2 The White House Outreach Group, meanwhile,
had enlisted conservative business, labor, religious, and veterans’ groups in a
Washington-led effort to generate grassroots pressure on Congress. According
to the Washington Post (August 10, 1983), some “150 organizations have partici-
pated in weekly ‘outreach’ meetings in the Executive Office Building in which
prominent administration officials, including the president, have been featured
speakers.” Both the White House Outreach Group and S/LPD reported to a
special planning group within the National Security Council, established in
January 1983 for the purpose of “overall planning, direction, coordination, and
monitoring of implementation of public diplomacy activities.”3
The Reagan administration also recruited anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans to
make its case. For example, a conference was held in Washington on July 19,
1983, the fourth anniversary of the Sandinista triumph, in which anti-Sandini-
sta Nicaraguan labor leaders, journalists, and opposition party leaders were
brought in to hobnob with members of Congress and the media. Also attending
were FDN Director Adolfo Calero and UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick. The
conference took place in the Dirksen Senate Office Building and was officially
sponsored by the Ad Hoc Committee for Democracy in Nicaragua, a coali-
tion of over thirty pro-Reagan organizations.4 In the fall of 1984, S/LPD hired
International Business Communications (IBC) to conduct a speaking tour in
the Northeast of anti-Sandinista Central Americans, stipulating, “It is under-
stood that I.B.C. will strive to obtain local sponsorship for the largest possible
number of program events in order to project an image of grassroots support
and involvement with respect to the message being transmitted.” The Office of
the Inspector General later determined that $84,000 in payments to IBC should
be recovered by the U.S. government, due to the inappropriate use of taxpayer
funds to influence the U.S. public and Congress.5
An Overview of the Contra War Debate [ 31 ]
Administration Themes and Arguments
The major themes and arguments advanced by the Reagan administration fell
into three main categories: security issues, the nature of the Sandinista govern-
ment, and the role of the contras. Security issues were framed in the Cold War
context, such that Nicaragua was said to be an “outpost of the Soviet empire,”
“exporting revolution,” and engaged in a military buildup beyond its defensive
needs. The heralded Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central
America ( January 1984), chaired by former national security adviser Henry
Kissinger, added the issue of U.S. “credibility,” warning that the “triumph of hos-
tile forces in what the Soviets call the ‘strategic rear’ of the United States would
be read as a sign of U.S. impotence.”6 The United States, in other words, had to
maintain hegemonic control over Central America in order to be considered a
credible superpower.
Although there was also no legal basis whatsoever in domestic or interna-
tional law that justified foreign military intervention for the purpose of bringing
freedom and democracy to a nation, the administration made it appear so by
highlighting the real and imagined abuses of the Sandinista government. “There
seems to be no crime to which the Sandinistas will not stoop—this is an out-
law regime,” declared Reagan in a televised address to the nation on March 16,
1986. “Could there be any greater tragedy than for us to sit back and permit
this cancer to spread, leaving my successor to face far more agonizing decisions
in the years ahead?”7 In contrast to the dark, foreboding picture drawn of the
Sandinistas, the contras were painted in the bright colors of American ideal-
ism. Administration officials hailed the contras as democratic reformers, “free-
dom fighters,” heroes, and “our brothers.”8 President Reagan told the American
people at various times that it was “our moral responsibility” to aid the contras;
that the United States had the “moral authority” to do so; that subduing the
Sandinistas constituted “a great moral challenge for the entire free world”; and
that the contras were the “moral equivalent of our founding fathers.”9 The over-
all theme for propagation was summarized in the S/LPD “Public Diplomacy
Action Plan,” dated March 12, 1985: “The Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters are
fighters for freedom in the American tradition; FSLN are evil.”10
Once the administration had established these themes, it was loath to alter
them, as any acknowledgment of improvement in the security situation, of
progress in democracy in Sandinista Nicaragua, or of evidence of contra atroci-
ties would weaken its case for contra aid before Congress and the public.
[ 32 ] CHAPTER 2
Ideological Underpinnings
The salience of administration’s themes and arguments depended in large
part on three overlapping conceptual frameworks: hegemonic assumptions
regarding the U.S. role in Central America, Cold War ideology, and military
patriotism. Americans who embraced these frameworks tended to support the
Reagan administration’s policies in Central America, although other consider-
ations could affect this.
Hegemonic assumptions were implicit in the idea that the United States had
the right and responsibility to intervene in Nicaragua—in the 1920s as well as in
the 1980s. Typical of the administration’s thinking was an S/LPD strategy paper
in March 1984, which declared that the United States would not allow any “foreign
inspired and supported insurgency” in Central America, as if the U.S.-supported
contra insurgency were not exactly that.11 Similarly, in November 1987 President
Reagan stated in his weekly radio address, without a hint of irony, that the Contra
War was “a Nicaraguan conflict that should be resolved by Nicaraguans.”12 U.S.
intervention in Nicaragua, in short, was not considered foreign intervention at
all. Nicaragua was colloquially referred to as “our backyard,” a sphere of influence
that the United States had the right to dominate. U.S. leaders did not explicitly
acknowledge the principle of hegemony because this would mean recognizing
the “right” of the Soviet Union to dominate its self-declared sphere of influence
in Eastern Europe.
Hard-line Cold War ideology reinforced U.S. hegemonic assumptions by
linking Sandinista Nicaragua to despotic “communism” and by grafting the
counterrevolutionary mission of the contras onto what many believed to be
the global mission of the United States—to promote freedom and democ-
racy abroad. Within this ideological framework, it was virtually impossible to
believe that the Marxist Sandinistas could hold free and fair elections or that
the United States could sponsor terrorism in Nicaragua. The grafting began
with the president’s first major address on Central America on April 27, 1983,
in which the words “free” or “freedom” were used thirty-three times. Reagan
declared that the United States was protecting the “free world,” defending free-
dom in the Caribbean basin, facing the “challenge to freedom and security in
our own hemisphere,” and supporting freedom fighters, freedom of religion, a
free press, freedom of speech, free labor unions, free institutions, free elections,
and “freedom from political oppression.”13
Closely allied with Cold War ideology was a patriotic view of America’s role
in the world, in which U.S. foreign policy was regarded a priori as benevolent and
protective, irrespective of intentions, interests, and actual results. According to
this view, the more power and influence the United States acquired, the more the
world benefited. At root, this view conflated national identity with high moral
principles, such that the nation and its foreign policies were assumed to embody
those principles. Some military patriots took this further and decried any criti-
cism of U.S. wars and foreign policies as “un-American.” President Reagan came
close to this in accusing his Contra War critics of being in league with “Sandinista
Communists” and “running a sophisticated disinformation campaign of lies and
distortion.”14 More subtly, the “Reagan revolution” sought to diminish citizen
attachment to the liberal social welfare state in favor of the patriotic military state,
accompanied by a shift in government spending from domestic to military pro-
grams (the military budget nearly doubled between 1981 and 1986). The bonds of
national unity were to be constructed, not on the basis of mutual support, but on
the basis of the nation’s military strength and global influence, on Pax Americana.
Ronald Reagan, christened the “Great Communicator” in the press, was able
to invoke these ideological themes and assumptions by using appealing and
understandable language, but their resonance depended more fundamentally on
having been historically affixed to the American identity and outlook by past
presidents and policymakers. Reagan’s speech on April 27, 1983, took its cue from
President Harry Truman’s famous speech on March 12, 1947, which first set forth
the Cold War framework. Truman warned that if the United States stood by and
allowed a communist victory in Greece, that nation would disappear “as an inde-
pendent state . . . disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East
. . . and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation.”15 Reagan simi-
larly warned that if the United States remained passive in Central America, that
region would be “delivered to totalitarianism,” followed by the “destabilization
of an entire region from the Panama Canal to Mexico on our southern border
. . . and we ourselves are left vulnerable to new dangers.”16 Both speeches ignored
salient facts-on-the-ground in the interest of framing the issue as a mythological
battle between freedom and totalitarianism. Truman failed to mention that the
Greek communists had previously participated in the Greek legislature before
the British-supported royalist government engaged in a wave of repression. He
labeled the communist-led faction “terrorist,” while according the British-backed
royalist government the potential for becoming a “self-respecting democracy.”
Reagan administration officials similarly identified rightist authoritarian regimes
as potentially democratic, while denying this possibility to leftist governments.
[ 34 ] CHAPTER 2
The salience of Truman’s message at the time depended in large part on Ameri-
cans’ recent experience in World War II. Truman used the word “communist”
only once in his speech but repeated the phrase “totalitarian regimes” four times.
If most Americans were hazy on the details of the Greek situation, they under-
stood well the idea of opposing totalitarian nations such as Nazi Germany.
Truman’s Cold War ideology essentially placed the Soviet Union into a preset
“enemy” image that had been solidified in World War II. It was thus unnecessary
to define or explain “communism” precisely, as the Soviet regime served as an
adequate negative image. This lack of clear definition allowed Truman and subse-
quent administrations to conflate real and imagined “communist threats” with a
variety of developments: national liberation movements in Asia and Africa, leftist
revolutions and reform governments in Latin America, democratic communist
and socialist parties in France and Italy, coalition governments that included com-
munists, governments receiving military aid from the Soviet Union, and groups
holding Marxist beliefs. Virtually any left-of-center challenge to U.S. economic
interests, political influence, or military power was labeled a “communist threat.”
Cold War ideology reigned in U.S. foreign policymaking for a generation,
but came under duress in the 1970s, allowing for a shift toward liberal for-
eign policies and views. The lengthy and unwinnable Vietnam War imposed a
sense of caution regarding possible interventions in the future—the “Vietnam
syndrome.” The policy of détente implemented by the Nixon administration
challenged hard-line anticommunist views as “peaceful coexistence” proved
possible after all. In the mid-1970s Congress enacted laws ending the CIA’s
secret involvement in Angola, prohibiting CIA assassinations, and establishing
human rights standards for U.S. foreign aid. President Jimmy Carter secured a
new Panama Canal treaty (a symbolic return to the Good Neighbor Policy),
endorsed human rights principles, and worked with other nations to fashion
the Law of the Sea Treaty under the United Nations. Granted that the Carter
administration abandoned détente in the wake of the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan in December 1979, the liberal legacy continued into the next decade.
Popular antipathy toward U.S. interventionism remained strong; human rights
standards and CIA restrictions remained on the books; and continuing friendly
relations between the United States and Communist China undermined the
“domino theory” of communist world domination.
Reagan’s vociferous revival of Cold War ideology in the early 1980s was aimed
at overcoming the liberal legacy of the previous decade and restoring the ideologi-
cal fundamentalism of the pre–Vietnam War era. In reinterpreting the Vietnam
War as a “noble cause” that “should have been won,” Reagan sought to wash away
any questions of guilt arising from the deaths of two million Vietnamese people.17
He derided détente as a ruse and once again interpreted diverse conflicts in the
Third World as evidence of the Kremlin’s desire for global domination. “Let us
not delude ourselves,” said Reagan while on the campaign trail in June 1980. “The
Soviet Union underlies all the unrest that is going on. If they weren’t engaged in
this game of dominoes, there wouldn’t be any hotspots in the world.”18 As presi-
dent, Reagan embarked on an aggressive rollback strategy that involved U.S. covert
support for guerrilla factions in Nicaragua, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique,
and Cambodia, countries either led by Marxist governments or embroiled in civil
wars. In his State of the Union Address in January 1984, Reagan cast his policies as
part of a “crusade for renewal” in which the United States has “the will to defend
peace and freedom.”19 Winning the Contra War in Nicaragua would presumably
redeem America from its fall in Vietnam.
Definitions
As the terms rightist, conservative, liberal, and leftist are commonly used here, it
is necessary to briefly define these perspectives in the context of the Cold War
debate in the United States. The following definitions reflect approximate pol-
icy orientations (and are personified for convenience); the views of actual par-
ties may overlap or integrate different aspects, thus producing modifications.20
The rightist position in the Cold War debate was that of “rollback,” rolling
back “communist” influence. This was mainly applied in the developing world
(e.g., the Reagan Doctrine) rather than in Eastern Europe. Rightists tended
to view international power politics as a zero-sum game: if the United States
did not assert control in a given region, the Soviet Union and its allies would;
hence, it was better for the United States to dominate. This was also the logic of
past empires, which sought peace by defeating all rivals—Pax Romana.
The conservative position was that of “containment,” which aimed to hold
the line against “communist expansion” without catalyzing nuclear war. Con-
servative “realists” were more cognizant than their rightist allies of the limits
of U.S. military and economic resources, and thus they aspired to construct
a world order in which U.S. “vital interests” would be safeguarded through
realpolitik alliances, global economic arrangements, and military intervention
when necessary. Conservatives were leery of ideological crusades but nonethe-
less dependent upon Cold War ideology to engender the requisite public sup-
port for America’s demanding “world policeman” role.
[ 36 ] CHAPTER 2
The liberal position in the Cold War debate was that of “peaceful coexis-
tence” with communist nations, a view predicated on the recognition of our
common humanity (rather than national loyalties). The liberal position has
often been misunderstood, in part because of references to “Cold War liber-
als” such as Truman, who were liberal on domestic issues but conservative on
foreign policy matters.21 Liberals advocated tolerance of different economic sys-
tems, support for the United Nations, human rights principles (not conflated
with national self-interest), and a “good neighbor policy” with Latin America.
The leftist position in the Cold War debate was barely audible in Washington
but could be heard among dissident groups and, more tentatively, in academia.
Leftists envisioned a fundamental reordering of economic priorities toward a
more equal distribution of economic resources and political power. Without this
redistribution, they argued, revolutionary turmoil was inevitable—and some
welcomed turmoil as an opportunity to establish ideal societies. (Conflicting
views within the left are discussed in the next chapter.)
The Reagan administration’s foreign policy was largely a product of right-
ist and conservative orientations. William LeoGrande, in Our Own Backyard:
The United States in Central America, 1977–1992 (1998), identified these fac-
tions respectively as “hardliners” and “pragmatists.” The hardliners, he wrote,
“were opposed to any diplomatic accord that left the Sandinistas in power,”
while the pragmatists were willing to pursue negotiations if “traditional U.S.
security interests . . . could be reasonably safeguarded by diplomatic compro-
mise.” President Reagan and his top staff were of the “hardliner” group and had
the final word on Central America policy. Representing the liberal view were
Democrats who rejected “Reagan’s Manichaean conception of international
affairs” and “pointed to the nearly universal opposition to U.S. policy among
allies in Latin America and Western Europe.” Whatever the differences between
“hardliners” and “pragmatists,” noted LeoGrande, “both regarded the policy
prescriptions of the liberal Democrats in Congress as anathema.”22 The ACWC
was largely a product of liberal and leftist orientations.
Themes and Arguments of the Anti–Contra War Campaign
Critics of the Contra War necessarily responded to administration claims and

rationales, but they also sought to establish their own line of discourse, tak-
ing the offensive in the debate. The ACWC had no overarching coordinating
agency equivalent to the Office of Public Diplomacy, but participating groups

shared information and resources, held common educational events, and pro-
moted common “talking points.”
The major themes advanced by Contra War opponents are divided here into
seven categories. Because the opponents differed in their thematic priorities and
emphases, the themes are discussed in the order of their perceived receptivity
in Congress and the mainstream media.23 The first three themes—administra-
tion violations of the law, the Vietnam analogy, and the need for diplomacy—
garnered enough support in Congress to compel the Reagan administration to
claim it was abiding by all U.S. laws, would not send U.S. troops into Nicaragua,
and was pursuing negotiations in good faith. The fourth theme of contra terror-
ism became a hot issue in Congress and the media in 1985, but faded into the
background thereafter. The fifth theme of self-determination under international
law had a marginal effect on U.S. policymakers and opinion leaders, but rein-
forced international opposition to the Contra War. The sixth theme concern-
ing the positive nature of the Sandinista reform program was strongly advanced
by some segments of the ACWC, but not by others; it was largely rejected by
the mainstream media and Congress, but nonetheless generated considerable
grassroots interest in Nicaragua and facilitated transnational solidarity work.
The last theme involving broad challenges to Cold War ideology and hegemonic
assumptions also gained little traction in the mainstream media and Congress.
Its importance lay in establishing an alternative framework for understanding
the Central American situation and in contributing to long-enduring efforts to
cultivate a progressive peace consciousness in the body politic.
Violations of U.S. Laws

During the 1970s, Congress enacted a number of laws designed to rein in the
“imperial presidency” and ensure democratic accountability in foreign poli-
cymaking.24 The Reagan administration sought to reverse this trend in general
and, more specifically, to avoid congressional oversight of its Nicaragua policy
insofar as possible.
Democratic accountability was not the most pressing issue for most anti–
Contra War groups, but it was a concern, and it provided a lever for challenging
the administration’s overall Nicaragua policy. ACWC groups along with civic
groups such as Common Cause charged the administration with violating a num-
ber of U.S. laws. According to a sixteen-page paper produced by the Central
America Historical Institute in Washington, D.C., “Arguments and Evidence:
[ 38 ] CHAPTER 2
Ten Talking Points against Contra Aid” (1987), the laws broken included the
Boland amendments of 1982 and 1984, the Neutrality Act of 1794, the Arms
Export Control Act of 1976, constitutional requirements (Art. I, Sec. 9) regard-
ing the handling of appropriated funds, and the Executive Order on Intelligence
Activities (EO 12333) prohibiting direct or indirect U.S. participation in assas-
sinations.25 A sixty-eight-page booklet published by the Institute for Policy
Studies, In Contempt of Congress: The Reagan Record of Deceit & Illegality on
Central America (1985), contrasted the “claims made by Reagan officials before
Congress and the reality of U.S. policy,” highlighting the lies and deceptions
accompanying violations of the law.26 The National Lawyers Guild and other
groups sponsored the public “War Crimes Tribunal on Central America and
the Caribbean” in New York City in October 1984, which gathered testimony
on administration illegalities and “the human suffering caused by U.S. mili-
tary activities.”27 The findings were delivered to the United Nations Center for
Human Rights.
The mainstream media proved to be an ally of the ACWC on this particu-
lar theme. In early 1982 the press revealed leaked government documents that
made the covert war overt and questioned the official rationale for contra aid
(interdicting arms transfers). In September 1984 newspapers reported that the
administration was secretly raising millions of dollars for the contras from pri-
vate sources and foreign governments. From 1984 through 1986 there were peri-
odic probes into the administration’s illegal supply line to the contras, although
this did not become a scandal until October 1986.28 These exposés embarrassed
and angered the administration but did not rise to the level of challenging over-
all administration policy.
Administration illegalities had a direct bearing on the Contra War debate
in Congress. News reports of the CIA’s mining of Nicaraguan harbors in April
1984 prompted a cutoff of aid that year. Speaker of the House Thomas Phillip
“Tip” O’Neill decried Reagan’s policy toward Nicaragua as “morally and legally
indefensible.”29 Rep. David Bonior (D-MI), chair of the House Democratic
Task Force on Central America, spoke for many liberals in charging that “the
drive to wage this war has led the administration to bypass our system of checks
and balances, to ignore the Constitution of the United States, and to subvert
the law of the land.”30 Congressional investigations into the Iran-Contra affair
in 1987 confirmed what many ACWC activists and their Nicaraguan contacts
had long been saying—that the administration never ceased to arm and direct
the contras. Sen. David Durenberger (R-MN), chair of the Senate Intelligence
Committee, found the administration’s lack of accountability so troubling that

he broke with his party on this issue and voted against contra aid in 1988.31 For
most Republicans and conservative Democrats, however, the procedural tres-
passes of the administration were not enough to invalidate other reasons for
supporting contras.
One reason for the lower priority assigned to this theme by most ACWC
groups was that most activists were not accustomed to being champions of law
and order. Many, after all, supported or engaged in nonviolent civil disobedi-
ence actions such as offering sanctuary for illegal refugees or conducting “sit-
ins” at congressional offices. Those who embraced civil disobedience generally
saw themselves as operating on a higher moral plane, their goal being to bring
the nation’s laws into conformity with their moral vision—“divine obedience,”
as religious activists called it. Lt. Col. Oliver North and other administration
officials similarly disobeyed laws for a higher cause in their own minds, the cause
being to fight communism. Activist civil disobedience, however, was not life
threatening and did not undermine the constitutional division of powers.
Lessons from Vietnam

Central America activist groups employed the Vietnam analogy as a wake-
up call to rekindle public antipathy toward interventionism. In May 1983, for
example, activist groups sponsored a demonstration, the Call to Action, in
Washington, DC, under the banner of “No Vietnam War in Central America.”
A newspaper advertisement for this demonstration quoted Lyndon Johnson
as saying “We seek no wider war,” followed by a quote from Ronald Reagan:
“There is no thought of sending American combat troops to Central America.”32
The message was clear: protest now in order to avoid “another Vietnam.”
Both leftist and liberal groups within the Central America movement pro-
moted this theme, recognizing its salience in mainstream America. In the
summer of 1983 the solidarity group Committee in Support of the People of
El Salvador (CISPES) adopted the poster board slogan “No Vietnam War in
Central America,” while the liberal peace group SANE issued press statements
to the effect that continued funding of the contras would lead down the slip-
pery slope to direct U.S. involvement. However salient this theme, it was defi-
cient in one important respect for the ACWC, as it did not directly address the
Contra War. Preventing the introduction of U.S. troops, in other words, would
not stop the contras from wreaking havoc in Nicaragua. When played up as the
leading theme, as in the 1984 Central America Peace Campaign’s slogan “Talks
[ 40 ] CHAPTER 2
Not Troops,” the impression could be given that, as long as U.S. troops were not
sent, the situation was under control. For the most part, ACWC groups avoided
giving this impression by blending the theme with others, particularly contra
atrocities, that spoke directly to U.S. support for the contras.
Fears of a direct U.S. invasion of Nicaragua rose dramatically in the wake of
the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983. Many U.S. citizens—and most
Nicaraguans—believed that Nicaragua was the next target. Activists organized
the Pledge of Resistance in early 1984, preparing for massive demonstrations
and civil disobedience actions so as to deter such an invasion. The idea of pre-
venting a direct invasion was also behind legislation introduced by Sen. Edward
M. Kennedy (D-MA) that year, which called for a ban on the funding of U.S.
combat forces in El Salvador or Nicaragua unless Congress declared war. The
bill was defeated in the Senate, 63–31. A similar bill in the House passed, 341–64,
but the House-Senate conference committee diluted the language to a non-
binding advisory to the president, which predictably had no effect. Concerns
were also expressed in and out of Congress about the stationing of U.S. mili-
tary forces in Honduras and nearby waters, which began in October 1981. By
June 1984, Kennedy noted, the United States had over a thousand troops in
Honduras on a sustained basis and U.S. personnel were operating ships in the
Pacific from which U.S. operatives were mining harbors and conducting raids.33
Rep. Clarence Long (D-MD) expressed anxiety over these military maneuvers,
saying, “My worry is that this will provoke an incident, a ‘sinking of the Maine,’
that will force us into action.”34
The Reagan administration, for its part, attempted to turn the Vietnam anal-
ogy to its advantage by declaring that U.S. troops would not be needed in
Nicaragua as long as the contras received adequate funding. Secretary of State
George Shultz, speaking to the American Bar Association on May 23, 1985,
warned that if members of Congress did not approve renewed aid to the con-
tras, “they are hastening the day when the threat will grow, and we will be faced
with an agonizing choice about the use of U.S. combat troops.”35 The adminis-
tration’s transparent strategy was designed to narrow the choice to two options:
fund the contras or send in U.S. troops. Activists took the possibility of a U.S.
invasion very seriously, in part because the Reagan administration suffered little
domestic political fallout from the invasion of Grenada. The anti-intervention-
ist “lesson of Vietnam” proved more porous than many had thought. U.S. citi-
zens were not anti-interventionist per se, it seems, but only wanted to avoid
“no-win” wars and large numbers of U.S. casualties. The quick U.S. victory in
Grenada, achieved with relatively few U.S. casualties, slipped under the radar of
the liberal-left “lesson of Vietnam.” With regard to Nicaragua, however, the pos-
sibility of a quagmire did exist, as the Sandinista government, with much popu-
lar support, promised fierce resistance.
Diplomacy over War

The theme of diplomacy-over-war became the standard liberal position in the
Contra War debate, invoked by religious leaders, liberal Democrats in Congress,
governments abroad, and ACWC groups. The American Lutheran church, to
take one example, passed a resolution in June 1983 urging the U.S. government
to support the “resolution of conflicts in Central America through non-military
means” and to suspend “both covert and overt actions seeking to destabilize the
government of Nicaragua.” Similarly, Catholic archbishop James A. Hickey testi-
fied before a congressional hearing on March 17, 1983: “The bishops of the United
States called in November 1981 for a U.S. policy that would engage Nicaragua dip-
lomatically, not isolate it. . . . In contrast to this recommendation of positive diplo-
matic engagement, U.S. policy toward Nicaragua presently has the effect of deep-
ening the internal crises in the country and escalating the dangers of war in the
region.” In October 1983 Catholic archbishop John R. Quinn of the Archdiocese
of San Francisco wrote in a pastoral letter, “The position of the Bishops of the U.S.
on Central America is clear and consistent: it affirms the need for a political and
diplomatic solution in Central America, not a military solution.”36
Beyond advocating the principle of peaceful diplomacy, Contra War oppo-
nents educated themselves and their communities on the particulars of nego-
tiations—the issues, changing positions, arguments and rationales, and pro-
cedures involved. Such knowledge was necessary if they were to effectively
counter the Reagan administration’s claim that it was negotiating in good
faith. To aid the educational process, various policy-oriented groups—the
Central America Historical Institute, Institute for Policy Studies, Center for
International Policy, and others—produced easy-to-read reports that were dis-
tributed through activist and religious networks. The Center for International
Policy, for example, produced two eight-page primers, “Contadora: The Treaty
on Balance” (September 1984) and “Arias Primer” ( June 1987), both providing
information on the progress of negotiations.
Most Latin American and Western European leaders strongly endorsed peace-
ful negotiations. Indeed, their advice to the president was exactly opposite that
of the Kissinger Commission, which called for a strong U.S. hand in Central
[ 42 ] CHAPTER 2
America. “The European allies of the U.S. shared neither its analysis of the prob-
lem nor its response,” noted one scholarly critique. “As European involvement
increased in the region, it tended to support Latin American diplomatic efforts.”37
Latin American diplomatic efforts lent support to congressional opponents of
contra aid by providing an alternative policy they could support. In March 1986
the House Democratic Caucus reiterated its support for the Contadora peace
process in a nineteen-page position paper, which declared that U.S. policy “must
be centered on diplomacy and the search for negotiated political solutions to the
region’s conflicts, rather than on the use of force.”38
One reason for the popularity of this theme was that it could be advocated
without a radical critique of U.S. foreign policy or a favorable attitude toward
the Sandinistas. As an example of the latter, the editors of the New York Times
published an editorial on November 7, 1984, in which they flatly rejected the
validity of the Nicaraguan elections held three days earlier but nevertheless
argued that internal developments within Nicaragua could not “serve as justifi-
cation for U.S. policy. . . . The political contest can be fought by diplomacy and
economic means. It does not warrant U.S. sponsored invasion or terrorism.”39
Contra Terrorism
What infused ACWC activists with the most energy, outrage, and determina-
tion to educate their fellow citizens was the theme of contra terrorism—sys-
tematic contra attacks against civilians. A decade earlier, anti-Vietnam War
protesters had similarly been incensed at the brutal effects of massive U.S. air
attacks and the use of napalm on civilians. This theme focused on the grisly
nature of the war itself, on contra violence, rather than on justifications for
the war. It often evoked strong emotional responses, as the killing of innocent
people violates people’s fundamental sense of justice and human rights. It also
violates internationally recognized norms related to the treatment of civilians
in war. The emotional and moral power of this theme was enhanced when con-
veyed by people with personal experience in Nicaragua, as was often the case.
One organization, Witness for Peace (WFP), created by religious activists in
1983, brought more than four thousand U.S. citizens to Nicaragua to witness first-
hand the destruction wrought by the contras. Long-term volunteers furthermore
produced detailed reports identifying those killed, wounded, or kidnapped. The
mainstream media was slow to pick up on this information, often describing
reports of contra atrocities as allegations. The media began to take more inter-
est after a CIA “assassination manual” was discovered in mid-October 1984. This
134-page manual, Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, was published in

Spanish and distributed to the contras. It advised the contras to avoid “explicit
terror” against the general population in favor of the “selective use of violence”
against Nicaraguan officials, judges, security officers, and others. “If possible,
professional criminals should be hired to carry out specific selective ‘jobs,’” the
manual stated.40 Upon learning about the manual, Sen. Claiborne Pell (D-RI),
the ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented,
“The administration has launched an aggressive anti-terrorism campaign, and
yet we seem to be engaged in the very same terrorist activities which we deplore
elsewhere.”41 The Reagan administration attempted damage control by claiming
that the manual had been produced by a low-level CIA employee with no official
authorization.
For the next few months, a spate of articles on contra attacks appeared in
major newspapers. Still, most articles treated civilian casualties as a byproduct
of war, offering little information about the victims and invoking little sym-
pathy. To take one example, a New York Times article titled “In a Nicaraguan
Village, ‘We’re Used to Gunfire’” (November 11, 1984), reported that the small
town of San Rafael del Norte, located in the mountainous region northwest
of Jinotega, had been attacked by the contras twice within the last six months.
The first attack had resulted in the deaths of “fourteen persons,” and the second
attack had left “nearly 20 residents” dead, according to the report. No further
details were provided as to who these people were or why they were killed. The
main storylines concerned the relative strength of contra and Sandinista forces
in the area and the loyalties of area residents. A townsperson was quoted as say-
ing, “This is a contra town. . . . Everyone knows it. No one attends Sandinista
demonstrations.” Yet why contra forces would twice attack a “contra town” and
kill its residents was not explained.42
Investigative reports by Witness for Peace, Americas Watch, and others offered
more thorough and personal accounts of contra attacks and revealed their system-
atic nature. Reagan administration officials claimed that such reports were
“bought and paid for by the Sandinistas” and berated the Sandinistas as “a more
serious violator of human rights than the contras.” They furthermore insisted that
the contras were needed to keep the pressure on the Sandinista government to
change its ways.43 The latter claim prompted the Jesuit editors of Envío in Managua
to write, “To refer to actions that result in nearly 50,000 victims, of whom more
than 22,000 are dead . . . as ‘pressure’ is a criminal twisting of reality.”44 In the final
analysis, the furor raised over contra attacks on civilians tarnished the reputation
[ 44 ] CHAPTER 2
of the contras but did not impel Congress to end contra aid, as had happened after
the unauthorized mining of Nicaraguan harbors in 1984. By the spring of 1986, the
shock value appeared to have worn off and, despite continuing reports of contra
attacks on civilians, Congress approved full military aid for the contras that
summer.
International Law
Opponents of the Contra War argued that the United States had no right to
intervene in Nicaragua regardless of the character of the Sandinistas. They held up
Nicaragua’s right of “self-determination” under international law, which meant
that Nicaraguans had the right to revolt against the U.S.-supported Somoza
dictatorship, to set up their own form of government, to choose a neo-Marx-
ist course of economic development, and to establish an independent foreign
policy. Contra War opponents pointed to the charters of the Organization of
American States and the United Nations, both of which prohibited interven-
tion in another nation’s internal affairs.45 Some members of Congress adopted
this line of thinking as well. During a debate in Congress in May 1984, for exam-
ple, Rep. Robert Garcia (D-NY) said, “I just wonder who gives us the right to
tell the people of Central America what to do and what not to do. It is not ours
to win or lose. Central America belongs to the Central Americans.”46
The principle of national self-determination was tested in a suit brought
before the International Court of Justice, or World Court, by Nicaragua follow-
ing the mining of Nicaraguan harbors in April 1984. The Reagan administration
informed the UN that it would not recognize the jurisdiction of the court in
the matter, but nonetheless attempted to defend itself in the court of public
opinion by arguing that its actions were consistent with the established prin-
ciple of “collective defense,” alleging Nicaraguan arms transfers to Salvadoran
rebels. On June 27, 1986, the court ruled against the United States in a 142-page
opinion, supported by twelve of the fifteen judges. The ruling stated that “the
evidence is insufficient to satisfy the Court that the Government of Nicaragua
was responsible for any flow of arms.” The court furthermore declared that “by
training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or oth-
erwise encouraging, supporting and aiding military and paramilitary activities
in and against Nicaragua,” the United States was acting “in breach of its obliga-
tion under customary international law not to intervene in the affairs of another
State.”47 The ruling obliged the United States to cease its support for the con-
tras and make reparation payments to Nicaragua. The Reagan administration
ignored the ruling. The World Federalist Association, Center for Constitutional
Rights, and Concerned U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua (CUSCLIN) filed
suit in federal court to make the U.S. government abide by the court ruling, but
to no avail.48
The Reagan administration suffered virtually no domestic political fallout
from its defiance of international law. When the United States formally an-
nounced on January 18, 1985, that it would not participate in the World Court
case, the editors of the New York Times sided with the administration, writing
that “there was legitimate doubt whether Nicaragua had proper standing, under
present rules, to bring this case before the World Court.”49 One who strongly
disagreed with this position was syndicated columnist Anthony Lewis, who
despaired at the administration’s cavalier attitude toward international obliga-
tions and the public’s longing “for the simple world of the frontier myth, in
which a man tough enough could set things right on his own.”50 The response in
Western Europe was decidedly critical. According to a U.S. Information Agency
report, “Condemnation was unanimous when the U.S. said it will not accept the
World Court’s jurisdiction.”51
Activist-scholars at the Institute for Policy Studies sought to break through the
nationalist mindset with a twenty-page booklet, Outcast among Allies: The
International Costs of Reagan’s War against Nicaragua (November 1985). As a result
of the Reagan administration’s aggressive policy toward Nicaragua, they argued,
“American credibility with nations that are most important to our national wel-
fare . . . is eroding.” The authors noted that thirteen of the fifteen members of the
UN Security Council had approved a draft resolution in 1984 calling for an imme-
diate end to “all threats, attacks and overt and covert hostile acts against the sover-
eignty, independence and territorial integrity of Nicaragua, in particular the min-
ing of its ports.”52 The United States, they concluded, was turning away from the
community of nations and becoming a law unto itself, a rogue nation.
The Reagan administration’s rejection of the World Court ruling was part of
a pattern of disengagement from international cooperation. The Carter admin-
istration had taken tentative steps toward working more closely with the UN,
but the Reagan administration reversed this and began withholding a portion of
U.S. dues in order to force changes in the UN in accordance with U.S. preroga-
tives. Despite the arm-twisting, the United Nations General Assembly voted
its disapproval of U.S. attacks on Nicaragua and the U.S. invasion of Grenada
in 1983, urged U.S. compliance with the World Court’s ruling on Nicaragua in
1986, and denounced the U.S. invasion of Panama in 1989.53
[ 46 ] CHAPTER 2
What’s Good about Nicaragua?

The Sandinista Revolution sparked a wave of excitement and hope among
leftists in the United States and around the world. The FSLN government’s
policies at the outset seemed to confirm their idealism. Books such as What
Difference Could a Revolution Make? Food and Farming in the New Nicaragua
(1982) reported on the progress of FSLN reforms with approval: “More than
40,000 landless rural farmers received access to land. . . . Production of basic
food crops increased. . . . Consumption of basic food soared. . . . Infant mor-
tality rate was cut by one-third.”54 Although the Contra War severely limited
FSLN achievements as the decade wore on, support from abroad for the new
Nicaragua remained strong, evident in a continual stream of international vol-
unteers and humanitarian aid projects.
The anti–Contra War campaign as a whole was more ambivalent about
Sandinista Nicaragua. Views among activists ranged from ardent support for
the FSLN party and government, to approval of the FSLN reform program in
the interest of the masses, to political impartiality, to animosity toward the
“authoritarian” FSLN. The majority of activists fell into the second category,
hoping that Sandinista reforms would truly help the poor majority. Activists
and commentators during in the 1980s often drew a distinction between
“solidarity” and “anti-interventionist” groups, but in fact, all ACWC groups
were anti-interventionist and the distinction lay in calibrated views toward
Sandinista Nicaragua.
Beyond activists’ own views was the strategic question of how to respond
to administration charges of Sandinista “totalitarianism.” Some believed that it
was best to avoid the murky issue of the character of the Sandinistas and keep
the focus on the wrongheadedness of U.S. interventionism. This would pre-
sumably make the ACWC more credible in the eyes of members of Congress
and the media, who generally disparaged the Sandinistas. “If the vote were on
whether you like the Sandinistas,” said Rep. Michael Barnes (D-MD), an oppo-
nent of the Contra War, “it’d be 20–1 for the contras. But that’s not the issue,
and that’s well understood here in Congress.”55 In fact, contra supporters did
make the character of the Sandinistas an issue, calculating that this would give
them an advantage in the contra aid debate. According to the scholars Cynthia
Arnson and Philip Brenner, attempts by Contra War opponents to broaden the
debate to include “Reagan’s portrayal of the Sandinista government” could well
be counterproductive in terms of reaching “moderate to conservative ‘swing’

voters.”56
Other activists, however, believed that avoiding discussion of the Sandinistas
would only allow the administration to frame the debate to its advantage. Should
the administration’s stereotypical view of the Sandinistas prevail, they argued,
the ACWC would be hard-pressed to counter a host of other claims, including
the claim that the Sandinistas could not be trusted to keep agreements and the
claim that the Sandinistas intended to take over Central America. The anti–
Contra War campaign could hardly expect to win the political debate if the
administration’s ideological presumptions prevailed.
Political calculations aside, there were U.S. religious missionaries in Nica-
ragua whose life work demanded an honest accounting of what was taking place
in Sandinista Nicaragua. Most welcomed Sandinista reforms, which reinforced
their own efforts to assist and empower the poor. In a response to President
Reagan’s address on April 27, 1983, forty-seven Catholic and Protestant religious
workers issued a statement that read in part:
We feel President Reagan’s address presented a very distorted

view of the Central American reality to the American people. As
religious workers in Nicaragua, we have found that we are free—
and encouraged—to exercise the preferential option for the poor
stressed by the Latin American bishops at Medellin and Puebla.
Nicaragua is one of the few Latin American countries in which
those efforts for the poor are echoed rather than repressed by
the government. We do not deny problems, nor mistakes—but
we must not confuse errors with systematic repression. We know
repression. In other Central American countries, we have all lost
friends and co-religious who were killed by U.S. backed military or
paramilitary forces for their work with the poor.57
U.S. scholars of Latin America also challenged the administration’s “totali-

tarian” depiction of Sandinista Nicaragua, whether explicitly or implicitly. Writ-
ing in journals such as the Journal of Latin American Studies, Latin American
Perspectives, Latin American Research Review, and NACLA Report on the Americas,
they described the Sandinista government’s assistance to privately owned
farms, popular support for Sandinista programs, and the diversity of political
parties within Nicaragua. Thomas W. Walker, in Reagan versus the Sandinistas:
The Undeclared War on Nicaragua (1987), wrote that most of the Reagan
[ 48 ] CHAPTER 2
administration’s “allegations were either completely groundless or very nearly

so. . . . Far from being a coterie of wild-eyed ideologues, the Sandinistas behaved
in a pragmatic and indeed moderate fashion throughout the first seven years.”58
The divide within the ACWC over the issue of how to address the Sandinistas
was more apparent in Washington than at the grassroots. At the local level,
there was simply too much interest in Sandinista Nicaragua for the topic to be
avoided. Tens of thousands of U.S. citizens traveled to Nicaragua and invariably
contrasted their experiences with the diabolical picture of Sandinista Nicaragua
drawn by the Reagan administration. This gap between administration claims
and the Nicaraguan reality was the source of many speeches, slideshows, and
discussions at the local level.
Still, knowledgeable speakers exercised caution when speaking before gen-
eral audiences. Aynn Setright, a long-term Witness for Peace volunteer who
returned annually to her home state of Wyoming, reflected on her many talks
to community and university groups. “I think I was very conscious about not
going on about the achievements of the Sandinista Revolution because I tried
to make the focus what the United States was doing,” she said. “I could have
waxed on about that, but I knew that that was a trap that I didn’t want to fall
into, and I did not want other people coming up and saying that I was just doing
Sandinista propaganda.” Setright would typically begin by describing her work
as an ambulance driver in the north central village of Bocana de Paiwas, a war
zone area. “I would tell the stories of what the contras did. And I would say, why
is the United States investing so much in this war? . . . Wouldn’t it have been
nice if the United States would have sent a couple hundred thousand doctors
to Nicaragua?59
Despite the efforts of religious missionaries, scholars, and activists to debunk
administration claims regarding the Sandinistas, the administration’s negative
view prevailed in the mainstream media and Congress. Little was written or
said in the media about Sandinista educational, health, and land reform pro-
grams and their benefits to the Nicaraguan population, although some balance
of views was provided in local news coverage of U.S. activists who traveled to
Nicaragua. Local editors were intrigued by the fact that so many U.S. citizens
were visiting Nicaragua and that community groups were forming sister city
partnerships and raising humanitarian aid for a nation with which the U.S. gov-
ernment was effectively at war.60
As for Congress, William LeoGrande, who served as a staff person for the
House Democratic Task Force on Central America in 1985–86, wrote that even
though the administration’s “exaggerated rhetoric was discounted, it had effect.

It skewed the terms of debate, shifting the ground from the question of effec-
tiveness and propriety of the Contra War to the issue of the Sandinista govern-
ment’s character.” In the end, he continued, “Democrats generally conceded the
evils of the Sandinistas, but kept insisting that Reagan’s policy was too aggres-
sive. . . . This posture proved to be untenable. If the Sandinistas were even half
as bad as Reagan insisted, then certainly the United States needed to do some-
thing.”61 Whether or not a unified ACWC would have been able to alter the
Reagan administration’s framing of Sandinista Nicaragua is a matter of debate,
but in hindsight it appears that the effort was necessary.
Meeting the Ideological Challenge

Opponents of the Contra War faced a daunting challenge in countering the
nationalistic, hegemonic, and Cold War ideological assumptions that under-
lay the Reagan administration’s Central America policies. As with the previous
theme, Contra War opponents were not all of one mind as to how to proceed in
this deeper realm of analysis. As a practical matter, any discussion of the Cold
War could range far and wide, diverting attention from Central America. Also,
not all critics and activists were up to the task of assessing the broad dimensions
of U.S. foreign policy or the history of U.S. interventionism and the Cold War,
even if they agreed on the main outlines.
The most common approach was to challenge the East-West framing of
Central America issues. One widely circulated booklet, Changing Course:
Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean ( January 1984), pro-
duced by Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA),
addressed the relationship between poverty, oppression, revolution, and U.S.
security. This ninety-five-page booklet explained that “revolutions in Nicaragua,
El Salvador and Guatemala are rooted in poverty and political oppression,” and
that the economic system in each country “has been dominated for generations
by a wealthy few,” often with the support of the U.S. government.62 The Reagan
administration’s claims of “communist subversion” and “export of revolution” in
Central America were thus recast as a problem of internal maldistribution of
wealth and power.
Another popular booklet, John Lamperti’s What Are We Afraid Of? An
Assessment of the “Communist Threat” in Central America (1988), published by
the American Friends Service Committee, addressed common fears about
communism. Lamperti, a professor of mathematics and computer science at
[ 50 ] CHAPTER 2
Dartmouth College, wrote that “U.S. government publications invariably describe

Nicaragua’s leadership as ‘Marxist-Leninist,’ but what that concept means, and
why the United States should fear it, are never explained.” Mild in tone,
Lamperti’s sixteen-page series of questions and answers refuted a host of admin-
istration claims about Nicaragua, including the alleged threat posed by Nica-
ragua to its neighbors and the United States.63
Many points about Cold War ideology were raised in a rather scattershot
way. Some pointed out that even if Nicaragua were “communist,” this did not
mean that it was a threat to the United States, as the United States and China
maintained friendly ties.64 Some argued, in line with liberation theology, that
Marxism and Christianity were not antithetical but, rather, potential allies in
addressing poverty, exploitation, and human suffering. Some challenged the
presumed dichotomy between democracy and communism, noting that there
were many socialist and communist political parties in the world that played by
democratic rules. Many pointed out that the United States could hardly claim
to be a champion of democracy in Nicaragua, having supported the repres-
sive Somoza regime for forty-three years. “The truth is,” wrote Mayes Crispin,
national co-coordinator of Nicaragua Network in the late 1980s, “the U.S. has
done everything in its power to thwart Nicaraguan democracy.”65 In an op-ed
article on July 3, 1983, the historian Walter LaFeber challenged the notion that
revolution and good government could not be reconciled. Responding to a
comment by Secretary of State George Shultz that the United States would not
tolerate “people shooting their way into power” in Central America, LaFeber
reminded readers that the United States had done exactly that in 1776 and still
managed to create a decent government.66
Other scholars in the progressive revisionist tradition called attention to
economic interests underlying U.S. policies in Central America. Although
there were no major U.S. companies in Nicaragua comparable to the United
Fruit Company in Guatemala in the 1950s, critics such as Noam Chomsky
argued that Nicaragua was important to the overall international capitalist
order, as a successful socialist-oriented economic program in Nicaragua would
inspire imitation in other poor countries.67 In a similar vein, Sergio Ramírez,
noted Nicaraguan writer, Junta member, and vice-president in the latter 1980s,
explained that Nicaragua’s “export of revolution” was not based on encourag-
ing violent revolution abroad but on promoting an alternative to the capital-
ist model of permanent underdevelopment in Latin America. “How can one
prevent a peasant from another Central American country from hearing, from
finding out, from realizing that in Nicaragua land is given to other poor and
barefoot peasants like him? . . . In this sense, we export our revolution.”68
The overall leftist critique of the situation in Nicaragua differed sharply from
that of the Reagan administration. Instead of the Sandinistas being “evil,” the
FSLN government was attempting to create a society in which people would
have a measure of economic security and dignity. Instead of the contras being
“freedom fighters,” they were engaged in state-supported terrorism. Instead of
the United States being the champion of freedom and democracy, it had his-
torically been on the side of oppression. Instead of the Soviet Union being the
source of unrest in Central America, it was a minor player in the region, posing
no threat to the United States.
This radical assessment was rejected out of hand by the mainstream media.
While the media were not averse to publishing evidence and arguments con-
trary to Reagan administration claims and assertions, they rarely challenged
underlying hegemonic assumptions or the overarching Cold War ideological
framework. In one scholarly study of television news reports on Nicaragua pro-
duced by ABC, CBS, and CNN, Leonardo Salazar concluded that the Reagan
administration’s point of view was consistently presented as the main story line.
While noting differences between the networks, Salazar judged that the news
media as a whole “did not present nor represent the claims of U.S. groups who
radically challenge the claims of the status quo in the U.S.”69
Members of Congress were even less inclined to question Cold War funda-
mentals, given four decades of bipartisan commitment to containing “commu-
nism.” Many liberal members were fearful of being labeled “soft” on communism
or “weak” on defense. In the spring of 1985, Rep. Dan Daniel (D-VA) circulated
a letter to his Democratic Party colleagues, warning, “If we now fail to oppose
the spread of communism in this hemisphere, and we are once more perceived
to be soft on defense and communism, then we could be shut out completely in
the next election.”70 Following a House vote in June 1985 to approve $27 million
in “nonlethal” aid for the contras, Democratic Party majority leader Jim Wright
explained, “Nobody wants to be portrayed as friendly toward Communism.”71
Although the Reagan administration held clear advantage in the ideological
realm, this did not overcome all other considerations as far as public opinion
was concerned. Public support for contra aid never reached a majority, accord-
ing to opinion polls taken over the course of the decade. Polls taken between
April 1983 and June 1988 showed public support for contra aid ranging from 25
to 29 percent, and opposition ranging from 56 to 58 percent, with one exception
[ 52 ] CHAPTER 2
between July and September 1987, when the gap narrowed from roughly 30
percent to 6. Pollsters have speculated that the shift was due to Lt. Col. Oliver
North’s patriotic testimony in televised hearings before a joint congressional
committee in July 1987. By June 1988 the gap had widened again to 30 percent,
with 27 percent in favor of contra aid and 57 percent opposed to it. When asked
about direct U.S. military intervention in Nicaragua, public opposition was even
stronger, ranging from 60 to 76 percent in Harris polls conducted between 1985
and 1987.72 Members of Congress who opposed contra aid could take heart in
these polls and the ACWC could take some credit for them. President Reagan
noted in his memoir that “one of the greatest frustrations during those eight
years was my inability to communicate to the American people and to Congress
the seriousness of the threat we faced in Central America.”73
CHAPTER 3
Origins of the Anti–Contra War Campaign
T he anti–Contra War campaign emerged out of progressive U.S.

sectors with connections to Latin America along with the post–
Vietnam War peace movement. The Nicaragua solidarity campaign coalesced in
early 1979, the Central America movement in 1980, and the anti–Contra War
campaign in early 1982, drawing together an eclectic mix of groups.
Progressive Religious Networks
Liberation theology had the effect of drawing Christian liberals closer to the
political left and pushing them further from the religious right—in both the
United States and Latin America. One result in the United States was a more
sympathetic view of Latin American revolutionaries. According to the histo-
rian Edward T. Brett, “until 1985 most of the U.S. Catholic popular press sym-
pathized with the Sandinistas, and several periodicals continued for the most
part to do so throughout the decade.”1 The foremost proponent of liberation
theology in the United States was the (Catholic) Maryknoll publishing house,
Orbis Books, founded in 1970 with the assistance of Fr. Miguel d’Escoto, later to
become the minister of foreign affairs in the Sandinista government.
Liberation theology and its corresponding manifestations in the popular
church and Christian base communities had a great effect on U.S. missionaries
[ 53 ]
[ 54 ] CHAPTER 3
serving in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. According to Margaret Swedish,
director of the Religious Task Force on Central America, these religious work-
ers not only began “to discover the real structural causes of the misery in which
most of the people they served were living—the result of nearly five hundred
years of colonial oppression—but they encountered sectors within the Latin
church that were taking on a new model of pastoral work from within that real-
ity, a model perhaps best expressed in the Basic Christian Communities
movement.”2
Protestants in Latin America also took up liberation theology. In the early
1960s the Latin American Protestant Commission for Christian Education
(Comisión Evangélica Latinoamericana de Educación Cristiana) was formed
to carry out an “evangelical option on behalf of the poor” and assist “their lib-
eration in every Latin American situation.”3 The World Council of Churches
provided institutional support for this mission. In the United States, Rev. Philip
Wheaton, an Episcopal minister who served in the Dominican Republic from
1952 to 1964, created the Ecumenical Program for Interamerican Communication
and Action (EPICA) in 1968. Its dual purpose was to promote solidarity
between U.S. and Latin American progressive sectors and to raise awareness in
the United States regarding the historic roots of poverty, repression, and war in
Latin America. The main U.S. Protestant connection in Nicaragua was the
Evangelical Committee for Aid and Development (CEPAD), which formed in
the wake of the devastating earthquake of 1972. Although Protestants consti-
tuted a smaller proportion of the Nicaraguan population than Catholics, mem-
bership was on the rise, growing from 3 percent in 1979 to 15 percent in 1985.4
Among the various Catholic orders, the Jesuits played a key role in devel-
oping transnational connections between progressive sectors in the United
States and Nicaragua during the 1980s. The Jesuits administered a major uni-
versity, two high schools, several urban and rural parishes, and the Instituto
de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica. In June 1981 Jesuit priests at the
latter initiated a high-quality news journal called Envío, published in Spanish,
English, German, and French for international audiences. “We felt that
Nicaragua was not understood because of the ideological campaign of the
United States against Nicaragua,” said Fr. Álvaro Argüello, a founder of the
journal. “We wanted to clarify, explain, from the people who lived the experi-
ence, what was happening in the country and to ask for solidarity. That was
the motivation.”5
The Jesuits generally supported the FSLN reform program but maintained a
Origins of the Anti–Contra War Campaign [ 55 ]
“critical distance” from the party, according to Fr. Joseph Mulligan, so as to make
independent assessments of policies. Mulligan, a North American Jesuit who
moved to Nicaragua in 1986, lived in a house with Frs. Ernesto and Fernando
Cardenal, respectively the ministers of culture and education in the FSLN gov-
ernment, and worked as a translator and writer for the English language edition
of Envío. He also assisted in the caring of those wounded or maimed in contra
attacks, an undertaking, he said, that “helped me to better understand the real-
ity.” He saw his role as both ministering to the needs of Nicaraguans and raising
consciousness in the United States—a “reverse mission.”6
What impressed U.S. people of faith most about Sandinista Nicaragua was
that so many Nicaraguans of faith supported the FSLN reform program. The
idea of uplifting the poor crossed religious and political lines. Rev. Richard
Shaull, a Presbyterian missionary in Latin America for twenty years and profes-
sor emeritus at Princeton Theological Seminary, wrote in Christianity and Crisis
( July 12, 1982), “Concern for improving the lot of the poor is not just a slogan;
it seems to be the motivating force of the revolution.”7 Presbyterian missionar-
ies James and Margaret Goff, who spent more than three decades in Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, and Nicaragua, argued that the popular church’s connection to
the FSLN was more than a tactical alliance: “What brings the Popular Church
and the Sandinistas together, rather than the imagined ‘front’ mechanism, are
shared ideals, specifically a shared commitment to empower the poor to trans-
form their material and spiritual conditions. These ideals led the two groups to
work together during the struggle to oust Somoza and to continue cooperating
in the attempt to build a just society that favors the poor.”8
The Goffs moved to Managua in 1981 and worked as editors and writers
at the Antonio Valdivieso Ecumenical Center, a progressive religious cen-
ter founded in 1979. The fact that Nicaraguan priests Miguel d’Escoto and
Ernesto and Fernando Cardenal were part of the FSLN government, however
controversial within the Catholic church, furthermore reinforced the con-
nection between the FSLN and Christianity, or at least the popular church
version. Other FSLN officials who openly professed their religious faith
were Carlos Tünnermann, the first minister of education who later became
ambassador to the United States; Roberto Argüello, president of the Supreme
Court; and María del Socorro Gutiérrez de Barreto, general secretary of the
Ministry of Housing.9
[ 56 ] CHAPTER 3
Leftist/Socialist Solidarity
In June 1981, Michael Harrington visited Nicaragua as part of a Socialist Inter-

national delegation. The democratic socialist leader and author of The Other
America (1962) was encouraged by what he saw—the potential of the Sandinista
government for raising the standard of living and empowering its citizens.
Nicaragua, he wrote, could become the “good domino,” a model for other devel-
oping nations. Harrington warned that the road to a humanistic socialist society
was fraught with dangers from within and without, but that there was hope and
expectation among the people for great changes to come. “The bronzed, lined
and sometimes toothless faces of men and women filled with evident hope had
not been conjured up in Moscow or Havana.”10
The left in the United States was a diverse lot in the 1970s and early 1980s,
hardly worthy of a single title. The intellectual left consisted of Marxist scholars,
revisionist historians, dependency theorists, liberation theologians, and popu-
lar writers such as Barbara Ehrenreich, Eduardo Galeano, and Harrington. The
activist left was divided into two main tendencies, democratic reformist and
pro-revolution. The Moscow-affiliated Communist Party, which was neither
pro-democracy nor pro-revolution, was a fading third tendency. The demo-
cratic reformists were represented by the Democratic Socialist Organizing
Committee (DSOC) and the New American Movement (NAM), both estab-
lished in the early 1970s and aligned with the democratic socialist parties of
Europe and the Socialist International. In 1982 DSOC and NAM merged to
become the Democratic Socialists of America, led by Harrington.
The pro-revolution tendency was subdivided into Maoist, Trotskyist, and
other minor factions. Some activists associated with this tendency joined
Central America groups in the 1980s, but only the Trotskyist Socialist Workers
Party had a perceptible role in the Central America movement. Pro-revolution
activists did not take up arms themselves, but generally held the view that forc-
ible measures were needed to redistribute wealth and power to the masses. Most
believed that revolutionary change would emerge on the periphery of capitalist
power centers—in places like Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, and El Salvador—and
that the role of the left in developed nations was to cultivate popular support for
these revolutions and provide material aid if possible. However radical this world
view, what marginalized pro-revolution groups, even on the left, was their sectar-
ian infighting and organizational manipulation—taking over other groups and
using them as fronts. According to one independent leftist in Portland, Oregon,
Bill Bigelow, what the radical left needed was to dispense with “organizational
chauvinism” and develop “a commitment to the bigger picture.”11
In the 1980s that bigger picture entailed an understanding of how the “Reagan
revolution” challenged leftists and liberals alike, requiring cooperation in the
building of broad-based oppositional movements. Cooperation was difficult
in part because of historically different approaches to organizing movements.
Generally speaking, from the liberal point of view, leftists were trying to move
too far, too fast, and with too few people; and the left’s laundry list of demands
and insistence on connecting all the issues made it nearly impossible to conduct
an effective political campaign. From the leftist point of view, liberals were try-
ing to win the political game without analyzing or addressing underlying causes
and systems; thus they wanted to win the “war on poverty” without examining
capitalism’s deficiencies, enact environmental laws without advocating social-
ist-type planning, and stop wars without challenging underlying hegemonic
and ideological assumptions, all of which allowed the right to set the terms of
debate—a recipe for ultimate failure.
Progress in cooperation was arguably made in the 1980s, but not without dif-
ficulty. Richard Healey, a lifelong activist on the left, reflected that some leftists
“had internal fights about who was more left, who was really anti-imperialist,
who was really revolutionary, and even which comandante were you aligned
with in Nicaragua.” The bulk of activists did not care about these arguments,
he said, but they were evident at the upper level. Healey was well versed in
the political culture of the left. His mother, Dorothy Healey, had been a long-
time leader in the Communist Party USA. Richard, born in 1943, attended
his first demonstration at the age of six. He was active in the civil rights and
anti–Vietnam war movements, formed a chapter of Students for a Democratic
Society in New Orleans during the 1960s, assisted in the formation of the New
American Movement in 1971, and became NAM’s national director during the
1970s. He also earned a doctorate in mathematics from UCLA and taught soci-
ology at Loyola University in Chicago for a time.
A talented coalition builder, Healey served as executive director of the
Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, a leading group in the Central
America movement, from 1982 to 1986. He came to the group with a larger
vision of change as well as extensive organizing experience. His big picture
embraced a nuanced leftist analysis that made connections between issues of
the Contra War, nuclear weapons, attitudes toward the USSR, and global eco-
nomics. “That fact that I could bring that to bear for Coalition was useful,” he
[ 58 ] CHAPTER 3
said, although he was frustrated that the coalition did not take up a broad edu-
cational campaign connecting global issues. Deepening the analysis on specific
issues proved easier. “If you just laid this stuff out, not calling it Marxist, they
were with us,” he said, referring to the liberal church denominations involved in
the coalition. “My respect for church people was very high.”12
Twenty years before the Sandinista triumph, leftist solidarity with Latin
America was sparked by the Cuban Revolution of 1959. The Fair Play for Cuba
Committee (FPCC) formed that year to support Fidel’s Castro’s revolutionary
transformation of Cuba. According to the historian Van Gosse, FPCC attracted
“thousands of disaffected liberals, newly leftist youth and African Americans.”
In December 1960 FPCC sponsored a “Christmas Tour of Cuba,” in which
326 North Americans visited the island on a good will mission. The following
month the U.S. State Department issued a ruling that required anyone who
wanted to travel to Cuba to first obtain special permission, which effectively
shut down this travel connection. The FPCC fell apart in late 1961, a casualty
of an unfriendly takeover by the Young Socialist Alliance, a Socialist Workers
Party youth group, and a declining pool of Cuba supporters.13
Leftist solidarity with the Cuban Revolution reemerged during the heyday
of anti–Vietnam War protests. Venceremos Brigades were organized between
1969 and 1972, in which hundreds of mostly youthful U.S. citizens traveled to
Cuba in order to assist sugar cane harvests. The State Department’s restrictions
on travel to Cuba had not held up in the Supreme Court. In United States v. Lee
Levi Laub ( January 10, 1967), the court ruled that traveling to Cuba without
explicit State Department permission did not constitute a crime. Kent Spriggs,
a thirty-one-year-old lawyer and director of Legal Services in Los Angeles in
1967, was a junior associate of the law firm representing Lee Levi Laub. In June
1971 he and two others led a harvest brigade of 150 Americans to Cuba. The
group flew to Mexico City, then to Havana, and returned two months later on
a steamer to Nova Scotia. The work of cutting cane was extremely demanding,
Spriggs recalled: “The first two weeks I thought I was going to die. The last four
weeks were hard, but not killing.”
Spriggs went to Cuba, he reflected, because “I thought the [U.S. economic]
blockade was wrong. It failed to respect the sovereignty of Cuba through their
revolutionary process. Going down there was voting with our feet.” During his
stay, Spriggs was impressed with Cuba’s progress in meeting basic needs. “My
whole adult life has been troubled by the maldistribution of wealth,” he said.
“It was very clear by 1971 that Cuba had gone a long way toward redistributing
wealth. Everyone had access to health care. They had built an incredible amount
of housing for poor people. Despite the fact that they did not have democratic
elections, I thought there was a lot to like. The literacy program was so success-
ful UNESCO declared Cuba illiteracy-free.”14 Spriggs went on to become a suc-
cessful civil rights lawyer. He was elected to the Tallahassee City Commission
in 1981 and served as the city’s mayor in 1984.
Others who found inspiration in the Cuban Revolution were the founders
of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA), established
in 1966. At the beginning, reflected Judith Adler Hellman, a staff member in
1970–71, “the focus of our attention and hope was the Cuban Revolution. The
readers and writers of the NACLA Newsletter tended to view the future of Latin
America and the Caribbean as resting on the possibility of reproducing some-
thing like the Cuban model elsewhere in the region.” The Cuban model, how-
ever, attracted few liberals, whether because of its revolutionary origins, leftist
authoritarianism, ties with the Soviet Union, or socialist economy.
In 1970, another model emerged in Latin America that avoided the first three
of the limitations outlined above. The election of Salvador Allende as president
of Chile excited new interest in democratic socialism among leftists as well as
liberals. The editors of NACLA Newsletter joined a new Chile solidarity move-
ment, cosponsoring organizational meetings around the country. They defined
their role as building solidarity between progressive North American and
Latin American sectors: “Solidarity involves a sense of common struggle and,
to some degree, common risk. It is based on the conviction that an injury to
one is an injury to all.”15 For Rev. Philip Wheaton of EPICA, the democratic
socialist experiment in Chile embodied the spirit of liberation theology. EPICA
organized North American delegations to Chile to witness developments
firsthand. One delegation attended a “Christians for Socialism” conference in
Santiago in April 1972. That same month, a regional conference was held on the
Cornell campus in Ithaca, New York. That meeting inspired Rev. Art Lloyd, an
Episcopal campus minister at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, to form a
new group, the Community Action on Latin America (CALA). CALA was one
of the many local groups in the Chile solidarity campaign to make the transition
to Central America issues in the 1980s.
Like many other activists, Lloyd was shocked when the Allende govern-
ment was overthrown in a military coup on September 11, 1973. Upon hearing
the news, he and a fellow minister sent letters to local religious and civic lead-
ers: “We write to you about a concern that weighs heavily upon our hearts as
[ 60 ] CHAPTER 3
Christians and Americans. . . . We mourn the death of democracy in Chile.”

Describing the coup as a “bloodbath” and noting “probable U.S. involvement,”
the two ministers urged their friends and associates to write to elected offi-
cials.16 Most assuredly, those letters fell on deaf ears in the White House, as the
Nixon administration immediately restored U.S. aid to Chile, signifying U.S.
approval of General Augusto Pinochet’s violent assault on Allende’s supporters.
Human Rights Activism
The coup in Chile transformed a hopeful solidarity campaign into a somber

human rights campaign, which nonetheless drew a wider circle of activists.
The reconstructed Chile campaign pressured Congress to cut off U.S. aid to
the Pinochet regime, demanded that the Chilean government release political
prisoners, organized a nationwide boycott of Chilean goods, assisted Chilean
refugees in the United States, and conducted educational programs.17
The Chile human rights campaign blended in with a broader human rights
movement aimed at ending U.S. aid to repressive regimes and dictatorships
abroad. The first target of concern before Chile was Brazil. Following a mili-
tary coup in 1964, the Brazilian government rounded up political dissidents
and imprisoned and tortured them. Groups of religious leaders, scholars, and
activists—operating clandestinely in Brazil—began a transnational campaign
to expose this repression and gain the release of political prisoners. The U.S.
media paid little attention to the issue until the spring of 1970, following the
publication of an eighteen-page booklet, Brazil: A Report on Terror, by the
American Committee for Information on Brazil. The New York Times editorial-
ized on April 29: “It is no longer possible to discount the accumulating evidence
that a great many innocents—including wives and even children of suspected
subversives—have suffered horribly.” According to the U.S. scholar James N.
Green, “the underlying organizing practices developed by clergy, academics,
exiles, and activists . . . proved extremely fruitful as interests shifted from Brazil
to Chile and Argentina, and then later Central America.”18
Human rights became a popular political issue in the mid-to-late 1970s.
Congress enacted new human rights standards for foreign aid, Jimmy Carter
hailed it as the “soul of our foreign policy” in a December 1978 speech, foun-
dations funded a host of new human rights advocacy groups, and two human
rights advocates were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize—Amnesty International
in 1977 and Adolfo Pérez Esquivel of Argentina in 1980. “By 1977,” wrote the
political scientist Lars Schoultz, “the combined interest groups concerned with
repression of human rights in Latin America had become one of the largest,
most active, and most visible foreign policy forces in Washington.” Their lob-
bying efforts were only partly successful, however, as the various regimes hired
public relations firms to counter the human rights lobby and cultivate support
from conservative politicians and business interests. The Somoza government
spent a total of $571,000 on public relations firms from mid-1975 to mid-1977.19
A number of organizations that would later become involved in the Central
America movement were active in human rights campaigns. The Washington
Office on Latin America (WOLA) was formed in the wake of the overthrow of
the Allende government in Chile. Founder Joe Eldridge, a native of Tennessee,
was in Chile when the coup took place. Underwritten mainly by religious
denominations, WOLA combined the functions of research, education, lobby-
ing, and activism.20 The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) com-
bined its human rights advocacy with humanitarian aid work. During the 1960s,
it created the Human Rights/Global Justice Program within its Peace Education
Division and initiated new Central America aid programs. In the aftermath of the
Sandinista victory, AFSC provided grants to the Nicaraguan Health Ministry,
Agrarian Reform Ministry, and other agencies for the purpose of training health
care workers in remote rural areas.21 Another pacifist group, the Fellowship of
Reconciliation (FOR), organized international gatherings for nonviolent social
justice reformers across Latin America. These gatherings culminated in the for-
mation of Service for Peace and Justice in Latin America (SERPAJ) at a meeting
in Colombia in 1974. SERPAJ focused on the “dirty war” in Argentina, in which
the rightist government set out to annihilate leftist radicals and reformers. An
estimated 30,000 people were “disappeared” between 1976 and 1983. SERPAJ
director Adolfo Pérez Esquivel was imprisoned by the Argentine government
for a year and tortured.22
Other Connections
The main organization for scholars concerned with Latin America was the Latin
American Studies Association (LASA), founded in 1966 in the aftermath of the
U.S. invasion of the Dominican Republic. “This was the decisive moment for U.S.
Latin Americanists when hundreds of colleagues signed a petition, published
[ 62 ] CHAPTER 3
in the New York Times, condemning the U.S. intervention,” reflected Ronald
H. Chilcote. During the 1970s, LASA members published research papers on
repression in Argentina, Guatemala, Chile, and other Latin American nations
under military rule. As more scholars from Latin America joined LASA, human
rights became personal. Those who “went through the authoritarian period in
Latin America,” wrote Teri Karl, “helped provide places for Latin Americans to
work when they had no place to work. Most of us protested oppression.”23 The
featured speakers at a LASA meeting on October 10–12, 1980, were Nicaraguan
Junta member Sergio Ramírez, FSLN foreign minister Fr. Miguel d’Escoto, and
U.S. deputy undersecretary of state James Cheek. According to one account of
the meeting, applause for the two Sandinista leaders led Cheek to criticize the
audience as naive, which in turn catalyzed a heated debate.24 At the March 1982
LASA meeting, a resolution was adopted that condemned U.S. intervention in
Nicaragua.
In 1982 a group of activist scholars and intellectuals associated with the
Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) created a new organization, Policy Alternatives
for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA). According to William
LeoGrande, a member of the executive board, the group’s goals were “to formu-
late a coherent alternative policy” to the Reagan administration’s Central
America policies, “to mobilize people in the academic community,” to educate
journalists and members of Congress about the “realities of the region,” and to
provide activists with solid information “so their lobbying efforts would be well
grounded.”25 The Jesuit father Xabier Gorostiaga of the Regional Office for
Economic and Social Research in Managua also served on PACCA’s executive
board. Robert Stark, a former Catholic priest with extensive experience in
Central America, served as director of this loose-knit organization, which was
housed in the IPS office in Washington.
The Sandinista Revolution attracted the interest of activists and intellectuals
concerned with women’s issues. The FSLN’s decrees of August 1979 establish-
ing a legal foundation for women’s equality sparked debate over how far the
Sandinista Revolution would go in this direction and what would actually be
achieved. Margaret Randall, in Sandino’s Daughters: Testimonies of Nicaraguan
Women in Struggle (1981) interviewed women involved in the revolutionary
struggle along with their mothers, refashioning the heroic image of revolution-
aries long associated with Che Guevara into a more balanced and humanistic
portrayal.26 During the 1980s, a group of women in the United States formed
MADRE, which initiated humanitarian aid projects of benefit to Nicaragua
women. MADRE tapped into women’s networks in the United States and cre-
ated a bridge of solidarity with women’s groups and projects in Nicaragua.
The Post–Vietnam War Peace Movement
Thousands of individuals who participated in the anti–Vietnam War movement

became involved in the Central America movement and ACWC during the 1980s.
Many saw the Contra War as another misguided attempt to save a poor country
from “communism” by unleashing terror against its people. The anti–Vietnam
War movement paved the way for the Central America movement in a few dif-
ferent ways. It challenged the reign of experts on foreign policy and encouraged
active citizen participation. It deflected charges of anti-Americanism and of being
manipulated by communists and foreign powers. Along with the civil rights move-
ment, it made street protests “normal.” It pushed mainstream religious denomina-
tions, particularly the Catholic church, toward an antiwar stand. It established a
link with liberal Democrats in Congress. Finally, it involved many “declarations of
conscience” in which people pledged to speak out or take action against the war.
All of these elements helped the Central America movement to quickly establish
itself as a legitimate voice of dissent in the early 1980s.
The rather chaotic organizational infrastructure of the anti–Vietnam War
movement did not last, but continuity and institutional memory were none-
theless maintained through participating groups, including peace organiza-
tions, religious denominations, and unions such as the United Auto Workers,
which broke with the AFL-CIO in 1969 and called for an immediate end to
the Vietnam War. Among the national peace organizations involved in both
the anti–Vietnam War movement and the anti–Contra War campaign were
AFSC, FOR, Clergy and Laity Concerned, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear
Policy (SANE), Vietnam Veterans against the War, War Resisters League, and
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom. Due in large part to the
Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, which sought a bilateral halt to the nuclear
arms race, the peace movement experienced a revival in the 1980s. The number
of local, state, and national groups grew from 1,300 in 1983 to 5,700 in 1985, to
over 7,000 in 1986.27
During the latter half of the 1970s, two new national peace and justice coali-
tions were established, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy
(CNFMP) in 1976, and Mobilization for Survival (MFS) in 1977. Each had
[ 64 ] CHAPTER 3
its own base of supporters, style of organizing, and set of multi-issue goals.
CNFMP was supported by forty national organizations, half of them religious,
and had a mainstream profile, with a focus on lobbying. It maintained working
groups on disarmament, human rights, and budget issues, each of which pro-
duced its own legislative alerts and background papers. MFS led a network of
thirty-three organizations and tapped into the alternative culture, emphasizing
dramatic protest actions. It grew mainly out of the anti–nuclear power move-
ment, which rose and fell between 1974 and 1982. MFS embodied the spirit of
mass mobilizations during the Vietnam War era. As one MFS tee shirt logo put
it, “We do demos.”
CNFMP was the more important of the two in the Central America move-
ment, at least until it was dissolved in 1988. When Central America issues rose
to the forefront in the early 1980s, a separate committee, the Central America
Working Group, was created out of the Human Rights Working Group,
becoming the center of legislative strategy and lobbying. Mobilization for
Survival took up Central America issues as the anti-nuclear power movement
began to taper off. At its fifth annual conference in December 1981, MFS par-
ticipants agreed to add “Nonintervention” to a ten-point list of concerns. The
following year, “Peace and Justice in Central America” became the second
highest priority.28 Within the anti–Contra War campaign, the MFS protest
style of organizing found a home in the Pledge of Resistance campaign that
began in 1984.
The Vietnam War catalyzed many acts of conscience in the form of civil dis-
obedience. For Joseph Mulligan, a young Jesuit seminarian in the late 1960s,
the path to civil disobedience was a step-by-step process of learning and reflec-
tion. Mulligan underwent, in his own words, “a gradual but steady formation
of conscience both in terms of informing myself about the realities of the war;
and then looking at that reality from the point of view of my conscience, my
faith, my Christian commitment, and saying, well, I just have to speak out in the
loudest possible way against this.” His superiors at the seminary, located forty
miles west of Chicago, “might not have agreed completely, but they respected
my judgment,” he said. On May 25, 1969, Mulligan and seven others broke into a
draft board office on the south side of Chicago and destroyed draft records. This
action resulted in a two-year prison term for Mulligan at a medium-security
federal prison in Sandstone, Minnesota. His formation of conscience did not
end with the Vietnam War:
I think what happened to a lot of us who were involved in the

Vietnam War and who were analyzing the war is that we began to
see that this was not a fluke, this was not a unique case of interven-
tion. It was part of a whole pattern of U.S. intervention in many
parts of the world, which we began to call imperialism and began
to understand imperialism; in the case of Vietnam, how the United
States had supported the French and then replaced them, basically
taking over, essentially interfering in the internal affairs of another
country in the name of anti-communism. There was obviously an
issue of communism there, but it was not threatening the shores of
California. From there, then, I began to see other parts of the world,
especially Latin America, as other theaters of U.S. intervention in
one way or another. . . . the Dominican Republic . . . the brutal,
violent overthrow of Salvador Allende . . . the history of Guatemala,
the military coup in 1954 supported by the CIA. . . . A common
pattern in all of these was essentially protecting U.S. economic
interests, corporate interests, whether it be for natural resources in
those countries of the exploitation of cheap labor, or having those
countries as markets; basically keeping them well within the inter-
national capitalist business system. So I think that I, like many oth-
ers, began to develop that kind of thinking.29
The Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign
In the years leading up to the triumph of the Sandinista Revolution, small

solidarity committees formed in the cities of New York, Chicago, Boston,
Los Angeles, San Francisco, Washington, DC, and New Orleans. Nicaraguans
who had fled the Somoza regime, often members of the FSLN, were instru-
mental in organizing a number of these committees, including Casa Nicaragua
in San Francisco and the Nicaraguan Solidarity Organization in Washington,
DC. Their general goals were to educate U.S. citizens about the situation in
Nicaragua, organize opposition to the Somoza government, and cultivate sup-
port and raise money for the FSLN.30
On February 24–25, 1979, representatives of these local solidarity groups
joined with representatives of progressive religious and human rights organiza-
tions to form the Nicaragua Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan People,
later shortened to Nicaragua Network. EPICA director Phil Wheaton, a key orga-
nizer of the conference, envisioned a broad-based coalition of liberal-left groups
[ 66 ] CHAPTER 3
that would work to educate U.S. citizens at the grassroots level and to change U.S.
policies in Washington.31 Some two hundred people attended the conference.
They passed resolutions declaring that “the United States government bears a
direct responsibility for the long suffering of the Nicaraguan people,” and that the
“people of the United States have a special responsibility to show concrete soli-
darity with the Nicaraguan people, and to work to make the U.S. government end
all forms of intervention in Nicaragua.” Participants agreed to hold a celebration
of solidarity during the week of April 22–29, 1979, “during which people will be
urged to contact their Representatives and Senators as well as to participate in
related marches, teach-ins, and political and cultural events.”32
The new organization set up an office at the EPICA headquarters in Wash-
ington and designated as its temporary coordinator Yvonne Dilling, a gradu-
ate of the Peace Studies Program at Manchester College who had only recently
begun to work at EPICA.33 In May Nicaragua Network opened its own office
on Dupont Circle and hired David Funkhouser as its first full-time coordi-
nator. Funkhouser was an ordained Episcopal priest who had spent a year in
Guatemala in 1978 as a Peace Corps volunteer. He attended the founding con-
ference of Nicaragua Network as a representative of AFSC. He was hired, he
said, because “I was available and had good facility with Spanish, and my values
were in line with the work, of course.” As coordinator from May 1979 until July
1981, his main tasks were to publish a monthly newsletter, circulate Nicaraguan
speakers, raise funds for the literacy crusade, and coordinate activities with local
solidarity groups. “It was a challenge,” said Funkhouser. “It was learn as you
go.” Operating on a “bare bones” budget, Funkhouser nevertheless managed to
visit local solidarity groups every few months—in Los Angeles, San Francisco,
Seattle, Detroit, Chicago, Boston, Atlanta, New Orleans, and elsewhere. By the
time Sandinista guerrillas marched into Managua on July 19, 1979, the organiza-
tion had twenty loosely connected local solidarity committees.34
The triumph of the Sandinista Revolution was cause for celebration among
solidarity activists. Tim Jeffries of Marin County, California, recalled, “When
the Nicaraguan people defeated the U.S.-created and -imposed Somoza dynasty,
I, like so many dreamers of a just world, was giddy with admiration and joy at
the proof that a determined people could stand up to the world’s biggest bully.”
Jeffries became a member of the Nicaragua Network executive committee and
later helped establish the Fairfax-Condega Sister City Project, California’s first
official sister city with Nicaragua.35 Most Nicaraguan émigrés returned to their
home country following the triumph, including DC activist Saúl Arana, who
became the director of the North American Section of the Nicaraguan Foreign
Ministry.36
Nicaragua Network’s second national conference, held in Detroit on Novem-
ber 17–18, 1979, drew over three hundred participants. The mood was upbeat
and the program was very ambitious as compared to available resources. Among
the speakers were Phillip Berryman of AFSC, Roger Burbach of NACLA, Phil
Wheaton of EPICA, Peggy Healy of WOLA, and Delores Schaeffer of Non-
Intervention in Chile. A blue ribbon panel of Nicaraguan officials and FSLN
representatives attended the conference: Moisés Hassan, a member of the Junta;
Rafael Solis, ambassador to the United States; Victor Hugo Tinoco, ambassador to
the UN; Alejandro Bendaña, counselor to the UN; Fr. Victor Lopez of Christians
for Socialism; and FSLN representatives Mónica Baltodano and Hilda Voldt.
Hassan discussed the current situation in Nicaragua. He began somewhat
boastfully by saying that in the four months since taking power, the Sandinista
government had “been able to maintain the absolute trust and confidence of
the Nicaraguan people.” He then described the government’s various cam-
paigns underway in education, health care, public services, and the economy,
followed by a description of many problems therein. He set forth no strategy or
action priorities for U.S. groups but emphasized the character of the Sandinista
Revolution that drew them to the cause. “This Sandinista Revolution has two
fundamental directions,” he said. “First, the Nicaraguan Revolution proudly
proclaims it is independent, sovereign, a free and self-determining process.
Second, the objective is to work for the well-being of the most dispossessed
classes, the poorest, the peasant class, the working class.”
At question-and-answer sessions, conferees discussed the international situ-
ation, developments within Nicaragua, and how U.S. solidarity activists might
assist Sandinista Nicaragua. In regard to the situation in El Salvador, Hassan
emphasized the FSLN’s solidarity with Salvadoran revolutionary organizations,
but Ambassador Tinoco, the diplomat, spoke of the Sandinista government’s
“attitude of realism,” saying, “We trust the organizations in El Salvador will
move the revolution forward.” Tinoco understood that any tangible support
provided by the FSLN to Salvadoran revolutionaries would cause serious prob-
lems with the United States and thus was cautioning against it. Ambassador
Solis discussed the importance of educational work in the United States and
the need to “strengthen information dissemination from Nicaragua.” The
Nicaraguan point of view had been pushed out of U.S. news, he said. “One thing
we would like to do is to have better information exchange between peoples,
[ 68 ] CHAPTER 3
Sandinistas and solidarity groups in this country. The Nicaraguan people here
should be asked to speak.”
At the Sunday session, participants tried to nail down specific actions to
be taken. Baltodano related that the FSLN had established three program-
matic priorities: a literacy campaign, a tools campaign, and a medical cam-
paign. She suggested that solidarity groups assist the literacy campaign by
providing 250,000 yards of cloth and other materials that could be used to
make 140,000 uniforms and badges. The donation of the cloth, she said,
would “give employment to a large number of presently unemployed women.”
The conferees agreed to support all three campaigns. The national office was
assigned the literacy campaign; the Boston Solidarity Committee took on the
“Medical Aid for Nicaragua” campaign, and the Detroit Nicaragua Solidarity
Committee adopted the tools campaign. The national office was also directed
to facilitate grassroots education by organizing tours of Nicaraguan speakers,
a broader speakers bureau, a media campaign, and a catalog of educational
resources. A national solidarity week was planned for February 17–23, 1980,
“during which people will be urged to join with Nicaragua in commemorat-
ing the struggle of Sandino.”
Conferees furthermore identified three political goals to pursue, according
to meeting notes: (1) “pressuring the U.S. government to grant generous and
unconditional aid to Nicaragua;” (2) the “cancellation of Nicaragua’s foreign
debt which was inherited from Somoza;” and (3) the “extradition of Somoza (if
he returns to the U.S.).” The means of exerting pressure on the Carter admin-
istration and Congress were not spelled out. The final conference declaration
stated, “We recognize that the best way to defend the Nicaraguan revolution is
by raising political consciousness in this country.”
Conference participants estimated that $500,000 would be needed to carry
out the various planned activities and to pay staff salaries over the next year.
Local groups were obliged to help raise these funds.37 The Washington, DC, sol-
idarity group reportedly raised $10,000 for Nicaragua in the six months follow-
ing the July revolution. During the planned solidarity week in February 1980,
the DC group co-sponsored two speakers from Nicaragua, Noel González of
the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Sayda Hernandez of the Luisa Amanda
Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women.38 These speakers and others
toured fifteen U.S. cities in all.
The connection between Nicaragua Network and the FSLN grew stron-
ger in the aftermath of the second national conference. An article in Barricada
on July 8, 1980, reviewed the history of U.S. solidarity with Augusto Sandino
and praised Nicaragua Network’s current efforts, concluding, “From the many
lessons of solidarity work in the U.S., one thing is clear: the North American
people can be and are in solidarity.”39 Nicaragua Network, in turn, edged closer
to an uncritical view of the FSLN. The Nicaragua Network Newsletter of August
1980, for example, reprinted on its front page an article from Barricada that
equated the will of the FSLN party with the will of the Nicaraguan people, a
common FSLN theme. The occasion was the first anniversary celebration of
the revolutionary triumph:
The people of Sandino ratified yesterday the indisputable position
of the FSLN as vanguard in the revolutionary process. The combat-
ive presence of hundreds of thousands of men, women, workers of
the country and the city, confirmed that after a year of struggle and
sacrifice, the people maintain their unshakable confidence in the
FSLN and the Government of National Construction. Once again,
the people have voted for the Revolution and the FSLN. . . . This is
the essence of yesterday’s mass demonstration: the consolidation
of the unity between the people and the vanguard to guarantee the
implementation of the revolutionary program.40
There was little nuance in this self-promotion by the FSLN. The complicated
history of competing groups and contending visions leading up to the over-
throw of Somoza was omitted in favor of presenting the FSLN as the embodi-
ment of the revolutionary ideal. Such expressions were particularly common
during the “honeymoon” period following the Sandinista victory.
Nicaragua Network’s attachment to the FSLN set it apart from other lib-
eral and progressive organizations, but the latter were by no means antagonis-
tic to Sandinista social reforms, which included building democratic institu-
tions; outlawing of the death penalty; initiating beneficial health, education,
and land reform programs; and allowing for private enterprise. The FSLN
government’s moderate and popular form of socialism eased liberal fears of
leftist authoritarianism, although not entirely and not for all activists and
groups, which in turn allowed for a liberal-leftist-religious alliance to develop,
similar to that of the Chile campaign. Nicaragua Network led the leftist sec-
tion of this informal alliance but not the whole of the anti–Contra War cam-
paign when it emerged in 1982.
[ 70 ] CHAPTER 3
The Central America Movement
In the aftermath of the Sandinista military victory in Nicaragua, a wave of right-

ist repression took place in El Salvador and Guatemala. Salvadoran death squads
roamed the country murdering opposition political leaders, labor union lead-
ers, religious workers, and others viewed as threats to the military-dominated
government. Guatemalan security forces massacred peaceful demonstrators
and decimated Mayan communities thought to be sympathetic to guerrillas.
The repression prompted tens of thousands of Salvadorans and Guatemalans
to leave their homelands for Honduras, Mexico, and the United States. In
February 1980 Archbishop Oscar Romero of El Salvador wrote to President
Jimmy Carter, pleading, “If you really want to defend human rights, prohibit
the giving of military assistance to the Salvadoran government.”41 On March
23 Romero publicly denounced the Salvadoran government’s repression and
called on military personnel to disobey their commanders’ orders to kill other
Salvadorans. The following day, Romero was assassinated in his church. His
martyrdom became a symbol of the repression in El Salvador.
U.S. support for the Salvadoran government’s repression became a grow-
ing concern among human rights advocates in the United States. On March 7,
1980, two weeks before Romero was murdered, Catholic activists founded the
Religious Task Force on El Salvador (later renamed the Religious Task Force
on Central America, or RTFCA), based in Washington, DC. Two months later
Protestant activists formed the Inter-Religious Task Force on El Salvador (later
renamed the Inter-Religious Task Force on Central America, or IRTFCA),
based in New York City. Together these two religious networks became the “con-
necting glue for local faith-based solidarity groups across the country,” accord-
ing to Margaret Swedish, director of the RTFCA.42 They took up the cause of
Romero, educating local church communities, lobbying members of Congress,
and organizing demonstrations against U.S. support for the Salvadoran govern-
ment. Leftist solidarity activists, meanwhile, formed the Committee in Support
of the People of El Salvador (CISPES) in October 1980, the same month that
five Salvadoran rebel factions merged to form the Farabundo Martí National
Liberation Front (FMLN). CISPES developed a dynamic outreach program. By
March 1982 the group claimed 300 local committees and campus groups, a half-
dozen regional centers, and a strong central committee at the national level.43
Another national solidarity group, the Network in Solidarity with the People
of Guatemala (NISGUA) was formed in 1981. NISGUA had a more moderate
profile than CISPES, with its support coming mainly from “academics and
church people with an abiding personal interest in Guatemala,” according to the
activist-historian Van Gosse.44 NISGUA remained a small network throughout
the decade. This was most likely due to the fact that the Carter administration
had already cut off U.S. military aid to the Guatemalan government and thus the
repression was not directly tied to U.S. support (the campaign lacked a political
handle). The Salvadoran government, in contrast, was heavily dependent on
U.S. military aid.
On December 2, 1980, four U.S. citizens—Maryknoll sisters Ita Ford and
Maura Clarke, Ursuline sister Dorothy Kazel, and lay missionary Jean Donovan—
were raped and murdered by Salvadoran soldiers. The Carter administration
immediately suspended military aid but resumed it six weeks later so as to
enable the Salvadoran government to survive a rebel offensive launched in
January 1981. Questions arose in Washington as to whether U.S. troops would
be needed to shore up the Salvadoran government. Conservatives warned of
“another Cuba” if the rebels won, while liberals warned of “another Vietnam” if
the U.S. militarily intervened.45 To counter public fears of the latter, the Reagan
administration promised in March 1981 to limit the number of U.S. military
advisers to fifty-five. This limit on direct military involvement, coupled with
U.S.-engineered elections in March 1982, ultimately enabled the administration
to win congressional approval for most of the aid it requested through the
decade, despite reports of continuing systematic political murders. The Romero
Christian Legal Aid Office in San Salvador, for example, reported that during
the first eight months of 1982, there were a total of 3,059 political murders,
“nearly all of them the result of action by Government agents against civilians
not involved in military combat.”46
During the 1980s, large numbers of Salvadorans and Guatemalans entered
the United States illegally and established themselves in Los Angeles, San
Francisco, Boston, New York, Chicago, and Washington, DC. Salvadoran émi-
grés played a role in the formation of CISPES and its educational outreach
efforts.47 According to one Salvadoran immigrant, “The Salvadorans told sto-
ries of opposition activists tortured and killed with sadism and cruelty, piles of
beheaded corpses appearing on the main streets of the cities, citizens kidnapped
and disappeared by the so-called ‘Security Forces’ and massacres of hundreds
of peasants. These reports moved thousands of U.S. citizens to participate in
solidarity actions.”48
CISPES openly supported the FMLN and its political arm, the Revolutionary
[ 72 ] CHAPTER 3
Democratic Front. At the founding conference in New York on October 11–12,

