Business Law Assignment

Government and Infrastructure Contracts

A Business Analysis

Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services

Business Law Case Analysis

EPGP-12 Group 8
# Roll Number Student Name
1 EPGP-12A-031 Chandury Satya Madhavi
2 EPGP-12A-136 Narayana Dasharathula
3 EPGP-12A-123 Vamsi Sagar Naidu
4 EPGP-12A-081 Rajeev Ranjan Kumar
5 EPGP-12A-109 Subbarao Venkata Rama Vemula
6 EPGP-12A-115 Sundari Harsha Priya Palati
7 EPGP-12A-117 Sushovan Mohapatra
8 EPGP-12A-040 Indu Rajan
9 EPGP-12A-049 Kethiri Rakesh Reddy
10 EPGP-12A-027 Ashutosh Tiwari

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 Table of Contents

1 Infrastructure Leasing &Financial Services Overview 3

2 IL&FS Key Projects 3
2.1 Delhi-Noida Toll Bridge (DNTB) 4
2.1.1 The Concession Agreement 4
2.2 Chennai Metro Rail Project 5
3 IL&FS Financial Analysis 6
3.1 Financial State 6
3.2 Financial Issues 7
4 IL&FS Investigation 7
4.1 Violation of Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) 8
4.2 Misconduct of Credit Rating Agencies 8
5 NCLT Resolution Process – Union of India vs Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services
Ltd. & Ors 9
5.1 National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) Resolution & Revival process 9
5.2 Description of charges 10
6 IL&FS Impact on Economy 10
7 Indian Law and Regulatory Framework Impact 11
7.1 Changing Legal Scenario impact on Indian Business 11
7.2 Taxation Ambiguity & Amendment to IT Act 11
7.3 Legal Maze 11
8 Conclusions/Recommendations 11
9 References 12
10 Individual Contribution in the Report 14

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1 Infrastructure Leasing &Financial Services Overview

Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services (IL&FS) was incorporated and promoted by the
Central Bank of India (CBI), Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited (HDFC) and
Unit Trust of India (UTI) together in 1987. Over the years, State Bank of India (SBI), Life
Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), ORIX Corporation Japan, and Abu Dhabi Investment
Authority (ADIA) acquired the stake in IL&FS.
IL&FS operates through more than 300+ subsidiaries, Joint Ventures (JVs) and Special Purpose
Vehicles (SPVs) to provide the array of services for successful project completion - from
visioning, documentation, development and finance, to management, technology and execution.
IL&FS business is divided into multiple areas of Investment and Financial services as shown in
the chart below.

IL&FS unique Public Private Partnership (PPP) model helped India’s growth by leveraging
limited public funds, reduced life cycle cost to develop and execute more projects on a
sustainable basis.
2 IL&FS Key Projects
IL&FS executed its largest infrastructure projects including India's longest tunnel, Dr. Syama
Prasad Mookerjee Tunnel, which was opened for traffic in April 2017. The Noida Delhi Toll
bridge project was another successful landmark achievement of IL&FS in 2001. Paradip water
supply project supplies water to Indian Oil Corporation's 5 MMTPA grassroots refinery and
petrochemical complex near the port of Paradip in Odisha. Other project includes Indo-Nepal
cross border transmission project for trade of surplus power from India to Nepal.
IL&FS had undertaken many contracts in various infrastructure segments. This section analyzes
two key infrastructure contracts executed in the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model with the
Government. The key contracts cover the success and failures of IL&FS in the execution of the
Government Projects, bidding, key areas and the project implementation process.

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2.1 Delhi-Noida Toll Bridge (DNTB)

Delhi-Noida Toll Bridge (DNTB) is an eight-lane toll bridge that connects Delhi with Noida
across the Yamuna River. The development and construction was based on the Build-Own-
Operate-Transfer (BOOT) model by the Noida Toll Bridge Company Limited (NTBCL) as a
SPV with equity participation from NOIDA (New Okhla Industrial Development Authority) and
IL&FS Transportation Networks Ltd. The project was structured as Rs 408.2 crore and 30-year
BOOT concession.

2.1.1 The Concession Agreement

On 12 November 1997, A Concession Agreement was signed between NOIDA, IL&FS, and
NTBCL (concessionaire) for Delhi-Noida bridge project. Following are key clauses of the
project related to financial returns, developmental rights, and termination of the payments.

a) Guaranteed returns on total project cost

The concessionaire is guaranteed a return on the Total Cost of the Project, which is defined as
the aggregate of (i) Project Cost; (ii) Major Maintenance Expenses; and (iii) shortfalls in the
recovery of returns in a specific financial year.

Per this clause, this agreement grants the concessionaire (NTBCL) the right to collect user fees to
recover (a) the total cost of the project (b) returns on the total cost of the project at a rate of 20%
per annum over the concession period from the effective date. The return on the total cost of the
project is guaranteed if the contract provides that the concession period will be extended by
NOIDA in 2-year increments during the 30-year initial concession period till the total cost of the
project and the returns have been recovered by the concessionaire.

b) Development Rights

From the point of view of the concessionaire, the grant of wide-ranging Development Rights as
outlined in the concession agreement, would virtually remove all traffic risk from the project
since the exercise of these rights would permit the recovery of the total project cost and returns
thereon in a timely fashion. Per this clause, NOIDA has the discretion of granting development
rights to support any shortfall in the fees required to recover the total cost of the project and the
designated returns thereon.

c) Control by NOIDA

Under the NTBCL Concession Agreement, NOIDA can assume temporary control of the ‘Delhi
NOIDA Toll’ Bridge in the event of national or state emergency upon seven days’ written notice
to NTBCL. However, within three days of the termination of the circumstances for such control
over the ‘Delhi NOIDA Toll’ Bridge, NOIDA is required to give back the same to NTBCL. If
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NOIDA fails to return control of the ‘Delhi NOIDA Toll’ Bridge within the specified period of
three days, or if such national or state emergencies extend beyond three months, it will be treated
as an event of force majeure.

d) Termination Payments

From the point of view of the concessionaire, the grant of wide-ranging Development Rights as
outlined in the concession agreement, would virtually remove all traffic risk from the project
since the exercise of these rights would permit the recovery of the total project cost and returns
thereon in a timely fashion.

e) Dissolution of Steering Committee

Upon satisfaction in full of all condition’s precedent set forth in Article 3 of the Concession
Agreement, the Steering Committee will be dissolved and will have no further role in the Project.

Though DNTB is a successful project from execution side, it was the center of allegations for toll
collection and PPP model. The dispute would itself up from the Allahabad High Court to the
Supreme Court (SC). The fact that this project was more favorable to private partners than the
public policy viewpoint is the main area of conflict.

2.2 Chennai Metro Rail Project

The Chennai Metro Rail Limited (CMRL), originally a created as SPV by The Government of
Tamilnadu is now a Joint Venture (JV) between the Government of India and the Government of
Tamil Nadu. The JV developed Chennai Metro, an Urban Mass Rapid Transit System (MRTS)
being built to serve Chennai.
The Metro network consists of two color-coded lines covering 45.1 kilometers. Phase 1 (Blue
Line) started in April 2009. The system has a mix of underground and elevated stations. The
Chennai Metro is the tThird largest metro system in India after Delhi and Hyderabad Metro.
Chennai Metro Rail Ltd. had invited bids for the construction of two underground stations on
Phase 1 (Blue Line) extension in August 2016 and at the estimated it to cost of Rs. 385 crores.
The IL&FS – PJSC Kyivmetrobud JV then submitted a bid of Rs. 371.218 crores to secure L-1
position and was awarded the contract in December 2016. The Joint VentureJV has emerged as
the Lowest Bidder for the development of the Project. The work was expected to be completed in
20 months of time according to the terms of the Contract and expected to open for commercial
operations towards the end of 2020.
3.2.3 Termination