1980 (another was held in Los Angeles the previous weekend), participants
declared that Salvadoran revolutionaries were engaged in a “just war of legiti-
mate defense.”49 CISPES itself was not a revolutionary group, nor did it send
arms to the rebels; rather, it provided tangible assistance to the FMLN through
projects such as Medical Aid to El Salvador, a Los Angeles-based operation that
distributed aid to regions under FMLN control. At the CISPES national con-
vention in 1985, CISPES attendees debated and approved a proposal to define
their organization as the “North American front of the Salvadoran revolution.”
Notwithstanding its support for the FMLN, CISPES shaped its outreach
message in the U.S. to highlight the egregious human rights abuses of the
Salvadoran government and the danger of “another Vietnam.” CISPES organiz-
ers avoided leftist ideological rhetoric so as not to appear too radical to potential
supporters and allies. Van Gosse, who served as a CISPES student outreach
coordinator, pointed out that “anyone looking for the words ‘capitalist,’ ‘socialist’
or ‘imperialist’ in its direct-mail appeals, its newspaper Alert! Focus on Central
America, or its voluminous internal program mailings, would be severely disap-
pointed.”50 CISPES acknowledged its desire to see an FMLN victory, but this
was not the point of its educational outreach efforts. “Our whole idea was to
educate people about the history of Central America,” said Félix Masud-Piloto,
coordinator of the CISPES chapter at Florida State University and a native of
Cuba. “We’re not about sending weapons. We’re about education in the U.S.” As
a graduate student and teaching assistant in Latin American history during the
1980s, Masud-Piloto gave many talks to student and community groups about
Central America, highlighting the conditions that gave rise to social unrest going
back a hundred years. His message regarding revolution was “Let them do what
they need to do.”51
By stressing salient themes and minimizing revolutionary jargon, CISPES
was able to maintain amicable relations with liberal, religious, human rights,
and peace groups. According to Margaret Swedish, the relationship between
the Religious Task Force on Central America and CISPES involved both “a col-
laboration and a tension.” RTFCA did not support the FMLN, but neither did
it condemn revolutionary violence. “What was remarkable,” said Swedish, “is
that this issue did not break open more than it did. People were so focused on
human rights and stopping Salvadoran aid that these underlying issues were
minimized.” Swedish described CISPES as “one of the most talented organiza-
tions” in grassroots organizing work. In Washington, however, she deemed the
most influential group “the Catholic social justice lobby, which had a lot of very
skilled people from a variety of bases.”52
That opinion was reiterated by Rep. Michael Barnes (D-MD), chairman of
the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, who remarked to the press
in March 1982, “The group that has the most credibility and that I sense is lis-
tened to most by my constituents is the Catholic Church. I’m not sure how they
mobilize people, but they are certainly well-mobilized.”53 The Catholic social
justice lobby had millions of church members as a base, an institutional sup-
port structure, experienced lobbyists, and leaders who spoke out frequently on
Central America issues.54 Swedish was raised Catholic and inspired by the “pro-
gressive Catholic peace and justice movement,” according to her own account.
She grew up in Milwaukee and attended colleges in Milwaukee and Boulder
during the Vietnam War era. Her first connection with Latin America was
through her volunteer work at a soup kitchen in Montreal that assisted refugees
from Chile and Argentina. She came to Washington, DC, in 1979 and became
the director of RTFCA in 1981, a role she continued until 2004.55
On March 24, 1981, the first anniversary of Romero’s assassination, the
Central America movement made its public debut. Some 3,000 demonstra-
tors marched in Boston, 1,500 in New York City, and hundreds in other cities
and on campuses across the country.56 Two days later, CNFMP held a press
conference in which members of the Congressional Black Caucus denounced
the Reagan administration’s policies toward El Salvador and South Africa, tying
together the two issues under the mantle of human rights.57 On April 18 another
demonstration was held in New York that drew between 3,500 and 10,000 pro-
testers. Two weeks later, on May 2, some 20,000 people demonstrated at the
Pentagon in what the New York Times described as “the largest antiwar protest
seen here” since the Vietnam War. Another 5,000 marched in San Francisco
that day.58 Activities on campuses also accelerated. At Princeton University in
mid-February 1982, a standing-room only crowd of 500 attended a film show-
ing, El Salvador: Another Vietnam. A new local group was formed that night, the
Committee Against Intervention in Central America.59
As Central America groups emerged around the country, CNFMP orga-
nized a national conference in Washington, DC, on June 10, 1981, with the
idea of connecting organizations and building a broad-based, united move-
ment. Titled “The Reagan Foreign Policy: Intervention vs. Human Rights,” the
conference drew approximately two hundred activists for two days of plenary
discussions, workshops, and strategy sessions. Among the featured speakers
[ 74 ] CHAPTER 3
were Democratic Socialist leader Michael Harrington and Rep. Gerry Studds
of Massachusetts. According to a follow-up report, “The conference strength-
ened ties to local and national solidarity organizations,” including Nicaragua
Network, CISPES, and NISGUA. “We established new relations with the
Socialist International, our Canadian neighbors, and we developed more labor
contacts.” Organizers judged that they had met their major objectives, which
included promoting “the Coalition as the central organizer in Central America
work,” but noted that “attendance could have been better.”60
Labor unions emerged as a distinct force in the Central America movement
with the formation of the National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy
and Human Rights in El Salvador (NLC), an association of union presidents
founded in September 1981. Led by Jack Sheinkman, secretary-treasurer of the
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, Douglas Fraser, presi-
dent of the United Auto Workers, and William Winpisinger, president of the
International Association of Machinists, NLC challenged the Cold War views
of the AFL-CIO. Twenty-three union presidents joined the NLC, representing
over seven million workers.
David Dyson, an ordained Presbyterian minister, served as NLC’s single staff
person until 1984, when he was joined by Daniel Cantor. Dyson “had for two
decades linked the worlds of religious faith and labor activism,” according to the
political scientist Andrew Battista. He made ten trips to El Salvador during the
1980s, some of which involved looking for “disappeared” Salvadoran labor lead-
ers.61 NLC activities included sending labor delegations to El Salvador, form-
ing “sister unions,” bringing Salvadoran labor leaders to the United States to
testify before Congressional committees, and cosponsoring the largest Central
America demonstration of the decade in April 1987. NLC took up opposition to
contra aid in the mid-1980s. The group allied itself with political lobby groups
such as CNFMP and SANE and veered away from leftist solidarity groups such
as CISPES and Nicaragua Network.
On the quieter side of the Central America movement, the Sanctuary
Movement offered assistance and refuge to Central American refugees. An
estimated one million Salvadorans and Guatemalans fleeing repression in their
native lands made the journey across Mexico and entered the United States
clandestinely during the 1980s.62 Sanctuary projects developed independently
in California and Arizona and spread across the country. By mid-decade,
hundreds of religious congregations and communities had declared them-
selves “sanctuaries,” offering material and legal assistance. According to the
sociologist Sharon Erickson Nepstad, “The illegal nature of sanctuary work pre-
vents a precise count, but some have estimated that 70,000 North Americans
and 2,000–3,000 Central American refugees were involved in the movement.”
As one U.S. sanctuary volunteer explained, “The sanctuary movement was
ingenious because, with the network of churches that developed through the
underground railroad, you had refugees that were moving into communities all
around the United States and telling their stories.”63
Between 1980 and 1982, the crisis in El Salvador led many local Nicaragua
solidarity groups to shift their emphasis to El Salvador. The Portland [Oregon]
Nicaragua Solidarity Committee, which formed in the wake of the Sandinista
Revolution in early 1979, changed its name to the Portland Central America
Solidarity Committee (PCASC) in 1980 in order to incorporate the Salvadoran
struggle. In one month alone, January 1981, PCASC organized two folk music
benefits, a press conference, a demonstration, and an “Ecumenical Procession,”
all protesting U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government. In San Antonio the
Nicaragua Committee picketed the El Salvador consulate in protest of that gov-
ernment’s repression. In Miami the Nicaragua Solidarity Committee changed
its name to the Latin America and Caribbean Solidarity Association.64 The
crossover to El Salvador diminished Nicaragua activism but ultimately ben-
efited it by increasing public interest in Central America issues. On the third
anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution in July 1982, Nicaragua Network
counted at last sixteen active local affiliates.65
Among the various organizations involved in the Central America movement

was the American Friends Service Committee (ASFC), one of the most well-
established peace and justice organizations in the United States. For more
than six decades, AFSC had been organizing campaigns, working in coalitions,
educating the U.S. public, lobbying Congress, and providing humanitarian aid
abroad. Although the Society of Friends (Quakers) was a relatively small reli-
gious denomination, its members were strongly committed to peace and justice
issues, evident in their financial support for both the AFSC and its sister orga-
nization, Friends Committee on National Legislation, based in Washington,
DC. The AFSC’s annual budget approved by the board of directors in 1985 was
$17,637,000.66
AFSC maintained a national office in Philadelphia, a research team (National
Action/Research on the Military Industrial Complex), an office at the United
Nations, nine regional offices, and at least twenty-three local offices. Regional
[ 76 ] CHAPTER 3
and local offices kept the national office in touch with grassroots developments
and enabled AFSC to implement its plans and projects quickly. In 1981 AFSC’s
Peace Education Division had a total of ninety full-time staff, along with many
student interns and volunteers. This made AFSC’s peace education network the
largest in the United States, according to Jack Malinowski, human rights coor-
dinator of the Peace Education Division. “Our main strength was a national
network of activists in about forty cities plus having people on the ground in
Central America.” Malinowski’s own path to peace activism originated dur-
ing the Vietnam War, which “changed my direction,” he said. He grew up in
Pennsylvania as a Roman Catholic and became a Quaker in the 1960s, studied
religion in graduate schools at Notre Dame and Temple University, and taught
at St. Joseph’s College, a Jesuit school in Philadelphia, before joining the AFSC
national staff.67
Unlike Nicaragua Network, AFSC did not regard the FSLN as the “vanguard
party.” According to Malinowki, “We were wary of, shall we say, the Leninist
model and too much ideology rooted in a Marxist-Leninist approach. We also
knew that unless they allowed some dissent and participation on the political
level, they were going to undermine themselves and give Reagan ammunition.”
In March 1981 AFSC inquired of the Sandinista government about the status
of a human rights advocate, José Estaban Gonzales, who allegedly had been
jailed by the FSLN government as a political prisoner.68 On the whole, how-
ever, noted Malinowski, “AFSC has basically been behind popular movements
for social change even when they used methods with which we disagree. . . . We
give more ground to underdogs.”69
AFSC expanded its Central America activities in the early 1980s. It devel-
oped new educational resources, including a slideshow, “Central America:
Roots of the Crisis,” sponsored speaking tours in the United States, and orga-
nized more fact-finding delegations to Central America. One AFSC-sponsored
study tour departed for Central America and the Caribbean on November 21,
1980. Led by Phillip Berryman, eight of its eighteen participants were African
American or Latino. The group’s report on Nicaragua noted “sharply oppos-
ing views of almost every situation” among Nicaraguans and “the enormous
expectations of people which cannot be fulfilled in the short run,” due to an
impoverished economy.70
Phillip and Angela Berryman played important roles in shaping AFSC’s
Central America work—as speakers, study tour guides in Central America,
staff members, and advisers. The couple had lived in Central America for over
a decade before returning to the United States in 1980 and finding employment
with AFSC. Angela went on speaking tours on the East Coast and coordinated
a series of teach-ins in Philadelphia on Guatemala. Phillip, who was well-versed
in liberation theology and Latin America history, traveled across the United
States speaking to community groups, news reporters, radio audiences, and
college students, including a largely white audience at Vanderbilt University
and a largely black audience at Tennessee State University. His talks typically
addressed the roots of the crises in Central America, the role of the church, and
the role of the United States in the region. When questions arose from the audi-
ence as to the relationship between pacifist groups such as AFSC and violent
revolutionaries, Berryman would often reply, “If the AFSC would have nothing
to do with violent groups, it would mean that AFSC would have nothing to do
with the U.S. government.”71
Phillip Berryman elaborated further on this subject in an article in WIN
Magazine (March 1981), a pacifist journal associated with the War Resisters
League. He argued that the “first principle is not nonviolence but liberation.”
Hence, pacifists “cannot condemn those who, after trying nonviolent means,
feel they have no choice but to take up arms.” He furthermore argued that con-
ditions in Latin America were different from “areas where ‘classical’ nonvio-
lence struggles had proved successful”—e.g., the Indian independence move-
ment and U.S. civil rights struggles—and that those in power in Latin America
have repeatedly shown they “can assassinate with impunity.”72
AFSC, as an organization, had long wrestled with the problem of how to bal-
ance its commitments to both nonviolence and social justice. The AFSC board
of directors attempted to clarify its position in a statement on January 24, 1981.
The statement reiterated AFSC’s commitment to “to work for social justice and
to aid victims of oppression,” and it firmly denied “the legitimacy of violence
however extreme the provocation.” The latter principle, however, did not exclude
AFSC from developing relationships with groups engaged in revolutionary vio-
lence: “Those who labor under structures of injustice and violence will set their
own course for breaking free from oppression. We will not support the choice
of violence, but where basic human rights and social equity are at issue, Quakers
and the AFSC need to be engaged in common cause to the limit of our beliefs,
resources, and program capacity. . . . The AFSC will not easily forsake those with
whom we have worked nor abandon the cause of the oppressed.”73
The internal discussion over nonviolence and social justice did not hamper
AFSC’s outreach efforts. At the San Francisco regional office, for example, staff
[ 78 ] CHAPTER 3
person Chris Coleman noted in his report to the national office in April 1981 that
over the previous six weeks, he had spoken to seventeen groups in seven north-
ern California cities and recruited over 250 people to work on Central America
issues. Looking back over the previous two years, Coleman wrote that his work
with Nicaragua had involved assisting the formation of the Nicaraguan Interfaith
Committee for Action, promoting educational activities among church groups,
organizing a lobbying campaign against U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, help-
ing collect three tons of medical supplies, raising $13,000 for food and the lit-
eracy campaign, cosponsoring a western regional conference on Nicaragua, and
cosponsoring a July 19th celebration that involved over 100 East Bay groups and
the mayor of Berkeley.74 All in all, AFSC’s local and regional offices were gener-
ous with their resources, often facilitating the development of independent local
groups and even chapters of other national organizations. This selfless quality
arguably had a positive effect on the Central America movement in terms of
working toward common goals and reducing organizational competition.
The Anti–Contra War Campaign, 1982
The Contra War began in earnest in March 1982. According to a Defense

Intelligence Agency report, “In the 100 day period from 14 March to 21 June,
at least 106 insurgent incidents occurred within Nicaragua.”75 Word of the
attacks spread quickly through the Central America network. On March 22
AFSC executive director Asia A. Bennett sent a letter to President Reagan and
members of Congress urging a halt to “any United States complicity in terrorist
actions and covert operations against the Nicaraguan government or any gov-
ernment in Central America or the Caribbean.” U.S. policies, insisted Bennett,
must be “based on principles of self-determination, non-intervention, and
mutual respect.”76 That same day, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military
Policy sent out a legislative update urging support for legislation introduced by
Rep. Michael Barnes, which would “prohibit U.S. support for military or para-
military operations in Nicaragua.”77 U.S. citizens living in Nicaragua held a press
conference in Managua on March 25, reading an open letter of protest directed
to U.S. ambassador Anthony Quainton. By the end of the month, 104 congres-
sional representatives had signed a letter to President Reagan urging acceptance
of a peace initiative proposed by Mexican president López Portillo.
Planned demonstrations against U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government now
added the demand to end U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. On March 27, 1982,
between 23,000 and 50,000 people demonstrated in New York City; another
15,000 marched in Philadelphia, and smaller numbers in Seattle, Chicago, Dallas,
Los Angeles, Denver, San Francisco, and Washington, DC. In West Germany
4,000 people staged a protest march at the U.S. Consulate in Bremen, orga-
nized by the Bremen chapter of the Nicaragua–El Salvador Committee.78 Two
months later, peace and religious groups released to the press the “Statement in
Opposition to Covert Intervention in Nicaragua,” signed by 120 prominent reli-
gious and civic leaders. The statement read in part, “A policy of covert interven-
tion against a sovereign nation fundamentally violates international law. . . . This
covert operation contradicts the democratic ideals of the United States and the
principle that a people have a right to determine their own future.”79
In September 1982 a delegation of fourteen representatives from the major
national peace organizations went on a fact-finding tour to Nicaragua and
Honduras. The purpose of the trip was to gather more information about the
U.S. military buildup in Honduras, the “role of U.S. military advisers in relation-
ship to terrorist activities along the Honduran and Nicaraguan border,” and the
effects of the “CIA plan to support the destabilization of Nicaragua.” The del-
egates traveled to the northern and eastern reaches of Nicaragua and met with
Sandinista and U.S. officials, including U.S. ambassador John Negroponte in
Honduras. Their eight-page report cited “armed aggression against the civilian
population by former Nicaraguan National Guardsmen” and concluded: “We
believe that more than any other factor, it is the United States’ attempt to pre-
serve its historic political, economic and cultural hegemony in the area which
is preventing the fulfillment of the Nicaraguan and Honduran peoples’ longing
for peace, independence, self-determination and equitable economic devel-
opment. We found that U.S. policy toward Nicaragua and Honduras, instead
of promoting the establishment of democracy, freedom and peace, is having
exactly the opposite effect.”80
In October 1982, representatives from a number of peace organizations—
AFSC, SANE, FOR, Clergy and Laity Concerned, Women’s International League
for Peace and Freedom, and War Resisters League—met to consider creating a
unified Central America peace campaign.81 It would take more than a year, how-
ever, before an umbrella organization by that name would be launched. In the
meantime, news reports were raising public awareness of the “covert” war against
Nicaragua, particularly a nine-page cover story in Newsweek (November 8, 1982).82
In Congress, opposition to the not-so-covert war was led by representatives
[ 80 ] CHAPTER 3
Michael Barnes (D-MD) and Tom Harkin (D-IA). On December 8, after the
House tabled legislation introduced by Barnes, Harkin introduced a simi-
lar amendment to the 1983 Defense Appropriation bill that called for a cutoff
of U.S. assistance to any group “carrying out military activities in or against
Nicaragua.”83 In the ensuing debate, it was revealed that the House Intelligence
Committee had already secretly approved this restriction last April, appro-
priating aid to the contras only for the purpose of weapons interdiction. Rep.
Edward Boland (D-MA), chair of the House Intelligence Committee, subse-
quently offered an amendment openly incorporating this restriction, replacing
Harkin’s bill. The House approved the Boland Amendment unanimously and
President Reagan signed it into law on December 21, 1982. The amendment did
nothing to change the contras’ strategy or diminish contra attacks, but it did
establish a legal basis for Congress to monitor administration actions, setting
the stage for future political battles over contra aid. For Central America activ-
ists, the Boland Amendment was profoundly inadequate, as it restricted only
the official purpose of the aid, not the aid itself.
CHAPTER 4
Expansion of the Anti–Contra War Campaign,

1983–84
T he Contra War became a hot political topic in Washington in

1983. The first volley was fired on April 13, 1983, when Rep.
Edward Boland publicly denounced the administration for lack of compliance
with the recently enacted Boland Amendment. Two weeks later, he introduced
legislation to cut off all aid to the contras. President Reagan chose that very day,
April 27, to present his case to the American people and Congress in a nation-
ally televised address. His full-throated endorsement of the contras excited
much news coverage but failed to sway the Democratic Party majority in the
House. On July 28, the House voted 228–195 to prohibit U.S. funding, directly
or indirectly, of any military operations against Nicaragua. The Senate, however,
with its Republican majority, approved a contra aid package, thus leaving the
matter to a joint House-Senate conference. In November, the joint conference
appropriated $24 million in military aid for fiscal year (FY) 1984 (beginning
October 1, 1983). The Reagan administration won the battle that year, but not
without arousing a great deal of opposition. The New York Times reporter Leslie
Gelb wrote in July 1983, “Not since the Vietnam War has an issue so engaged the
political passions of the President and his advisers, Congress, the public and
many nations around the world, as recent Reagan Administration decisions
about Central America.”1
Historians have made much of the rise of the religious right in the early
[ 81 ]
[ 82 ] CHAPTER 4
1980s, but in the foreign policy arena, at least, it was the liberal religious com-
munity that rose up and made waves. Mainline liberal religious denominations
played a leading role in the rapid expansion of the anti–Contra War campaign
in 1983 and 1984, providing both an organizational base and a respectable public
image. Between 1982 and 1984, over twenty U.S. Protestant, Catholic, Jewish,
and ecumenical organizations issued statements in opposition to U.S. military
intervention in Nicaragua. Each statement provided authoritative approval for
local congregations and individuals to challenge the U.S. government on this
issue—in essence, to assert the primacy of religious values over governmental
policy.2 These faith networks also had clout in Washington. According to the
political scientists Cynthia Arnson and Philip Brenner, “The most numerous
and effective groups arrayed against the president’s policies in Central America
were religious. . . . Virtually all of the major Protestant denominations had
Washington offices responsible for linking their congregants to the national
political process.”3 Well-known peace and justice leaders included Rev. William
Sloane Coffin Jr., senior minister at Riverside Church in Manhattan, and Bishop
Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit, the founding president of Pax Christi.
Part of the motivation for religious involvement came from personal and
institutional ties with Nicaragua. In mid-1984 there were eighty-six U.S. Catholic
missionaries living in Nicaragua. “They ask us to do all we can in the United
States to counter U.S. policies,” said Rev. Anthony D. Bellagamba, executive
director of the U.S. Catholic Missions Association. According to the Washington
Post, reports and letters from the U.S. missionaries in Nicaragua were “widely
circulated within the religious community” and “generally favored the social
initiatives of the Sandinista revolution and detailed the suffering of villagers
from contra raids.”4 Gustavo Parajón, a Baptist minister, medical doctor, and
director of the Nicaraguan Council of Protestant Churches (CEPAD), wrote to
the various U.S. Protestant denominations in 1983, urging them to “denounce
the atrocities committed by the counter-revolutionaries attacking our country,
of which our brethren are victims. These groups are clearly trained and financed
by the government of the U.S. and as they invade our country they are planting
death, panic and desperation among our people.” Parajón’s appeal was incorpo-
rated into a resolution adopted by the United Methodist Church General
Conference in May 1984. The resolution called on the U.S. government to
“refrain from any activities . . . designed to destabilize existing governments.”5
Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill attributed his opposition to the Reagan
administration’s Central America policies in part to his connection with the
Expansion of the Anti–Contra War Campaign, 1983–84 [ 83 ]
Maryknoll Catholic order. As he told the New York Times (September 12, 1984),
“I have great trust in that order. When the nuns and priests come through, I ask
them questions . . . and I’m sure I get the truth. I haven’t found any of these mis-
sionaries who aren’t absolutely opposed to this policy. . . . I think it’s disgraceful
what the Nicaraguan rebels are doing, tearing down schools and health care
centers and murdering the civilian population.” One of O’Neill’s contacts in
Nicaragua was Peggy Healy, a Maryknoll nun based in Managua. Healy encour-
aged O’Neill to stand firm against contra aid, which he did.6 O’Neill’s firm
stand was also supported by his relatively liberal constituency in Massachusetts.
Indeed, every member of the House and Senate from the state voted consis-
tently against contra aid. Moreover, at the request of the Boston Coordinating
Council on Central America, Governor Michael Dukakis signed resolutions in
1983 and 1984 declaring September 15 a “Day for Peace and Justice in Central
America.” The resolutions called on citizens to “express their concern over the
grave situation in whatever ways they feel are appropriate.”7
One of the many claims made by the Reagan administration was that the
Sandinista government was persecuting Nicaraguan Jews. Rabbi Balfour
Brickner of the Stephen Wise Free Synagogue in New York, having twice vis-
ited Nicaragua, felt obliged to refute this claim in an opinion column in the
Philadelphia Daily News in December 1984. “No Jew I met in Nicaragua com-
plained about anti-Semitism,” he wrote. “In fact, they most vigorously rejected
the charge. The government doesn’t persecute Catholics or Protestants either.
It does challenge, and sometimes expels, those who, in religious garb, conduct
counter-revolutionary activities.” Addressing the U.S. role in Nicaragua, Rabbi
Brickner asserted, “America is waging an illegal and an unjust war against the
sovereign nation of Nicaragua.” This, he said, “is sinful. Ought not that be a mat-
ter of Jewish concern?”8
Reagan administration officials attempted to deflect the outpouring of criti-
cism from the liberal religious community by intimating that U.S. religious lead-
ers were aiding America’s Cold War enemy. On March 8, 1983, Secretary of State
George Shultz complained to a House subcommittee about U.S. “churchmen
who want to see Soviet influence in El Salvador improve.” The following day,
Vice President George Bush told the press that he was unable to understand
how Catholics could support Marxist revolutionary movements in Central
America.9 United Nations ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, in an op-ed article in
the Washington Post on April 17, went a step further and accused administration
critics of willful deception, declaring that “a very well organized lobby works
[ 84 ] CHAPTER 4
indefatigably to confuse the moral, political and intellectual questions involved

in U.S. policy toward Central America.”10
By the summer of 1983, the White House Outreach Group and the Office of
Public Diplomacy were actively engaged in a covert effort to manipulate and
intimidate the mainstream media (see Chapter 2). Hence, on August 9 Faith
Ryan Whittlesey, the White House Outreach Group director, accused both the
news media and religious leaders of promoting a “deliberate distortion” of the
Nicaraguan situation. “I think the media has tried to portray what we think are
the bad guys, the communists, as Robin Hoods,” she said. “And I think the con-
fusion has been deliberate and that accounts for some of the ignorance [of the
U.S. public].” American church leaders, too, she said, “tend to characterize the
Sandinistas as Robin Hoods, essentially fighting for social justice.”11
Some U.S. religious leaders did, in fact, view revolutions in Central America as
having just goals, even as they eschewed revolutionary violence. Ten days before
Whittlesey’s published comments, Rev. William Sloane Coffin had argued in an
opinion piece in the New York Times (July 31, 1983) that “the revolutions brewing
in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras share the same legitimate twin goals of
the Sandinista revolution: to stop the exploitation of the many by the few and to
end foreign domination.” Coffin also affirmed the consensus position in the lib-
eral religious community, writing, “You don’t have to think that the Sandinistas
are doing anything right to know that the United States is doing everything
wrong.”12 Coffin penned the article just after returning from a week-long trip to
Nicaragua, where he and 156 other North Americans stayed in the border town of
Jalapa, a target of repeated contra attacks (the trip marked the beginning of
Witness for Peace, discussed later). Never afraid of controversy, Coffin had orga-
nized “freedom rides” in the civil rights movement and been a leader in the anti–
Vietnam War movement. During the 1980s, he played prominent roles in anti-
nuclear weapons campaigns and the Central America movement.13
For many peace activists, the most pressing issue in the early 1980s was the
nuclear arms race. Thousands of new peace groups emerged in support of the
Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, which advocated an immediate, bilateral
(United States–Soviet Union) halt to the production, testing, and deployment
of nuclear weapons. SANE, the largest national disarmament organization with
80,000 members, took on Central America issues in the summer of 1983. SANE
was founded in 1957 as the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, with the goals
of halting open-air nuclear testing (in Nevada) and curbing the arms race. The
group made its first transition to anti-intervention work at the outset of the
Vietnam War.
To director David Cortright, who was part of the G.I. peace movement dur-
ing the war, taking on Central America issues was both necessary and difficult.
It was necessary because the violence was escalating. “There was the reality on
the ground in Nicaragua,” said Cortright. “The war had started to take a toll . . .
causing a tremendous amount of suffering and death. We felt frustration and
anger at what our government was doing. We could not call ourselves peace
activists without doing something about this issue.” It was difficult because
SANE was fully engaged in the Freeze campaign, stopping the MX missile, and
other disarmament and budgetary issues. “It was a big stretch to take on Central
America issues,” he said.14 Notwithstanding the organizational challenge, Cort-
right wrote a memo to the SANE staff on July 23, 1983: “The time has come for
us to take a stand and make an organizational commitment to opposing the
American war [in Nicaragua]. We can no longer purport to be a leading national
peace organization and remain on the sidelines in this crucial struggle.”15
Cortright and other SANE staff members visited Nicaragua in October 1984.
Like the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), SANE had a capa-
ble organization. Its professional staff included two lobbyists, four field organiz-
ers, four communications and media experts, and others. SANE approached
the Central America movement in a businesslike manner, examining needs and
opportunities. Cortright asked Richard Healey, director of the Coalition for a
New Foreign and Military Policy, how SANE could best contribute to the
movement. Healey suggested that SANE help draw in more peace and disarma-
ment groups. In August and September 1983, SANE tested the waters to see if its
own local chapters were interested in taking up Central America issues. The
feedback was mildly encouraging. Local coordinators in the Southeast noted
that most activists saw the arms race and intervention as “all of one piece,” but
“we need to be cautious about not pushing some folks too far.” The national
office nevertheless pushed. SANE cosponsored a six-week tour of five Central
American youth leaders to ten U.S. cities that fall; the SANE World newsletter
and its Spanish-language counterpart published more articles on Central
America; and SANE’s radio program, Consider the Alternatives, began producing
programs on Central America.16
Robert Musil, who directed the SANE radio program, took two trips to
Nicaragua in 1983 and 1984, during which time he interviewed FSLN leaders
Daniel Ortega, Bayardo Arce, Miguel d’Escoto, and other notable Nicaraguans.
[ 86 ] CHAPTER 4
In the United States, said Musil, “I interviewed anyone of note, including soli-
darity workers, nuns, activists, etcetera, when they returned to or were visiting
the U.S.” During the Vietnam War, Musil had been an army captain who taught
communications and policy at the Defense Information School in Ft. Benjamin
Harrison, Indiana. When ordered to go to Vietnam, he refused and applied for
conscientious objector status. He had come to the view that the “war was illegal”
and that the “tactics used were illegal,” based on Geneva conventions. After leav-
ing the army, Musil earned a doctorate at Northwestern University in American
studies.17
The surprise U.S. invasion of Grenada on October 25, 1983, sparked new inter-
est in anti-intervention among peace groups. Multi-issue national peace organi-
zations developed a new educational campaign called the “Deadly Connection,”
which tied together the issues of interventionism and the nuclear arms race.
The basic concept was that U.S. intervention in Central America and elsewhere
increased Cold War tension, which in turn exacerbated the nuclear arms race,
which in turn brought the superpowers closer to nuclear war. Whatever the
educational value of this concept, the main goal was organizational—to pull
more peace and disarmament groups into the Central America movement.
On November 2, 1983, the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy
(CNFMP), Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), SANE, and other groups spon-
sored a “Deadly Connection” conference in Washington, DC, attracting over
five hundred people. Cortright addressed the topic “Why is Central America
becoming a compelling issue for disarmament organizations?”18 Similar confer-
ences were organized by AFSC and Mobilization for Survival (MFS) in Boston,
Philadelphia, and Connecticut towns over the winter of 1983–84. MFS made
the “deadly connection” campaign one of its top priorities at its annual confer-
ence in January 1984, stating its intention “to increase the number of people
willing and able to respond to U.S. military intervention, regardless of the kinds
of weapons used or the region of the world in which it occurs.”19
Many local and state disarmament groups did, in fact, take up Central
America issues in 1983 and 1984. The Florida Coalition for a Nuclear Weapons
Freeze, for example, conducted a survey of its thirty-five member groups in
October 1984, one year after the Grenada invasion, and found that most were
engaged in Central America issues. The state organization, which began in early
1982 with assistance from the AFSC office in St. Petersburg, changed its name
to the Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice in early 1985 in order to reflect its
broader agenda. Not all peace groups worked on Central America issues and
many did so as a second or third priority, but the infusion of peace groups into
the anti–Contra War campaign (ACWC) provided a significant boost.
Protests and the Pledge of Resistance
There were many demonstrations against U.S. intervention in Central America

in 1983 and 1984, mostly small and local. One mid-size demonstration took
place at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, DC, on July 2, 1983,
attended by 7,500 people. Ron Kovic, a paralyzed Vietnam veteran and author,
delivered the main message.20 Planning was already under way for a larger dem-
onstration in Washington on November 12 when the U.S. invasion of Grenada
took place. The ad hoc coalition of national groups organizing the event quickly
added “Opposition to U.S. intervention in the Caribbean” to their demands
regarding El Salvador and Nicaragua. Rev. Coffin and Rev. Joseph Lowery of
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) announced the rally
at a press conference on October 27. An advertisement placed in the New York
Times one day before the demonstration read: “If President Reagan Can Get
Away with the Invasion of Grenada, What Next?”21
The rally on November 12 drew approximately 20,000 people, according to
Capitol police. People gathered at three locations, then marched to the Ellipse,
just south of the White House. Rev. Jesse Jackson, a Democratic Party presiden-
tial contender, told the crowd that the same assumptions that had “put us into
Vietnam” were at work in Central America. “Latin America is not our back door,”
he said. “It’s next door and we must respect our next-door neighbors.” A state-
ment by former senator George McGovern (D-SD) was read that said in part,
“I want you to know that I stand with you.” Rep. Ted Weiss (D-NY) told the
cheering crowd that he and eight other members of Congress had called for the
impeachment of Reagan. The demonstration was peaceful despite a small group
of counterprotestors who tried to block the antiwar marchers by sitting down
in the middle of Pennsylvania Avenue, which led to the arrest of eighteen. The
New York Times, Washington Post, and Boston Globe all covered the demonstra-
tion, highlighting Jackson’s speech but also quoting others. The New York Times
described it as “festive rally.” The Washington Post noted that a few protesters were
carrying American flags. One of the flag bearers, Tim Rowe of Northampton,
Massachusetts, was quoted as saying, “This flag can stand for peace and justice.”22
Organizers of the rally considered it a success in terms of numbers of people
[ 88 ] CHAPTER 4
attending, publicity, and cooperation among national organizations. The plan-

ning committee consisted of representatives from more than a dozen organiza-
tions, including AFSC, CISPES, CNFMP, Democratic Socialists of America, the
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, MFS, National
Student Association, Nicaragua Network, NISGUA, SANE, and the Socialist
Workers Party. Jim Matlack of the AFSC office in Washington reported to the
national office in Philadelphia, “My overall impression of the [planning] process
was quite favorable to the dedication, cooperation, and hard work of the lead
organizers in this effort.” He added, “They are, of course, understaffed and under-
funded with a constantly shifting context of world events in which to work. The
scale of the effort seems much larger than the resources available to meet it.”23
On November 2–4, 1983, one week after the U.S. invasion of Grenada, fifty-three
representatives of Christian peace organizations gathered for a retreat at the
Kirkridge Center in northern Pennsylvania. Led by Jim Wallis and Jim Rice, they
considered the question of how to deter a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua. One idea
put forth was to recruit people to go to Nicaragua and stand unarmed before the
invading U.S. force. Another, more pragmatic idea was to have people occupy
congressional offices in acts of civil disobedience. The latter became the basis for
a new plan of action that became known as the Pledge of Resistance. After further
refinement by interested parties over the next few months, the plan was published
in Sojourners (August 1984) under the title “Pledge of Resistance: A Contingency
Plan in the Event of a U.S. Invasion of Nicaragua.” Written by Jim Wallis, the arti-
cle described the mechanics of the plan and ended with the statement, “If the
armies of the United States are mobilized to wage war on Nicaragua, may a mighty
nonviolent army of U.S. citizens also be mobilized to wage peace.”24
The first mass recruitment took place in San Francisco on October 9, 1984.
Seven hundred people signed the pledge in front of the Federal Building, taking
an oath to join with others in acts of civil disobedience or legal protest “as my
conscience leads me . . . in order to prevent or halt further death and destruction
in Central America.”25 A microphone was set up for individuals to explain to the
gathered crowd why they were signing the pledge. Ken Butigan, a doctoral stu-
dent in theology, organized the event with the help of progressive groups in the
area. The AFSC office in San Francisco subsidized Butigan with $50 per week and
provided him with office space. The following week, Butigan joined representa-
tives of national groups at the Sojourners office in Washington, DC, to establish a
national Pledge of Resistance campaign. Two committees were formed, an analyst
group and a signal group. The analyst group was charged with advising the signal
group on political and international developments; the signal group was given
the authority to activate the national Pledge network.26 More than twenty activ-
ist organizations immediately endorsed the Pledge campaign and made commit-
ments to promote it. A national Pledge office was opened in Washington and a
number of local groups were enlisted as regional coordinators.
The Pledge of Resistance (POR) sign-up proved to be an excellent out-
reach tool for local groups. Pledge drives took place in all regions of the
nation, including the southern states of Texas, Virginia, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Florida. “Some of our states have been going to town,” said
Gail Phares, who served as regional Pledge coordinator for the Southeast. 27
The Pledge sign-up knew no organizational boundaries. In Atlanta a chapter
of Clergy and Laity Concerned coordinated the operation; in Seattle, it was a
Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) chapter; in Philadelphia, a new POR
group was formed. The Seattle group gained the endorsement of the Church
Council of Greater Seattle and merited an article in the Seattle Times that
kindly listed FOR’s telephone number for those interested. By the end of
1984, 42,000 people had signed the pledge nationwide, with about half com-
mitted to civil disobedience.28 In the course of becoming a mass mobilization
vehicle, the original religious identity of the Pledge campaign became some-
what diluted. Given the decentralized nature of the Pledge sign-up operation,
local groups could choose how they wanted to present it. Some groups rein-
forced the original religious, or specifically Christian, character of the Pledge,
while others did not. The Pledge of Resistance became, in the words of the
national Pledge handbook (1986), a “broadly-based campaign, spanning the
religious, peace and justice, and anti-interventionist communities.”29
The two strongest local pledge groups were located in San Francisco and
Boston. In San Francisco Butigan’s successful fund-raising appeals enabled him
to move out of the AFSC office and open a downtown office with two paid staff
persons. Bay Area organizers linked the Pledge to the American political tradi-
tion of protest dating back to the Boston Tea Party. One local Pledge flyer,
addressing the question of whether public protests are “effective in such a cri-
sis,” asserted that national mobilizations against the Vietnam War had “suc-
ceeded more than most of us ever dreamed,” as “Nixon was threatening the pos-
sible use of nuclear weapons against North Vietnam.”30 Such claims served to
imbue the Pledge campaign with an expectation of political influence. Granted
that Pledge signers were motivated by their individual consciences, most hoped
[ 90 ] CHAPTER 4
that by joining with others in timely fashion, their protests would achieve con-
crete results—preventing a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua.
In Boston the Pledge campaign was permeated by an activist subculture that
integrated interpersonal support networks with social change activism. The roots
of this eclectic subculture lay in pacifist “direct action” groups that formed during
the late 1950s, the civil rights movement, the anti–Vietnam War movement, femi-
nist consciousness-raising groups, and recent anti–nuclear power and anti–
nuclear weapons protest movements. The organizational design of the Boston
Pledge group reflected this activist subculture in the form of affinity groups, con-
sensus decision making, and nonviolence training workshops. Affinity groups
were designed to cultivate a sense of belonging and trust among participants and
allow for participatory (consensus) decision making. Training workshops primed
participants for civil disobedience by role-playing arrest scenarios. Affinity groups
were not for everybody, of course, and many Bostonians signed the pledge regard-
less of cultural associations. The Boston group ultimately signed up 3,400 people.
All in all, wrote the sociologist James Hannon, a participant observer, “the early
organizing efforts of the Pledge were a spectacular success.”31
At the national level, the early organizational success of the Pledge campaign
may be attributed to a sense of urgency regarding a possible U.S. invasion of
Nicaragua, the simplicity of the sign-up method, and the existence of hundreds
of activist groups ready to spread the campaign in local communities. The
Pledge had its limitations as well: it appealed to those already persuaded on the
issue; it was narrowly focused on protest actions; and, initially at least, it did not
directly address the Contra War. The latter deficiency was rectified by the spring
of 1985, as national POR organizers incorporated contra aid legislation into the
Pledge signal system. The Pledge campaign, as such, became a key component
of the ACWC and the vehicle of choice for many activists.
Legislation and Political Action
In the legislative arena, CNFMP took the lead in rallying opposition to the
Contra War. CNFMP kept track of bills in Congress, how members voted,
when members would be in their home districts, and what “talking points” to
raise in communicating with them. It sent out periodic press releases, held train-
ing conferences, joined with other groups in organizing campaigns, and coordi-
nated lobbying efforts through its Central America Working Group (CAWG).
Margaret Swedish, director of the Religious Task Force on Central America

(RTFCA), described CAWG as “the main place where everyone sat together.
. . . That was the vehicle that we joined to do our lobbying work together.”
CAWG convened weekly meetings to plan strategy and divide tasks. Although
each group had its “own rhetoric and logic,” said Swedish, “we worked together
on singular goals. It was an amazing collaboration.” On key bills, representa-
tives took responsibility for getting the word out to local contacts across the
country. “We coordinated strategy—we tried not to duplicate efforts,” said
Yvonne Dilling, director of Witness for Peace (WFP). Dilling had served as
temporary coordinator of Nicaragua Network in early 1979 and became the first
WFP director in October 1983. “Everybody had their strengths,” she said. The
particular strength of WFP lay in providing “a never-ending stream of people
who would bother their Congresspersons. So when CAWG wanted to talk with
aides in twenty-five offices, they had this huge pool to do it.”
The cooperation that developed in CAWG drew high praise from par-
ticipants. “That was our best—working cooperatively,” said CNFMP director
Richard Healey. “It was well done,” said SANE director David Cortright. “I had
the impression it was like Monday lobby group on arms control, very focused,
very business like around legislation.” Healey credited CAWG coordinators
Cindy Buhl and Bill Spencer with keeping the committee on task and maintain-
ing the spirit of teamwork among the autonomous groups.32
The leftist solidarity groups, Nicaragua Network and CISPES, were fully
engaged in the political program, distancing themselves from radical leftists
who eschewed political lobbying in favor of building grassroots support for
sweeping social transformation. “We mobilized CISPES around contra aid
because it was the big legislative battle,” said Van Gosse, CISPES student out-
reach coordinator. If the Reagan administration and its rightist allies “won on
that, they could win everything else. Whereas, if they were pushed back, if they
were wholly or partially defeated on contra aid, then we would have space to
win on something else.” He added that “it was a mark of the increasing realism
and maturity of my organization that we did get involved.”33
CAWG’s lobbying strategy typically involved targeting “swing votes,”
those members of Congress who had either changed their vote on Central
America legislation or indicated some willingness to do so. Fewer than one
in seven House and Senate members were considered “swing votes” on the
contra aid issue. These select members of Congress were the focus of heavy
lobbying from both sides in their home districts and in Washington. One
[ 92 ] CHAPTER 4
designated “swing vote,” Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), had voted against
authorizing covert operations in Central America in December 1982 but
was considered susceptible to administration pressure and thus targeted by
all concerned for constituent pressure. In early 1984 the senator received so
many letters and phone calls on the contra aid issue that he set up a special
meeting at the Federal Courthouse in downtown Philadelphia in mid-March.
Specter brought with him to the meeting James Michael, deputy secretary
of state for inter-American affairs, to explain the administration’s position.
When Michael spoke, according to a report by the Philadelphia Inquirer, most
of the audience of 150 “jeered, hissed and, at one point, stood and turned their
backs.” Twenty-five people reportedly spoke against U.S. policy and no one
spoke in favor of it. Among the critics were Kenneth Sharp, political science
professor at Swarthmore College, and Phillip Berryman of AFSC.34 The
meeting did not immediately persuade Specter, as he voted in June for a $14
million contra aid measure. In 1985 and 1986, however, he reversed himself
and voted against all contra aid proposals.
In the House of Representatives, CAWG members worked closely with
the House Democratic Task Force on Central America, chaired by Rep.
David Bonior. Kathy Gille, Bonior’s legislative assistant who staffed the task
force, described the relationship with CAWG as “synergistic.” She attended
CAWG’s weekly meetings, which were usually held at the Methodist building
across from the Capitol. “It was the best experience of my life working with
that group of people,” she reflected, “people who were so profoundly commit-
ted” to changing public policy. “They were able to hold out an alternative view
and to do it in a way that appealed to Congress. They had a sophisticated lob-
bying strategy.” The House task force rated members of Congress on a one-to-
five scale on the contra aid issue, ranging from those who strongly opposed
contra aid to Reagan’s ardent supporters. What was most important in terms
of influencing the middle range of congressional representatives was the
framing of issues, according to Gille. The battle over contra aid “was largely a
matter of perceptions,” she said. The Reagan administration framed the issues
as a “communist takeover” in Nicaragua and the “threat of Nicaraguan expan-
sion into El Salvador.” The task force countered with alternative frames: “no
more Vietnams,” international law, human rights, and democratic account-
ability (highlighting the misuse of funds). Gille credited the people and orga-
nizations involved in CAWG with “continually feeding us alternative view-
points from the region.”35
Rep. David Bonior was appointed by Speaker O’Neill to lead the Task
Force on Central America when the first Boland Amendment came up in
early 1982. His work included lobbying other members of Congress, speaking
to the media, monitoring diplomatic negotiations, and strategizing with
groups such as CAWG. “There was a huge network of people and organiza-
tions in the country working on this,” he said. “It was quite an amazing net-
work. We had a really good connection with religious groups.” In 1985 the task
force was renamed the Democratic Leadership Council on Central America.
On a half dozen occasions Bonior was asked to present the Democratic
Party’s response to Ronald Reagan’s Saturday morning radio addresses on
Central America. He also brought members of Congress to Nicaragua in
order “to see our point of view,” as he said. Bonior was strongly committed to
ending the Contra War. “The fact that we were arming and financing the wars
in El Salvador and Nicaragua was very, very disturbing to me,” he said. “I was
opposed to this kind of imperialism. Cold War proxies end up in wars in which
people lose their lives.” IPS director Robert Borosage described Bonior as “a
huge champion against the contras,” one who earned great respect from ACWC
groups.36
Born in 1945, Bonior grew up in a working class neighborhood in Detroit
and attended Catholic schools. “My interest in Central America started with
nuns interested in Haiti and Nicaragua,” he said. He learned about the cor-
ruption of the Somoza regime and liberation theology, absorbing its princi-
pled worldview. “Somewhere in grade school that message was drubbed into
me.” Bonior served in the U.S. Air Force from 1968 to 1972, but not in Vietnam,
and graduated from Chapman College with a master’s degree in history. He
was elected to the Michigan state house of representatives in 1972 and to the
U.S. Congress in 1976. As a freshman in the House, he was put on the Panama
Canal Subcommittee and spent much of his time working with the Carter
administration on the Panama Canal treaties. He often traveled to Panama
and spent time in Nicaragua as well. Being aware of the history of U.S. inter-
vention in the region and its ill effects, Bonior was “inclined to let the revolu-
tion play itself out,” as he said. “They ought to have the right to play out their
own destiny.” Bonior became the chief deputy whip under Speaker Jim
Wright in 1987. He was actively involved in the diplomatic negotiations lead-
ing up to the Esquipulas accords of August 1987.37
The lobbying efforts of Bonior’s task force and CAWG were greatly assisted
by revelations in April 1984 of the Reagan administration’s illegal mining of
[ 94 ] CHAPTER 4
Nicaragua harbors. Incensed at the administration’s callous disregard for

democratic accountability, the House passed a second Boland Amendment in
July and again in October, which cut off all contra funding for FY 1985. The
House refused to accommodate the Senate this time, and U.S. aid to the con-
tras officially ceased. It was a great political victory for the ACWC, but tenu-
ous. Moreover, contra attacks continued unabated in Nicaragua due to the
administration’s illegal supply network.
On December 1, 1983, representatives of several national organizations met to

discuss how to build a stronger and more politically influential Central Amer-
ica movement.38 Out of this meeting came two new, overlapping projects, the
Central America Peace Campaign (CAPC) and the Central America Education
Project (CAEP). CAPC was designated the main vehicle for political organizing,
while CAEP was the tax-deductible agency for producing educational materi-
als. Both were employed in “a coordinated field operation to do grassroots edu-
cation in key areas throughout the country,” the political goal being to generate
pressure on swing members of Congress. By mid-1984 sixteen national orga-
nizations were serving on the CAPC steering committee, including religious
and secular peace groups, solidarity groups, and Washington policy groups.39 It
was a genuine cooperative effort among the various groups, although funding
was tenuous. Nine of these organizations committed staff and resources to the
grassroots-building project, which focused on a dozen congressional districts.
CAPC also hired four field organizers to work in Texas, South Florida, and the
state of Washington.
The field operation stimulated activism and raised public awareness in
the applicable regions, but the immediate political benefits were slight. Only
one representative changed his or her vote. Republican Rep. Joel Pritchard
of the first district in Washington had voted against contra aid in July 1983,
then for it in October that year. In May 1984, after much lobbying pressure,
he voted against contra aid again—a success for the ACWC. To secure the
latter vote, field organizer Jamie K. Donaldson persuaded ten labor leaders,
four church leaders, and three members of a newly formed commission, the
Mayor’s Commission on Central America, to send telegrams or call Pritchard.
Donaldson arranged for a twelve-member delegation to meet with Prichard on
March 20. He also organized a petition drive that involved thirty organizations
in the area. The petitions were delivered to Prichard with more than seven thou-
sand signatures. Unfortunately for the ACWC, Pritchard was replaced in 1985
by John Miller, a conservative Republican who consistently supported contra

aid. Notwithstanding the letdown, the Central America Peace Campaign in the
state of Washington continued even after the national office folded at the end
of 1986.
CAPC’s most important role was to represent the Central America movement
at the Democratic National Convention in San Francisco, July 14–19, 1984. On
May 10 SANE held a press conference to announce a “major effort on Central
America” in regard to the upcoming Democratic Party convention. “We are one
of the peace groups which worked hard to end the war in Vietnam,” said director
David Cortright. “We have no intention of allowing this administration to put
our country back in that situation again.”40 Prior to the convention, CAPC orga-
nizers sent educational packets and questionnaires to hundreds of delegates and
promoted a media ad campaign with the slogan “Talks Not Troops.” At the con-
vention itself, CAPC hosted an initial reception for delegates followed by daily
briefings for both delegates and the press.
CAPC gained valuable allies in two presidential hopefuls, Sen. Gary Hart
and Rev. Jesse Jackson. Hart’s “Central America Peace Plank” opposed “uni-
lateral intervention” and sought “to make clear in the record the difference be-
tween the Democratic Party and the Reagan Administration with respect to
our approach in Central America.” Jackson, after traveling to Nicaragua in late
June, more pointedly called for an end to contra aid and the removal of all U.S.
military installations in Honduras. “Our foreign policy must be characterized
by mutual respect, not by gunboat diplomacy, big stick diplomacy, and threats,”
he declared in his keynote address on July 18. Vice-President Walter Mondale
was on record as opposing contra aid, but he took the position at the conven-
tion that the party platform was not the place to restrict foreign policy options.
A Los Angeles Times poll of 92 percent of the convention delegates found that
84 percent of those polled thought that President Reagan’s Central American
policy should be an important issue in the fall campaign, with 10 percent say-
ing it should be the most important. CAPC’s own questionnaire, returned by
1,003 delegates, or 25 percent of the total, found that 90 percent were opposed
to the “CIA arming and supporting rebels in Nicaragua trying to overthrow the
Sandinista government in that country.”41
Delegates to the Democratic Party convention ultimately approved a peace
plank on Central America, but the long prelude in the document actually rein-
forced some of President Reagan’s cherished themes—that the Sandinistas were
totalitarian and were intent on promoting revolution elsewhere—before calling
[ 96 ] CHAPTER 4
for an end to contra aid. The relevant passages in the platform on Nicaragua began
by declaring that Reagan’s policies were a failure for having made the hemisphere
more unstable, more hostile to the United States, and more impoverished. It also
noted that “our support for the contras and for the covert war has strengthened
the totalitarians at the expense of the moderates,” and that the “Soviet Union,
Cuba and Nicaragua have all encouraged instability and supported revolution in
the region.” The peace plank nevertheless ended with an unequivocal policy state-
ment: “We must terminate our support for the Contras and other paramilitary
groups fighting in Nicaragua. We must halt those U.S. military exercises in the
region which are being conducted for no other real purpose than to intimidate or
provoke the Nicaraguan government or which may be used as a pretext for deeper
U.S. military involvement in the area. And, we must evidence our firm willingness
to work for a demilitarized Central America, including the mutual withdrawal of
all foreign forces and military advisers from the region.”42
In the aftermath of the Democratic convention, the Democratic Party nomi-
nee, Walter Mondale, shifted rightward in response to a barrage of charges
by President Reagan portraying him as weak on defense. In mid-September
Mondale said that if the Sandinistas “rejected a good-faith compromise and con-
tinued to export revolution in Central America, he would respond with a ‘quar-
antine.’ ”43 Mondale’s backtracking did not inoculate him from rhetorical attacks
from the right. Indeed, in the sole foreign policy debate of the election campaign,
which was nationally televised on October 20, 1984, Reagan accused the former
vice-president of offering the Soviets “unilateral concessions” on arms control,
of voting “against military strength in the 1970s,” of being “possessed” by the idea
that U.S. military strength constitutes “a threat to world peace,” and of devoting
his “political career to opposing strength, exposing us to dangerous unnecessary
risks.”44 Mondale’s retreat from the Democratic Party platform was dishearten-
ing to anti–Contra War activists, to say the least. Although Congress had cut
off funds for the contras in 1984 and U.S. public opinion remained steadfastly
opposed to contra aid, activists were uneasy over future political prospects.
Educational Outreach
Educational outreach involved the promotion of ACWC themes and arguments

by numerous parties through various means—speeches, newsletters, press
releases, and so forth—to a range of audiences. The purpose of educational
outreach was not only to inform and persuade people, but also to encourage them
to take responsibility for their government’s actions and to become involved in
the ACWC. For those already persuaded, mainly in liberal and left quarters, edu-
cation was still needed to reinforce the importance of the issue amid competing
issues and to keep people apprised of international and political developments
and campaign strategies. Rather than “preaching to the choir,” such educational
outreach served to cultivate a base of informed supporters, members, and volun-
teers willing and able to expand the reach of the campaign.
An important part of educational outreach involved bringing the reality of the
Contra War closer to the people of the United States. The geographical proxim-
ity of Nicaragua combined with the FSLN government’s openness to visitors
and the relative safety of Nicaraguan cities allowed for easy travel. The novelty of
U.S. citizens visiting the land of the “enemy” became the source of many house
parties, community presentations, and newsletter articles. Although most did
not go into war zones, the effects of the Contra War were visible in this small
nation; and the hospitality of the Nicaraguan people, as well as the freedom to
travel around the country, marked a sharp contrast to the “totalitarian” image of
Nicaragua put forth by the Reagan administration. Many of the talk and slide-
show presentations of returning visitors focused on particular developments in
Sandinista Nicaragua, such as medical care, education, or women’s rights, which
often attracted people with similar interests in U.S. communities.
One common educational vehicle across the nation was “Central America
Week,” held annually in March to commemorate the martyrdom of Archbishop
Romero. Promoted nationally by the two religious task forces, RTFCA and
IRTFCA (Inter-Religious Task Force on Central America), the content of activ-
ities was left up to local groups. In Philadelphia the week of activities in March
1983 included presentations by Salvadoran refugees, “teach-ins” on U.S. foreign
policy at Temple University and the University of Pennsylvania, a talk on health
care in Nicaragua by Dr. Mercedes Zweigle, and a program on women in Central
America. David Funkhouser, director of the Central America Organizing
Project in Philadelphia (and former coordinator of Nicaragua Network), raised
the memory of the Vietnam War in speaking to the Philadelphia Inquirer. “Many
people see a lot of parallels between the way this country is getting involved in
Central America and the way it entered the war in Southeast Asia,” he said.45
The Vietnam analogy became the number one theme among ACWC groups
in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Grenada. Mobilization for Survival
launched a national recruitment campaign with the slogan “Do you have five
[ 98 ] CHAPTER 4
minutes to prevent another Vietnam in Central America?” A New York City

group, Artists Call Against U.S. Intervention in Central America, placed an
advertisement in the New York Times ( January 22, 1984), which read: “Vietnam?
We are starting down the Vietnam road again. Thousands of U.S. troops are
already on the ground in Honduras.” The ad listed more than seventy upcoming
Central America events in northeastern cities, including poetry readings, films,
lectures, performances, and an “art and solidarity” panel discussion.46
The task of producing both readily usable information and in-depth back-
ground papers fell to a number of Washington policy organizations: Center
for International Policy, Central America Historical Institute, Commission
on U.S.–Central American Relations, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, IPS,
Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource Center, and Policy Alternatives for
the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA). On the weightier side of edu-
cational materials was PACCA’s signature work, Changing Course: Blueprint
for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean, published in January 1984. The
lengthy booklet did not actually offer a blueprint for the future but rather a prin-
cipled, historical analysis that challenged the “ill-fitting East-West framework
on Central America.” Its conclusion inverted the conservative Cold War ideo-
logical paradigm: “The historical enemies of freedom and justice in the small
countries of Central America have not been communists, much less Soviets,
but the ruling aristocracies whose militaries have been trained by the United
States and by U.S. forces themselves.”47
With articles and information on Central America proliferating, the Central
America Resource Center in Austin, Texas, began publishing the Central
America Writers Bulletin in the spring of 1983. This semiannual publication pro-
vided annotated lists of all newspaper articles and books on Central America
published during the previous six months—a useful tool for researchers and
writers. The center also surveyed Central America groups and produced a direc-
tory identifying each group’s issues, activities, location, and national affiliations.
The first directory came out in 1984. An updated third edition in 1987 listed 1,075
local, state, and national organizations working on Central America issues.48
Apart from activist groups and religious denominations, the ACWC had
many allies among independent progressive media. Ample criticism of Reagan’s
Central America policies could be found in popular magazines such as The
Nation, The Progressive, and Mother Jones; in Latin Americanist journals such
as NACLA Report on the Americas, Envío, and Nicaraguan Perspectives (initiated
by the Nicaraguan Information Center in Berkeley in July 1981); in religious
journals such as Sojourners, Christianity and Crisis, and Tikkun; and on Pacifica
Radio, which ran its first series on the Contra War in July 1982 and maintained a
steady stream of reports and interviews.49 The ACWC also had a few consistent
allies in the mainstream media, such as syndicated columnists Tom Wicker and
Anthony Lewis. Wicker wrote more than one hundred articles critical of the
Reagan administration’s Central America policies during the 1980s, with the
first published on June 1, 1982. To take one example, Wicker wrote on March
27, 1984, “It’s sheer hypocrisy, too, for Mr. Reagan to push a guerrilla insurgency
against Nicaragua while denouncing such tactics in El Salvador. . . . What does
he imagine the efforts of the C.I.A.-directed contras amount to, if not ‘state
terrorism’?”50
IFCO’s Central America Information Weeks

One organization that made a noteworthy contribution to both educating
the wider public and building grassroots organizations was the Interreligious
Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO). Founded in 1967 for the
purpose of creating and sustaining organizations dedicated to social justice,
IFCO took up Central America work in the summer of 1983. “We became con-
vinced that our main task was education,” said Rev. Lucius Walker, an African
American Baptist pastor and director of IFCO. There was “abysmal ignorance”
of the region; and “people had blinders on” as to “the historical role that the U.S.
had played in Nicaragua and the region.” The means of education chosen by
Walker and the IFCO staff were statewide Central America Information Weeks
(not to be confused with annual Central America weeks), in which hundreds of
educational activities were organized across a state in a single week.
Walker’s own dedication to social justice began in Union County, New
Jersey, where he grew up. While in high school, he “got a call to ministry,” as
he put it, which entailed a commitment to social justice. “The realities of my
family and community led me to see that there were some basic systemic root
causes to the poverty and issues we were facing,” reflected Walker. “I was called
to address those realities as a central objective of my ministry.” After graduat-
ing from Andover Newton Theological School in Massachusetts and becoming
an ordained American Baptist minister, he began working at a Christian Center
in Milwaukee in 1957. From 1973 to 1978 he served as the associate general sec-
retary of the National Council of Churches. Philosophically, Walker was of the
view that there was “no contradiction whatsoever” between Christianity and
Marxism.
[ 100 ] CHAPTER 4
The first Central America Information Week took place in Kansas in Sep-
tember 1983. This was followed by campaigns in Washington, Oregon, and Ohio
in 1984, and in Wisconsin, Arizona, Florida, South Carolina, and Kentucky in
subsequent years. IFCO typically brought to a state thirty-five to forty resource
people who had lived or worked in Central America or who were themselves
Central American. “We were just bringing people together and giving them an
opportunity to talk and share,” said Walker. “We tried to keep it as simple and
direct as possible, and free of jargon as possible. We did not use language of the
extreme left.” Walker wanted people from the United States and Central America
“to meet so they could eyeball each other and share their analyses. . . . The point
was to break through cultural and ideological barriers, and encourage empathy
and understanding.”
IFCO field organizers Sharon Haas and Don McClain would typically arrive
in a state three months in advance of the targeted week of activities in order to
recruit community activists as local coordinators and discuss possible speaking
engagements and media interviews. The mass of activities undertaken generally
attracted favorable media coverage. According to Walker, IFCO activities “were
able to turn a lot of editorial policies around and get the media to cover issues
that they were not covering.” IFCO organizers were diligent in keeping records
and assessing their work. IFCO’s first four statewide campaigns produced 150
events in 31 Kansas communities, 222 events in 37 Washington communities, 201
events in 36 Oregon communities, and 607 events in 97 Ohio communities. The
Ohio campaign, said Sheila Darrow of the Ohio Council of Churches, was “by all
accounts a success.” Following the week of activities in Ohio (November 11–18,
1984), a meeting was held on December 1 for the purpose of establishing a per-
manent statewide network. Local group representatives attending agreed to
form a coordinating committee that would circulate information on resources,
speakers, legislative bills, travel tours, and work opportunities in Nicaragua, and
coordinate lobbying delegations, a legislative-alert phone tree, and a statewide
Emergency Response Network (the Pledge sign-up).
Like AFSC, IFCO was generous in its organizing work, offering much to local
groups and asking little in return other than participation. Unlike AFSC, how-
ever, IFCO ran on a very tight budget and was not part of the Washington lobby
network or the ad hoc coalitions that planned demonstrations. IFCO kept its
focus on building grassroots organizations and sustaining local activism. IFCO
organizers routinely encountered “feelings of ineffectiveness” and “discourage-
ment, despair, and exhaustion” among activists; and they sought to counter this
by helping to develop well-organized groups with clear goals and a division of

labor. In working with local and state organizations, IFCO maintained a strict
policy of openness and inclusion. “We always insisted that whenever we came to
town, we would never participate in any divisiveness,” said Walker. “There might
have been some people on the left who did not want to sit down with other peo-
ple. We were not going to allow in any way our strategy to be diverted by sectari-
anism. At least they would have to sit at the same table. We would have it no
other way.”51
AFSC’s Media Project

In mid-1984, the AFSC staff held a meeting in Philadelphia in which they
assessed the overall state of the Central America movement, including its prog-
ress in promoting educational themes. Under the heading of “relative successes,”
they noted public identification of the “contras as terrorists” and recognition of
“the economic roots of the conflict.” They deemed the movement “less success-
ful” in generating “enthusiasm for the Contadora process.” Under the heading
of “setbacks or failures,” they listed the public’s tenuous grasp of the “reality of
war in El Salvador and Nicaragua,” the difficulty of countering “administration
depictions of Sandinista Nicaragua as repressive, undemocratic, Cuba-like,” and
“public ignorance of the principle of self-determination.” Out of this reflective
discussion came a renewed commitment to “reframe the debate in the media.”52
That commitment took shape in the new Central America Media Project,
suggested by AFSC staff persons Phillip Berryman, Angela Berryman, and Jack
Malinowski. According to Angela Berryman, writing in July 1984, newspaper
editorial writers “have not given detailed consideration to alternative proposals,
in part because they have had little access to information on them.” The media
project involved putting together packets of information and recruiting local
volunteers to deliver these packets personally to editorial boards and interna-
tional news editors. The targets were “the 300 daily papers which constitute the
vast majority of newspapers in the United States, as well as local T.V. and radio
stations.” The media packets included PACCA’s Changing Course, two pam-
phlets written by Phillip Berryman, What’s Wrong in Central America and What
to Do About It (AFSC, 1984) and Talking Sense about Nicaragua (AFSC, 1984),
and materials on the Contadora negotiations and Central American refugees. A
new staff person was hired to coordinate the project, and in early December 475
media packets were sent to local contacts.
As it turned out, fewer than one hundred of the local contacts actually
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arranged meetings with media personnel. The others, according to an AFSC

follow-up report, “had lost their nerve about going to the newspaper because
they anticipated a hostile response.” Those who did meet with media person-
nel generally received a favorable hearing. In the case of the Newport News in
Virginia, for example, a visiting delegation of four was encouraged by the edi-
tor, Ernie Gates, to submit op-ed articles to the paper in the future. The overall
meager results of the Central America Media Project suggested to the AFSC
staff that local contacts and activists, especially those living in conservative
communities, “needed more support, encouragement, and training” and “that
the program operated on an unrealistic, short time frame.”53
That assessment could well apply to CAPC’s grassroots organizing project
and other educational efforts, which generally required more time, consistency,
expertise, and resources in order to reframe the debate. All in all, the educa-
tional efforts of ACWC groups were most effective in local settings where per-
sonal experiences in Nicaragua were invoked. Influencing the mass media was
more difficult, but opponents of the Contra War at least offered a critical dis-
course and made progress on some themes.
Transnational Activities
Transnational activities in 1983 and 1984 were many and varied. Dozens of
national and local organizations sponsored study tours of Sandinista Nicaragua.
Many employed the services of Marazul Tours or Tropical Tours, professional
travel agencies located in New York City. Over the course of the decade, Marazul
alone arranged for 25,000 people to travel to Nicaragua, according to program
director Bob Guild. He described the agency’s purpose as helping “Americans
to see Third World countries with social systems different from our own. . . .
We’re not saying they should love these systems; we’re just saying they should
try to understand them.”54
One of the more popular tours focused on the Nicaraguan elections sched-
uled for November 4, 1984. Between August 1 and October 31, 1984, Marazul
arranged twenty-four group tours, each lasting ten to fourteen days. Tropical
Tours similarly organized tours lasting eight days. The latter included meetings
with representatives of the FSLN, opposition political parties, the Supreme
Electoral Council, La Prensa, Barricada, the Antonio Valdivieso Ecumenical
Center, the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women,
neighborhood defense committees, trade unions, and agricultural cooperatives;

and there were visits to factories, schools, agricultural cooperatives, hospitals,
and childcare centers.55 Apart from study tours, some norteamericanos learned
about the new Nicaragua by attending one of the progressive Spanish language
schools in the country. Casa Nicaragüense de Español, located in Managua,
held language classes in the morning and arranged educational meetings and
cultural activities in the afternoon and evening.
Witness for Peace

In April 1983 Gail Phares led a group of thirty religious leaders to three north-
ern border towns of Nicaragua that had recently been attacked by the contras.
According to Phares, “One of these villages was under attack when we arrived.
We were within 200 yards of the Honduran border where the contra leader who
called himself ‘El Diablo’ was based. The people told us that the contras had
stopped shooting because they could see us. I remember thinking, ‘We have got
to stop President Reagan from destroying the Nicaraguan revolution—as the
U.S. had done in Guatemala in 1954.’ ” On the bus returning to Managua, the
visiting norteamericanos talked about holding a large vigil of U.S. citizens in the
Nicaraguan war zone. The following week, Phares and others discussed the idea
with CEPAD leaders Sixto Ulloa and Gustavo Parajón, who in turn arranged
a meeting with FSLN officials Ernesto Cardenal, Sergio Ramírez, and Tomás
Borge. Interior Minister Borge was reluctant to allow North Americans to put
themselves in danger, lest the Reagan administration use them as an excuse for
intervention, but ultimately he approved the vigil “in a place where you would
be safe.”56 Phares returned to North Carolina and began making contacts out of
her office at the Carolina Interfaith Task Force on Central America (CITCA),
located in Durham, North Carolina, enlisting the support of the IRTFCA and
other groups. On the Nicaraguan side, CEPAD handled arrangements for an
upcoming trip. A CEPAD flyer listed the first purpose of the trip as “stop the
killing in the Nicaraguan border zone.” Another purpose was to “increase inter-
national support for the people of Nicaragua.”57
On July 2, 1983, a delegation of 157 North Americans from thirty-one states
and Puerto Rico arrived in Managua. Many brought with them small gifts such as
baseballs for their hosts in Jalapa. On the ten-hour trip from Managua to Jalapa,
military vehicles with Nicaraguan troops escorted the caravan, as contras were
known to be in the area. According to Chuck Jacobsen, a high school teacher from
Tallahassee, Florida, “The bus got stuck on the way there and the group proceeded
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to ride in open pickup trucks to Jalapa.” Upon arriving, the group was briefed on
the military situation. Residents showed them a bomb shelter covered with wood
they had built, and pieces of U.S.-made mortar shells and oil cans they had col-
lected. The visitors slept that night in a brand new school built by the Sandinista
government, guarded by soldiers on the perimeter.58 The visitors heard many sto-
ries over the next few days. The highlight of the trip was a vigil on July 6 in which
guests and hosts held hands across a field. On the last night there, about 20 people
attended a meeting to discuss plans for a permanent witness.
One month later, CEPAD leaders and a small group of Americans led by David
Sweet, a professor of Latin American history, managed to secure the FSLN gov-
ernment’s approval of a permanent witness project. An agreement was reached
in which the American witnesses would be given the same travel privileges as
foreign journalists, allowing them to travel in all but the most dangerous areas.59
The new organization would be called Acción Permanente Cristiana por la Paz
(Permanent Christian Action for Peace) in Nicaragua and Witness for Peace in
the United States.
Witness for Peace (WFP) was formally established at a meeting of twenty
people in Philadelphia on October 8–10, 1983. The group was all white and
highly educated, with a wealth of progressive organizing experience. A steering
committee of six was named and Yvonne Dilling, at the age of twenty-eight,
was chosen as national coordinator. The group agreed on three principles for
the new organization: nonviolence, nonpartisanship in relation to the FSLN,
and public identification as a “biblically-based community of U.S. citizens who
stand with the Nicaraguan people.” The latter language represented a compro-
mise between those who wanted to define the group as Christian and those
who sought a broader religious identity. Jim Wallis argued for the former, while
Phyllis Taylor, a Jew, argued for the latter. Despite the compromise, Wallis pre-
sented the new organization in the November 1983 issue of Sojourners with
a Christian overlay, writing, “We are moved not by any political ideology or
program, but by the call of faith. . . . We remember that the peace of Christ,
which we have been given to share, was won through the cross.” The first WFP
press release on November 17, 1983, was more down to earth, explaining the
group’s purposes as, first, to “establish a human shield to protect the people of
Nicaragua from the violence of the U.S.-backed counterrevolutionary forces,”
and second, to generate public opposition to “the covert war being waged by
the U.S. government against the people of Nicaragua.”60
WFP’s type of nonviolent action was well suited to Yvonne Dilling. She
had traveled through Nicaragua in September 1979 and worked in Honduras

with Salvadoran refugees in the early 1980s. “The experiences in Nicaragua left
me with a political realism,” she wrote to a pacifist friend in 1981. She noted
with some consternation that the violent revolution in Nicaragua had suc-
ceeded, whereas nonviolent attempts to remove the Somoza regime had failed.
Moreover, despite the violence of the revolution, the Sandinista government
had inaugurated a new era of hope and progress in Nicaragua. The lesson for
Dilling was that nonviolent action, if it is to have real value, must be strategic
and effective.61 Gail Phares was similarly oriented toward productive results.
She wanted thousands of U.S. citizens to travel to Nicaragua and witness first-
hand the effects of the Contra War in order to “come back rarin’ to go” as com-
munity activists. “We need organizers, not dead people,” she quipped.62
Gail Phares grew up in a devout Catholic family in Devils Lake, North
Dakota, the oldest of nine children. She attended Catholic schools and devel-
oped a strong desire to help people, along with a “strong sense of God’s love
and presence.” In 1957 she joined the Maryknoll order. Her service as a nun,
she said, “took me out of my comfort zone—out of my comfortable life in
North Dakota—and in time would make it possible for me to live and work
in Nicaragua and later Guatemala.” She became critically conscious of the role
played by the U.S. government and capitalism in the poverty she saw in both
countries. Living in Siuma, Nicaragua, from 1963 to 1966, she shared a house
with Maura Clarke, one of the four American women murdered by Salvadoran
security forces in December 1980. In Guatemala she witnessed the ruthless
counter-insurgency campaign carried out by Guatemalan security forces, with
the assistance of U.S. arms and trainers. “Over 200,000 people were killed by the
Guatemalan Army, mostly unarmed peasants but also students, college profes-
sors, trade union organizers, journalists, priests, pastors, and nuns,” said Phares.
“Many of my students and friends were murdered. People were tortured, disap-
peared, and killed because they dared to live and preach the Gospel.”
Phares left the Maryknoll Order in 1970 but retained her commitment to
the liberating social justice mission of the church. During the next decade, she
married Robert Phares, a Social Security administrative judge, gave birth to two
daughters, earned a master’s degree in Latin American studies from American
University, and worked in Washington with the Interamerican Foundation,
overseeing antipoverty projects in Latin America. During the 1980s, she applied
her considerable energy and organizational talents to the Central America
movement, helping to found three national organizations—NISGUA, Witness
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for Peace, and the Pledge of Resistance—along with CITCA, which developed
twenty-six chapters in the Carolinas. She later wrote that at times she became
emotionally exhausted and “it was difficult to balance everything.” She praised
her husband, Bob, for making her work possible “through his support for our
daughters and our family.” Phares never lost her sense of mission: “My family
extends to people all across the world. I believe that as people of faith we are
called to work for the Kingdom now—for peace and justice.”63
Witness for Peace quickly moved into action following the October 1983
meeting. Within two months, Dilling, the steering committee, and many dedi-
cated volunteers had set up offices in Washington, DC, Durham, and Santa
Cruz; established an advisory committee of influential religious leaders; sent out
fund-raising appeals to potential supporters; and organized the first long- and
short-term delegations to Nicaragua, aided by twenty-seven local support groups
that formed around the country. The support groups grew to ninety by April
1984. On October 27, 1983, four long-term volunteers arrived in Jalapa, followed
five weeks later by the first short-term delegation. Thus began, said Phares, “the
longest nonviolent presence in an active war zone in history.”64
In 1984 WFP sent two short-term delegations a month on average, each with
eighteen people. According to a WFP report: “These delegations traveled the
dangerous roads, shared with Nicaraguan families, worked in the fields with their
Nicaraguan brothers and sisters, experiencing to a degree the tension, the danger,
the fear experienced each day by campesinos in the war zone. The delegations then
returned to the U.S., ready to relate these experiences.”65 Long-term volunteers
focused initially on coordinating short-term delegations in Nicaragua but soon
began documenting contra attacks as well. This was deemed necessary because of
a dearth of news about such attacks in the U.S. media in 1983 and much of 1984.
On June 2, 1984, long-term volunteer Peter Olson discovered a copy of the CIA-
produced Freedom Fighter’s Manual, which set off a chain of communications that
ultimately led to a national exposé of this “assassination manual” in October.
Long-term volunteers gradually branched out from Jalapa, establishing a pres-
ence in Ocotal, Somotillo, San Pedro del Norte, Jinotega, Matagalpa, Paiwas, San
Juan del Sur, and Bluefields on the eastern coast. Their reporting also expanded
to cover various developments in Nicaragua, including the Nicaraguan elec-
toral process in 1984 (interviewing different political party leaders about their
freedom to organize and campaign), the military situation, and the relationship
between the Sandinista government and churches. Information and documen-
tation was relayed from the field to the Managua office, then to the Washington
office, where it was repackaged into press releases, WFP newsletter articles,
and mailings to local contacts. Successful fund-raising appeals allowed WFP
to expand its staff in Washington and to hire its first coordinator in Managua,
Arnold Snyder, in February 1984. The highlight of 1984 was the WFP-sponsored
National Peace Vigil in Nicaragua from June 26 to July 4; it included a ceremony
in Jalapa in which some two hundred U.S. citizens participated.
The first WFP delegations received mixed reviews in the U.S. press. The fact
that Americans were traveling to war zones in Nicaragua was deemed newswor-
thy, but perspectives on the credibility of the organization varied. One of the more
positive articles, published in the Washington Post (December 1, 1983), described
WFP as an “unusual experiment in political nonviolence” that had grown out of
the religious community. The reporter Marjorie Hyer noted that, despite the dan-
gers in Nicaragua, the WFP office “has been flooded with applicants,” such that its
rotation teams were filled through 1984.66 Anne Keegan, a reporter for the Chicago
Tribune (August 4, 1984), on the other hand, portrayed WFP as a brainwash-
ing operation. Without identifying anyone by name or using any direct quotes,
Keegan wrote of the U.S. visitors: “Some thought they had been given a guided,
pro-government tour that shielded them from some of the negative realities of
the Sandinista government. Others thought they had been herded around blindly
and led to so many vigils that the vigils had become meaningless.”67
The WFP office in Washington tried to keep the focus on contra attacks, but
both WFP delegations and the media were often more interested in the nature
of the new Nicaragua. The first short-term delegation from Florida, for exam-
ple, which traveled to Nicaragua in September 1984, produced a lengthy paper
assessing human rights, economic and social programs, military conscription,
and church-state relations—in addition to documenting the results of contra
attacks. “We went to Nicaragua motivated by a primary concern for the victims
of war and violence,” wrote team member John Frank in his summary report.
“Most of us left Nicaragua with both supportive and critical feelings about the
Sandinista government, but all of us believe that the positive forces for eco-
nomic justice since the revolution deserve our nurture and support.”
After a three-day training period, the twelve-person Florida delegation trav-
eled to the north-central area near the Honduran border, staying in Jalapa, San
Juan de Limay, and La Estancia, the latter being a cooperative resettlement proj-
ect. They ate and worked alongside their hosts, celebrated a birthday party, wor-
shipped at churches, and listened to stories. In talking with residents, the
norteamericanos recorded the names of persons who had been killed, wounded,
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or kidnapped in recent contra attacks and the circumstances surrounding those

attacks. In Managua they met with Bob Fretz, consul general of the U.S.
Embassy. Fretz defended administration policy, but equivocated on some
points, according to Frank. Regarding the contras, Fretz told the visiting group,
“there isn’t one other country on the face of the earth that has stood up and said,
‘Yes, we think you are right to support the Contras, we think they’re a great
bunch of guys.’ ” Asked about Reagan’s demeaning descriptions of Nicaragua,
Fretz said, “Would I call Nicaragua a reign of communist terror and a totalitar-
ian dungeon? I wouldn’t.”68
The Gainesville Sun wrote a story about Frank and the Florida WFP delegation.
Headlined “ ‘Witness for Peace’ Says He Saw Genuine Progress in Nicaragua,” the
article did not mention the Contra War until the seventh paragraph. More inter-
esting to the reporter were Frank’s comments on positive developments in
Sandinista Nicaragua: illiteracy and infant mortality down, health care and farm
ownership up, and pluralistic democracy moving forward.69
All WFP delegates committed themselves to speaking to community groups
and local media upon their return. “We encouraged education in the commu-
nity,” said Dilling, such as writing opinion columns and letters to the editor,
and speaking to community groups. “The media team at Sojourners would say,
You have a local angle on an international issue, so use your local opportunities.
Speak to different groups, call your newspaper, let your church do a send-off
and do a press release; get covered.” What caught the attention of the press, said
Dilling, was the local angle and “making it personal. It’s not just that this nation
is suffering the effects of U.S. foreign policy, it’s this person I met . . . José, who
has lost his children due to the contras, paid for by U.S. tax dollars.”70 WFP’s
educational activities at the national level included arranging a speaking tour
for five Nicaraguan church workers, holding forty-eight “Citizen Hearings on
Nicaragua” across the United States in October 1984, and publishing a book-
length report, Bitter Witness, documenting contra attacks.71
International Work Brigades (Nicaragua Network)

On November 10, 1983, two weeks after the U.S. invasion of Grenada, the Nica-
raguan government issued a call for assistance in harvesting the valuable coffee
crop. Contra attacks had caused massive relocations, and rural communities were
being forced to maintain twenty-four hour vigilance, leading to a critical shortage
of labor. Most of the labor needed was supplied by Nicaraguans, but some 1,500
internationalists answered the call for help as well, including 660 U.S. citizens.
Like WFP delegations, the North American brigadistas saw their mission as one
of “accompaniment” with Nicaraguans; but unlike the former, they identified
themselves as witnesses to the benefits of the Sandinista Revolution as well. As
the Brigadista Bulletin explained, “Brigadistas have a special role as witnesses to
the daily reality of the war against Nicaragua that our government is sponsoring.
We are witnesses, as well, to the literal meaning of the revolution in the lives of
Nicaraguans: to their pride and faith as they defend what they are building.”72
As with WFP volunteers, the dangers, exhilaration, and camaraderie of the
experience in Nicaragua had a galvanizing effect on those who went. Returning
brigadistas launched the Brigadista Bulletin in February 1984 in order keep in
touch with each other, share stories, and encourage activism. A section of the
newsletter was devoted to discussing methods for educational outreach. In
Vermont returning brigadistas joined WFP activists and others in setting up a
statewide conference on March 24, 1984. Their activities in the state appeared
to have some influence on Congressman James Jeffords, a moderate Republican
who voted consistently against contra aid. He recorded in his memoir, “I knew
that I had the support of many Vermonters; a score of towns had gone so far
as to voice opposition to U.S. military intervention in Central America at their
traditional town meetings.”73 Jeffords was elected to the Senate in 1988.
Nicaragua Network organized four brigades in 1984: a cultural workers’ bri-
gade in August, a reforestation brigade in September, a construction brigade in
November, and another coffee harvest brigade over the winter of 1984–85. In
the fall of 1984, Nicaragua Exchange was created to coordinate the expeditions,
relieving the national office of this responsibility. Operating out of New York City,
Nicaragua Exchange was formally incorporated under the fiscal sponsorship of
the IFCO. The staff made concerted efforts to include “as many different kinds of
people as possible, and not just longtime Nicaragua activists,” according to staff
members. It recruited “Third World” participants (racial and ethnic minorities)
and organized a brigade of veterans. The main hindrance in recruitment was that
a brigadista needed two to four weeks free from work responsibilities and at least
$1,000 for the trip. Nicaragua Exchange could provide only limited subsidies.74 A
shortage of funds ultimately forced Nicaragua Exchange to dissolve in June 1987,
thus returning the coordination of work brigades to Nicaragua Network.
CUSCLIN
Yet another effect of the U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 was the for-
mation of the Committee of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicaragua (CUSCLIN).
[ 110 ] CHAPTER 4
Rev. Jim Goff served as the first coordinator of the group, which included many
long-time U.S. religious workers in Nicaragua. CUSCLIN members wanted
both the U.S. government and the Nicaraguan people to know that U.S. citizens
in Nicaragua did not support the Reagan administration’s aggressive policies.
Most important, they did not want to be used as an excuse for a U.S. invasion,
as had happened in Grenada (the administration claimed that U.S. medical stu-
dents were in danger).
CUSCLIN began weekly vigils in front of the U.S. Embassy in Managua,
an activity that quickly became a popular attraction for international visitors.
According to CUSCLIN’s “Policy and Guidelines for Thursday Vigils,” the
vigils were to be “a permanent witness to our rejection of U.S. policy toward
Nicaragua.” Secondary purposes were to “express support for the Sandinista
Revolution” and to “generate energy for ongoing organizing and consciousness-
raising among visitors who will return to the U.S. and work in solidarity.” The
guidelines mandated that the protests be peaceful, “respecting U.S. Embassy
personnel and symbols (such as the U.S. flag).” Such courtesy was also good
politics, as both CUSCLIN members and international visitors often met
with Embassy personnel.75 In addition to holding weekly vigils, members of
CUSCLIN served as guides and interpreters for visiting delegations. Like the
WFP office in Managua, they kept their contacts in the United States apprised
of developments in Nicaragua.
CUSCLIN members were the subject of a twenty-seven-minute docu-
mentary film, Waiting for the Invasion: U.S. Citizens in Nicaragua (produced by
Icarus Films in 1984). This professionally made film was shown on the Public
Broadcasting Service and cable television, and at various theaters, universities,
churches, community arts centers, museums, and film festivals in the United
States. It won the Best Documentary award at the Global Village Documentary
Festival in New York City in 1984.76
Humanitarian Aid
Humanitarian aid projects originated out of different networks and focused on
different needs within Nicaragua. Each project tapped into a different, if overlap-
ping, constituency, drawing more people into the anti–Contra War campaign.
In the summer of 1983, a group of U.S. women traveled to the Atlantic coast
of Nicaragua “to witness the impact of the US sponsored contra war.” Upon
return, they formed MADRE, an organization dedicated to educating the U.S.
public about Nicaragua and raising funds for health clinics, child care centers,
and other projects. Founding director Kathy Engel raised two million dollars
in 1984 for the Bertha Calderón Hospital in Managua, a hospital specializing in
women’s care. Operating out of New York City, this women-led group began a
twinning project that paired Nicaraguan and U.S. day care centers, schools, and
health clinics. MADRE also sponsored exchange tours of U.S. and Nicaraguan
mothers and organized fund-raising drives to help Nicaraguan mothers sustain
their families.77
Two groups operating out of California offered technical expertise to Sandi-
nista Nicaragua. TecNica, based in Berkeley, sent agricultural technicians, com-
puter engineers, and skilled trade workers, advertising its program as “liberation
technology.” APSNICA (Architects and Planners in Support of Nicaragua),
based in Topanga, provided building construction experts and donated build-
ing tools. Another project, Bikes Not Bombs, was initiated by Karl Kurz, based
in Boston. Its purpose was to provide Nicaraguans with environmentally sound
transportation and reduce the country’s dependence on oil. The organization
donated hundreds of bikes and established a bicycle repair shop in Managua.
Nicaragua Network, in addition to organizing work brigades, consolidated its
humanitarian aid efforts under the Humanitarian Assistance for Nicaraguan
Democracy (HAND) program. Funds were raised for agricultural, medical,
and educational tools and supplies, which were directed to rural communities
that had been disrupted by the war. AFSC also donated medical and school
supplies along with toys.
The Quixote Center, based in Hyattsville, Maryland, became a central hub
for humanitarian aid projects through its systematic collection and shipment
system. Bill Callahan, a Jesuit priest with a doctorate in physics, and Dolly
Pomerleau, a former nun and high school principle, founded the Catholic-
based Quixote Center in 1976. Callahan lived in Nicaragua for four months in
early 1983, learning Spanish and exploring the country. Pomerleau traveled to
Nicaragua in the fall of 1983 with a women’s delegation. “Everybody was coming
back from Nicaragua and wanted to do something to help,” she said. The cen-
ter first became involved in the provision of humanitarian aid in response to a
request for medical supplies from Maryknoll sisters in Nicaragua. The Quixote
Center appealed to its supporters, and the response was gratifying. The center
was able to send $40,000 worth of medicines and equipment in early 1984.
Over the next eighteen months, the Quixote Center developed an informal
national network as it gathered four hundred tons of goods and supplies, valued
at over $3 million, from individuals and groups. These were shipped in twenty-ton
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cargo containers, each costing about $6,000. The aid was distributed in Nicaragua
by the Institute of John XXIII, a Jesuit social action agency headed by Ketxu
Amezua. To encourage local groups to participate, the Quixote Center provided
modest start-up grants. The center also developed a way to get medical supplies
to Nicaragua quickly. “Everyone that went down with Witness for Peace took a
thirty-pound blue duffle bag with medical supplies,” said Callahan. Like other
groups, the Quixote Center blended its humanitarian aid efforts with educational
activities. It published an easy-to-read booklet titled Nicaragua: Look at the Reality,
which described the positive reforms taking place in Sandinista Nicaragua. Some
300,000 copies were freely distributed to individuals and groups.78
Sister Cities
Sister cities originated in the 1950s as part of a Cold War cultural offensive.
“People to People” programs, said President Dwight Eisenhower in September
1956, would “wage peace with all the vigor and resourcefulness and univer-
sal participation of wartime.”79 When the Wisconsin-Nicaragua Partners was
launched in 1964, Wisconsin Governor John W. Reynolds praised the Somoza
government as a “bastion of Western democracy and freedom, facing Castro
and Communism.”80 The new United States–Nicaragua sister cities that formed
in the 1980s were quite at odds with this Cold War perspective. The guiding
ethos centered on dissolving enemy images through personal contact and cul-
tural understanding. According to Wisconsin sister city activists Liz Chilsen
and Sheldon Rampton, “People-to-people contact re-humanizes the dehuman-
ized images manufactured by the political factories of hate, the images which
prepare us to do violence to one another.”81
Sister city projects had a number of desirable attributes for activists: they
were locally organized (and not dependent on Washington); they facilitated
travel and interpersonal relationships between U.S. and Nicaraguan citizens;
they provided tangible benefits to the Nicaraguan people; and they served
to educate U.S. citizens. In January 1984 Wisconsin activists created a new
state network, the Wisconsin Coordinating Council on Nicaragua (WCCN),
which rejected the Cold War animosity of its predecessor in favor of a con-
genial relationship with Sandinista Nicaragua. WCCN became the center
for a multitude of projects in the state, from putting together a collection of
Nicaraguan poetry to sponsoring tours in Nicaragua of health profession-
als from the University of Wisconsin. Some called it “citizen diplomacy”
or “détente from below.” More than forty-five local groups linked up with
WCCN. The following year WCCN took on the additional role of facilitating
sister city partnerships across the United States.
Chilsen and Rampton later wrote a “how-to” book, Friends in Deed: The Story
of U.S. Nicaragua Sister Cities (1988), in which they defined the sister city move-
ment as “a means for U.S. citizens to learn more about Nicaragua without adopt-
ing a political commitment that they may not feel comfortable making.”82 This
was a minimal definition, to be sure, as the organizing impetus for virtually all
sister city programs came from dedicated Contra War opponents. Rampton him-
self noted that “the Contra War was the main reason I got involved in WCCN.”
Still, the public promotion of sister cities in nonpolitical terms of “building friend-
ship between peoples” served the ACWC well, as it drew “new” people into activ-
ism and allowed them to develop their views and commitments at their own pace.
This moderate approach to organizing suited Sheldon Rampton personally.
He had grown up in a devout Mormon family in Las Vegas and been “indoc-
trinated by this ideology,” as he put it. After a year of college at Princeton, he
became a Mormon missionary in Japan for two years, where he learned to speak
Japanese. As his political views developed, he quit the church and returned to
college. He got involved with leftist causes, including Central America solidar-
ity, while studying English at the University of Wisconsin at Madison in 1979.
“I think when I started off I was something of an angry young man,” he said.
“Not only was I a radical activist in college, I was also pretty hostile to religion.”
That hostility dissolved as Rampton began working with religious activists like
Art and Sue Lloyd, who served on the WCCN board with him. What is most
important, said Rampton, is working with “people of good will.”83
CHAPTER 5
Organizational Dynamics of a Decentralized

Campaign
U nlike the anti–Vietnam War movement, in which activist

groups argued for years over whether to demand immediate
withdrawal of U.S. troops or a negotiated settlement, there were no division in
the anti–Contra War campaign over immediate political goals. Participating
groups were united in seeking an immediate end to U.S. support for the contras,
opposing a direct U.S. invasion of Nicaragua and, after May 1985, calling for an
end to the U.S. trade embargo. These common political goals did much to miti-
gate differences in philosophies, organizing styles, tactical preferences, and con-
stituencies. Although there was no central leadership body comparable to the
Nuclear Weapons Freeze Clearinghouse in St. Louis, the ACWC and Central
America movement developed a number of cooperative venues that served to
align organizational strategies and activities: annual Central America weeks;
lobbying and legislative strategy coordinated by the Central America Working
Group (CAWG); nationally coordinated demonstrations (November 1983,
April 1985, October 1986, and April 1987); a movement presence at the
Democratic Party convention in 1984 via the Central America Peace Campaign
(CAPC); a nationwide protest network via the Pledge of Resistance (POR); a
United States–Nicaragua sister city movement facilitated by the Wisconsin
Coordinating Council on Nicaragua (WCCN); and a common humanitarian
aid shipment system developed by the Quixote Center.
[ 114 ]
Organizational Dynamics of a Decentralized Campaign [ 115 ]
Whether the sum of these projects added up to a well-coordinated campaign

is a matter of debate. David Reed, who followed Richard Healey as director of
the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy (CNFMP), described the
anti-intervention movement in 1986 as “for the most part, reactive, unable to
anticipate and prepare for coming events.” He bemoaned “the absence of a clear
division of labor among the many groups in the anti-intervention movement”
and an organizational tendency toward “turf protection.”1 The scholar-activist
William M. LeoGrande was more sanguine about the Central America move-
ment. “You had a degree of division of labor” and the “coordination of groups
was quite good,” he said. The fact that there were so many different groups was
“appropriate as different constituencies were reached. To force everyone into
one mold was unnecessary.”2 The historian-activist Van Gosse also found much
to admire in the Central America movement, describing it as “a movement of
bewildering diversity, an oddly workable cacophony of individual and institu-
tional histories, and highly developed organizational practices.” Yet he also noted
an excessive degree of “local autonomy” within the movement and a self-defeat-
ing tendency among some groups to “attack leadership whenever possible.”
“What is missing,” he wrote, “is some central leadership” that could coordinate
“sustained campaigns of public education and action.”3
Virtually all activists recognized the need for some degree of national coordi-
nation of activities for reasons of both efficiency and effectiveness. It was hardly
worthwhile for one national group to call for a national “day of action” without the
support of other organizations and related publicity. To be considered a credible
movement in the press as well as to generate enthusiasm within the movement,
sizable numbers of people were needed at events and demonstrations. Similarly,
the more agreement on a common set of educational themes to promote, the
more likely these themes would be amplified in the media and influence the pub-
lic discourse. Yet there was also a strong desire among activists to maintain their
separate organizations, as each had its own range of issues, base of supporters,
cultural identity, and philosophical perspective. The loose construction of the
ACWC allowed diverse groups to maintain their autonomy and cooperate where
they saw fit, avoiding schisms. Leftist and pacifist groups could espouse their radi-
cal critiques of U.S. foreign policy; liberal groups could maintain their political
focus and respectable image; and religious groups could retain their faith-based
identity, embodied in prayers, sermons, rituals, symbols, and language.
Decentralization did not resolve differences between groups, but it generally
kept conflicts within bounds. One small conflict occurred at the third United
[ 116 ] CHAPTER 5
States–Nicaragua Sister Cities Conference in Managua in June 1988. As recalled

by Sheldon Rampton of WCCN, a leftist solidarity activist from the West Coast
got up during a workshop and denounced a WCCN brochure for emphasizing
solidarity with the Nicaraguan people (the word “people” was underlined) rather
than with the FSLN. “You know,” said Rampton, “it was very much a Nicaragua
Network type of line—support for the Sandinistas was a principle in and of
itself.” The moment passed without further ado, but Rampton came away from
the meeting feeling that the “ideological types” were scolding WCCN delegates.
“Over time,” he said, “I came to the conclusion that it wasn’t that we were less clear
in our political line. We really did have a different political line than those people,
and I think ours was more correct. . . . We were really grounded in the idea of
support for the people of Nicaragua. . . . They were much more overtly political.”
For the most part, the two organizations got along with each other. “We
were never really hostile or had a problem with Nicaragua Network . . . and
they were never, to my knowledge, hostile to us,” said Rampton. “But it was a
different approach to things, a different emphasis.”4 The loose construction of
the ACWC allowed these networks to coexist and work in the same direction.
In fact, there were four transnational solidarity networks that made noteworthy
contributions to the ACWC: leftist solidarity (brigadistas) led by Nicaragua
Network; people-to-people partnerships led by WCCN; religious solidarity
facilitated by the religious task forces RTFCA and IRTFCA; and the nonviolent
activist “accompaniment” project of Witness for Peace (WFP).
Within single organizations, differences could become more acute, as identi-
ties and priorities had to be established. Katherine Hoyt, who served as a POR
coordinator while working at the Michigan Interfaith Committee on Central
American Human Rights, quipped that some “groups couldn’t agree on a min-
ute of silence. They couldn’t agree on a prayer or whether to hold hands.”5 The
issue of religious-versus-secular identity became a source of tension within the
national Pledge of Resistance, at least for some of the founders. As Jim Rice
expressed it in an interview by the sociologist Christian Smith, some church
people felt they were “being pushed aside” as the campaign expanded and
became more heterogeneous. Dennis Marker recalled “fighting to preserve the
religious character” of the Pledge.6
Undoubtedly, those who wanted the Pledge to maintain a strictly religious
identity felt a sense of loss as it was taken up by secular groups and activists;
yet religious activism remained vital to the Pledge and religious groups could
still maintain their identity. In the San Francisco Bay area, which had “a stronger
secular/political/dissident emphasis,” noted regional coordinator Ken Butigan,

“faith-based activists nevertheless played an important role in the Pledge.” Of the
250 Pledge affinity groups in the area, 25 identified themselves as being part of a
distinctly “religious cluster.” Butigan’s own motivation, he wrote, “was rooted in
faith-based nonviolence committed to peace, justice, and the well-being of all.”
As national Pledge coordinator from 1987 to 1990, “I always was a ‘bridge figure’
between religious and secular communities.”7
Identity politics pervaded the ACWC and Central America movement no
less than other social change movements. Groups evinced different, if over-
lapping, cultural-political-ideological orientations: leftist (socialist) solidarity,
religious solidarity, political liberalism, humanitarianism, nonviolent activism,
unionism, and feminism. Most activists gravitated toward the groups and net-
works that best fit their own philosophy and style. The decentralized ACWC
allowed for such differences while also facilitating cooperation among groups
on joint projects. For the most part, activists kept their eyes on the prize of end-
ing the Contra War.
While decentralization had its benefits in terms of minimizing conflicts, it
had at least three deficiencies that inhibited the anti–Contra War campaign’s
overall effectiveness. One was the lack of a designated spokesperson or recog-
nized leader to whom the media could turn for commentary. While the press
interviewed various local and national ACWC leaders from time to time, it more
often sought out members of Congress for criticism of administration policy. A
designated national spokesperson or group could have kept the ACWC’s themes
and arguments in the forefront and established the campaign’s identity in the
public mind.
A second deficiency was the lack of a common communication vehicle—a
weekly newspaper or magazine—offering a holistic view of the ACWC. Given
the range of activities undertaken, it was difficult for even activists to see how
all the pieces fit together. Such a vehicle could have kept track of ACWC activi-
ties, reported on key political and diplomatic developments, provided infor-
mation on upcoming events and new resources, served as a forum for discus-
sion of issues, and perhaps profiled individual activists and groups. A campaign
newspaper would arguably have given activists a stronger sense of movement
identity, increased public recognition of the ACWC, and furthered educational
outreach. To some degree, the monthly journal Nuclear Times did this for the
disarmament movement.
A third, if partial, deficiency was the lack of national coordination with
[ 118 ] CHAPTER 5
respect to grassroots organizing. Local groups were typically inundated with

requests for participation in national campaigns and activities. As described by
Eric Fried of Santa Rosa, California, “National and regional offices of all the
groups compete for the limited energy and money of local, grassroots groups,
often leading locals to a sense of being overwhelmed and frustrated.”8 From the
vantage point of local organizers, local groups had less money and fewer staff but
were expected to implement the ambitious plans of national groups. National
organizers, on the other hand, fretted over whether their plans would be carried
out at the local level. Some felt that national organizations were giving more
than they were receiving from local groups in terms of financial support.
Many national organizations did, in fact, commit themselves to building a
strong grassroots base, but they did not necessarily work together in this. SANE
had a formal chapter system and spent roughly 40 percent of its program bud-
get on its field organizing department. WFP had eleven regional offices and
numerous local affiliates by the end of 1988. POR had nine regional coordina-
tors and claimed four hundred affiliates.9 The religious task forces cultivated
peace and justice committees in churches and synagogues. Nicaragua Network
facilitated the development of leftist solidarity groups. CISPES was one of the
few organizations that initiated chapters on college campuses. CNFMP did
not have chapters or affiliates but held periodic training workshops and sent
out field organizers, mainly for the purpose of developing legislative alert net-
works. AFSC had an integrated national-regional-local office network and often
assisted other organizations at the local level. The Interreligious Foundation
for Community Organization (IFCO) likewise worked across organizational
boundaries in facilitating state networks and coalitions in the nine states
where it held Central America Information Weeks. The Central America Peace
Campaign (CAPC) developed a cooperative outreach effort in 1984, but lack
of funding undermined the effort after a short time. All in all, there was much
grassroots organizing activity, with some of it being cooperative, but this fell
short of a comprehensive strategy and a coordinated national-local program
that could sustain public education and action.
These were not the only problems of the ACWC, to be sure. There was a
noticeable divide between groups focused on nonviolent direct action (POR and
Mobilization for Survival) and those focused on lobbying (CNFMP/CAWG,
CAPC, and SANE). This tactical divide had cultural overtones as well, as the for-
mer prided itself on challenging the status quo while the latter strove for respect-
ability and sought access to elite decision-makers. The differences between the
two networks made strategic coordination difficult and at times resulted in com-
petition and duplication. In January 1984, for example, CAPC introduced a peti-
tion, “Pledge for Non-Intervention in Central America,” at the same time that
POR was circulating its pledge sign-up list. As it turned out, the CAPC petition
fell by the wayside as local groups eagerly circulated the POR pledge. The dif-
ferent orientations were also evident in the organization of the largest Central
America demonstration of the decade, the “Mobe” (Mobilization) in April 1987.
The Mobe steering committee was divided between those who favored the
inclusion of elected officials in the design and promotion of the demonstration,
and those who wanted to keep the focus on grassroots mobilization, more or less
challenging rather than including elected officials. In the aftermath, those of the
former persuasion criticized the latter for “the lack of attention devoted to the
Congress by the Mobilization.”10
Another problem involved fundraising. CNFMP director Richard Healey,
who raised funds for different foreign policy campaigns, reflected that “raising
money for the Freeze campaign was incredibly easy,” but “for Central America,
very hard.”11 In September 1984 the CAPC executive committee noted that
“many groups working on Central American issues were seeking backing from
the same sources.” In order to create a more unified network, the committee
deemed it “imperative” that fundraising efforts be coordinated.12 No effort was
actually made to do this, but CAPC at least was not allowed to become another
permanent Washington coalition competing with other groups for funds. CAPC
remained dependent upon the contributions of participating groups along with
a few foundation grants. This did not suffice. At the end of 1984 CAPC had to
lay off its three field organizers and reduce its staff in Washington from three to
one. The group rebounded in the spring of 1985 but hit another financial draught
in the fall of 1986 and was dissolved.13 POR, in contrast, established itself as a
separate organization and developed its own financial base of support along with
local affiliates. Although this added to the overall competition for funding, POR
survived through the 1980s.
In West Germany, by way of contrast, peace organizations succeeded in cre-
ating a single national coordinating body in the early 1980s. This appeared to
solve some problems and create others. As Alice Holmes Cooper described it in
Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945 (1996), “the peace move-
ment put together the broadest and most durable coalition on the political center
and left in West German history.” This coalition reached “from the extraparlia-
mentary extremes well into mainstream parties and churches.” The coalition had
[ 120 ] CHAPTER 5
a coordinating committee consisting of twenty-six member groups, its composi-

tion “carefully balanced between five factions: religious groups, the independent
(nonparty) left, Greens, Social Democrats, and Moscow-oriented communists.”
Yet this closer cooperation and centralized decision making also produced con-
siderable friction. “The movement’s sheer heterogeneity,” noted Cooper, “made
cohesion difficult and conflict frequent.” Moreover, once the original uniting goal
was not achieved—preventing U.S. Pershing II missiles from being deployed on
European soil—“old conflicts resurfaced without the overarching compromises
available to tame them.” The “Coordinating Committee meetings increasingly
consisted of fruitless searches for a new central agenda under which other proj-
ects could be subsumed.”14
Local Organizing Structures
Local organizations developed three ways to avoid competition and duplica-

tion—merging groups, building coalitions, and networking—each being a pro-
gressively looser construction. In Sonoma County, California, a new POR group
formed in 1984 amid the surge of interest in the Pledge nationwide. Within a
short time, it became apparent to local activists that maintaining a separate POR
chapter along with an existing solidarity coalition, People for Peace in Central
America, only created more organizational work. Hence, in 1985 the POR chap-
ter merged with the solidarity coalition, which had already consolidated the
chapters of Nicaragua Network, CISPES, and NISGUA.15
In Philadelphia activists established a coalition, the Central America Organ-
izing Project (CAOP), which acted as a project center and facilitated and
publicized the activities of participating groups. At least eighteen groups were
involved, including a WFP chapter, a feminist solidarity group, a coffee brigade,
a lawyer’s committee, an interuniversity committee, and a health rights commit-
tee.16 Each week, CAOP arranged to visit one of the area’s newspapers and one
community association in order to promote projects underway. The group was
committed to “thoroughly strategic grassroots work,” wrote staff person Donna
Cooper in the spring of 1984. “We are committed to a slow grassroots process,
and already we feel the positive results of this style. The base of concerned peo-
ple, the respect from the press and the calls we receive from members of groups
who want to help, are all encouraging signs.”17
In Tallahassee, a city with a population of about 100,000 in 1985, the answer
for a half-dozen groups concerned with Central America was networking. An

initial attempt was made to develop an inclusive Central America coalition,
but differences over support for the FMLN could not be resolved between
members of the Tallahassee Peace Coalition (TPC) and the CISPES chapter
at Florida State University. The looser network allowed for cordial relations and
cooperation in the planning and implementation of activities. The TPC news-
letter publicized the activities of all the groups, including the CISPES chapter, a
Veterans for Peace chapter, Pax Christi Tallahassee, and two sanctuary groups.18
Although each group was distinct, the newsletter provided a holistic view of the
progressive peace movement in one community.
As with national networking, local networking did not preclude philosophical
conflicts. To take one example, TPC volunteer Victoria Martinez recalled an expe-
rience while staffing an information table in which she argued with “a fanatical left-
ist ideologue in our group who wanted me to endorse the Sandinistas during our
tabling,” as she described it. Martinez, who was born and raised in Cuba, felt that
supporting the FSLN “seriously detracted from the credibility of our movement,
which promoted a peaceful resolution of the conflict and didn’t take sides.”19
A Multiracial Movement?
Although leaders of the Southern Christian Leadership Council, Congressional

Black Caucus, Rainbow Coalition, and Jesse Jackson presidential campaigns of
1984 and 1988 all lent support to the Central America movement, the African-
American community as a whole was not drawn to Central America issues. Relig-
ious leadership on Central America issues was exerted by predominantly white
churches. The foreign policy campaign that hit home in the African-American
community was the antiapartheid movement related to South Africa, which was
perceived as a civil rights issue. The sociologist Christian Smith surveyed 452
WFP short-term delegates and 129 Sanctuary Movement activists and found that
96 percent of WFP volunteers and 98 percent of Sanctuary activists were white
(the surveys did not distinguish Hispanic from Anglo whites.)20 At the national
POR meeting in November 1985, participants noted that “although POR has pro-
vided leadership to women, a weakness is that it is almost an all white organiza-
tion.” They brainstormed how “to explicitly include people of color.”21
Other national groups similarly sought to increase minority participation.
WFP did so through its recruitment of volunteers for short-term delegations to
[ 122 ] CHAPTER 5
Nicaragua in the latter half of the 1980s.22 In the mid-1980s the AFSC board
decided to hire more Third World activists to staff its local offices, and to focus
more of its outreach activities on minority communities. By June 1987 Jack
Malinowski and Angie Berryman could write that AFSC had made progress in
bringing minorities into the Central America movement.23 The organizers of
Central America demonstrations in Washington in April 1985 and April 1987
made concerted efforts to reach out to the African-American community, in part
by linking Central America and South Africa issues. In the latter demonstration,
African American staff were hired, but the rush of events and short timeline
resulted in little substantive coalition-building. A month after the demonstra-
tion, former staff members fired off a memo titled “Meeting Racism in the
Mobilization,” in which they charged that the steering committee had failed to
include “Third World organizations at the very outset” in the planning of the
event. Minority participation, including Latinos, was nevertheless estimated at
20 percent of the 100,000 people who attended.24
At the local level, the Seattle/Managua sister city project was described by
Liz Chilsen and Sheldon Rampton as “an outstanding example of multi-eth-
nic, multi-racial organizing. Of its delegations that have visited Nicaragua, 48
percent come from Chicano, Asian, Black, Indian, and other non-white com-
munities.”25 Reaching out to Latinos proved easier in some local areas, apart
from the Cuban American community in Miami. Many local groups sponsored
Latin American dances, dinners, and performances. A strong Latina voice was
added to the Central America movement when Angela Sanbrano, a Mexican
American, was elected as director of CISPES in 1985.
State Networks: Case Studies
State organizations connected Central America activists and groups on an

wider but still accessible scale. Organizations ranged considerably in their
development and influence, as may be seen in the two examples below.
New Jersey
The New Jersey Central American Network (NJCAN) was fortunate to operate
under the umbrella of New Jersey SANE, based in Montclair, which provided
NJCAN with office space and a paid coordinator. At its peak NJCAN con-
sisted of about sixty organizations, including peace and religious groups, Pledge
groups, four sister city programs, SANE chapters, CISPES chapters, Women’s
International League for Peace and Freedom chapters, veterans groups, medical
aid groups, TecNica, and a Quixote Center (Quest for Peace) project. “We worked
together so well,” said Barbra Apfelbaum, who coordinated the network from 1983
to 1990. “People were mutually supportive.” Van Gosse, who represented CISPES
in NJCAN beginning in the fall of 1985, similarly noted the spirit of cooperation.
NJCAN “was a very good formation because it allowed us to work cooperatively,”
he said. “People got along. We were all in it together. We had democratic function-
ing.” Activists understood and accepted the fact that there were different perspec-
tives within this network, according to Gosse, who also served on the NJCAN
steering committee.26 The important thing was to focus on the common goals of
ending U.S. interventionism in Nicaragua and El Salvador.
New Jersey’s fourteen-member House delegation was split on the issue of
contra aid, with eight voting consistently against it and six voting consistently
for it. One New Jersey senator opposed contra aid while the other, Sen. Bill
Bradley, was deemed a “swing vote.” Bradley voted against contra aid in 1984
and 1985, then for it in 1986 and 1987, then switched back to opposing it in
1988. NJCAN groups expended much effort on lobbying Bradley. Andy Mills,
a volunteer, organized a constant flow of people to travel from New Jersey
to Washington in what he called a “peace mission.” Other activists and local
groups organized demonstrations around the state whenever contra aid votes
were coming up—at the Newark train station, federal buildings, and the local
offices of senators and representatives. “It’s a small state,” said Gosse, “You can
get around. We implemented all the Pledge calls for civil disobedience.”
NJCAN’s Central America Week activities in March 1986 attracted the atten-
tion of the New York Times. Apfelbaum told a reporter that the week’s activities
were designed “to reach as many citizens as possible and to urge them to influ-
ence their lawmakers to stop U.S. dollars from paying for military support in
Nicaragua and El Salvador.” In Trenton this message was conveyed by a promi-
nent cast of speakers, including a state senator, three local assemblymen, the
dean of graduate studies of the New York Theological Seminary, the chairman
of the English Department at Kean College, the director of the Communications
Workers of America, and the president of Church Women United. Assemblyman
Byron M. Baer (D-37th district) introduced a resolution in the state legislature
at the time calling on the president and Congress “to discontinue overt and
covert operations directed at Nicaragua.” More than 120 Bergen County
Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish leaders signed a statement urging the United
[ 124 ] CHAPTER 5
States to “cease funding covert and overt operations directed against Nicaragua
and support the Contadora peace initiatives to end the militarization of Central
America.” The Bergen County Committee on Central America (BCCCA)
developed the statement and made contact with each clergy member, according
to Bob Guild, a BCCCA volunteer. During the week of activities, Guild spoke
at a rally in Ridgewood. At Rutgers University, fifty-two students participated in
a three-day fast to protest the war and raise $5,000 for Nicaraguan relief.27
Twenty years earlier, in the spring of 1966, Guild had participated in a fast
against the Vietnam War. “I’ve always viewed myself as a radical,” he said. Guild
grew up in a small town in Massachusetts with conservative parents. He was radi-
calized by the civil rights movement, joined the anti–Vietnam War movement
while a student at Wesleyan University, worked full-time for Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS) in the late 1960s, and became a community and union
organizer. During the 1980s, in addition to serving as program director of Marazul
Tours, he was one of two county coordinators for the Rainbow Coalition and
served as vice-chair for the Jesse Jackson campaign in 1988. In Bergen County, said
Guild, “there were several multiracial communities, and it was very important for
us to reach out to Latino and black communities.” He recruited SANE and Central
America activists to join the Rainbow Coalition and encouraged Rainbow
Coalition activists to participate in Central America activities. His work with
BCCCA included organizing meetings with elected officials, raising humanitar-
ian aid for Nicaragua, and, in 1986, helping to form a sister county program
between Bergen County and the department of Rivas, south of Managua. BCCCA
tended to stay away from civil disobedience actions, he noted. “In some commu-
nities, it was perhaps not the best way of bringing people into the movement.”28
NJCAN coordinator Barbra Apfelbaum, before becoming a full-time activ-
ist, obtained a PhD in Italian language and literature, and taught two years
at Yale and Bryn Mawr colleges. Raised in a Jewish family of “good FDR lib-
eral democrats” in Philadelphia, her activism began with attendance at anti–
Vietnam War demonstrations during her college years. After entering upon an
academic career, she decided that she “wanted to do something more important
and meaningful.” She worked for five years with the New American Movement
(NAM) in New Haven. “It was really that combination of education and activ-
ism that characterized those years with NAM,” she said. “They had really smart
people who were open to ideas, the exact opposite of sectarianism.” A self-
described socialist-feminist, Apfelbaum became an excellent meeting facili-
tator—a valuable skill in activist circles. Working with NJCAN groups in the
1980s, she found that her politics were to the left of New Jersey SANE, which
nonetheless had a “quite liberal” base. The Montclair–Pearl Lagoon sister city
program had a more leftist orientation, she noted, but some of her friends on
the left “were a little bit disdainful or dismissive of liberals in SANE.” Apfelbaum
was just as eager to raise consciousness as her friends, “but you don’t just wake
up a leftist. You need personal conversations and meaningful experiences.” she
said. “I felt it was important to work with and respect people whose views were
not as left as mine.” Apfelbaum kept NJCAN focused on the work at hand. “I
don’t ever remember getting bogged down in sectarian fights,” she said. “We
never did have those kind of debates or arguments at NJCAN meetings.”29
Van Gosse, in reflecting on his experiences with NJCAN, said that what he
valued most was people coming together from different traditions, “from faith
traditions, from the older disarmament movement, from the anti–Vietnam War
movement,” and from the solidarity movement. “The nice thing about NJCAN
is that you had people of every age. There were key people in their seventies, and
quite a few, and there were college students, and people from these different
traditions. . . . For me, the Central America movement was a harvesting of these
different traditions, where people had learned quite a lot, especially through
Vietnam, but not only Vietnam. There was a lot of experience. We weren’t start-
ing over from scratch.”30
Florida
Organizing in Florida proved more difficult, partly because of the size of the
state, partly because of the overall conservative temperament of the population
and members of Congress on foreign policy issues, and partly because of the
organizers’ relative lack of experience and resources. Orlando, which lies at the
center of the state, is 447 miles from Pensacola and 406 miles from Key West. Of
the state’s nineteen members of Congress, thirteen voted for contra aid and six
opposed it in 1984, when the mining of Nicaraguan harbors was an issue. In sub-
sequent years, only one voted against contra aid in 1985, two in 1986, and three
in 1987 and 1988. Both Florida senators, one Democrat and one Republican,
supported contra aid. Perhaps because they had a steeper hill to climb than
their counterparts in New Jersey, Florida’s peace and justice activists, on the
whole, were less inclined toward lobbying strategies and more inclined toward
protest actions.
The first Central America groups in Florida were solidarity groups, formed
in Miami, Gainesville, Tallahassee (CISPES chapter), Tampa, and Orlando.31
[ 126 ] CHAPTER 5
Peace groups increasingly took up Central America issues in 1983 and 1984,
aided by the “deadly connection” and Pledge of Resistance campaigns. A loose
POR Florida network formed in 1984, coordinated by Pax Christi director John
Frank. “In many respects,” said Frank, “the POR wasn’t so much an organization
as it was a means to engage all these Central America groups and activists. The
Pledge became a calling card to do an action.” By mid-1985 a dozen local groups
had collected pledge commitments from roughly one thousand individuals
across the state, with eighty committed to civil disobedience.32 Local groups
initiated a number of Central America demonstrations that year, but with-
out overall coordination.33 A statewide Pledge conference was held at Eckerd
College on February 22, 1986. By this time, however, the Pledge campaign was
starting to lose momentum in Florida, and in any case its protest orientation
made it a limited organizing tool in Florida, as education and persuasion were
needed to attract larger numbers.
The catalyst for creating a modest statewide Central America network was the
Central America Information Week held in Florida April 6–13, 1986, sponsored
by IFCO and the Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice (FCPJ). IFCO organiz-
ers Sharon Haas and Don McClain settled into an office provided by the Florida
Council of Churches in Orlando for three months of planning and preparation.
They eventually involved 162 local volunteer coordinators, who organized 662
speaking engagements and press conferences in 106 communities. A follow-up
statewide meeting was held on April 26, attended by 81 people. The attendees
were divided about equally between representatives of religious, peace, and left-
ist organizations, according to an IFCO report.34 Out of that meeting came the
new Central America Task Force (CATF) operating under the auspices of FCPJ,
composed of about 40 groups at the time. An increase in FCPJ’s rather meager
budget in 1986 and 1987 allowed for the hiring of two part-time CATF coordina-
tors, Bill Lazar and Beth Raps.35 Raps, who was twenty-four in 1986, also coordi-
nated the Florida Coalition’s feminist task force.
The Central America Task Force was more of an information network than a
coordinating body, the one exception being a demonstration organized by Lazar
in December 1986, in response to a new contra training program at Hurlburt
Field, near Ft. Walton Beach (see chapter 7). Raps, being relatively new to
Central America issues, looked to local groups for direction. “I would travel,
meet with local groups, become informed of what they were doing,” she said.
“I was not in the position to be able to offer much help. . . . At first I was feeling
kind of inadequate. I remember all these national networks calling me, asking
me to help get letters to representatives regarding upcoming votes in Congress.”

She felt a lot of pressure, she said, but over time got to the point where she could
assess priorities. “I remember saying no to national groups, we have another
priority at this time. Other times we did do things with them.” Raps facilitated
local delegation visits to congressional representatives’ offices, but she stayed
in the background, as FCPJ was a tax-exempt organization and could not be
involved in lobbying for more than a small percentage of its work. Raps contin-
ued to learn on the job. She became a full-time FCPJ staff person in 1987, devot-
ing half of her time to Central America work. Although she left the following
year, CATF continued to function as a low-key information network.36
Perhaps the most difficult city in the nation in which to do Central America
organizing work was Miami, and the Orlando-based CATF was not much help in
this regard. A rally against the Contra War organized by the Latin American and
Caribbean Solidarity Organization (LACASA) and other local groups drew a
violent response. Held at the Torch of Friendship in downtown Biscayne Park on
March 22, 1986, the anti-contra rally drew about three hundred people, accord-
ing to Jack Lieberman, a key organizer. However, “there was a mob of about two
thousand people who showed up across the street, throwing rocks, forcing us to
end our rally,” he said. “It’s amazing that no one was really hurt.” There were, in
fact, some minor injuries at the rally. An anti–Contra War protester was struck
on the head with a white cross that he had been holding; a member of Miami’s
crisis response team was hit by a rock and had to be taken to a nearby hospi-
tal; and many people were pelted with eggs, including Miami commissioner
Rosario Kennedy. Speakers at the anti–Contra War rally included state senator
Jack Gordon and state representative Mike Friedman. On the opposite side of
Biscayne Boulevard, Miami mayor Xavier Suarez made a five-minute speech to
the pro-contra crowd in which he condemned the presence of “Marxist groups”
across the street. Jorge Mas Canosa, chairman of the Cuban-American National
Foundation, compared the anti–Contra War protest to a Nazi march in Miami
Beach’s Jewish neighborhoods, or a Ku Klux Klan rally in Liberty City (a black
section of Miami).37
The comparison of the anti–Contra War protesters to Nazis was particu-
larly offensive to Lieberman. Born in 1950, he spent his early years in a Jewish
working class neighborhood in Philadelphia, where he came into contact with
Holocaust survivors. “When I would go to the delicatessen or the food store, I
would see people with numbers on their arms,” he said. “This was before people
started talking about the Holocaust. It was shunned.” Lieberman nevertheless
[ 128 ] CHAPTER 5
absorbed the message. “My bedrock of activism was my early experience as a Jew
in the generation right after the Holocaust,” he said. As a young man, Lieberman
became involved in labor union struggles, the civil rights movement, and the
anti–Vietnam War movement. He joined Students for a Democratic Society and
the Socialist Workers Party for a time. He was known at Florida State University
as “Radical Jack.” Lieberman became a founding member of the Miami group,
LACASA, formed in July 1979, and attended an international solidarity confer-
ence in Managua on January 26, 1981. Later that year, he was personally threat-
ened by a militant group called Omega Siete. “Someone knocked on my door,
asked for me, and said he was there to sell me a funeral plot, that I had set up an
appointment to purchase a plot,” Lieberman recounted. “A lot of people were
intimidated from being active because of the violent climate here.” LACASA
found allies in the local Pax Christi chapter, the Miami AFSC office, and the
South Florida Peace Coalition. “We all worked together,” he said. Lieberman’s
volunteer activism in the 1980s also included being the social action director
at a local synagogue. At one anti–contra aid demonstration in Hollywood in
May 1985, he placed a sign on his nine-month-old daughter’s stroller that read,
“Contras are Reagan’s SS” (Schutzstaffen, an elite unit under Adolf Hitler).38
Local Organizations: Case Studies
This section examines four different kinds of local organizations active in the anti–
Contra War campaign: a sister city program in Baltimore, a Pledge of Resistance
group in Buffalo, a Latin American committee within a peace group in Rochester,
New York, and a solidarity group in Portland, Oregon. All four were still active in
2011, indicating strong bonds and commitments cultivated by these groups.
Casa Baltimore/San Juan de Limay Sister-City Program

At the core of most sister city programs were a few key people who made things
happen. In the case of the Baltimore–San Juan de Limay sister city program,
established in November 1985, Nan McCurdy and Philip Mitchell provided
the initial inspiration and organizing energy. Nan had been a pharmacist in St.
Louis with little knowledge of Central America prior to visiting Guatemala in
1981. Soon after her return, she met and fell in love with Phil Mitchell, who had
served in the Peace Corps in Chile in 1963–64. The couple first got involved
with Sanctuary movement activities at a Lutheran Church in St. Louis.
The U.S. invasion of Grenada in October 1983 jolted the couple into full-time
activism. “We had to do something,” said Nan. They organized a delegation of
ex–Peace Corps volunteers for a fact-finding mission to Nicaragua in February
1984. That summer they moved to Baltimore. “There was not a big movement in
Baltimore in regard to protests,” said Nan, “so we encouraged the idea of a sis-
ter relationship.” The couple set about forming an interfaith group in Baltimore,
then went to the Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington and met with staff member
Rita Clark and Ambassador Carlos Tünnermann. They later received word that
Baltimore could be paired with San Juan de Limay, a village twelve kilometers
from the Honduran border, northwest of Estelí. In January 1985 the contras had
attacked Limay and left fifteen people dead. Despite the danger, Phil and Nan
decided to go to Limay for a year. They sold all of their worldly possessions,
advertising this in the Baltimore Sun as a “Sellout for peace in Nicaragua,” and
arrived in Nicaragua on November 3, 1985. That same month, a dedication cer-
emony was held at Baltimore’s St. John’s United Methodist Church to formally
establish the Casa Baltimore-Limay sister city program. The first delegation from
Baltimore arrived in San Juan de Limay in January 1986. Nan and Phil ended up
staying a total of three years, returning occasionally to the United States.
San Juan de Limay was an area hit hard by the contras. In addition to attack-
ing the town, they kidnapped young men and tried to persuade them to join
the contras. Those who refused were killed. Tranquilino Garmendia, the chair-
person of the Baltimore-Limay sister city program on the Limay side, had three
of his sons killed by the contras. “Almost every family had someone killed,
tortured, kidnapped, or disappeared,” said Nan. Nan and Phil regarded their
work as a “pastoral ministry of accompaniment.” They shared their lives with
the people of the town and recounted the stories they heard to Americans back
home. Nan taught English at the community high school—teenagers on week-
day mornings and adults in the evenings. The couple got to know the people of
the community “well enough for them to cry and share their stories with us,”
said Nan. “ ‘We can’t go to the U.S. and tell our stories,’ some would say. ‘You
have to be our loudspeaker.’ We felt an incredible commitment to do that.” By
communicating the reality of the Nicaraguan situation, Nan and Phil hoped to
make a contribution to stopping the Contra War. “That was really the purpose
of what we were doing—to stop the war,” said Nan.
In the spring of 1986, the contras engaged in a series of attacks on passenger
vehicles near the town. A WFP delegation was ready to travel to San Juan de
Limay in November 1986, but the Sandinista government would not allow it
[ 130 ] CHAPTER 5
because of the danger. The trauma of war continued. Within a period of two
weeks in late 1987, Nan recalled, the couple attended three funerals of young
men killed by the contras. The McCurdy-Mitchells documented these and
other deaths with photographs of the corpses. They also took pictures of “cute”
children in the community and sent these to the United States as well, as if to
sharpen the contrast. During their three years in San Juan de Limay, Nan and
Phil hosted some thirty U.S. groups, mostly from Baltimore.
Almost all who returned to Baltimore from San Juan de Limay spoke at com-
munity gatherings and to congregations about their experiences, often using slide
presentations. The Casa Baltimore/Limay sister city project reached out to the
Baltimore community through these gatherings along with its monthly newslet-
ter, which included news of upcoming events and delegations, autobiographical
letters from Limay residents, legislative alerts, and voting records of members
of Congress. The two congressional representatives from the Baltimore area,
Democrats Barbara Mikulski and Parren J. Mitchell, voted consistently against
contra aid through 1986. Their replacements, Democrats Benjamin Cardin and
Kweisi Mfume, similarly voted against contra aid in 1987 and 1988.
Casa Baltimore/Limay, housed at St. John’s United Methodist Church in
Baltimore, defined itself as an interfaith group on a mission of friendship and
support. It was. The church’s congregation was “very progressive,” according to
Barbara Larcom, who traveled to Nicaragua with a delegation in mid-1989 and
became program coordinator in 1992. “We did not have to get into the ins and
outs of pacifism,” she said. It was enough to know our government was “slaugh-
tering people we know and love in our sister city of Limay.” Funds were raised
through a donor pledge program (approximately thirty people each pledging
from $15 to $25 per month), donations, benefits, and an occasional grant. A por-
tion of the money was allocated for humanitarian aid projects in San Juan de
Limay. A committee of Limay residents recommended projects to the Baltimore
committee, which in turn chose which to fund. Sometimes the Baltimore group
suggested projects as well. One of the major funding projects was the purchase
and maintenance of emergency vehicles and school buses. Visiting delegations
also carried with them needed medical supplies.
Nan and Phil McCurdy-Mitchell, after completing their time in San Juan
de Limay, became full-time workers with the Board of Global Ministries of
the Methodist Church, which assigned them to the Antonio de Valdivieso
Ecumenical Center in Managua for a time. Phil Mitchell died in 1991. Barbara
Larcom continued on as coordinator of Casa Baltimore/Limay and also helped
to organize the U.S.-Nicaraguan sister cities conference held in Managua on July

16–17, 2005.39
The Buffalo Pledge of Resistance

“There are plenty of people who think that things are not going right in the
world, but they don’t really see any advantages to joining an organization,” said
Terry Bisson, a college math instructor. This was true of Bisson until a friend
presented him with a Pledge sign-up sheet in 1984 and said, “If you’re against
war you should sign this.” Bisson, in his mid-thirties, did. “And you know,” he
said, “immediately once you sign something like that you had to go to meet-
ings to talk about what would be the grounds under which you would do civil
disobedience, and that led to long, long discussions of tactics and background.
Then you had to go to these Central America dinners because, how were you
going to understand what was going on in all these different countries.”
The Buffalo Pledge of Resistance group was formed in early 1984 under the
auspices of the Western New York Peace Center (WNYPC), which began in
1967 as an affiliate of Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam. As in other
cities, the Buffalo Pledge organized small affinity groups to prepare people for
civil disobedience actions and protests. “The affinity is, for me,” said Bisson,
“the foundation of my whole activity in the Latin American solidarity move-
ment. I’m still partly in the same affinity group that I was in 1984.” Bisson never
traveled to Latin America, but his sense of solidarity with his local affinity group
motivated him to keep informed and active. “What I found in Buffalo was that
there were plenty of people coming through who had direct stories to tell about
Central America,” he said. The Pledge meetings “were really open discussion
meetings,” with all kinds of people involved.
The Buffalo Pledge avoided the narrow protest orientation inherent in
the Pledge campaign through its connection with WNYPC, participating in
broader educational and political activities. The WNYPC, for its part, assisted
the Pledge group by hiring a staff person to manage and expand Pledge activi-
ties. Jim Mang, co-director of WNYPC, pointed out that the formation of
nonviolent affinity groups in the Pledge campaign went “more smoothly here
because, during the Freeze Campaign and Women’s Encampment at Seneca
Falls, there was a lot of civil disobedience training here, and maybe two or three
affinity groups out of the Buffalo area that formed.” Mang, a former Catholic
priest who married a former nun, had engaged in civil disobedience actions
during the Vietnam War and been jailed along with William Sloane Coffin. In
[ 132 ] CHAPTER 5
the early 1980s he participated in an anti–nuclear weapons affinity group. “Our

affinity group was arrested three different times at the Army Depot” at Seneca
Falls, said Mang. “A lot of those same people continued with the Pledge.”
The Buffalo POR conducted its first protest action at the downtown Federal
Building in June 1985, in response to congressional approval of a $27 million
“non-lethal” aid package for the contras. Fifty people were arrested “for sitting
on the steps where the senators had their offices,” according to Bisson. Although
not exactly blocking the entrance, the protesters “did make it a little difficult. It
was lunchtime.” The demonstrators were charged, fingerprinted, and released.
A later court hearing, however, dismissed the charges. Another civil disobedi-
ence action took place on March 3, 1986, this time in response to the president’s
request for $100 million in military aid to the contras. A total of 35 people were
arrested for trespassing at the Buffalo Federal Building while another 120 par-
ticipated in a legal protest outside.
Beyond protests, the Buffalo POR joined WNYPC in sponsoring educa-
tional programs, holding Latin America dinners, and lobbying members of
Congress. Representing the Buffalo area were Republican Rep. Jack F. Kemp,
who supported contra aid, and two Democrats, Rep. Henry J. Novak and Rep.
John J. LaFalce, who both opposed to it. WNYPC members met regularly with
the Democratic representatives, encouraging them to take leadership on Central
America issues in Congress. Activists also attended Kemp’s town meetings to
ask him questions about Central America and “put pressure on him,” according
to Mang. Kemp’s pro-contra votes prompted some Buffalo activists to work for
his opponent, Jim Keane, in the 1986 congressional elections (Keane lost). In
1989 the Buffalo Pledge group changed its name to the Latin America Solidarity
Association and continued to meet once a month as a committee of WNYPC.
Although the issues have changed over the years, the group has continued to
foster sustained commitments and camaraderie.40
The Rochester Committee on Latin America

One of the many local peace groups that formed during the Vietnam War was the
faith-based Rochester Peace and Justice Education Center (PJEC), another affili-
ate of Clergy and Laity Concerned About Vietnam. PJEC members first became
involved in Latin America issues in 1973, in the aftermath of the overthrow of the
Allende government in Chile. A new PJEC committee was formed that year, the
Rochester Committee on Latin America (ROCLA). ROCLA activists partici-
pated in the Chile solidarity campaign by holding “teach-ins” at local high schools
and colleges, meeting with local newspaper editorial boards, and organizing ben-
efit concerts. When ROCLA shifted its focus to Central America in 1979–80, the
group’s mailing list expanded from forty to some three hundred.41
As with other cities, local interest was stimulated by Rochesterians travel-
ing to Nicaragua. Anne Meisenzahl went in December 1981 to learn about early
childhood education and the Rural School of Education and Work. Upon
return, she worked with the photojournalist Jamie Stillings to create a 130-slide
presentation, “Nicaragua: Portrait of a Revolution,” which they presented to
church and community groups. Another ROCLA member, Marilyn Anderson,
traveled regularly to Guatemala to photograph indigenous weavers as well as
document the devastating effects of the government’s repression. Anderson
and other ROCLA members arranged for Guatemalan textiles to be sold at the
annual International Folk Festival sponsored by the Rochester Museum and
Science. ROCLA also organized citywide arts festivals from 1985 to 1988, which
included arts and crafts exhibits, concerts, readings, and performances—cre-
ative means of reaching new audiences. Other ROCLA activities included
sponsoring Central America speakers, organizing annual commemorations of
the Nicaraguan Revolution, and raising funds for Medical Aid to El Salvador
and Radio Venceremos, the rebel voice in El Salvador.42
The latter activity prompted concern within the larger peace group. PJEC
was not officially pacifist, but it leaned strongly in that direction. According to
Jon Garlock, who served as ROCLA convener from 1982 to 1987, the idea “that
in certain situations armed struggle is justified tended to polarize PJEC mem-
bers and proved a particularly difficult debate for some members of the PJEC
steering committee who were committed pacifists.” The issue was discussed at
length without definitive resolution. Finally, at the end of 1987 the PJEC steer-
ing committee simply gave ROCLA more autonomy over its programming
and budget, diluting the controversy without actually resolving it. A number
of other controversial issues came up over the years: how “militant” to be at
demonstrations, how critical to be of the Sandinista Party in Nicaragua, how to
attract the younger generation, and how to involve labor union members. The
latter issue was of particular concern to Garlock, a member of the Rochester
Central Labor Council, which represented over a hundred local unions and
sixty thousand members. Garlock chaired the labor council’s education com-
mittee and initiated a Latin America solidarity committee within it. ROCLA’s
main connections, however, were with religious congregations.
ROCLA was an enthusiastic participant in the Pledge of Resistance campaign.
[ 134 ] CHAPTER 5
In late 1984 a subcommittee was formed, the Nicaragua Invasion Contingency

Action (NICA), for the purpose of coordinating Pledge actions. Dr. Peter Mott,
a physician and professor at the University of Rochester, served as co-chair of
NICA and maintained contact with the national Pledge office in Washington.
Those who signed up for civil disobedience were directed to one of three affinity
groups for support and training. “I remember our affinity group as being a lot
of fun,” said Kathleen Kern, then a twenty-four-year-old student at the Colgate
Rochester Divinity School. To promote the Pledge, NICA sponsored a full-page
advertisement in the City Newspaper on December 6, 1984, encouraging citizens
to “join us in opposing U.S. intervention and helping the people of Nicaragua.”
The ad challenged the Reagan administration’s depiction of Nicaragua as “totali-
tarian,” noted progress made by the FSLN government in literacy and health
care, and asserted that the United States, rather than Nicaragua, was violating
international law and supporting terrorism. It demanded an end to U.S. contra
aid and urged support of the Contadora negotiations and “a political solution in
the region.”43
On the political front, ROCLA members successfully lobbied Rep. Frank
J. Horton, a Republican, to vote against contra aid in 1983 and 1984. In 1985,
however, Horton gave in to administration pressure and voted for “nonlethal”
aid to the contras. The latter vote prompted a protest by ROCLA/NICA at the
Rochester Federal Building on June 12. According to the Rochester Democrat and
Chronicle, nine “chanting protesters, six women and three men, were charged
with disorderly conduct.” One of the protesters, Bob Good, told the press, “We
had to disrupt the peace a little bit to let the people know the United States is
disrupting the lives of thousands in Nicaragua.”44 Bob Good’s brother, Jim, was
working at the time in Paiwas, Nicaragua, using his carpentry skills to help dis-
placed families and widows.
ROCLA members continued to lobby Representative Horton, and in 1986
he bucked the party line and resumed voting against contra aid. He did so in
subsequent years as well, arguably testifying to the influence of Contra War
opponents in the 29th Congressional District of New York. ROCLA members
also worked to elect Democratic challenger Louise Slaughter to the 30th District
House seat occupied by Republican Rep. Fred Eckert, a consistent supporter of
contra aid. Slaughter won in the November 1986 elections and thereafter voted
against contra aid. Soon after being elected, Slaughter traveled with a congres-
sional delegation to Nicaragua. She met regularly with ROCLA members to
discuss issues and encouraged them to provide her with information.
In addition to educational and cultural programs, protests, and lobbying

efforts, ROCLA members began a sister city program. On December 4, 1986,
Henrietta Levine contacted the Nicaraguan Embassy about possible sister cit-
ies. The embassy suggested pairing Rochester with El Sauce, an agricultural
community with a population of twenty-six thousand located in northwestern
Nicaragua, about forty kilometers south of San Juan de Limay. In January 1987
Zelmira García of the Nicaraguan Embassy came to speak to ROCLA members
about the project. The sister city idea gained sponsorship from Metro-Act, a
Rochester social justice organization founded in the 1960s, and was formally
launched in February 1987. A letter written by El Sauce’s municipal coordinator,
Antonio Ruíz García, on June 3, 1987, welcomed the new sister city relationship,
placing it in the context of the Contra War: “It is clear that the bonds of friend-
ship between the people of Rochester and El Sauce will be of great significance,
proving once again that the Nicaraguan people and the people of the United
States are not at war with each other. The war from which we deliver ourselves
is a dirty and unjust one that is organized and directed by the government of
Reagan, and does not represent the people of the United States. You are the
ones, compañeros, who can contribute to putting an end to the bloodshed.”45
Levine, a founding member of ROCLA in 1973, became the first chairper-
son of the Rochester–El Sauce sister city program, known as Ciudad Hermana.
Born in 1920, she was raised in a conservative Jewish family and married at the
age of eighteen. In the 1940s she began working with groups advocating fair
employment practices and an end to prejudice against African Americans and
Jews. She became the first Jewish secretary hired by the Colgate Divinity School
in Rochester. She served for two years as president of the Rochester section of
the National Council of Jewish Women and took part in the civil rights move-
ment, the women’s rights movement, and especially the peace movement. “The
1960s for me were anti–Vietnam War years,” she said.
During a protest against the Contra War outside the Rochester Federal
Building in late 1987, Levine invited Dr. Arnie Matlin, a pediatrician and ROCLA
member, to join her on an upcoming trip to Nicaragua in January. The purpose
of the trip was to prepare the way for the first Rochester sister city delegation to
El Sauce in June 1988. Matlin went with Levine and took his seventeen year-old
daughter, Sally, with him. He was highly impressed with what he saw despite
the deteriorating economy: “For the first time in my life I had found a coun-
try whose government was dedicated to helping the poorest of its citizens. In
Nicaragua Libre, health care was a right of the people and the responsibility of
[ 136 ] CHAPTER 5
the government. In Nicaragua, schools and child care centers were free and open
to all. In Nicaragua Libre, the revolutionary vanguard resisted the temptation to
become a dictatorship, remaining true to the Nicaraguan people they vowed to
serve.”46 Upon return Matlin and his daughter made presentations “to a dozen
service organizations, a high school assembly, and on any other platform we
could find to spread the word,” he recalled.
The sister city program added a practical dimension to ROCLA’s outreach
efforts. A “shoe boxes for peace” project was initiated in which supplies such
as aspirin, soap, and small toys were collected. Metro-Act coordinator Maria
Scipione told the press that money for the contras “is killing people twice,”
once in Nicaragua, and the other in U.S. “communities from which money is
being taken to fight the Contra War.”47 Scipione and Levine attempted to make
inroads into black and Latino communities in Rochester, but this proved dif-
ficult. Rochester had experienced a “white flight” to the suburbs in the 1970s,
leaving an impoverished downtown area with a largely African-American popu-
lation. “I don’t think that we were ever successful in our effort to reach out to the
black community,” reflected Levine. “It’s very hard to make people realize how
these things directly affect their lives.”
After Hurricane Joan devastated Nicaragua in October 1988, Ciudad
Hermana donated a water pump system, medical supplies, and a truck—driven
from Rochester to El Sauce as part of an IFCO Pastors for Peace caravan in
December 1988 (see chapter 8). Ciudad Hermana’s most substantial gift was an
ongoing program in which medical students from the University of Rochester
worked in El Sauce’s health clinic. Two other projects were personally funded
by Arnie Matlin, a preschool in El Sauce and college scholarships for two or
three medical students each year. Matlin returned to Nicaragua on average once
a year for the next two decades. In 2004 the FSLN party awarded him the Hero
of the Revolution medal, the only U.S. citizen to have ever received one. His
solidarity work over the years included serving on the Nicaragua Network exec-
utive committee. “I’ve never given up on Nicaragua,” he said in 2006.
The Portland Central America Solidarity Committee

In Portland, Oregon, the main vehicle for progressive organizing on Central
America issues was the Portland Central America Solidarity Committee
(PCASC). The group formed in early 1979, following a film on the Nicaraguan
Revolution shown at the Portland Community College. Originally named
the Portland Nicaragua Solidarity Committee, the group changed its name to
PCASC in 1980. The group linked up with all three solidarity networks, Nicaragua
Network, CISPES, and NISGUA, but retained its autonomy as an independent
leftist group. Diane Hess, who served as the first PCASC coordinator, noted that
there were ideological differences within the group, but these were “more a matter
of emphasis” than a divide. There was a common desire to educate the Portland
community and mobilize opposition to the Reagan administration’s Central
America policies.48
Hess coordinated the first major PCASC initiative, a referendum on the
November 1982 ballot asking Multnomah County residents whether the United
States should terminate military aid to El Salvador and withdraw its military per-
sonnel. The promotion of this initiative began a year in advance, engaged between
200 and 300 volunteers, and expanded PCASC membership rolls “from hundreds
to thousands,” according to Lynn DeWeese-Parkinson, who served as PCASC
development coordinator in the mid-1980s. To convince the county commission
to put the measure on the ballot, PCASC volunteers collected 12,880 petition sig-
natures at house parties and public settings. Following the city commission’s
approval of the referendum, PCASC distributed 200,000 brochures, participated
in at least 11 radio talk programs, and obtained endorsements from Portland’s two
major newspapers and some 100 organizations and community leaders. The latter
included a dozen state representatives and Portland’s two congressional represen-
tatives, Les AuCoin and Ron Wyden (both Democrats).
In garnering public support for the ballot measure, PCASC focused on the
bread-and-butter issue of how much money the United States was spending
on El Salvador and what citizens were getting for their money. Conservative
opponents put out a flyer that read, “Don’t be tricked by communists! Vote No
on #7! . . . Measure 7 is purely a propaganda ploy by local liberal Red sympa-
thizers!” This red-baiting strategy did not appear to work, as voters approved
the measure by a 75 percent margin (135,050 to 44,729). Ironically, the measure
did not “get commitments or support from the organized left, many of whom
criticized our electoral strategy,” according to an internal PCASC report. “Some
groups even opposed us publicly.”49 This extreme leftist orientation classically
viewed liberal reform as siphoning energy from radical change and thus a threat
to the ultraleftist program. Such views remained on the fringes of PCASC.
PCASC leaders made a conscious decision to avoid open advocacy of social-
ism or revolution. During the El Salvador referendum campaign, the labor orga-
nizer Jamie Partridge challenged the PCASC leadership to endorse socialism,
arguing that PCASC was in fact supporting socialist revolutions in El Salvador
[ 138 ] CHAPTER 5
and Nicaragua. How, he asked, can a socialist consciousness in the United

States be cultivated if the word “socialism” itself is banished? But the PCASC
steering committee saw no advantage in using this word. Partridge accepted the
steering committee’s decision and continued to work on the campaign. As for
supporting the FMLN, Hess noted, “We understood internally that CISPES
was supporting the FMLN, but I don’t think that is what we projected into the
broader community. I don’t think people here even knew much about CISPES.”
The ability of PCASC to win hearts and minds in the Portland community
was due in large part to the sensible manner in which its themes and arguments
were communicated. Diane Hess, in particular, had a knack for translating
“radical” ideas into common language. Born in 1955, she grew up with politi-
cally active parents in Los Angeles, her mother being the president of the local
teachers’ union. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, she became “a young lefty,
concerned about U.S. policy,” in her words. In speaking with different audiences
in the 1980s, Hess characteristically appealed to common values, but framed
them in a “radical” context.
For example, in a speech commemorating “Nicaragua Independence Day”
given at Lewis and Clark College on July 19, 1986, Hess encouraged the audi-
ence to accept “the responsibilities of democracy” and uphold the principle
of freedom—by opposing U.S. interventionism in Nicaragua. She compared
the Sandinista Revolution to the American Revolution of 1776, except that the
contras were linked to the mercenary Hessians employed by the British, and
the Sandinistas, to the rebelling colonists. Daniel Ortega’s words, “It is better to
die on your feet than to live on your knees,” were compared to Patrick Henry’s
famous saying, “Give me liberty or give me death.” Having inverted the Reagan
administration’s image of the contras as liberators, Hess underscored that it is
“our country which has become destructive to the ends of life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness in Nicaragua and other parts of the world.” She ended on
a positive note, saying, “I believe Americans and Nicaraguans share the same
dream . . . of offering a better, more peaceful future to our children.”50
PCASC encouraged Portlanders to travel to Nicaragua and witness develop-
ments firsthand. Many did so, and upon return they created slide presentations
for showings around the community. In the fall of 1983 PCASC developed a more
organized approach. Jamie Partridge, Millie Thayer, Susan Feldman, and Kathy
Gordon, each having returned from separate trips to Nicaragua, pooled their
slides and wrote a script for a half-hour slide presentation titled “Nicaragua and
Us.” The composite slide presentation was the centerpiece of the Community
Education Campaign, in which trained volunteers presented the slideshow in

living rooms, classrooms, union halls, churches, and community centers. More
than thirty volunteers participated in training workshops, which role-played
question-and-answer sessions with potential audiences. In the first half of 1984,
close to fifty showings of “Nicaragua and Us” took place, each followed by a dis-
cussion session. “We wanted to make the revolution come alive for people by
presenting stories of Nicaraguans we had met,” said Kathy Gordon.
PCASC’s other educational activities included bringing Nicaraguan speakers
such as Gustavo Parajón of CEPAD to Portland, producing a monthly newslet-
ter, maintaining a regular speakers bureau, sponsoring film festivals on Central
America, and participating in the statewide Central America Information Week
sponsored by IFCO. The latter was held May 6–13, 1984, and featured twenty
speakers from El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala in two hundred events
across the state.
PCASC became the central hub for Central America activism in Portland.
“Sometimes we were coordinating,” said Hess, “sometimes we just kept up with
what was going on.” PCASC operated primarily on volunteer energy, with coor-
dination provided by one or two paid staff persons. The group networked and
cosponsored activities with many other local groups, including the Committee
for Health Rights in Central America (CHRICA).51 Each group had its own
audience and projects. CHRICA, for example, targeted medical students for
educational programs on Central America and collected much-needed medical
supplies for Nicaragua, particularly I-V tubing, medications, and gauze.
PCASC became involved with the Pledge of Resistance campaign, but not
to the extent that some other local organizations did. At a statewide POR orga-
nizational meeting on November 17, 1984, Oregon activists expressed concern
that PCASC’s labor allies would not condone civil disobedience actions; and
some noted that the Pledge campaign did not directly address the Contra War.52
PCASC remedied the latter problem by asking all Pledge signers to partici-
pate in other PCASC activities, such as letter-writing parties, the Community
Education Campaign, humanitarian aid projects, or a developing sister city pro-
gram. Diane Hess and Chuck Bell of the Fellowship of Reconciliation served as
local Pledge coordinators. Portlanders responded to the first Pledge demonstra-
tions on June 12, 1985, by holding a vigil in which over 300 people participated.53
The next Pledge-related demonstration in Portland took place on March 15, 1986,
five days before the House was scheduled to vote on a $100 million contra aid
package. The community turned out 350 “spirited opponents,” according to a
[ 140 ] CHAPTER 5
PCASC report. They “came out to sing, shout, hear speakers representing a vari-
ety of constituencies,” and to jeer at “Ronbo” Reagan (an actor), the lone inter-
ventionist voice at the rally.54
On the political front, PCASC members developed a friendly relationship
with Rep. Les AuCoin and met with him often. “It was startling to me how
much he knew about the issues and how passionate he was,” said Bill Bigelow,
a member of the PCASC newsletter team. “His staff was great,” said Hess. “We
were really friends with them.” PCASC members also developed cordial rela-
tionships with Rep. Ron Wyden, a Democrat, and Sen. Mark Hatfield, a liberal
Republican on foreign policy issues. Republican Senator Bob Packwood, on the
other hand, “was like the enemy,” said Hess. “We met with him. He was really
rude.” Both Portland representatives (AuCoin and Wyden) and Sen. Hatfield
voted consistently against contra aid in the 1980s. PCASC nevertheless encour-
aged Portlanders to keep writing to their Washington representatives, encour-
aging them to “speak out to your colleagues and to the public” against any and
all kinds of aid to the contras, including so-called nonlethal aid. This was the
message delivered to AuCoin and Wyden on April 14, 1986, signed by over sev-
enty Portlanders who had traveled to Nicaragua since 1979.55
Perhaps the most successful PCASC organizing effort was the creation of
a sister city program between Portland and Corinto, a city of twenty-seven
thousand people on the northwestern coast. Planning began in the fall of 1983,
with Hess initially coordinating the effort. PCASC and affiliated groups gen-
erated community support for the program, which the Portland City Council
approved on April 17, 1985. City Commissioner Dick Bogle told an audience of
two hundred people at the meeting:
Based on the letters and phone calls received in my office and the
testimony I have heard today, the will of the public is quite clear to
me. I’ve heard testimony from the sectors of education, medicine,
religion, the arts, labor; and in each of those arenas, it’s very clear
there has already been established a people’s sister city relation-
ship. All that’s left to do now is to formalize that relationship and
to broaden its base. I think that this is an opportunity for the soul
of Portland to grow culturally and humanistically . . . we are truly
reaching out and embracing the people of Corinto.56
In mid-September 1985 Corinto’s mayor, Francisco Tapia Mata, a dentist

by trade, arrived in Portland and was treated as an honored guest. He spoke
to a number of groups and held a news conference in which he explained the
importance of the sister city program to the people of Corinto. “What we most
need from Portland is its solidarity . . . to have people here understand how we
truly are in Nicaragua,” he said through an interpreter. Noting that the people
of Corinto continue to suffer because of the Contra War, he added, “If I could
speak with the president of the United States, I would ask him to remember
that two hundred years ago, thirteen American colonies fought against English
colonialism to have the right to live the way they wanted to live. This is the same
right that we are asking him to respect.”57 The sister city program, which shared
office space with PCASC, hosted other visitors from Nicaragua as well, includ-
ing a folkloric dance troupe. PCASC also sponsored multilevel Spanish classes
and held benefits to raise funds for humanitarian aid projects. One project
provided Corinto’s hospital with an emergency generator, air conditioner, and
water pump. Organizers furthermore cultivated relationships between particu-
lar schools, churches, and health clinics in Portland and Corinto.
All in all, PCASC was remarkably successful in its outreach efforts, particu-
larly for a self-identified leftist solidarity group. Its success may be attributed
to at least four factors: a relatively hospitable liberal environment in Portland,
talented organizers who could recruit volunteers and manage projects, a capac-
ity for communicating its themes and arguments in a sensible manner, and the
ability to diffuse sectarianism and maintain internal unity. Regarding the latter,
PCASC was able to avoid much of the infighting over ideology, strategy, and
leadership that historically had marginalized the left. There were many debates,
to be sure, but in the end the spirit of unity prevailed. “Sectarianism here was
not as intense as in the Bay area,” said Hess.
Bill Kowalczyk moved to Portland from Eugene, Oregon, in 1983. He came
with a great deal of experience and family history on the left, his grandfather
being a member of the Communist Party. “In Portland,” reflected Kowalczyk,
“we didn’t have that level of sectarian tension. I mean, it was kind of there in
the background, but generally it wasn’t that significant of an issue. . . . People in
this town really tended to downplay whatever affiliation they had with whatever
party they happened to be associated with.” As a result, he said, people could
debate theoretical issues “without the same kind of animosity” that character-
ized hard-line left groups. Lynn and Cathie DeWeese-Parkinson, both veter-
ans of many leftist battles, identified four reasons why PCASC was able to rise
above sectarianism: there were enough unaligned leftists in PCASC to over-
come small leftist groups; good personal relations developed over the course of
time; PCASC was engaged in productive activities, often with positive results;
[ 142 ] CHAPTER 5
and Portland was a small enough city that people knew they had to “live with
each other.”
The PCASC newsletter, the Central America Update, initiated in March
1984, provided a forum for discussion and debate on a range of issues. It was
designed, according to Bill Bigelow, as both a “news outlet” and a place to reflect
on “what it means to do solidarity work. . . what the movement meant.” The
newsletter contained a “Viewpoint” section for this purpose, featuring analy-
ses, reflections, and debates among PCASC activists. Issues discussed included
how to work with moderate-liberal congressional opponents of Reagan’s poli-
cies; whether, when, and how to criticize the Sandinistas; whether PCASC as a
group should support particular political candidates; how to educate U.S. citi-
zens on socialism without waving a red flag; how to respond to red-baiting; and
rationales for civil disobedience. The newsletter editorial board, noted Bigelow,
was comprised of “prominent social justice activists,” including Frank Giese,
Patsy Kullberg, Chris Neilson, Bill Resnick, and Millie Thayer.
Bigelow, a self-described independent leftist, grew up in a Presbyterian
household in the San Francisco Bay area. He began teaching high school history
and social studies in Portland in 1978. During the 1980s, he developed a high
school curriculum on Central America issues, and with fellow teacher Thayer,
organized the Teachers Committee on Central America in the Portland area.
When it came to organizing, Bigelow looked at the big picture. “There are a
lot of left groups who see recruiting people to their organization as the equiva-
lent of building consciousness and building the movement and all that, when in
fact, what they are really doing is just recruiting people to their organization,”
he explained. Whatever the merits of their particular ideology, he said, “to the
extent that the people who carry that ideology are just concerned about getting
people in their discrete organization, then it absolutely becomes an obstacle to
working together and building a social movement.”
On April 28, 1987, Portland native Ben Linder and two of his Nicaraguan
co-workers, Sergio Hernández and Pablo Rosales, were killed by the contras
while working on a hydro-electric project near the village of San José de Bocay,
located west of Wiwilí. Linder had been living in Nicaragua since August 1983,
utilizing his engineering skills in the service of the Nicaraguan National Energy
Institute and amusing audiences with his unicycle-riding clown acts. He had
returned to the United States in September 1986 for a six-week speaking tour in
order to raise funds for the completion of the hydro-electric project. His death
came as a great shock to the Portland community. “People were hurt and in a
fury over what happened to Ben and the family. The family was very beloved in
Portland,” said Cathie DeWeese-Parkinson. “It brought the reality of the Contra
War home here in a way that maybe was not true in other places,” said Bigelow.
“I remember I spent 24/7 in the office after that. People would come and leave
groceries for us. The phones were ringing all the time. U.S. foreign policy just hit
people in a way that it had not before. There was massive disgust.” News of Ben’s
death sparked an impromptu gathering of fifteen hundred Portlanders at the
Federal Building on the evening of April 28. The following day, Representative
AuCoin issued a statement, which read in part:
Yesterday the war in Nicaragua came home to Portland. This war
was organized by officials of our government and paid for with
our taxes. . . . I am full of anger and sadness: Anger at those in
this Administration who spend more time financing this God-
forsaken war than they do solving poverty in Central America.
Overwhelming sadness, that a dedicated young man has lost his
life for caring enough to work for development in peasant com-
munities in spite of the dangers. . . . Count on me to do everything
I can to make sure this insanity stops. I asked Secretary of State
George Schultz today to start an investigation of this incident
immediately.58
Sen. Hatfield also issued a statement that day, declaring that Ben Linder “was
the victim of a war for which the United States bears a major responsibility. And
it is a war which might not be necessary if we were about the business of search-
ing for a solution instead of military victories.”59 In early May, the Multnomah
County Commission unanimously approved resolutions that honored Ben
Linder and condemned contra aid. In Salem, the state capital, a majority of state
legislators signed a letter to the Oregon congressional delegation calling for an
immediate halt to contra aid, an end to the U.S. embargo, and an investigation
into the role of U.S. agencies in the murder of civilians like Ben.60 (A one-day
congressional hearing was held in May—see chapter 7.) Within three weeks the
Ben Linder Memorial Fund, created by his parents to continue the Cua-Bocay
hydroelectric project, had raised $25,000. The Portland-Corinto Sister Cities
Association initiated the Ben Linder Construction Brigade, with the goal of
helping to rebuild hospitals and health clinics in Corinto.
Among those who participated in the Ben Linder Construction Brigade was
Carlos Flores, a Salvadoran immigrant who arrived in Portland in 1986. He was
initially hesitant to become involved in any kind of activism. “The war [in El
[ 144 ] CHAPTER 5
Salvador] was still happening,” he said. “People still had relatives in El Salvador.
You had to be careful about who you talked to, find who you can trust.” Flores
left El Salvador at the age of fifteen because he feared he would be linked to
the revolutionaries—a relative had been killed by the right-wing death squads.
“My brother was still there,” he said. “This was something I was always worried
about—his safety.” The catalyst for his involvement in PCASC activities in 1988
was a talk he attended at Portland State University (PSU) given by Dr. Charlie
Clements about El Salvador. “Soon after that talk,” he said, “I started meeting
with students at PSU, the Central America Study and Action Group.” He also
met Martin Gonzalez of the Portland AFSC office and the two quickly became
friends. Flores started helping with AFSC activities, then assisted a PCASC-
sponsored walk-a-thon benefit. “So, little by little I started participating,” he
said. “I met great people. You could feel that commitment.”
PCASC was still functioning in 2011. Its office was located in a building that
served as a part-time community center for the multicultural neighborhood.61
“One measure of success,” said Bill Bigelow, “is when people join a project that
may be limited, such as supporting Nicaragua, and then stay in the movement
for social justice beyond that particular issue. I think there were a lot of people
who came into PCASC and are still involved . . . and the fact that PCASC is still
around is utterly extraordinary.”
CHAPTER 6
The Politics of Transnational Solidarity
W hat progressive activists hailed as “solidarity” with the Nica-

raguan people, the Reagan administration and its rightist
allies decried as a Sandinista conspiracy. On April 2, 1985, with votes on con-
tra aid coming up in Congress, President Reagan told Washington Post report-
ers that the reason his Nicaragua policy lacked public support was that “we’ve
been subjected, in this country, to a very sophisticated lobbying campaign by
a totalitarian government—the Sandinistas.” Three weeks later, he declared in
a national radio address, “The Sandinista Communists are lobbying your sena-
tors and representatives. Together with the misguided sympathizers in this
country, they’ve been running a sophisticated disinformation campaign of lies
and distortion.”1 Reagan returned to this theme the following year. On March
11, 1986, he claimed that lack of public support for his Nicaragua policy was due
to “a great disinformation network that is at work throughout our country.” As
a result, he said, “a great many people are confused.”2
Internal memoranda indicate that President Reagan’s statements reflected
a common bureaucratic mindset.3 A memorandum titled “Public Diplomacy
and Central America” (May 1, 1983), written by Kate Semarad, an official with
the Agency for International Development, warned of a “Soviet-orchestrated
effort to influence the United States Congress, the national media, and the gen-
eral public.” Soviet propaganda agencies, she wrote, were circulating “fabricated
allegations of massacres” by U.S. allies in Central America. To counter these
[ 145 ]
[ 146 ] CHAPTER 6
allegations, she advised, “We can and must go over the heads of our Marxist
opponents directly to the American people.”4 A fifty-page report from the State
Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean
(S/LPD), titled “Sandinista Disinformation” (September 1, 1984), identified
the ringleader of the “Sandinista disinformation campaign” as Maryknoll Father
Miguel d’Escoto, the FSLN government’s minister of foreign affairs. “He spear-
headed the organization of a Nicaragua solidarity network in the United States
and Europe, even organizing training sessions for activists on how to present
the message.” Two other Nicaraguan religious leaders, Gustavo Parajón and
Sixto Ulloa, both of the Council of Protestant Churches (CEPAD), were iden-
tified as “fervent spokesmen of Sandinista propaganda and hosts to the many
tour groups that visit Nicaragua.” The U.S. citizens most likely to succumb to
this propaganda were those “who are continually in disagreement with all U.S.
foreign policy” and “naive idealists who believe in any movement that calls itself
revolutionary.”5
In an effort to find out how deep this “Sandinista propaganda” had reached
into the American heartland, S/LPD underwrote a study by the Institute for the
Study of the Americas (ISA) in the fall of 1984. ISA interviewed 250 U.S. organi-
zations involved in Latin American issues, including policy-oriented research
institutes, universities, interest groups, humanitarian and human rights organiza-
tions, service organizations, and lobby groups. The ISA report, dated January 1,
1985, concluded that most of these groups maintained a liberal-left orientation:
“What appears most unusual about the Latin American affairs area—in com-
parison to those of, say, Europe or the Soviet Union—is the heavily liberal-radi-
cal orientation of the vast majority of the entities which are active in the field.
This is not a political judgment on the part of the ISA staff, but rather the obvious
empirical result of our research. The left of center predominance is so striking
. . . that it could hardly be ignored even by the most superficial observers.”6
This objective assessment did not appear to change the thinking of S/LPD
director Otto Reich, who continued to maintain that Sandinista propaganda
was responsible for the lack of public support for administration policies, not
only in the United States but also in Western Europe. In an S/LPD report titled
“Public Diplomacy Plan for Europe” ( July 29, 1985), Reich wrote, “Because
the Sandinista, FMLN, and other communist propaganda supporters work so
effectively in Europe, our effort to counter their activities and explain our views
will have to be intensive and sustained over a long period of time.”7 Another
S/LPD report (December 17, 1985) predicted, “The Sandinistas will probably
The Politics of Transnational Solidarity [ 147 ]
mount a campaign beginning in early January to persuade Congress to with-

draw support from the Nicaraguan armed forces [contras]. The campaign will
be run from the grass-roots level and directed at religious groups, the media,
and special interest groups.”8
By the time Robert Kagan took charge of S/LPD in April 1986, it was clear
that S/LPD’s strategy needed revision, as the agency had thus far failed to stem
the tide of domestic opposition. Kagan necessarily acknowledged the domestic
sources of opposition to the Contra War so as to devise a more effective coun-
terstrategy. In a memo to National Security Council adviser Walter Raymond
Jr. (September 18, 1986), he wrote:
Church-based supporters of the Sandinistas have been able to

frame much of the public debate on Nicaragua. . . . [They are]
dominating the flow of information to local churches, parishes, and
synagogues. Many of the denominational national offices and their
respective justice and peace committees and offices of social policy
reflect the views of pro-Sandinista religious activists. This bias is
bolstered by such church-supported groups as the Washington
Office on Latin America and Witness for Peace, and is reinforced
by inexpensive solidarity tours of Nicaragua. Opposition to U.S.
policy in Central America has continued to be a central effort
of many DC-based religious offices and their support network.
Because of this, any public diplomacy effort must reach the local
level and respond to the charges and allegations made by the vari-
ous inter-religious networks supportive of the Sandinistas.9
Kagan still missed the point that most U.S. religious organizations and activ-
ist groups did not base their opposition to the Contra War on whether or not
they supported the Sandinistas. As Thomas Quigley, head of the U.S. Catholic
Conference’s Office of International Justice and Peace, pointed out, “people
who disapprove strongly of U.S. efforts to overthrow the [Nicaraguan] govern-
ment and fund the Contras can still be quite critical of the Sandinistas.”10 What
the liberal U.S. religious community held in common with the FSLN govern-
ment was a belief that the U.S.-directed Contra War “is immoral, illegal, and
unwise,” as Bishop Thomas Gumbleton told a Congressional subcommittee
in 1987, speaking for the National Conference of Catholic Bishops.11 Opinions
regarding the nature of the FSLN and its reform program were more diverse,
although most liberal religious groups approved of Sandinista reforms in health
care, education, and land redistribution in the interest of the masses.
[ 148 ] CHAPTER 6
One of the ways in which the Reagan administration sought to undermine