The CMRL has terminated the Phase 1 Chennai Metro Rail Project extension contract awarded
to IL & FS Transportation Network Limited (ITNL) due to extensive delay in the completion of
construction work.
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3 IL&FS Financial Analysis
It i’s important to understand the financial condition of IL&FS to analyze its impact on meeting
the contractual obligations in execution of its projects. IL&FS’s initial focus was to finance the
make and maintenance of infrastructure projects with long run commercial viability. Over the
decades, it reinvented itself in every way imaginable way & grew into a huge complex &
complicated structure, with over 300 business units/arms/ SPVs,. none None of them were listed
except 3. The modus operandi waswere simple - aggressively bag new projects, borrow to fund
them, divert the money to repay lenders to earlier projects.
3.1 Financial State
As infrastructure became the central theme in the past two decades, IL&FS used its first mover
advantage to lap up projects. Between FY14 and FY18, IL&FS’ total assets grew from INR
65,716 Cr to INR 1,15,815 Cr with CAGR of 15%. However, it sales and profit became negative
from 2016. The group and its all subsidiaries had a combined debt of about INR 91,000 Cr by
2018 where its financial problems peaked. INR 60,000 Cr debt of this is at project level,
including road, power and water projects.

● The debt-equity ratio of IL&FS increased to a very high number of ~17 times in FY18. It
shows the high financial crunch of IL&FS. Excessive/Spilled project costs were handled
through group debts.
● Interest coverage ratio, current ratio, quick ratio and cash ratio of less than 1 for all the
past 4 years. High Gearing & Liquidity Ratios of IL&FS indicate it was ready for
financial difficulties as actually happened.

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 IL&FS requires continuous refinancing. The operating model of IL & FS is to invest in
infrastructure projects (assets) with long payback periods mostly by utilizing short-term
borrowings (liability). However, it used the short-term debts to service long-term. It i’s
evident in its increase of short-term debt, and poor interest coverage ratio of less-than 1.5 is a
red flag.
3.2 Financial Issues
The decline in profit margin was mainly because of
1 Increased direct costs which led to led to many incomplete projects. The Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement
Act, 2013 made many of its projects unviable due to complications in land acquisition along
with government/regulatory approvals.
2 Increased borrowing costs (from 40% of revenue to 45% of revenue)
3 Lack of timely action exacerbated the problems.
4 Complexity across Business Vertical & Holding Structure. IL&FS have multiple business
verticals and layers (till 4 layers) which comprises subsidiaries with counterparties (Private
& government), associates, JVs resulting in complexity in terms of intermeshing of
financials and holding structures.
5 IL&FS group’s outstanding debt of INR 99,355 Cr as on 30 Sep 2018 comprises both Fund
based and Non-Fund based credits. Debt of INR 48,470 Cr out of 94216 Cr Fund based
belongs to 4 major holding companies (ILFS, IFIN, IEDCL & ITNL).
6 IL&FS helps in financing to internal and external parties but recovery of loans was poor.
Large portions of loans were given to the external parties which were weak in repayments
thus resulting in bad loans.

Finally, tThe Company reported defaults on its borrowing obligations during the financial year
2018-19. Further, the credit rating of the Company was downgraded to ‘D’ (lowest grade) in
September 2018.

4 IL&FS Investigation
It is evident from the financial analysis in the previous section that, IL&FS was in a deep
financial crisis. In July 2018, IL&FS faced difficulty in making repayments due on its bonds,
various short and long-term deposits, inter-corporate deposits, and commercial papers.
IL&FS came under scrutiny for financial discrepancies by the following agencies:
1. Pursuant to a report filed by the Registrar of Companies, Mumbai ("RoC") under Section
208 of the Companies Act, 2013, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (“MCA”) vide its
oOrder dated September 30, 2018, directed that the affairs of the Company be
investigated by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office ("SFIO").
2. SFIO commenced investigation of the affairs of the Company and filed an 800-page
charge sheet in Mumbai sessions court. It has charged the company’s auditors BSR & Co