its opponents was to discourage travel to Nicaragua. In mid-1983 the admin-
istration closed six Nicaraguan consulates in the United States, thereby mak-
ing it more difficult for U.S. citizens to obtain visas. The Nicaraguan govern-
ment responded by allowing U.S. citizens to enter the country without visas,
even placing an advertisement in the New York Times to announce this.12 In
early 1984 the administration employed more intimidating tactics, directing
the FBI and Customs agents to question returning brigadistas and other U.S.
travelers to Sandinista Nicaragua. “Within months of the first brigades,” wrote
the sociologist Sharon E. Nepstad, “several brigadistas were contacted by FBI
agents who wanted to discuss their trips to Nicaragua and whether they had
been approached by representatives of the Sandinista government.”13 Nicaragua
Network sent out warning letters to inform travelers of their rights and offer
advice as to how to respond to questions. During a Congressional inquiry in
April 1985, FBI director William H. Webster testified that agents had questioned
one hundred U.S. travelers to Nicaragua about their activities and contacts in
Nicaragua. Rep. Don Edwards (D-CA), after hearing Webster’s testimony, said,
“These FBI interviews have the odor of harassment. We want to know what
they’re doing with various groups and people who are not even suspected of
committing crimes, but are diligent in their opposition to the president’s poli-
cies in Central America.” The Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed
suit on behalf of Edward Haase, a freelance journalist whose diary and address
book had been photocopied by the FBI at the Miami airport when he returned
from Nicaragua on January 16, 1985. A federal district judge dismissed the suit
after the FBI promised to not use any of the “evidence” obtained. This litigation,
along with pressure from members of Congress, led U.S. Customs to issue new
rules barring such searches.14
The administration took more forceful action against the Sanctuary Move-
ment and the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador. Prominent
sanctuary leaders were arrested and put on trial in 1984 and 1985, and CISPES
was placed under investigation as a potential illegal foreign agent and supporter
of international terrorism. After years of FBI surveillance, however, no charges
were brought against CISPES. In September 1988 CCR obtained through the
Freedom of Information Act 1,320 pages of documents on FBI activities from
1981 to 1985. The documents revealed that the FBI had placed under investiga-
tion 2,370 individuals and 1,330 groups in the United States. In July 1989 the
Senate Intelligence Committee issued a 150-page report that called the FBI
investigation of CISPES “a serious failure in F.B.I. management” but did not

criticize the White House.15
Part of the administration’s “public diplomacy” strategy involved encourag-
ing and sometimes subsidizing rightist groups to attack the anti–Contra War
campaign and Central America movement. In the mid-1980s, at the height of
the political debate over contra aid, a half-dozen rightist think tanks produced
a spate of books and articles denouncing opponents of administration policy
as the pawns of revolutionary communists and the Soviet Union. The book
titles convey the message: The Revolution Lobby (1985); The Washington Battle
for Central America: The Unmet Challenge of the “Red Chorus” (1986); The Red
Orchestra: Instruments of Soviet Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean (1986);
Second Front: Advancing Latin American Revolution in Washington (1986); and
Prophets or Useful Idiots? Church Organizations Attacking U.S. Central America
Policy (1986). One of the more prolific writers of such works, J. Michael Waller,
contracted with S/LPD to produce a study on the “Central American Church
Connection,” to be distributed to “a variety of leadership groups and priority
audiences.”16
The Institute on Religion and Democracy, a rightist group founded in 1981,
specifically targeted Witness for Peace. In a press release on October 15, 1986,
headlined “The False Witness of Witness for Peace,” the institute charged that
WFP was engaged in “deception” and “betrayal of solidarity with persecuted
Christians in Nicaragua,” and that the group was abusing its “religious witness
for partisan political purposes.” In response, on November 25 the WFP steering
committee issued a statement declaring that it was “speaking the truth about the
effects of U.S. support for the contras, because our government is responsible
for their terrorist attacks on civilian targets.”17
Fr. Miguel d’Escoto, the alleged ringleader of the “Sandinista propaganda
campaign,” was indeed influential in the United States, but this was hardly a
conspiracy. D’Escoto’s influence stemmed from his long-standing contacts
in the religious community and his well-known advocacy of liberation theol-
ogy. D’Escoto was born in Los Angeles, California, in 1933, the oldest son of
Nicaraguan parents. His maternal grandfather was German and his mother and
uncles had been educated in Germany—and also trapped there during World
War I. His father worked as a movie actor in southern California, sometimes
doubling for Rudolph Valentino, according to d’Escoto. The family returned to
Nicaragua when Miguel was a young child.
Being from a well-off family, Miguel was given the option at the age of fourteen
[ 150 ] CHAPTER 6
to study abroad. His father suggested Spain, but Miguel said he wanted to go to
the United States, where he might learn about democracy. Spain, he said, was
too much like Nicaragua in being ruled by a dictatorship. Miguel got his wish.
He attended a private high school in Berkeley, California, where he became flu-
ent in English and found excitement in following the baseball heroics of Jackie
Robinson. D’Escoto recalled a formative experience when a fellow student told
him that Jackie Robinson was not a good baseball player. Miguel responded that
Robinson was indeed a very good player. “He cannot be good,” said the other boy.
“Why he cannot be good?” asked Miguel. “Because he is black,” came the reply.
D’Escoto never forgot the answer. He came to understand America’s cultural
prejudices and also to admire those Americans who challenged discrimination
and injustice. “If I were to choose the people who most influenced me in my life
and who were paradigmatic figures for me,” he reflected, “I would choose four,
of which two were American. One is Martin Luther King and the other one is
Dorothy Day. . . . The others would be [Mohandas] Gandhi and [Leo] Tolstoy.”
His study of U.S. history also led him to admire William Lloyd Garrison, the
famous abolitionist. An original painting of Garrison, along with two original
mastheads of Garrison’s newsletter, The Liberator, hang in his Managua home.
D’Escoto pursued his higher education at a seminary in Glen Ellyn, Illinois,
where he studied philosophy. He entered the Maryknoll seminary at Ossining,
New York, in 1953 and was ordained a priest in 1961. He served as a missionary
in Chile from 1963 to 1969, a time when liberation theology was sweeping
through Latin America and progressive reform was gaining momentum in
Chile. Upon return to the United States in 1970, d’Escoto helped found Orbis
Books and became its publisher. In 1977 he became a member of the influential
Group of Twelve in Nicaragua, which brought the FSLN into the political dia-
logue at the time.18
During the 1980s, while serving as minister of foreign relations, d’Escoto
continued to reach out to the U.S. religious community. In an article in
Sojourners (March 1983), for example, he linked the liberation theology move-
ment in Latin America to Martin Luther King’s civil rights movement in North
America. The spirit of King was alive and well in Sandinista Nicaragua, he wrote,
as people of faith were undertaking “the common task of searching for a more
human and just society.” He assured readers of this progressive Christian maga-
zine that a “reservoir of Christian values” underlay the Sandinista Revolution
and that, after the revolution, “a great amount of forgiveness was manifested.”
He explained the economics of Sandinista Nicaragua in straightforward moral
terms: “The revolution demands that we abandon ideas of only ourselves

becoming better off. It demands a great amount of brotherhood and sisterhood
and sharing and thinking not only of myself but of us.”19
D’Escoto’s younger sister, Rita, was also born in the United States. During
the 1950s, while working at the United Nations Division of Social Affairs, she
fell in love with a West Point cadet named John Clark. The two were married in
1956 and had six children, all being U.S. citizens. On June 2, 1970, Lt. Col. John
Clark was killed in action in Vietnam. One and a half years later, Rita sent her
two oldest children, Sophia and Margarita (identical twins, age thirteen), to live
with extended family in Nicaragua. The sisters arrived just after the devastating
earthquake hit Managua in December 1972 and stayed for two and a half years.
They finished high school in the United States and returned to Nicaragua during
summers. Sophia graduated from the University of Virginia in 1980 with a BA
in government, writing her final research paper on the Sandinista Revolution.
In late 1980 Sophia Clark moved to Nicaragua and began working at the
Department of North American Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, headed by
her uncle. “Father Miguel was truly a mentor for me,” she said. “He’s my godfa-
ther but he was also a political mentor to me.” Sophia’s physical appearance as
a gringa—blond hair and light skin—made some of her colleagues wary, but
she soon gained their confidence. She became a translator at top-level meet-
ings between Daniel Ortega and visiting English-speaking dignitaries. In pro-
test against the Contra War, she renounced her U.S. citizenship. Sophia’s sister,
Margarita, moved to Nicaragua in 1982 and began working as a health volunteer
in Ciudad Sandino. Still retaining her U.S. citizenship, she became deputy direc-
tor of international relations of the Sandinista Association of Cultural Workers.
Her tasks included making arrangements for such notable visitors as Salmon
Rushdie, Carlos Fuentes, Graham Greene, Harold Pinter, Martin Sheen, and
Daryl Hannah. “I said to my sister,” said Sophia, “you get all the fun people, I get
all the members of Congress.”
In 1986 Sophia returned to the United States to become the first secretary of
the Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington, DC, joining her mother and brother
Michael there. Rita Clark remained eternally hopeful that U.S. citizens would
recognize the grievous error of the Contra War. “I have a great love for this
country,” she said. “To me, seeing how the U.S. was acting in Nicaragua, I can’t
tell you how painful it was.” After the FSLN party lost the elections of February
1990, Rita continued her transnational solidarity work through the newly cre-
ated Nicaragua–United States Friendship Office.20
[ 152 ] CHAPTER 6
More than a few Nicaraguans were intimately familiar with the United
States. Junta member Moisés Hassan obtained his doctorate in civil engineer-
ing from the University of North Carolina at Raleigh in 1971. Minister of Foreign
Trade Alejandro Martínez Cuenca majored in economics at Vanderbilt in the
1970s. Alejandro Bendaña, Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry, obtained
his doctorate in history from Harvard University in 1979 (and became a visit-
ing professor of history at the University of Chicago in 1993). Nora Astorga,
Nicaragua’s Deputy Representative at the United Nations, went to medical
school in Washington, DC, in 1967–68. Gustavo Parajón, head of CEPAD and
an ordained Baptist minister, attended Case Western Reserve Medical School
in Cleveland and went on to obtain a master’s degree in public health from
Harvard. His American-born wife, Joan, grew up near Chicago.21 In contrast to
the cardboard stereotypes of Sandinista Nicaragua circulating among Reagan
administration officials, many Nicaraguan political and religious leaders were
well versed in American culture, politics, and history.
Views of Solidarity from Nicaragua
FSLN leaders typically described those abroad who aided Nicaragua as being
in “solidarity with the Sandinista Revolution.” This definition did not necessar-
ily match the self-definitions of foreign organizations involved in Nicaragua.
Among U.S. groups, only Nicaragua Network and its affiliates defined their soli-
darity along the same lines as the FSLN, being supportive of both the FSLN and
its reform program. Religious groups identified themselves as being in solidar-
ity with their Nicaraguan counterparts or the Nicaraguan people. Sister cities
defined their involvement in terms of building people-to-people friendship at
the local level. Humanitarian aid groups tended to label themselves “nonpoliti-
cal,” irrespective of the fact that their assistance worked in tandem with FSLN
programs of economic uplift. FSLN leaders understood these differences and
encouraged each in their own right, but nonetheless identified all of these groups
as being in solidarity with the Sandinista Revolution. It was in their interest to do
so, after all, as international support boosted their credibility in the eyes of the
Nicaraguan people. Oddly, then, both the Reagan administration and the FSLN
identified U.S. groups involved in Nicaragua as being pro-Sandinista, the former
viewing this as diabolical and the latter viewing it as a blessing.
While FSLN leaders encouraged international solidarity, what they needed
most was domestic support for their reform program, or popular solidarity with
the Sandinista Revolution. This was cultivated in a number of ways: by memorial-
izing those who had fallen during the revolution; by enlisting popular participa-
tion in the literacy crusade, health brigades, and Sandinista mass organizations;
by emphasizing that “the revolution was made to create a new society,” as Interior
Minister Tomás Borge declared; by making Sandino the national patriarch; and
by promoting Sandinismo, the spirit of cooperation and sacrifice for the good of
the whole.22 “The greatest advance of our revolution,” said Fr. Ernesto Cardenal,
minister of culture, “is the brotherhood it has produced.”23 The FSLN’s efforts to
cultivate popular and international solidarity often blended together.
The development of international solidarity went through three phases,
according to Comandante Dora María Téllez. During the period of revolution-
ary struggle, the FSLN focused on developing “relations of solidarity” with
groups in other countries, and “particularly with Cuba.” Following the assump-
tion of power, “solidarity expanded and broadened” to generate international
support for the FSLN’s reform program and the “political perspective of the
Revolution.” During the Contra War period (1982–90), “the solidarity move-
ment took on a different role and became much more important in regard to the
aggression begun by Reagan.”24
Revolutionary Solidarity
Dora María Téllez and René Nuñez were both guerrilla fighters during the revo-
lutionary period. Téllez began working with the FSLN in 1972 and went under-
ground in 1976, leaving behind her medical studies at the University of León.
Her family did not see her again for three years. She became one of a handful of
women commanders in the FSLN and led guerrilla units in the final battle for
León in June 1979—at the age of twenty-three. Following the military triumph,
Téllez was appointed deputy president of the Council of State, then minister of
health in 1985.
René Nuñez left his university studies in civil engineering to join the
FSLN in 1967. He was imprisoned twice by the Somoza government, spend-
ing a total of four years in prison. His release in August 1978 was part of a hos-
tage exchange deal arranged with Somoza after FSLN guerrillas took over the
National Assembly. Téllez was second in command during that operation.
Nuñez left for Cuba and returned when revolution forces were triumphing in
León. During the 1980s, he served in three official capacities, as secretary of
the FSLN Directorate, director of the Office on Religious Affairs, and minister
[ 154 ] CHAPTER 6
to the President’s Office. For both Nuñez and Téllez, the revolutionary period
embodied the spirit of Sandinismo. “All the militants trained during that period
are the same—forged in the struggle, with a tremendous commitment to the
Organization [FSLN], and to the Nicaraguan people,” said Téllez. “That faith in
the people, no one really knows where it comes from. . . . We revolutionaries are
visionaries to a certain extent.”25
According to Nuñez, international solidarity during the revolutionary period
involved sending groups of people out of the country—to the United States,
Mexico, other Central American countries, Venezuela, some European coun-
tries. Their primary mission was to develop solidarity committees, foster sup-
port and raise money for the FSLN, and spread “the story of the Sandinistas.”
Some solidarity groups in Latin America also sent arms, doctors, and a few hun-
dred volunteer fighters, most of whom joined the FSLN’s Simon Bolívar bri-
gade. The most important FSLN connection was the Cuban government and
people, according to Nuñez. “Cuban solidarity was a special case, because they
were there from the very beginning and were there when the Sandinistas grew.”
The Cuban government provided military training and a safe haven for FSLN
operatives, but did not send people to fight in Nicaragua.26
Panama was also a place of refuge. In late September 1978, a conference titled
the Continental Conference of Solidarity with the People of Nicaragua was held
in Panama City, attended by some one hundred international supporters, includ-
ing a half-dozen U.S. citizens. According to the U.S. Embassy, which monitored
the meeting, the purpose of the conference was “to determine ways in which
‘solidarity’ with the Nicaraguan people could be made manifest.” Discussions
centered on the formation of volunteer brigades to join the anti-Somoza fight
and on building solidarity movements in the home countries of participants.27
On the diplomatic front, the FSLN established formal relations with the
governments of Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico in 1978. “Connections were
made with government officials in order that the Sandinista Party, even though
it was not in the government, would be able to go to the Organization of
American States and make statements,” said Nuñez. This diplomacy paid off
when the United States came to the OAS in June 1979 with a last-minute pro-
posal to create an interim government to replace Somoza—in order to head off
an expected FSLN victory. The OAS rejected the measure and voted instead to
demand Somoza’s resignation. Mexico, Panama, Costa Rica, and Ecuador fur-
thermore broke off diplomatic relations with the Somoza government.28
Postrevolutionary Solidarity
In the postrevolutionary period, the revolutionary rhetoric that had galvanized
Nicaraguans into action against the “dictator” was refashioned into a call for
participation in the revolutionary process. The military triumph in July 1979 had
the immediate effect of validating revolutionary rhetoric, but governance ulti-
mately required a shift toward pragmatism in both domestic and international
affairs. FSLN leaders faced the daunting task of meeting the nation’s pressing
economic needs with extremely limited resources. They needed the support of
business owners, skilled technicians, managers, and international aid organiza-
tions irrespective of political ideology. In foreign affairs, the FSLN was obliged
to abide by international (UN and OAS) rules that proscribed support for revo-
lutionaries in other countries. Those who wanted to aid the revolutionary strug-
gle in El Salvador had to contend with the possibility that this would open the
door to U.S. support for counter-revolutionaries in Nicaragua. Revolutionary
rhetoric, as such, was constrained. FSLN public statements gravitated toward
calling for “a negotiated solution to the Salvadoran conflict.”29
The two FSLN agencies most responsible for both international and transna-
tional relationships in the post-revolutionary period and beyond were the gov-
ernment’s Ministry of Foreign Relations (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores,
or MINREX) and the party’s Directorate of International Relations (Dirreción
de las Relaciones Internacionales, or DRI). Overall coordination fell to a small
commission composed of National Directorate members Bayardo Arce and
Daniel Ortega; the minister and vice minister of foreign relations, respectively,
Miguel d’Escoto and Victor Hugo Tinoco; the head of the DRI, which for many
years was Julio López; and occasionally the chief of the army. This commission
was a very stable group, according to Tinoco, holding almost weekly meetings
for ten years. “It oversaw the whole relationship of international solidarity,” he
said. Arce was the main force in the commission in the first half of the 1980s,
while Ortega exerted more influence in the latter half of the decade.30
MINREX, as a government bureau, dealt with other governments, foreign
political parties, Nicaraguan embassies, multinational agencies, and diplomatic
initiatives. “Because we could not afford to have embassies everywhere in the
world,” said d’Escoto, “I was practically forced to travel the whole world in order
to meet with heads of state.”31 MINREX officials worked at a brisk pace to secure
loans and aid from other governments and international agencies. These efforts
paid off. During its first thirty-two months of existence, the Sandinista govern-
ment received $1.2 billion in external financing and $260 million in direct aid.32
[ 156 ] CHAPTER 6
The aid came from Latin America, Western Europe, the socialist bloc, and Arab
oil exporters, mainly Libya, in keeping with the FSLN’s announced policy of
“walking on four legs,” designed to reduce dependence on the United States.33
The foreign aid, however, was not enough to prevent an economic crisis
in the summer of 1981; hence the need for additional assistance from interna-
tional humanitarian aid and solidarity organizations. The FSLN government
often delegated the coordination of aid projects to its various ministries. “Each
ministry had its own kind of work and its own particular work with solidarity
groups as well, such as in the area of health,” said Tinoco.34 Agencies directly
coordinating international aid and programs included the Ministry of Health,
Ministry of Construction, National Energy Institute, Ministry of Social Welfare
(which had its own Office of Foreign Cooperation), Ministry for Agrarian
Development and Reform (which helped make arrangements for international
work brigades), and the Directorate of Municipal and Regional Affairs (which
worked with foreign embassies and local municipalities to facilitate sister city
partnerships).
DRI, being a party vehicle, was more ideological than MINREX. DRI
worked closely with the FSLN Department of Propaganda and Political Edu-
cation and with Barricada, the official party newspaper, which published an
English-language edition for international audiences. The staff at MINREX and
DRI were sometimes called upon to work on joint projects. When Ronald
Reagan was elected in November 1980, for example, Bayardo Arce requested
that the North American desks of MINREX and DRI work together to produce
a chronology of all statements made by the Santa Fe committee about Nicaragua
and the situation in Central America (the Santa Fe committee was a rightist
group that influenced the Republican Party platform on Central America). The
idea was to gain a better understanding of the thinking of the incoming Reagan
administration.35
In 1980 DRI established the Committee in Solidarity with the Peoples
(CNSP) for the dual purpose of facilitating international solidarity relation-
ships and cultivating an internationalist consciousness among the Nicaraguan
people. According to staff member Ana Patricia Elvir, CNSP facilitated
“experiential education,” in which Nicaraguans met with internationalists
working on various projects in the country for mutual education and shar-
ing of perspectives. CNSP also conducted information campaigns to edu-
cate Nicaraguans about international issues, albeit from an anti-imperialist
perspective—such issues as the Salvadoran people’s struggle for justice, the
“Palestinian people’s right for identity and territory,” and “the achievements
of countries in the socialist camp.” CNSP became the main contact for leftist
solidarity groups abroad, including Nicaragua Network in the United States.
The agency was governed by a board of directors made up of representatives
of Sandinista mass organizations, which met twice a year.36 Sandinista mass
organizations also developed transnational relationships on their own. The
Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women connected with
other women’s groups; Sandinista labor unions connected with their counter-
parts; and the Sandinista Association of Cultural Workers developed relation-
ships with writers, actors, and artists abroad. The latter group was headed by
Rosario Murillo, a well-known poet and Daniel Ortega’s partner.
At the nongovernmental and nonparty level, there were many kinds of trans-
national connections—business, professional, educational, and especially reli-
gious. There were, of course, deep and historic transnational ties among Catholic
orders and Protestant denominations, and many norteamericano missionaries
were serving in Nicaragua. Other religious entities that cultivated relationships
abroad were the Jesuit-run Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica,
the Catholic-based Institute of John XXIII, the Protestant-based CEPAD,
the Antonio Valdivieso Ecumenical Center, and CONFER (the Nicaraguan
Conference of Religious). The FSLN government encouraged these indepen-
dent relationships as a counterweight to the influence of the Catholic hierarchy,
even subsidizing liberation theology conferences in Managua.
The potential for building international solidarity and support for the new
Nicaragua was evident in the rush of international visitors in the postrevolution-
ary period. “Virtually everywhere I went there were people from other coun-
tries,” observed Harvey Williams, a sociology professor from California. Many
came because they thought “what was happening here was good” and wanted
to be part of it. The Nicaraguan people were eager to talk with international visi-
tors. They “were very much interested in having us get the story straight,” said
Williams. The FSLN government welcomed these international visitors and
encouraged their interest. According to Thomas Walker, distinguished Latin
Americanist scholar at Ohio University, FSLN leaders “seemed determined from
the very beginning to be very open. . . . Their attitude was, ‘This is a Nicaraguan
revolution. This is not a Cuban revolution. We’re going to do things our way.’ And
being open was their way.” Being open also fit the post-revolutionary pragmatic
outlook, as the FSLN obtained aid from wherever it could, be it foreign gov-
ernments, nongovernmental organizations, religious denominations, solidarity
[ 158 ] CHAPTER 6
organizations, or individual cooperantes—foreigners with technical expertise

working in Nicaragua. The FSLN government placed dozens of internationalists
in governmental positions, including Williams, who worked at the Ministry of
Labor for six months in 1985.37
International Solidarity during the Contra War
In the fall of 1981 Javier Chamorro, Nicaraguan ambassador to the United

Nations, spoke at the Mission Cultural Center in San Francisco on the impor-
tance of solidarity activities in the United States. “Though the war is over,” he
said, “solidarity work is still important to educate the American public about
recent developments in Nicaragua and to counteract the campaign of disinfor-
mation that is being conducted against Nicaragua.”38 As the Contra War heated
up, solidarity appeals grew more urgent. At a meeting of the Standing Committee
of Intellectuals for the Sovereignty of the Peoples of Our America, held in
Managua on March 4, 1982, Junta member Sergio Ramírez called upon intel-
lectuals “to protest against any kind of intervention in Central America or the
Caribbean.” He raised the memory of the Vietnam War, saying, “We know that
the U.S. people’s sense of justice has not been dulled and that they cannot so
easily forget the past. We are confident that they will stand beside the peoples of
Latin America and the world, that they will form a bastion to hold back inter-
vention in Central America.”39
That same month, Carlos Fernando Chamorro, the son of the martyred
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro and editor of Barricada, spoke at a meeting in
Toronto on March 31, 1982. He described how Somocistas (ex–national guards-
men) operating near the Honduran border had killed 141 Nicaraguans in the
past eighteen months. He then asked his audience to join in solidarity with
Nicaragua: “We hope that the solidarity work done here might also become a
source of strength for us. We hope it can be united with the efforts of the people
of the United States in order to build a very powerful anti-interventionist move-
ment.”40 Similar appeals for international solidarity and support were made at
the Continental Conference for Peace and Sovereignty in Central America and
the Caribbean, held in Managua from April 21 to 23, 1983.
Complementing these international appeals for solidarity were domestic
calls for popular defense of the revolution. These calls typically lacked Ramírez’s
confidence that U.S. citizens would rise to the occasion and prevent the U.S.
government from invading Nicaragua. FSLN directorate members Tomás

Borge, Daniel Ortega, Luis Carrión, Humberto Ortega, Jaime Wheelock, and
others spoke frequently on the need to “defend the revolution” against Yankee
imperialism. Wheelock, speaking at a May Day rally (May 1, 1984) before a
crowd of some 30,000 people in Chinandega, a town in northwestern Nicaragua,
declared that the “world is with Nicaragua. . . . Even allies of the United States
are opposed to the policy of the Reagan administration.” He warned that a
Vietnam-like quagmire awaited a U.S. invasion: “And it will cost them to inter-
vene here, because the people are mobilized for defense. He who intervenes
here can expect to suffer tens of thousands of casualties, to be buried with
marines and flags back in the United States—that is, if they manage to get out of
Nicaragua.”41 Wheelock thus made it clear that if Americans did not learn from
their fiasco in Vietnam, Nicaraguans would reteach them the lesson. What he
did not mention was that the “lesson of Vietnam” had cost the Vietnamese peo-
ple dearly.
Sandinistas in the United States

FSLN leaders balanced these dire warnings at home with renewed efforts to
forge bonds with progressive U.S. sectors and present a human face to the
American people. In early October 1984 Daniel Ortega, Rosario Murillo, and
Miguel d’Escoto embarked on a nine-day speaking tour through New York, Los
Angeles, San Francisco, Boston, and Atlanta. Their purpose was to counter the
Reagan administration’s “campaign of disinformation about Nicaragua,” accord-
ing to Ortega. Visiting the Lower East Side of Manhattan, where the Christian-
based Habitat for Humanity was rehabilitating tenement housing, Ortega
thanked Habitat for its plans to build low-cost housing in Nicaragua and told
residents of the neighborhood, “May the power of construction always be
greater than the power of destruction.”
In Los Angeles, Ortega was presented with an official Certificate of Welcome
by city councilman Robert C. Farrell. He later attended a Beverly Hills garden
party hosted by the Committee of Concern for Central America, a group that
included Hollywood actors. Ortega invited those gathered to visit Nicaragua
and humbly declared, “Our revolution is not perfect, but we’re trying to con-
struct a better society.”42 Such soft-sell rhetoric was designed to dissolve the
menacing images of the Sandinistas drawn by the Reagan administration and its
rightist allies. Although markedly different in tone from the fiery anti-imperial-
ist speeches at home, both had the same objectives of ending U.S. intervention
[ 160 ] CHAPTER 6
in Nicaragua and preventing a direct U.S. invasion, thus allowing the FSLN to
get on with the business of reform and development.
That the political culture in at least some parts of the United States did not
buy administration stereotypes of Nicaragua became clear when Daniel Ortega
spoke at the Park Slope United Methodist Church in Brooklyn on July 27, 1986.
After listening to Ortega admonish the Reagan administration for not abiding
by the recent World Court decision and not listening to U.S. public opinion,
the audience gave the FSLN leader a standing ovation accompanied by thun-
derous shouts of “Viva Nicaragua Libre!” according to the New York Times.43
The city of Brooklyn had recently established a sister city relationship with the
Nicaraguan town of San Juan del Rio Coco. As part of this partnership, the Park
Slope Methodist Church had established a sister congregation relationship
with La Merced, a Roman Catholic church. Eight days before Ortega’s speech,
according to a Brooklyn newspaper, the “Brooklyn/San Juan del Rio Coco
project held a parade with a marching salsa band and steel drums to mark July
19, the anniversary of the Nicaraguan revolution.”44 A few weeks after Ortega
spoke, the contras once again attacked San Juan del Rio Coco, leaving seven
dead. Brooklyn residents held a memorial service, attended by Nora Astorga,
FSLN representative at the UN, and sent $2,500 to the Nicaraguan community
to support a water project and health clinic.45
Although FSLN leaders and Nicaraguans in general typically distinguished
between the “imperialist” U.S. government and its citizens, it was nonetheless
eye opening for many Nicaraguans to meet so many U.S. citizens who opposed
their own government’s policies and wanted to help the Nicaraguan people.
Vilma Nuñez de Escorcia, vice president of the Nicaraguan Supreme Court of
Justice, came into contact with many Americans. As vice president of the
Nicaraguan Commission for Peace as well, she “worked with international
groups opposed to the U.S. embargo, groups that brought supplies to Nicaragua,
and also groups that brought work brigades to Nicaragua,” by her own account.
“I realized,” she said, “there was a big difference between the position of the
people and the government of the United States, because I was working with
people that opposed their government’s policy toward Nicaragua.”
In 1984 Nuñez de Escorcia assisted former New York district attorney Reed
Brody in gathering data on contra attacks on civilians, later published in Contra
Terror in Nicaragua: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission, September 1984–January
1985 (1985). She also visited many U.S. cities during the 1980s, speaking at uni-
versities (University of California, Berkeley and New York University), public
forums, and conferences. She would typically explain “how the legal system was
working in Nicaragua and how we were implementing law.”46 Other FSLN offi-
cials who spoke in the United States during the 1980s included Sergio Ramirez,
Jaime Wheelock, Alejandro Bendaña, Ernesto Cardenal, Dora María Téllez,
Javier Chamorro, Carlos Tünnermann, and Rosa Carlota Tünnermann. FSLN
leaders also made their views known on occasion by writing op-ed articles.
Daniel Ortega had three published in the New York Times (March 13, 1985,
January 14, 1988, and November 3, 1989); Sergio Ramírez had one published in
the same newspaper ( July 26, 1983); and Tomás Borge was interviewed by the
Washington Post ( July 31, 1983) and Playboy magazine (August 1983).
The Foreign Ministry

During the Contra War, the Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry directed its efforts
toward isolating the United States internationally, even as the United States
tried to isolate Nicaragua. Miguel d’Escoto found that many of his counter-
parts, including the foreign ministers of NATO countries, understood and
sympathized with Nicaragua‘s position, even if they would not say so publicly.
“It was really interesting,” he said, “how some who were perceived to be the
closest friends of the United States did not agree with the U.S. position. . . . I was
amazed to see how they understood exactly what the facts were.”47 MINREX
held its own in the competition for international support and allies. Tinoco and
Astorga successfully lobbied African and Asian nations to give Nicaragua a seat
on the UN Security Council in 1983, over the vehement objection of the U.S.
representative. D’Escoto and Tinoco convinced Western European leaders in
1984 to reject a U.S. request to cut off aid to Nicaragua.48 In May 1985, in direct
opposition to the U.S. embargo, France, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands, and
Canada all increased their trade with Nicaragua and extended new credits.49
At the UN, the General Assembly passed resolutions opposing the U.S.
embargo in 1985 and urging U.S. compliance with the World Court decision
in 1986. The favorable World Court ruling was a major diplomatic coup for
Nicaragua, buttressing European and Latin American opposition to what was
clearly defined as U.S. aggression toward Nicaragua. It was largely at d’Escoto’s
insistence that the Nicaraguan government took its case to the World Court in
1984, according to Sophia Clark, as some FSLN leaders feared that the Court
would rule against Nicaragua, in deference to U.S. pressure.50
Clark’s job at the North American division of MINREX was to research and
analyze political developments in the United States, so that when members of
[ 162 ] CHAPTER 6
Congress came to visit Nicaragua, FSLN officials would know where they stood
on the issues, how they had voted, and their party’s positions. Many members of
Congress did visit Nicaragua. During the Congressional Easter recess in 1985, for
example, twenty senators and representatives, both Republican and Democrat,
came in five separate delegations.51 The FSLN had no formal relationship with
the Democratic Party leadership, but MINREX officials worked with individual
members, particularly Tom Harkin, John Kerry, and Christopher Dodd in the
Senate, and Jim Wright and David Bonior in the House. Tinoco, as deputy for-
eign minister in charge of relations with the U.S. and Latin American govern-
ments, regularly traveled to Washington and met with Democratic Party mem-
bers of Congress. “I had very cordial relations with Democrats,” he said. “I did
a lot of lobbying. I met a lot of congressional representatives and senators.” The
amicable feeling was mutual on the part of Rep. Bonior. “Of the Sandinistas, he
was my favorite,” said Bonior. “I really admire him.” Bonior was less impressed
with other FSLN officials. “Some were very easy and good to work with, others
were almost impossible to work with.” He placed in the latter category Miguel
d’Escoto. “He had no patience,” said Bonior.
Notwithstanding the Reagan administration’s frequent denunciations of the
“Sandinista lobby,” Nicaraguan diplomats operated like dozens of other govern-
mental lobbies in Washington; and certainly the Nicaraguan lobby was one of
the smaller ones. Meeting with U.S. elected officials was normal procedure for
foreign governments, including the former Somoza government of Nicaragua.
Moreover, while the Reagan administration alleged conspiratorial and mali-
cious designs by the “Sandinista lobby,” it arranged and paid for anti-Sandini-
sta Nicaraguans to come to Washington to lobby members of Congress. The
administration was essentially trying to win the contra aid “debate” by shutting
out one side.
Tinoco, Clark, and the MINREX staff worked with a number of ACWC
groups, including the Washington Office on Latin America, Nicaragua
Network, and “specific solidarity groups, for example, in Los Angeles and San
Francisco.” Tinoco considered these and other groups common allies in the
struggle to end the Contra War. “My perception was that all these groups were
very valuable,” he said. “Their activities in Nicaragua had political repercus-
sions, as they would return to the U.S. and put pressure on their members of
Congress.” Although “they could not stop the continuation of Reagan’s policy,
solidarity made it more difficult for Reagan to carry out what he wanted to do
and at one point he had to resort to illegal methods—the Iran-Contra scandal.
Solidarity was very important.” In Sophia Clark’s estimation, anti–Contra War

groups were “enormously effective” in countering the Reagan administration’s
negative stereotypes of Nicaragua. She furthermore credited the international
solidarity movement with helping Nicaragua “survive the embargo.”52
The Nicaraguan Embassy

The Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington maintained regular communication
with U.S. activist groups and frequently responded to their requests for speak-
ers. According to Clark, who became first secretary of the embassy in 1986,
“When groups in the U.S. knew that someone would be coming . . . we would
start getting calls from different solidarity groups in the U.S., and we would have
to communicate with the Foreign Ministry . . . to let them know that there was
an interest.” The embassy typically relied on ACWC groups to make arrange-
ments for speakers. Clark accompanied Dora María Téllez on a speaking tour
that took them to Washington, DC, Boston, Chicago, New York, San Francisco,
Berkeley, and finally to the annual convention of the American Public Health
Association in Las Vegas in September 1986. They visited U.S. hospitals and
spoke with media in cities along the way. “We were particularly looking for
alternative ways to give a different image to the media,” said Clark.
I think Nicaraguans were very, very good in what I would call talk-
ing in non-ideological terms and also talking on an equal basis. We
weren’t talking down to people. We weren’t making excuses for
ourselves. We were just saying, you know, how would you feel if
people came in and told you that you couldn’t do this, you couldn’t
do that. . . . So I think people could disagree with us, but at least
they didn‘t think that we were this horrible monster . . . threatening
the security of their country.53
The Nicaraguan Embassy was the site of dueling demonstrations on one

occasion. On March 26, 1985, at 4:00 p.m., Rev. Bill Callahan, director of the
Quixote Center, received a telephone call from the Nicaraguan Embassy. He was
informed that a pro-contra demonstration was scheduled to take place in front of
the embassy the next day, organized by a group from Miami called Concerned
Citizens for Democracy. “Can you do anything about it?” asked the embassy staff
person. Callahan met with his staff and volunteers at the Quixote Center, and
they decided to hold a counterdemonstration. A flurry of calls went out to the
center’s supporters. The next day there were 150 pro-contra demonstrators stand-
ing in front of the embassy and 200 anti-contra demonstrators surrounding
[ 164 ] CHAPTER 6
them. Callahan led the latter group in offering prayers for peace. Afterward, he
and five others visited with Ambassador Tünnermann inside the embassy.54
The Nicaraguan Committee in Solidarity with the Peoples (CNSP)

During the Contra War, international visitors, study tours, and aid projects
became more abundant in Nicaragua. “Nicaragua was more visited during those
years than ever before in its history,” said Miguel d’Escoto, “and then again, by
far, more than half of the visitors came from the United States.” As a priest as
well as foreign minister, d’Escoto was especially sought out by religious groups.
He sensed in many of his visitors a genuine empathy for the Nicaraguan peo-
ple. They opposed the Contra War, he said, not because too many Americans
were dying, but because they grieved for Nicaraguans.55 In mid-1985 Salomón
Alarcón, a spokesperson for CNSP, told a Washington Post journalist, “Without
neglecting the importance of the rest of the world, we think that solidarity from
the North American people has a special role to play. The visitors are . . . very
important, because our objective is not only to have these people pick coffee
or build houses, but also to have them inform the U.S. public about our pro-
cess.” Alarcón estimated that his committee alone had arranged for three thou-
sand U.S. citizens to visit Nicaragua in 1984, with more arriving through other
agencies.56
The mission of CNSP broadened during the Contra War period to include
making arrangements for international brigadistas and distributing humani-
tarian aid. When the FSLN government called for national and international
volunteers to assist the coffee harvest in the winter of 1983–84, it was up to the
CNSP staff to recruit the internationalists and help make arrangements for their
stay, working in conjunction with the Ministry for Agrarian Development and
Reform. CNSP later recruited and arranged for brigadistas to assist cotton har-
vests, building construction, and environmental projects as well as more coffee
harvests. A Washington Post reporter who embedded himself in a volunteer work
brigade in 1985 noted, “The word ‘brigadista’ carried power. Unlike the Spanish
world for journalist, ‘periodista,’ which often inspired more questions than it
answered, ‘brigadista’ implied work, political support and comradeship.”57
For Ana Patricia Elvir, who joined the CNSP staff in 1986, a typical work
day might involve receiving an international solidarity brigade in the morning
and conducting an educational seminar for the group in the afternoon, as she
explained it. Topics of discussion could include the state of the counterrevo-
lution, the Sandinista government’s efforts for peace, the human and material
needs resulting from contra aggression, and in that context the importance of
the international volunteers to Nicaragua. In the evening she might devote her
time to answering the questions of interested foreign journalists or perhaps
attend a meeting or demonstration in support of solidarity with the people of
South Africa against the apartheid regime and its intervention in Angola.58
On June 1, 1985, in response to the recently imposed U.S. embargo against
Nicaragua, President Daniel Ortega inaugurated a new international solidarity
campaign, Nicaragua Must Survive (La Campaña Nicaragua Debe Sobrevivir).
Its purpose was to help Nicaragua overcome the effects of the embargo by
increasing the volume of international material aid received—food, medicines,
educational and agricultural supplies—and improving the distribution of that
aid. Although Nicaragua received a fair amount of material support from the
international community, much of it went to specific projects and particular
communities. CNSP was directed to remedy this problem by creating a central-
ized distribution system that would spread the aid more evenly. The interna-
tional response to the new campaign was very positive, according to Elvir. She
estimated that two thousand “international solidarity committees” joined the
campaign worldwide. In Mexico, Argentina, and Canada, the Nicaragua Debe
Sobrevivir campaign became known as Ships for Peace (Barcos por la Paz), a
reference to the ships that embarked for Nicaragua full of supplies collected by
“people’s organizations” in these countries. Elvir estimated the total value of the
material contributions to Nicaragua at $5 million annually. The process of col-
lecting these goods also provided “opportunities to condemn the war and dis-
seminate information about its consequences,” she said.59
In the United States, the Nicaragua Debe Sobrevivir campaign was promoted
as the Let Nicaragua Live campaign by Nicaragua Network. Money raised and
goods collected by local solidarity committees and others were transferred to
CNSP, then distributed to worthy projects in Nicaragua. As part of this effort,
Nicaragua Network undertook a unique program, Oats for Peace, in which it
contracted with the Federation of Southern Cooperatives, a network of African
American family farm cooperatives in the South, to grow and process 225 tons
of oats. The program was designed to help struggling black farmers in the South
as well as provide a nutritious oatmeal drink to Nicaraguan orphanages and
children’s hospitals. “The first harvest,” said Nicaragua Network coordinator
Chuck Kaufman, “was largely a learning experience with lots of technical prob-
lems. We finally had to bring the oats back to the U.S., rough mill them here,
rebag them, and ship them back for final processing in Nicaragua.”60
[ 166 ] CHAPTER 6
In 1987 CNSP merged with three other organizations—the Nicaraguan

Commission for Peace, the Anti-Imperialist Tribunal of Our America, and
the Nicaraguan Association of Friendship with the Socialist Countries—to
become the Nicaraguan Council for Friendship, Solidarity, and Peace (Consejo
Nicaragüense de Amistad, Solidaridad y Paz, or CNASP). The merger was
designed to improve coordination of political education activities, said Elvir,
toward the twin goals of promoting within Nicaragua a “new vision of interna-
tional relations between the peoples of different countries,” and securing interna-
tional condemnation of “the injustice of the war of aggression against Nicaragua”
and the U.S. “economic blockade.”61
Religious Connections
Miguel d’Escoto responded to the U.S. economic embargo against Nicaragua by
undertaking a fast. As he explained to Envío, the fast was an act of conscience by
a Christian priest “faced with the death and destruction in Nicaragua due to the
war of aggression declared against us by the government of the United States.”62
On July 7, 1985, at the age of fifty-two, he began a fast that would last twenty-six
days. Sympathy poured in from around the world. More than five thousand peo-
ple from twenty-eight countries visited d’Escoto in Managua during the first
three weeks. Among them was a delegation of eight from the United States, led
by Marjorie Tuite, a Dominican sister and founder of the Women’s Coalition to
Stop Intervention in Central America. Tuite joined d’Escoto in his fast, as did
Rev. Philip Cousins, president of the National Council of Churches, and Rabbi
Irwin Blank, president of the Synagogue Council of America. The Nicaraguan
government declared a “National Fast Day” on July 26. Thousands of Nicaraguans
fasted as prayer groups and vigils were held around the country. In the United
States, “National Fast Days” were held on July 26 and July 27, with fifty people
fasting in the Detroit area alone, including Bishop Thomas Gumbleton. In
Mexico, over seven hundred priests fasted in support of d’Escoto.63
The FSLN government’s Office of Religious Affairs was created to encourage
progressive religious solidarity. Headed by René and Leana Nuñez, the office
assisted Witness for Peace and other international groups in such matters as
obtaining scarce supplies, arranging meetings with government officials, and
obtaining approval of projects. René Nuñez had grown up in a Catholic family,
gone to church, and confessed once a year during his youth. “But once I became
a university student, I left my religious practices for my political evolution,” he
said. “At that point, liberation theology was not around, and it seemed to me
that it was more important to dedicate myself to struggling for poor people than
to be praying in church.” When the Catholic Church later adopted its “prefer-
ential option for the poor,” Nuñez found congruence with his political beliefs.
“There is no contradiction between being both Christian and Marxist,” he said.
That view was similarly expressed by FSLN founder Carlos Fonseca, who wrote
that “unity between true revolutionaries and true Christians is fundamental in
the Frente Sandinista.”64
One of the main functions of the Office of Religious Affairs was to make
arrangements for visiting religious delegations, of which there were many. “The
vehicle for communication and for bringing people down was always the
Nicaraguan people and people from the church specifically,” said Nuñez. Religious
delegations would come with many questions about Nicaragua. Upon their arrival,
“we would give them an introductory talk about Nicaragua and answer questions
they had,” he said. The office would often arrange for delegations to visit interna-
tional aid projects such as “the vaccination effort, the literacy drive, the adult edu-
cation projects, health projects. . . . At the end, we would have another meeting to
have a political interchange, suggestions, questions, anything. This is to say, there
was a government very interested in sharing with them.” Nuñez asserted that what
motivated international visitors to help Nicaragua in the end was not some kind of
FSLN indoctrination, if that were possible, but rather their direct personal experi-
ences in the country:
After visiting different places in the country, seeing the programs that
were in place, seeing the necessities of the people, they would come
and say they wanted to help the Revolution, help Nicaragua. Their
consciences would be raised because they would see the reality of
this small country and the injustices of such a small country under
attack. So it was the reality, the plain reality, that they were seeing and
living that raised their consciences. And that’s where we saw them
rejecting the official government line of the U.S. and working so that
Nicaraguans would have the right to develop their own country.
The religious groups that undertook projects in Nicaragua, he noted, devel-

oped both “solidarity among the different churches that were doing work here”
and “solidarity with Nicaragua.”65
Sister City/State Partnerships

The sister city movement played an important role in stimulating international
support and solidarity relationships at the local level. By 1988, there were 84
[ 168 ] CHAPTER 6
Nicaraguan pairings with U.S. cities and 209 with European cities.66 According
to Nicaraguan researchers Manuel Ortega Hegg and Günther Maihold, the ini-
tial impetus to develop sister cities came from European delegations in the early
1980s. The latter generally viewed Sandinista Nicaragua as model project for
overcoming the North-South divide between developed and underdeveloped
nations. From the Nicaraguan side, sister cities had three principal functions:
to establish friendly relations and solidarity with people of different coun-
tries; to gain assistance in local development projects; and to resist the Reagan
administration’s attempt to isolate Nicaragua internationally and to strangle it
economically.67
The Nicaraguan-European sister cities that emerged focused on specific
development projects in Nicaragua, the top three areas being education, health
care, and municipal services. Large Nicaraguan cities and regions developed
multiple partnerships, with each European partner taking on a project. Estelí,
the third largest city in Nicaragua, partnered with seventeen European cit-
ies—four in Germany, three in France, two in Italy, two in Sweden, and one
each in Holland, Great Britain, Austria, Spain, Finland, and Norway. The good
works produced by these partnerships included the construction of schools, a
recreational center, a children’s park, and a large medical center.68 Nicaraguan-
U.S. pairings emerged slowly at first, then blossomed mid-decade, increasing
from ten in 1985 to eighty-four in 1988. The first national conference of U.S.-
Nicaraguan sister cities, held in Boulder in April 1985, was attended by fifteen
U.S. organizers and Luís Mendez from the Nicaraguan Embassy. The fourth
conference, held in Managua, July 20–26, 1988, in conjunction with the ninth
anniversary of the triumph of the Sandinista Revolution, drew representatives
from fifty-five U.S. cities.69
The FSLN government encouraged these partnerships, albeit without offer-
ing much tangible support. Of 138 sister cities surveyed by Hegg and Maihold,
one-half received some type of governmental assistance in getting started,
mainly in facilitating communication and travel. Another 10 percent received
help from religious agencies. For the most part, once the application for a sis-
ter city partnership was approved by the Nicaraguan Directorate of Municipal
and Regional Affairs, the local committees were on their own. There were
many problems at the local level at the outset, according to Hegg and Maihold.
Difficulties included the planning and management of projects, due in part to
a lack of local expertise, maintaining communication between sister cities, and
establishing a structure for participation and decision-making within sister city
committees (Comités de Hermanamientos).70 Overall, the spirit of Sandinismo

appeared to prevail in this movement, encouraged by the participatory charac-
ter of sister city projects and their productive results.
Danger Zones
International brigadistas, Witness for Peace volunteers, and cooperantes working
in remote areas of Nicaragua all faced the possibility of contra attacks. The con-
tras killed two internationalists in the spring of 1983, Pierre Grosjean, a French
doctor, and Albrecht Pflaum, a West German doctor, both of which elicited citi-
zen protests in their home countries. The first German brigadistas who arrived in
December 1983 came with the intention of both assisting the coffee harvest and
forestalling “an American intervention” by having “as many Europeans as possible
in Nicaragua,” according to coordinator Michael Rüder. “We offered something
like protection.” Rüder and a thirteen-member staff coordinated their operations
from a networking center in the Ruhr Valley industrial city of Wuppertal. Over
the next three years, more than a thousand West German brigadistas came to
Nicaragua, aiding harvests and helping to build houses, schools, and hospitals.
During that time, the contras killed two West Germans, raped two, and kid-
napped and released ten.71 It was much worse for Nicaraguan campesinos. The
Ministry for Agrarian Development and Reform reported that during the cof-
fee harvest in the winter of 1984–85, the contras killed 131 Nicaraguan civilians
engaged in picking, processing, or transporting coffee beans.72
The FSLN government was very concerned about the safety of international-
ists in Nicaragua. According to René Nuñez, who dealt with them in his capacity
as minister to the President’s Office, the various delegations that “arrived with the
idea of being a shield to protect the Nicaraguan people by their presence” would
still have a measure of government protection: “What we would do is have our
military intelligence scout areas where they wanted to go beforehand and if battles
were not being fought there at that moment, we would say, go ahead; but if the
area was a heavy conflict zone, then we would ask them not to go to that area.
. . . When they would travel to a more dangerous zone, the Army would know that
and would actually open a periphery zone around them, enabling the Army to
confront anything that would happen before it got to them.”
With regard to Witness for Peace volunteers, Nuñez noted that it was not in
the interest of the contras to harm Americans, given that their sponsor was the
U.S. government. As such, the presence of WFP volunteers in communities did
appear to deter contra attacks. “It is obvious,” said Nuñez, “that the presence
[ 170 ] CHAPTER 6
of the North Americans in more heavily fought over zones limited the actions
that the contras would take in those areas.”73 Aynn Setright, a WFP staffer in
Managua, voiced a similar view. Although WFP volunteers offered no actual
protection, she said, “Nicaraguans felt safer if there was a U.S. presence in their
communities because they thought the contras knew who was buttering their
bread and they wouldn’t attack a community if there were U.S. citizens there.”74
Contra violence grew worse in 1986. Contra bands mined rural roads, result-
ing in the indiscriminate killing and maiming of civilians. On February 16, 1986,
a pickup truck driven by the Swiss agronomist Maurice Demierre hit a land
mine. Following the explosion, contras waiting in ambush killed Demierre and
two women and two children. On July 28, the contras ambushed two civilian
vehicles in the northern province of Jinotega, killing five people. Three of the
five were internationalists—from West Germany, Switzerland, and France. The
following day, nearly two thousand people rallied outside the U.S. Embassy in
Managua in protest.
The murders prompted the Swiss and West German governments to
demand that the Nicaraguan government take stronger measures to protect
foreign citizens or else they would call their citizens home. The FSLN gov-
ernment acceded to these requests and required 430 foreign brigadistas and
other internationalists working in war zones to relocate to well-protected areas.
“We want to show you don’t have to die to be in solidarity with Nicaragua,”
explained CNSP spokesperson Salomón Alarcón. Many internationalists were
saddened by the order, as they hoped to finish the schools, health clinics, and
other projects they had started. Exempted from the FSLN order were religious
groups not directly involved in government projects, such as WFP. The contra
leadership, for its part, appeared to be encouraged by its successful intimidation
of foreign governments. In a radio broadcast from Honduras on September 5,
1986, it demanded that foreign governments “warn their citizens of the perils of
traveling in areas of its operations.” These operations were said to cover eleven
regions, or nearly all of Nicaragua.75
One of the internationalists who continued to work in a war zone was
Ben Linder, the only American killed by the contras. His burial took place in
Matagalpa on April 30, 1987. Daniel Ortega spoke at the funeral along with John
and Miriam Linder, Ben‘s brother and sister, respectively. A funeral procession
of 10,000 people proceeded through the streets of the city to a hillside cem-
etery. One of the pall-bearers was Andrew Young, Atlanta mayor and former
U.S. Ambassador to the UN. Upon his return, Young and Mayor Mike Mears
of Decatur, Georgia, joined 150 people at another memorial service held for
Ben Linder in Decatur. Young told those gathered, “The war of the contras is
not a war against the Sandinista government. It’s a war against the Nicaraguan
people—against teachers, doctors, and people trying to grow food. . . . The
United States of America cannot consider itself a bastion of freedom and human
dignity if it continues to support the likes of the contras.”76 U.S. citizens living
in Nicaragua honored Linder by naming their new meetinghouse in Managua
after him—Casa Ben Linder.
Contra violence did not stop internationalists from working in Nicaragua.
According to the Envío team, writing in February 1988:
The number of international brigadistas visiting Nicaragua doubled
in 1987, totaling more than 8,000 from Western Europe, Canada,
Australia, Latin America, the United States and other parts of
the world. Since 1983, according to the Nicaraguan Committee in
Solidarity with the People (CNSP), more than 20,000 brigadistas
have given their services to Nicaragua, and many international-
ists involved in solidarity, religious or NGO [nongovernmental
organization]-sponsored social service and development projects
have taken up residence here for longer periods. Some have given
their lives, as well. Since 1983, the contras have killed 14 internation-
alists, raped 4, and kidnapped 59. But they have not managed to put
a stop to this very personal way of showing international support
for Nicaragua.77
The Western European Connection
There was a broad consensus in Western Europe against the Contra War. Western
European leaders expressed their disagreement with Washington by supporting
the Contadora peace negotiations, endorsing adjudication by the World Court,
opposing the U.S. embargo, and offering material assistance to the Nicaraguan
government. Public opinion in Western European countries lent support to
these actions, and thousands of citizens became involved in Nicaragua solidarity
activities.
Many Western Europeans were already up in arms over a NATO decision in
1979 to deploy U.S. Pershing II and Cruise missiles on Western European soil.
Massive demonstrations took place in cities across Western Europe between 1981
[ 172 ] CHAPTER 6
and 1983. Some demonstrators connected the issues of nuclear weapons and
U.S. Central America policy. “Recent demonstrations against the nuclear mis-
siles have included signs and slogans critical of U.S. policy in Central America,”
reported the Washington Post (August 10, 1983). “European governments have
begun to fear that the scheduled maneuvers [of U.S. troops in Honduras] will
give added impetus to the general anti-American tone of the protests.”78 The
central issue, however, was not whether Western Europeans were “anti-Amer-
ican,” but whether they could trust the United States under Reagan to act as a
responsible ally and world power. European security, after all, was intricately
connected to U.S. foreign policy. Flora Lewis, foreign affairs columnist for the
New York Times, wrote from Copenhagen on April 19, 1984, that “the peace
movement has burgeoned here in the last two years,” stimulated most recently
by U.S. “moves around Nicaragua,” which were giving President Reagan an
“image of recklessness.”79
When President Reagan visited Ireland on June 3, 1984, he was met with
a protest march of some three to five thousand people and given a lecture on
diplomacy by Prime Minister Garret FitzGerald. According to the New York
Times, the prime minister “implicitly rebuked the United States for its policy
in Central America” and endorsed the Contadora negotiations. “With many of
these Latin American countries,” said FitzGerald, “our people have close emo-
tional ties through the work of our priests and nuns and lay helpers there, who
seek to relieve the poverty of the people and to give them back their dignity.”
Reagan ignored the criticism and focused instead on terrorism in Ireland, say-
ing, “I can’t think of anything more vulgar than Americans providing anyone in
Ireland the means of killing his fellow man.”80
In early 1985, Spain’s foreign minister, Fernando Moran, warned the United
States that an invasion of Nicaragua would force Spain to withdraw from
NATO.81 This diplomatic warning was followed a few months later by massive
demonstrations against both NATO bases in Spain and U.S. policies toward
Nicaragua. The catalyst for the demonstrations was a visit to Spain by President
Reagan on May 6, 1985. An estimated 1 million Spaniards marched in “largely
peaceful protests across Spain,” according to the San Francisco Chronicle. “A
Nicaraguan flag was tied to a tall pedestal topped by a statue of Christopher
Columbus in Madrid’s central Colon Plaza, drawing wild cheers from what the
police estimated were 75,000 protesters. . . . Speakers repeatedly condemned
Reagan’s trade embargo against Nicaragua.” In Barcelona, Spain’s second largest
city, police estimated the number of demonstrators at 225,000. Spanish Prime
Minister Felipe Gonzalez subtly indicated his opposition to the U.S. policy
toward Nicaragua by welcoming Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega to Spain
the following weekend.82
In the Netherlands two religious peace groups, the Interchurch Peace Council
and Pax Christi, initiated a “twinning” movement between Western and Eastern
European independent groups, a project described as “détente from below.” This
was soon followed by a municipal twinning project between Western European
and Nicaraguan cities and towns. “A special movement grew in the mid-eighties
expressing solidarity with the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua,” wrote peace
activist Dion van den Berg. “The campaign was quite successful and in only a few
years time more than twenty of such friendship links with Nicaragua were estab-
lished.” In May 1988 Amsterdam was the site of the First European Conference
on City Linking with Nicaragua, attended by 350 people from over fifteen
countries.83
Another avenue of activism involved organizing Nicaragua solidarity groups
in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and elsewhere.
The Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign in London, for example, which had seven
paid staff persons in 1989, organized coffee harvest brigades to Nicaragua, raised
funds for medical supplies, sold Sandino and Sandinista paraphernalia—shirts,
baseball caps, and mugs—to raise more funds, and published a quarterly maga-
zine, Nicaragua Today.84 Such grassroots activism was complemented by the dip-
lomatic efforts of former German chancellor Willy Brandt, leader of the Social
Democratic Party and president of the Socialist International, who urged
Western European parties and governments to aid Sandinista Nicaragua as well
as encourage its move toward democracy.85
On the eastern side of the iron curtain, dissident groups involved in the
“détente from below” movement joined Western activists in calling for an end
to U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. The circuitous process that led to this con-
cord of voices began with Eastern European activists demanding freedom and
political rights for themselves. Unlike Sandinista Nicaragua, Eastern European
governments repressed independent connections with Western groups, even
those promoting détente and disarmament. Hounded by their own govern-
ments, Eastern European activists insisted that Western groups make human
rights part of their common agenda. “Amid earnest discussions,” wrote the his-
torian Lawrence Wittner, “Western activists came to agree with their Eastern
allies that there could be no peace without a loosening of the political restric-
tions on freedom.”86 Western groups such as European Nuclear Disarmament
[ 174 ] CHAPTER 6
issued statements calling on Eastern European governments to permit indepen-

dent organizing and release political prisoners. A number of Eastern activists
and groups, in turn, joined Western activists in opposing U.S. interventionism
in Central America.
In early 1986, prominent activists from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Ger-
many, Poland, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union signed a petition circulated by
the Campaign for Peace & Democracy/East & West demanding an immediate
end to “the Reagan administration’s escalating war on Nicaragua.” The petition
linked U.S. intervention in Central America to Soviet hegemony in Eastern
Europe, and asserted that both undermined peace and human rights. “We defend
the democratic right of every nation to self-determination in complete freedom
from superpower control,” it stated, “whether that domination is justified by the
Brezhnev doctrine in Eastern Europe and Afghanistan, or by Reagan’s claims of
U.S. special interests in Central America and the Caribbean.”87 Charter 77 in
Czechoslovakia similarly promoted a principled human rights policy, issuing
statements against U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, apartheid in South Africa, and
repression in Poland.
Western European Public Opinion

The Reagan administration was well aware that its Central America poli-
cies were not supported in Western Europe, as the United States Information
Agency (USIA) regularly polled Western European publics. A USIA survey in
June-July 1984 asked the citizens of four countries whether they approved or
disapproved of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua. The results in all cases showed
high rates of disapproval: 44 percent (disapproval) to 14 percent (approval) in
Britain; 40 to 9 percent in the Netherlands, 50 to 22 percent in Italy; and 44
to 6 percent in Spain. The survey also found that that those who were better
educated and more informed about Central America issues were more likely to
oppose U.S. policies. “The informed public in each country is even more critical
of U.S. policies than the general public,” noted the report.88
The latter finding was reinforced in another set of USIA surveys taken in
Great Britain, West Germany, and Italy between December 1982 and June 1984,
except that the question was whether the United States was morally superior to
the Soviet Union. A plurality in each country judged this to be so, but “the more
influential [citizens] in the countries surveyed tend to be least convinced of U.S.
moral superiority over the USSR.” This finding had profound implications for
USIA informational programs, according to the USIA analyst Leo P. Crespi:
“Such a pattern of findings suggests that the absence of judgments of higher U.S.
than Soviet moral standing is not a simple matter of ignorance of the facts that
support such a judgment. . . . This means that views of U.S. political morality
as compared to the USSR are not likely to be improved merely by information
programs. More intensive efforts will be required in the direction of argumen-
tation and persuasion.”89 Notably, Crespi did not suggest altering U.S. policies,
but only devising better arguments to persuade Western Europeans of America’s
moral superiority.
America’s image as a responsible world power did not improve in 1985. A
USIA summary report dated May 10, 1985, found that, except for West Germany
“where opinion is divided, more see the U.S. as a threat to peace and stability
in Central America than as a positive influence for change.” Once again, in all
countries surveyed—Great Britain, West Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland,
and Denmark—those who were more knowledgeable about the issues held this
view by larger proportions.90 USIA analysts also assessed the content of 148
West European editorials and 143 Latin American editorials written between
February 14 and May 9, 1985, and found: “More than twice as many editori-
als and by-line commentaries during the examined period were critical of U.S.
policy than the Nicaraguan government and its policies.”91
Historical Perspective
The divide between the Reagan administration and Western Europe over U.S.
intervention in Central America had deeper historical roots beyond the issues
of the 1980s. The experience of two devastating wars on European soil within
thirty years left many Europeans with a stronger aversion to war and a greater
willingness to explore peaceful alternatives than the United States. Western
European leaders led the way to détente, beginning in the mid-1950s, and many
citizens saw no reason to end it in the 1980s. In the aftermath of World War II,
Western European leaders took steps to gradually dilute national animosities
through the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC), which
greatly reduced the likelihood of another fratricidal war in Europe. Western
European nations also gave up their colonial empires in the thirty-year period
following World War II, albeit not without a fight in the case of France. This
major historical change arguably underpinned a more critical view of Great
Power hegemony, whether practiced by the United States or the Soviet Union,
and greater respect for international institutions and law.
In the United States, meanwhile, many citizens became enamored with the
[ 176 ] CHAPTER 6
idea that the world had entered upon the “American century,” a new era in which
U.S. ideals and global influence would reign supreme and peace would be secured
by U.S. military supremacy. As European nations gave up their empires, the
United States expanded its global reach, inheriting its role in Greece from Great
Britain and its role in Vietnam from France. In the early 1960s French President
Charles de Gaulle, having renounced imperialism, offered to broker an agreement
with Ho Chi Minh for a neutral, united Vietnam, but Presidents Kennedy and
Johnson would have none of it.92 Nor would President Reagan listen to Western
European leaders on resolving Central America issues in the 1980s.
While wary of the powerful Soviet Union, few Western Europeans con-
sidered the Truman Doctrine’s Manichean division of the world into free
and totalitarian societies a plausible blueprint for policymaking. Even British
ambassador Sir Oliver Wright, speaking in Washington in April 1985, noted that
Europeans had “adopted over the years a distinctively less apocalyptic way of
thinking and talking about the threat to their neighborhood than the Reagan
administration conveys when it speaks of the comparatively minuscule Soviet
presence in Cuba and Nicaragua.”93 The Reagan administration’s difficulty in
selling its foreign policies in Western Europe was not caused by communist
conspirators or Sandinista operatives, but by the reasonable concerns among
Western Europeans for international stability and their own security, if not a
more just and peaceful world order as well.
CHAPTER 7
Meeting the Political Challenge, 1985–86
I n early 1985 the Reagan administration launched an all-out media

and lobbying offensive aimed at winning Congressional approval
of $14 million in “humanitarian assistance” to the contras. Strengthened by
his landslide reelection, President Reagan ratcheted up the verbal war. He
accused the Sandinistas of attempting “to spread communism to El Salvador,
Costa Rica, Honduras, and elsewhere,” and lauded the contras as “our broth-
ers.”1 The administration ruled out for the time being the “direct application of
U.S. military force” against Nicaragua but maintained that this “must realisti-
cally be recognized as an eventual option, given our stakes in the region, if other
policy alternatives fail.”2 Secretary of State George Shultz furthermore warned
that failure to support the contras would constitute “a shameful surrender—a
betrayal not only of brave men and women but of our highest ideas and the
national security of the United States.”3
Liberal Democrats in Congress countered with a $14 million aid package that
allocated $10 million for the Contadora peace negotiations and $4 million for
international border guards so as to prevent any arms transfers. Speaker of the
House Tip O’Neill accused the White House of abandoning its original goal of
halting arms transfers and seeking instead the overthrow of the Nicaraguan
government.4
The issue of contra atrocities continued to reverberate on Capitol Hill in the
wake of the discovery of a CIA “assassination manual” in October 1984. In late
[ 177 ]
[ 178 ] CHAPTER 7
December contra commander Bosco Matamoros acknowledged “several hun-

dred cases” of rebel abuses against civilians over the previous two years.5 In early
March 1985 Reed Brody, former assistant attorney general of New York, released a
report documenting twenty-eight cases of contra attacks on Nicaraguan civilians
between September 1984 and January 1985, based on the sworn affidavits of 145
witnesses. The New York Times sent reporters to Nicaraguan war zones to inter-
view four of Brody’s witnesses, selected randomly. All confirmed their testimony.6
Other detailed reports of contra atrocities were produced by Witness for Peace
and Americas Watch. A report by Americas Watch on March 5, 1985, noted a sig-
nificant increase in contra attacks on civilians and a “sharp decline in violations
of the laws of war by the Nicaraguan government following 1982.”7 Rep. Samuel
Gejdenson (D-CT), chair of the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs, commented the following day, “It’s clear we have a situation where the
contra targets are primarily and almost exclusively civilians.” He furthermore
warned, “Should Congress approve the administration’s request for contra aid, we
would become knowing accomplices to the crimes of the contras.”8
Gejdenson’s subcommittee held a three-day hearing on the issue in mid-
April. Among those testifying was Nancy Donovan, a Maryknoll sister who had
been kidnapped by the contras on January 8, 1985, and held at gunpoint for a
day. Donovan offered detailed evidence of recent contra attacks, describing the
sequence of events and names of those killed, wounded, or kidnapped. Former
CIA director Adm. Stansfield Turner also testified, reluctantly acknowledging
contra terrorism:
Rightly or wrongly, there are many of us today who see the actions
of the contras as being beneath the ethical standards we would like
the United States to employ. And specifically, I believe it is irrefut-
able that a number of the contras’ actions have to be characterized
as terrorism, as State-supported terrorism. Until we put this issue
of the contras behind us, I believe we are going to have a deeper
controversy in our body politic than is healthy. And I believe that
the CIA already has been badly hurt by its involvement with the
contras, and will be hurt more if we continue.9
Mobilizing against the Contra War, 1985
Anti–Contra War campaign groups pressed the issue of contra terrorism with
Meeting the Political Challenge, 1985–86 [ 179 ]
their own educational and media activities. On February 12, SANE held a press
conference on Capitol Hill to kick off a media advertisement campaign focused
on the “human rights atrocities committed by the contras in Nicaragua.”
Newspaper ads and thirty-second television and radio spots were placed in
media outlets located in the congressional districts of “swing” members of
Congress. Two local television companies initially rejected the ads as too con-
troversial, but one later approved them after receiving documentation regard-
ing the murder of civilians by the contras. The newspaper ads posed a ques-
tion to members of Congress, “If you vote for more support to the U.S.-backed
contra ‘freedom-fighters,’ will it be a vote for heroism or terrorism?”10 The ads
directly responded to President Reagan’s radio address on February 16, in which
he described the contras as the “true heroes of the Nicaraguan struggle.”
Operating separately from SANE, Nicaragua Network and the Institute for
Food and Development Policy initiated an advertisement campaign in early 1985
with a similar focus on the human costs of the Contra War. Nicaragua Network
also joined with Witness for Peace, MADRE, and other groups in developing
and distributing a poster that graphically depicted the effects of the war in the
form of deceased children in open coffins.11
The Central America Working Group’s lobbying plan in 1985 targeted fifty-five
“swing” members of Congress—twenty Republicans and thirty-five Democrats.
Participating national organizations each chose one or more members with whom
to meet and report back to the committee. A CAWG subcommittee was formed to
generate grassroots pressure in designated congressional districts. The subcommit-
tee sent out information packets that included legislative updates, information
about members of Congress, and a sample phone script highlighting contra human
rights abuses. Local contacts were encouraged to flood members of Congress with
letters and phone calls, and to undertake visible actions such as press conferences,
paid advertisements, and public hearings in which people with direct experience in
Nicaragua presented testimony.12 In mid-April, CAWG’s parent group, the
Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, brought television actors Mike
Farrell (of the M.A.S.H. series) and Robert Foxworth (of the Falcon Crest series) to
lobby members of Congress, which gained some press attention. The two actors
were part of the Committee of Concern for Central America, based in Hollywood,
California, and brought with them a letter signed by fifty other Hollywood
celebrities.13
Unions associated with the National Labor Committee (NLC) weighed in
on the contra aid issue in 1985. The Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers
[ 180 ] CHAPTER 7
Union endorsed a resolution calling on the U.S. government “to end all mili-
tary support for the contras.” The American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees approved a more nuanced resolution: “Whatever dis-
agreements American unionists have about the nature of the Sandinista revo-
lution, we do agree on one central point: the U.S. support of the counterrevo-
lutionary forces known as the contras is illegal, immoral, and contrary to the
best interests of the American and Nicaraguan people.” The NLC was critical
of the FSLN government for harassing opposition labor unions but nonetheless
insisted, according to the historian Andrew Battista, “that in Nicaragua there was
no repression of unions or murder and torture of union leaders, as there was in
El Salvador.” The leftist Labor Network on Central America, based in Oakland,
California, in contrast, was very supportive of the Sandinista government. A fol-
low-up report on a West Coast delegation to Nicaragua in September 1984 noted
the “unprecedented gains” made by workers since the Sandinistas took over.14
The issue of contra aid was hotly debated at the AFL-CIO convention in
October 1985. While the AFL-CIO leadership was generally in accord with the
Cold War views of the Reagan administration, the repression of unions in El
Salvador prompted a closer review of Central America policies. In regard to
Nicaragua, the lack of support among Nicaraguan labor unions for the contras
led the AFL-CIO to take no official stand on the issue of contra aid in 1985. This
allowed NLC-related unions to take the lead on this issue, albeit not without
criticism from the right.15
A small but important constituency that took up the anti–Contra War cause
in the mid-1980s was antiwar veterans. When Vietnam veteran Jerry Genesio
and his wife, Judy, traveled to Nicaragua on a short-term Witness for Peace del-
egation in April 1984, they had no plans to initiate a new organization. Upon
return, the couple put together a slideshow and made presentations in towns
across their home state of Maine. According to Jerry’s account, his background
as a Marine Corps officer and the couple’s middle-class image helped gain them
respectful attention from audiences. Jerry spoke about his brother’s death in
Vietnam in 1969 and his own struggle to make sense of that war. He perceived
among his listeners a “widespread misconception” that a person cannot be both
a military veteran and a peace activist. In talking about Sandinista Nicaragua,
the Genesios shared their personal experiences and the testimonies of families
who had lost loved ones in contra attacks.
The Genesios’ travels brought them into contact with antiwar veterans
across Maine and, through correspondence, with veterans across the country,
including members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War. A series of organi-
zational meetings were held between April and June 1985, and in July, Veterans
for Peace (VFP) was formally established. “We had come together because
of our disdain for Reagan Administration policies in Central America,” wrote
Jerry.16 Veterans for Peace held its first national convention in Portland, Maine,
in August 1986. The participation of veterans in the ACWC generally improved
the campaign’s public image and also led to a number of new projects.
April 1985 Demonstrations

With Congress scheduled to vote on contra aid on Tuesday, April 23, an ad hoc
coalition of national organizations initiated demonstrations in Washington and
San Francisco on the Saturday before. Hoping to bring together different activ-
ist networks and draw larger crowds, they set forth four broad demands: disar-
mament, an end to U.S. interventionism, an end to apartheid in South Africa,
and reductions in military spending.17 While this multi-issue agenda served its
stated purposes, it also had the effect of diluting the focus on contra aid at a
critical political juncture.
The demonstration in Washington on April 20 drew an estimated 26,000
people, according to the U.S. Park Police, or as many as 100,000, according to
rally organizers. The Washington Post reported that the rally was “peaceful and
orderly” with a diversity of people attending. Protesters marched down the
streets carrying coffins and chanting slogans such as “Stop the bombing, stop
the war, U.S. out of El Salvador.” Rev. Jesse Jackson, a keynote speaker, chastised
the Reagan administration for trying to bring down a government in Nicaragua
that was helping its people, while supporting a government in South Africa that
was oppressing its people. Besides marches and speeches, the rally featured cul-
tural art displays, skits, poetry, and music. The San Francisco demonstration
drew some 50,000 people, according to police estimates. Union banners were
prominently displayed at the latter rally, reflecting efforts by West Coast activ-
ists to involve local unions in Central America issues and build leftist labor-
solidarity alliances. Smaller rallies were also held in Los Angeles and Seattle.18
The issue that garnered the most national press attention was opposition
to South African apartheid. The anti-apartheid movement had exploded onto
the political scene in recent months, with hundreds of student and commu-
nity groups pressing for sanctions against the South African government, and
for boycotts of, and divestment in, companies doing business in South Africa.
(The movement achieved a significant political victory with the passage of the
[ 182 ] CHAPTER 7
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act, enacted in October 1986 over President

Reagan’s veto.) Next on the media’s radar were Central America and disar-
mament issues, the messages of the demonstrators being sparingly presented
through a few choice quotes. The main theme was the diversity of the crowd
and its sponsors. The New York Times noted that the demonstration was “orga-
nized by a coalition of more than 80 groups that included activists from labor
unions, civil rights organizations and churches.”19
The Saturday rally in Washington was followed by “lobby days” on Monday
and Tuesday, and a civil disobedience action on Tuesday as well. The latter
focused solely on the contra aid issue and involved more than three hundred
protesters, who blocked entrances to the White House. The Washington Post
reported the details of the action, noting that it took police officers hours to
carry the limp protesters into police vans, but said little about the reasons for the
civil disobedience. Rev. William Sloane Coffin, who was arrested, was quoted as
saying, “Our president has an obsession about intervening.”20
Congress Votes for “Humanitarian Assistance” for the Contras

The ACWC won a temporary victory in Congress when the House voted on
April 23 to reject the administration’s request for $14 million in contra aid by a
vote of 248–180 (the Senate voted 53–46 that day to approve the measure). The
following day the House narrowly defeated, 215–213, a compromise proposal to
provide $14 million in “humanitarian assistance” to the contras. The closeness
of the latter vote indicated trouble ahead for the ACWC. Less than two months
later, on June 12, the House reversed itself and approved $27 million in “human-
itarian assistance” for the contras by the substantial margin of 248–184. Seven
Republicans and twenty-six Democrats switched their vote between April 23
and June 12, with seventeen of the latter being from the South.21
The switch was attributed in part to a recent visit by Nicaraguan President
Daniel Ortega to the Soviet Union, the actual purpose of which was to obtain
subsidized oil from the Soviet Union in the wake of the new U.S. trade embargo
against Nicaragua, declared on May 1. Also, President Reagan had sent a letter
to Rep. Dave McCurdy (D-OK), who led the Democratic switch, promising
not to seek the overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, to resume bilateral
negotiations with the Sandinistas, and to remove human rights violators among
the contras.22
The day after the House vote, members of the Committee of U.S. Citizens in
Nicaragua (CUSCLIN) issued a statement from Managua that condemned the
so-called humanitarian aid as a legal fiction. The statement pointed out that
the Geneva Conventions and Protocols had established three conditions for
humanitarian aid: it must be distributed by parties independent of the conflict;
it must be distributed on the basis of need and only to noncombatants; and it
must be impartially offered to all affected civilians on both sides of the con-
flict. The contra aid package approved by Congress met none of these condi-
tions. The CUSCLIN statement described a recent contra attack near San Jose
de Bocay that had left twelve civilians dead and ended with the admonition,
“Humanitarian aid should not be used to kill.”23
The compromise “humanitarian aid” package of 1985 changed the shape
of the contra aid debate by opening up a new middle ground between oppos-
ing sides. Contra War opponents now faced the prospect of having to choose
between military aid and “nonlethal” aid if votes for ending contra aid fell short.
This political dilemma remained in the background during 1986, as the admin-
istration sought and won full military aid for the contras, but it returned in later
years when Congress voted on a series of “nonlethal” aid measures.
The Pledge of Resistance, 1985

Unlike multi-issue demonstrations, the Pledge campaign responded directly
to the Nicaraguan situation. By early 1985, some 55,000 people had signed the
pledge, providing a sizable base upon which to draw for demonstrations. The
national POR office was prepared at this time to send a signal to local groups
to initiate mass demonstrations should Congress approve contra aid, but the
rejection of Reagan’s proposal in the House on April 23 made this unneces-
sary. A new impetus for action turned up a week later, when President Reagan
imposed an economic embargo against Nicaragua. Many local groups regarded
this as sufficient cause for protest, and without a signal from the national POR
office, initiated demonstrations and civil disobedience actions.
An estimated 10,000 people participated in these actions nationwide, with
most taking place at federal office buildings on May 7 and 8. Approximately
2,000 people were arrested, including 559 in Boston, 443 in San Francisco, and
183 in New York City.24 Legal penalties were generally light or nonexistent.
Authorities in Boston dropped all charges against the 559 trespassers at the John
F. Kennedy Federal Building. In Denver, where 22 POR activists were arrested
for occupying a U.S. senator’s office, the activists pleaded “not guilty” and took
their case to court. At the trial the judge allowed the jury to hear “evidence of
necessity,” by which the defendants claimed that their civil disobedience actions
[ 184 ] CHAPTER 7
constituted an “emergency measure to avoid imminent public or private injury.”

The jury acquitted all of the defendants.25
In Seattle, where Pledge organizers had gathered 1,200 pledge signatures,
fourteen people occupied the lobby of the Federal Building overnight and were
not arrested. The demonstrators left peacefully in the morning, only to return in
the evening for the next eleven nights. A spokesperson for the U.S. General
Services Administration’s Federal Protective Service, Ross Buffington, said,
“We will not bother them as long as they are peaceful and are not disturbing
anyone else.” Local Pledge coordinator Ken Finch used the unusual civil dis-
obedience action as an opportunity for public relations. “We’ve decided to main-
tain at least a minimal presence here and do outreach work,” he said.26
When the House approved the $27 million “nonlethal” contra aid package
on June 12, 1985, the national POR office did not hesitate to give the signal for
action. Protests took place across the nation once again, with some 1,200 per-
sons arrested in civil disobedience actions.27 In Philadelphia, 103 protesters
occupied the local Federal Building. Organized into nine affinity groups, four of
the groups occupied Sen. John Heinz’s office on the ninth floor. Some 400 to
500 people remained outside the building, engaged in celebrative singing,
prayer, leafleting, and chants of “Where’s Senator Heinz?”28 Such spirited pro-
tests notwithstanding, the passage of the “nonlethal” contra aid package was a
significant setback for the ACWC. According to San Francisco Bay area coordi-
nator Ken Butigan, “Virtually everyone felt leaden with the crushing defeat and
the sense of the enormity of the opposition.”29 Sill, the Pledge actions provided
an outlet for frustration, an occasion for camaraderie, and an opportunity for
educating the public. The Pledge network continued to grow, reaching 70,000
people by September 1985, and 100,000 by 1987.30
On November 18, 1985, the national POR board met in Washington to analyze
the state of the campaign and set future directions. Attending were representa-
tives of eight national organizations, the national POR staff, and nine regional
coordinators. Angela Berryman of the American Friends Service Committee
chaired the meeting. Participants brainstormed the campaign’s strengths and
weaknesses. Strengths included building a sizable organization, bringing in new
people, and involving the grassroots. Weakness included a “gap” in communica-
tion between local groups and the national office, difficulties in sustaining com-
mitments from “new people,” and being “almost an all white organization.” On
the sensitive issue of religious identification, participants opted for a statement
that identified POR signers as “people of conscience, including people of faith,
who make a formal commitment to nonviolent direct action.” This presumably

would provide enough room for faith-based groups to retain their identity within
POR.31
Having broadened the Pledge to include contra aid legislation and the eco-
nomic embargo, POR organizers now examined the tactical limitations of the
Pledge. For local groups in politically conservative areas, educational events as
opposed to dramatic protests might well be more persuasive; and for groups in
districts where members of Congress already opposed contra aid, there was no
reason to demonstrate against these officials. POR leaders thus advised that
local groups should engage in activities most suitable to their situation. These
activities “could include delegation visits to congressional offices, press confer-
ences, vigils, demonstrations, and other legal activities.” Organizers also decided
not to wait for congressional votes on contra aid, but to set two definitive dates
for action, May 17, 1986, and a day to be announced in early October.
With these changes, the POR campaign remade itself into a flexible network
adaptable to local conditions. At the same time, the distinction between POR
and other national groups began to blur, as many national groups were prod-
ding local groups to undertake multiple activities. Nor did the four educational
themes adopted at the conference differentiate POR. These themes—the ille-
gality of the Contra War, contra atrocities, diplomatic alternatives, and the cost
of the war to U.S. citizens—were all commonly promoted.32 The Pledge cam-
paign was nonetheless one of a handful of national organizations devoted
almost entirely to Nicaragua, the others being Nicaragua Network, Witness for
Peace, CUSCLIN, and the Wisconsin Coordinating Council on Nicaragua. For
many local POR groups, the Pledge remained the direct-action arm of the anti–
Contra War campaign.
The Home Front, 1986
The lead-up to Congressional voting on contra aid in the spring of 1986 entailed
another all-out political and media battle, even more ferocious than the previous
year. A slew of pro-contra groups joined administration officials and agencies in
pushing a new $100 military aid package. Among the better-funded private
groups were the Heritage Foundation, the National Endowment for the
Preservation of Liberty (NEPL), the Council for Inter-American Security (CIS),
and Citizens for Reagan. In early 1986, NEPL spent $1.2 million for a series of six
[ 186 ] CHAPTER 7
television ads, and another $800,000 for a nationwide speaking tour of anti-San-
dinista Nicaraguans; and CIS spent $2.84 million on lobbying and media activi-
ties.33 Citizens for Reagan, formed in 1980, targeted fifty-two members of
Congress for an intensive lobbying and advertising campaign. In the district of
Republican Sherwood Boehlert in upstate New York, for example, the group
purchased advertisements on two Utica radio stations and sent letters to 10,000
Republicans. The letters declared that “Congressman Boehlert hasn’t yet found
reason to vote for aid to the freedom fighters” and implored constituents to “help
convince Congressman Boehlert to support the President.”34 Boehlert had voted
against both military and “nonlethal” aid in 1985. Despite the pressure from the
right, he voted against contra aid again in 1986.
In Florida Citizens for Reagan targeted Rep. Kenneth H. “Buddy” MacKay, a
Democrat. The group sponsored full-page ads in two local newspapers in Ocala
in early 1986, headlined “Whose Buddy Is He?” The ads accused MacKay of
letting down the “pro-American freedom fighters” who were fighting “the com-
munist Sandinista regime.” MacKay had voted against contra aid in 1983, 1984,
and April 1985, but he approved “nonlethal” aid in June 1985. Ironically, the ads
moved many local citizens to express their support for MacKay. MacKay’s press
secretary, Greg Farmer, said that before the ads were published, calls were run-
ning 70 to 30 percent in favor of contra aid, but afterwards, it was 60 to 40 per-
cent against contra aid. “People here don’t like it when outsiders come in and
take cheap shots at a third-generation Ocalan,” said Farmer.35
Two residents of Ocala, Tim Fogarty and Lynne Rigmey-Barolet, spouses
and ardent opponents of the Contra War, arranged a meeting with MacKay
at his local office in early 1986. Rigmey-Barolet had recently returned from a
short-term Witness for Peace delegation to Bocana de Paiwas, a war zone. Upon
entering MacKay’s office, she placed on his desk a collection of photos of peo-
ple killed by the contras. MacKay got very mad, according to Fogarty. “He took
it very personally. ‘You’re saying that I’m responsible for these people’s deaths?
But I’m not responsible.’ He sort of didn’t go where we wanted—how to stop
this,” said Fogarty. The couple subsequently contacted the pastor of the local
Presbyterian Church where MacKay was a deacon, hoping that the pastor and
the denomination’s stand against the Contra War would influence MacKay.36 In
early 1986 the Presbyterian Church USA sent letters to fifty-four Presbyterian
senators and representatives, encouraging them to vote against contra aid.
MacKay, as it turned out, did vote against contra aid in 1986.
Other religious denominations and organizations also made their views
known to members of Congress. The American Jewish Congress informed rep-

resentatives of its unequivocal resolution adopted on March 18, 1986: “We urge
the Administration and the Congress to bring an immediate end to our unde-
clared war against the Government of Nicaragua and to cease supplying money,
arms, munitions and political legitimacy to the contras.”37 Religious groups orga-
nized a demonstration on the steps of the Capitol on March 4, 1986. A statement
was read, which said in part: “We refuse to allow the deception to go on unchal-
lenged or to accept the senseless violence. Together we say, ‘In the name of God,
stop the lies, stop the killing.’ ” The statement had been signed by over one hun-
dred religious leaders, including five Catholic bishops, six United Methodist
bishops, six Episcopal bishops, and the president of the United Church of Christ.
A few days after this demonstration, Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-GA) told the
press that religious leaders who opposed President Reagan’s Central America
policies were naive and beholden to “a left-wing, pacifist and isolationist ideol-
ogy.”38 Rep. David Bonior, a devout Catholic, offered a counterpoint view. “The
Church in this country has been the single most important force working for
peace in Central America,” he said. It has provided “an alternative view of the
problems and possibilities in Central America.”39 It was precisely the credibility
of the liberal religious lobby that provoked the right to attack it. The Reagan
administration and its rightist allies were conducting a virulent rhetorical offen-
sive against the Central America movement and ACWC at this time (see chap-
ter 6). Not only did the administration want to shut out alternative views; it also
needed to deflect charges of state-sponsored terrorism. As President Reagan
told reporters at a question-and-answer press conference on June 13, 1986, con-
tra attacks against civilians were not to be believed because “much of this we
have found is a part of a disinformation campaign tending to discredit them.”40
Some members of Congress who supported contra aid similarly found it use-
ful to discredit the messenger. In response to a letter from Mark Becker, a Witness
for Peace volunteer who spent nine months in Nicaragua, Rep. Bob Whittaker
(R-KS) wrote on March 3, 1986, “Contrary to many reports of biased organiza-
tions, I have seen little meaningful progress by the Sandinista regime to accom-
modate dissent. . . . This convinces me that some well-intentioned visitors are see-
ing only what the Marxist government wants them to see.” Becker received a more
favorable response from Sen. Tom Daschle (D-SC), who wrote, “I will continue
to oppose the Administration’s ill-conceived military approach to the unrest in
Central America and support a diplomatic solution to the conflict there.”41
[ 188 ] CHAPTER 7
The Congressional Battle

The stakes were set high in 1986, as the proposed $100 million military and
economic aid package for the contras signified a dramatic increase in killing
power and expansion of the war. Every group involved in the ACWC activated
its members and supporters to write or visit their members of Congress. SANE,
with 11,000 members in “swing” congressional districts, set up phone banks and
letter-writing projects in at least fifteen congressional districts. Jack Sheinkman,
the moving force in National Labor Committee, sent out letters to union mem-
bers on February 7, urging them to tell their representatives in Congress to
“oppose any and all aid, military or humanitarian, to the Contras.”42 Veterans
for Peace members met with members of Congress, demonstrated in front of
the White House, and held a press conference in mid-April 1986 hosted by Rep.
Robert J. Mrazek (D-NY), a Vietnam veteran.
CAWG regrouped for the political battle in 1986 with another list of targeted
“swing” voters similar to that of the previous year. One of those targeted was Jim
Sasser (D-TN), who had opposed contra aid in 1984 and 1985 but was considered
susceptible to administration and conservative influence. In early 1986 a revived
Central America Peace Campaign focused its resources solely on Tennessee, tar-
geting Sasser and a few “swing” House members. Another group, Neighbor-to-
Neighbor, newly formed in 1985 by Fred Ross, a veteran farmworker organizer,
also sent people to Tennessee. Neighbor-to-Neighbor utilized house parties and a
28-minute documentary film, Faces of War, to reach new people. The film, nar-
rated by Mike Farrell, illustrated the devastating effects of U.S. policies in El
Salvador and Nicaragua, as seen through the eyes of six Americans working in the
region. Discussion and letter writing typically followed the film showing.
In sizing up the political battle in the mid-1980s, the political scientists Cynthia
Arnson and Philip Brenner judged that pro-contra groups held an advantage over
their adversaries due to the active support of the White House, “considerable
financial resources,” and the nationalistic appeal of Cold War ideology. Anti-
contra groups, on the other hand, were deemed to have more “personal energy,”
a stronger grassroots base, and the support of most mainline religious denomina-
tions. “Anti-contra Democrats,” wrote Arnson and Brenner, “relied on the consid-
erable activity of groups around the country—especially religious organiza-
tions—to convince potentially wavering members that opposition to aid would
not have electoral repercussions despite the president’s popularity.”43
As the Senate vote scheduled for March 27 approached, Senator Sasser was
inundated with letters and telephone calls. According to his legislative aide, in
one day alone—Monday, March 18—the senator received more than 1,300 calls,
of which about 48 percent were for contra aid and 52 percent were against it.44 In
the end, Sasser voted against the administration’s contra aid package, which nev-
ertheless passed in the Senate, 53–47. The battle then shifted to the House. On
March 20 the House had rejected Reagan’s $100 million contra aid proposal by a
vote of 222–210. Over the next two months, however, a “few dozen swing voters
were the subject of extraordinary presidential attention,” according to William
LeoGrande. “Reagan badgered them, threatened them, courted them, and
promised them favors.”45 He managed to convince eleven representatives to
switch their votes, enough for a victory. On June 25, in a stunning reversal, the
House voted to approve the president’s proposal by a vote of 221–209. The aid
package not only provided ample funds for a new contra military offensive, but
also removed all restrictions on CIA activities and allowed contras to be trained
in the United States.
The aid was scheduled for release on October 24, 1986. Opponents tried
once more to defeat the measure—Senator Sasser introduced an amendment to
delete the $100 million in aid for the contras—but this was rejected, 57–42, on
August 12. The ACWC, having won the legislative battle in 1984, was at its politi-
cal nadir. The vote in Congress was also a defeat for the campaign’s international
allies and for international law. Two days after the vote, the World Court found
the United States guilty of violating international law by training, arming, and
financing a guerrilla war against Nicaragua.
Unbeknownst to all parties at the time, the political momentum would shift
again in the fall, due in part to the Iran-Contra affair, which undermined the pres-
ident’s credibility, and to Democratic party gains in Congress in the November
elections. Democrats gained eight seats in the Senate, giving them the majority,
and also increased their majority in the House. According to William LeoGrande
and Philip Brenner, “The 1986 election reduced the pro-contra coalition by 11
votes [in the House], allowing opponents of contra aid to narrowly defeat
President Reagan’s requests for additional military assistance” in subsequent
years.46 As the majority party in Congress, the Democrats would have the power
to convene hearings on administration illegalities.
Educational Outreach
U.S. News & World Report (March 17, 1986), after taking an informal survey
of newspaper editorial positions, reported that the nation’s newspapers were
“sharply divided” on the issue of contra aid. Those favoring contra aid generally
[ 190 ] CHAPTER 7
accepted President Reagan’s view of Sandinista Nicaragua as a “Communist

stronghold,” according to the report, while those opposed highlighted the ille-
gitimacy of overthrowing another government and expressed preference for a
negotiated settlement.47 There were no surveys taken of news reporting, but
over the last few years a perceptible tilt toward criticism of Reagan’s Nicaragua
policy could be seen, in part because of President Reagan’s exaggerated claims.
One tart commentary was offered by Newsweek (March 31, 1986):
Reagan’s own State Department contradicted the president’s asser-
tion that Brazilian radicals are being trained in Nicaragua. The Drug
Enforcement Administration can’t substantiate his charge that the
Sandinistas have been involved in international narcotics trafficking.
And at least one prominent rabbi rebutted his charge that the “entire
Jewish community” had been “forced to flee Nicaragua.” Residents
of Harlingen, Texas, meanwhile were bemused to hear the president
say that Nicaraguan “terrorists and subversives” were “just two days”
driving from their town, which is more than 2,000 miles from
Managua.48
ACWC groups welcomed such commentaries that cast doubt upon the presi-
dent’s credibility, but they also found much to criticize in the mainstream media.
Major gripes included declining reports of contra atrocities in 1986, a consistent
failure to question U.S. hegemonic assumptions (e.g., that the U.S. had the right
to direct a war against Nicaragua), and superficial coverage of ACWC demon-
strations. Regarding the latter, POR coordinator Ken Butigan complained that
media coverage of Pledge demonstrations almost always focused on “the poten-
tial for social unrest” with “little or no treatment of the complex social issues
which draw people to risk arrest on principle.”49
ACWC groups varied in their sophistication in terms of working with the
media, but the campaign as a whole had its own set of limitations: there was no
common educational strategy for addressing the “complex social issues” sur-
rounding the Contra War; the campaign lacked a central spokesperson or group
that could present its case to the media and public; and a sizable number of
groups may have relied too heavily on demonstrations to convey their substan-
tive themes and arguments. The media was predictably enticed by the prominent
display of signs and banners at demonstrations, proffering slogans such as “Farm
Aid, Not Contra Aid,” “Stop the Lies, Stop the Killing,” “Peace through Peace,”
and “The People United Will Never Be Defeated.” This photogenic medium
sometimes became the message.50
The ACWC continued to promote its multiple educational themes and

arguments through various means. The bedrock principle for many Contra
War opponents remained the diplomacy-over-war theme. An open letter to
members of Congress, signed by forty-nine leaders of religious denominations,
peace and justice groups, labor unions, and civic groups on April 8, 1986, called
on Congress to promote “good faith negotiations” aimed at achieving a “politi-
cal settlement to the Central American conflict.”51 The theme of contra atroci-
ties was also high on the list, despite the mainstream media’s apparent decision
that this was no longer “news.” The Commission on U.S.–Central American
Relations, a Washington policy group formed in 1982, underwrote a speaking
tour around the country by former contra leader Edgar Chamorro. Chamorro’s
message regarding systematic contra attacks on civilians was reinforced by the
Witness for Peace network, which by mid-1986 had grown to seventy-eight
organizational contacts in thirty-two states.52
Regarding other themes, the effort to humanize Nicaragua took form in
advertisements on Boston public buses, which showed photographs of Nica-
raguan children under the headline “Nicaragua Is Not Our Enemy.” The ads were
sponsored by a local coalition called United for Peace With Nicaragua. Similar
ads were placed on twelve billboards in Atlanta in April 1986, sponsored by local
groups.53 SANE continued to play up the Vietnam analogy. One of its media
advertisements was specifically addressed to Rep. Steve Gunderson (R-WI)
with the headline “Please Don’t Send Our Dollars or Our Boys to a Nicaraguan
War.”54 The Institute for Policy Studies concentrated on administration illegali-
ties, both domestic and international, producing two succinct booklets for circu-
lation in 1985, In Contempt of Congress: The Reagan Record of Deceit and Illegality
on Central America and Outcast among Allies: The International Costs of Reagan’s
War against Nicaragua.
The contributions of independent academics, intellectuals, and writers added
depth to the campaign’s educational themes. At least ninety-two academic and
general audience books were published on the Contra War between 1983 and
1987, with the majority being critical of administration policies. This was all the
more so among scholarly studies.55 According to Stephen Webre, writing in Latin
American Research Review (1986), “Much of the recent literature on Central
America has appeared in the form of multi-author works. Most are critical of
Washington’s role in the region and most aspire to contribute to the policy
debate, although the majority probably end by preaching to the converted.”56
Critical scholarship did not merely preach to the converted, however; it
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provided a solid intellectual foundation for activist arguments and themes, and a
base of knowledge from which the media and public could draw in questioning
administration claims and rationales.
Protests and Patriotism, 1986
Approval of the $100 million contra aid package in the House on June 25, 1986,
sparked an outpouring of demonstrations in cities across the nation, most of
them small. In Minneapolis protesters occupied the Federal Building and the
local office of Rep. Bill Frenzel. Among the fifty-seven people arrested was Erica
Bouza, wife of Minneapolis police chief Tony Bouza. She declared that the pro-
testers only wanted “the American government to leave Nicaragua in peace.”
Activists were especially aggrieved by the fact that Frenzel, a Republican, had
switched his vote. Two months earlier, when he had voted against contra aid,
activists had been so delighted that they organized a march to support him.57 On
August 4, a week before the final vote in the Senate on the contra aid package, a
civil disobedience action was held in the rotunda of the Capitol in Washington,
DC, in which 112 people were arrested.
Veterans Fast for Life

The impending resurgence of the Contra War impelled two veterans, Charles
Liteky and George Mizo, to begin a fast, the Veterans Fast for Life, on September
1, 1986. They were joined on September 15 by two other veterans, Brian Willson
and Duncan Murphy. Liteky had served as an army chaplain in Vietnam and
received the Congressional Medal of Honor for rescuing his fellow soldiers
during an attack. Mizo, who had also served in Vietnam, described their cur-
rent mission as a “fast for life, to stop the killing in Nicaragua.” The four spent
much of their time on the steps of the Capitol, where they attracted an increas-
ing number of people. Murphy, a World War II veteran, remarked, “We tried
everything else to stop the atrocities funded with our tax money and nothing
else worked.”58
The Veterans Fast for Life was not officially endorsed by the Veterans for
Peace, but many VFP members nonetheless lent their support by holding vig-
ils in their local communities. Veterans in the Boston area set up a “tent city”
on the Boston Common and maintained a twenty-four-hour vigil for peace. A
rally there on September 29 drew a thousand people, among them, John Barr,
a retired Marine Corps colonel who had been in both the Korean and Vietnam
wars. Barr told the Boston Globe that he came “to show his disapproval for
‘the U.S. government supporting terrorism in Nicaragua.’ ”59 In Washington a
rally was held at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial on October 9. Liteky, who
had left his Medal of Honor at the memorial in an envelope marked “Ronald
Reagan” in late July, now returned to discard his Purple Heart. In all, veterans
at the demonstration renounced more than seventy war medals, ribbons, and
commendations.
The four vets finally ended their fast on October 17, after forty-six days for
Liteky and Mizo. All were extremely weak but still managed to stand and walk to
the microphones at a press conference that day. Mizo noted that the public
response to their fast was “incredible,” as they had received 7,000 to 10,000 pieces
of mail and thousands of phone calls. The four later appeared on Phil Donahue’s
television talk show. They vowed to continue their protest through other means.60
October 1986 Demonstrations

On the weekend of October 24–25, 1986, coinciding with the scheduled release
of contra aid approved by Congress, demonstrations were held in at least fifteen
cities, organized by a host of local and national groups, including the Pledge
campaign. An estimated 10,000 people marched in Los Angeles, 5,000 in New
York City, 4,000 in Washington, DC, 3,500 in Chicago, 2,000 in San Francisco,
and 2,000 in Boston.61 Most of these demonstrations embraced numerous
issues, which once again had the effect of diluting each issue, at least in eyes of
the media. Ben A. Franklin, a reporter for the New York Times, described the
demonstration in Washington as a “polyglot” protest against the Reagan admin-
istration and only briefly listed the various causes. Moreover, he noted that in
gathering information for the article he had called the demonstration head-
quarters and received the following recorded message: “Say no to U.S. interven-
tion in Central America and the Middle East. Say no to apartheid in South
Africa and racism at home. Say no to nuclear weapons, nuclear power at home
and militarism.”62 Clearly, media relations was not a top priority for the
Washington organizers.
Another issue related to communicating a clear message arose in Seattle,
where 103 people were arrested after sitting on crosswalks and blocking down-
town traffic in a demonstration on October 24 organized by the local POR
group. This disruptive civil disobedience tactic had been employed on occasion,
as in a Detroit demonstration in June 1985, when the local Pledge group closed
[ 194 ] CHAPTER 7
down Michigan Avenue for forty-five minutes, but it was not widely used in
the ACWC or Central America movement. Following the action in Seattle, a
local activist, Dan Raphael, wrote a letter to the local Pledge group in which he
argued that causing traffic delays only results in public animosity toward pro-
testors and diverts attention from the group’s message. Describing the action
as “a kind of nonviolent machismo,” he suggested that the group undertake as
an alternative “the mundane task of approaching the public in dozens of largely
unspectacular ways.” Seattle POR organizer Ken Finch was unconvinced, reply-
ing, “Though I think it was generally understood by the public that our message
was mainly intended for Washington, DC, we were also openly challenging our
fellow citizens here to accept responsibility and act to stop the bloodshed. To
this end I introduced the slogan, ‘Only You Can Stop The War!’ ”63
Whether or not the public in Seattle understood that the action was directed
at Washington, there was still the question of whether this disruptive tactic
constituted an effective means of communicating the group’s message. The civil
disobedience actions of the civil rights movement, in comparison, had involved
common, nonthreatening “illegal” actions such as sitting at lunch counters and
in the front of buses, the significance of which was easily grasped by the public.
The tactic of blocking traffic was also different in kind from the more serious
illegal actions of breaking into draft board offices and destroying files, which
took place during the Vietnam War. The latter, however, were directed at a spe-
cific government agency deemed to be part of the “killing machine,” which at
least made strategic sense. The national POR office published the Seattle con-
troversy in its January 1987 newsletter but offered no comment. It maintained
only one cardinal rule for civil disobedience actions, nonviolence, leaving local
groups to work out their own approaches.
National Guard Deployment

In the absence of U.S. troops fighting in Nicaragua, the deployment of National
Guard units to Honduras established a tangible connection between local
communities and U.S. foreign policies. Pentagon plans in 1986 called for 9,000
National Guard members from forty-three states and territories to train in
Central America, with 5,300 deployed in Honduras. Their job was to build roads
and other kinds of infrastructure needed for the rapid deployment of U.S. mili-
tary forces in the region, and to train in realistic conditions of war.
In Oregon, citizen groups appealed to the governor and state legislators to pre-
vent Oregon National Guard units from being sent to Honduras, scheduled for
February 1, 1986. United in opposition to the deployment were the Portland

Central America Solidarity Committee, the Ecumenical Ministries of Ore-
gon, the Catholic Peace Ministry of Oregon, the Council for Human Rights
in Latin America, and a number of peace group chapters. At the request of
these groups, Vera Katz, speaker of the Oregon House of Representatives, and
John Kitzhaber, president of the Oregon Senate, wrote a letter to Governor
Victor Atiyeh, urging him to abort the mission: “By cooperating with the
United States government’s militaristic intrusion into the affairs of another
nation, we are abdicating our moral responsibility to work for peaceful resolu-
tion in the region.” The governor was not persuaded, and the guard units were
sent. On January 31, the night before departure, opponents held a vigil at the
Portland Airport.64
Other governors joined the ACWC in opposing guard deployments to
Central America. In February 1986 Gov. Bruce Babbitt of Arizona accused the
Reagan administration of sending guardsmen to the Honduran-Nicaraguan
border in order to provide a “pretext” for a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua. Gov.
Michael Dukakis of Massachusetts charged that the administration was usurp-
ing the state’s constitutional authority over the guard units. He and Gov. Joseph
Brennan of Maine refused to allow their units to participate.65 This resistance
prompted the administration to seek passage in Congress of the Montgomery
Amendment, which denied governors the right to control their state guard
units. A majority of governors meeting in South Carolina in early September
indicated their opposition to this amendment, but Congress nevertheless
approved it, and President Reagan signed it into law in early November.
A variety of local groups were involved in the National Guard issue, including
Pledge of Resistance groups in St. Louis and Boulder, Veterans for Peace groups
in Minneapolis and southern Maine, and other local groups in Arkansas, Florida,
Michigan, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere. On
February 11, 1986, in St. Louis, Pledge activists held a demonstration aimed at
persuading Gov. John Ashcroft to keep the state’s National Guard units from
being sent to Honduras. Ellen Whitt, a University of Missouri political science
professor, told USA Today, “They’re building an infrastructure that would allow
the United States to conduct a full-scale war. It’s the same thing that happened in
Vietnam in ’61 and ’62.”66 The St. Louis POR, with support from fourteen national
organizations, established the National Guard Clearinghouse, which kept track of
developments and informed local and state groups of guard unit plans.67
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Contra Training in Florida

The Reagan administration initially kept its plans for contra training in the
United States secret. After a month of speculation in the press, however, the
Washington Post revealed on November 27, 1986, that seventy contras had arrived
at Hurlburt Field in north Florida for a six-week training course. Hurlburt Field
is home to Air Force special operations and lies adjacent to Eglin Air Force Base,
a 724-square-mile reservation (two-thirds the size of Rhode Island) near Ft.
Walton Beach. The Panhandle region of Florida was also home to many retired
military personnel and known for its conservative political orientation, and
hence it was well represented by Rep. Earl Hutto (D–Panama City). Hutto wel-
comed the contras’ presence, telling the Ft. Walton Beach Playground Daily News,
“We have to do what we can to prevent the solidification of another Marxist-
Leninist regime like we have in Cuba.”68
In Orlando, meanwhile, the Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice (FCPJ)
decided that a demonstration was needed in the area to let it be known that
the contras were not welcome in Florida. Part-time staff person Bill Lazar trav-
eled to Ft. Walton Beach to lay the groundwork for a demonstration there on
December 13. Speaking with a local news reporter from The Log, he described
the contras as “terrorists” and insisted, “They have no business being in this
country, and we don’t want them here.”69
While Lazar was making plans, a small group of antiwar protesters led by Fr.
Roy Bourgeois conducted a civil disobedience action on Sunday, November
30. Bourgeois, a U.S. Navy veteran and a Maryknoll priest, was arrested along
with two other Catholic priests for trespassing at the Hurlburt Field gate.
Another twenty demonstrators conducted a four-hour legal protest outside the
gate. Bourgeois refused to give his name and was held in custody until trial on
December 16. The two other priests, Fr. James Sinotte and Fr. Tony Egan, were
released the same day. Bourgeois later told U.S. magistrate Susan Novotny, “I
tried to stop a crime from taking place: the arming and training of Contras in
Florida.” He served a thirty-day jail term.70
FCPJ organizers hoped to attract a larger crowd at their upcoming dem-
onstration. As news of the contras’ presence in north Florida spread, a dozen
national organizations and twenty-three Florida organizations signed on as
cosponsors.71 Upon hearing about the planned demonstration, Harry Aderholt,
a retired Air Force brigadier general and the past president of the Air Commando
Association, decided that a counterdemonstration was needed, a “protest against
the protesters.” He and Carl Gustman, an employee of a local defense contractor,
began planning a pro-contra rally at the same site and on the same day. “We sup-
port the contra training and the role it plays in our defense,” said Gustman. “We
want to show that our country is doing what needs to be done—we don’t need
more communist countries.”72
The potential for a clash between the two groups of demonstrators led
Aderholt and Lazar to sit down and talk on December 10. As reported in the
Playground Daily News, Lazar asked Aderholt to help him divide the space in
front of Hurlburt Field, but Aderholt refused. Aderholt wanted a list of all the
peace activists who planned to participate, as well as Lazar’s assurance that
they would “behave themselves.” Lazar refused to give such assurance, expect-
ing another civil disobedience action to take place. Aderholt then commented,
“You people are the violent ones, not us. You throw blood; you carry coffins.
What you are is professional agitators. You aren’t from here and you don’t belong
here.”73 In fact, relatively few people from the local area were part of the anti-
contra group, but there were some. One was Patricia Edminsten, a University of
West Florida associate professor, who explained to The Log, “Although there are
people out there who might back us, there are many who tend to draw the line
when it comes to getting out and marching with a placard.”74 Few residents, in
other words, wanted to antagonize their neighbors over the issue.
On the night before the December 13 rally, opponents of the contras held an
open meeting at the Ft. Walton Beach Municipal Auditorium. Among the speak-
ers were military veterans Bill Gandall and Charles Liteky. Gandall recounted his
experience as a marine in the U.S. occupation of Nicaragua in the late 1920s. “We
were a completely brainwashed outfit,” he said. “But when I came home, I began
to see that our policy of manifest destiny was all wrong.” He also talked about his
recent visit to Nicaragua and gave the Sandinista government high marks for insti-
tuting health and education programs for the Nicaraguan people. Liteky, having
recovered from his long fast, spoke about his experience in Vietnam. “For 4½
years I was a Catholic chaplain in the Army,” he said. “And, at the time, I supported
the Vietnam War, until I found out the whole thing was a lie. Now I see it starting
again in Central America, with the tapestry of lies starting to unravel before our
eyes. . . . What we want to do is stop the killing in Nicaragua.” Local residents who
did not attend this meeting could still read about it in the local newspapers, which
gave a fair amount of coverage to the speakers. Aderholt, for his part, continued to
publicly refer to Contra War opponents as “professional agitators.”75
The two demonstrations took place as planned on December 13. Some two
hundred anti-contra protesters rallied on one side of the street, while a hundred
[ 198 ] CHAPTER 7
pro-contra demonstrators rallied on the other side. The antiwar crowd included a
caravan of seventeen from Gainesville, Florida, as well as activists from as far away
as Albany, New York, and New Haven, Connecticut. Thirty-four members of the
press were present, along with twenty plain-clothes police officers and twenty-
five members of the Florida Highway Patrol’s riot unit. There was no serious dis-
order, however, only a ritual civil disobedience action by eleven antiwar protesters
at the Hurlburt Field gate. As each protester was arrested for stepping across the
property line, the pro-contra group across the street applauded. Tom Fischer of
the Tallahassee Veterans for Peace checked with police officers to make sure that
the larger antiwar group was not blocking traffic or otherwise breaking the law.
On the anti-contra side of the street, banners and signs read, “Be All You Can
Be—Work for Peace,” “Contra Aid Is Murder,” and “Stop Training Contra
Terrorists.” On the other side, the signs read, “Help Contras, Stop Communism”
and “Free Nicaragua from Slavery.” Gustman appeared at the pro-contra rally
wearing a T-shirt emblazoned with the words, “I’m a Contra, too.” Waving an
American flag, he yelled to motorists, “They’re passing out communist propa-
ganda. You don’t want to read it.” Aderholt was pleased with the hundred-person
pro-contra turnout. “I’d have been happier, of course, if everyone in Fort Walton
Beach had come out,” he said. “But I think this is great.”
The front page of the Playground Daily News on the following morning fea-
tured a large photograph of anti-contra protesters lying motionless on the street,
their placards partly covering their bodies. The adjacent title read, “Protesters
ask for arrest and get it.” The article itself, however, described how Liteky and
other protesters had carried out their civil disobedience action in a dignified
manner. Liteky, with Bible in hand, even spoke well of Hurlburt security offi-
cers, describing them as “very courteous.” The controversy did not end with the
dueling demonstrations. Gustman told the Pensacola News-Journal that his next
step was to organize a pro–United States parade on December 22. “It’s not the
contra issue,” he said. “It’s more being proud to be an American type of thing.”
Ft. Walton Beach resident Jackie Delacruz, whose husband had fought in
Vietnam, had stood with the anti-contra protesters on December 13. She also
felt proud of her country, telling the Pensacola News-Journal, “I am standing up
for my country, my town, my friends, and neighbors.” Another local resident
who participated in the anti-contra protest, Renee Williams, said of the whole
affair, “I think it was an excellent example of how people with opposing views
can express them without becoming violent. . . . We carried flags and crosses.
We felt as much patriotism as they did.”76 Whether or not the anti–Contra
War protesters persuaded anyone, they at least sparked a public debate on this
foreign policy issue, challenging the unexamined assumption that patriotism
means always supporting the nation’s wars and foreign policies.
A Solitary Vigil
Sometimes a small demonstration can have a large effect on individuals. Such
was the case with the solitary vigil of Grace Gyori, a Presbyterian missionary
who stood outside a post office in Chicago’s Loop each day in the summer of
1985, protesting the “U.S. war on Central America.” Rev. Grant Gallup, an
Episcopal minister working with low-income communities on Chicago’s West
Side, was moved by her witness. “She stood there,” reflected Gallup, “with an
array of little wooden crosses planted in coffee cans set on the pavement. Each
had the name of a victim of U.S. terror in Guatemala.” Gyori told Gallup about
an upcoming trip to Mexico and Central America that fall. Gallup decided to
go. His visit to Nicaragua in particular excited his interest in liberation theology
and social change. He returned again in 1986, 1987, and 1988, each time with a
different sponsoring group, whether religious or political. In 1989 he accepted a
one-year appointment as a liaison officer to the Episcopal Church in Nicaragua.
He remained in the country thereafter and founded Casa Ave Maria in Managua,
“a house of hospitality, study, sojourn, and service,” which provided free classes
in English, piano, guitar, dance, painting, drawing, and computer skills.77 Sister
Gyori’s singular protest thus led at least one person to devote his life to helping
the Nicaraguan people.
Nicaragua Connections, 1985–86
There were many notable humanitarian aid efforts in 1985–86. AFSC, MADRE,
Nicaragua Network, the Quixote Center, and a growing number of sister cities
sent medical, educational, and agricultural supplies. TecNica and Architects and
Planners in Support of Nicaragua provided technicians and tools. Independent
solidaridados such as Ben Linder and Fred Royce added their individual con-
tributions. Royce, a native of Jacksonville, established an agricultural mechan-
ics school near Matagalpa. By April 1987 Nicaragua Network and its offshoot,
Nicaragua Exchange, had arranged for 1,400 Americans to participate in coffee,
cotton, construction, and other international work brigades.78 Coordinators
Debra Reuben and Sylvia Sherman emphasized that solidarity was a two-way
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street and not simply charity, “a relationship based on mutual interests and
respect. North Americans have in fact learned a great deal from the Nicaraguan
people.”79 A continuing stream of U.S. visitors and study tours did indeed learn
much from Nicaraguans. CUSCLIN members and the Envío staff often helped
make arrangements for meetings and seminars.
A new group, Trade for Peace, arose in May 1985 in response to the U.S. em-
bargo against Nicaragua. Based in Madison, Wisconsin, the group began import-
ing small amounts of goods from Nicaragua and selling them in the United
States in outright defiance of the embargo. A complaint from Citizens for Reagan
brought the group to the attention of U.S. Customs, which later raided a mem-
ber’s house, seizing coffee and crafts.80
Another small but notable group that joined in Nicaragua solidarity efforts
consisted of the veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, the volunteer American
force that had fought against Francisco Franco’s fascist forces in the Spanish Civil
War during the 1930s. The aging members of this group included Bill Gandall,
Ted Veltfort, and Abe Osheroff, all lifelong leftists. Gandall and Veltfort had
both driven ambulances in Spain (Gandall had also trained American, French,
and Moroccan volunteers in guerrilla warfare). After visiting Nicaragua in 1985,
the two began a fundraising project that resulted in eleven ambulances being
delivered to Nicaragua. Osheroff, meanwhile, initiated the Lincoln Construction
Brigade in the fall of 1985. With the help of a dozen younger volunteers, they built
twenty-nine wooden houses in the small farming cooperative in Mombachito,
located near the city of Granada.81
The Quixote Center’s Quest for Peace Project

Congressional approval of the $27 million “humanitarian aid” package for the
contras in June 1985 inspired the Quixote Center to initiate the Quest for Peace
project. Announced on December 12, 1985, its goal was to raise $27 million in
real humanitarian aid for the Nicaraguan people, contrasting it with the admin-
istration’s support for armed guerrillas. The goal was reached in late May 1986.
Almost one-half of the $27 million worth of aid was raised though the Quixote
Center. Director Bill Callahan tabulated the rest by conservatively estimating
the value of all material aid and donated labor, including the labor of brigadis-
tas. The project ultimately involved 425 organizations and 2,500 individuals,
creating an informal network of humanitarian aid groups in the process.
Following congressional approval of a $100 million contra aid package in
mid-1986, the Quixote Center repeated the process, setting a new goal at the
same amount. Over 600 organizations took part in the second effort, and the
Quixote Center staff increased to twelve in order to meet the demand. At a
press conference on November 24, 1986, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton, Sister
Janet Roesener, and Rev. Joseph Lowery announced that $11.5 million had thus
far been collected in “life-sustaining” humanitarian aid. In promoting the cam-
paign, Quixote Center staff members and field organizers gave some 150 work-
shops and talks in communities across the United States.
The goal of $100 million in aid was reached in mid-1987, with the Quixote
Center responsible for raising about 45 percent of it. The aid included food, cloth-
ing, educational items, medical equipment and supplies, and agricultural tools.
It was used in part to assist displaced families and to build a forty-bed hospital
in the small northern rural community of El Viejo. One of the major contribu-
tors to the hospital was the Sisters of Mercy in Pittsburgh, who gathered medi-
cal equipment worth $450,000 from seventeen area hospitals.82 In Nicaragua the
hospitals were filling up with casualties from land mines planted on rural roads
by the contras. Michael Gillen, on a tour of Nicaragua with a dozen members of
Vietnam Veterans Against the War, noted that a civilian hospital in the city of
Esteli “seemed loaded with recent mine blast-related amputees.”83
Jim Burchell, a field organizer for the Quixote Center in the northeast-
ern states, viewed the Quest for Peace project as a multi-pronged organizing
tool. Beyond raising humanitarian aid for the Nicaraguan people, he sought
to involve more people in the ACWC, build cooperation and local coalitions
among activist groups, educate U.S. citizens about Nicaragua, support grass-
roots pressure on Congress, and generate positive publicity for anti–Contra
War groups. The Quest for Peace project, he said, was a “very effective way of
pulling activists together and giving them something concrete to do as well as
involving new people.” In his educational presentations, Burchell would “put
a real human face” on foreign policy issues. “If I went to a church and said I
wanted to talk about structural adjustment, I would get nowhere,” he explained.
“But if I said I wanted to talk about poor people in Nicaragua, then that opens
the door. . . . People ask why there are street children. So we’re able to make
the transition” to underlying systems. “We don’t treat poverty in Nicaragua as a
natural disaster. It’s man made.”
Burchell’s own journey into social change began in high school in Rochester,
New Hampshire, during the Vietnam War years. Having initially “bought the
line about the nature of our country,” he became aware of a deep contradiction
between the rhetoric of democracy and human rights, and the reality of the
[ 202 ] CHAPTER 7
U.S. war in Vietnam. “I just saw the hypocrisy of it,” he said. The United States
refused to allow Vietnam “the right of self-determination.” After spending a few
semesters at the University of Virginia, Burchell returned to New Hampshire
in 1976 to run for a seat in the legislature. He won, at the age of twenty-one,
and served three two-year terms. During this period, he also won a seat on the
Rochester city council and served a four-year term.
Burchell returned to college and earned a master’s in public policy from the
University of Michigan in 1985. While in Ann Arbor, he brought his legislative
experience and knowledge to bear in assisting a referendum on Reagan’s Central
America policies in 1985–86. About this same time, he was recruited by Rev. Bill
Callahan to work on the Quest for Peace project. Although not a “theistic person,”
he said, he grew to respect “all these radical Catholics.” Burchell described himself
as a democrat “with a small d,” one who believes in “the ideals that were embodied
in the formation of our country” and in “the basic rules of civilization.”84 As in the
Vietnam War, he saw the U.S. role in Nicaragua as contrary to the principles of
freedom and democracy for which the United States presumably stands.
The Hasenfus Affair in Madison

International developments and local activism crossed paths in Madison, Wis-
consin, in the fall of 1986. On October 5 a U.S. cargo plane supplying arms and
aid to the contras inside Nicaragua was shot down by Sandinista troops. Eugene
Hasenfus, an air cargo handler, survived the ordeal and was arrested by the
Sandinista government. He was tried in a Nicaraguan court and sentenced to a
thirty-year jail term. Hasenfus’s home was in Marinette, Wisconsin. The follow-
ing month, Nicaraguan vice president Sergio Ramírez visited Madison at the
invitation of the Wisconsin-León sister state program. After touring the state
capitol, Ramírez spoke to a welcoming crowd of over a thousand people at Saint
Paul’s Catholic Church. He later met with Gov. Anthony Earl, held two press
conferences, and spoke with the family of Eugene Hasenfus. “Our main interest,”
said Ramírez at one of the press conferences, is that “a new Hasenfus won’t be in
the future, that no North American citizen will be involved in illegal actions
against a legal government.” Ramírez extended an invitation to the Hasenfus
family to visit Nicaragua. Sandy Coppens, Eugene Hasenfus’s sister, was im-
pressed with Ramírez, saying, “He was very encouraging, very warm.”85
A week before Christmas, President Ortega pardoned Hasenfus as a ges-
ture of good will. Nicaraguan Supreme Court justice Vilma Nuñez de Escorcia
signed the official pardon, even though she strongly disagreed with it, believing
that Hasenfus’s actions made him a war criminal.86 Hasenfus was turned over
to Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-CT), who arrived in Managua in late December
with Sally Hasenfus, the pardoned prisoner’s wife. “This is a Christmas and
New Year message to the American people,” said Ortega. “It is a very concrete
message of peace.”87
Witness for Peace in Nicaragua

Witness for Peace continued to expand in 1985 and 1986, organizing short-term
delegations and arranging for long-term volunteers to stay in rural communities.
In February 1985 WFP hired two staff persons in Managua, Sharon Hostetler,
who coordinated operations out of the CEPAD office, and Ed Griffin-Nolan,
who managed media relations. By July 1987 the Managua office had grown to a
staff of fourteen—five U.S. citizens and nine Nicaraguans.88
The big story in 1985 was the abduction in August of a boat full of WFP vol-
unteers and journalists. Following an increase in contra attacks on Nicaragua’s
southern border, WFP volunteers decided that they would take a “peace cruise”
down the San Juan River in August, hopefully defusing the situation by putting
U.S. citizens in the area. WFP held a press conference to announce the trip but
few media people came. Then on August 4, contra commander Edén Pastora
announced that anyone going beyond a certain point along the river would be
shot. “When he made that public statement,” said Hostetler, “all of a sudden
we asked, are we going to do this?” WFP organizers decided to call another
press conference. This time the media turned out in full force, and a number of
reporters volunteered to ride on the fifty-foot barge. “And so we had all the press
on the boat when our group was kidnapped,” said Hostetler.
On August 7 contra forces on the banks of the river fired warning shots, forc-
ing the boat to shore. They held twenty-nine WFP members and eighteen jour-
nalists at gunpoint. Hostetler received the news immediately through a short-
wave radio kept by Griffin-Nolan. “We called our office in Washington, DC, and
they started calling the State Department. . . . Then I called Leana [Nuñez of
the FSLN Office of Religious Affairs] and our partners, telling them our group’s
been kidnapped. Then I called the U.S. Embassy and they actually sent people
over to our office.”
The captured contingent was marched up a muddy hill by seven armed men.
The nonviolent activists kept conversing with the soldiers and managed to
establish a measure of rapport, despite the circumstances. The group also nego-
tiated their return to the boat for the night. The contra commander, “William,”
[ 204 ] CHAPTER 7
the son of a National Guardsman, was apparently under orders not to harm
the group. His superior, “Daniel,” arrived the next morning and gave the group
permission to leave. Before doing so, the norteamericanos asked the contra sol-
diers to join them in prayer. “All but two let go their rifles for just a moment and
joined hands to say the Lord’s Prayer,” noted Ed Griffin-Nolan in his account of
the incident.
The twenty-nine-hour ordeal made front-page news in Nicaragua and across
the United States. The Reagan administration immediately attempted to dis-
credit WFP by claiming that the capture had been staged. The WFP office in
Washington called a news conference to rebut the charge. Some media com-
mentators called WFP “Witless for Peace,” said Hostetler. “But then later in the
Contra War, we were a main source of information for the mass media for what
was happening in the war. We had to work hard on our credibility. And we took
it very seriously; for example, in the documentation, we never used or printed
anything that we didn’t have . . . two corroborating sources who would say, yes,
that’s what happened.”89
WFP underwent subtle changes in the Nicaraguan setting with regard to its
identification as “a prayerful, biblical” community, originally stated in the WFP
Charter. According to Managua coordinators Sharon Hostetler and Daniel
Erdsman, during the 1984–86 period, WFP staff and long-term volunteers be-
came less concerned with establishing a specifically religious community than
with simply creating community, inclusive of different religious and secular
views. “The very nature of the work has attracted people who ‘do not fit the
mold,’ whether those people defined themselves in traditional religious terms or
not,” they wrote. People came with views ranging “from traditional Catholic to
New Age to individual philosophy.” Any attempt to narrow the boundaries of
religious identity risked alienating some people, they argued. What evolved
instead in the long-term team (LTT) was an effort to build an inclusive commu-
nity around the WFP mission in Nicaragua. “The LTT with its diversity laid less
emphasis on the ‘Biblical, prayerful’ phrase and more on the ‘we welcome others
who differ from us.’ ”90
A professionally made documentary film, Destination Nicaragua (Empower-
ment Project, 58 min.), released in March 1986, followed Witness for Peace
groups and others as they journeyed through rural villages and cooperative farms,
allowing viewers to absorb the reality with little added commentary. “When the
delegates arrive in Jalapa,” wrote one film reviewer, “they meet a mother who
describes how she found her son’s mutilated body after one contra attack on their
village. After this heart-wrenching scene, one wonders how anyone could want to
support the contras, but the film makes no comment.”91
WFP volunteers were not immune to the pathos nor the danger. Aynn
Setright first came to Nicaragua as part of a short-term WFP delegation in
1985, at the age of twenty-five. She went on to become a long-term volunteer
and worked as an ambulance driver in the north central village of Bocana de
Paiwas, a war zone. Jim Feldt, a U.S. priest from Wisconsin who headed the
village parish, had requested a WFP volunteer to drive the parish-owned ambu-
lance, thinking that the contras would “think twice before killing a U.S. per-
son,” according to Setright. “I remember thinking, now this whole theory of me
being a gringa and driving the ambulance may work if the contras stop me and
see me. But how is this going to work on a land mine, which is indiscriminate?
. . . I would sometimes come up to a mud puddle and think . . . If I were a contra,
where would I put the mine? Would I put it on the left? Would I put it on the
right? I’m here today, so I always made the right decision about where to drive.
But it was scary. It was very scary.”
Setright grew up in a conservative Catholic family in Wyoming. She became
an exchange student in Brazil in 1978. When the Sandinistas toppled the Somoza
regime on July 19, 1979, she recalled, “People are out on the streets, dancing the
samba, and I’m thinking, what’s going on? Brazil itself was living under a mili-
tary dictatorship at the time, so this was kind of an expression of the people,
out on the streets dancing. There was something in my consciousness about a
liberation movement that was born then.”
Setright later attended Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., where
the future UN ambassador, Jeane Kirkpatrick, was her political theory adviser.
“I just didn’t agree with anything she said,” said Setright. After Reagan was
elected, she lost her enthusiasm for a career in the foreign service and returned
to Wyoming. As a peace activist at the University of Wyoming at Laramie, she
debated Rep. Dick Cheney, the Wyoming congressional representative, two
years in a row. She became interested in Nicaragua when a Maryknoll lay mis-
sionary, Pat Carr, came to the university on a speaking tour in 1983. After finish-
ing college in 1985 she joined with WFP. She was fluent in Portuguese but still
learning Spanish. “In those days, there were about forty long-term volunteers,”
she said. The WFP team was mainly looking for “people who could keep a cool
head, who were able to do fund-raising and grassroots organizing in the United
States, people they could trust.” Setright was one of a dozen new WFP long-
term volunteers that year.
[ 206 ] CHAPTER 7
The local parish in Paiwas headed by Pastor Feldt was engaged in resettling
internally displaced families that had left their mountain farms because of con-
tra attacks. The Sandinista government provided land for cooperative resettle-
ment communities. This made Paiwas and the roads leading to it the target of
frequent contra attacks. Neither the Red Cross nor the Health Ministry would
go to Paiwas because it was considered too dangerous. The nearest town was
about three hours’ drive. As Setright drove her ambulance back and forth, she
sometimes met contras face to face. “I was stopped a dozen times,” she said.
Once the contras stopped her and took an injured Sandinista soldier from the
ambulance and presumably killed him. After that, she insisted that injured sol-
diers riding with her undress to their underwear. “But you could tell they were
soldiers because they had bad feet from wearing wet socks and dirty wet boots
for twenty-four hours a day for three months at a time,” she said. “I would never
take anybody armed.”
Some of the contras who stopped her, said Setright, were high on speed [an
amphetamine]. “They had a baggie full of white crosses, and they were just pop-
ping them.” One time, a contra put a grenade right beside her. “They wanted
to know where we were going with this tin/zinc sheet roofing; why was I help-
ing the Sandinistas; why wouldn’t I give him a ride; why wouldn’t I let them
take the zinc; what was I doing with these people; who were these men; were
they really Sandinistas; was I really a Sandinista?” Another time, contras forced
Setright out of her vehicle:
They tied my hands behind my back. They walked me up to a little
ranchito at the top of a hill. . . . I was sitting on a little stool . . . and
they had a huge radio there. And this guy, this contra who stopped
me, was talking in Spanish and must have been to Honduras,
because I heard a guy with a Southern [U.S.] accent in Spanish tell-
ing the guy, “No queremos nada con la iglesia . . . Es una monja, ver-
dad, es una monja.” They thought I was a nun. . . . My fear was that
the Sandinistas were going to come in and try to have some rescue
operation, and the danger was when the two groups met. I felt okay
if I was just with the contras. And I was okay with the Sandinistas.
The contras let Setright go. They later ambushed a vehicle driven by Setright’s
co-worker, killing her and two little girls with a grenade launched at the vehi-
cle. “She was a civilian, a Nicaraguan woman, mother of seven,” said Setright.
After completing her one-year duty, Setright did not feel ready to go back to the
United States. “I was just too traumatized by all the things I had seen with the
ambulance,” she said. So she stayed in Paiwas and continued to work with Pastor
Feldt. At one point she became the target of a contra ambush designed to kidnap
her. “I actually had to leave the country for a little while because there was a
contra who apparently had seen me from afar and I was a pretty strong, strappy
young gal and he took a shine to me,” she said. “And he set up a couple ambushes
to capture me. I just got out by the luck of my hide.” In one case, she was advised
by local people of a contra ambush ahead and turned back. “And then he took
it out on them,” she said. Despite all the danger and tragedy she experienced,
Setright reflected:
I felt privileged to be here. I thought that I was the luckiest person
alive, because I was in Nicaragua during this absolutely incredible
moment of Nicaragua’s history. It’s such a contradiction because, in
spite of the fact that mostly what I remember is the war and the trag-
edy, what was so sustaining during that period of time was indeed
the celebration of life, to be together with all of these other people
who are like-minded, Nicaraguans and from other countries, who
are all together in the same thing. And you feel like you have this
very insignificant part of something that’s so much bigger than who
you are at any given time. That was a really heady feeling.92
CHAPTER 8
Sustaining the Anti–Contra War Campaign,

1987–90
R ecent events have given us the opportunity to make 1987 a turn-

ing point in the six year U.S. war in Central America,” wrote
Steven Slade, national Pledge of Resistance coordinator, in early 1987. “After
years of struggle to simply slow the pace of escalation, we now have the chance
to actually reverse the direction of U.S. policy. This is the chance we have been
waiting for.” Slade pointed to three developments as sources of hope: Demo-
cratic Party control in both houses of Congress, a decline in the administration’s
credibility due to the Iran-Contra affair, and an increase in the credibility of the
anti–Contra War campaign.1
The ACWC was at its height in early 1987. More than 1,000 local, state, and
national organizations were working against the administration’s Central Amer-
ica policies.2 Approximately 100,000 individuals had made a “commitment to
take nonviolent action to prevent further harm to Nicaragua” via the Pledge
campaign.3 More than 2,200 U.S. citizens had participated in Witness for Peace
delegations, accompanying Nicaraguans in war zones.4 Witness for Peace direc-
tor Betsy Crites noted in July 1987, “WFP has advanced to a new level of promi-
nence in recent months as our work at building relations with Congress, col-
league organizations and the press has come to fruition. The mainstream press
in Managua and Washington generally consider WFP a credible source.”5
Religious leaders, unfazed by red-baiting, continued to speak out strongly
[ 208 ]
Sustaining the Anti–Contra War Campaign, 1987–90 [ 209 ]
against the Contra War, and labor unions were increasingly engaged in the
issue. “By 1986,” wrote David Dyson of the National Labor Committee, “it was
clear that the labor side of anti-intervention work had advanced faster and far-
ther than anyone had thought possible.”6 Public opinion also remained solidly
opposed to contra aid. According to a February 1987 poll commissioned by
Time magazine, 52 percent of Americans favored cutting off all military support
to the contras, while 26 percent favored additional military aid. The poll also
revealed that 62 percent believed that it was “very likely” or “somewhat likely”
that U.S. troops would end up fighting in Nicaragua.7
Protests and Politics, 1987–88
The first major initiative of the anti–Contra War campaign in 1987 was the
Lenten Witness to End the War in Nicaragua, a seven-week series of demon-
strations and civil disobedience actions at the Capitol organized by religious
denominations. In the first demonstration, on Ash Wednesday, March 4, three
hundred people gathered for a prayer service, and five prominent religious lead-
ers were arrested after refusing to leave the Capitol Rotunda. The five declared
that they were “willing to go to jail for their belief that U.S. policy in Nicaragua
is wrong,” according to the Boston Globe.8 Each of the next six Wednesday
actions was led by a different set of denominations, respectively: Episcopal and
Moravian; Presbyterian and Lutheran; Methodist; Church of the Brethren and
Unitarian Universalist; Disciples of Christ and United Church of Christ; and,
on April 15, Roman Catholic. In all, some two thousand people participated
in the demonstrations and eighty-two religious leaders and laypersons were
arrested.
Participants also lobbied Congress in between the weekly demonstrations.9
The first legislative battle fell short of victory, but gains were made in the House.
On March 11 the House voted 230–196 to place a six-month moratorium on $40
million in contra aid that had been previously approved. Although the measure
was later rejected by the Senate, the substantial margin of opposition to contra
aid in the House convinced the Reagan administration to delay submission of a
new proposal until at least September.
The elaborately planned and executed Lenten Witness for Peace garnered
less press attention than a trial the next month involving Amy Carter, daugh-
ter of the former president. A sophomore at Brown University, Carter and
[ 210 ] CHAPTER 8
fifty-nine others had been arrested on November 24, 1986, for occupying a
building at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst, in protest against CIA
recruitment on the campus. Fifteen of the sixty protesters, including Carter
and Abbie Hoffman, a well-known leader of the anti–Vietnam War movement,
pleaded innocent to charges of trespassing and disorderly conduct. At their trial
in mid-April, the defendants employed the “necessity” defense, arguing that
their illegal trespass was justified in order to prevent greater harm to others.
The CIA, they asserted, was engaged in criminal activity in Nicaragua, harming
innocent people. To substantiate their case, the defendants brought in eleven
expert witnesses, including former contra leader Edgar Chamorro and former
National Security Council aide Daniel Ellsberg. After two days of testimony,
the judge acquitted the defendants. Upon leaving the courthouse, the exoner-
ated defendants were cheered by hundreds of supporters. Carter recounted to
the press, “My parents told me they were proud of me.”10
The April 25th Mobilization

David Reed, the new executive director of the Coalition for a New Foreign and
Military Policy, was more interested in expanding the popular base of the
Central America movement than escalating its tactics. In mid-1986, Reed and
David Dyson began discussing how labor unions might be brought into “a
nationwide, unified effort that could put tens of thousands of people in the
streets,” according to Dyson.11 Reed and Dyson set up a retreat at the Machinists
Lodge in Placid Harbor, Maryland, on September 12, 1986, and invited repre-
sentatives of national peace, labor, and religious organizations along with foun-
dation representatives to discuss the possibility of organizing a major demon-
stration focused on Central America in the spring. There was general enthusiasm
for the idea at the meeting. The group decided that religious denominations
and labor unions should officially sponsor the demonstration in order to pres-
ent a mainstream image and reach as wide an audience as possible.
Over the next few weeks, plans were solidified as to the structure of the
steering committee and nature of the demonstration, nicknamed “the Mobe.” A
thirty-five member steering committee was created, with equal representation
from five sectors: labor unions, religious denominations, faith-based activist
groups such as AFSC and Witness for Peace, secular peace and justice groups
such as SANE, Rainbow Coalition, and Democratic Socialists of America,
and solidarity groups such as CISPES and Nicaragua Network. Leslie Cagan,
program coordinator for Mobilization for Survival from 1980 to 1986 and an
experienced organizer of mass demonstrations, was hired as the Mobe coordi-

nator, in charge of staff and general operations.
In working out plans for the Mobe, labor representatives opposed a pro-
posal to add a civil disobedience component, arguing that this would under-
mine the desired mainstream image, but a majority voted to approve an action
on the Monday following the main demonstration on Saturday, April 25. Denom-
inational representatives argued against adding more issues to the agenda, fear-
ing a dilution of the focus on Central America, but they were outvoted on one
addition—southern Africa issues (apartheid in South Africa and U.S. support
for Angolan rebels). Three antiapartheid groups were subsequently invited to
join the solidarity sector of the steering committee, and the demonstration was
officially titled the “National Mobilization for Justice and Peace in Central
America and Southern Africa.” The Mobe steering committee set forth four
instrumental goals: to “express citizen outrage”; to demonstrate “the high
domestic political costs of continuing and escalating the U.S. intervention in
Central America and southern Africa”; to “broaden the public debate over U.S.
foreign policy in general and the Reagan Doctrine in particular”; and to broaden
the anti-intervention movement.12
The steering committee decided not to take on any more issues, despite
appeals from disarmament and social justice issue groups. The majority view was
that too many demands would scare away the labor movement and dilute the
anti-interventionist message. Local organizations and coalitions were neverthe-
less allowed to take on issues as they pleased. SANE/Freeze (a merger of SANE
and the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign), Mobilization for Survival, and the
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (all on the steering com-
mittee) sent out letters encouraging local disarmament activists to come to the
demonstration and “bring banners, signs and literature which address some of
the pressing disarmament issues.”13 On the West Coast activists grumbled at the
two-issue limit and organized their own West Coast alliance to plan a demon-
stration in San Francisco on the same day, with more expansive demands.
As the planning proceeded, the Mobe evolved into a complex set of events
and activities, each of which required considerable time, effort, and money to
organize. In addition to the main event on Saturday, which included a morning
rally, a march to the Capitol, and an afternoon rally, plans called for a benefit
concert on Friday evening, training for civil disobedience on Sunday, an inter-
faith service on Sunday afternoon, a civil disobedience action at CIA headquar-
ters on Monday, lobbying at the Capitol on Monday, and “teach-ins” during the
[ 212 ] CHAPTER 8
week. The Mobe opened a national office, hired staff, and initiated meetings
with local organizers to spread the word. With limited time and funding avail-
able, however, some critical aspects of organizing were delayed or left undone.
According to a follow-up report by scholars Beverly Bickel, Philip Brenner, and
William LeoGrande (hereafter called the Bickel report), the national Mobe
office failed to produce a national leaflet publicizing the Mobe, as well as lit-
erature “drawing out the links between the two issues”; a media person was not
hired until February, and that person “had no previous experience with this
scale of national media work”; and a lobbying coordinator was not hired until
three weeks before the planned lobby day.14
Another set of problems emerged around the idea of uniting the Central
America movement, which was predominantly white, with the antiapartheid
movement, which resonated with the African-American community. There
was little time to develop any substantial connections between the two issue
campaigns, let alone an alliance. The Bickel report noted an “absence of black
church networks and leadership in the mobilization.” The fact that the official
“Call” for the mobilization did not list any sponsoring organizations on its let-
terhead made it difficult to garner support in the African-American community,
which expected to see some prominent African-American names and organiza-
tions listed. Labor unions proved to be the most adept at facilitating minority
involvement, albeit from within their own ranks.15
The Mobe’s efforts to recruit labor union members were successful despite
the expected opposition of the AFL-CIO. Twenty-four labor union presidents
endorsed the Mobe, including the presidents of the United Automobile Workers,
the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, the
Communications Workers of America, and the National Education Association.
In March, AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland sent out letters to state and local
labor councils urging them to actively oppose the mobilization. In early April
John T. Joyce, president of the Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen, distributed a six-
teen-page critique of the mobilization, alleging connections between the Mobe’s
sponsoring groups and Central American revolutionaries. The latter accusation
was reiterated in an open letter by Albert Shanker, president of the American
Federation of Teachers, published in the New York Times on April 19, titled
“Avoiding the Wrong Crowd.”16 These efforts did not deter some 25,000 to
40,000 union members from attending the rally in Washington on April 25.
The Washington rally drew approximately 100,000 people despite inclement
weather—rain, wind gusts up to twenty m.p.h., and a temperature of forty-seven
degrees. Another 30,000 people attended the protest in San Francisco.17 Some 170
local coalitions organized buses and car pools to one or the other demonstration.
The largest contingent came from New York City, which filled 500 buses to
Washington. The demonstrators gathered at the Ellipse behind the White House
for a morning rally, then marched down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol, wav-
ing signs and chanting slogans: “Boycott South Africa, Not Nicaragua,” “Student
Aid, Not Contra Aid,” “Stop the Bombing in El Salvador,” “Let Nicaragua Live,”
and “Give Peace a Chance.” The lead contingent included religious leaders Jesse
Jackson, Joseph Lowery of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and
Thomas Gumbleton of Pax Christi; congressional representatives Major Owens
(D-NY), David Bonior (D-MI), and John Conyers (D-MI); peace activists
William Sloane Coffin, Cora Weiss, David Cortright, and Daniel Ellsberg; and
union representative Cleveland Robinson, Eleanor Smeal of the National
Organization of Women, Maria Teresa Tula from CoMadres (Committee of
Mothers of the Disappeared and Assassinated from El Salvador), and Fr. César
Jerez, president of the Jesuit University of Nicaragua.
The afternoon rally featured many speeches, skits by the Bread and Puppet
Theater, performances by singers Jackson Browne and Holly Near, and readings
by poet June Jordan. On Sunday, over 700 people attended the interfaith ser-
vice.18 The following day, 563 people were arrested at CIA headquarters while
1,500 people rallied in support. The focus of this action was ending contra aid.
The chant that went around was “USA, CIA, out of Nicaragua.”19
News coverage of the April 25 rally and civil disobedience action was not
unfavorable, but neither did it offer much in the way of education about the
issues. Articles focused on the actions at hand, the recognized personalities in
attendance, and the conflict over foreign policy within the labor movement.
There was no significant discussion of Central America or South Africa issues
and no mention of the Reagan Doctrine. In the view of the political scientist
Philip Brenner, the Mobe “didn’t have a clear theme.” It used terms such as “peace
and justice,” but “those were such vague themes that they didn’t teach anything.”
Granted that the Reagan Doctrine was “a very, very hard thing to explain to the
media,” the Mobe “did not send a clear message that linked southern Africa and
Central America.” William LeoGrande offered a more upbeat assessment, argu-
ing that the Mobe stimulated interest in the issue, which in turn could lead to
further education: “A Mobe like this can serve an educational function without
actually providing much in the way of direct education. It can be a catalyst that
gets people focused on the issue, which they then learn about from other sources.
[ 214 ] CHAPTER 8
In fact, getting people’s attention to an issue is really what these demonstrations

are all about—which is why they’re called mobilizations.”20
The Iran-Contra Affair

The televised Iran-Contra hearings in Congress from May 5 to August 6, 1987,
proved to be a rather tepid affair. Lt. Col. Oliver North pointed to his superi-
ors as the source of the Iran-contra arms exchanges, but Congress let President
Reagan and Vice President George Bush off the hook. Independent counsel
Lawrence E. Walsh concluded in his final report (August 1993) that the “poli-
cies behind both the Iran and contra operations were fully reviewed and devel-
oped at the highest levels of the Reagan Administration.”21 Worse still for the
ACWC, North’s testimony made him a hero in conservative circles and beyond.
Testifying between July 7 and 14, North presented himself as the ultimate
patriot, a bureaucratic “Rambo,” who had to go beyond the law in order to save
the country from its enemies.
One beneficial result for the ACWC of the Iran-Contra investigation and
indictments was the disruption of the administration’s “public diplomacy”
operation. Carl R. “Spitz” Channell, director of the National Endowment for
the Preservation of Liberty, pleaded guilty in April 1987 to conspiring to defraud
the government by funneling tax-exempt funds to the contras. Channell and his
organization had also played a major role in domestic propaganda operations,
raising millions of dollars for the purchase of air time on radio and television
and sponsoring speaking tours of anti-Sandinista Nicaraguans.22
The Office of Public Diplomacy (S/LPD) was shut down in 1987 after the
General Accounting Office concluded that the agency had engaged “in prohib-
ited, covert propaganda activities designed to influence the media and the public
to support the Administration’s Latin American policies.”23 A later investigation
by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs confirmed that S/LPD had illegally
used taxpayer funds for the purpose of domestic propaganda. The committee
report, dated September 7, 1988, stated that S/LPD had employed “groups of pri-
vate citizens outside the government” that had “raised money for contra weapons,
lobbied the Congress, ran sophisticated media campaigns in targeted congressio-
nal districts, and worked with S/LPD to influence American public opinion
through manipulation of the American press.”24 Ironically, much of the press
appeared less concerned with this systematic manipulation of the fourth estate
than with the question of whether Ronald Reagan’s reputation could be restored.
Countdown ’87
In June 1987 national ACWC groups created a new lobbying and media cam-
paign called “Countdown ’87 Campaign to End Contra Aid.” The sobering real-
ity of political defeat the previous year inspired a new level of dedication, coop-
eration, and strategic thinking. There was a determination to win the political
battle this year and Countdown ’87 was the primary vehicle. The ACWC had
four political assets—a strong activist base, supportive public opinion, commit-
ted Democratic Party leaders, and international support—that needed to be
maximized and woven together. Campaign ’87 began by creating a united front
of national groups, building on the cooperation developed in the Central
America Working Group. Participating organizations included the Coalition
for a New Foreign Policy (formerly the Coalition for a New Foreign and Military
Policy), the National Labor Committee, Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean
and Central America, Institute for Policy Studies, SANE, Witness for Peace,
Nicaragua Network, Neighbor-to-Neighbor, the Presbyterian Church USA, the
United Church of Christ, and others.
To ensure integration with the Democratic Party, the campaign created an
oversight board, chaired by Rep. George Miller (D-CA), that worked with the
House Democratic Task Force on Central America, headed by Rep. David
Bonior (D-MI) and Executive Floor Assistant Kathy Gille. Taking a lesson
from the Mobe, a coordinator was hired who was thoroughly familiar with the
workings of Congress—Rosa DeLauro, administrative assistant and chief of
staff for Sen. Christopher Dodd (D-CT) from 1981 to 1987. (DeLauro was
elected to the House of Representatives from a Connecticut district in 1990.)
The campaign’s political strategy centered on influencing twenty-nine
“swing” members of Congress—twenty-three House members and six senators
(ten Democrats and nineteen Republicans). National groups along with some
state groups divided up the congressional districts and states, sent in field orga-
nizers, recruited local activists, and designed information and arguments spe-
cific to each member and district or state. The operative goals at the local level
were to generate massive numbers of constituent phone calls and letters,
arrange meetings between members of Congress and influential community
members, and influence the public discourse through letters to the editor, opin-
ion columns, and media events.
The national campaign, for its part, arranged for the production of thirty-
second television commercials, sixty-second radio spots, and newspaper adver-
tisements placed in the home districts of targeted members of Congress. The
[ 216 ] CHAPTER 8
professionally produced television ads reminded audiences of the Vietnam War

and appealed to economic sensibilities: “Since 1982, the American taxpayer has
aided the contras to the tune of $250 million—$25,000 for every contra now
under arms. You can stop this tragic waste of our national resources.”25 To pay
for these ads, the Countdown campaign raised more than $1 million with the
help of popular musicians—Joan Baez, Judy Collins, Don Henley, Peter, Paul
and Mary, Bonnie Raitt, and others—who performed at benefit concerts in Los
Angeles, New York, and Washington.
Campaign ’87 integrated supportive public opinion by commissioning
surveys in particular congressional districts. The idea was partly inspired by
surveys on contra aid taken by the Stanley Greenberg polling agency in two
localities, Oklahoma City and the Chicago suburbs. The Greenberg report
(August 20, 1987) found “strong antipathies” to U.S. support for the contras,
concluding: “For years, the American majority opposed to Contra aid has
held firm, despite presidential appeals and major events; it will almost cer-
tainly outlast the present debates.”26 The surveys commissioned by Campaign
’87, beginning in October, yielded similar results, even in Republican-
dominated districts. In New York’s 34th congressional district, represented
by Republican Amo Houghton, the survey indicated that 64 percent of likely
voters were opposed to further contra aid; and in Pennsylvania’s 19th district,
represented by Republican Bill Goodling, 63 percent of likely voters opposed
to contra aid.27 The national office and local groups used these survey results
in their lobbying efforts and press releases.
Pro-contra groups were also engaged in the political battle. In early 1987 the
National Conservative Foundation initiated a $250,000 advertising campaign
with the message that legislators should not “abandon” the contras. Citizens for
Reagan and the Council for Inter-American Security sent out “Nicaragua Action
Kits,” which contained preaddressed postcards to members of Congress, a
“Wanted” poster with Daniel Ortega’s picture on it, and bumper stickers that
read “Support Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters.”28
Opponents of the Contra War received a great boost when the five Central
American presidents signed the Esquipulas accords on August 7, 1987. Drafted
by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, the agreement required a cessation of
all outside support for guerrilla forces and stipulated that the Sandinistas must
hold talks with the contras. Arias later received the Nobel Peace Prize for his dip-
lomatic efforts. The Reagan administration took revenge against Arias by fun-
neling $433,000 to his political opponents in Costa Rica through the National
Endowment for Democracy and the Republican Institute for International

Affairs.29 Not surprisingly, the administration ignored the treaty requirement
demanding an end to U.S. aid to the contras (outside support for guerrillas).
In early September Secretary of State Shultz announced to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee that the administration would seek $270 million in new
contra aid from Congress.
ACWC groups responded to Shultz’s announcement by organizing a call-
in campaign and holding a press conference in Washington on September 15.
A statement was presented at the press conference titled “In the Name of
God—Stop U.S. Contra Terrorism,” signed by two hundred national reli-
gious leaders. On September 24 Witness for Peace released a ninety-nine-
page report, compiled from February through July 1987, which documented
twelve contra attacks on rural communities in which eighty-four civilians
were killed. The report was released simultaneously in sixty cities, with activ-
ists in each city holding press conferences. At the press conference in Atlanta,
held at the Central Presbyterian Church, WFP staff person Makini Coleman
remarked, “Without the U.S. support there would be no contras, so we are
asking all freedom-loving people, all American citizens to come together and
oppose any more funding for the contras.”30
Nuremberg Actions
The spirited protests that followed congressional approval of military aid to the
contras in the summer of 1986 had not exhausted themselves after a year. One
memorable demonstration had a tragic outcome. The Naval Weapons Station in
Concord, California, had been the site of many protests during the Vietnam War,
which is one reason why Brian Willson and fellow Vietnam veterans chose it as
a target. The station shipped trainloads of weapons and ammunition to cargo
ships on the West Coast, which found their way to destinations beyond, includ-
ing Central America. On September 1, 1987, Willson and two others sat on the
train tracks to prevent a munitions train from departing. The train did not stop,
however, and Willson was run over, his legs crushed beyond repair.
Ten days before the incident, Willson had written a letter to Commander
Lonnie Cagle at the Concord Naval Weapons Station, informing him that he
planned to sit on the tracks every day for forty days while fasting. He recounted
the destruction and murder wrought by the contras in Nicaragua and asserted
that U.S. support for the contras “violates a number of domestic and interna-
tional laws.” An attorney by profession, Willson said he felt obliged, based on the
[ 218 ] CHAPTER 8
precedent of the Nuremberg trials of 1945, to “do everything reasonable in our

power to make known the crimes of our country and to stop them from continu-
ing.”31 He called his protest the “Nuremberg Actions.” On November 18, 1987,
forty-eight days after being run over, Willson presented similar testimony to the
U.S. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations, explaining that
contra attacks on “civilian targets such as health clinics, schools and farms, and
torture and murder many of the civilians” violate international law as well as
“fundamental standards of decency and fair rules.”32
Born on the Fourth of July in 1941, Willson had grown up in a conservative
environment in upstate New York. He was a “total believer in the U.S. involve-
ment in the Vietnam War” when he first set foot in Vietnam as an air force officer
in March 1969. Assigned to examine the effects of bombing on villages, Willson
witnessed firsthand the grotesque deaths and maiming of civilians. He experi-
enced a deep revulsion and, ultimately, a paradigm shift in consciousness. After
leaving the air force at the rank of captain in 1970, he became an ardent critic of
the war and a proponent of nonviolence. His first trip through the war zones of
Nicaragua in January 1986 reminded him of Vietnam and intensified his com-
mitment to take action. He joined the Veterans Fast for Life in September, then
returned to Nicaragua with the newly formed Veterans Peace Action Team in
March 1987. Trekking through the countryside between Jinotega and Wiwilí,
the group of nine witnessed the results of a recent contra attack on the com-
munity of El Cedro. They vowed to help rebuild a destroyed health clinic in
the town. A succession of Veterans Peace Action Teams followed to El Cedro,
hammers in hand.33
In the aftermath of the train incident, sympathy poured in. Rep. Nancy
Pelosi (D-CA) issued a statement expressing “sorrow and outrage for what hap-
pened to Brian Willson.” Rep. Ron Dellums (D-CA) called for a full congressio-
nal investigation, saying, “There is absolutely no excuse for what happened.” From
Managua, Daniel Ortega declared that Willson’s “act of solidarity” would not be in
vain; and Rosario Murillo traveled to the United States with four of her children
to wish Willson well and attend a follow-up protest at the same site.34 Willson,
after recovering and being fitted with artificial legs, continued his activism,
becoming a recognized leader in the Central America movement.
Countdown ’87 in 1988

In late January 1988, after a five-month delay, the Reagan administration pre-
sented to Congress its much anticipated proposal for contra aid. The measure
called for $36.25 million in military and non-military aid for a four-month
period. Countdown ’87 continued into 1988, accompanied by a rising tide of
advertisements, lobbying days, and grassroots activities. Sojourners news edi-
tor Vicki Kemper summed up local activities over the last few months in the
January issue: “Since August, more than 220 local groups in 42 states had held
hundreds of vigils and demonstrations against contra aid, groups had made
more than 300 visits to congressional offices and sent more than 90,000 letters
opposing contra aid to members of Congress, and scores of activists had been
arrested for committing acts of civil disobedience.”35
With the vote on contra aid approaching in Congress, over one hundred reli-
gious leaders signed a statement declaring that any “additional aid to the Contras
in any form or any amount would violate the Central American peace plan,” and
that the “immoral Contra war policy must finally be ended.” The statement was
inserted into the Congressional Record by Rep. Louise Slaughter (D-NY), rep-
resenting the Rochester, New York, area.36 Adding to this moral suasion, all
seven Democratic presidential candidates (Bruce Babbitt, Michael Dukakis,
Richard Gephardt, Albert Gore Jr., Gary Hart, Jesse Jackson, and Paul Simon)
were on record against contra aid.37 Another impetus for all parties to reject con-
tra aid came from abroad. The International Verification Commission, which
was set up to monitor the progress of the Esquipulas peace agreement, issued a
report in mid-January reiterating that a “definitive halt” of U.S. aid to the contras
was “an indispensable requirement for the success of . . . peace efforts” in Central
America. The commission, which was made up of representatives from the five
Central American nations and eight Contadora nations, effectively blunted the
Reagan administration’s efforts to sabotage the peace agreement. As the Los
Angeles Times noted, “The Reagan administration has been pressing Nicaragua’s
four neighbors to declare the peace plan a failure and to focus blame on the
Sandinista government in order to bolster a White House bid for new aid to the
U.S.-backed Contras.”38
One indication of growing disenchantment with the Contra War was a
statement signed by thirty-nine mayors at the U.S. Conference of Mayors in
Washington, DC, in January 1988. The two-paragraph “Mayors’ Initiative for
Peace in Central America” endorsed the Arias peace plan and called for an end
to contra aid. The initiative was a joint project of Berkeley mayor Loni Hancock,
the Berkeley-León Sister City Project, the Nicaragua Information Center, and
Neighbor-to-Neighbor. At a press conference, Lionel Wilson, mayor of Oakland,
told reporters, “According to all polls, our citizens strongly support the peace
[ 220 ] CHAPTER 8
plan and are overwhelmingly opposed to further funding of the contras.” Of the
thirty-nine mayors who signed the statement, five were from southern states
(Atlanta, Birmingham, Louisville, New Orleans, and San Antonio). Mayor Raul
Martinez of Hialeah, Florida, however, called a press conference to express his
opposition to the initiative.39
When the House vote took place on February 3, 1988. Contra War opponents
eked out a victory. After ten hours of debate, the House voted 219–211 to reject
the president’s contra aid request. (The measure passed in the Senate, 51–48, but
to no avail.) A change of only five votes in the House would have reversed the
outcome. Jean Walsh, codirector of the Witness for Peace office in Washington,
DC, credited Countdown ’87 with influencing at least four crucial votes. All in
all, of the twenty-three “swing” House members targeted by Countdown ’87,
six voted against contra aid. Of those six, two changed their vote from 1986, two
were freshmen and had not voted on the issue before, and two who had voted
previously against contra aid did so again.
Rep. Les Aspin (D-WI) was one of the two House members who changed
his vote to oppose the contra aid measure. According to Campaign ’87 reports,
he received 2,700 letters and 500 phone calls from constituents and held meet-
ings with the state Democratic Party chair, the president of the state AFL-CIO,
and the director of Wisconsin Council of Churches. An anti-contra rally was
held at his district office and sixty-one labor leaders published an open letter
asking him to oppose contra aid. The Wisconsin Action Coalition coordinated
the lobbying effort.40
The victory celebration did not last long. Speaker Jim Wright, in order to
secure the votes of “moderate” Democrats, had promised to introduce a com-
promise “nonlethal” aid package in the near future. He assigned Rep. Bonior the
task of crafting this compromise. With reservations, Bonior developed a pro-
posal that offered $16 million in “nonlethal” aid distributed through a neutral
party, and prohibited further distribution of military aid.
Bonior’s compromise bill “split the coalition,” according to IPS director
Robert Borosage, who served on the Countdown ’87 oversight board. As the
thrust of the ACWC from the outset had been to oppose any and all aid to the
contras, many activists could not in good conscience support Bonior’s “nonle-
thal” proposal. Others, however, recognized the political quandary and made
accommodations. As Borosage described it, Countdown ’87 and the “more
sophisticated legislative groups, mainly church lobbies,” went with the proposal,
owing to the “credibility of Bonior in making the call” and the belief that they
could “come back for more later.” Groups that opposed the measure included
Nicaragua Network, CISPES, and a large number of locals. “It was a struggle for
everybody,” said Kathy Gille. “It was a struggle for us,” referring to the House
Democratic Task Force on Central America. “We were never for humanitarian
aid to the contras. To give humanitarian aid to a military force was the same as
giving military aid.” Yet once it became clear that there were not enough votes to
permanently cut off contra aid, the next best option was to allow for some non-
lethal aid that would support the demobilization of the contras.
That, at least, was what Rep. Bonior had in mind. “I was originally opposed
to nonlethal aid because it was fungible,” said Bonior. “But it became necessary
at some point to do that to wind it [the Contra War] down.” Gille similarly
argued that the aid was “aimed at demobilizing the contras in an unclear situa-
tion. . . . We felt this demobilization effort was real and that it needed support.”
She praised the “sophistication of the campaign” for being “able to take a risk
in this way. One of the problems of grassroots organizing is that you do it on a
moral basis . . . thus it’s very hard to do a nuanced strategy.”41
As it turned out, it was the Republicans who rejected the compromise mea-
sure (all but five), believing that they would get another chance to vote for
military aid. Two dozen liberal Democrats also refused to go along with the
compromise, believing that the aid could not be justified in light of the contras’
abominable human rights record and continuing defiance of the Esquipulas
accords. The vote on March 3 was 216–208 against Bonior’s proposal.
The defeat of Bonior’s compromise had the unanticipated effect of impel-
ling some contra leaders to accept an invitation from FSLN leaders to negotiate
a settlement. They met on March 21 in the tiny town of Sapoá on Nicaragua’s
southern border. Two days later, Sandinista representatives and contra leaders
Diógenes Hernández and Walter Calderón signed an agreement stipulating a
sixty-day ceasefire, amnesty for returning contras, and access to humanitarian
aid for the contras channeled through neutral organizations. The contra leader-
ship had been in turmoil during the last few months, with civilian leaders Adolfo
Calero and Alfredo Cesar, both businessmen, at odds with the top military chief,
ex-national guardsman Enrique Bermúdez. The civilian leaders had indicated
some willingness to negotiate with the Sandinistas, given the insecurity of con-
tra funding in Congress, the signing of the Esquipulas accords, which called for
the dissolution of the contras, and demands by the Honduran government for
the contras to leave. Bermúdez rejected the Sapoá agreement and expelled the
two contra leaders who had signed it. He openly declared on Costa Rica’s Radio
[ 222 ] CHAPTER 8
Impacto on March 27 that “the forces under my command will continue fighting
until we win a complete victory.” The ceasefire, as such, did not hold.42
In the United States, the Sapoá agreement led to speculation in the media
that the Contra War was on its last legs, with pundits writing contra obituar-
ies. Reports of the contras’ demise, however, were highly exaggerated, as contra
attacks continued to exact lethal results.43 Still, the reigning idea in Congress
was that “nonlethal” aid would facilitate the peace process. On March 30–31, the
House and Senate voted for a new aid package, extended another lifeline to the
contras under the auspices of demobilization. The aid included $17.7 million in
“nonlethal” aid to the contras (food, clothing, shelter, and medical supplies),
$17.7 million for children in Nicaragua who were victims of the war, and $10 mil-
lion for a verification commission as set forth in the Sapoá agreement. The bill
stipulated that aid to the contras must be delivered by “neutral organizations,”
consistent with the Sapoá agreement. The votes were 345–70 in the House and
88–7 in the Senate. Most liberal Democrats voted for the measure, believing
that they were aiding the peace process. Most Republicans conceded that this
was the best deal they could get at the time.
The Honduran “Invasion”

The Reagan administration still had on the back burner Lt. Col. Oliver North’s
contingency plan, in which the United States would undertake military action
against Nicaragua in response to a Nicaraguan “invasion” of Honduras. The
administration, in fact, had never ceased preparing for a direct attack on Nicaragua.
In May 1987, for example, 50,000 U.S. troops engaged in a mock invasion of the
eastern coast of Honduras as part of a month-long exercise known as “Solid Shield
’87.” On March 16, 1988, six weeks after Congress had voted down Reagan’s mili-
tary aid package, an opportunity arose for direct U.S. involvement. Sandinista
forces had chased a group of contras back to their bases in Honduras, temporarily
crossing the border. President Reagan responded by immediately ordering 3,200
U.S. troops to Honduras.
Skepticism abounded as to the necessity and wisdom of the president’s
action. Honduran President José Azcona played down the border incident, as
he was intent on relieving his country of the contras rather than reinforcing their
mission with U.S. troops. Two days after U.S. troops were sent, former president
Jimmy Carter told a meeting of university presidents, “I think it is a serious mis-
take. It’s another example of where President Reagan is exaggerating the situ-
ation for his own purposes.” House Speaker Jim Wright accused White House
officials of “obviously trying to do everything in their power to keep the war

going.” U.S. News & World Report subtitled its report on the incident “American
Troops in Honduras May Be the Last Ploy in Conflict.” The article noted that
Congress was reluctant to believe the administration due to a “history of mis-
leading the Congress.” Indeed, only six weeks earlier, the New York Times had
revealed a secret CIA plan to arrange for an Eastern Block arms shipment to be
captured in El Salvador and falsely link it to Nicaragua.44 The president’s cred-
ibility gap, it seems, had become a chasm.
Contra War opponents had remained vigilant over the years in preparing for
the possibility of a U.S. invasion of Nicaragua, as it was known that President
Reagan did not want to leave office with the Sandinistas in power. Following
the deployment of U.S. troops to Honduras on March 16, the national Pledge of
Resistance office gave the signal for local demonstrations and civil disobedience
actions. These took place in over 100 U.S. cities over the next twelve days, with
many “sit-ins” at federal buildings. A total of 900 demonstrators were arrested,
including 250 in San Francisco. In Washington, DC, a dozen demonstrators
blocked traffic in front of the White House. In Seattle, rather than blocking traf-
fic this time, protesters drove their cars in circles around the Federal Building
and blasted their horns for an hour, while others stood on the sidewalks waving
signs that denounced the U.S. intervention.45 Ultimately, the combination of
domestic protests, elite criticism, press skepticism, and international opposi-
tion was enough to restrain the administration from further military action.
Educational Outreach, 1987–88
The efforts of anti–Contra War activists and intellectuals to advance their

themes and arguments were aided by political and international developments
in the latter part of the 1980s. The Iran-Contra scandal, of course, validated their
allegations of administration illegalities. The Esquipulas Treaty in August 1987
reinforced the theme of diplomacy over war. The earlier World Court decision
in June 1986 placed the ACWC on the side of international law and allied it with
the international community.
Regarding other themes, despite the administration’s “successful” invasion of
Grenada in October 1983, the ACWC was able to make the anti-interventionist
“Vietnam syndrome” stick with respect to Nicaragua. And despite President
Reagan’s heartfelt endorsement of the contras. the consistent documentation of
[ 224 ] CHAPTER 8
contra attacks on civilians by Witness for Peace and other groups severely tar-
nished the reputation of the contras, Time magazine wrote in March 1987 that
contras “have hurt their cause by failing to distinguish between civilian and
military targets. There were recent reports of contras burning down a small com-
munity’s church-sponsored health clinic.”46 Opponents of the Contra War also
made some progress in humanizing Nicaraguans through their many local trans-
national activities and news coverage of such, even if the Sandinista government
continued to be framed in Cold War stereotypes.
Another point raised by various groups was the cost of the Contra War. This
“guns versus butter” theme was a standard of the peace movement, but it was
useful only to a degree in the anti–Contra War campaign. The overall cost of con-
tra aid was a pittance compared to the Pentagon budget. For fiscal conservatives
who supported Reagan’s Nicaragua policy, the contras were a bargain as com-
pared to sending in U.S. troops. Contra War opponents, including most recently,
the U.S. Conference of Mayors, nevertheless found this theme a useful hook for
gaining public attention—for example, your tax dollars are going to the contras.
The new détente that developed between the United States and the Soviet
Union in the latter half of the 1980s theoretically weakened the administration’s
case against Nicaragua, as the alleged security dangers posed by Sandinista
Nicaragua were seen to originate in the Soviet Union. If the United States could
make friends with the “evil empire,” as Ronald Reagan did in May 1987, why not
the Sandinistas as well, which had already embarked on perestroika-like reforms?
Yet the administration did not follow this line of logic, being relentlessly com-
mitted to reestablishing a pro-U.S. government in America’s “backyard.” Presi-
dent Reagan continued to make the same arguments and accusations against
Nicaragua. On February 2, 1988, for example, he declared in an address from the
Oval Office, “With Cuban and Soviet-bloc aid, Nicaragua is being transformed
into a beachhead for aggression against the United States.” He once again identi-
fied the Sandinistas as a “communist dictatorship in Nicaragua,” and the contras
as “freedom fighters,” and cast doubt on any peace agreement, asking rhetorically
if “we can trust the Sandinistas to keep their word.”47
It remained an uphill battle for Contra War opponents to cultivate a progres-
sive understanding of the Central American situation. AFSC staff persons Jack
Malinowski and Angie Berryman lamented in an internal analysis dated June 1,
1987, that few U.S. citizens “have a realistic view of what is going on in Nicaragua,”
as the Reagan administration’s “campaign of lies and distortions has taken its toll
on public perceptions.” Although majority opinion remained opposed to contra
aid, they wrote, this “has yet to be translated into active concern by most peo-
ple.” Robert Stark, director of Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central
America (PACCA), was similarly aware of the great distance still to be traveled in
establishing a progressive mindset in the body politic. “With the administration
policy in disarray,” he wrote in mid-1988, “progressive forces have the opportu-
nity to put forward policy alternatives.” To succeed, however, much educational
work “remains to be done, because the national security assumptions that under-
lie a policy of dominating Central America remain unchallenged.”48 Stark did
not mean that activist groups had not persistently challenged national security
assumptions, but that the results thus far had been meager.
In 1987 and 1988 ACWC groups continued their efforts to raise conscious-
ness and encourage involvement in the campaign. AFSC produced a new four-
teen-page brochure in April 1987 titled “Talking Sense About Nicaragua,” which
used a question-and-answer format to examine a dozen negative assumptions
about Sandinista Nicaragua. The Unitarian Universalist Service Committee
produced an informative, 315-page study and action guide, A Journey to Under-
standing (1988), that became the source book for many study groups, religious
and secular. Nicaragua Network and the Nicaragua Information Center in
Berkeley produced an updated two-page flyer, “Nicaragua’s Revolution at Six
Years: A Look at the Achievements,” which provided an overview of Nicaragua’s
achievements in literacy, health, and food security as well as the Sandinista
government’s efforts on behalf of peace. In the wake of the ceasefire agreement
at Sapoá in March 1988, PACCA added a new section to its Changing Course
manifesto titled “Alternative Policy for Peace in Central America.” Witness for
Peace added a new element to its periodic reports on contra attacks—videos.
The WFP report, “Contra Activities: 18 Incidents, December 1986 to November
1987,” came with a video filmed on location.
New films and television programs were independently produced as well. A
fifty-two-minute film, The World Is Watching (White Pine Pictures, 1987), criti-
cally analyzed how news was gathered and reported from Nicaragua. The Public
Broadcasting Service’s Frontline program ran a one-hour investigative report,
“The War in Nicaragua” in May 1987. Pacifica Radio aired eleven and a half hours
of programming on Nicaragua in 1987, including a program on the Conference
in the Spirit of Ben Linder in Portland in October 1987. The building process in
El Cedro was captured in a documentary film, The War in El Cedro: American
Veterans in Nicaragua (Northstar Productions, 1987, 50 min.). The following
year, a hard-hitting film, Coverup: Behind the Iran Contra Affair (Empowerment
[ 226 ] CHAPTER 8
Project, 1988, 72 min.), was released in theaters in eighty cities across the United
States. The film probed administration violations of the law beyond the mild
congressional investigation of the Iran-Contra affair. It won the American Film
and Video Association’s Blue Ribbon Award for Best Documentary. Activist
groups in many cities organized discussions following the film and recruited
people outside the theaters.49
Circulating speakers around the country continued to be a popular method
of educational outreach. AFSC sponsored a tour of Nicaraguan teachers in
1987, with a special focus on reaching Latino and African-American audiences.
IRTFCA sponsored a tour of eleven Central American pastors and lay people who
spoke in eighteen cities in 1988. The Interreligious Foundation for Community
Organization organized two successful Central America Information Weeks—in
South Carolina (1987) and in Kentucky (1988). In conservative South Carolina
IFCO recruited eighty-five local coordinators in sixty-eight communities who
organized 623 events.50 U.S. Marine veteran Bill Gandall maintained his regular
schedule of speaking engagements at college campuses and churches. Still strong
at the age of eighty, he participated in a civil disobedience action in West Palm
Beach, Florida, in February 1989. After spending a spent a night in jail, he was on
his way to speak at the University of Connecticut the next day.51
Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States Carlos Tünnermann also made
the rounds as a speaker. The Washington Post (April 19, 1987) noted that dur-
ing his “frequent speeches to community groups around the country, he often
asks whether anyone present has visited Nicaragua. ‘There are always three or
four hands,’ ” he said. President Reagan ordered the expulsion of Ambassador
Tünnermann and seven others at the Nicaraguan Embassy, including Sophia
Clark, one day after the Nicaraguan government expelled the U.S. ambassador
to Nicaragua, Richard Melton, and seven others at the American Embassy at
Managua for allegedly encouraging opposition demonstrations.52
The most popular speakers on the ACWC lecture circuit in 1987 were members
of the Linder family. In the aftermath of Ben Linder’s death on April 28, father
David, mother Elisabeth, brother John, age thirty-two, and sister Miriam, age
thirty, went on speaking tours from June through December, covering forty-
three states, six Canadian provinces, and Sweden and Norway. David, a phy-
sician, was active in the Portland-Corinto sister city program. During World
War II he had served as an army medic and been shot in the elbow during the
Battle of the Bulge. Elisabeth, a legal aide with the Washington County Public
Defender’s Office, was active in the Women’s International League for Peace
and Freedom. In 1938, she and her Jewish family had fled Czechoslovakia, ahead
of Adolf Hitler’s troops, and settled in Mexico.53
To coordinate the logistics of the tours, the family set up a Ben Linder Peace
Tour office across the hall from Nicaragua Network in Washington, DC. John
Linder, who was active in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), hired Jerry Frei-
wirth, a fellow SWP member, and Teresa Delgadillo, who had been living in Nic-
aragua as a reporter for The Militant, an SWP newspaper. “The Socialist Workers
Party was quite helpful on this tour,” said John. “It was a great example of a left-
wing party working in a completely unifying way.” The Linder Peace Tour office
was assisted by three national groups, Nicaragua Network, Quixote Center, and
Witness for Peace, each of which provided local contacts for making arrange-
ments. John and Miriam started out together in Miami, but after three cities they
split apart in order to cover more ground. David and Elisabeth also traveled sepa-
rately, as both speakers were in high demand. “Wherever I have gone,” said
Elisabeth, “they have filled every place. At my first appearance in a church in New
York, there were probably two hundred people outside who wouldn’t leave, so
we spoke to them on the steps.”54 The Linder Peace Tour also recruited four of
Ben’s coworkers from Nicaragua to speak in the United States.
John Linder had visited his brother in Nicaragua in January 1984, staying
for two months. During that time, he joined a Nicaraguan coffee-picking bri-
gade made up of employees of the Nicaraguan Energy Institute. They worked
for three weeks at a farm where the contras had recently killed a number of farm
workers. “I was sleeping with thirteen Nicaraguans every night and picking cof-
fee with two hundred Nicaraguans,” he recounted. During his 1987 speaking
tour, John spoke at community gatherings from Miami to Portland, Oregon. “It
was union halls, community centers, churches, and a few campuses,” he said.
In late July, while traveling through the prairie states, John stopped in the town
of Canton, South Dakota, to hear Vice President George Bush deliver a speech.
In the question-and-answer session that followed, John stood up and introduced
himself. “I’m John Linder. I’m the brother of Ben Linder, who was murdered by
the contras in Nicaragua on April 28, 1987.” He described what Ben was doing and
the circumstances of his death, ending with, “my brother was shot in the head at
point-blank range as he lay wounded. . . . Nobody from the administration that
you represent has condemned my brother’s killing.” Bush replied that he empa-
thized with the Linder family, but that Ben had “made his choice” to support
“those who are in that Nicaraguan regime.” Bush followed this response with an
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attack on the Sandinistas for allegedly reneging on their pledge to hold elections
and practice democracy. He then declared that the Sandinistas had “done a great
job getting out what I think is the propaganda side. We have got to do a better
job getting the truth out. Then I think the American people will respond.”55 The
interchange made front-page news in the New York Times, Washington Post, and
Los Angeles Times.
Administration officials missed few opportunities to get their message out.
Such was the case with the one-day hearing on the death of Ben Linder convened
by the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs on May 13, 1987.
Chairman Rep. George Crockett (D-MI) opened the meeting with a statement
demanding “an end to a policy which threatens American lives” and harms “inno-
cent citizens of Nicaragua.” He noted that since 1981 “2,032 women, 1,996 chil-
dren, 176 school teachers and 52 doctors have been kidnapped, killed or wounded.
There are 9,132 war orphans and 250,000 displaced persons.” Elliot Abrams, assis-
tant secretary of state for inter-American affairs, speaking for the administration,
made no apologies for the contras and instead called for Americans to leave
Nicaragua. He argued that “there is an enormous amount of danger for those
roughly 1,500–2,000 Americans in Nicaragua. And this hearing may actually do
some good if it alerts more Americans who are thinking of going down there to
the danger.” Abrams did not mention the crucial fact that the sole source of this
danger to Americans was the U.S.-backed contras. Michael Ratner, director of the
Center for Constitutional Rights, testified that contra actions and statements in
1986 indicated a new policy of killing internationalists so as to scare them away.
“I believe the contras are now willing to take the risk of one or two days of bad
publicity in order to stem the flow of foreigners to Nicaragua,” he said.56
Nicaragua Connections, 1987–88
The sizable presence of U.S. citizens in Nicaragua remained in the last years of
the decade. The flow of Americans to Nicaragua continued through mission-
ary work, study tours, international work brigades, Witness for Peace delega-
tions, and individual projects. “Since the Sandinistas came to power in 1979,”
reported the Washington Post on May 3, 1987, “U.S. peace groups, churches and
various organizations are estimated to have sent more than 60,000 American
volunteers to Nicaragua.”57 Veterans for Peace opened an office in Managua
in the spring of 1988, staffed by Joe Ryan of Tallahassee. The Quixote Center,
AFSC, Nicaragua Network, MADRE, TecNica, APSNICA, sister city pro-

grams, and other groups continued to provide humanitarian aid, particularly
after Hurricane Joan slammed into the eastern coast of Nicaragua on October
21, 1988. The Quixote Center shipped sixty-eight cargo containers of goods to
Nicaragua between October 1988 and February 1989.58 A separate shipment of
tools, medical supplies, and building equipment sent by APSNICA in 1988 was
seized by U.S. Customs. The California-based organization declared that the
U.S. government’s actions were “clearly harassment” and that “all of the materi-
als seized are unquestionably exempt from the U.S. trade embargo.”59
The FSLN government invited Witness for Peace volunteers to accompany
its 250 peace commissions into the war zones. Established as part of the contra
reconciliation process, the commissions sought out contra groups and encour-
aged them to return to their communities under the FSLN government’s new
amnesty law. The commissions also hoped to win the release of an estimated
5,000 civilians kidnapped by the contras. WFP began a new publication, Peace
Watch, to monitor the reconciliation process.60 The Quixote Center developed
an independent initiative to support the peace process. In February 1988, the
center initiated the Communities of Peace and Friendship project, which raised
funds to resettle former contras and otherwise assisted “community-based
efforts to rebuild and reconcile in Nicaragua.” The Quixote Center raised nearly
$30,000 in the first six months for twenty-four community projects, including
$2,000 for the Nicaraguan Red Cross. The center also developed a secret plan to
buy out 10 percent of the contra army on the eastern coast of Nicaragua. Accord-
ing to a Quixote Center report: “After quiet negotiations we focused on 400
Miskito fighters who indicated that, if supported, they would drop out with their
weapons and resettle in their original homeland south of Puerto Cabezas. To side-
step the embargo, we organized in Canada, gathered supplies and shipped them
to the East Coast of Nicaragua. A few months later, the newspapers reported that
400 Miskito fighters had dropped out of the war and returned to their homes.”61
Walk in Peace
In October 1986 Don Mosley was riding in the back of a truck with a group of
Nicaraguans traveling to the northern town of Jinotega. Among the travelers
was Carmen Picado, who had recently lost both her legs while riding in the
back of a similar truck that had hit a land mine. Two family members—her
sister’s husband, Amancio Sanchez, pastor of a Pentecostal Christian Mission
church in the town of Pantasma, and Sanchez’s seven-year-old daughter—had
[ 230 ] CHAPTER 8
lost their right legs in the same explosion. After meeting with the family mem-
bers, Mosley envisioned a new aid project that would provide artificial limbs to
an estimated two thousand amputees in Nicaragua, nearly one-third of whom
had lost legs or arms within the last year. He named the project “Walk in Peace.”
With the help of former president Jimmy Carter, who served with Mosley on
the International Board of Directors of Habitat for Humanity, Mosley obtained
visas for Picado and the Sanchezes to come to the United States. When they arrived
in Atlanta on February 7, 1987, Mosley took them to the Emory Center, where
they were fitted with artificial limbs. Carter came by for a visit, chatting with them
in Spanish. On February 25 Mosley held a press conference in Washington, DC,
with the Nicaraguan family present, to announce the new Walk in Peace project.
Word of the project spread quickly through the religious and activist networks.
Local community groups organized walk-a-thons and other fundraising events.
The money raised was channeled through the Council of Protestant Churches
(CEPAD) to either the Aldo Chavaria Rehabilitation Hospital, which set up a
new prosthesis workshop, or the Velez Pais Children’s Hospital, both located in
Managua. Over the next few years, Walk in Peace provided the money for hun-
dreds of amputees to receive artificial limbs, without regard to their politics.62
Don Mosley grew up in Waco, Texas, in a Christian fundamentalist environ-
ment. His devotion to “true Christian living” never wavered, he said, but his
understanding of what this meant evolved considerably. He began his humani-
tarian service in the Peace Corps, being one of the first to apply in the early
1960s. He served in Malaysia and South Korea, becoming a regional Peace
Corps director with supervision over from 100 to 125 volunteers in South Korea
from 1967 to 1969. In 1970 he settled into a new life at Koinonia, an intentional
Christian community in Americus, Georgia. Nine years later he helped estab-
lish a nearby sister community, Jubilee Partners, which was dedicated to Chris-
tian service. Mosley, a pacifist, also served as the national chairperson of the
Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) from 1984 to 1986.
He first visited Nicaragua in February 1984 as part of an eighteen-person
fact-finding delegation, co-sponsored by WFP and FOR. At the time, he wres-
tled in his own mind with the question of pacifism in a revolutionary context.
“Part of my reason for coming had been to probe the question of nonviolence,
to find out how people caught up in this conflict could reconcile armed struggle
with the teachings of Jesus,” he later wrote. Then “it struck me with great force
that I was asking the wrong question—and the wrong people. The real question
with which I should be struggling was, what could I do to change the awful
circumstances that promoted this mutual slaughter?”63 That same year, Mosley
helped initiate a new Habitat for Humanity housing project in Nicaragua. This
Christian nonprofit group maintained a low political profile but offered steady
assistance to the Nicaraguan people. By 2007 the group had sponsored the
building of 4,500 houses in Nicaragua.
Mosley had been instrumental in persuading former President Carter to join
the international board of Habitat for Humanity. Thus, it was not unusual for the
two to discuss Carter’s impending trip to Nicaragua while at a board meeting
in January 1986. Carter hoped to independently mediate an agreement between
FSLN and contra leaders. The State Department had advised Carter to limit his
meetings and get out of the country quickly, so as not to place himself in danger,
but Mosley encouraged him to take his time and meet with a variety of groups
and individuals representing different interests. The following month, Carter
embarked on a ten-day trip to Latin America, with three days in Nicaragua. He
first flew to Venezuela to meet with a prominent contra leader, then to Managua
to meet with FSLN leaders. Although he was unable to broker an agreement, he
developed cordial relations with FSLN leaders. Carter and Daniel Ortega drove
together to the new Habitat project in German Pomares, where they met with
co-directors Jim and Sarah Hornsby, and Julie Knop. Four years later, Carter
returned to Nicaragua as an international election observer.
Mosley’s efforts on behalf of peace never ceased after visiting Nicaragua in
early 1984. In addition to initiating humanitarian aid projects, he went on speak-
ing tours across the United States, making more than five hundred presentations
in thirty states. He spoke at churches, college campuses, community meetings,
conferences, and protest rallies. In one church in Indiana, Mosley recalled, the
pastor walked out after he spoke of the warmth of the Nicaraguan people.
Apparently, said Mosley, “the attribution of Christian compassion to an enemy
touched a raw nerve in the pastor.” He was also called “a damned communist” at
times, he noted, presumably because “many people found it difficult to find any
mistake in U.S. policy.”
Material Aid Convoys

Like other humanitarian aid projects undertaken by activist groups, material aid
caravans were organized with multiple purposes in mind: providing direct aid
to Nicaraguans, educating U.S. citizens, attracting favorable publicity, involv-
ing activists, and encouraging community support. All of these elements were
part of two material aid caravans that made their way to Nicaragua in 1988, the
[ 232 ] CHAPTER 8
Veterans Peace Convoy, from May through July, and IFCO’s Pastors for Peace
caravan, from October through December.
The Veterans Peace Convoy (VPC) was organized by representatives from
seven organizations: Veterans Peace Action Teams, Smedley Butler Brigade (the
Boston chapter of VFP), Quixote Center, Nicaragua Network, Chicanos Against
Military Intervention in Latin America, MADRE, and the Ben Linder Memorial
Fund. The caravan originated from different parts of the United States—Seattle;
Missoula, Montana; Minneapolis; and Caribou, Maine—and stopped in over
100 cities in 42 states before converging in Laredo, Texas, on June 7, 1988. There
were 106 convoy members and 37 trucks and buses filled with 30 tons of food,
medical supplies, and other humanitarian aid.64 On June 15 the convoy arrived at
the Mexican border but was blocked from going through by U.S. Customs,
which claimed that the aid was not allowed under the rules of the embargo.
Customs officials seized four trucks and held them for a week. The rest of the
convoy, meanwhile, turned around and headed for Washington, DC.
Upon arriving in Washington, thirty vehicles circled the White House in pro-
test. “We intend to lobby and gain support for this convoy to pass,” said VPC orga-
nizer Gerry Condon of San Francisco. “We want to feed the children, not the war.”
The media picked up on the unfolding drama, making the convoy national news.
Rep. Mickey Leland (D-TX) introduced a resolution in the House advising the
treasury secretary not to regulate the donation of articles designed to relieve
human suffering in Nicaragua. “It’s wrong to thwart the humanitarian impulses of
the American people,” said Leland.65 The convoy also became a popular cause in
activist circles. Protesters in Boston recreated the Boston Tea Party by dumping
copies of the embargo order into the harbor. Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of the
Detroit Archdiocese, speaking in Boston, decried the embargo as “illegal and
immoral.”66 Local groups raised money for the convoy to keep it going. Some con-
voy members had to leave in order to return to their jobs and families, but replace-
ments filled in.
The convoy, with fifty people and twenty vehicles, drove back to Laredo and
attempted another crossing on July 8. Rebuffed by U.S. Customs once again,
eight members in three vehicles attempted to dodge a police blockade and
cross the border. The eight were arrested and their vehicles impounded. Press
coverage of the veterans’ travail continued at a high level as the group waited
at the border. Finally, on July 15 the remaining convoy of fourteen trucks and
one bus was allowed to cross. VPC members were elated but puzzled by the
sudden switch in U.S. actions. On July 29 the convoy arrived in Managua. The
veterans were received by President Daniel Ortega in a public ceremony. “These

people are representatives of the American people who don’t want war, they
want peace,” said Ortega. “While Reagan sends arms to the contras to murder
our children, he tried also to obstruct this caravan.” Holding up a baby bottle
taken out of a box of goods delivered, Ortega said, “This is what Reagan did not
want to arrive.”67
The Veterans Peace Convoy paved the way for subsequent convoys, as a law-
suit filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights resulted in a ruling against the
administration’s interpretation of the embargo. U.S. District Judge George P.
Kazan in Laredo ruled on October 1, 1988, that the president has no authority
to regulate or prohibit U.S. citizens’ donations to foreign countries intended to
relieve human suffering.68
Lucius Walker, IFCO’s director, began thinking about organizing a material
aid caravan to Nicaragua while recovering from a bullet wound in his buttocks.
On August 2, 1988, the contras had attacked a civilian passenger ferry on the
Rio Coco in northeastern Nicaragua on which he was riding. Two persons were
killed; and Walker, age fifty-seven, was one of the twenty-nine wounded. The
bullet “didn’t kill me,” said Walker, “but it sure got my attention.”69 Walker con-
ferred with his staff, and they decided to initiate a Pastors for Peace Convoy that
fall. With IFCO’s talented organizers and many contacts around the country, it
did not take long to set up the operation.
Like the Veterans for Peace Convoy, the Pastors for Peace Convoy originated
from different regions of the United States, holding meetings and press confer-
ences and collecting materials and medicines along the way. There were six legs
in all, involving 54 people and 19 trucks. They traveled through 78 U.S. cities
before converging at San Antonio on December 9. Crossing the Mexican bor-
der took a full day, but there were no legal problems. The caravan arrived intact
in Managua on Christmas Eve 1988, with 120 tons of humanitarian aid. Most of
the aid was delivered to church-related agencies. Some went to the Bluefields
area, on the eastern coast, which had been devastated by Hurricane Joan. The
contingent of trucks that traveled to Bluefields was halted for a night by FSLN
security forces, due to contra activity in the area.70
A second Pastors for Peace Convoy followed in 1989. This one delivered 26
trucks worth over $200,000 and 200 tons of humanitarian aid, valued at over $1
million. The second caravan held events in 106 cities covering 36 states and was
aided by over 250 local churches, peace and solidarity groups, and community
organizations. “Each stop along a route involved some combination of education
[ 234 ] CHAPTER 8
event, press conference, community gathering and/or material aid collection,”

noted an IFCO report. The Pastors for Peace caravans attracted local news cov-
erage but did not receive the national attention garnered by the Veterans Peace
Convoy.71
New Challenges and the Unexpected Outcome, 1989–90
The limits of the anti–Contra War campaign’s inroads into U.S. politics became
clear in the presidential election campaign of 1988. Gov. Michael Dukakis, the
Democratic Party candidate running against Vice President George Bush, had
heretofore been an outspoken opponent of the contra aid. He had filed suit to pre-
vent the Massachusetts National Guard from being sent to Honduras in May 1988.
He had publicly admonished the Reagan administration for “using National Guard
training in Central America as part of its ill-advised and illegal strategy to over-
throw the Nicaraguan government.”72 Yet during the fall election campaign,
Dukakis chose as his running mate an ardent supporter of contra aid, Sen. Lloyd
Bentsen of Texas, and said very little about Nicaragua while on the campaign trail.
The Democratic Party platform in 1988, in contrast to the lengthy discussion of
Central America issues in the 1984 platform, stated only that the Reagan adminis-
tration had “consistently undermined” the peace process in Central America.73 The
Democrats hoped that their Massachusetts-Texas combination would produce the
same results as the Kennedy-Johnson ticket in 1960, but this was not to be.
Upon entering the White House in January 1989, President George H. W.
Bush revised the Nicaragua strategy. Recognizing that the reputation of the con-
tras had been tarnished beyond repair, the new administration rhetorically
emphasized its support for the Sandinista government’s internal opponents,
albeit while still supporting and directing the contras. Like the Reagan adminis-
tration, the Bush administration ignored the requirement in the Esquipulas
accords that the United States cease its support for the contras. The Bush admin-
istration enticed and pressured opposition political parties to unite under the
banner of the National Opposition Union (UNO), in preparation for national
elections set for February 25, 1990. UNO consisted of fourteen political par-
ties—four on the right, seven in the middle, and three on the far left, including
the Nicaraguan Communist Party. The lack of agreement on ideology and policy
was of no concern to the Bush administration, as the only important objective
was to defeat the FSLN at the ballot box.
The FSLN, for its part, lived up to its obligation under the Esquipulas accords
to hold democratic elections, inviting international observers to monitor the
process. At the request of the FSLN government, the UN sent 170 official del-
egates and the OAS sent another 200, all of whom were given unrestricted access
to voting centers and political parties throughout the election campaign. The
Bush administration paid little attention to UN verification and reserved the
right to judge the elections for itself, much as the Reagan administration had
done in 1984. The administration’s not-so-subtle message was that only if the
FSLN lost would the elections be considered valid.
Congress as a whole went along with the Bush administration’s strategy. On
April 13, 1989, a bipartisan accord was reached in which Congress approved
nearly $50 million in nonmilitary aid for the contras, thus keeping them in the
field through the upcoming national elections. In October 1989 Congress ap-
proved another $9 million for the ostensible purpose of supporting democratic
institutions in Nicaragua. The New York Times noted that the $9 million would
be used “to assist opposition parties in the election next February and to sup-
port international observers.”74 Much of that money went to UNO presidential
candidate Violeta Chamorro, enabling her to promote her campaign more vig-
orously and keep the disparate parties of her coalition in line.
The mainstream media in the United States also moved in tandem with the
administration’s shift in focus to UNO. Contra attacks, when reported at all,
were depicted as the last vestige of a fading and tiresome war. Anti-Sandinista
demonstrations, on the other hand, were prominently featured in the news.
Notwithstanding ceasefire talks, Sandinista peace commissions, and prema-
ture obituaries, the U.S.-supplied contras continued their attacks in the north-
ern and central areas of Nicaragua. A Witness for Peace summary report in
October 1989 described fifty-one contra attacks on civilian communities that
had occurred between April 13 and October 14, 1989. The grisly results of these
attacks were seventy-one persons murdered, forty-seven wounded, and sev-
enty-eight kidnapped. Some of the attacks were aimed at disrupting voter reg-
istration drives, thus contradicting administration depictions of the contras as
guarantors of democratic elections.75
The anti–Contra War campaign faced a new set of challenges in 1989, largely
a result of the widespread impression that the Contra War was ending. Bob
Greene, editor of the quarterly Nicaragua Network News, stressed in the sum-
mer of 1989 that activists needed to spread the word that “the war is not over.”76
To counter what Greene called the “concerted misinformation campaign carried
[ 236 ] CHAPTER 8
out through the media,” Nicaragua Network joined with Witness for Peace,
Quixote Center, and FAIR (Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting) to organize a
new campaign, the Emergency Response Campaign. Its objective was to re-
spond to “the lies we feel are most damaging to Nicaragua during the electoral
process.” Its rather complicated procedure entailed recruiting representatives of
various ACWC organizations to monitor media stories on Nicaragua and iden-
tify the most egregious; copies of the selected articles and suggested responses
would then be sent to local contacts, who in turn would find community leaders
to write letters to the offending editors and publications. The organizers of the
Emergency Response Campaign hoped to see at least one critical letter-to-the-
editor published in response to each offending article—a rather modest goal.
The coordinating national groups also put together a new media packet and
sent it to grassroots contacts.77
There was a noticeable decline in anti–Contra War activism in 1989. Peace
groups began to drift away as the likelihood of a direct U.S. invasion dimin-
ished—or so it appeared before the U.S. invasion of Panama in December 1989.
The Pledge of Resistance, having fulfilled its primary mission in responding to
the Honduran incident in March 1988, shifted its attention to El Salvador. The
POR national office joined CISPES in organizing a large nonviolent civil disobe-
dient action at the Pentagon in October 1988, in which 240 people were arrested.
The Coalition for a New Foreign Policy went out of business in 1988, although its
lobbying committee, the Central America Working Group, continued, refash-
ioning itself as the Latin American Working Group. Fewer people volunteered
for Witness for Peace short-term delegations, prompting the national WFP of-
fice to pare down its planned trips in 1989 from twenty-nine to twenty-one.78
There was also a general decline in funding for ACWC groups. For WFP,
the drop-off began in 1988, after an expansion of staff and resources the previ-
ous year. WFP was forced to eliminate eight staff positions in 1988.79 IFCO was
forced to nix plans for Central America Information Weeks in Georgia and Texas
in 1989. IRTFCA had to stop publishing its monthly publication, Update Central
America, at the end of 1989. Donations to the Quixote Center’s Communities of
Peace and Friendship project came in more slowly than expected, ultimately tak-
ing ten years to raise the targeted amount of $2 million.
As anti–Contra War groups struggled to keep their issue before the public and
sustain their own organizations, the Bush administration gained advantage in fram-
ing its strategy as a legitimate effort to support democracy in Nicaragua. Officials
typically presented the issue in terms of whether the Sandinista leadership could
be trusted to hold free and fair elections, banking on the inculcated Cold War ide-
ological assumption that Marxism and democracy could not be reconciled. Paul
Doughty, a member of the Latin American Studies Association delegation that
had observed the Nicaraguan elections in 1984, bemoaned the fact that the media
and Congress had largely accepted the administration’s view of Nicaragua’s earlier
elections. “The LASA report, as valuable as it was,” he said in 1989, “was massively
and deliberately ignored by the U.S. government and media, and despite the fact
that it was sent to every member of Congress and their staffs, plus all major and
regional media, public recognition of its findings was virtually zero.”80
The administration’s switching of horses from the contras to UNO further-
more undermined the ACWC’s strong suit—public aversion to contra atroci-
ties. Activist groups such as WFP had invested considerable energy in promot-
ing the idea that the contras were terrorists, but the administration’s de-emphasis
on the contras now made the administration appear less culpable for contra
atrocities, when the media reported them at all.
In response to the Bush administration’s “democracy” initiative, SANE, Wit-
ness for Peace, and other national organizations initiated the Campaign for
Free and Fair Elections in Nicaragua, designed to broadcast the message that
the United States has no business subsidizing political parties and manipulat-
ing elections in other countries. As part of the campaign, 250 religious leaders
signed a letter to members of Congress urging opposition to the use of any U.S.
funds to influence the Nicaraguan elections, whether covert or overt. Nicaragua
Network and the Quixote Center sponsored another project called “Pens and
Pencils for Nicaraguan Elections.” Estimating that the election process would
cost the Nicaraguan government $10 million, constituting “a huge strain on Nic-
aragua’s meager resources,” the two organizations pledged to provide 280,000
pens, 200,000 pencils, and 100,000 felt markers needed to register voters and do
the balloting. Nicaragua Network ultimately raised $100,000 to meet the mate-
rial costs of the national elections, according to coordinator Chuck Kaufman.81
Beyond election-related work, Nicaragua Network continued to raise money for
the Let Nicaragua Live campaign and organized harvest and construction bri-
gades to Nicaragua in 1989. It joined Witness for Peace in cosponsoring a tour of
U.S. cities by Nicaragua’s premier Afro-Latin Band, Luis Enrique Mejía Godoy
and Mancotal, from September 15 to October 30, 1989.
A number of ACWC groups organized delegations to observe the Nicaraguan
elections. Veterans for Peace sent thirty-nine individuals, with most assigned to
rural villages in the combat zones. LASA organized a delegation of scholars to
[ 238 ] CHAPTER 8
monitor the election process, as it had in 1984. By far, the largest number of U.S.
observers arrived in Nicaragua through sister city programs. Forty sister cities
and states sent 450 U.S. citizens under the aegis of the Ad Hoc Coalition of
Sister Cities, created in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on October 7, 1989. Local delega-
tions ranged in size from two to forty persons. Each person paid his or her own
costs, amounting to approximately $1,200 per person.
To counter the charge that these sister city groups were biased in favor of the
FSLN, many of the delegations included local officials. The Ann Arbor delega-
tion, for example, which traveled to sister city Juigalpa, included the city clerk, a
former city council member, a current state representative, and a former
Michigan congressman. The New Haven–Leon sister city program invited repre-
sentatives from “credible organizations” such as the Yale Law School, the League
of Women Voters, the mayor’s office, and congressional offices. The Wisconsin
Coordinating Council on Nicaragua’s delegation included former Wisconsin
governor Anthony Earl and municipal officials from the state.82
The Sandinista leadership fully expected the FSLN to win the election despite
the depressed state of the economy and ongoing war in the northern highlands.
In a May 1989 interview, interior minister Tomás Borge acknowledged that
Nicaraguans were distressed by the economic situation, but he nonetheless pre-
dicted that “the immense majority of Nicaraguans will choose their historic
project. . . . Here the people vote on the basis of their political consciousness, not
their stomachs. That is the great miracle of a genuine revolution.”83 It was thus a
shock to FSLN leaders and their supporters when the FSLN lost the national
elections, and by a substantial margin. UNO won 54.7 percent of the national
vote and gained fifty-one seats in the National Assembly, as compared to the
FSLN’s 40.8 percent of the vote and thirty-eight seats.84 Daniel Ortega conceded
victory to Violeta Chamorro and her coalition.
Nicaraguan observer María López Vigil, who later became an Envío editor,
believed that the vote was largely a response to U.S. intimidation. “Everyone
understood that if Violeta won, the war would end,” she said. “Nicaraguans
voted for peace and for an end to the draft.”85 Heike Amelung, a member of
the Gainesville-Matagalpa sister city election delegation, similarly observed,
“Although these elections were technically free and fair, this cannot be said of
their political and economic context. After nine years of what Pentagon strate-
gists call ‘low intensity warfare,’ the Nicaraguan people did indeed (as Reagan
wanted them to) ‘cry Uncle.’ ”86
Many U.S. activists understood the pressures on Nicaraguan voters but
were still upset and disappointed at the outcome. Brian Willson, an election
observer, said he was “shocked, and in deep anguish and grieving” over the
FSLN’s electoral loss. He regarded the new Chamorro government as a “U.S.
client government” that “can’t possibly represent the Nicaraguan people.”87
Two days after the elections, Sam Hope, executive director of Witness for
Peace, issued a statement declaring that “U.S. policy has bludgeoned the peo-
ple of Nicaragua into submission. Thirty thousand graves dot the country-
side, while the wounded and maimed struggle for life amid wheelchairs and
crutches.”88 Chuck Kaufman, Nicaragua Network director, commented on
the “irony of providing implements for the Sandinista defeat,” referring to the
hundreds of thousands of pens, pencils, and markers provided by Nicaragua
Network for the elections.89 Barbra Apfelbaum, who went with a New Jersey
delegation to monitor the elections, reflected on her own assumptions. “For
me personally,” she said, “I remember thinking . . . maybe there was a kind of
naiveté we had, a false ideal or a false idealization of the Nicaraguan people. It
was very humbling, in a way.”90
After the Contra War
With the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas, the United States ceased its sup-
port for contra military operations and refashioned its aid to help resettle the
contras in Nicaragua. President Bush congratulated Violeta Chamorro and
declared, “Given a clear mandate for peace and democracy, there is no reason
at all for further military activity from any quarter.”91 It would take much work
and healing, however, for the contras to reintegrate into Nicaraguan society.
Almost a year and a half later, more than 4,000 armed contras remained in the
countryside. As of June 10, 1991, according to a Witness for Peace report, 11,228
of approximately 15,600 contras had disarmed.92
A core of activists and groups remained committed to Nicaragua in the post-
Sandinista era. In August 1990,some 2,500 people packed Manhattan’s Riverside
Church to hear former president and FSLN leader Daniel Ortega speak.
According to one news report, “Solidarity members pointed to the turnout as
evidence of continuing interest in Nicaragua.”93 Nicaragua Network vowed it
would continue to support the FSLN and “defend the Sandinista Revolution.” In
practical terms this meant helping to “preserve from rollback by the Chamorro
government” rural land reform programs and worker-owned industries. TecNica
[ 240 ] CHAPTER 8
similarly revised its strategy to emphasize support for unions, health clinics,
cooperatives, and organizations of disabled veterans, although it continued to
send individual volunteers as well. A number of other organizations continued
to provide humanitarian aid as well: the Quixote Center, AFSC, the Wisconsin
Coordinating Council on Nicaragua, Walk in Peace, Habitat for Humanity, and
many sister city programs. Thirteen years after the FSLN defeat, the 2003 U.S.-
Nicaragua Sister Cities Directory compiled by WCCN listed thirty active sister
city programs.94
Three new organizations were initiated in 1990 and 1991. Rita Clark founded
the Nicaragua–United States Friendship Office in order to continue to build
bonds of solidarity between the two countries. Jim Burchell initiated Peaceworks,
which organized tours, material aid, and a range of projects related to Nicaragua.
Dorothy Granada of Los Angeles founded the Women’s Empowerment Project,
which worked with the Maria Luisa Ortiz Cooperative and Women’s Center in
Mulukuku to establish a new health clinic. In addition, WCCN created a sepa-
rate Women’s Empowerment Project for the purpose of establishing the first
women’s shelters in Nicaragua and supporting public campaigns to stop violence
against women. Working with CEPAD, WCCN also initiated the Community
Development Loan Fund in 1992, which provided micro-loans to small farms
and businesses, particularly those led by women.95
In Nicaragua CUSCLIN reorganized itself as the Ecumenical Committee of
English-Speaking Religious Personnel and continued to meet at the Ben Linder
House in Managua. On October 18 and 19, 1991, the first international solidarity
conference was held in Managua since the FSLN defeat. According to Katherine
Hoyt, Nicaragua Network coordinator, the conference “gave groups from dif-
ferent continents and countries the opportunity to share experiences and make
connections and reaffirm their commitments to working to help the people of
Nicaragua defend the gains of the revolution.” The conference was named “The
Heroes and Martyrs of Solidarity with Nicaragua,” in honor of the international-
ists who gave their lives in service to the Nicaraguan people.96
The Central America movement continued for a few more years. The mur-
der of six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, and the housekeeper’s daughter
by the Salvadoran military in November 1989 sparked a new wave of protests
against U.S. aid to the Salvadoran government. Congress cut the aid in half
in 1990. A peace agreement ending the Salvadoran civil war was signed in
January 1992. Another ending the Guatemalan civil war was signed in June
1994. International Truth Commissions investigating these wars verified the
claims of the Central America movement regarding the systematic murder of

civilians by government forces and rightist paramilitary squads. 97
With the arrival of peace in El Salvador, representatives of U.S. Central
America groups organized the Central America Solidarity Roundtable confer-
ence in Blue Mountain Lake, New York, on October 22–25, 1992. Attending were
leaders of most of the key organizations involved in the ACWC and Central
America movement. Peter and Gail Mott of the Rochester Committee on Latin
America (ROCLA) were the conveners of the meeting. After sharing their views
on issues and programs underway, the representatives envisioned four common
goals for the future: educating U.S. citizens about the region, building bridges
between the people of the United States and Central American nations, chang-
ing U.S. policy so as to allow “self-development by the people of the Region,” and
promoting “an economic order which allows all to participate and to have what
they need” both within the United States and Central America. They agreed to
continue networking and to publish an online monthly newsletter, Interconnect.98
The Central America movement ultimately faded into a broader network of
progressive groups concerned with Latin America. The latter initiated cam-
paigns in the 1990s against “structural adjustment” programs of the International
Monetary Fund, “free trade” proposals such as NAFTA (North American Free
Trade Agreement), and various “privatization” schemes. All were deemed cor-
porate vehicles for maintaining exploitive and inequitable economic conditions
and for dismantling social welfare programs in poor nations. WFP Managua
coordinator Sharon Hostetler, speaking in 2006, mused that WFP and other
activist groups had “missed some opportunity” to broaden the discussion to
economic issues during the 1980s. “We didn’t ask ourselves, where does solidar-
ity take you?” she said.99 WFP expanded its educational focus to include eco-
nomic issues and also opened offices in Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and
Cuba (1999–2005).100
The Pledge of Resistance national office closed its doors in August 1993, but
at least one organization carried on the nonviolent activist tradition with
respect to Latin America, the School of Americas (SOA) Watch. Founded in
1990 by Father Roy Bourgeois, its main goal was to close down the School of the
Americas in Ft. Benning, Georgia, where thousands of Latin American military
personnel had been trained since 1946 (the school was renamed the Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation in 2001). Another SOA Watch
project involved meeting with Latin America leaders and urging them to with-
draw their military personnel from the U.S. training program. As of November
[ 242 ] CHAPTER 8
2007, the presidents of five nations—Costa Rica, Argentina, Uruguay, Vene-

zuela, and Bolivia—had announced plans to do so.101
In Nicaragua the Chamorro government received loan subsidies and debt
write-offs from the Bush administration amounting to nearly $1 billion from 1990
through 1992. In exchange, the United States expected the Chamorro govern-
ment to cut governmental expenditures, privatize industries, and restore prop-
erty to former large landowners, which it did.102 As with other underdeveloped
economies, however, the lack of an internal market—too many poor people—
limited entrepreneurial opportunities, business profits, and growth, consigning
Nicaragua to the same fate as other perpetually underdeveloped nations. During
the first year of Chamorro’s presidency, unemployment soared to nearly one-half
the work force. “A chaotic scramble for choice farmland has sparked bloody prop-
erty feuds that contributed last year to a 25 percent drop in cultivated acreage,
a severe blow to Nicaragua’s agrarian-based economy,” reported the Los Angeles
Times (April 15, 1991).103 The Chamorro government added to the misery of the
poor by cutting government subsidies for transportation and basic foods such as
rice, beans, and tortillas.
The FSLN became the largest opposition party in the aftermath of the 1990
elections, but it was unable to stem the tide of capitalist retrenchment under
Chamorro. The party was furthermore consumed by internal criticism that had
previously been held in check. The issue of authoritarianism broke the party
apart in 1995. A new Sandinista party was formed, the Sandinista Renovation
Movement, led by Sergio Ramírez, Dora María Téllez, and Victor Hugo Tinoco.
Remaining with the FSLN were Daniel Ortega, Fr. Miguel d’Escoto, and René
Nuñez. In 2006, sixteen years after being voted out of office, Daniel Ortega and
the FSLN were returned to power with a plurality of the vote. The FSLN pro-
gram this time was modest, reflecting economic constraints. The party’s former
glory had all but disappeared for a new generation of Nicaraguans. For some, the
greatest loss of the former Sandinista era was the spirit of Sandinismo. “Before
1990,” reminisced Leonel Calero Calderón in 2006, “there was hope and national
self-esteem. People were proud to be part of the projects that unified people.
After 1990, there developed more selfishness, above ethics, above ‘God’s will.’
‘Business is business’ became the reigning idea, which provoked divisions and
corruption.” Calero served as the coordinator of the Casa de Cultura Conthecatl
in the town of Condega (north-central Nicaragua), and was active in the Con-
dega-Bend (Oregon) sister city program.104
Bill Gandall died on March 29, 1991, at the age of eight-two. The son of Russian
and Jewish immigrants, his life spanned two eras of U.S. intervention in Nica-
ragua a half-century apart. In his first experience in Nicaragua as a U.S. marine, at
the age of eighteen, he was led to believe that he was there to protect the people
from the outlaw Sandino. He later came to question that rationale and also to
regret his own participation in the intervention. “I felt bad about the things I did
there,” Gandall said in a November 1989 interview. “I developed a conscience.”
On his second trip to Nicaragua in 1985, he once again felt a desire to protect the
Nicaraguan people, but this time he identified the danger as coming from the
U.S. government and its proxy army of contra guerrillas. With his understanding
and conscience in accord, Gandall became a tireless activist in the anti–Contra
War campaign for the next five years. “Wild Bill” also became something of a
sensation in his home county of Palm Beach, Florida, agitating for various causes,
including veterans’ benefits. He was honored by the Palm Beach County com-
missioners in October 1990 for his contribution to peacemaking. As had hap-
pened in the past, however, Gandall had more to say than the commissioners
wanted to hear, and he was later escorted out of the meeting for interrupting the
proceedings. In making peace with his conscience, Bill Gandall made himself a
gadfly of America.105
Conclusion
T he path to a humanistic socialist society was indeed difficult for

Nicaragua. The Sandinista experiment might have fallen on its
own, due to intransigent poverty, poorly managed programs, business opposi-
tion, or other internal causes, but the Reagan and Bush administrations were
not willing to take the chance. They sought to foreclose the possibility of a via-
ble socialist-oriented economy in Latin America by beating Nicaragua into sub-
mission through terrorism and sabotage. In the end, this proved nothing about
socialism, but only that a powerful nation can bully a smaller one. To the Latin
Americanist historian Thomas Walker, the Contra War was “one of the greatest
human tragedies of the second half of the twentieth century.”1
Those who opposed the Contra War did not believe that the tragedy of
American foreign policy was inevitable. They raised objections to both the hege-
monic purpose of U.S. intervention in Nicaragua and its brutal means. They
challenged the Reagan administration’s nationalistic conception of morality in
foreign affairs and offered alternative frameworks for understanding the revolu-
tionary turmoil in Central America. They joined with the international commu-
nity in asserting Nicaragua’s right under international law to conduct its own
economic, political, and international affairs. Working with great heart, Contra
War opponents developed an unprecedented level of transnational connections
in Nicaragua, undermining administration stereotypes of the “enemy” and pro-
viding tangible assistance to the Nicaraguan people. Those who served in
[ 245 ]
[ 246 ] Conclusion
Nicaragua as Witness for Peace volunteers, brigadistas, or individual cooperan-

tes showed the Nicaraguan people the better part of the United States.
The anti–Contra War campaign’s call to conscience was energized by a sense
of democratic responsibility for the nation’s foreign policies, a sense of closeness
to the Nicaraguan people, and a belief in the possibilities of social change orga-
nizing. Motivated citizens joined activist groups and committees of various phil-
osophical and religious hues. They became practiced in the arts of conversing on
substantive foreign policy issues, organizing events and activities, thinking stra-
tegically, and working cooperatively. They created organizations, networks of
groups, ad hoc coalitions, and cooperative venues to unite their efforts so as to
influence the public discourse and congressional legislation. They found ways to
involve more people through a range of activities calibrated to suit different lev-
els of time, talent, and motivation, ranging from the simple act of signing a peti-
tion to high risk “accompaniment” in Nicaragua. The various groups involved in
the anti–Contra War campaign recognized their common interests and found
ways to overcome differences in political philosophy, outreach strategies, and
organizational styles, enabling the campaign to endure for eight years.
Although unsuccessful in actually stopping the Contra War, the anti–Contra
War campaign strengthened public and congressional opposition to contra aid,
which in turn limited the Reagan administration’s options with respect to both
contra operations and a direct U.S. invasion of Nicaragua. The ACWC extended
the debate in Washington to communities across the nation, refusing to let the
“imperial presidency” and its propaganda agencies dominate the domestic dis-
course. The campaign was part of a larger and longer struggle to cultivate a com-
passionate and progressive peace consciousness in the body politic. Other cam-
paigns and movements have similarly fought on the moral frontier of foreign
policymaking, often losing political battles but nonetheless influencing another
generation of citizens and preparing them for future campaigns.
If, as Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. said, “the arc of the moral universe is long,
but it bends toward justice,” then history books should properly identify the
protagonists of the late twentieth century as those nonviolent activists who
gathered in the capitals of Eastern Europe to protest Soviet domination, those
who organized opposition to the apartheid regime in South Africa, and those
who challenged the U.S.-directed terrorist war against Nicaragua.2
Notes
The following abbreviations are used throughout the notes:
DDRS Declassified Document Retrieval System

NARA National Archives and Record Administration
NSA National Security Archive
PED Peace Education Division of AFSC (archive division)
SCPC Swarthmore College Peace Collection (archive)
WHS Wisconsin Historical Society (archive)
Introduction
1. Donald Caswell and Rick Campbell, “Touring Nicaragua: A Soldier’s Story,” Zelo Maga-
zine (Winter Park, FL), Summer 1988, Wisconsin Historical Society (WHS) archive,
Veterans for Peace (VFP) files, box 1, folder 6; Garry Duffy, “Peace Advocate Recounts
Events That Led Him to His Current Beliefs,” Green Valley News, June 1, 1988, 1, 9, ibid.;
and Michael Greenwood, “After a Night in Jail, Gandall Is at UConn,” The Daily Campus
(University of Connecticut), Feb. 28, 1989, 1, ibid.
2. Ambassador Carlos Tünnermann, letter to Bill Gandall, Dec. 7, 1987, WHS, VFP files,
box 1, folder 6.
3. Martin Tolchin, “Key House Member Fears U.S. Breaks Law on Nicaragua,” New York
Times, Apr. 14, 1983, A1.
4. Kenneth A. Briggs, “Episcopal Bishop Calls U.S. Latin Policy ‘Illegal and Immoral,’ ”
New York Times, Apr. 23, 1984, A9.
5. Stephen Kinzer, “Gift-Laden Ship Docks in Nicaragua,” New York Times, July 28, 1984, 3.
6. Cynthia Arnson, Crossroads: Congress, the President, and Central America, 1976–1993 (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1993), ix.
[ 247 ]
[ 248 ] Notes to Pages 3–6
7. The 100,000 figure was cited by Nicaraguan ambassador to the United States Carlos Tün-
nermann in a letter to the editor published in the New York Times, Apr. 26, 1986; also in
Marcos Membreño Idiáquez, “Whither U.S. Solidarity with Nicaragua?” Envío, no. 189
(Apr. 1997). Envío newsletters are located at the Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y
Centroamérica, in Managua, and are now available online at www.envio.org.
8. At least sixteen books and dissertations have been written on the Sanctuary Movement
alone. See books by Ignatius Bau, Ann Crittenden, Hilary Cunningham, Miriam David-
son, Renny Golden and Michael McConnell, Robin Lorentzen, Gary MacEoin (editor),
Judith McDaniel, Elma L. Otter and Dorothy F. Pine, Dick Simpson and Clinton Stock-
well, and Robert Tomsho; and dissertations by Jeanne Clark, Susan Coutin, Anne Marie
Hildreth, Rachel Ovryn-Rivera, and Angela Stout.
9. Melvin Small, “Influencing the Decision Makers: The Vietnam Experience,” Journal of
Peace Research 24, no. 2 (1987): 185–97. See also William LeoGrande and Philip Brenner,
“The House Divided: Ideological Polarization over Aid to the Nicaraguan ‘Contras,’”
Legislative Studies Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Feb. 1993): 105–36.
10. Lt. Col. Oliver North, “U.S. Political/Military Strategy for Nicaragua” (Plan to Over-
throw the Sandinista Government), July 15, 1985, reprinted in Peter Kornbluh and Mal-
colm Byrne, eds., The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: New
Press, 1993), 50.
11. I have found 284 books with at least 50 pages devoted to the Contra War. The Central
America movement and various aspects thereof are examined in the following studies:
Andrew Battista, “Unions and Cold War Foreign Policy in the 1980s: The National Labor
Committee, the AFL-CIO, and Central America” (Diplomatic History, 2002); Edward T.
Brett, “The Attempts of Grassroots Religious Groups to Change U.S. Policy toward Cen-
tral America: Their Methods, Successes, and Failures” (Journal of Church and State, August
1991); Ross Gelbspan, Break-Ins, Death Threats, and the FBI: The Covert War against the
Central American Movement (1991); Van Gosse, “ ‘The North American Front’: Central
American Solidarity in the Reagan Era” (The Year Left, 1988); Gosse, “Active Engagement:
The Legacy of Central America Solidarity” (NACLA Report on the Americas, March/
April 1995); Sharon E. Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture, and Agency in
the Central America Solidarity Movement (2004); Héctor Perla, “Sí Nicaragua Veñcio, El
Salvador Veñcera: Central American Agency in the Creation of the U.S.-Central Ameri-
can Peace and Solidarity Movement” (Latin American Research Review, 2008); Christian
Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America Peace Movement (1996); and Robert E.
Surbrug, Beyond Vietnam: The Politics of Protest in Massachusetts, 1974–1990 (2009).
12. Of the eighty-seven individuals interviewed by this author, twenty-three were directors,
staff persons, or board members of national organizations during the 1980s; forty-five
were local/state organizers and activists; seventeen were Americans who had lived and
worked in Nicaragua for extended periods of time; two were legislative aides and one
was a member of Congress; and ten were Nicaraguan, of whom seven were FSLN offi-
cials. (The numbers add up to more than eighty-seven because some individuals had
more than one role.)
13. “Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America),” International Court of Justice, www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/70/6503.pdf.
Notes to Pages 7–13 [ 249 ]
1. U.S.-Nicaragua Relations, the Sandinista Revolution, and the Contra War

1. “Coolidge Sends More Ships and Marines to Nicaragua; Seeks Democrats’ Support;
Urges Senate to Unite,” New York Times, Jan. 7, 1927, 1.
2. Robert Olds, Undersecretary of State, Memorandum, Jan. 2, 1927, quoted in David F.
Schmitz, Thank God They’re on Our Side: The United States & Right-Wing Dictatorships,
1921–1965 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 50–51.
3. President Calvin Coolidge, “Intervention in Nicaragua,” Interwar documents, 1927,
entered in the Congressional Record 69, 2nd Session, 1324–26, www.mtholyoke.edu/acad
/intrel/cc101.htm.
4. The 3,000 figure is cited in Charles F. Howlett, “Neighborly Concern: John Nevin Sayre
and the Mission of Peace and Goodwill to Nicaragua, 1927–28,” The Americas 45, no. 1
( July 1988), 20. Regarding the 136 U.S. Marines who died in Nicaragua, Neill Macaulay, in
The Sandino Affair (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), notes that only 47 were killed in
the fighting; the remainder died from accidents, airplane crashes, murders, and suicides.
5. Howard Jones, Quest for Security: A History of U.S. Foreign Relations, Vol. II, From 1897
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1996), 352. For foreign views, see the following: “Score U.S.
on Nicaragua: Press in London and Paris Condemns Our Policy There,” New York Times,
Jan. 8, 1927, 4; “Criticism from Peru; Lima Paper Assails Intervention in Free, if Small,
Nation,” New York Times, Jan. 8, 1927, 4; and “Costa Rican Objections; Secretary Kel-
logg’s Foreign Policy Is Called Imperialistic,” New York Times, Jan. 8, 1927, 4.
6. Robert David Johnson, The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 217, 337. See also “Coolidge Is Assailed in Both
Houses for Policy in Mexico and Nicaragua,” New York Times, Jan. 9, 1927, 1; and Anne
Regis Winkler-Morey, “The Anti-Imperialist Impulse: Public Opposition to U.S. Policy
toward Mexico and Nicaragua (Winter of 1926–27)” (MA thesis, University of Minne-
sota, 1993).
7. Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, Dollar Diplomacy: A Study in American Imperial-
ism (New York: B. W. Huebsch and the Viking Press, 1925), 195. Other critical works of
the era include Harold Norman Denny, Dollars for Bullets: The Story of American Rule in
Nicaragua (New York: Dial Press, 1929) and Rafael de Nogales, The Looting of Nicaragua
(1928; New York: Arno Press, 1970).
8. Howlett, “Neighborly Concern,” 34.
9. Macaulay, Sandino Affair, 112–13.
10. Howlett, “Neighborly Concern,” 38–39.
1 1 . President Herbert Hoover, “State of the Union Address, Dec. 3, 1929,” American Presi-
dency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=22021.
12. “UDEL’s Manifesto (1977),” published in La Prensa, Oct. 19, 1977, reprinted in Robert S.
Leiken and Barry Rubin, eds., The Central American Crisis Reader (New York: Summit
Books, 1987), 169.
13. “Catholic Bishops: Medellín Declaration (1968),” reprinted ibid., 126.
14. Dennis Gilbert, Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution (New York: Basil Blackwell,
1988), 133.
15. Mary B. Vanderlaan, Revolution and Foreign Policy in Nicaragua (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1986), 65.
16. FSLN National Directorate, Participatory Democracy in Nicaragua (Managua, 1984, Eng-
lish translation), 75–77.
17. Philip Zwerling and Connie Martin, Nicaragua: A New Kind of Revolution (Westport,
CT: Lawrence Hill, 1985), 76.
18. Nicaragua, Triunfa en la Alfabetización: Documentos y Testimonios de la Cruzada Nacional
de Alfabetización (San José, Costa Rica: Departamento Ecuménico de Investigaciones,
1981), 488.
19. Teófilo Cabestrero, Revolutionaries for the Gospel: Testimonies of Fifteen Christians in the
Nicaraguan Government, translated from the Spanish by Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis Books, 1986), 34.
20. Pierre Hurel, “Ortega ne red pas les armes” (interview with Daniel Ortega), Paris Match,
Mar. 22, 1990, quoted in Thomas Walker, ed., Revolution and Counterrevolution in Nicara-
gua (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 10. Dr. Walker also related this information to
me in a telephone interview, May 21, 2007.
21. In regard to the nine-member Sandinista Directorate, two were from upper-class families,
four from middle-class homes, and three from the working class. Gilbert, Sandinistas, 42.
22. Envío team, “The Agrarian Reform Law In Nicaragua,” Envío, no. 3 (Aug. 1981); and
Larry Rohter, “Nicaragua Has a Postwar Baby Boom,” New York Times, Feb. 24, 1985, 15.
23. Lorraine Bayard de Volo, Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs: Gender Identity Politics in Nica-
ragua, 1979–1999 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 35–36.
24. Margaret Randall, Sandino’s Daughters Revisited: Feminism in Nicaragua (New Bruns-
wick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994), 5. Randall interviewed commanders Dora
María Téllez, Leticia Herrera, and Mónica Baltodano.
25. Volo, Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs, 35.
26. Vilma Nuñez de Escorcia, interview by the author, Managua, June 26, 2006, with Harold
Urbina Cruz translating.
27. Carlos Núñez, President of the Council of State, speech at a special session to close the
Third Legislative Period (Dec. 4, 1982), translated copy, WHS, Nicaragua Network files,
box 1. On the tension between the FSLN vanguard approach and participatory democ-
racy, see Katherine Hoyt, The Many Faces of Sandinista Democracy (Athens: Ohio Uni-
versity Center for International Studies, 1997).
28. Fr. Álvaro Argüello, interview by the author, Managua, June 26, 2006; and Central Amer-
ican Historical Institute, “The Question of Pluralism: Negotiations Continue on Law of
Political Parties” ( Jan. 28, 1983), reprinted in Peter Rosset and John Vandermeer, eds.,
The Nicaragua Reader: Documents of a Revolution under Fire (New York: Grove Press,
1983), 79–83. Fr. Argüello died in Managua on May 24, 2010.
29. “Official Communiqué of the National Directorate of the Sandinista National Libera-
tion Front on Religion,” Oct. 7, 1980, in FSLN National Directorate, Participatory Democ-
racy, 133–37.
30. “FSLN: ‘Seventy-Two Hours’ Document (September 1979),” reprinted in Leiken and
Rubin, Central American Crisis Reader, 220.
31. Envío team, “Two Faces of UNO,” Envío, no. 108 ( July 1990).
32. Nora Boustany, “Veteran of Nicaragua’s Political Turmoil Draws Lesson from Her Child’s
Short Life,” Washington Post, May 16, 2003, A24. See also William Branigin, “Nicaraguan
Family Fights Own Civil War—1 Editor Joins Contras, Other is Sandinista,” Washington
Post, Feb. 21, 1987, A20.
33. Lawrence A. Pezzulo (U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua), “Confidential Cable to the
U.S. State Department,” Aug. 23, 1979, National Security Archive (NSA), Nicaragua
collection, NI01063. This and many other documents at the NSA are available online,
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/index.html.
34. William M. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard: The United States in Central America, 1977–
1992 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 30; and Holly Sklar, Wash-
ington’s War on Nicaragua (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 41–42.
35. Rep. Jim Wright, Worth It All: My War for Peace (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1993).
36. Gerry E. Studds, “Central America, 1981: Report to the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives,” quoted in Robert E. Surbrug Jr., “‘Thinking Globally’:
Political Movements on the Left in Massachusetts, 1974–1990” (PhD diss., University of
Massachusetts Amherst, 2003), 429.
37. Nicaraguan Embassy (Washington, DC), “Sandinista Military Staff Tours United States
Military Bases,” Nicaragua Newsletter 1, no. 1 ( Jan. 1980), 11, Swarthmore College Peace
Collection (SCPC), Central America Working Group (CAWG) files, box 3.
38. “U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Pezzulo, Cable to Secretary of State Alexander Haig Jr.,
Dept. of State, Secret, February 18, 1981,” 1–2, Declassified Documents Retrieval System
(DDRS) online, accessed through Florida State University.
39. The Committee of Santa Fe, A New Inter-American Policy for the Eighties (Washington,
DC: Council for Inter-American Security, 1980), 1; and “1980 Republican Party Plat-
form,” The Patriot Post, http://patriotpost.us/document/1980-republican-platform.
40. “Finding Pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended, Con-
cerning Operations Undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency in Foreign Countries,
Other Than Those Intended Solely for the Purpose of Intelligence Collection” (Presiden-
tial Finding, declassified sections), Mar. 9, 1981, NSA, Nicaragua collection, NI01287.
41. Bernard Weinraub, “Congress Renews Curbs on Actions against Nicaragua: Measure
Forbids U.S. Support for Military Moves Aimed at Toppling Sandinists,” New York Times,
Dec. 23, 1982, A1.
42. “U.S. Halts Economic Aid to Nicaragua,” New York Times, Apr. 2, 1981, A3.
43. David Hoffman and George Lardner Jr., “Hill Panel to Disclose Criticism of Intelligence
on Central America,” Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1982, A3.
44. Philip Taubman, “In from the Cold and Hot for Truth,” New York Times, July 11, 1984, B6.
45. Ariel C. Armony, Argentina, the United States, and the Anti-communist Crusade in Central
America, 1977–1984 (Athens: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1997), 115.
46. Dieter Eich and Carlos Rincón, The Contras: Interviews with Anti-Sandinistas (San Fran-
cisco: Synthesis Publications, 1985), 64; and Envío team, “Nicaragua Struggles to Avoid
Regional War,” Envío, no. 23 (May 1983).
47. Duane Clarridge, quoted in “Backyard,” CNN Cold War series (videotape), no. 18. See
also Alejandro Bendaña, Una Tragedia Campesina: Testimonios de la Resistencia (Mana-
gua, Center for International Studies, 1991); Christopher Dickey, With the Contras: A
Reporter in the Wilds of Nicaragua (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985); and Lynn Hor-
ton, Peasants in Arms: War and Peace in the Mountains of Nicaragua, 1979–1994 (Athens:
Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1998).
48. Sklar, Washington’s War on Nicaragua, 101–5; and Thomas W. Walker, Nicaragua: Living in
the Shadow of the Eagle (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 114.
49. “Allegations of Contra Massacre,” Confidential Cable from Ambassador Anthony
Quainton to Dept. of State, Aug. 13, 1983, 1–2, NSA, Nicaragua collection, NI01791.
50. Edgar Chamorro, “Letter to the Editor,” New York Times, Jan. 9, 1986, A22.
51. Philip Taubman, “2 Americans Assert U.S. Assisted Private Effort Against Latin Left,” New
York Times, Sept. 6, 1984, A10; Taubman, “Letting Citizens Give Rebels Aid Was U.S. Pol-
icy,” New York Times, Sept. 11, 1984, A1; and Peter Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Interven-
tion; Reagan’s Wars against the Sandinistas (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies,
1987), 59.
52. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 392.
53. Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, “Memorandum to Director of
Central Intelligence; Subject: Nicaragua,” Dec. 14, 1984, 1, NSA, Iran-Contra collection,
IC00656.
54. Lt. Col. Oliver North, “U.S. Political/Military Strategy for Nicaragua” (Plan to Over-
throw the Sandinista Government), July 15, 1985, reprinted in Peter Kornbluh and Mal-
colm Byrne, eds., The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: New
Press, 1993), 50.
55. “Remarks of CIA Director William J. Casey before the University Club, September 18,
1986,” Washington, DC, DDRS online.
56. According to Lynn Horton, in Peasants in Arms, “Out of a population of approximately
3.5 million, 30,865 Nicaraguans were killed during the war” (xv). Internal displacement
figures are cited in Walker, Revolution and Counterrevolution, 52. Economic damage costs
of $9 billion are cited in both of the above studies.
57. LeoGrande, Our Own Backyard, 289, 120. Ambassador Pezzulo, in a 1989 interview, com-
mented that what the administration actually proposed to the Sandinistas “was damned
insulting, and crass.” Ambassador Lawrence A. Pezzulo, interview by Arthur R. Day, Feb.
24, 1989, The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral His-
tory Project, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mfdip.2004pez01.
58. Kenneth E. Sharpe, “The Post-Vietnam Formula under Siege: The Imperial Presidency
and Central America,” Political Science Quarterly 102, no. 4 (Winter 1987–88), 564.
60. Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 212.
61. Sen. James M. Jeffords, An Independent Man: Adventures of a Public Servant (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2003), 184.
62. National Security Council, “National Security Planning Group Meeting, June 25, 1984;
Subject: Central America,” 7, 10, NSA, Iran-Contra collection, IC00463.
63. Joanne Omang and David Hoffman, “Reagan Sends Dole to Seek Pope’s Advice on Cen-
tral America, Washington Post, Apr. 6, 1985, A16.
64. Shirley Christian, “Reagan Aides See No Possibility of an Accord with Sandinistas,” New
York Times, Aug. 18. 1985, A1.
65. Elaine Sciolino, “Reagan Will Seek Contra Arms Aid Despite New Move; Managua Vow
Dismissed,” New York Times, Jan. 18, 1988, A1.
66. “C.I.A. Aid to Rebels Reported,” New York Times, Apr. 14, 1986, A8; and LeoGrande, Our
Own Backyard, 543.
67. “A symbol of opposition to Sandinista rule: Cardinal Obando y Bravo,” Newsweek, June
15, 1987, 27–28, www.mosquitonet.com/~prewett/contrascardinal.html.
68. Ernesto Uribe and David Varie, “Distribution of VOA Broadcast Material to Domestic
Radio Stations in Nicaragua,” Memorandum, July 18, 1983, 1–2, National Archives and
Record Administration (NARA), RG 306, USIA Regular and Special Reports of the
Office of Research, 1983–87.
69. Teófilo Cabestrero, Blood of the Innocent: Victims of the Contras’ War in Nicaragua, trans-
lated from the Spanish by Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985), 2.
70. Gilbert, Sandinistas, 141.
71. Mark T. Gilderhus, The Second Century: U.S.-Latin American Relations since 1899 (Wilm-
ington, DE: Scholarly Resources Books, 2000), 229.
72. “Election Draws Many U.S. Observers,” New York Times, Nov. 4, 1984, 21. See also “Nica-
ragua’s 1984 Elections—A History Worth the Retelling,” Envío, no. 102 ( Jan. 1990).
73. Latin American Studies Association (LASA), The Electoral Process in Nicaragua: Domes-
tic and International Influences (Austin, TX: LASA, 1984), 1, 31–32, available online: www.
williamgbecker.com/lasa_1984.pdf. Other reports of international observers include:
Thom Kerstiens and Piet Nelissen (official Dutch government observers), “Report on
the Elections in Nicaragua, 4 November 1984”; Irish Inter-Party Parliamentary Delega-
tion, The Elections in Nicaragua, November, 1984 (Dublin: Irish Parliament, 1984); Parlia-
mentary Human Rights Group, “Report of a British Parliamentary Delegation to Nica-
ragua to Observe the Presidential and National Assembly Elections, 4 November 1984”;
and Willy Brandt and Thorvald Stoltenberg, “Statement [on Nicaraguan Elections on
behalf of the Socialist International],” Bonn, Nov. 7, 1984.
74. See Philip Taubman, “Key Aides Dispute U.S. Role in Nicaraguan Vote,” New York Times,
Oct. 21, 1984, A12. Taubman writes: “Since May [1984], when American policy toward
the elections was formed, the Administration has wanted the opposition candidate,
Arturo Jose Cruz, either to not enter the race or, if he did, to withdraw before the elec-
tion, claiming conditions were unfair. ‘The Administration never contemplated letting
Cruz stay in the race,’ one official said, ‘because then the Sandinistas could justifiably
claim that the elections were legitimate, making it much harder for the United States to
oppose the Nicaraguan government.’ ” See also Taubman, “U.S. Seeks to Sway Opinion
on Nicaragua,” New York Times, Nov. 14, 1984, A10.
75. Philip Taubman, “The Nicaraguan Vote; Results Will Probably Heighten Tensions
Between Washington and the Sandinistas,” New York Times, Nov. 5, 1984, A12.
76. Alejandro Bendaña, “Nicaragua’s and Latin America’s ‘Lessons’ for Iraq,” in Silent War:
The US’ Ideological and Economic Occupation of Iraq, Mar. 1, 2004, online: http://aworld-
towin.net/documents/Iraq_Dossier.pdf.
2. An Overview of the Contra War Debate

1. U.S. Dept. of State, Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean
(S/LPD), “Public Diplomacy Strategy Paper: Central America,” May 5, 1983, 1–2, NSA,
Iran-Contra collection, no. IC00096.
2. S/LPD Summary Report, Dec. 1, 1984, 2–4, NSA, Iran-Contra collection, no. IC00639.
3. Lou Cannon, “‘Distortion’ on Latin Policy Decried,” Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1983;
and National Security Decision Directive 77, signed by President Reagan, Jan. 14, 1983,
quoted in Peter Kornbluh, Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention; Reagan’s Wars Against the
Sandinistas (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987), 160.
4. Ad Hoc Committee for Democracy in Nicaragua (announcement), “Day-long confer-
ence to present a comprehensive look at the Nicaraguan revolution four years later, July
19, 1983,” WHS archive, Nicaragua Network files, box 3.
5. Francis D. Gomez, International Business Communications, “Payment for Services for
the Period September 1 through December 31, 1984,” Memorandum, Aug. 1, 1984, 2, NSA,
Iran-Contra collection, IC00519; and U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on For-

eign Affairs Staff Report, “State Department and Intelligence Community in Domestic
Activities Related to the Iran/Contra Affair,” Sept. 7, 1988, 24, NSA, Nicaragua collec-
tion, NI03127.
6. Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (Washington, DC:
Government Printing Office, 1984), 111. The Reagan administration also periodically
accused Sandinista Nicaragua of being part of a terrorist network and a drug-smuggling
ring, and a source of illegal refugees to the U.S. It was the contras, however, who were
found to be involved in drug trafficking, according to a Senate Foreign Relations report
released Apr. 13, 1989.
7. President Ronald W. Reagan, “Address to the Nation on the Situation in Nicaragua, Mar.
16, 1986,” The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library, www.reagan.utexas.edu (hereafter referred to as the Reagan Public Papers).
8. President Reagan, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America,”
Apr. 27, 1983, Reagan Public Papers; Bernard Weinraub, “President Calls Sandinista Foes
‘Our Brothers,’” New York Times, Feb. 17. 1985, A1; and President Reagan, “Radio Address
to the Nation on Central America,” Feb. 16, 1985, American Presidency Project, www.
presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38231.
9. President Reagan, speeches on Apr. 27, 1983, May 9, 1984, Oct. 21, 1984, Mar. 30, 1985, Feb.
4, 1986, and Feb. 2, 1988, Reagan Public Papers.
10. Col. Daniel Jacobowitz, “Public Diplomacy Action Plan: Support for the White House
Educational Campaign,” Mar. 12, 1985, NSA, Iran-Contra collection, IC00934, 2–3.
11. “Public Diplomacy Strategy Paper: Central America,” Mar. 19, 1984, 7, NSA, Iran-Contra
collection, IC00369.
12. John Goshko, “Diplomacy by Wright, Ortega Hit,” Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1987.
13. President Reagan, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America,”
Apr. 27, 1983, Reagan Public Papers. There was a domestic political component to anti-
communism as well, as it served to unify the three-part New Right coalition of busi-
ness interests, social traditionalists, and foreign policy conservatives, which respectively
denounced “communism” as anticapitalist, irreligious, and expansionist.
14. President Reagan, “Radio Address to the Nation on the Central American Peace Pro-
posal,” Apr. 20, 1985, Reagan Public Papers.
15. President Harry S. Truman, “Address of the President of the United States: Recommen-
dation for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, Mar. 12, 1947,” Truman Presidential Museum
and Library, www.trumanlibrary.org.
16. President Reagan, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on Central America,
Apr. 27, 1983,” Reagan Public Papers.
17. Howell Raines, “Reagan Calls Arms Race Essential to Avoid a ‘Surrender’ or ‘Defeat,’”
New York Times, Aug. 19, 1980, D17.
18. Ronald Reagan, quoted in the Wall Street Journal, June 3, 1980, 1, cited in Walter LaFeber,
America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945–2000 (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2002), 316.
19. President Reagan, “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress Reporting on the State
of the Union, January 25, 1984,” Reagan Public Papers.
20. Absolute ideological values such as freedom and democracy should not be identified
with any particular position, as each group/position enunciated noble principles to suit
its particular perspective and policy recommendations.
21. The confusion over the liberal position on foreign policy issues may be seen in Tony
Smith’s study, A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal
of the American Promise (New York: Routledge, 2007), which describes U.S. foreign pol-
icy as “liberal imperialism.” He writes of “the liberal imperialists who organized the Iraq
War,” and adds, “Prior to the administration of George W. Bush, no presidency since
Wilson’s time had been more liberal in world affairs than Reagan’s” (71). Smith’s reading
of liberal and conservative hinges on the ideological rationales used to justify policies,
rather than on the nature of the policies themselves.
1992 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 510–11 and ix–x.
23. Two sociologists have examined the framing of issues in the Central America debate of
the 1980s: Charlotte Ryan, in Prime Time Activism: Media Strategies for Grassroots Orga-
nizing (Boston: South End Press, 1991), and Christian Smith, in Resisting Reagan: The
U.S. Central America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996). Both
studies identify six frames, three of which correspond to each other. All of the frames
identified are incorporated into my seven-part analysis, with the additional frame of
administration illegalities.
24. Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., in The Imperial Presidency (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973),
defined the “imperial presidency” as the “unprecedented centralization of decisions over
war and peace in the Presidency” (208). Congressional legislation enacted during the
1970s that restricted presidential prerogatives include the following: the Church-Cooper
Amendment (1970), which prohibited the Nixon administration from sending combat
troops into Cambodia; the War Powers Act (1973), which placed a time limit on the
deployment of U.S. combat troops abroad; the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (1974), which
required the president to report “in a timely fashion” on all CIA covert operations; the
Clark Amendment (1976), which ended CIA operations in Angola (rescinded in 1985);
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (1978), which required court-supervised
monitoring of domestic surveillance operations.
25. Betsy Cohen, Charles Roberts, and Jim Lobe, “Arguments and Evidence: Ten Talking
Points against Contra Aid” (Washington, DC: Central America Historical Institute,
Georgetown University, Oct. 1987), 10–11.
26. Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), In Contempt of Congress: The Reagan Record of Deceit
and Illegality on Central America (Washington, DC: IPS, 1985), 5.
27. Paul Ramshaw and Tom Steers, eds., Intervention on Trial: The New York War Crimes Tri-
bunal on Central America and the Caribbean (New York: Praeger, 1984), xvii.
28. See, e.g., Alfonso Chardy, “U.S. Found to Skirt Ban on Aid to Contras, Miami Herald, June
24, 1985; and Chardy, “Despite Ban, U.S. Helping Contras,” Miami Herald, June 8, 1986.
29. David Rogers and Robert S. Greenberger, “Democrats Assail Reagan’s Policy on Nica-
ragua—U.S. Mining of Ports Creates Strong House Opposition to Funding the Guerril-
las,” Wall Street Journal, Apr. 10, 1984, 1.
30. Rep. David E. Bonior, Congressional Record, Mar. 11, 1987, H1246–47, cited in LeoGrande,
Our Own Backyard, 487.
31. Philip Shenon, “Senator Durenberger Stirs New Concern with Outspokenness,” New
York Times, Apr. 8, 1987, B6. Durenberger voted for contra aid in 1984 and 1985, split his
votes in 1986, and voted against aid in 1988.
32. “No Viet Nam war in Central America!” (advertisement), New York Times, May 1, 1983, E7.
33. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, “Is the Reagan Administration Policy toward Nicaragua
Sound? Pro and Con,” The Congressional Digest 63, no. 11 (Nov. 1984), 267.
34. George J. Church, “A Big Stick Approach: U.S. Policy in Central America Becomes
Tougher—and Harder to Sell,” Time magazine 122, no. 7 (Aug. 8, 1983).
35. “U.S. Military Is Termed Prepared for Any Move against Nicaragua,” New York Times,
June 4, 1985, A1.
36. Inter-Religious Task Force on Central America (IRTFCA), Peacemaking II: U.S. Reli-
gious Statements on Central America (New York: IRTFCA, ca. late 1984 or early 1985),
7, 80; and Archbishop James A. Hickey, testimony given to a joint session of the House
Subcommittee on Western Hemispheric Affairs and the Subcommittee on Human
Rights and International Organizations, Mar. 7, 1983, AFSC archive, Peace Education
Division (PED) files.
37. Cristina Eguizábal, David Lewis, Larry Minear, Peter Sollis and Thomas G. Weiss,
“Humanitarian Challenges in Central America: Learning the Lessons of Recent Armed
Conflicts,” Humanitarianism and War Project, Occasional Paper #14, p. 10, http://repos-
itory.forcedmigration.org/pdf/?pid=fmo:2637. See also James LeMoyne, “Europeans
Back Contadora Drive,” New York Times, Sept. 30, 1984, A7.
38. John Felton, “Reagan and the ‘Contra’ Question: Cloudy Policy Goals, Cloudy Outlook
on Hill,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Online (Mar. 15, 1986), http://library.cqpress.
com.proxy.lib.fsu.edu/cqweekly/WR099406386.
39. “Nobody Wins in Nicaragua” (editorial), New York Times, Nov. 7, 1984, A26.
40. “C.I.A. Said to Produce Manual for anti-Sandinistas,” New York Times, Oct. 15, 1984.
41. Joel Brinkley, “Democrats Assail C.I.A. Primer for Latin Rebels,” New York Times, Oct.
18, 1984, A6.
42. Gordon Mott, “In a Nicaraguan Village, ‘We’re Used to Gunfire,’” New York Times, Nov.
11, 1984, 17.
43. Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams is quoted in Reed Brody, Contra Terror in
Nicaragua: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission, September 1984–January 1985 (Boston: South
End Press, 1985), 8; Felton, “Reagan and the ‘Contra’ Question”; and Philip Taubman,
“C.I.A., Too, May Be Hurt in Nicaragua,” New York Times, Oct. 28, 1984, E4.
44. Envío team, “Conclusions: Whither Central America,” Envío, no. 81 (Mar. 1988).
45. The United Nations Charter, Art. 2, Sec. 4, states, “All members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.” The Organization of American States Charter of
1948, Art. 15, states, “No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or
indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.”
46. “From the Well: Shadows of a Foreign Policy,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 1984, 1.
47. “Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. United States of America),” www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6457.pdf. See
also Abram Chayes, “Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court,” Columbia Law
Review 85, no. 7 (Nov. 1985), 1445–82.
48. “WFA Files Suit in Federal Court to Enforce World Court Judgment,” World Federalist
11, no. 4 (Autumn 1986), 1.
49. “Scorning the World Court” (editorial), New York Times, Jan. 20, 1985, E22.
50. Anthony Lewis, “In Age of Reagan, Law Doesn’t Matter,” Tallahassee Democrat, Oct. 12,
1985.
51. United States Information Agency (USIA), Office of Research, “West European Press
Reaction to Mining of Nicaraguan Ports,” Apr. 25, 1984, NARA, RG 306, Regular and
Special Reports of the Office of Research, 1983–87.
52. Daniel Siegel and Tom Spaulding, with Peter Kornbluh, Outcast Among Allies: The Inter-
national Costs of Reagan’s War against Nicaragua (Washington, DC: IPS, 1985), 1, 7.
53. William Blum, Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower (Monroe, ME: Com-
mon Courage Press, 2000), 184–99.
54. Joseph Collins, Francis Moore Lappé, and Nick Allen, What Difference Could a Revolu-
tion Make? Food and Farming in the New Nicaragua (San Francisco: Institute for Food
and Development Policy, 1982), 4.
55. Joanne Omang, “Contra Aid Fight Nears,” Washington Post, Apr. 15, 1985, A1.
56. Cynthia J. Arnson and Philip Brenner, “The Limits of Lobbying: Interest Groups, Con-
gress, and Aid to the Contras,” in Richard Sobel, ed., Public Opinion in U.S. Foreign Policy
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 196–97.
57. “Statement by U.S. Religious in Nicaragua in Response to Address by President Reagan
to Joint Session of Congress,” Apr. 29, 1983, CUSCLIN records, Managua.
58. Thomas W. Walker, ed., Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), 3–4.
59. Aynn Setright, interview by the author, Managua, June 25, 2006.
60. See, e.g., Harriet Ludwig, “‘Witness for Peace’ Says He Saw Genuine Progress in Nicara-
gua,” Gainesville Sun, Oct. 13, 1984, 1B.
61. William M. LeoGrande, “The Contras and Congress,” in Walker, Reagan Versus the San-
dinistas, 222; and LeoGrande, “The Controversy over Contra Aid, 1981–90: A Historical
Narrative,” in Richard Sobel, Public Opinion, 44.
62. Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA), Changing Course:
Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean (Washington, DC: IPS, 1984),
13–14.
63. John Lamperti, What Are We Afraid Of? An Assessment of the “Communist Threat” in Cen-
tral America (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 5, 7.
64. See, e.g., Dr. Peter Mott, “U.S. Aids Real Communists in China, Falsely Invents Them in
Nicaragua” (op-ed), Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, Sept. 24, 1985, 6A.
65. Mayee Crispin, “Dear Friend of the Nicaragua Network” (mass mailing letter), July 17,
1989, author’s collection.
66. Walter LaFeber, “Marking Revolution Opposing Revolution,” New York Times (op-ed), July
3, 1983, E13. The quote from Secretary of State Shultz comes from his testimony before the
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Senate Appropriations Committee, Mar. 22, 1983.
67. Noam Chomsky, What Uncle Sam Really Wants (Tucson, AZ: Odonian Press, 1986), 42.
68. Sergio Ramírez, “The Unfinished American Revolution and Nicaragua Today,” July 14,
1983, reprinted in Marlene Dixon and Susanne Jonas, eds., Nicaragua Under Siege (San
Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1984), 211.
69. Leonardo Salazar, “Discourses on Terrorism and Nicaragua: A Case Study of Televi-
sion,” (PhD diss., Michigan State University, 1988), 205–6. See also Sandra H. Dickson,
“Propaganda and the Press: The Treatment of the United States–Nicaraguan Conflict
by the Washington Post and the Washington Times” (PhD diss., Florida State University,
1989). Dickson analyzed 1,539 articles in the Washington Post and the Washington Times,
and concluded that, while there were differences between the two papers, the results of
her content analyses “lent credence to the notion that the U.S. press serves as a legitima-
tor of the ‘government line’” (abstract).
70. Quoted in Rep. Jim Wright, Worth It All: My War for Peace (Washington, DC: Brassey’s,
1993), 78.
71. Steven V. Roberts, “House Reverses Earlier Ban on Aid to Nicaragua Rebels; Passes $27
Million Package,” New York Times, June 13, 1985, A1.
72. Poll results are tabulated in Richard Sobel, Public Opinion, 22–28, 59–70.
73. Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 471.
3. Origins of the Anti–Contra War Campaign

1. Edward T. Brett, The U.S. Catholic Press on Central America: From Cold War Anticom-
munism to Social Justice (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003), 112.
2. Margaret Swedish, “The Religious Roots of Solidarity,” www.nathannewman.org/EDIN
/.mags/.cross/.40/.40salv/.swedish.html.
3. Dafne Sabanes Plou, “Ecumenical History of Latin America,” World Council of Churches
(WCC), http://overcomingviolence.org/en/about-dov/annual-focus/2006-latin-amer-
ica/ecumenical-history-of-latin-america.html (from “A History of the Ecumenical Move-
ment,” 2004, WCC Publications).
4. Betsy Cohn and Patricia Hynds, “The Manipulation of the Religion Issue,” in Thomas
W. Walker, ed., Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua (Boulder,
CO: Westview Press, 1987), 101.
5. Fr. Álvaro Argüello, interview by the author, June 26, 2006, Managua.
6. Fr. Joseph Mulligan, S.J., interview by the author, Managua, Mar. 9, 2010.
7. Richard Shaull, “Leaven in the Loaf: The Nicaraguan Difference,” Christianity and Crisis
( July 12, 1982), 211, 210.
8. James and Margaret Goff, “The Church Confronting Change,” Nicaraguan Perspectives,
no. 17 (Summer/Fall 1989), 27.
9. Teófilo Cabestrero, Revolutionaries for the Gospel: Testimonies of Fifteen Christians in the
Nicaraguan Government, translated from the Spanish by Phillip Berryman (Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis Books, 1986). See also Michael Dodson and Laura O’Shaughnessy, The Other
Revolution: The Church and the Popular Struggle in Nicaragua (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1990).
10. Michael Harrington, “The Good Domino,” in Marvin E. Gettleman et al., eds., El Salva-
dor: Central America in the New Cold War (New York: Grove Press, 1981), 313.
11. Bill Bigelow, interview by the author, Portland, OR, May 28, 2007.
12. Richard Healey, telephone interview with the author, Dec. 17, 2006. Regarding Healey’s
mother, see Dorothy Healey and Maurice Isserman, Dorothy Healey Remembers: A Life in
the American Communist Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
13. Van Gosse, “Active Engagement: The Legacy of Central America Solidarity,” NACLA Report
on the Americas 28, no. 5 (Mar.–Apr. 1995), www.nacla.org; and Van Gosse, Where the Boys Are:
Cuba, Cold War America and the Making of a New Left (New York: Verso, 1993), 161–62, 244.
14. Kent Spriggs, telephone interviews with the author, Nov. 10, 2007, and Dec. 19, 2009.
15. Judith Adler Hellman, “Annual Essay on Social Movements: Revolution, Reform, and
Reaction,” NACLA Report on the Americas 30, no. 6 (May/June 1997); and “Reinventing
Solidarity,” NACLA Report on the Americas 28, no. 5 (Mar.–Apr. 1995).
16. The Rev. Arthur Lloyd, St. Francis House, and the Rev. Lowell Fewster, Madison Cam-
pus Ministry, “A letter to the Churches in the Madison area,” Sept. 14, 1973, WHS, Com-
munity Action for Latin America (CALA) files, box 2, folder 1. The author interviewed
Rev. Lloyd along with Sue Lloyd, Carol Bracewell, and Sheldon Rampton in Madison,
WI, on July 20, 2006.
17. See Margaret Power, “The U.S. Movement in Solidarity with Chile in the 1970s,” Latin
American Perspectives 36, no. 6 (2009), 46–66.
18. James N. Green, We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictator-
ship in the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 164, 366.
19. Lars Schoultz, Human Rights and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), 115, 75, 60.
20. See www.wola.org/publications/thirty_years_of_advocacy_for_human_rights_democ-
racy_and_social_justice.
21. The AFSC grants to Nicaragua, amounting to $190,000 in 1982, assisted vaccination cam-
paigns, sanitation, curative services, and health education. Nicaragua was one of a dozen
countries in Latin America to receive such grants. Dick Erstad, “Eloesser Fund,” Memo-
randum to Betsy Deisroth, Michael Valoris, Sept. 21, 2004, AFSC archive, International
Development Division files; and “Reconstruction in Nicaragua: AFSC Gives Support,”
ca. 1980, ibid.
22. See Ron Pagnucco, “The Transnational Strategies of the Service for Peace and Justice
in Latin America,” in Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco, eds., Trans-
national Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 1997): 123–38; and “Argentina: Ex-dictator Sentenced in Mur-
ders,” New York Times, Dec. 23, 2010, A14.
23. Ronald H. Chilcote, “The Legacy of the Sixties and Its Impact on Academics,” LASA
Forum 37, no. 2 (Spring 2006), 24; and Teri Karl, “Comments on the Presentations about
LASA in the 1960s,” ibid., 25.
24. Richard Erstad, “Latin America Studies Association Meeting—October 10–12, 1980,”
Memorandum to Latin America panel, Oct. 30, 1980, AFSC archive, International Devel-
opment Division files.
25. William LeoGrande, e-mail communication with the author, July 10, 2007. In addition to
PACCA, WOLA, and EPICA, which are described in this chapter, there were a number
of other progressive policy-oriented organizations, or “think tanks,” that contributed to
the Central America movement in the 1980s (founding dates noted): Institute for Policy
Studies (1963), Council on Hemispheric Affairs (1975), Center for International Policy
(1975), Institute for Food and Development Policy (1975), Inter-Hemispheric Education
Resource Center (1979), Nicaraguan Information Center in Berkeley (1981), Central
American Historical Institute (1982), Commission on U.S.–Central American Relations
(1982), and the Central America Resource Center in Austin (1983). Publications of the
latter center along with the newsletters of a variety of Central America groups are located
at the Benson Library, University of Texas at Austin.
26. Margaret Randall, Sandino’s Daughters: Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle,
edited by Lunda Yanz (Vancouver/Toronto: New Star Books, 1981). See also Randall,
Gathering Rage: The Failure of Twentieth Century Revolutions to Develop a Feminist Agenda
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1992); Randall, Sandino’s Daughters Revisited: Femi-
nism in Nicaragua (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1994); Lorraine Bayard
de Volo, Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs: Gender Identity Politics in Nicaragua, 1979–1999
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Karen Kampwirth, Feminism and
the Legacy of Revolution: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas (Ohio University Press, 2004);
Katherine Isbester, Still Fighting: The Nicaraguan Women’s Movement, 1977–2000 (Pitts-
burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001); and Clare Weber, “Women to Women: Dis-
sident Citizen Diplomacy in Nicaragua,” in Nancy A. Naples and Manisha Desai, eds.,
Women’s Activism and Globalization: Linking Local Struggles and Transnational Politics
(New York: Routledge, 2002), 45–64.
27. Carl Conetta, ed., Peace Resource Book, 1988/89: A Comprehensive Guide to Issues, Groups,
and Literature (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), vii.
28. “New Directions: Conference Decisions,” The Mobilizer (Mobilization for Survival news-
letter) 2, no. 1 (Winter 1982), 6; and “Mobilization for Survival 1983 Program: Ongoing
Campaigns and Priorities,” The Mobilizer 2, no. 4 (Winter 1983), 11.
29. Fr. Joseph Mulligan, interview by the author. On conscience and the Vietnam War, see
Christian G. Appy, Patriots: The Vietnam War Remembered from All Sides (New York:
Penguin Books, 2003); Charles DeBenedetti, “On the Significance of Citizen Peace
Activism: America, 1961–1975,” Peace and Change 9, no. 2/3 (1983), 6–20; Mitchell K.
Hall, Because of Their Faith: CALCAV and Religious Opposition to the Vietnam War (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1990); and Andrew Hunt, The Turning: A History of
Vietnam Veterans against the War (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
30. David Funkhouser, telephone interview by the author, Dec. 20, 2006; René Nuñez, interview
by the author, Managua, Mar. 11, 2010, with Galen Cohee Baynes translating; Hector Perla,
“Si Nicaragua Venció, El Salvador Vencerá: Central American Agency in the Creation of the
U.S.-Central American Peace and Solidarity Movement,” Latin American Research Review 43,
no. 2 (2008), 147; Marcos Membreño Idiáquez, “Whither U.S. Solidarity with Nicaragua?”
Envío, no. 189 (Apr. 1997); and Van Gosse, “‘The North American Front’: Central American
Solidarity in the Reagan Era,” in Michael Sprinker and Mike Davis, eds., The Year Left, vol. 3:
Reshaping the U.S. Left: Popular Struggles in the 1980s (New York: Verso, 1988), 20–21.
31. Phil Wheaton’s inclusive vision was noted by Yvonne Dilling in a telephone interview by
the author, Mar. 3, 2007.
32. “Declaration from the National Conference on Nicaragua, Feb. 24–25, 1979,” WHS, Nica-
ragua Network files, box 3.
33. Yvonne Dilling, interview by the author.
34. David Funkhouser, interview by the author.
35. Tim Jeffries, “Serendipity,” in “Reminiscences of the 25th Anniversary of the Nicaraguan
Revolution,” 2004, Nicaragua Network website, www.nicanet.org/archive/global/remi-
niscences_revolution_tim.php.
36. Nicaragua Network, “Nicaragua Network Hotline,” Feb. 17, 2009, www.nicanet/org-/?p=621.
37. Jim McGinnis, “Notes (rough copy) from Nicaragua Conference, Sacred Heart Semi-
nary, Detroit, Nov. 16, 17, 18 [1979],” SCPC, CAWG files, DG-145; “Declaration from the
Second National Conference on Nicaragua, November 17–18, 1979,” ibid.; attached to
McGinnis’s twenty pages of notes are two pages of meeting notes by Diane Passmore,
titled “Outcomes, Resolutions, Directions from the Second National Conference on
Nicaragua,” ibid.; and “Second National Conference On Nicaragua, Detroit, Michigan,
Nov. 16–18, 1979, Conference Agenda,” WHS, Nicaragua Network files, box 3.
38. Judith Valente, “D.C.-Area Hispanics Collect Funds to Spread Revolutionary Informa-
tion,” Washington Post, Feb. 25, 1980, A20.
39. Nicaragua Network Newsletter 2, no. 7 (Aug. 1980), 1, North American Congress on Latin
America (NACLA) microfilm archive, reel #11, Latin America Collection (4th floor),
Smathers Library, University of Florida, Gainesville.
40. Nicaragua Network Newsletter 2, no. 7 (Aug. 1980), 1, NACLA microfilm archive, reel #11.
41. Archbishop Oscar Romero, Letter to President Carter, Feb. 12, 1980, quoted in Inter-Reli-
gious Task Force on Central America outreach letter, May 1989, author’s collection.
42. Margaret Swedish, telephone interview by the author, Feb. 17, 2007.
43. Terri Shaw, “Mimeographs Roar in Propaganda War,” Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1982, A1;
and Van Gosse, “Radical, Pragmatic, and Successful,” Crossroads Magazine, no. 40 (Apr.
1994), www.nathannewman.org/EDIN/.mags/.cross/.40/.40salv/.40salv.html.
44. Gosse, “‘The North American Front,’” 30.
45. President Reagan formally approved a policy designed to prevent the “proliferation of
Cuba-model states” in Central America in April 1982. Raymond Bonner, “President
Approved Policy of Preventing ‘Cuba-Model States,’” New York Times, Apr. 7, 1983, A1.
46. Cited in “Report of the UN Truth Commission on El Salvador,” 31, www.derechos.org/
nizkor/salvador/informes/truth.html.
47. Gosse, “Radical, Pragmatic and Successful”; and Van Gosse, telephone interview by the
author, Sept. 29, 2006.
48. Aquiles Magana, “The Heart, Soul and Engine,” Crossroads Magazine, no. 40 (Apr. 1994),
www.nathannewman.org/EDIN/.mags/.cross/.40/.40salv/.magana.html. See also Nora
Hamilton and Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Seeking Community in a Global City (Philadel-
phia: Temple University Press, 2001).
49. “Resolution from the East Coast Conference,” Oct. 11–12, 1980, quoted in Gosse, “‘The
North American Front,’” 45–46, note 15.
50. Gosse, “Radical, Pragmatic, and Successful.”
51. Felix Masud-Piloto, telephone interview by the author, July 21, 2007.
52. Margaret Swedish, interview by the author.
53. Terri Shaw, “Mimeographs Roar in Propaganda War,” Washington Post, Mar. 7, 1982, A1.
54. See, e.g., Juan De Onis, “Catholic Bishops Ask End of Arms Aid to El Salvador,” New York
Times, Nov. 9, 1980, 15; Kenneth Briggs, “Catholic Bishops Criticize Aid to El Salvador,”
New York Times, Nov. 20, 1981, A17; and Briggs, “U.S, Catholic Bishops Opposing Admin-
istration’s Salvador Policy,” New York Times, Feb. 21, 1982, 1.
55. Margaret Swedish, interview by the author.
56. Raymond Bonner, “Protests on Salvador Are Staged across U.S.,” New York Times, Mar.
25, 1981, 3. See also Bonner, “The Agony of El Salvador,” New York Times, Feb. 22, 1981, 7.
57. Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy (CNFMP), “El Salvador: U.S. Policy in
Crisis,” Campaign Against U.S. Intervention, Legislative Update #1, Apr. 3, 1981, AFSC
archive, PED files.
58. Timothy M. Phelps, “U.S. Role in El Salvador Protested,” New York Times, Apr. 19, 1981,
A26; and Juan de Onis, “Capital Rally Assails Arms to Salvador,” New York Times, May 4,
1981, A3.
59. Stona Fitch, “El Salvador Dispels Apathy at Princeton,” New York Times, Mar. 14, 1982, 16.
60. CNFMP, “Central America Conference Report,” June 1981, AFSC archive, PED files.
61. Andrew Battista, “Unions and Cold War Foreign Policy in the 1980s: The National Labor
Committee, the AFL-CIO, and Central America,” Diplomatic History 26, no. 3 (Summer
2002), 39, 410–11, 442.
62. Susan Gzesh, “Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era,” Migration Infor-
mation Source, Apr. 2006, www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?id=384.
63. Sharon Erickson Nepstad, Convictions of the Soul: Religion, Culture, and Agency in the Cen-
tral American Solidarity Movement (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 132, 133.
64. Portland Central America Solidarity Committee (PCASC) organizational records and
newsletters; Nicaragua Network Newsletter 3, no. 1 ( Jan.–Feb. 1981), NACLA microfilm
archive, reel #11; and Jack Lieberman, telephone interview by the author, Dec. 24, 2006.
65. Nicaragua Network staff, “A Partial Listing of What NNSNP Committees Are Doing
around the Flood and July 19” [1982], SCPC, CAWG files, DG-145.
66. AFSC budget figure and locations of regional and local offices were provided by archi-
vist Barbara Montabana, Philadelphia AFSC office.
67. Jack Malinowski, “Central America Human Rights Program, 1982–1983: A Proposal by the
AFSC Peace Education Division,” AFSC archive, PED files; Malinowski, “AFSC Program
Related to Central America,” Memorandum to Board of Directors, CarEth Foundation,
Sept. 17, 1981, 1, ibid; and Jack Malinowski, telephone interview by the author, July 23, 2007.
68. Jack Malinowski,“Recent Arrest of Human Rights Spokesman in Nicaragua,” Memoran-
dum to Asia Bennett (executive director), Mar. 5, 1981, AFSC archive, PED files.
69. Jack Malinowski, interview by the author.
70. “Countries in Crisis: Report of an AFSC Study Tour to Central America and the Carib-
bean,” Nov.–Dec. 1980, 2 and 11–12, AFSC archive, PED files; and “Message from Phil
Berryman,” Nov. 1980, ibid.
71. Phillip Berryman, interview by the author, Philadelphia, May 18, 2006. Berryman
authored two books on the subject of liberation ideology: The Religious Roots of Rebel-
lion: Christians in Central American Revolutions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1984) and
Liberation Theology: Essential Facts About the Revolutionary Movement in Latin America
and Beyond (New York: Pantheon, 1987).
72. Phillip Berryman, “Central America: Prospects for Nonviolence,” WIN Magazine, Mar.
15, 1981, AFSC archive, PED files.
73. AFSC, “Board Perspectives on AFSC’s Nonviolent Role in Relation to Groups Strug-
gling for Social Justice,” Jan. 24, 1981, 1–2, AFSC archive, PED files.
74. Chris Coleman, “Staff Report to AFSC National Office, Peace Education Committee,”
AFSC archive, PED files.
75. Defense Intelligence Agency Report, July 1982, quoted in Peter Kornbluh, Nicaragua:
The Price of Intervention; Reagan’s Wars against the Sandinistas (Washington, DC: Insti-
tute for Policy Studies, 1987) 23.
76. Asia A. Bennett, letter to President Ronald Reagan, Mar. 22, 1981, AFSC archive, PED files.
77. CNFMP, “Nicaragua and U.S. Covert Action,” Campaign Against U.S. Intervention,
Legislative Update #19, Mar. 22, 1982, SCPC, CAWG files, DG-145.
78. Martin Tolchin, “Thousands in Washington March to Protest U.S. Policy in Salvador,”
New York Times, Mar. 28, 1982, A18.
79. “Statement in Opposition to Covert Intervention in Nicaragua,” May 1982, AFSC
archive, PED files.
80. “Report of a U.S. Peace Delegation to Nicaragua and Honduras, Sept. 5–14, 1982,” AFSC
archive, PED files. The delegates on the trip represented AFSC, Clergy and Laity Concerned,
CNFMP, FOR, IRTFCA, MFS, National Assembly of Women Religious, Pax Christi,
SANE, Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, and U.S. Peace Council.
81. Jack Malinowski, “Contribution to Central America Peace Campaign,” Memorandum to
NPED Interim Committee, Oct. 27, 1982, AFSC archive, PED files.
82. “A Secret War in Nicaragua,” Newsweek, Nov. 8, 1982. There were earlier stories suggesting
that the United States was engaged in a covert war against Nicaragua: e.g., Don Oberdor-
fer and Patrick Tyler, “Reagan Backs Action Plan for Central America,” Washington Post,
Feb. 14, 1982.
83. Sen. Tom Harkin, letter to Diane Passmore, Dec. 16, 1982, SCPC, CAWG files, box 3.
4. Expansion of the Anti–Contra War Campaign, 1983–84

1. Leslie H. Gelb, “The Boiling Point: White House Puts Central America on a Front
Burner,” New York Times, July 24, 1983, E1.
2. Inter-religious Task Force on Central America (IRTFCA), Peacemaking II: U.S. Religious
Statements on Central America (New York: IRTFCA, ca. late 1984 or 1985), 49, 39–40.
Denominational statements were issued by the United Hebrew Association and the fol-
lowing churches: American Baptist, American Lutheran, Disciples of Christ, Church
of the Brethren, Episcopal, Mennonite, Moravian, Presbyterian, Religious Society of
Friends, United Church of Christ, Unitarian, and United Methodist. Pastoral letters
were issued by five Catholic bishops and archbishops.
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 195.
4. Joanne Omang, “Catholic Groups Differ with Pope over Nicaragua,” Washington Post,
July 23, 1984, A1.
5. IRTFCA, Peacemaking II, 55, 57.
6. Philip Taubman, “The Speaker and His Sources on Latin America,” New York Times,
Sept. 12, 1984, B10.
7. “A Proclamation by His Excellency Michael S. Dukakis, Governor,” quoted in Robert E.
Surbrug Jr., Beyond Vietnam: The Politics of Protest in Massachusetts, 1974–1990 (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 2009), 180.
8. Rabbi Balfour Brickner, “What’s Jewish in Nicaragua” (guest opinion), Philadelphia
Daily News, Dec. 1, 1984, 14.
9. Charles Mohr, “Reagan Receives Bishops’ Protests,” New York Times, Mar. 10, 1983, A7.
Secretary of State Shultz spoke before a joint session of the House Subcommittee on
Western Hemispheric Affairs and the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and Inter-
national Organizations.
10. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Communism in Central America” (op-ed), Washington Post, Apr. 17,
1983, D8.
11. Lou Cannon, “‘Distortion’ on Latin Policy Decried,” Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1983.
12. William Sloane Coffin, “Nicaragua Is Not An Enemy” (op-ed), New York Times, July 31,
1983, E19.
13. See Warren Goldstein, William Sloane Coffin Jr.: A Holy Impatience (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2006).
14. David Cortright, telephone interview by the author, Oct. 13, 2006. For a history of SANE,
see Milton S. Katz, Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear
Policy, 1957–1985 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986).
15. David Cortright, “Opposing the War in Central America,” Memorandum to Staff, July 26,
1983, SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, Series G, box 78.
16. “Response from Charlie’s District Coordinators on Central America,” attached to David
Cortright, Memorandum, July 26, 1983; and “Report on Central America Educational
Activities, October 1983–June 1985, SANE” (n.d.), ibid.
17. Robert Musil, interview by the author, June 27, 2005; and e-mail communication, June
4, 2005.
18. “Report on Central America Educational Activities, October 1983–June 1985, SANE”(no
date), SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, box 78.
19. “Mobilization for Survival 1984 Program,” The Mobilizer 3, no. 4 (Spring 1984), 6–7. The
issue of whether disarmament organizations should become involved in the Central
America movement was debated by Joseph Gerson and Theo Brown in the February
1984 issue of Nuclear Times, the main forum for the disarmament movement. Gerson,
the peace secretary of AFSC, called for a multi-issue peace movement, uniting its “two
wings” of disarmament and anti-interventionism. Brown, executive direction of Ground
Zero, argued that incorporating a multi-issue agenda would reduce the ability of disar-
mament organizations to reach new constituencies. “The more baggage we add to our
central concern about nuclear war, the more obstacles we put in the way of new people
who would come to the issue,” said Brown. “Forum: Deadly Connections,” Nuclear
Times 2, no. 4 (Feb. 1984), 11–13. See also Joseph Gerson, ed., The Deadly Connection:
Nuclear War and U.S. Intervention (Philadelphia: New Society Publishers, 1986).
20. Peter Peri and Caryle Murphy, “Opposing Groups Air Latin America Views at Vietnam
Memorial,” Washington Post, July 3, 1983, A1.
21. “If President Reagan Can Get Away with the Invasion of Grenada, What Next?” (adver-
tisement), New York Times, Nov. 11, 1983, B22. The advertisement was officially sponsored
by AFSC.
22. Susan Trausch, “20,000 Protest Invasion, U.S. Role in Latin America,” Boston Globe, Nov.
13, 1983; Robert Pear, “Washington Rally Draws Thousands,” New York Times, Nov. 13,
1983, 17; and Caryle Murphy, “20,000 Protest against U.S. Policy,” Washington Post, Nov.
13, 1983, B1.
23. Jim Matlack, AFSC Washington office, “Planning Meeting for November 12 Rally,” Mem-
orandum to Joe Volk et al. (national office), Oct. 27, 1983, AFSC archive, PED files.
24. The original sponsors of the Pledge included AFSC, CALC, FOR, IRTFCA, New Call
to Peacemaking, Pax Christi, SANE, SCLC, Sojourners, WFP, and World Peacemakers.
25. The Emergency Response Network (Ken Butigan et. al., eds.), Basta! No Mandate for
War: A Pledge of Resistance Handbook (Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers, 1986),
preface.
26. The original twelve-member analyst group included Richard Barnet of IPS, Yvonne Dill-
ing and Buddy Summers of WFP, William LeoGrande of American University, David
MacMichael, former CIA analyst, Debbie Reuben of Nicaragua Network, Jim Wallis
of Sojourners, and representatives from the Center for Defense Information, CAPC,
CISPES, NISGUA, and WOLA. The original eight-member signal group consisted of
Ken Butigan of the Emergency Response Network in San Francisco, Suzanna Cepeda
of SANE, Timothy McDonald of SCLC, Jim Wallis, and representatives from CISPES,
Nicaragua Network, NISGUA, and WOLA.
27. Emergency Response Network, Basta!, 22.
28. Ibid.; and Charles Lee Moriwaki, “Protest Effort Planned if U.S. Invades Nicaragua,”
Seattle Times, Nov. 17, 1984, D12.
29. Emergency Response Network, Basta!, 1.
30. Pledge of Resistance Emergency Response Network (San Francisco), “Are You Pledging
to Do Nonviolent Civil Disobedience?” (two-page flyer), AFSC archive, PED files.
31. James Thaddeus Hannon, “Identity and Participation in a Social Movement Organiza-
tion, the Boston-Area Pledge of Resistance” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, Madi-
son, 1991), 268–69. Hannon points to tension between the personal and the political,
arguing that the former got in the way of the latter at times, but the evidence he presents
would rather indicate that personal support networks helped sustain social activist
commitments. Barbara Epstein draws a sharper distinction between the personal and
the political in Political Protest and Cultural Revolution: Nonviolent Direct Action in the
1970s and 1980s (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991).
32. Margaret Swedish, telephone interview by the author, Feb. 17, 2007; Yvonne Dilling, tele-
phone interview by the author, Mar. 3, 2007; Richard Healey, telephone interview by the
author, Dec. 17, 2006; and David Cortright, interview by the author.
33. Van Gosse, telephone interview by the author, Sept. 29, 2006.
34. Sara Solovitch, “Specter’s Aid Votes Are Challenged,” Philadelphia Inquirer, Mar. 18, 1984.
35. Kathy Gille, telephone interview by the author, June 30, 2011.
36. Robert Borosage, telephone interview by the author, May 27, 2011.
37. Rep. David Bonior, telephone interview by the author, June 27, 2011.
38. Information for this section was gleaned from the following: National Central America
Anti-Intervention Coalition Meeting notes, Dec. 1, 1983, SCPC, SANE files, DG-058,
Series G, box 78; Central America Education Project (CAEP), “Dear Friends” letter, Apr.
6, 1984, ibid.; Karen A. Thomas, CAEP Director, “To Friends and Allies, July 27, 1984, Re:
Six Month Progress Report,” ibid.; CAEP Coordinating Committee Meeting minutes by
Emily Bloch, Apr. 5, 1983, ibid.; “National Campaign for Peace in Central America: The
Time for Action Is Now,” Jan. 1984, ibid.; Jean Walsh, Central America Peace Campaign
(CAPC), “Dear Friends” letter of Dec. 20, 1984 (summarizing the year’s activities), ibid.;
Frank Vardeman, “Report on Field Operations,” July 25, 1984, ibid.; Jamie K. Donaldson,
“Monthly Report and Workplan,” Mar. 30, 1984, ibid.; and “Working Paper for a Central
America Peace Alternative,” Mar. 1984, ibid.
39. The CAPC steering committee consisted of religious peace groups AFSC, Clergy and
Laity Concerned, IRTFCA, and RTFCA; secular peace groups CNFMP, MFS, and
SANE; solidarity groups Nicaragua Network, CISPES, and NISGUA; and Washing-
ton policy groups Caribbean Basin Information Project, Commission on U.S.-Central
America Relations, IPS, and WOLA.
40. SANE press release, “SANE announces major effort on Central America,” May 10, 1984,
SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, Series G, box 78.
41. CAPC, “Central America Peace Campaign, Preliminary Democratic Delegate Poll
Results as of July 15, 1984,” SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, Series G, box 78; Richard E.
Meyer, “Hart Threatening to Fight for Central America Plank,” Los Angeles Times, July 16,
1984; and Jesse Jackson, keynote address at the 1984 Democratic National Convention,
July 18, 1984, www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/jessejackson1984dnc.htm.
42. “Democratic Party Platform of 1984,” in “Political Party Platforms,” The American
Presidency Project, www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29608 #axzz1asY94Za2.
43. Leslie H. Gelb, “Isolate Nicaragua if It Won’t Bend, Mondale Suggests,” New York Times,
Sept. 18, 1984, A1.
44. Francis X. Clines, “Mondale and Reagan Make Sharp Policy Attacks,” New York Times,
Oct, 21, 1984, 30.
45. Beth Gillin, “Across Nation This Week, Protests of U.S. Policy in Central America,” Phila-
delphia Inquirer, Mar. 18, 1984, 3F.
46. Holly Sklar, “Central America: No Time to Lose,” The Mobilizer 4, no. 1 (Summer 1984),
9; and “Vietnam? Artists Call against U.S. Intervention in Central America” (advertise-
ment), New York Times, Jan. 22, 1984, E6.
47. Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA), Changing Course:
Blueprint for Peace in Central America and the Caribbean (Washington, DC: IPS, 1984), 32.
48. Central America Resource Center, Directory of Central America Organizations, 3rd Edi-
tion, 1987 (Austin, TX: Central America Resource Center, 1986), Introduction.
49. Pacifica Radio Archives online, www.pacificaradioarchives.org.
50. Tom Wicker, “Reagan’s Terrorists,” New York Times, Mar. 27, 1984, A31.
51. Information in this section is from the following sources: Rev. Lucius Walker Jr., tele-
phone interviews by the author, Aug. 20 and Aug. 30, 2007; IFCO, “35 Years of Con-
tinued Struggle for Peace and Justice,” www.ifconews.org/about/IFCO-history.htm;
IFCO, Looking Back, Looking Forward: A Review of Central America Information Weeks
(New York: IFCO, 1986); and An IFCO Report on Central America Information Week
Conducted in Ohio, November 11–18, 1984, 1–2, 26, WHS archive, WCCN files, box 4. Rev.
Lucius Walker Jr. died on Sept. 7, 2010.
52. “Reframing the debate in the media” was a recommendation by AFSC staff persons at a
meeting on Oct. 15, 1984, a few months after the meeting to assess successes and failures
in the Central America movement. Jack Malinowski, “Summary from AFSC input to
meeting of Washington, DC, groups working on Central America,” Oct. 15, 1984, AFSC
archive, PED files.
53. Jack Malinowski, “A Proposal: Negotiation Not Intervention: An AFSC Response to U.S.
Policy in Central America, Spring, 1984–Spring, 1985,” AFSC archive, PED files; Angela
Berryman, “Proposal for Local Media Project,” July 10, 1984, ibid.; and Betsy Berger,
project director, “Evaluation of the Central America Media Project,” Feb. 20, 1985, 2, ibid.
54. Medea Benjamin and Andrea Freedman, Bridging the Global Gap: A Handbook to Linking
Citizens of the First and Third Worlds (Cabin John, MD: Seven Locks Press, 1989), 21; and
Barbara Feinman, “Nicaragua Holiday,” Washington Post, May 29, 1984, C1. The 25,000
figure was cited by Bob Guild in a telephone interview by the author, July 11, 2007.
55. Marazul Tours, “1984 Programs to Nicaragua,” Aug. 13, 1984, WHS archive, Nicaragua
Network files, box 4, Tours to Nicaragua folder; and Tropical Tours, Inc., “Election Tour,
October 28 thru November 5, 1984,” ibid.
56. Ed Griffin-Nolan, Witness for Peace: A Story of Resistance (Louisville, KY: Westminster/
John Knox Press, 1991), 28. See also Smith, Resisting Reagan, 70–78. Borge is quoted by
Gail Phares, e-mail communication with author, May 2, 2011.
57. Council of Protestant Churches (CEPAD), “Program for the Christian Peace Vigil of
Our Brothers and Sisters from the United States” ( July 2–8, 1983), Chuck Jacobsen’s
collection.
58. Chuck Jacobsen, interview by author, Tallahassee, FL, May 6, 2006.
59. Griffin-Nolan, Witness for Peace, 46.
60. Jim Wallis, “Witness for Peace,” Sojourners, Nov. 1983; and “Press release, Nov. 17, 1983:
Christians to Obstruct U.S. Policy in Nicaragua,” SCPC, WFP files, DG-149. Jim Wallis
was a radical reformer in the Christian prophetic tradition. In his book, The Call to Con-
version, he wrote that Christians must break free of “false security” and “spiritual paraly-
sis” so as to work for national redemption and the “conversion of the church in the midst
of a crumbling empire, an empire to which the church is now closely allied.” Jim Wallis,
The Call to Conversion (San Francisco: Harper, 1981), xxi.
61. Yvonne Dilling and Mary Jo Bowman, “Revolutionary Violence: A Dialogue on Central
America,” originally published in the Manchester College Bulletin of the Peace Studies
Institute ( June 1981); reprinted in the A. J. Muste Memorial Institute Essay Series, no. 8,
(New York: A. J. Memorial Institute, n.d.), 29.
63. Gail Phares, e-mail communication with the author, May 2, 2011; Robertson Barrett,
“Spiritual activist lobbies for peace,” News and Observer (Raleigh, NC), Aug. 6, 1989; and
Peter A. Geniesse, “A Profile of Gail Phares,” Sojourners, Nov.–Dec. 2003, http://d1112418.
domain.com/CITCA/docs/Pharesl.pdf.
64. “Peace Action Award Dinner, April 7, 2005, Acceptance Speech by Gail Phares,” CITCA;
see Gail Phares, “Witness for Peace SE History 25 Years, April 1982 to 2007,” http://
d1112418.domain.com/CITCA/history25.htm.
65. Daniel Erdman and Sharon Hostetler, “History and Evolution of the WFP Program in
Nicaragua” (Report to Steering Committee), Jan. 22, 1988, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
66. Marjorie Hyer, “21 Leave Here for Nicaragua to Be ‘Human Shield,’” Washington Post,
Dec. 1, 1983, A34.
67. Anne Keegan, “Americans Carry Peace Plea to Nicaragua War Zone,” Chicago Tribune,
Aug. 5, 1984, 18.
68. Helen Brewer and John W. Frank, The Report of the Florida Delegation of Witness for Peace
in Nicaragua, September 9–23, 1984 (Gainesville, FL: Pax Christi Florida, 1985).
69. Harriet Ludwig, “‘Witness for Peace’ Says He Saw Genuine Progress in Nicaragua,”
Gainesville Sun (FL), Oct. 13, 1984, 1B.
70. Yvonne Dilling, telephone interview by the author.
72. “1983–84 Volunteer Work Brigades of the National Network in Solidarity with the Nica-
ragua People,” Brigadista Bulletin, Mar. 13, 1984, 1, NACLA microfilm archive, reel #11.
See also “U.S. Volunteers Help Nicaragua with the Harvest,” New York Times, Feb. 16,
1984, A4.
73. Senator James M. Jeffords, An Independent Man: Adventures of a Public Servant (New
York: Simon & Schuster, 2003), 184.
74. “Special Report from the Third World Brigade,” Brigadista Bulletin, no. 23 (Mar. 1986,)
NACLA microfilm archive, reel #11.
75. “Policy and Guidelines for Thursday Vigils, CUSCLIN,” n.d., CUSCLIN records, Mana-
gua. CUSCLIN organizational records and literature were made available to the author
by Penn Garvin.
76. Peace Education Project of the Mobilization for Survival, “Understanding Central
America through Media,” 1986, author’s collection; and http://deedeehalleck.blogspot.
com/2011/02/looking-bad.html.
77. MADRE, “History,” www.madre.org/index/meet-madre-1/who-we-are-49/history-161.
html; and James McGinnis, Solidarity with the People of Nicaragua (Maryknoll, NY:
Orbis Books, 1985), 139–40.
78. Rev. Bill Callahan and Dolly Pomerleau, interview by the author, Hyattsville, MD, May
25, 2006; and Douglas Martin, “Rev. William R. Callahan Dies at 78, Dissident Who Chal-
lenged the Vatican,” New York Times, July 11, 2010, 24. See also David Cortright’s interview
with Callahan in Peace Works: The Citizen’s Role in Ending the Cold War (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1993), 224–26. Quixote Center organizational records and literature were
made available to the author by co-directors Bill Callahan and Dolly Pomerleau.
79. Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and
Abroad (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 235.
80. Liz Chilsen and Sheldon Rampton, Friends in Deed: The Story of U.S.-Nicaragua Sister
Cities (Madison: Wisconsin Coordinating Council on Nicaragua, 1988), 20.
81. Ibid., x.
82. Ibid., 6.
83. Sheldon Rampton, interview by the author, Madison, WI, July 20, 2006.
5. Organizational Dynamics of a Decentralized Campaign
1. David Reed, “U.S. Estimates War in Central America,” Coalition Close-up (CNFMP) 8,
no. 3 (Fall 1986), 2–3.
2. William LeoGrande, interview by the author, Washington, DC, May 23, 2006.
3. Van Gosse, “Active Engagement: The Legacy of Central America Solidarity,” NACLA
Report on the Americas 28, no. 5 (Mar.–Apr. 1995), www.nacla.org; and Gosse, “‘The
North American Front’: Central American Solidarity in the Reagan Era,” in Michael
Sprinker and Mike Davis, eds., The Year Left, vol. 3: Reshaping the U.S. Left: Popular Strug-
gles in the 1980s (New York: Verso, 1988), 42–43, 39.
4. Sheldon Rampton, interview by the author, Madison, WI, July 20, 2006.
5. Katherine Hoyt, in-person interview by the author, Washington, DC, June 27, 2005.
6. Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America Peace Movement (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1996), 335.
7. Ken Butigan, e-mail communication with the author, October 14–15, 2011.
8. Eric Fried, “Letters,” Brigadista Bulletin no. 24 (Apr. 1986), NACLA microfilm archive,
reel #11.
9. Letter from David Cortright to the author, May 1, 1984, author’s collection; Betsy Crites,
“Witness for Peace Year End Report, 1988,” SCPC, WFP files, DG-149; and “Summary of
the Minutes of the Pledge of Resistance National Meeting,” Nov. 18, 1985, afternoon ses-
sion, AFSC archive, PED files.
10. Beverly Bickel, Philip Brenner, and William LeoGrande, Challenging the Reagan Doc-
trine: A Summation of the April 25th Mobilization (Washington, DC: The Foreign Policy
Education Fund, Oct. 1987), 21, 42.
11. Richard Healey, telephone interview by the author, Dec. 17, 2006. There were a number
of small foundations that funded Central America work, including the A. J. Muste Insti-
tute Foundation, Agape Foundation, Arca Foundation, Capp Street Foundation, Peace
Development Fund, Sunflower Foundation, and Resist Foundation.
12. “Meeting Minutes of the Executive Committee,” CAPC, Sept. 13, 1984, SCPC, SANE
files, DG-058, Series G, box 78; and “Meeting Minutes of the CAPC Coordinating Com-
mittee,” June 17, 1985, ibid.
13. “Meeting Minutes of the CAPC Coordinating Committee,” June 17, 1985; and Kathy
Flewellen, “Central America Peace Campaign on the Road Again,” Central America Peace
Campaign newsletter, July–Sept. 1985, 1.
14. Alice Holmes Cooper, Paradoxes of Peace: German Peace Movements since 1945 (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 205, 207, 229.
15. Eric Fried, “Letters.”
16. “Special Central America Issue, Keeping in Touch,” The Bread and Roses Community
Fund (newsletter), Winter–Spring 1984, SCPC, Central America Working Group (Phila-
delphia) files, DG-145, box 3.
17. Donna Cooper, “Organizing Notes: Bringing Central America to Philadelphians,” The
Mobilizer 3, no. 4 (Spring 1984), 22–23.
18. The author was a founder and co-coordinator of the Tallahassee Peace Coalition and
convened its Central America committees during the 1980s.
19. Victoria Martinez, responses to author’s questionnaire, July 2, 2006.

20. Smith, Resisting Reagan, 380, 171, table 7.1.
21. “Minutes of the National Pledge of Resistance Meeting,” Nov. 19, 1985, morning session,
AFSC archive, PED files. The perception of the Central America movement as being
overwhelmingly “white” was also noted by Bob Guild, Van Gosse, and Jack Malinowski,
all interviewed by the author.
22. In March 1988 WFP hired Makini Coleman, an African American, to coordinate delegations
to the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua, where the population was largely Afro-Caribbean. Cole-
man soon leveled charges of racism at WFP, claiming that her leadership was being unfairly
scrutinized because of her race. In an effort to resolve issues, on June 6, 1988, national direc-
tor Betsy Crites and Coleman sent a twelve-page memo on “Racism and Inclusion” to all
WFP staff, steering committee, and regional coordinators. WFP also held a racism work-
shop in Managua for long-term volunteers in July 1988. Betsy Crites and Makini Coleman,
“Memo” to steering committee, staff, regional coordinators, and long-term volunteers,
regarding “Atlantic Coast Program” June 6, 1988, 9, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
23. Jack Malinowski and Angie Berryman, “Recommended Cuts in Human Rights/Global
Issues Program,” Memorandum to Budget and Priorities Subcommittee, June 1, 1987,
AFSC archive, PED files.
24. Bickel, Brenner, and LeoGrande, Challenging the Reagan Doctrine, 59, 48.
25. Liz Chilsen and Sheldon Rampton, Friends in Deed: The Story of U.S.-Nicaragua Sister
Cities (Madison: Wisconsin Coordinating Council on Nicaragua, 1988), 41.
26. Barbra Apfelbaum, telephone interview by the author, July 11, 2007, and e-mail commu-
nication; and Van Gosse, telephone interview by the author, Sept. 29, 2006.
27. Patricia Squires, “Aiding Contras Opposed,” New York Times, Mar. 16, 1986, 695; and Bob
Guild, telephone interview by the author, July 11, 2007. Guild provided the author with a
copy of the “Statement on Central America” signed by religious leaders of Bergen County.
28. Bob Guild, interview by the author.
29. Barbra Apfelbaum, interview by the author.
30. Van Gosse, interview by the author.
31. “Florida Conference Against Intervention” meeting notes, July 21, 1984, Friends Meeting
House, Orlando, author’s collection. The author participated in the founding of the Flor-
ida Coalition in 1982 and briefly served on its board of directors. FCPJ organizational
records, literature, and media publicity was made available to the author by coordinator
Bob Tancig at FCPJ headquarters in Graham.
32. John Frank, telephone interview by the author, Oct. 4, 2006; and Frank, “Report on
Local Groups in Florida Participating in Pledge of Resistance,” Jan. 18, 1985, John Frank’s
collection.
33. Some 150 people rallied at the federal building in Tallahassee in February 1985; a series of
demonstrations took place in Gainesville between February and April; two-dozen members
of the South Florida Coalition for Non-intervention in Central America protested contra
aid outside the local office of Rep. Larry Smith in Hollywood in mid-May; and a demonstra-
tion in Orlando organized by the Central Florida POR brought out 75 people in June.
34. Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO), An IFCO Report on
Central America Information Week in Florida, April 6–13 (New York: IFCO, 1986).
35. Florida Coalition for Peace and Justice (FCPJ) financial reports (various years), author’s
collection.
36. Beth Raps, telephone interview by the author, Oct. 17, 2006. Information for this section
was also gathered from the author’s telephone interview with FCPJ coordinator Bruce
Gagnon, Oct. 16, 2006.
37. Jack Lieberman, telephone interview by the author, Dec. 24, 2006; Luis Feldstein Soto
and Fabiola Santiago, “Demonstrations Turn Ugly Violence Mars Miami Pro-Contra
Protest,” Mar. 23, 1986, Miami Herald, A1; and Marc Fisher, “Miami Tests Meaning of
Free Speech,” Miami Herald, Mar. 30, 1986, B1.
38. Jack Lieberman, interview by the author; and Renee Krause, “Activists Picket Smith on
Contras,” Sun Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale), May 15, 1985, B13.
39. Nan McCurdy, telephone interview by the author, Nov. 29, 2006; Barbara Larcom, inter-
views by the author, Washington, DC, June 27, 2005, and Baltimore, May 20, 2006; and
Casa Baltimore/Limay organizational newsletters and literature, 1986–1990, made avail-
able to the author by Barbara Larcom.
40. Jim Mang and Terry Bisson, interview by the author, Buffalo, NY, July 17, 2006; and
“Reflections on Civil Disobedience,” Dovetail, no. 6 ( July 1986), 5–6. The latter publica-
tion along with WNYPC organizational literature were made available to the author by
Terry Bisson and WNYPC director Jim Mang.
41. Mailing list figures were cited by Jon Garlock, interview by the author, July 16, 2006,
and by Terry Lindsey, telephone interview by the author, July 15, 2006. Unless other-
wise noted, the information for this section on Rochester has come from interviews
and communications with the following nine persons, all in Rochester, NY, in June–July
2006: Marilyn Anderson, Michael Argaman, Jon Garlock, Bob Good (telephone), Kath-
leen Kern, Henrietta Levine (telephone), Terry Lindsey (telephone), Dr. Arnie Matlin
(telephone and e-mail communication), and Dr. Peter Mott; and, second, from orga-
nizational records and literature of ROCLA, made available to the author by members
and former staff persons. Metro Justice coordinator Jon Greenbaum assisted the author
in identifying Rochester people to contact for this section; the author also interviewed
Rochester native Anne Meisenzahl in Tallahassee, FL, Oct. 30, 2004.
42. Michele Sprint-Moore, “Rochester Committee on Latin America: A Brief History of the
Last Three Decades,” Update on the Americas (a bimonthly publication of ROCLA), Spe-
cial Edition, Oct.–Nov. 2000, 4, 7.
43. “Why Is the Reagan Administration at War with Nicaragua?” (advertisement), City
Newspaper: A Journal of Urban News and Opinion (Rochester), Dec. 6, 1984, 2.
44. Todd Lighty, “Nine Nicaragua-Aid Foes Arrested,” Rochester Democrat and Chronicle,
June 13, 1985, 1B.
45. Antonio Ruíz García ( Junta de Gobierno Municipal, El Sauce, Nicaragua), letter to Roch-
ester sister city, June 3, 1987, translated by Susan Cergol, Henrietta Levine’s collection.
46. Arnie Matlin, “Nicaragua Libre,” Nicaragua Network online, www.nicanet.org/archive/
global/reminiscences_revolution_arnie.php.
47. Michele Moore, “Building Links to Nicaragua,” City Newspaper: A Journal of Urban News
and Opinion (n.d., ca. Feb. 1988), Henrietta Levine’s collection.
48. Unless otherwise noted, the information from this section on Portland has come, first,
from nine interviews with activists conducted in Portland, Oregon, May 26–28, 2007:
Bill Bigelow, Cathie DeWeese-Parkinson, Lynn DeWeese-Parkinson, Diane Drum, Car-
los Flores, Diane Hess, Bill Kowalczyk, John Linder, and Jamie Partridge; and second,
from PCASC organization records and newsletters (Central America Update) made
available to the author by members, former staff persons, and then-current staff person
Dan Denvir, who also helped arrange meetings and interviews.
49. “The Pledge of Resistance,” Central America Update 1, no. 9 (Dec. 1984/Jan. 1985), 3.
50. Diane Hess, “Notes for Nicaragua Independence Day Speech, July 19, 1986, Lewis and
Clark College, Portland, Oregon” (provided to the author by Hess).
51. PCASC also networked with the following groups: Portland Labor Committee on Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean, Teachers’ Committee on Central America, Council for
Human Rights in Latin America, Rainbow Coalition, Sanctuary Coalition, Black United
Front, American Indian Movement, the Portland AFSC office, Pax Christi and FOR
chapters, and campus groups at Lewis and Clark College, Oregon Health and Science
University, Portland Community College, Portland State University, and Reed College.
52. Bill Bigelow and Jan Fenton, “PCASC Wants You to Volunteer,” Central America Update
1, no. 8 (Nov. 1984), 3.
53. Holly Allen and Jan Fenton, “Congress Approves Aid to the Contras . . . and the Pledge
Responds,” ibid., 2, no. 5 ( July/Aug. 1985), 1, 5.
54. Millie Thayer, “No Contra Aid,” ibid., 3, no. 2 (Apr. 1986), 5.
55. “Portland vs. the Contras,” ibid., 3, no. 3 (May 1986), 1.
56. Dick Bogle, City Commissioner, “Excerpts from the Testimony,” ibid., 2, no. 3 (May 1985), 3.
57. Richard Read, “Nicaraguan Mayor Calls for ‘Solidarity,’” Oregonian, Sept. 17, 1985.
58. “Statement by the Honorable Les AuCoin,” Apr. 29, 1987, PCASC records.
59. “Statement by Senator Mark O. Hatfield” (press release), Apr. 29, 1987, PCASC records.
60. Francie Royce and Millie Thayer, “Mourning and Organizing,” Central America Update
4, no. 4 ( June 1987), 2; and “Rebuilding in Ben’s Name, ibid., 4, no. 6 (Sept. 1987), 2.
61. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Multnomah County had 584,000 people in 1990,
of which 12,400 spoke Spanish at home.
6. The Politics of Transnational Solidarity

1. “A Reagan Interview,” Washington Post, Apr. 2, 1985, A12 (the interviewers were Lou Can-
non and Dave Hoffman); and President Ronald Reagan, “Radio Address to the Nation
on the Central American Peace Proposal,” Apr. 20, 1985, The Public Papers of President
Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, www.reagan.utexas.edu. See also
David Hoffman, “Reagan Attacks Nicaragua Plan,” Washington Post, Apr. 21, 1985, A1.
2. John Felton, “Reagan and the ‘Contra’ Question: Cloudy Policy Goals, Cloudy Outlook
on Hill,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Mar. 15, 1986, 601–5.
3. In September 1981 President Reagan signed a “counterpropaganda initiative” proposed
by Charles Z. Wick, head of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), designed “to cope
with Soviet propaganda and disinformation.” Dubbed “Project Truth,” the initiative
established working groups for various regions and issues, with one devoted exclusively
to Nicaragua. This USIA operation set the tone for later creations such as the Office of
Public Diplomacy (S/LPD) and White House Outreach Group. Wick had no interna-
tional or foreign policy experience prior to his appointment in 1981. His credentials for
office lay in being a long-time friend of Ronald Reagan, an excellent fund-raiser, and a
conservative ideologue. Nicholas J. Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information
Agency: American Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945–1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 408.
4. Kate Semarad, Associate Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
Development, “Public Diplomacy and Central America,” Memorandum to Gerald Hel-
man, May 1, 1983, 1, NSA, Iran-Contra collection, IC00092.
5. Geraldine O’Leary de Macias, “Sandinista Disinformation,” Public Diplomacy Office

Review, Sept. 1, 1984, nonclassified report, 1–3, 6, 13, NSA, Nicaragua collection, NI02192.
6. William Perry and Peter Wehner, Institute for the Study of the Americas, “The Latin
Americanist Establishment: A Survey of Involvement; An Interpretive Report,” Jan. 1,
1985, Public Diplomacy Office Review copy, NSA, Iran-Contra collection, IC00683. Wil-
liam Perry signed a contract with S/LPD for $9,850 on July 19, 1984.
7. Otto J. Reich, “Public Diplomacy Plan for Europe,” Secret Memorandum to Walter Ray-
mond Jr., July 29, 1985, 1, NSA, Iran-Contra collection, IC01369.
8. S/LPD, “Ninety-Day Plan,” Revision 5, Dec. 17, 1985, 2, NSA, Iran-Contra collection,
IC02006.
9. Robert Kagan, “Public Diplomacy Plan for Explaining U.S. Central American Policy
to the U.S. Religious Community,” Confidential Memorandum to Walter Raymond Jr.,
Sept. 18, 1986, 1, NSA, Iran-Contra collection, IC03439.
10. Joanne Omang, “Catholic Groups Differ With Pope Over Nicaragua,” New York Times,
July 23, 1984, A1.
11. United States Volunteers in Nicaragua and the Death of Benjamin Linder; Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, first session, May 13, 1987 (reprint from the collection of the University of
Michigan Library, 2010), 118.
12. “The Embassy of Nicaragua Informs U.S. Citizens Traveling to Nicaragua” (advertise-
ment), New York Times, July 3, 1983, E6.
13. Sharon E. Nepstad, “Nicaragua Libre: High-Risk Activism in the U.S.-Nicaragua Solidar-
ity Movement” (PhD diss., University of Colorado, Boulder, 1996), 67.
14. David Burnham, “F.B.I. Questions Visitors to Nicaragua,” New York Times, Apr. 18, 1985,
A3; and Howard Kurtz, “FBI Probing Nicaragua Visitors; Bureau Declines to Explain
Purpose; Rep. Edwards Plans Hearings,” New York Times, May 12, 1987, A12.
15. Philip Shenon, “Papers Show Wide Surveillance of Reagan Critics,” New York Times,
Jan. 28, 1988, A1; Kathy Bodivitz, “U.S. Salvador Policy Foes: Big FBI Probe of Protest
Groups,” San Francisco Chronicle, Jan. 28, 1988, A1; Ross Gelbspan, “Suit Seeks FBI’s Files
on Dissidents,” Boston Globe, Nov. 30, 1988, 8; and Michael Wines, “Panel Criticizes F.B.I.
for Scrutiny of U.S. Group,” New York Times, July 17, 1989.
16. “Contract Purchase Order to Pay J. Michael Waller—Resume Attached,” Aug. 3, 1984,
NSA, Iran-Contra collection, IC00524.
17. “Response of the National Steering Committee of Witness for Peace to the October 1986
Statement and Press Release Made By the Institute on Religion and Democracy,” Nov.
25, 1986, in Betsy Crites, Witness for Peace Memorandum to WFP Steering Committee,
Staff and Regional Coordinators, Dec. 9, 1986, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
18. Miguel d’Escoto, interview by the author, Managua, Mar. 12, 2010; and “Maryknoll Wel-
comes Nicaraguan,” New York Times, June 30, 1986, B2.
19. Miguel d’Escoto, “An Unfinished Canvas,” Sojourners, Mar. 1983.
20. Rita Clark, telephone interview by the author, Oct. 30, 2006; and Sophia Clark, inter-
view by the author, Managua, Mar. 9, 2010.
21. Ron Ridenour, Yankee Sandinistas: Interviews with North Americans Living and Working in
the New Nicaragua (Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press, 1986).
22. Tomás Borge, “This Revolution Was Made to Create a New Society” (excerpts from speech
given in Managua on May 1, 1982), reprinted in Bruce Marcus, ed., Nicaragua: The Sandinista
People’s Revolution; Speeches by Sandinista Leaders (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1985), 22.
23. Ernesto Cardenal, “Toward a New Democracy of Culture” (excepts from the statement
of Ernesto Cardenal before UNESCO in Paris, Apr. 17, 1982), reprinted in Peter Rosset
and John Vandermeer, eds., Nicaragua, Unfinished Revolution; The New Nicaragua Reader
(New York: Grove Press, 1986), 417.
24. Dora María Téllez, interview by the author, Managua, Mar. 8, 2010, with Joseph Mulligan
translating.
25. Ibid.; Margaret Randall, Sandino’s Daughters: Testimonies of Nicaraguan Women in Struggle,
edited by Lunda Yanz (Vancouver/Toronto: New Star Books, 1981), 53; and René Nuñez,
interview by the author, Managua, Mar. 11, 2010, with Galen Cohee Bayne translating.
26. René Nuñez, interview by the author; and William Grigsby, “Passionate Memories from
Times of Solidarity,” Envío, no. 276 ( July 2004).
27. Ambler H. Moss Jr., U. S. Embassy, Panama, Confidential Cable, Oct. 6, 1978, NSA,
Nicaragua collection, NI00372. In an earlier cable, the Embassy reported that “1500 to 16
hundred Panamanian Volunteers are ready to go to Nicaragua to fight against Anastasio
Somoza Debayle.” Victor H. Dikeos, U.S. Embassy, Panama, Confidential Cable, Sept. 15,
1978, NSA, Nicaragua collection, NI00242.
28. René Nuñez, interview by the author.
29. See, for example, Against Imperialist Aggressions and Intervention in Central America and
the Caribbean: Continental Conference for Peace and Sovereignty in Central America and the
Caribbean, Managua, Nicaragua, April 21–23, 1983 (Managua: Conference Proceedings,
1983), 27.
30. Victor Hugo Tinoco, interview by the author, Managua, Mar. 10, 2010, with Joseph Mul-
ligan translating.
31. Miguel d’Escoto, interview by the author.
32. Junta for National Reconstruction, “The Philosophy and Policies of the Government of
Nicaragua” (Mar. 1982), reprinted in Rosset and Vandermeer, Nicaraguan Reader, 261.
33. Richard Fagan, “The Nicaraguan Crisis,” Monthly Review 4, no. 6 (Nov. 1982), reprinted
in ibid., 30.
34. Victor Hugo Tinoco, interview by the author. The independence of agencies was also
noted by Dora María Téllez.
35. Sophia Clark, interview by the author.
36. Ana Patricia Elvir, e-mail communication with the author, Sept. 2007 and Dec. 2009.
37. Harvey Williams, interview by the author, Managua, June 26, 2006; and Thomas W.
Walker, telephone interview by the author, May 21, 2007. Williams first came to Nica-
ragua after the earthquake struck in 1972. He was employed at the Ministry of Labor
and taught courses at the University of Central America in Managua during the Somoza
years. He returned to the United States in 1976 and regularly visited Nicaragua thereafter.
38. Annie O’Connor, “Nicaraguan Ambassador to U.N. Urges Solidarity,” Nicaraguan Per-
spectives 1, no. 2 (Fall 1981), 15.
39. Sergio Ramírez, “U.S. Working People Can Stop Intervention in Central America” (Mar.
4, 1982), reprinted in Marcus, Nicaragua: The Sandinista People’s Revolution, 6.
40. Carlos Fernando Chamorro, “Without Solidarity It Is Difficult to Talk About Revolu-
tion” (Toronto, Canada, Mar. 31, 1982), reprinted in ibid., 14, 17.
41. Jamie Wheelock, “The Sandinista Front Is the Organization of the Working People”
(May 1, 1984), reprinted in ibid., 284.
42. Joanne Omang, “Nicaraguan Leader Makes U.S. Tour,” Washington Post, Oct. 9, 1984,
A3; “Construction Brigade Leaves for Nicaragua,” Brigadista Bulletin no. 10, Nov. 1984,
NACLA microfilm archive, reel #11; William Becker, “The Home Front,” www.williamg-
becker.com/HomeFront.php; and Jacob V. Lamar, “Battle for Hearts and Minds: The
Sandinistas and Contras Vie for U.S. support,” Time, April 22, 1985, 20.
43. “Sandinista Makes His Case on a Brooklyn Church Visit,” New York Times, July 28, 1986, A2.
44. Liz Koch, “Marchers Bridge Nicaragua/U.S. Gap,” The Phoenix (Brooklyn community
newspaper), July 29, 1986, 1, quoted in Liz Chilsen and Sheldon Rampton, Friends in
Deed: The Story of U.S.-Nicaragua Sister Cities (Madison: Wisconsin Coordinating Coun-
cil on Nicaragua, 1988), 50.
45. Lydia Chavez, “Nicaragua Is Aided by Sister City Projects,” New York Times, Feb. 1, 1987, E6.
46. Vilma Nuñez de Escorcia, interview by the author, Managua, June 26, 2006, with Harold
Urbina Cruz translating.
48. George de Loma, “Europe vows to expand Latin Aid,” Chicago Tribune, Sept. 30, 1984, 3.
1992 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998), 430.
51. Envío team, “The Embargo: A Time for Solidarity,” Envío, no. 47 (May 1985).
52. Victor Hugo Tinoco, interview by the author; Rep. David Bonior, telephone interview by
the author, June 27, 2011; and Sophia Clark, interview by the author.
54. Rev. Bill Callahan, interview by the author, Hyattsville, MD, May 25, 2006; and “Pro-
Sandinistas, Opponents March,” Washington Post, Mar. 28, 1985, D5.
56. Edward Cody, “Americans Pay Tribute to a Revolution,” Washington Post, July 23, 1985, A9.
57. Neil Henry, “Inside the Revolution,” Washington Post, Sept. 29, 1985, 6.
58. Ana Patricia Elvir, e-mail communication with the author.
59. Ibid.
60. Chuck Kaufman and Katherine Hoyt (Nicaragua Network coordinators), e-mail com-
munications with the author, Sept. 2007.
61. Ana Patricia Elvir, e-mail communication with the author.
62. Envío team, “Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Fasts for Peace: An Interview with Father
Miguel D’Escoto,” Envío, No. 49 ( July 1985).
63. “Nicaragua Official Expected to End Fast,” Washington Post, Aug. 3, 1985, A25; Millie
Thayer, “Priest’s Fast Ignites Widespread Support,” (PCASC) Central America Update 2,
no. 6 (Sept. 1985), 3; and Katherine Hoyt, 30 Years of Memories: Dictatorship, Revolution, and
Nicaragua Solidarity (Washington, DC: Nicaragua Network Education Fund, 1996), 141.
64. Carlos Fonseca, Bajo las Banderas del Sandinismo (reprint; Managua: Nueva Nicaragua,
1981), 199, quoted in English in Joseph E. Mulligan, The Nicaraguan Church and the Revo-
lution (Kansas City, MO: Sheed & Ward, 1991), 222.
66. Chilsen and Rampton, Friends in Deed, appendixes.
67. This outline is a summary of objectives listed by Manuel Ortega Hegg and Günther Mai-
hold in La Cooperación Intermunicipal e Intercomunal y Los Hermanamientos de Ciudades
en Nicaragua 1980–1990 (Managua: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1991), 13, 8, 18–19.
68. Ibid., 56; and Chilsen and Rampton, Friends in Deed, 138.
69. Chilsen and Rampton, Friends in Deed, 3, 6, 22; and Hegg and Maihold, La Cooperación
Intermunicipal, 14.
70. Hegg and Maihold, La Cooperación Intermunicipal, 10, 27–29.

71. James M. Markham, “Young Germans Hear the Sandinistas’ Drummer,” New York Times,
Sept. 17, 1986, A2. See also “Death of German Prompts Protests,” New York Times, May
4, 1983, A9.
72. Mary Dakin et. al., eds., Nicaragua: 4th Battle of the Coffee Harvest (London: Nicaragua
Solidarity Campaign, ca. early 1986), 2.
75. “Foreign Volunteers Ordered to Quit Nicaraguan War Zones—Move Follows Contra
Attacks on West European Workers,” Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1988, A21.
76. “Decatur and Atlanta Mayors Mourn Ben Linder,” Bulletin of Municipal Foreign Policy 1,
no. 3 (Autumn 1987), 21.
77. Envío team, “International Solidarity on the Upswing,” Envío, no. 80 (Feb. 1988).
78. William Drozdiak, “Europe Concerned Over Central America’s Impact on Alliance,”
Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1983, A16.
79. Flora Lewis, “Foreign Affairs: Signal From the Voters.” New York Times, Apr. 19, 1984, A19.
80. R. W. Apple, “Ireland’s Premier Chides President,” New York Times, June 4, 1984, A1.
81. Jack Nelson, “Latin Policy of U.S. Viewed as Dividing NATO,” Los Angeles Times, Mar.
17, 1985.
82. “Spaniards Protest Visit by Reagan,” San Francisco Chronicle, May 6, 1985, 13.
83. Dion van den Berg, “Local Governments’ Support for the Peace Movement in the 1980s:
the Example of Dutch Municipalities” ( June 2008), www.citydiplomacy.org/fileadmin/
user_upload/813093_Binnenwerk_en4.pdf.
84. Peter Slevin, “Britons Champion Sandinistas vs. U.S.,” Miami Herald, Aug. 11, 1989, 17A.
There were also “North-South” committees and activities that were part of the larger
European Nuclear Disarmament campaign. See London School of Economics archive,
European Nuclear Disarmament papers, box 51.
85. Eusebio Mujal-León, “The West German Social Democratic Party and the Politics of
Internationalism in Central America,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs
29, no. 4 (Winter 1987–88), 99.
86. Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarma-
ment Movement, 1971 to the Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 239.
87. Joanne Landy, Jiri Dienstbier, Eva Kanturkova, Vaclav Maly, and Anna Sabatova Jr. et al.,
“Protests on Nicaragua” (letter to the editor), New York Review of Books, Feb. 13, 1986,
www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1986/feb/13/protests-on-nicaragua.
88. USIA Office of Research, “West Europeans Critical of U.S. Central American Policy”
Research Memorandum, Aug. 30, 1984, 1, 4, 5, NARA, RG 306, Regular and Special
Reports of the Office of Research, 1983–87.
89. Leo P. Crespi, “West European Views of U.S. versus Soviet Moral Standing in Interna-
tional Behavior,” Sept. 19, 1984, 1, 6, ibid.
90. C. Ritchey Sloan, USIA Office of Research, “West Europeans Remain Detached but
Critical of U.S. Policy in Central America,” May 10, 1985, Research Memorandum, 1, 11
(table), ibid.
91. Steven K. Smith, USIA Office of Research, “Latin American and West European Press
Generally Critical of U.S. Policy Towards Nicaragua,” May 17, 1985, 2, ibid.
92. See Sean J. McLaughlin, “De Gaulle’s Peace Program for Vietnam: The Kennedy Years,”
Peace and Change 36, no. 2 (Apr. 2010), 218–61.
93. Phillip Geyelin, “Do Americans Really Understand Western Europe?” Washington Post,
Apr. 25, 1985, A23.
7. Meeting the Political Challenge, 1985–86
1. Bernard Weinraub, “President Calls Sandinista Foes ‘Our Brothers,’” New York Times,
Feb. 17, 1985, A1.
2. Hedrick Smith, “A Larger Force of Latin Rebels Sought by U.S.,” New York Times, Apr.
17, 1985, A1.
3. David Hoffman and Margaret Shapiro, “Democrats, Reagan Reach Aid Impasse,” Wash-
ington Post, Apr. 23, 1985, A1.
4. Hedrick Smith, “O’Neill Turns against Reagan,” New York Times, Feb. 27, 1985, A6.
5. Joel Brinkley, “Nicaragua Rebels Accused of Abuses,” New York Times, Dec. 27, 1984,
A1. Regarding contra attacks on civilians, Adolfo Calero, chairman of the FDN, made
the implausible argument that the contras were fighting in self-defense, telling reporter
Stephen Kinzer, “What they [Sandinistas] call a cooperative is also a troop concentra-
tion full of armed people. We are not killing civilians. We are fighting armed people and
returning fire when fire is directed against us.” Stephen Kinzer, “Nicaraguan Rebels Step
Up Raids in Coffee Areas as Harvest Nears,” New York Times, Nov. 23, 1984, A1.
6. Reed Brody, Contra Terror in Nicaragua: Report of a Fact-Finding Mission, September
1984–January 1985 (Boston: South End Press, 1985); and Larry Rohter, “Nicaragua Reb-
els Accused of Abuses: Private Group Reports Pattern of Attacks and Atrocities,” New
York Times, Mar. 7, 1985, A1.
7. An Americas Watch Report: Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua, 1981–
1985 (Washington, DC: Americas Watch, Mar. 1985), 1.
8. Joanne Omang, “Inquiry Finds Atrocities by Nicaraguan ‘Contras,’” Washington Post,
Mar. 7, 1985, A14.
9. “Statement of Adm. Stansfield Turner, Former Director of Central Intelligence” (Apr. 16,
1985), U.S. Support for the Contras, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress,
First Session, April 16, 17 and 18, 1985 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1985), 4.
10. John Carmody, “The TV Column,” Washington Post, Apr. 12, 1985; and SANE advertise-
ment (n.d.), SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, series G, box 78.
11. Debra Reuben, Nicaragua Network letter to affiliates and friends, Feb. 1985, WHS archive,
Nicaragua Network files, box 3.
12. CAWG meeting notes and plans, Jan. 10, 1985, SCPC, CAWG files, DG-058; and “Suggested
Actions for Local Organizers on Covert Aid Debate,” Mar. 27, 1985, ibid. CAWG at this time
included representatives of peace and solidarity organizations (CNFMP, CISPES, Nicara-
gua Network, NISGUA, Quixote Center, SANE, RTFCA, WFP, U.S. Out of Central
America, and WOLA), church denominations (American Baptist, Church of the Brethren,
Church World Service, Presbyterian Church, United Church of Christ, and Unitarian Uni-
versalist Association), and civic and labor groups (International Longshoreman and Ware-
housemen’s Union, League of United Latin American Citizens, and Common Cause).
13. Desson Howe, “Hollywood Invasion,” Washington Post, Apr. 13, 1985, D3; and Jacob V.
Lamar Jr., “Battle for Hearts and Minds: The Sandinistas and Contras Vie for U.S. Sup-
port,” Time 125 (Apr. 22, 1985), 20.
14. Daniel Cantor and Juliet Schor, Tunnel Vision: Labor, the World Economy, and Cen-
tral America, PACCA Series on the Domestic Roots of U.S. Foreign Policy (Boston:
South End Press, 1987), 9; Andrew Battista, “Unions and Cold War Foreign Policy
in the 1980s: The National Labor Committee, the AFL-CIO, and Central America,”
Diplomatic History 26, no. 3 (Summer 2002), 429; and Labor Network on Central
America, Nicaragua: Labor, Democracy, and the Struggle for Peace: Report of the West
Coast Trade Union Delegation to Nicaragua (Oakland, CA: Labor Network on Central
America, Nov. 1984), 31.
15. Battista, “Unions and Cold War Foreign Policy in the 1980s,” 438, 434–35. NLC unions
made further progress at the 1987 AFL-CIO convention when the latter passed a resolu-
tion calling for an end to both U.S. military aid to the contras and Soviet and Cuban aid
to the Nicaraguan government.
16. Jerry Genesio, Veterans for Peace: The First Decade (Falmouth, ME: Pequawket Press,
1997), 17, 27.
17. A promotional flyer by the War Resisters League included, under the subheading of “anti-
interventionism,” the regions of Central America, “the Middle East, Asia, the Pacific and
Europe.” War Resisters League, “4 Days in April: April 19–22 Protest in Washington,
D.C.,” author’s collection.
18. Martin Well and Margaret Engel, “Reagan Policies Protested,” Washington Post, Apr. 21,
1985, B1.
19. Stephen Engelberg, “Thousands Join Protest in Washington,” New York Times, Apr. 21,
1985, 22A. The organizations that signed on as sponsors of the demonstrations went
beyond foreign policy groups and included the American Indian Movement, Congress
of National Black Churches, League of United Latin American Citizens, Rainbow Coali-
tion, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, U.S. Student Association, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists, International Chemical Workers Union, International
Longshoremen’s and Warehousemen’s Union, United Electrical Workers, and United
Food and Commercial Workers.
20. Karlyn Barker, “More Than 300 Arrested in White House Protest,” Washington Post, Apr. 23,
1985, B1.
21. Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy, “1985 Voting Record,” authors collection.
23. CUSCLIN press statement, June 13, 1985, CUSCLIN records.
24. Overall estimates are cited in Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America
Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 83. Specific figures for
arrests are cited in “300 Seized in San Francisco in Nicaragua Protest” (Associated Press),
New York Times, May 9, 1985, A6, and in Thomas Palmer, “Charges Dropped against 559 at
JFK Nicaragua Protest,” Boston Globe, May 31, 1985.
25. William P. Quigley, “The Necessity Defense in Civil Disobedience Cases: Bring in the
Jury,” New England Law Review 28, no. 3 (Fall 2003), 10, www.loyno.edu/~quigley/Arti-
cles/articlecivil_disobedience_and_publi.pdf.
26. Ronald W. Powell, “Group in 12th Day of Nicaragua Protest in Federal Building,” Seattle
Times, May 21, 1985, B1.
27. Smith, Resisting Reagan, 83.
28. “National Pledge Action,” Witness for Peace (Philadelphia chapter newsletter), June 1985,
1, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
29. Ken Butigan, “The Pledge of Resistance,” Pace e Bene Nonviolence Service, http://
paceebene.org/nvns/nonviolence-news-service-archive/pledge-resistance, 12.
30. The figure of 70,000 is noted in “Minutes of the POR National Meeting for Monday,
Nov. 18, 1985,” 1, AFSC archive, PED files. The 100,000 figure is noted in Ken Butigan,
“The Pledge of Resistance,” 7.
31. “Minutes of the POR National Meeting for Monday, Nov. 18, 1985,” 1–4.
32. “Minutes of the POR National Meeting for Monday, Nov. 18, 1985,” 1–4; and Pledge of
Resistance, “Contra Aid Alert,” Jan. 9, 1986, SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, series G.
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 203.
34. “Briefing: The Nicaragua Push,” New York Times, Mar. 13, 1986, A24.
35. Lore Croghan, “Battle over Aid to Contras Fought on Ad Front,” Adweek, Mar. 31, 1986,
23, WHS archive, Nicaragua Network files, box 7.
36. Tim Fogarty, telephone interview by the author, Feb. 22, 2007.
37. American Jewish Congress, “Dear Representative” (letter), Mar. 19, 1986, SCPC, SANE
files, DG-058, series G.
38. “Religious Figures Protest Contra Aid,” New York Times, Mar. 5, 1986, A4.
39. Michael J. McManus, “Religious Leaders Unite in Opposing Aid for Contras,” Providence
Journal (Providence, RI), Mar. 22, 1986, A9.
40. President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session at a White
House Luncheon for Regional Editors and Broadcasters,” June 13, 1986, The Public Papers
of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, www.reagan.utexas.
edu.
41. Rep. Bob Wittaker, letter to Mark Becker, Mar. 3, 1986, in Mark Becker, “Walking Through
the New Nicaragua” (Bethel College, KS: Peace Studies Internship Paper, Aug. 1986),
Appendix, www.yachana.org/reports/nicawfp; and Rep. Tom Daschle, letter to Mark
Becker, June 30, 1986, ibid.
42. SANE News Release, “SANE to Continue Opposition to Contra Aid,” Mar. 20, 1986,
SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, series G; and David Dyson and Daniel Cantor, “To Friends
and Supporters” (NLC outreach letter), Feb. 7, 1986, SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, series G.
43. Arnson and Brenner, “The Limits of Lobbying,” 203–4, 209, 211.
44. Kevin Ellis, “Citizens Respond on Contra Aid Plea,” The Tennessean, Mar. 18, 1986.
46. William LeoGrande and Philip Brenner, “The House Divided: Ideological Polarization
over Aid to the Nicaraguan ‘Contras,’” Legislative Studies Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Feb. 1993): 122.
47. “Aid for the Contras, yes and no; nation’s newspapers split over Reagan’s plan to help
guerrillas,” U.S. News & World Report, Mar. 17, 1986, 71.
48. Melinda Beck, with David Newell and Margaret Garrard Warner, “Aid to the Contras:
Saying No—For Now,” Newsweek, Mar. 31, 1986, 20.
49. Ken Butigan, “Crossing the Line,” Pledge of Resistance Newsletter, Winter 1987, 1, author’s
collection.
50. These slogans were gathered from the national POR Campaign’s “Synopsis of Regional
Actions” (brief reports on activities in various cities, Oct. 25, 1986 and Nov. 1–2 demon-
strations), n.d., WHS archive, Nicaragua Network files, box 7.
51. “Dear Representative” (CAWG form letter to representatives), Apr. 8, 1986, SCPC,
SANE files, DG-058, series G.
52. Robin Toner, “They Who Beg to Differ on Aid to Nicaragua,” New York Times, Mar. 14,
1986, A14; and Ed Griffin-Nolan, Witness for Peace: A Story of Resistance (Louisville, KY:
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991), 165.
53. Croghan, “Battle over Aid to Contras”; and National POR Campaign, “Pledge Actions,
February–May, 1986,” Cornell University, Kroch Library, Division of Rare and Manu-
script Collections, CUSLAR (Cornell University Committee on U.S–Latin American
Relations) files (collection #39/6/2796), box 6.
54. “Congressman Gunderson, Please Don’t Send Our Dollars or Our Boys to a Nicara-
guan War” (advertisement), Leader Telegram (Chippewa Falls, WI), Apr. 11, 1986, WHS
archive, Nicaragua Network files, box 7; and SANE News Release, “SANE to Continue
Opposition to Contra Aid,” Mar. 20, 1986, SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, series G.
55. In reviewing the ninety-two books (with 50 pages or more on the Contra War), I found
fifty-one to have a strong critical or leftist orientation, while fourteen were clearly sup-
portive of administration claims. Scholars who authored studies (books and articles)
critical of the administration’s policy toward Nicaragua, published between 1983 and
1987, include the following: Morris J. Blachman, John A. Booth, E. Bradford Burns,
Noam Chomsky, Kenneth M. Coleman, Martin Diskin, Marlene Dixon, George C.
Herring, Eldon Kenworthy, Peter Kornbluh, Walter LaFeber, William M. LeoGrande,
Kent Norsworthy, William I. Robinson, Lars Schoultz, Kenneth E. Sharpe, Jack Spence,
Wayne Smith, and Thomas W. Walker.
56. Stephen Webre, “Central America and the United States in the 1980s: Recent Descrip-
tions and Prescriptions,” Latin American Research Review 21, no. 3 (1986), 184.
57. Bob von Sternberg, “57 Arrested in Protests against U.S. Latin Policy,” Minneapolis Star
and Tribune, June 27, 1986, B1.
58. Joel Brinkley, “Four Veterans Ending Fast on Policy in Nicaragua,” New York Times, Oct.
17, 1986, A16; Randy Furst, “Fast Was Vet’s Last-Ditch Effort to Protest U.S. Nicaragua
Role,” Minneapolis Star and Tribune, Oct. 25, 1986, A14; and David Behrens, “A Fast in the
Name of Peace,” Newsday (Long Island, NY), Oct. 8, 1986, 4.
59. Bella English, “Rally against Contra Aid Draws 1,000,” Boston Globe, Sept. 29, 1986, 17.
60. “War Medals Returned to Protest U.S. Policy,” New York Times, Oct. 10, 1986, A22; Penny
Pagano, “Fast against Contras Marks Its 39th Day,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 10, 1986, 12;
and Penny Pagano, “Four Veterans Say Other Efforts Will Go On, Fast over Central
America Policy to End,” Los Angeles Times, Oct. 17, 1986, 14.
61. Actions for Peace, Jobs and Justice, letter, July 17, 1986 (plans for October 25, 1986 regional
demonstrations), WHS, Nicaragua Network files, box 7; and “Synopsis of Regional
Actions” (brief reports on activities in various cities, Oct. 25, 1986 and Nov. 1–2 demon-
strations), n.d., ibid.
62. Ben A. Franklin, “Polyglot Protest Planned Today,” New York Times, Oct. 25, 1986, A1.
63. “Dialog: Reaching Out or Acting Out?” Pledge of Resistance Newsletter, Winter 1987, 2,
author’s collection.
64. Bob Rini, “Local News: Oregon Guard in Central America,” (PCASC) Central America
Update 3, no. 1 (Mar. 1986), 2.
65. “Weekend Warriors No More,” Time 128 (Sept. 8, 1986), 26–27.
66. “National Guard Trips to Honduras Draw Fire,” USA Today, Feb. 11, 1986.
67. St. Louis POR (National Guard Clearinghouse), “The National Guard in Central Amer-
ica and Other Local Military Connections: Organizing Guide,” Dec. 1986, SCPC, SANE
files, DG-058, series G; and Peggy Moore (St. Louis Pledge), “Honduran Training:
National Guard and Reserve,” Pledge of Resistance Newsletter, Winter 1987; and “Local
Military Connections,” ibid.
68. Tracy Wenzel, “Secrecy Cloaks Contra-Training Plan,” Ft. Walton Beach Playground Daily
News, Nov. 29, 1986, B1.
69. “Are Contras Training at Eglin? Peace Activists on Lookout for Where to Protest,”
Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 23, 1986, B5; and Bob Benz, “Pro-Contra Demonstration Planned,”
The Log (Fort Walton Beach), Dec. 8, 1986.
70. “Priest Won’t Promise to End ‘Contra’ Protest, Is Ordered Held without Bail,” St. Peters-
burg Times, Dec. 2, 1986.
71. Betsy Crites, “Endorsers of Hurlburt Field Action Dec. 13, 1986, as of 12/5/86,” Memoran-
dum to Witness for Peace Steering Committee, Dec. 9, 1986, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
72. Tracy Wenzel, “Protesters Plan Vigil over Contra Funding,” Ft. Walton Beach Playground
Daily News, Dec. 3, 1986; and Tracy Wenzel, “Aderholt Denies Contra Dealings,” Ft. Wal-
ton Beach Playground Daily News, Dec. 6, 1986. The Air Commando Association is made
up of retired Air Force personnel.
73. Tracy Wenzel, “Rivals Debate Contra Situation,” Ft. Walton Beach Playground Daily News,
Dec. 11, 1986.
74. Bob Benz, “Marchers Air Opposing Contra Views, The Log, Dec. 13, 1986, 1A.
75. Tracy Wenzel, “Peace Activists Ready for Rally,” Ft. Walton Beach Playground Daily News,
Dec. 13, 1986, 1.
76. Robert Kuntz and Tracy Wenzel, “Deputies Prepared for Protest,” Ft. Walton Beach
Playground Daily News, Dec. 14, 1986, 1B; Tracy Wenzel, “Contra Backers Give Their
Side of the Story,” ibid.; Tracy Wenzel, “Protesters Ask for Arrest and Get It,” Ft. Wal-
ton Beach Daily News, Dec. 14, 1986, 1A; “Hurlburt Protests Are Peaceful, but 10 Are
Detained and One Arrested,” Pensacola News Journal, Dec. 14, 1986, 13A; Elizabeth
Donavan, “Anti-Contra Protester: Those Arrested Give Up Freedom for Beliefs,” Pen-
sacola News-Journal, Dec. 14, 1986; Barbara Janesh, “Pro-Contra Rally Organizer Plans
Pro-American Parade,” Pensacola News-Journal, Dec. 14, 1986; Dudley Clendinen,
“Friends and Foes of Contras Rally at Florida Base,” New York Times, Dec. 14, 1986, 20;
Lee Forst, “Opponents Uncertain of Future Contra Rallies,” Ft. Walton Beach Play-
ground Daily News, Dec. 15, 1986, 1A; and Tom Fischer, e-mail communication with the
author, June 12, 2010.
77. Rev. Grant Gallup, interview by the author, Managua, June 16, 2006; and Gallup, e-mail
communication, June 2006.
78. Joanne Omang, “U.S. Groups Counter Contra Aid with Private ‘Quest for Peace’; Multimil-
lion-Dollar Effort Includes Medicine, School Supplies,” Washington Post, Apr. 19, 1987, A20.
79. Debra Reuben and Sylvia Sherman, “Ten Years of Solidarity: A Nicaragua Network His-
tory,” Nicaraguan Perspectives, no. 17 (Summer/Fall 1989), 51.
80. Mary Beth George, “Activists Target Trade Embargo,” The Guardian, Nicaragua Anniver-
sary Supplement, Summer 1989, 6.
81. William R. Long, “For U.S. Volunteers Aiding Nicaraguans, Thanksgiving Came Early,”
Los Angeles Times, Nov. 28, 1985; Virginia Escalante, “An Old Warrior Continues His Bat-
tle on the Road to Nicaragua,” Los Angeles Times, Mar. 28, 1986, 1; “Theodore Ernest, Jr.
Veltfort,” Abraham Lincoln Brigade Archives, www.alba-valb.org/volunteers/theodore-
ernest-jr-veltfort; and Larry Aydlette, “Ex-Soldier, 81, Now Battles for Peace, Veterans’
Rights,” Palm Beach Post, Nov. 19, 1989, 1B.
82. Quixote Center, “Quest for Peace 20th Anniversary Celebration: An Interactive History
of the Quest for Peace,” Quest for Peace News, No. 68, June 2006; “Quest for Peace: A
Campaign to Send $100 Million in True Humanitarian Aid to the People of Nicaragua”;
“Quest for Peace National Tally Report—December 15, 1986”; and Rev. Bill Callahan
and Dolly Pomerleau, interview by the author, Hyattsville, MD, May 25, 2006.
83. Michael Gillen, “Memories of Nicaragua, 1986,” The Veteran (Vietnam Veterans Against
the War) 29, no. 2 (Fall/winter 1999), 28, www.vvaw.org/veteran/article/?id=180.
84. Jim Burchell, telephone interviews by the author, July 16, 2007, and May 4, 2011.
85. Rogers Worthington, “Pardon for Hasenfus ‘Possible,’” Chicago Tribune, Nov. 21, 1986,
12; and Liz Chilsen and Sheldon Rampton, Friends in Deed: The Story of U.S.-Nicaragua
Sister Cities (Madison: Wisconsin Coordinating Council on Nicaragua, 1988), 12.
86. Vilma Nuñez de Escorcia, interview by the author.
87. Stephen Kinzer, “Hasenfus Is Freed by Nicaraguans and Heads Home,” New York Times,
Dec. 18, 1986.
88. Daniel Erdman and Sharon Hostetler, “History and Evolution of the WFP Program in
Nicaragua,” Jan. 22, 1988, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
89. Sharon Hostetler, interview by the author, Managua, June 26, 2006; Griffin-Nolan, Wit-
ness for Peace, 149, 153; and “Clergymen Assert Abduction in Nicaragua Wasn’t Staged,”
New York Times, Aug. 15, 1985, A3.
90. Sharon Hostetler and Daniel Erdsman, “Spiritual Basis of the Long-Term Team Work in
Nicaragua,” Jan. 1989, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
91. Joan Friedberg, “A Review: Destination Nicaragua: The Documentary,” The Messenger,
Mar. 13, 1986, Empowerment Project, www.empowermentproject.org/pages/destactual
_rev.html.
8. Sustaining the Anti–Contra War Campaign, 1987–90
1. Steven Slade, “The Chance We’ve Been Waiting For,” Pledge of Resistance Newsletter, Win-
ter 1987, 1.
2. Central America Resource Center, Directory of Central America Organizations, Introduction.
3. Ken Butigan, “The Pledge of Resistance,” Pace e Bene Nonviolence Service, Jan. 18, 2006,
http://paceebene.org/nvns/nonviolence-news-service-archive/pledge-resistance.
4. Gail Phares and Rev. Bill Webber, Witness for Peace letter to Rev. Phillip Cousin,
National Council of Churches, Nov. 30, 1986, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
5. Betsy Crites, Memorandum to WFP Staff, Steering Committee and Regional Coordina-
tors, July 22, 1987, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
6. Dave Dyson, “Labor Takes the Field,” 4, www.nathannewman.org/EDIN/.mags/.
cross/.40/.40salv/.dyson.html.
7. Richard Stengel, “Congress Shows Its Impatience: With an Artful Ploy, It Registers
Coolness toward the Contras,” Time, Mar. 23, 1987, 16–17.
8. James L. Franklin, “5 Christian Leaders Charged in Protest,” Boston Globe, Mar. 14, 1987,
19. The five leaders were Rev. Arie Brower, general secretary of the National Council of
Churches, Rev. John Humbert, president of the Disciples of Christ Church, Rev. Avery
Post, president of the United Church of Christ, Rev. Joseph Nangle of the Catholic Con-
ference of Major Superiors of Men, and Doris Anne Younger, general director of Church
Women United.
9. Beverly Bickel, Philip Brenner, and William LeoGrande, Challenging the Reagan Doctrine:
A Summation of the April 25th Mobilization (Washington, DC: The Foreign Policy Educa-
tion Fund, Oct. 1987), 8–10, 39.
10. Matthew L. Wald, “Amy Carter Tells Court She Sat in Road to Alter C.I.A. Policy,” New
York Times, Apr. 14, 1987, A17; and Wald, “Amy Carter Is Acquitted over Protest,” New
York Times, Apr. 16, 1987, A17.
11. Dyson, “Labor Takes the Field,” 5. The source of much of the information in this section
is from Bickel et al., Challenging the Reagan Doctrine.
12. Bickel et al., Challenging the Reagan Doctrine, 6. The makeup of the Steering Committee
for the April 25th mobilization was not listed in the Mobe’s publications, but it would
appear from various reports that the faith-based activist sector included AFSC, IRT-
FCA, National Council of Churches, POR, Quixote Center, RTFCA, and WFP; the
secular peace and justice sector included CNFMP, Democratic Socialists of America,
MFS, Rainbow Coalition, SANE/Freeze, Washington Peace Center, and WILPF; and
the solidarity sector, which combined Central America and Southern Africa groups,
included CISPES, NISGUA, Nicaragua Network, MADRE, American Committee on
Africa, TransAfrica, and Washington Office on Africa.
13. The National Mobilization for Justice and Peace in Central America and Southern Africa,
“Dear Disarmament Activist” (letter), Mar. 6, 1987, SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, series G.
14. Bickel et al., Challenging the Reagan Doctrine, 25, 48, 20, 45.
15. Ibid., 28, 34, 37, 48.
16. Joel Freedman, Assistant to the President for Economic Development, International Union
of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, “An Analysis of the April 25th Mobilization.” Memo-
randum to John T. Joyce, Apr. 2, 1987, 11, SCPC, SANE files, DG-058, series G; and Albert
Shanker, “Avoiding the ‘Wrong Crowd’” (display ad), New York Times, Apr. 19, 1987, E7.
17. Wayne King, “Thousands Protest U.S. Policy in Central America,” New York Times, Apr.
26, 1987, A32. The U.S. Capitol Police estimated the total turnout in Washington at 75,000.
18. Ibid.; and Bickel et al., Challenging the Reagan Doctrine, 10–11.
19. Lee Hockstader, “560 Arrested at CIA Headquarters: Throng Protesting U.S. Foreign
Policy Snarls Traffic in McLean,” Washington Post, Apr. 28, 1987, A1.
20. Philip Brenner, telephone interview by the author, July 19, 2007; and William Leo-
Grande, e-mail communication with the author, July 10, 2007.
21. Lawrence E. Walsh, “Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters,”
vol. 1, Investigations and Prosecutions, Aug. 4, 1993, Washington, DC, Executive Sum-
mary, www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh. See also Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne,
eds., The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History (New York: New Press, 1993), 338.
22. Richard L. Berke and Kenneth B. Noble, “Lobbying and Contributions by Conservative
Fund-Raiser Evoke Questions,” New York Times, Jan. 9, 1987, A10; and Daniel K. Inouye
and Lee H. Hamilton, Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra
Affair, with the Minority View, abridged edition (New York: Random House, 1988), xxvii.
23. Harry Van Cleve, Comptroller General of the U.S. General Accounting Office, non-
classified letter to Rep. Jack Brooks and Rep. Dante B. Fascell, Sept. 30, 1987, NSA, Iran-
Contra collection, IC04287.
24. Committee on Foreign Affairs Staff Report, U.S. House of Representatives, State Depart-
ment and Intelligence Community Involvement in Domestic Activities Related to the Iran/
Contra Affair, Sept. 7, 1988, 24, NSA, Nicaragua collection, NI02137.
25. Dan Chapman, “Lobby Groups Take Aim at the Undecideds,” Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Online ( Jan. 30, 1988), 200; Andrew Rosenthal, “Campaign Formed Opposing
Contras,” New York Times, Aug. 14, 1987, A8; and “Coalition Lobbying Against Contra
Aid,” Nuclear Times 5, no. 5 ( July/Aug. 1987), 33.
26. Stanley B. Greenberg, “Contra Aid: American Antipathy to Foreign Engagement,” Aug.
20, 1987, 18, www.gqrr.com/articles/1693/3757_r_contraaid_082087.pdf.
27. Countdown ’87 Highlights: Field Organizing—February, 1988, Bonior Papers, Wayne
State University, box 66, cited in Paul Thomas Dean, “Unusual Campaign: NGO’s Long
Battle to End Contra Aid” (PhD diss., Washington State University, May 2011), 129, 141.
28. Rosenthal, “Campaign Formed Opposing Contras.”
30. Kathy Scruggs, “Contras Are Killing Civilians, Report Claims,” Atlanta Constitution,
Sept. 24, 1987, A4.
31. S. Brian Willson, letter to Capt. Lonnie Cagle, Commander Concord Naval Weapons
Station, Aug. 21, 1987, WHS archive, VFP files, box 2, folder 11.
32. “Excerpts from Testimony Prepared and Presented by S. Brian Willson for Hearings
Conducted by the U.S. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Investigations, Wash-
ington, DC, November 18, 1987,” www.brianwillson.com/evracnwstest.html.
33. S. Brian Willson, “Autobiography,” www.brianwillson.com/autobiography; and “Ameri-
cans Visit Military Zone, Protesters in Nicaragua,” San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 5, 1987, 15.
34. “Ortega’s Partner to Visit Man Run Over by Train,” Houston Chronicle, Sept. 4, 1987, 4.
35. Vicki Kemper, “The Times: Grassroots Campaigns for Peace in Nicaragua,” Sojourners 17,
no. 1 ( Jan. 1988), 11–12.
36. Dean, “Unusual Campaign,” 178.
37. Rosa DeLauro, “All Seven Democratic Presidential Candidates Oppose Contra Aid Bill”
(press release), Feb. 2, 1988, Bonior Papers, cited in Dean, “Unusual Campaign,” 173
footnote.
38. Richard Boudreaux, “U.S. Must End Contra Aid, Latin Report Says: International Panel
Views Support for Rebels, Non-Compliance by 4 Nations as Barring Peace,” Los Angeles
Times, Jan. 14, 1988.
39. “Central America: 39 Mayors Sign Anti–Contra Initiative,” Bulletin of Municipal Foreign
Policy 2, no. 2 (Spring 1988), 28–29.
40. Dean, “Unusual Campaign,” 190, 130–32.
41. Robert Borosage, Kathy Gille, and David Bonior interviews by the author.
42 Envío team, “Sapoá—A New Benchmark,” Envío, no. 83 (May 1988).
43. See, e.g., Julia Preston, “28 Deaths, Mostly Civilian, Are Laid to Contras in Nicaragua:
Neighbor Northern Towns Jolted by Explosions,” Washington Post, Feb. 10, 1988, A1.
44. “Reagan Action in Honduras Stirs Demonstrations in U.S.,” New York Times, Mar. 19,
1988, 5; Peter Ross, “The End Game in Nicaragua (American Troops in Honduras May
be Last Ploy in Conflict),” U.S. News and World Report, 104, no. 12 (Mar. 28, 1988), 16; and
Steven Engelberg with Elaine Sciolino, “A U.S. Frame-up of Nicaragua Charged,” New
York Times, Feb. 4, 1988, A1.
45. “Reagan Action in Honduras Stirs Demonstrations in U.S.,” New York Times; and “Pro-
testers Hit Streets over U.S. Troop Move,” Seattle Times, Mar. 19, 1988, A1. The figure of
900 total arrests was cited in Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The U.S. Central America
Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 85.
46. Stengel, “Congress Shows Its Impatience.”
47. President Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Aid to the Nicaraguan Democratic
Resistance,” February 2, 1988, The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, Ronald
Reagan Presidential Library, www.reagan.utexas.edu.
48. Jack Malinowski and Angie Berryman, “Recommended Cuts in Human Rights/Global
Issues Program,” Memorandum to Budget and Priorities Subcommittee, June 1, 1987,
AFSC archive, PED files; and Robert Stark and Colin Danby, “After Contra Aid Defeat—
What Next?” Nicaraguan Perspectives, no. 15 (Summer 1988), 13.
49. “Cover-Up: Behind the Iran-Contra Affair,” Empowerment Project, www.empower-
mentproject.org/pages/coverup.html.
50. Sharon Haas, Don McClain, and Lucius Walker, IFCO fundraising letter, June 11, 1987,
WHS, WCCN files, box 4.
51. Michael Greenwood, “After a Night in Jail, Gandall is at UConn,” The Daily Campus, Feb.
28, 1989, WHS VFP files, box 1, folder 6.
52. Joanne Omang, “U.S. Groups Counter Contra Aid with Private ‘Quest for Peace,’ Multi-
million-dollar Effort Includes Medicine, School Supplies,” Washington Post, Apr. 19, 1987,
A20; and John M. Goshko, “Expelled Nicaraguan Envoy Beats Deadline; Tünnermann,
7 Others Ousted in Retaliation for Sandinista Action Against U.S.,” Washington Post, July
16, 1988, A16.
53. John Linder, interview by the author, Portland, Oregon, May 27, 2007 (used throughout
this section on the Linder family tour); Ben Linder Memorial Fund Newsletter, Autumn
1989, PCASC records; and Bill Donahue, “A Personal Mission; Northwest Living: Ben’s
Legacy,” The Oregonian, April 19, 1992, www.stanford.edu/group/arts/nicaragua/stu-
dent/linder/local1.html.
54. Tim Calvert, “Linder Family Tours for Peace,” (PCASC) Central America Update 4, no.
6 (Sept. 1987), 7.
55. Gerald M. Boyd, “Bush Debates With Brother of American Slain by Contras,” New York
Times, Aug. 1, 1987, A1; and Frank Clifford, “Audience Hails Vice-President’s Reply,
Brother of Man Slain by Contras Confronts Bush,” Los Angeles Times, Aug., 1, 1987.
56. United States Volunteers in Nicaragua and the Death of Benjamin Linder; Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, first session, May 13, 1987 (reprint from the collection of the University of
Michigan Library, 2010), 2, 65, 96.
57. William Branigin, “Americans in Nicaragua Undeterred by Killing: Linder’s Death Spot-
lights Volunteer Brigade,” Washington Post, May 3, 1987, A21.
58. Quixote Center, “Rebuilding Nicaragua, April 1989 Report,” 1, Quixote Center records.
59. Envío team, “Nicaragua Tries Peace Moves While Waiting for US Voters,” Envío, no. 88
(Nov. 1988).
60. Ed Griffin-Nolan, Witness for Peace: A Story of Resistance (Louisville, KY: Westminster/
John Knox Press, 1991), 192, 196.
61. Quixote Center, “Rebuilding Nicaragua, April 1989 Report,” 3; and “Quest for Peace 20th
Anniversary Celebration,” Quest for Peace News, no. 68 ( June 2006), 2, Quixote Center
records.
62. Sources for this section include the following: Don Mosley, telephone interview by the
author, August 1, 2007; Don Mosley, with Joyce Hollyday, With Our Own Eyes: The Dra-
matic Story of a Christian Response to the Wounds of War, Racism, and Oppression (Scott-
dale, PA: Herald Press, 1996); “Nicaragua: Walk in Peace,” Update Central America (IRT-
FCA newsletter), May–June 1987, 5; and Jubilee Partners Report, Dec. 1989, 4. All quotes,
unless otherwise noted, are from the Mosley interview.
63. Mosley, With Our Own Eyes, 151.

64. Veterans Peace Convoy Update, July 1, 1988, WHS archive, VFP files, box 2, folder 6; and Ed
Deaton, interview by the author, Tallahassee, Oct. 1, 2004.
65. “Nicaragua Supply Convoy Protests at White House,” Sun Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale) (AP),
June 24, 1988, 3A. See also Peter Applebome, “Talks Over Convoy Reach Dead End,”
New York Times, June 15, 1988, A6.
66. Nicholas W. Pilugin, “U.S. Policy against Aid to Nicaragua Is Target of Harbor Demon-
stration,” Boston Globe, July 10, 1988, 24.
67. “Ortega Receives U.S. Convoy in Public Ceremony,” Boston Globe (AP), July 30, 1988.
68. “Nicaragua Embargo Weakened by Ruling,” Boston Globe, Oct. 2, 1988.
69. “Minister’s Mission is Nicaragua,” USA Today, July 17, 1989, 2A.
70. IFCO Pastors for Peace Convoy (1988), author’s collection. The author drove the Miami
truck in the convoy and went to the Bluefields area.
71. IFCO Pastors for Peace Caravan to Nicaragua, July–August 1989 (New York: IFCO, 1989),
11. This IFCO report includes copies of local news articles on the caravan. Figures on the
value of aid and numbers of events, drivers, and people reached are cited on p. 5.
72. Gov. Michael Dukakis, quoted in Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, U.S. Army
Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
Press, 1989), 82. See also “Dukakis Loses Appeal on National Guard,” Washington Post,
Oct. 26, 1988, A14.
73. “1988 Democratic Party Platform,” The Patriot Post, http://patriotpost.us/document
/1988-democratic-platform.
74. Michael Oreskes, “Senate Votes, 64 to 35, to Send Money to the Opposition Parties in
Nicaragua: Arms Are No Longer the Issue. Now It’s a Matter of Sound Trucks,” New York
Times, Oct. 18, 1989, A1.
75. WFP, “Nicaragua Hotline: Summary of Documented Contra Attacks After Passage of
Bipartisan Accord, April 13–October 14, 1989,” SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
76. Bob Greene, Nicaragua’s Continuing Challenge,” Nicaragua Network News 2, no. 4 (Sum-
mer 1989), 5, WHS archive, Nicaragua Network files, box 3.
77. “National Media Response Campaign,” Nicaragua Network Subscriber Service 1, no. 3 (Sept.
15, 1989), 1; and “Quest for Peace Media Project,” The Activist (FCPJ Central America Proj-
ect newsletter), no. 2 (Nov. 1989), 3, WHS archive, Nicaragua Network files, box 4.
78. Lucy Harris, Coordinator of Short-Term Delegations, “Update on WFP Delegations,”
Memorandum to Steering Committee, Regional Coordinators, Staff, and Long-Term
Team, July 6, 1989, 2, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
79. Betsy Crites, “Year-End Report, Witness for Peace, 1988,” 2, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
80. Sheldon Rampton, “Sister Cities Gear Up for Nicaraguan Elections,” Bulletin of Munici-
pal Foreign Policy 3, no. 4 (Autumn 1989), 34.
81. “SANE/Freeze Weekly Legislative Report, Week of September 25, 1989,” author’s collec-
tion; Nicaragua Network and Quest for Peace, fundraising letter regarding the “Pens and
Pencils for Nicaraguan Elections” project, July 1, 1989, author’s collection.; and Chuck
Kaufman, conversations with the author, June 2006.
82. “The Nicaraguan Elections of February 25, 1990, Report of the Ad Hoc Coalition of
United States Sister Cities for Election Observation in Nicaragua,” March 12, 1990, WHS,
WCCN files, box 4; and Rampton, “Sister Cities Gear Up for Nicaraguan Elections.”
83. Rampton, “Sister Cities Gear Up for Nicaraguan Elections.”
84. “1990 Election Results,” Nicaraguan Perspectives, no. 19 (Fall/Winter 1990), 3.
85. María López Vigil, director of Envío magazine in 2006, comments at a meeting with a
visiting group of U.S. citizens, organized by Nicaragua Network and Kairos House in
Managua, June 19, 2006.
86. Heike Amelung, “Nicaragua’s Election,” The Activist (Gainesville, FL), no. 6, (Mar.
1990), 1, WHS archive, Nicaragua Network files, box 4.
87. Jay Mathews, “Settlement Reached in Protest Case,” Portland Press Herald (Portland,
OR), Aug. 9, 1990, WHS archive, VFP files, box 1, folder 2.
88. Sam R. Hope, “A Statement Regarding the Elections in Nicaragua,” Feb. 27, 1990, SCPC,
WFP files, DG-149.
89. Chuck Kaufman, conversations with the author, June 2006.
90. Barbra Apfelbaum, telephone interview by the author, July 11, 2007.
91. “The Morning After in Nicaragua,” New York Times (editorial), Feb. 27, 1990.
92. Witness for Peace, “Special Report from Nicaragua: Contra Demobilization,” June 11,
1990, SCPC, WFP files, DG-149.
93. Steven Crabill, “Sandinistas Out; So Are Tourists,” The Record (Hackensack, NJ), Aug.
21, 1990, C22.
94. Katherine Hoyt, 30 Years of Memories: Dictatorship, Revolution, and Nicaragua Solidarity
(Washington, DC: Nicaragua Network Education Fund, 1996), 147; Hari Dillon, let-
ter to TecNica friends and supporters, Nov. 28, 1990, author’s collection; and WCCN,
“2003 US-Nicaragua Sister Cities Directory,” author’s collection.
95. Clair Weber, Visions of Solidarity: U.S. Peace Activists in Nicaragua, from War to Women’s
Activism and Globalization (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 95, 88. For an anno-
tated list of U.S. groups involved in Nicaragua as of 2011, see “Links: National Groups
with Nicaragua Programs,” www.nicanet.org/archive/nicanet_links.php.
96. Hoyt, 30 Years of Memories, 147.
97. See United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador, From Madness to Hope: The 12
Year War in El Salvador (Mar. 1993), and Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clari-
fication, Guatemala: Memory of Silence (Feb. 1999).
98. “Central America Solidarity Roundtable, October 22–25, 1992: Report of Proceed-
ings,” 18, made available to the author by Peter Mott, conference organizer. Conference
participants included representatives from AFSC (Angela Berryman), CITCA (Gail
Phares), CAWG, CISPES, EPICA, FOR, Neighbor to Neighbor, Nicaragua Network
(Katherine Hoyt), PACCA (Robert Stark), RTFCA (Margaret Swedish), Unitarian
Universalist Service Committee, WFP, and WOLA.
99. Sharon Hostetler, interview by the author, Managua, June 26, 2006.
100. WFP Nicaragua Team, “Dead-End Trade Deal Nears Dead End,” Witness for Peace News-
letter 24, no. 2 (Fall 2007), 6.
101. SOA Watch, “Evo Morales Announces: ‘No More Bolivian Soldiers to the SOA/WHIN-
SEC!’” Oct. 11, 2007, www.soaw.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=1600.
102. Tim Merrill, ed., Nicaragua: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Library of Congress,
1993), www.country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-9296.html.
103. Richard Boudreaux, “Nicaragua Economy Worse After Chamorro’s 1st Year,” Los Angeles
Times, Apr. 15, 1991.
104. Leonel Calero Calderón, comments at a meeting with community leaders from Con-
dega, organized by Nicaragua Network and Kairos House in Managua, held in Con-
dega, June 22, 2006.
105. Larry Aydlette, “Ex-Soldier, 81, Now Battles for Peace, Veterans’ Rights,” Palm Beach
Post, Nov. 19, 1989, 1B; and Jane Musgrave, “Gadfly Gets Honored—Then Gets Heave-
Ho,” Sun Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 17, 1990, 5B.
Conclusion
1. Thomas W. Walker, ed., Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), xiii.
2. Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., “Where Do We Go From Here?” Address to the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference, Atlanta, Aug. 16, 1967, http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.
edu/index.php/encyclopedia/documentsentry/where_do_we_go_from_here
_delivered_at_the_11th_annual_sclc_convention.
List of Personal Interviews and
Communications
Anderson, Marilyn. In person, taped, Rochester, NY, July 16, 2006 (Rochester activist).
Anonymous. In person, Nicaraguan Embassy, Washington, DC, May 23, 2006.
Apfelbaum, Barbra. Telephone, July 11, 2007. (NJCAN state coordinator).
Arenas, Carlos. In person, Madison, WI, July 19, 2006 (WCCN coordinator in 2006).
Argamon, Michael. In person, taped, Rochester, NY, July 16, 2006 (Rochester activist).
Argüello Hurtado, Father Álvaro. In person, taped, Managua, June 26, 2006 (part of the
Envío team and Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Centroamérica, Managua).
Berryman, Philip. In person, Philadelphia, May 18, 2006 (AFSC national staff person and
speaker; author).
Bigelow, Bill. In person, taped, Portland, OR, May 28, 2007 (Portland activist and PCASC
newsletter editor).
Bisson, Terry. In person, taped, Buffalo, NY, July 17, 2006 (Buffalo activist).
Bonior, David. Telephone, June 27, 2011 (congressional representative from Michigan, chair
of the House Democratic Task Force on Central America).
Borosage, Robert. Telephone, May 27, 2011 (IPS director).
Bracewell, Carol. In person, taped, Madison, July 20, 2006. (CALA coordinator in 2006.)
Brenner, Philip. Telephone, July 19, 2007, and email communication (author).
Burchell, Jim. Telephone, July 16, 2007, and May 4, 2011 (NJCAN activist; Quixote Center
field staff).
Butigan, Ken. E-mail communication, October 14–15, 2011 (POR coordinator, San Francisco
Bay area and national level).
Butler, Judy. In person, taped, Managua, June 25, 2006 (Envío editor in Managua).
Callahan, Rev. William. In person, Hyattsville, MD, May 25, 2006 (Quixote Center
codirector).
[ 289 ]
[ 290 ] Personal Interviews and Communications
Clark, Rita. Telephone, Oct. 30, 2006 (Nicaraguan Embassy staff person; founder of the U.S.-
Nicaragua Friendship Society in 1990).
Clark, Sophia. In person, taped, Mar. 9, 2010, Managua (Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry, Dept.
of North American Affairs staff person; first secretary at the Nicaraguan Embassy
in Washington, DC).
Cortright, David. Telephone, Oct. 13, 2006 (SANE executive director).
Deaton, Ed. In person, Tallahassee, FL, Oct. 1, 2004 (Tallahassee VFP chapter president).
D’Escoto Brockmann, Fr. Miguel. In person, taped, Mar. 12, 2010, Managua (minister of
foreign relations in the FSLN government).
DeWeese-Parkinson, Cathie. In person, taped, Portland, OR, May 26, 2007 (PCASC steering
committee member).
DeWeese-Parkinson, Lynn. In person, taped, Portland, OR, May 26, 2007 (PCASC
coordinator).
Dilling, Yvonne. Telephone, Mar. 4, 2007 (temporary coordinator of Nicaragua Network;
WFP national director).
Drum, Diane. In person, taped, Portland, OR, May 27, 2007 (Portland activist).
Elvir, Ana Patricia. Email communications, Sept. 2007 and Nov/Dec. 2009 (CNASP
coordinator in Nicaragua).
Fischer, Tom. Email communication, Sept. 12, 2010, and other conversations (VFP activist
in Tallahassee).
Flores, Carlos. In person, taped, Portland, OR, May 27, 2007 (Portland activist).
Fogarty, Tim. Telephone, Feb. 22, 2007 (local activist in Ocala, FL; Habitat for Humanity
volunteer in Nicaragua).
Frank, John. Telephone, Oct. 4, 2006 (Florida Pax Christi coordinator; Florida POR
coordinator).
Funkhouser, David. Telephone, Dec. 20, 2006 (Nicaragua Network national coordinator;
Philadelphia CAOP staff person).
Gagnon, Bruce. Telephone, Oct. 18, 2006 (FCPJ state coordinator).
Gallup, Grant Mauricio. In person, Managua, June 16, 2006 (independent religious activist
in Nicaragua).
Garlock, Jon. In person, taped, Rochester, NY, July 16, 2006 (ROCLA coordinator).
Gille, Kathy. Telephone, June 30, 2011 (foreign policy aide to Rep. David Bonior and staff
person for the House Democratic Task Force on Central America).
Good, Bob. Telephone, July 2006 (Rochester, NY, activist).
Gosse, Van. Telephone, taped, Sept. 29, 2006 (national CISPES student outreach coordinator;
NJCAN member; author).
Guild, Bob. Telephone, July 11, 2007, and email communication (New Jersey activist;
program director of Marazul Tours).
Hall, Lillian. In person, Managua, July 14, 2004 (Quaker House in Managua staff person).
Healey, Richard. Telephone, Dec. 17, 2006 (CNFMP national director).
Hess, Diane. In person, taped, Portland, OR, May 27, 2007 (PCASC coordinator).
Hochstetler, Kenn. In person, taped, Tallahassee, FL, Aug. 31, 2006 (assisted Quaker-based
Alternatives to Violence program in Nicaragua in 1994).
Hostetler, Sharon. In person, taped, Managua, June 23, 2006 (WFP coordinator in Managua).
Hoyt, Katherine. In person, Washington, DC, July 27, 2005 (Michigan Interfaith Committee
on Central American Human Rights coordinator; Nicaragua Network national
staff person beginning in 1991; author).
Personal Interviews and Communications [ 291 ]
Jacobsen, Chuck. In person, Tallahassee, FL, May 6, 2006 (Tallahassee activist).

Kampwirth, Karen. In person, Nicaragua, June 18, 2006 (author).
Kaufman, Chuck. In person, Washington, DC, July 27, 2005, and subsequent conversations
and email communications (Nicaragua Network national staff person beginning
in August 1987).
Kern, Kathleen. In person, taped, Rochester, NY, July 16, 2006 (Rochester activist).
Kowalczyk, Bill. In person, taped, Portland, OR, May 27, 2007 (Portland activist).
Larcom, Barbara. In person, Washington, DC, July 27, 2005, and Baltimore, May 20, 2006
(Baltimore activist, coordinator of Baltimore–San Juan de Limay sister city
program beginning in 1992).
LeoGrande, William M. In person, Washington, DC, May 23, 2006, and email communications
(staff person for the House Democratic Caucus Task Force on Central America
in 1985–86; PACCA board member; POR Signal Committee member; author).
Levine, Henrietta. Telephone, July 18, 2006, and correspondence (Rochester, NY, activist
and coordinator of Ciudad Hermana sister city program).
Lieberman, Jack. Telephone interview, Dec. 24, 2006 (founding member of LACASA,
Miami).
Linder, John. In person, taped, Portland, OR, May 27, 2007 (activist in New Orleans and
Portland; Ben Linder Peace Tour speaker in 1987).
Lindsey, Terry. Telephone, July 2006 (Rochester, NY, activist).
Lloyd, Rev. Art. In person, taped, Madison, WI, July 20, 2006 (founding member of CALA,
Madison).
Lloyd, Sue. In person, taped, Madison, WI, July 20, 2006 (Madison activist; WCCN staff
person).
Loudon, Tom. In person, Hyattsville, MD, May 25, 2006 (WFP long-term volunteer).
Malinowski, Jack. Telephone, July 23, 2007 (AFSC Peace Education Division national
coordinator).
Mang, Jim. In person, taped, Buffalo, NY, July 17, 2006 (WNYPC coordinator).
Martinez, Victoria. Questionnaire completed, July 2, 2006 (Tallahassee, FL, activist).
Masud-Piloto, Félix. Telephone, July 21, 2007 (coordinator of CISPES chapter at Florida
State University).
Matlin, Arnie. Telephone, Rochester, NY, July 2006, and other correspondence (Rochester
activist).
McCurdy, Nan. Telephone, Nov. 29, 2006 (founder of Casa Baltimore/Limay; lived and
worked in San Juan de Limay).
Meisenzahl, Anne. In person, Tallahassee, FL, Oct. 30, 2004 (Rochester, NY, activist).
Mosley, Don. Telephone, Aug. 1, 2007 (founder of Habitat for Humanity and Walk in Peace
projects in Nicaragua; FOR national coordinator, 1984–86; author).
Mott, Peter. In person, taped, Rochester, NY, July 16, 2006 (Rochester activist).
Mulligan, Fr. Joseph. In person, March 9, 2010, Managua ( Jesuit missionary in Nicaragua;
Envío English editor and writer; author).
Musil, Robert. In person, Washington, DC, June 27, 2005, and email communication, June 4,
2005. (director of SANE radio program, Consider the Alternatives).
Nuñez de Escorcio, Vilma. In person, taped, Managua, June 26, 2006 (vice president of the
Nicaraguan Supreme Court of Justice; active in Nicaraguan peace, human rights,
and women’s rights groups).
Nuñez Téllez, René. In person, taped, March 11, 2010, Managua (secretary of the FSLN
[ 292 ] Personal Interviews and Communications
Directorate, director of the Office on Religious Affairs, and minister to the Presi-
dent’s Office).
Paine, Ruth Hyde. Questionnaire, May 29, 2005, and email communication (Pro-Nica
coordinator, St. Petersburg, FL).
Partridge, Jamie. In person, taped, Portland, OR, May 27, 2007 (Portland activist).
Phares, Gail. Email communication, May 2, 2011 (CITCA founder and cofounder of
NISGUA, WFP, and POR).
Pomerleau, Dolly. In person, Hyattsville, MD, May 25, 2006 (Quixote Center codirector).
Rampton, Sheldon. In person, taped, Madison, WI, July 20, 2006 (WCCN board member;
author).
Raps, Beth. Telephone, Oct. 17, 2006 (FCPJ Central America Network coordinator).
Schestopol, Abe. In person, Tallahassee, FL, Jan. 17, 2007, and Dec. 19, 2009 (Tallahassee
activist).
Setright, Aynn. In person, taped, Managua, June 25, 2006 (WFP long-term volunteer and
independent activist in Nicaragua).
Spriggs, Kent. Telephone, Nov. 10, 2007, and Dec. 19, 2009 (helped coordinate Venceremos
brigade to Cuba in 1971).
Swedish, Margaret. Telephone, Feb. 18, 2007 (RTFCA national director; author).
Téllez, Dora María. In person, taped, Mar. 8, 2010, Managua (deputy president of the Council
of State in the FSLN government, 1979–84, and minister of health, 1985–90).
Tinoco Fonseca, Victor Hugo. In person, taped, Mar. 10, 2010, Managua (deputy foreign
minister in the FSLN government).
Walker, Lucius. Telephone, Aug. 20 and Aug. 30, 2007 (IFCO national director).
Walker, Thomas W. Telephone, May 21, 2007 (led LASA delegations to Nicaragua; author).
Williams, Harvey. In person, partly taped, Managua, June 15 and 26, 2006 (led LASA
delegations to Nicaragua with Tom Walker; author).
Index
Abrams, Elliot, 26, 228 American Lutheran church, 41, 263n2

Addams, Jane, 8 Americas Watch, 43, 178
Ad Hoc Committee for Democracy in Amezua, Ketxu, 112
Nicaragua, 30 Amnesty International, 60–61
affinity groups, 90, 117, 131–32, 134, 184 AMNLAE (Luisa Amanda Espinoza Asso-
Afghanistan, 34, 35 ciation of Nicaraguan Women), 14, 68,
AFL-CIO, 26, 63, 74, 180, 212, 277n15 102, 157
agrarian reform, 14 Anderson, Marilyn, 133
Alarcón, Salomón, 164, 170 anti–Vietnam War movement, 6, 63, 64,
All-American Anti-Imperialist League, 9 194; as inspiration, 89; parallels of, with
Allende, Salvador, 59; overthrow of (1973), anti–Contra War campaign, 6, 42, 63;
59–60, 61 problems within, 6, 114; veterans of,
Amelung, Heike, 238 in Central America movement, 4, 63,
American Committee for Information on 64–65, 124, 131, 135, 210
Brazil, 60, 282n12 Antonio Valdivieso Ecumenical Center, 55,
American Friends Service Committee 102, 130, 157
(AFSC), 9, 63, 75–78, 122, 226; in anti– Apfelbaum, Barbra, 123, 124–25, 239
Contra War coalitions, 79, 86, 88, 118, April 1987 Mobilization (Washington,
210, 262n80, 265n39, 282n12, 286n98; DC), 119, 122, 210–14
educational resources developed by, Arana, Saúl, 66–67
49–50, 76, 101–2, 225; and humanitarian Arce, Bayardo, 85, 155, 156
aid, 61, 78, 111, 199, 229, 240; and nonvio- Architects and Planners in Support of
lence, 77–78; and Pledge of Resistance, Nicaragua (APSNICA), 111, 129
88, 184, 264n24 Argentina, 25, 61, 165, 242. See also Argen-
American Institute for Free Labor Develop- tine security forces
ment, 26 Argentine security forces, 1, 12, 16, 20
[ 293 ]
[ 294 ] Index
Argüello, Álvaro, 15–16, 54, 250n28 Contra War opponents in U.S. House,
Argüello, Frederico, 27 38, 92, 93, 215, 220–21
Argüello, Roberto, 55 Borge, Tomás, 10–11, 16, 103, 153, 159, 161,
Arias, Oscar, 25, 216–17; peace plan spon- 238
sored by: see Esquipulas accords Borosage, Robert, 93, 220–21
Armony, Arial C., 21 Boston, Mass., 71, 83, 86, 89, 111, 191; antiwar
Arnson, Cynthia, 3, 46–47, 82, 188 veterans in, 192–93, 232; demonstra-
Artists Call Against U.S. Intervention in tions in, 73, 183, 192–93, 232; Nicaraguan
Central America, 98 speakers in, 159, 163; in 1970s, 65, 66;
Aspin, Les, 220 Pledge of Resistance in, 89, 90, 183
Astorga, Nora, 152, 160, 161 Bradley, Bill, 123
Atlanta, Ga., 66, 89, 159, 191, 217, 220, 230 Brazil, 25, 60, 190, 205
Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, 21, 110, 269n22 Bread and Puppet Theater, 213
AuCoin, Les, 137, 140, 143 Brenner, Philip, 46–47, 82, 188, 189, 212, 213
Brett, Edward T., 53
Baer, Byron M., 123 Brickner, Balfour, 83
Baez, Joan, 216 Britain. See Great Britain
Baltimore, Md. See Casa Baltimore/San Brody, Reed, 160, 178
Juan de Limay sister city project Browne, Jackson, 213
Baltodano, Mónica, 67, 68 Buffalo Pledge of Resistance, 131–32
Barnes, Michael, 46, 73, 78, 79–80 Buhl, Cindy, 91
Barricada, 17, 68–69, 102, 156, 158 Burbach, Roger, 67
Bayard de Volo, Lorraine, 14 Bush, George H. W., 83, 214, 227–28, 234,
Beals, Carleton, 9 239; administration of, 234–36, 237, 242,
Bedell, Berkley, 2 245
Bell, Chuck, 139 Butigan, Ken, 88, 89, 116–17, 117, 184, 190,
Bellagamba, Anthony D., 82 264n26
Bendaña, Alejandro, 28, 67, 152, 161
Bennett, Asia, 78 Cabestrero, Teófilo, 27
Bentsen, Lloyd, 234 Cagan, Leslie, 210–11
Bergen County Committee on Central Calderón, Leonel Calero, 242
America (BCCCA), 124 Calero, Adolfo, 30, 221, 276n5
Bermúdez, Enrique, 20, 221–22 California, 66, 74, 78, 111, 120, 179, 217–18. See
Berryman, Angela, 76–77, 101, 122, 184, also Los Angeles; San Francisco
224–25 Callahan, Bill, 111, 112, 163, 164, 200, 202
Berryman, Phillip, 67, 76–77, 92, 101 Cantor, Daniel, 74
Bickel, Beverly, 212 Cardenal, Ernesto, 55, 103, 153, 161
Bigelow, Bill, 56–57, 140, 142, 143, 144 Cardenal, Fernando, 13, 55
Bikes Not Bombs, 111 Cardin, Benjamin, 130
Bisson, Terry, 131, 132 Carolina Interfaith Task Force on Central
Blank, Irwin, 166 America (CITCA), 103, 106
Bogle, Dick, 140 Carrión, Luis, 159
Boland, Edward, 80, 81. See also Boland Carter, Amy, 209–10
amendments Carter, Jimmy, 222, 230, 231; as presi-
Boland amendments (1982 and 1984), 38, dent, 18, 34, 60, 70 (see also Carter
80, 81, 93, 94 administration)
Bonior, David, 93, 162, 187, 213; as leader of Carter administration, 12, 18–19, 34, 45,
Index [ 295 ]
60–61, 71; and El Salvador, 70, 71; and CEPAD. See Council of Protestant
Nicaragua, 12, 18, 19 Churches of Nicaragua
Casa Baltimore/San Juan de Limay sister Cesar, Alfredo, 221
city project, 128–31 Chamorro, Carlos Fernando, 17, 158
Casa Nicaragua (San Francisco), 65 Chamorro, Claudia, 17
Casey, William, 23–24 Chamorro, Cristiana, 17
Catholic Church, 12, 167; in Nicaragua, Chamorro, Javier, 158, 161
11–12, 16, 27, 157; in U.S., 41, 53, 63, 73, 147 Chamorro, Pedro Joaquín (father), 11, 12,
(see also Religious Task Force on Cen- 158
tral America). See also Catholic orders Chamorro, Pedro Joaquín (son), 17
Catholic orders, 157. See also Jesuit order; Chamorro, Violeta Barrios de, 15, 17, 235,
Maryknoll order 238, 239; government headed by, 242
Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR), Channell, Carl R. “Spitz,” 214
45, 148, 228, 233 Chatfield, Charles, 6
Center for International Policy, 41, 98, Cheek, James, 62
259n25 Chicago Tribune, 107
Central America Education Project Chicanos Against Military Intervention in
(CAEP), 94 Latin America, 232
Central America Historical Institute, 37–38, Chilcote, Ronald H., 62
41, 98, 259n25 Chile: 1973 coup in, 2, 59–60, 61, 132; U.S.
Central America Information Weeks, activists and, 59–60, 61, 62, 132–33
99–101, 118, 126, 139, 226, 236 Chilsen, Liz, 112, 113, 122
Central America Organizing Project Chomsky, Noam, 50
(CAOP, Philadelphia), 120 Christianity and Crisis, 55, 99
Central America Peace Campaign (CAPC), CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency
39–40, 94, 119, 265n39; limited success CISPES. See Committee in Solidarity with
of, 94–95, 102, 118–19; and 1984 Demo- the People of El Salvador
cratic convention, 95, 114; revival of, 188 “Citizen Hearings on Nicaragua” (1984),
Central America Resource Center (Austin, 108
Tex.), 98, 259n25 civil disobedience, 196, 198; disagreements
Central America Solidarity Roundtable about, 39, 124, 139, 194, 211; Pledge of
conference (1992), 241 Resistance and, 40, 88, 89, 90, 123, 131,
Central America Week, 97, 123–24 132, 183–84, 193–94, 223; training for, 90,
Central America Working Group 131; and Vietnam War, 64, 131; in Wash-
(CAWG), 90–91, 119, 215, 236, 276n12, ington, DC, 182, 192, 209, 211, 236
286n98; coordination of lobbying by, Civilian Military Assistance, 22–23
90–94, 114, 179; creation of, 64 Clark, Margarita, 129, 151, 240
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1–2, Clark, Sophia, 151, 161–62, 163, 226
10, 20, 23, 178, 210, 223; ”assassination Clarke, Maura, 71, 105
manual” of, 42–43, 106, 177; bombing Clarridge, Duane R., 20, 21
of Nicaraguan oil depots by, 1–2, 22; Clements, Charlie, 144
congressional restrictions on, 20, 34, Clergy and Laity Concerned, 63, 79, 89, 131,
189; demonstrations against, 210, 211, 132, 262n80, 265n39
213; and formation of contras, 1, 20–21; Coalition for a New Foreign and Military
mining of Nicaraguan harbors by, 1–2, Policy (CNFMP), 63–64, 86, 118,
22, 38; and Nicaraguan internal opposi- 265n39, 276n12; and emergence of Cen-
tion, 26–27 tral America movement, 73–74;
[ 296 ] Index
CNFMP (continued) Sovereignty in Central America and the

lobbying role of, 64, 90–91 (see also Caribbean (1983), 158
Central America Working Group); Continental Conference of Solidarity with
name change of, 215; and national dem- the People of Nicaragua (1978), 154
onstrations, 88, 282n12. See also Healey, contra aid; congressional votes on, 4–5, 23,
Richard; Reed, David 44, 80, 81, 94, 182, 189, 209, 220–21, 222,
Coalition for a New Foreign Policy, 215, 236. 235; as major political issue in U.S., 3,
See also Coalition for a New Foreign 29, 81, 91; public opinion regarding, 4,
and Military Policy 51–52, 145, 209, 216; secret illegal chan-
Coffin, William Sloane, Jr., 82, 84, 87, 131, nels for, 23, 38, 94, 163, 214
182, 213 contras, 1, 20–22, 239; CIA and, 20, 22, 23,
Cold War ideology, 31, 32–36, 188, 224, 237; 42–43; composition of, 20–21; conflict-
efforts to challenge, 49–51, 98 ing characterizations of, in U.S., 2, 31, 51,
Coleman, Chris, 77–78 138, 178, 179, 187; in Costa Rica, 1, 21–22,
Coleman, Makini, 217, 269n22 221–22; differences among, 21–22,
Collins, Judy, 216 221–22; formation of, 1, 16, 20–21; mili-
Commission on U.S.–Central American tary weakness of, 23; in negotiations
Relations, 98, 191, 259n25, 265n39 (1988), 221–22; regional peace plans
Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy. See and, 24, 25, 216; targeting of civilians by,
SANE 22, 42–44, 108, 129–30, 142, 160, 169–71,
Committee for Health Rights in Central 177–79, 191, 206, 217, 224, 228, 233, 235;
America (CHRICA), 139 training of some, in U.S., 196–97. See
Committee in Solidarity with the People also contra aid
of El Salvador (CISPES), 39, 70–72, 74, Conyers, John, 213
137, 236; in antiwar coalitions, 72, 88, 91, Coolidge administration, 7–8
121, 123, 210, 221, 264n26, 265n39, 276n12, Cooper, Alice Holmes, 119–20
282n12, 286n98; on college campuses, Cooper, Donna, 120
118, 121; FBI harassment of, 148–49; and Cortright, David, 85, 86, 91, 95, 213
FMLN, 71–72, 121, 138; Latinos in, 71, 122 COSEP (Superior Council for Private
Committee in Solidarity with the Peoples Enterprise), 11, 16
(CNSP), 156–57, 164–66 Costa Rica, 17, 154, 242; contras in, 1, 21–22,
Common Cause, 37 221–22; and regional peace initiatives,
Communications Workers of America, 25, 216–17
123, 212 Council of Protestant Churches of Nica-
Communist International, 9 ragua (CEPAD), 54, 146, 157, 230, 240;
Communist Party USA, 9, 56, 57, 141 origins of, 54; and Witness for Peace,
Community Action on Latin America 103, 104, 203. See also Parajón, Gustavo
(CALA), 59 Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 98,
Concerned U.S. Citizens Living in Nica- 259n25
ragua (CUSCLIN), 45, 109–10, 182–83, “Countdown ‘87 Campaign to End Contra
185, 200, 240 Aid,” 215–17, 218–22
Condon, Gerry, 232 Cousins, Philip, 166
CONFER (Nicaraguan Conference of Coverup: Behind the Iran Contra Affair
Religious), 157 (film), 225–26
Congressional Black Caucus, 73, 121 Crespi, Leo P., 174–75
Contadora initiative, 25, 42, 101, 171, 172, 177 Crispin, Mayes, 50
Continental Conference for Peace and Crites, Betsy, 208
Index [ 297 ]
Crockett, George, 228 Donaldson, Jamie K., 94

Cruz, Arturo, 18, 28, 253n74 Donovan, Jean, 71
Cuba, 10, 58–59, 96, 224; as bad example in Donovan, Nancy, 178
U.S. conservative rhetoric, 71, 196; San- Doughty, Paul, 237
dinistas and, 13, 16, 18, 26, 153, 154, 157 Du Bois, W. E. B., 8
CUSCLIN. See Concerned U.S. Citizens Dukakis, Michael, 83, 195, 219, 234
Living in Nicaragua Durenberger, David, 38–39, 255n31
Dyess, William J., 20
Daniel, Dan, 51 Dyson, David, 74, 209, 210
Darrow, Sheila, 100
“Deadly Connection” educational cam- Earl, Anthony, 202, 238
paign, 86 earthquake of 1972, 11, 54, 151
DeBenedetti, Charles, 6 Eastern Europe, 173–74
DeLauro, Rosa, 215 Ecumenical Committee of English-
Delgadillo, Teresa, 227 Speaking Religious Personnel, 240. See
Dellums, Ron, 218 also Concerned U.S. Citizens Living in
Demierre, Maurice, 170 Nicaragua
Democratic Leadership Council on Central Ecumenical Program for Interamerican
America, 93. See also House Democratic Communication and Action (EPICA),
Task Force on Central America 54, 59, 66, 286n98. See also Wheaton,
Democratic Party convention (1984), Philip
95–96, 114 Edgar, Robert, 18
Democratic Socialist Organizing Commit- educational outreach, 71, 72, 96–99, 189–92,
tee (DSOC), 56 223–28
Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), Edwards, Don, 148
56, 88, 210, 282n12 Ehrenreich, Barbara, 56
Democratic Union for Liberation (UDEL), Eisenhower, Dwight, 112
11 Eldridge, Joe, 61
D’Escoto, Miguel, 55, 149–51, 155, 162, 242; elections: in Nicaragua: see Nicaraguan
background of, 149–50; as diplomat, 24, elections; in U.S., 96, 177, 189, 234
26, 161; efforts to discredit, 146, 149; fast Ellsberg, Daniel, 210, 213
undertaken by (1985), 166; and libera- El Salvador, 2–3, 8, 25, 71, 155, 240; alleged
tion theology, 53, 149, 150–51; speeches FSLN aid to guerrillas in, 19, 20, 24, 44,
by, in U.S., 62, 159; and U.S. antiwar 67, 223; human rights abuses in, 27, 70,
activists, 85, 150–51, 164 71, 180, 240; refugees from, in U.S., 70,
Detroit, Mich., 66, 67, 68, 166, 193–94 71, 74–75, 143–44; U.S. activists and,
DeWeese-Parkinson, Cathie, 141–42, 143 2–3, 70, 73–75, 133, 137–38, 236, 240 (see
DeWeese-Parkinson, Lynn, 137, 141–42 also Committee in Solidarity with the
Díaz, Adolfo, 7 People of El Salvador)
Dilling, Yvonne, 66, 91, 104–5, 106, 108, Elvir, Ana Patricia, 156, 165, 166
264n26 Emergency Response Campaign (1989),
Directorate of International Relations 236
(DRI), 155, 156 Enders, Thomas, 24
disarmament movement, 86, 117, 263– Engel, Kathy, 111
64n19. See also SANE Envio, 54, 55, 98, 166, 171, 200, 238
Dodd, Christopher, 162, 203, 215 EPICA. See Ecumenical Program for Inter-
Dominican Republic invasion (1965), 61–62 american Communication and Action
[ 298 ] Index
Esquipulas accords (1987), 4, 25, 93, 216, Fraser, Douglas, 74

219, 221, 223; Nicaraguan compliance Freeman, Joseph, 8–9
with, 235; U.S. attempts to undermine, Freiwirth, Jerry, 227
25–26, 216–17, 219, 234 Fretz, Bob, 108
Esquivel, Adolfo Pérez, 2, 61 Fried, Eric, 118
Europe. See Eastern Europe; Western Friedman, Mike, 127
Europe FSLN. See Sandinista National Liberation
Evangelical Committee for Aid and Devel- Front
opment (CEPAD), 54. See also Council Ft. Walton Beach, Fla., 126, 196–98
of Protestant Churches of Nicaragua Fuentes, Carlos, 151
Executive Order on Intelligence Activities Funkhauser, David, 66, 97
(EO 12333), 38
Gainesville, Fla., 108, 125, 198, 238
Fairfax-Condega Sister City Project, 66 Galeano, Eduardo, 56
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting Gandall, Bill, 1–2, 197, 200, 226, 242–43
(FAIR), 236 García, Antonio Ruíz, 135
Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), Garcia, Robert, 44
58–59 García, Zelmina, 135
Farabundo Martí National Liberation Garlock, Jon, 133
Front (FMLN), 70, 72, 121, 138; CISPES Gates, Robert, 23
and, 71–72, 121, 138; founding of (1980), Gejdenson, Samuel, 178
70 Gelb, Leslie, 81
Farrell, Robert C., 159 Germany. See West Germany
FDN. See Nicaraguan Democratic Force Giese, Frank, 142
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Gilderhus, Mark T., 27
148–49 Gille, Kathy, 92–93, 215, 221
Feldman, Susan, 138–39 Goff, James, 55, 110
Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR), 9, 61, Goff, Margaret, 55
63, 79, 230; and Pledge of Resistance, 89, Gonzalez, Felipe, 172
139, 264n24 Gonzalez, Martin, 144
films, 73, 110, 188, 204–5, 225–26 González, Noel, 68
FitzGerald, Garret, 172 Good, Bob, 134
Flores, Carlos, 143–44 Good, Jim, 134
Florida, 107–8, 125–28, 186, 195–99; Bill Good Neighbor Policy, 10, 34
Gandall in, 226, 243; Central America Gordon, Jack, 127
Information Week in, 100, 126; Pledge Gordon, Kathy, 138–39
of Resistance in, 89, 126; statewide Gorostiaga, Xabier, 62
organizations in, 86, 126–27, 196. See also Gosse, Van, 58, 71, 72, 91, 115, 123, 125
Ft. Walton Beach; Gainesville; Miami; Granada, Dorothy, 240
Tallahassee Great Britain, 33, 173, 174, 175, 176
Florida State University, 72, 121, 128 Green, James N., 60
FMLN. See Farabundo Martí National Greene, Bob, 235–36
Liberation Front Greene, Graham, 151
Fogarty, Tim, 186 Grenada invasion (1983), 40–41, 45, 86, 87,
Fonseca, Carlos, 10–11, 167 109–10, 129, 223
Ford, Ida, 71 Grosjean, Pierre, 169
Frank, John, 107–8, 126 Guatemala, 16, 25, 50, 240; human rights
Index [ 299 ]
abuses in, 27, 70, 105, 199, 240–41; 1954 and, 61, 78, 111, 199, 229, 240; MADRE
coup in, 2, 10, 103; refugees from, in and, 62–63, 110–11, 199, 229, 232; Nica-
U.S., 70, 71, 74; U.S. activists and, 4, 62, raguan Network and, 111, 165, 229, 232,
70–71, 133, 199 237; Quixote Center and, 111–12, 114,
Guild, Bob, 102, 124 199, 200–202, 228–29, 232, 236, 240;
Gumbleton, Thomas, 82, 147, 166, 201, 213, sister city partnerships and, 136, 141, 199,
232 229, 240
“guns versus butter” theme, 224 Humanitarian Assistance for Nicaraguan
Gutierrez de Barreto, María del Socorro, 55 Democracy (HAND), 111
Hurricane Joan (1988), 136, 229, 233
Haas, Sharon, 100, 126 Hyer, Marjorie, 107
Haase, Edward, 148
Habitat for Humanity, 159, 230, 231, 240 IFCO. See Interreligious Foundation for
Haig, Alexander, 19 Community Organization
Hancock, Loni, 219 infant mortality, 14, 46
Hannah, Daryl, 151 Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), 38, 41, 45,
Hannon, James, 90, 264n31 62, 86, 191, 215
Harkin, Tom, 80, 162 Institute for the Study of the Americas
Harrington, Michael, 56, 73–74 (ISA), 146
Hart, Gary, 25, 219 Institute of John XXIII, 112, 157
Hassan, Moisés, 67, 152 Institute on Religion and Democracy,
Hatfield, Mark, 140, 143 149
Healy, Peggy, 67, 83 Instituto de Historia de Nicaragua y Cen-
Hegg, Manuel Ortega, 168 troamérica, 15, 54, 157
Hellman, Judith Adler, 59 Inter-Hemispheric Education Resource
Henley, Don, 216 Center, 98, 259n25
Hernandez, Diógenes, 221 International Association of Machinists
Hernandez, Sayda, 68 and Aerospace Workers, 74, 88, 277n19
Hernández, Sergio, 142 International Business Communications
Hess, Diane, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141 (IBC), 30
Hickey, James A., 41 International Court of Justice, 6, 44, 161,
Hoffman, Abbie, 210 189, 223; U.S. defiance of, 44–45
Honduras, 25; contra bases in, 1, 16, 22, 170; international law, 31, 37, 79, 189, 217–18, 223.
efforts to provoke Nicaraguan “inva- See also International Court of Justice;
sion” of, 23, 222–23; U.S. forces in, 40, United Nations: charter of
98, 172, 194–95, 222–23 Interreligious Foundation for Community
Hoover, Herbert, 9–10 Organization (IFCO), 99–101, 109;
Hope, Sam, 239 aid caravans organized by, 136, 232,
Hornsby, Jim, 231 233–34; and Central America Informa-
Hornsby, Sarah, 231 tion Weeks, 99, 100, 118, 126, 139, 226,
Horton, Frank J., 134 236; work of, with local and statewide
Horton, Lynn, 24 groups, 100–101, 118, 126, 226
House Democratic Task Force on Central Inter-Religious Task Force on Central
America, 38, 48, 92, 215, 221. See also America (IRTFCA), 70, 97, 116, 226,
Bonior, David 236; in coalitions, 264n24, 265n39,
Hoyt, Katherine, 116, 240, 286n98 282n12
humanitarian aid, 110–12, 199–202; AFSC Ireland, 172, 175
[ 300 ] Index
Jackson, Jesse, 87, 95, 121, 181, 213, 219 Larcom, Barbara, 130–31
Jacobsen, Chuck, 103–4 Latin American Perspectives, 47
Jeffords, James M., 25, 109 Latin American Protestant Commission for
Jeffries, Tim, 66 Christian Education, 54
Jerez, César, 213 Latin American Research Review, 47, 191
Jesuit order, 54–55, 240. See also Institute Latin American Studies Association
of John XXIII; Instituto de Historia de (LASA), 28, 61–62, 237–38
Nicaragua y Centroamérica Latin American Working Group, 236. See
Johnson, Lyndon, 39, 176 also Central America Working Group
John XXIII, 12 Lazar, Bill, 126, 196, 197
Jordan, June, 213 Leland, Mickey, 232
Journal of Latin American Studies, 47 Lenten Witness to End the War in Nicara-
Joyce, John T., 212 gua (1987), 209
LeoGrande, William M., 24, 36, 62, 115; on
Kagan, Robert, 147 April 1987 Mobilization, 212, 213–14;
Kansas, 100 on dynamics of Contra War debate,
Karl, Teri, 62 48–49, 189
Kaufman, Chuck, 165, 237, 239 Levine, Henrietta, 135, 136
Kazan, George P., 233 Lewis, Anthony, 45, 99
Keane, Jim, 132 Lewis, Flora, 172
Keegan, Anne, 107 liberation theology, 12, 50, 53–55, 93, 157;
Kellogg, Frank, 7, 8 Miguel d’Escoto and, 149, 150–51
Kemp, Jack F., 132 Lieberman, Jack, 127–28
Kemper, Vicki, 219 Linder, Ben, 142–43, 170–71, 199, 225, 228
Kennedy, Edward M., 40 Linder, David, 226, 227
Kennedy, John F., 176 Linder, Elisabeth, 226–27
Kennedy, Rosario, 127 Linder, John, 170, 226, 227, 228
Kern, Kathleen, 134 Linder, Miriam, 170, 226, 227
Kerry, John, 162 literacy campaign, 13, 14, 59
King, Martin Luther, Jr., 150, 246 Lloyd, Art, 59–60, 113
Kirkland, Lane, 212 Lloyd, Sue, 113
Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 30, 83–84, 205 Long, Clarence, 40
Kissinger, Henry, 31. See also Kissinger López, Julio, 155
Commission Lopez, Victor, 67
Kissinger Commission (National Biparti- López Portillo, José, 24, 78
san Commission on Central America), Lowery, Joseph, 87, 201, 213
31, 41–42 Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of
Knop, Julie, 231 Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE), 14,
Kovic, Ron, 87 68, 102, 157
Kowalczyk, Bill, 141
Kullberg, Patsy, 142 MacMichael, David, 20
Kurz, Karl, 111 MADRE, 62–63, 179, 282n12; founding of
(1983), 110–11; and humanitarian aid,
LaFalce, John J., 132 62–63, 110–11, 199, 229, 232
LaFeber, Walter, 50 Maihold, Günther, 168
Lamperti, John, 49–50 Malinowski, Jack, 76, 101, 122, 224–25
La Prensa, 11, 17, 26, 27, 102 Mang, Jim, 131–32
Index [ 301 ]
Marazul Tours, 102, 124 Mother Jones, 98

Marker, Dennis, 116 Mott, Gail, 141
Martinez, Raul, 220 Mott, Peter, 134, 141
Martinez, Victoria, 121 Mulligan, Joseph, 55, 64–65
Martinez Cuenca, Alejandro, 152 Murillo, Rosario, 157, 159, 218
Maryknoll Catholic order, 53, 82–83, 105, Musil, Robert, 85–86
111, 178, 205; and El Salvador, 71; See
also Bourgeois, Roy; D’Escoto, Miguel; NACLA Report on the Americas, 47, 98
Healy, Peggy; Orbis Books Nation, The, 9, 98
Masud-Piloto, Félix, 72 National Bipartisan Commission on Cen-
Mata, Francisco Tapia, 140–41 tral America (Kissinger Commission),
Matlack, Jim, 88 31, 41–42
Matlin, Arnie, 135–36 National Conference of Catholic Bishops,
Mayorga, Silvio, 10–11 147
McClain, Don, 100, 126 National Conservative Foundation, 216
McCurdy, Dave, 182 National Council of Churches, 99, 166,
McCurdy, Nan, 128–30 281n8, 282n12
McGovern, George, 87 National Education Association, 212
Mears, Mike, 170–71 National Endowment for Democracy
Medellin conference (1968), 12, 47 (NED), 26
Medical Aid to El Salvador, 72, 133 “National Fast Days,” 166
medical supplies, 78, 111–12, 130, 139, 201. See National Guard deployment, 195
also humanitarian aid National Labor Committee in Support of
Meisenzahl, Anne, 133 Democracy and Human Rights in El
Mendoza, Donald, 19 Salvador (NLC), 74, 179–80, 277n15
Mexico, 7, 154, 166; and Central American National Lawyers Guild, 38
refugees, 70, 74; Nicargua solidarity in, National Opposition Union (UNO), 234,
165, 166; and regional peace initiatives, 235, 237, 238
24, 25, 78 National Peace Vigil (1984), 107
Mfume, Kweisi, 130 National Security Council, 30
Miami, Fla., 75, 163–64 National Student Association, 88
Mikulski, Barbara, 18, 130 Near, Holly, 213
Miller, George, 215 Nearing, Scott, 8–9
Mills, Andy, 123 Negroponte, John, 79
Miskitos, 21, 229 Neighbor-to-Neighbor, 188, 215, 219, 286n98
missionaries, 47, 53–54, 55, 82–83, 157 Neilson, Chris, 142
Mitchell, Parren J., 130 Nepstad, Sharon Erickson, 75, 148
Mitchell, Philip, 128–30 Netherlands, 161, 172, 174, 175
Mobilization (1987). See April 1987 Network in Solidarity with the People of
Mobilization Guatemala (NISGUA), 70–71, 74
Mobilization for Survival (MFS), 63–64, Neutrality Act of 1794, 38
86, 97; in coalitions, 211, 262n80, 265n39, New American Movement (NAM), 56,
282n12; emphasis of, on nonviolent 57, 124
direct action, 64, 118 New Jersey, 122–25, 239
Mondale, Walter, 95, 96 Newsweek, 79, 190
Moore, Paul, Jr., 2 New York, N.Y., 38, 65, 71, 160; demonstra-
Mosley, Don, 229–31 tions in, 73, 79, 183, 193
[ 302 ] Index
New York Times, 20, 22, 212, 223, 235; adver- Novak, Henry J., 132
tisements in, 61–62, 87, 98, 148; coverage Nuclear Times, 117, 264n19
of anti–Contra War campaign in, 73, 81, Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, 63,
87, 123, 160, 172, 182, 193, 228; editorials 84, 131, 211
in, 42, 45, 60; op-ed pieces in, 45, 84, Nuñez, Carlos, 15
161; reports of contra attacks in, 43, 178 Nuñez, Leana, 166, 203
Nicaragua Exchange, 109, 199 Nuñez, René, 153–54, 166–67, 169–70, 242
Nicaragua Hoy, 17 Nuñez de Escorcia, Vilma, 14–15, 160–61,
Nicaraguan Commission for Peace, 160, 166 202–3
Nicaraguan Committee in Solidarity with Nuremberg trials, 217–18
the Peoples (CNSP), 156, 164–66
Nicaraguan Conference of Religious Oats for Peace, 165
(CONFER), 157 Obando y Bravo, Miguel, 11, 12, 16, 27
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin
20–21, 22. See also contras America and the Caribbean (S/LPD),
Nicaraguan elections, 8, 11, 242; in 1984, 29–30, 31, 32, 146–47, 149, 214
15–16, 27–28, 42, 102, 237, 253n74; in Ohio, 100
1990, 24, 234–35, 236–39 Olds, Robert, 8
Nicaragua Network, 65–69, 74, 179, 225, Olson, Peter, 106
227, 235–36; in coalitions, 210, 215, O’Neill, Thomas Phillip “Tip,” 38, 82–83,
264n26, 265n39, 282n12; directors of, 93, 177
50, 91; founding of, 65–66; and FSLN, Orbis Books, 53, 150
68–69, 152, 157, 162, 239; growth of, Oregon, 100, 194–95. See also Portland
75; and humanitarian aid, 68, 111, 165, Central America Solidarity Committee
229, 232, 237; and lobbying, 91, 221; Organization of American States (OAS),
and national demonstrations, 88, 210, 25, 154, 155, 235; charter of, 10, 44,
282n12; place of, in broader anti–Con- 256n45
tra War movement, 69, 116, 118, 152; Ortega, Daniel, 138, 159, 161, 165, 173, 231;
work brigades organized by, 108–9, 148, demonization of, 26, 216; in FSLN
199–200, 237 leadership, 12, 14, 155, 159, 242; meet-
Nicaraguan Information Center (Berkeley, ings of, with U.S. officials, 18, 19; on
Calif.), 98, 219, 259n25 nature of Sandinista Revolution, 13;
Nicaraguan Ministry of Foreign Relations in presidential elections, 238, 242; and
(MINREX), 155–56, 161–62 release of Eugene Hasenfus, 202, 203;
Nicaraguan Perspectives, 98 speaking tour of U.S. by (1984), 159,
Nicaragua Solidarity Organization (Wash- 160; trip to Soviet Union by, 4, 182;
ington, DC), 65 and U.S. solidarity movement, 170,
Nicaragua-United States Friendship Office, 218, 233, 239; and visitors to Nicara-
151, 240 gua, 18, 85, 151
NISGUA (Network in Solidarity with the Ortega, Humberto, 159
People of Guatemala), 70–71, 74 Owens, Major, 213
Nixon administration, 34, 60
Norris, George, 8, 9 Pacifica Radio, 99, 225
North, Oliver, 5, 23, 39, 52, 214, 222 Packwood, Bob, 140
North American Congress on Latin Panama invasion (1989), 45
America (NACLA), 59, 67, 98. See also Parajón, Gustavo, 82, 103, 139, 146, 152
NACLA Report on the Americas Partridge, Jamie, 137–39
Index [ 303 ]
Pastora, Edén (“Comandante Cero”), America and the Caribbean

21–22, 203 public health campaign, 14
Pastors for Peace Convoy, 136, 232–34
Pauling, Linus C., 2 Quainton, Anthony, 22, 78
Pax Christi, 121, 173, 262n80; in Florida, 121, Quigley, Thomas, 147
126, 128; and Pledge of Resistance, 126, Quinn, John R., 41
264n24. See also Gumbleton, Thomas Quixote Center, 111, 163–64, 227, 237,
Peaceworks, 240 282n12; and educational outreach, 112,
Pell, Claiborne, 43 236; and humanitarian aid, 111–12, 114,
Pelosi, Nancy, 218 199, 200–202, 228–29, 232, 236, 240
Peter, Paul and Mary, 216
Pezzulo, Lawrence A., 17–18, 19, 24, 252n57 Radio Catolica, 27
Pflaum, Albrecht, 21, 169 Radio Venceremos, 133
Phares, Gail, 89, 103, 105–6, 286n98 Rainbow Coalition, 121, 124, 210, 271n51,
Phares, Robert, 105, 106 277n19, 282n12
Philadelphia, Pa., 77, 86, 92, 97, 104, 120; Raitt, Bonnie, 216
demonstrations in, 79, 184; Pledge of Ramas, 21
Resistance in, 89, 184 Ramírez, Sergio, 19, 50–51, 103, 158–59, 242;
Pinochet, Augusto, 60 speeches by, in U.S., 62, 161, 202
Pinter, Harold, 151 Rampton, Sheldon, 112, 113, 116, 122
Pledge of Resistance (POR), 88–90, 119, Randall, Margaret, 62
121, 183–85, 223, 241; and civil disobedi- Raps, Beth, 126–27
ence, 40, 88, 89, 90, 123, 131, 132, 183–84, Ratner, Michael, 228
193–94, 223; and contra aid, 90, 139, Raymond, Walter, Jr., 147
183, 185; and El Salvador, 235; extent of, Reagan, Ronald, 19–20, 26, 36, 39, 156, 172,
118, 208; founding of, 40, 88–89, 105–6, 222; charactization of contras by 27, 31,
264n24; and National Guard deploy- 177, 179; characterization of Sandinis-
ment, 195; as outreach tool for local tas by, 31, 43, 177, 190, 224; constraints
groups, 89–90, 120, 126, 131–32, 133–34, placed on, by anti–Contra War cam-
139–40; racial composition of, 121; paign, 52, 162–63; on critics of Contra
tensions in, over religious identity, 89, War, 33, 52, 145, 187; direct lobbying
116–17, 184–85; and threat of U.S. inva- with Congress by, 182, 189; on “free-
sion of Nicaragua, 40, 88, 89–90 dom,” 32; and Iran/Contra scandal, 214;
Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and radio addresses by, on Nicaragua, 29, 32,
Central America (PACCA), 49, 62, 98, 93, 179; re-election of (1984), 4, 95–96;
215, 225 television addresses by, on Nicaragua, 3,
polls, public opinion, 4, 51–52, 209, 216; by 29, 31, 33, 47, 81; on Vietnam War, 34–35
USIA in Europe, 174–75 “Reagan Doctrine,” 35, 211, 213
Pomerleau, Dolly, 111 Reed, David, 115, 120, 210
popular church, 11–12, 16, 53–54, 55 referenda, 137, 202
Portland Central America Solidarity Com- Reich, Otto, 29, 146
mittee (PCASC), 75, 136–44 Religious Task Force on Central America
Princeton University, 73 (RTFCA), 70, 97; and broader Central
Pritchard, Joel, 94–95 America movement, 72–73, 91, 116,
Progressive, The, 98 265n39, 276n12, 282n12, 286n98. See also
“public diplomacy,” 30, 149, 214. See also Swedish, Margaret
Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin Resnick, Bill, 142
[ 304 ] Index
Rice, Jim, 88, 116 265n39, 282n12; focus of, on lobbying,

Rigmey-Barolet, Lynne, 186 118, 188, 191; local affiliates of, 122–23;
Robelo, Alfonso, 15 and national demonstrations, 88, 210,
Robinson, Cleveland, 213 211, 282n12; and Vietnam analogy, 39,
Rochester Committee on Central America 191. See also Cortright, David
(ROCLA), 132–36 SANE/Freeze, 211. See also SANE
Romero, Oscar (Archbishop of San Salva- San Francisco, 71, 158, 162; AFSC office in,
dor), 70, 73, 97 77–78, 88, 89; demonstrations in, 73, 79,
Romero Christian Legal Office, 71 181, 183, 193, 211, 213, 223; early solidarity
Roosevelt, Theodore, 7 groups in, 65, 66; Nicaraguan speakers
Rowe, Tim, 87 in, 158, 159, 163; 1984 Democratic con-
Rúder, Michael, 169 vention in, 95–96; Pledge of Resistance
Rushdie, Salmon, 151 in, 88, 89–90, 116–17, 183, 223
Rutgers University, 124 Sayre, John Nevin, 9
Ryan, Joe, 228 Schaeffer, Delores, 67
School of the Americas (SOA) Watch,
Sacasa, Juan Bautista, 7, 10 241–42
Salazar, Jorge, 16 Schoultz, Lars, 61
Salazar, Leonardo, 51 Scipione, Maria, 136
San Antonio, Tex., 75, 220, 233 Seattle, Wash., 66, 122, 232; demonstrations
Sanbrano, Angela, 122 in, 79, 181, 184, 193–94, 223; Pledge of
Sanctuary Movement, 4, 74–75, 121, 148 Resistance in, 89, 184, 193–94, 223
Sandinismo, 13, 17, 153, 154, 169; waning of, Semarad, Kate, 145–46
242 Service for Peace and Justice in Latin
Sandinista National Liberation Front America (SERPAJ), 61
(FSLN), 10–17, 21, 46, 67–68, 159–61; Setright, Aynn, 48, 170, 205–7
Carter administration and, 17–19; Shanker, Albert, 212
characterization of, by Reagan, 31, 43, Sharpe, Kenneth E., 25, 92
177, 190, 224; before coming to power, Shaull, Richard, 55
10–11, 12, 150, 153–54; differing views Sheen, Martin, 151
of, within anti–Contra War campaign, Sheinkman, Jack, 74, 188
46–48, 54–55, 69, 76, 116, 121, 147, 152; in Shultz, George, 25, 40, 50, 83, 177, 217
elections, 24, 27–28, 235, 238–39, 242; sister city partnerships, 66, 112–13, 135–36,
and El Salvador, 19–20, 67, 155; and 140–41, 152, 167–69; conferences of,
human rights, 16, 21, 27, 180; Nicaragua in Managua, 115–16, 131; differences
Network and, 68–69, 152, 157, 162, 239; among, 116, 122, 125; European cities
reforms instituted by, 13–16, 18–19, 46, in, 168; and humanitarian aid, 136, 141,
47, 62, 69; and regional peace initia- 199, 229, 240; Nicaraguan government
tives, 25, 26, 216; and religion, 16, 54–55, and, 156, 160, 168; and 1990 Nicaraguan
147, 166–67; split in (1995), 242; and elections, 238; number of, 3, 167–68;
women, 14–15, 62–63, 155 persistence of many, 240. See also Casa
Sandino, Augusto César, 1, 8–9, 10, 69, 153, Baltimore/San Juan de Limay sister city
243 project
Sandino, Sócrates, 9 Slade, Steven, 208
SANE (Committee for a Sane Nuclear Slaughter, Louise, 134, 219
Policy), 63, 84–86, 95, 179, 237; in coali- S/LPD. See Office of Public Diplomacy for
tions, 79, 86, 88, 91, 215, 262n80, 264n24, Latin America and the Caribbean
Index [ 305 ]
Small, Melvin, 4 study tours, 3, 76, 102–3, 200

Smeal, Eleanor, 213 Sumus, 21
Smedley Butler Brigade, 232 Superior Council for Private Enterprise
Smith, Christian, 116, 121 (COSEP), 11, 16
Smith, Peter H., 25 Swedish, Margaret, 54, 70, 72, 73, 91, 286n98
Snyder, Arnold, 107 Sweet, David, 104
Socialist International, 56, 173
Socialist Workers Party (SWP), 56, 58, 88, Taft administration, 7
128, 227 Tallahassee, Fla., 59, 120–21, 125, 198. See also
Sojourners, 98–99, 150–51, 219; and origins Florida State University
of Pledge of Resistance, 88, 264nn24,26; Taylor, Phyllis, 104
and Witness for Peace, 104, 108 TecNica, 111, 123, 199, 229, 239–40
Solis, Rafael, 67–68 television news, 51
Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 11, 12 Téllez, Dora Maria, 153–54, 161, 163, 242
Somoza Garcia, Anastasio, 10. See also Thayer, Millie, 138–39, 142
Somoza regime Tikkun, 99
Somoza regime, 10, 11–12, 14, 50, 65, 112; Time magazine, 209, 224
economic ruin left by, 13, 18; human Tinoco, Victor Hugo, 67, 155, 156, 161,
rights abuses by, 10, 11, 27; ouster of, 12, 162–63, 242
154; U.S. support for, 10, 50, 112 Tropical Tours, 102–3
Sonoma County, Calif., 120 Truman, Harry S., 33–34, 36, 176
South Africa, 181–82, 246; as issue in Tünnermann, Carlos, 2, 13, 55, 129, 161, 164,
national demonstrations, 73, 121, 122, 211, 226
213; linking of, to Central America poli- Tünnermann, Rosa Carlota, 161
cies, 73, 122, 181 Tuite, Marjorie, 166
South Carolina, 100, 226 Tula, Maria Teresa, 213
Southern Christian Leadership Conference
(SCLC), 87, 121, 213, 277n19 UDEL (Democratic Union for Libera-
Soviet Union, 13, 51, 174–75, 176; and Cold tion), 11
War ideology, 31, 32–34, 35; fighter Ulloa, Sixto, 103, 146
places supposedly sent by, 28; Nicara- UNESCO (United Nations Educational,
gua and, 13, 224; Ortega trip to, 4, 182; Scientific, and Cultural Organization),
in Reagan administration rhetoric, 35, 14, 59
83, 145, 224 unions, 74, 179–80, 277n15. See also specific
Spain, 172–73, 174, 200 unions
Spanish classes, 103, 141 Unitarian Universalist Service Committee,
speaking tours, 9, 85, 108, 142, 191, 226–27, 225
231; by Contra War supporters, 30; by United Auto Workers (UAW), 63, 74, 212
FSLN leaders, 159, 163 United Church of Christ, 187, 209, 215,
Specter, Arlen, 92 263n2
Spencer, Bill, 91 United Methodist Church, 82, 187, 263n2
Spriggs, Kent, 58–59 United Nations (UN), 38, 45, 161, 235; char-
Stark, Robert, 62, 225 ter of, 10, 44, 256n45; and Contra War,
Stillings, Jamie, 133 25, 38, 45. See also UNESCO
Studds, Gerry, 18–19, 74 United States v. Lee Levi Laub (1967), 58
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), U.S. Conference of Mayors, 219, 224
57, 124, 128 U.S. Customs, 148, 200, 229, 232
[ 306 ] Index
U.S. House of Representatives, 40, 214; and Walker, Lucius, 99, 100, 101, 233
Boland amendments, 80, 94; commit- Walker, Thomas W., 47–48
tee hearings in, 178, 218, 228; Intelligence “Walk in Peace,” 229–31, 240
Committee of, 20, 80; votes by, on con- Waller, J. Michael, 149
tra aid, 51, 81, 182–83, 189, 209, 220–21, Wallis, Jim, 88, 104, 264n26, 266n60
222. See also House Democratic Task Walsh, Jean, 220
Force on Central America Walsh, Lawrence E., 214
U.S. Information Agency (USIA), 45, 174 “War Crimes Tribunal on Central America
U.S. Marines, 1, 7–8, 9–10, 197, 243 and the Caribean” (October 1984), 38
U.S. Senate, 10, 40; Intelligence Committee War Resisters League, 63, 77, 79, 277n17
of, 38–39, 148–49; votes by, on contra Washington, DC, 39, 71, 79, 216, 232; civil
aid, 81, 182, 189, 209, 220, 222 disobedience in, 182, 192, 209, 211,
U.S. Supreme Court, 58 236; conferences in, 73–74, 86, 88–89;
UNO (National Opposition Union), 234, early solidarity committees in, 65, 68;
235, 237, 238 national demonstrations in, 39, 79,
87–88, 122, 181–82, 193, 210–14, 232;
Valenzuela, Eduardo López, 21 Nicaraguan speakers in, 71, 163; orga-
van den Berg, Dion, 172 nizational offices in, 70, 88, 89, 98, 106,
Venceremos Brigades, 58 119, 203, 227; Pledge of Resistance in,
Vermont, 109 106, 184–85
Veterans for Peace (VFP), 188, 192, 228, 237; Washington Office on Latin America
founding of (1985), 180–81; local chap- (WOLA), 61, 67, 264n26, 265n39,
ters of, 121, 192, 195, 198 276n12, 286n98
Veterans Peace Action Team, 218, 232 Washington Post, 30, 161, 164, 172, 196, 228;
Veterans Peace Convoy (VPC), 232–33, 234 coverage of anti–Contra War campaign
Vietnam analogy, 87, 158, 159, 195, 216; and in, 82, 87, 107, 164, 181, 182, 226; White
El Salvador policy, 71, 73; as frequent House viewpoint expressed in, 83–84,
theme in anti–Contra War campaign, 145, 257n69
37, 39, 87, 95, 97–98, 191, 223; political Washington state, 94–95, 100. See also
limitations of, 39–41 Seattle
“Vietnam syndrome,” 34, 223 Webster, William H., 148
Vietnam Veterans Against the War, 63, 181, Weiss, Cora, 213
201 Weiss, Ted, 87
Vietnam War, 34–35, 176, 201–2; anti–inter- Western Europe, 174–75, 176; opposition
ventionist legacy of, 4, 34, 223; antiwar in, to Contra War, 24, 25, 41–42, 45, 146,
veterans of, 180–81, 188, 192–93, 197, 201, 161, 171–73, 174–75, 176; solidarity orga-
217–18; invoking of, by Central America nizing in, 168, 169, 173
activists: see Vietnam analogy; Reagan Western New York Peace Center
on, 34–35. See also anti–Vietnam War (WNYPC), 131–32
movement West Germany, 79, 119–20, 169, 170,
Vigil, María López, 238 174–75
Voice of America (VOA), 27 Wheaton, Philip, 54, 59, 65–66, 67
Voldt, Hilda, 67 Wheeler, Burton K., 8
Wheelock, Jaime, 159, 161
Waiting for the Invasion: U.S. Citizens in White House Outreach Group, 29, 30, 84
Nicaragua (film), 110 Whittlesey, Faith Ryan, 29, 84
Wald, George, 2 Wicker, Tom, 99
Index [ 307 ]
Williams, Betty, 2 identity, 104, 204. See also Dilling,

Williams, Harvey, 157, 158, 273n37 Yvonne
Williams, Renee, 198 Wittner, Lawrence, 173
Wilson, Lionel, 219–20 women: in Nicaraguan revolution, 14–15,
Winpisinger, William, 74 153, 153 (see also AMNLAE); in solidar-
Wisconsin Coordinating Council on Nica- ity movement, 62–63, 110–11, 240
ragua (WCCN), 112–13, 114, 116, 240 Women’s Empowerment Project, 240
Witness for Peace (WFP), 42, 106–8, 112, Women’s International League for Peace
179, 203–7, 227, 237; in coalitions, 91, 210, and Freedom (WILPF), 63, 79, 123, 211,
236, 276n12, 282n12, 286n98; and con- 227, 262n80
gressional lobbying, 91, 186, 187; danger work brigades, 108–9, 143, 148, 164, 199,
faced by volunteers of, 169, 203–4, 205, 200, 237
206–7; as deterrent to contra attacks, World Council of Churches, 54
169–70; documenting of contra attacks World Court. See International Court of
by, 42, 43, 106, 107–8, 178, 186, 191, 217, Justice
223–24, 225, 235; efforts to discredit, 107, World Federalist Association, 45
147, 149, 204; founding of, 42, 84, 103–4; World War II, 34, 175
growth of, 118, 191, 203, 208; long-term Wright, Jim, 18, 51, 93, 162, 220, 222–23
volunteers in, 48, 106, 204, 205–7; media Wright, Sir Oliver, 176
coverage of, 107, 108, 204; Nicaraguan Wyden, Ron, 137, 140
government and, 104, 129–30, 166, 229;
after 1987, 228, 229, 235, 236, 237, 239, Young, Andrew, 170–71
241; place of, in broader anti–Contra Young Socialist Alliance, 58
War campaign, 116, 185; racial composi-
tion of, 121–22, 269n22; and religious Zelaya, José Santos, 7
ROGER PEACE was born during the Korean War, came of age during the Vietnam
War, and became a local peace movement organizer during the Reagan years. (Peace is
his family name.) He received a B.A. in history from Sonoma State University in 1976
and an M.S. in social science education (1994) and a Ph.D. in the history of American
foreign relations (2007) from Florida State University. He has taught U.S. and world
history at four collegiate institutions and is currently an adjunct professor at Tallahassee
Community College, as well as the communications coordinator for a Florida non-
profit organization. He has contributed scholarly papers to national and international
conferences and has published articles in The History Teacher, Peace and Change, and
International Journal of Peace Studies. His previous writings include A Just and Lasting
Peace: The U.S. Peace Movement from the Cold War to Desert Storm (1991).
Unlike earlier U.S. interventions in Latin America, the Reagan administration’s attempt to
overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua during the 1980s was not allowed to
proceed quietly. Tens of thousands of American citizens organized and agitated against U.S.
aid to the counterrevolutionary guerrillas, known as “contras.” Believing the Contra War to be
unnecessary, immoral, and illegal, they challenged the administration’s Cold War stereotypes,
warned of “another Vietnam,” and called on the United States to abide by international norms.
A Call to Conscience offers the first comprehensive history of the anti–Contra War campaign
and its Nicaragua connections. Roger Peace places this eight-year campaign in the context
of previous American interventions in Latin America, the Cold War, and other grassroots
oppositional movements. Based on interviews with American and Nicaraguan citizens and
leaders, archival records of activist organizations, and official government documents, this
book reveals activist motivations, analyzes the organizational dynamics of the anti–Contra
War campaign, and contrasts perceptions of the campaign in Managua and Washington.
Peace shows how a variety of civic groups and networks—religious, leftist, peace, veteran,
labor, women’s rights—worked together in a decentralized campaign that involved extensive
transnational cooperation.
“A ground-breaking book. If a hundred years from now the anti–Contra War

movement is included on the list of significant American protest movements,
there is no question this book will be a major reason why. It clarifies our vision
of the 1980s, refutes the dominant Reagan triumphalism, and shows contem-
porary America to be just as fraught with protest as the 1960s.”
—Andrew E. Hunt, author of The Turning: A History of Vietnam Veterans Against the War
ROGER PEACE is adjunct professor of history at Tallahassee Community College.
A volume in the series Culture, Politics, and the Cold War

Cover design by Sally Nichols
Cover photo by Rick Reinhard, April 25, 1987
Mobilization, Washington, D.C.
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS PRESS

Amherst & Boston www.umass.edu/umpress

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A CALL TO

University of Massachusetts Press Amherst and Boston

Designed by Sally Nichols

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Peace, Roger C. (Roger Craft), 1952–

British Library Cataloguing in Publication data are available

I am grateful to the many individuals who shared their experiences

ACWC anti–Contra War campaign

COSEP Superior Council for Private Enterprise (Consejo Superior

ROCLA Rochester Committee on Latin America (Rochester, NY)

campaigns to halt U.S. aid to the governments of El Salvador and Guatemala,

U.S.-Nicaragua Relations, the Sandinista

T he United States looms large in the history of Nicaragua. In

The Sandinista Revolution

three Nicaraguans embarked on the Herculean tasks of bringing down the

The Sandinistas in Power

Managua to celebrate the Revolution’s second anniversary, Ortega announced

Initial U.S. Responses to the New Sandinista Government

The Nicaraguan Revolution gives every evidence of being an authen-

Regarding the influence of Cuba, Pezzulo observed, “There is no reason to

The Reagan Administration’s War against Nicaragua

efforts to accommodate U.S. security concerns. On March 9, 1981, he signed a

The Contra War

international support is what brings down or alters an unpopular government.

An Overview of the Contra War Debate

U . S. aid to the contras began in secret, but once exposed in the

Administration Themes and Arguments

Themes and Arguments of the Anti–Contra War Campaign

Critics of the Contra War necessarily responded to administration claims and

agency equivalent to the Office of Public Diplomacy, but participating groups

Violations of U.S. Laws

Committee, found the administration’s lack of accountability so troubling that

Lessons from Vietnam

Diplomacy over War

134-page manual, Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, was published in

What’s Good about Nicaragua?

be counterproductive in terms of reaching “moderate to conservative ‘swing’

We feel President Reagan’s address presented a very distorted

U.S. scholars of Latin America also challenged the administration’s “totali-

administration’s “allegations were either completely groundless or very nearly

though the administration’s “exaggerated rhetoric was discounted, it had effect.

Meeting the Ideological Challenge

Dartmouth College, wrote that “U.S. government publications invariably describe

Origins of the Anti–Contra War Campaign

T he anti–Contra War campaign emerged out of progressive U.S.

Progressive Religious Networks

In June 1981, Michael Harrington visited Nicaragua as part of a Socialist Inter-

Christians and Americans. . . . We mourn the death of democracy in Chile.”

Human Rights Activism

The coup in Chile transformed a hopeful solidarity campaign into a somber

The Post–Vietnam War Peace Movement

Thousands of individuals who participated in the anti–Vietnam War movement

I think what happened to a lot of us who were involved in the

The Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign

In the years leading up to the triumph of the Sandinista Revolution, small

The Central America Movement

In the aftermath of the Sandinista military victory in Nicaragua, a wave of right-

Democratic Front. At the founding conference in New York on October 11–12,

Among the various organizations involved in the Central America movement

The Anti–Contra War Campaign, 1982

The Contra War began in earnest in March 1982. According to a Defense

Expansion of the Anti–Contra War Campaign,

T he Contra War became a hot political topic in Washington in