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 and Deloitte Haskins & Sells (DHS), audit committee members and independent directors
under certain sections of the Companies Act and the Indian Penal Code. SFIO probe has
found violation of Section 36 of the Companies Act, which pertains to fraudulently
inducing people to invest.
3. Union of India, (acting through Ministry of Corporate Affairs MCA), based on SFIO
report, started a prosecution against bar the IL&FS auditors. It has petitioned in the
National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT).
4. National Financial Regulatory Authority (NFRA), a newly minted watchdog for auditors,
initiated quality review.
5. Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI)’s initiated disciplinary proceedings.
6. Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) probed in the auditors’ role in IL&FS
group’s listed entities such as IL&FS Transportation Networks Ltd (ITNL)
7. Enforcement Directorate (ED)’s probed IFIN for possible money laundering and
registered a case. The new probe targeted six erstwhile directors of IFIN, including Ravi
Parthasarathy, Hari Sankaran and Ramesh Bawa, as well as others including C Siva
Sankaran and his group firms which borrowed money from the company.
8. The Income Tax (IT) department is also probing the infrastructure financier for alleged
tax-rule violations.
4.1 Violation of Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA)
IL&FS Financial Services (IFIN) is as a Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC) regulated by
the Reserve Bank of India was in the business of lending. It has found to be undertaken
meandering dealings through multilayering and floating of multiple fake or shell companies
floated with the sole purpose to launder funds. The management of the IFIN in connivance with
other accused, adopted fraudulent practices in order not to let aforesaid loan/ credit facility to be
classified as a Non Performing Asset (NPA) s, Such manner of debt-servicing led to ballooning
up of outstanding liabilities against a group, which were funded from the borrowings from
market. The biggest chunk in this is that of IL&FS road arm ITNL, whose subsidiary IL&FS Rail
is being probed. All these transactions are interlinked and part of the larger conspiracy to launder
funds.
The SFIO, ED, and the forensic audit team of Grant Thornton under Project Icarus started a
probe into a group company of IL&FS. Project Icarus exposed the nature of round-tripping and
suspicious deals by IFIN with other entities within the group, joint venture partners, borrowers
and others and the suspicious nature of many loans.
4.2 Misconduct of Credit Rating Agencies
EPFO (Employees’ Provident Fund Organisationorganization), based on the credit ratings
IL&FS, invested more than Rs 9,000 crore of Provident Fund amounts in IL&FS and their
subsidiaries. MCA, SFIO, and ED have discovered that India Ratings and Research Pvt. Ltd,
Credit rating agencies (ICRA) and Credit Analysis and Research Ltd (CARE) top brass had

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meddled in assigning high ratings of ‘AAA’ to IL&FS and its subsidiaries in the lieu of some
favourfavor even when its subsidiary, IL&FS
SEBI observed procedural lapses in due diligence by credit rating agencies in the assignment of
rating to the Non-Convertible Debentures (NCDs) of IL&FS. SEBI has initiated adjudication
proceedings against the three rating agencies for their failure to exercise proper skill, care and
due diligence while rating the securities of IL&FS.
5 NCLT Resolution Process – Union of India vs Infrastructure Leasing & Financial
Services Ltd. & Ors
IL&FS failed continuously to service its debt. and tThe imminent possibility of a contagion
effect in the financial market led the Union of India (UoI) to move an application under Sections
241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 before the NCLT, Mumbai Bench.
The following section details the resolution process set in motion under the direction of NCLT.
5.1 National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) Resolution & Revival process
1. Suspension of existing Board of Directors (NCLT order)
NCLT invoked its powers under Sections 242, 242, 246 R/W 339 of the Companies Act and
suspended the existing Board of Directors on the grounds of mismanagement and compromise in
corporate governance norms and risk management by the erstwhile Board of the Company and
that the affairs of the Company being conducted in a manner prejudicial to the public interest.
NCLT reconstituted the new board with the six persons proposed by the UoI. Mr. Uday Kotak
was appointed as the chairman of the new Board of Directors. The new Board has been tasked to
restore the financial solvency of IL&FS group.
2. Grant of moratorium - NCLAT order
IL&FS under the new board sought a moratorium from NCLT Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT)
against certain creditor actions to avoid impending threat of adverse legal actions by creditors. It
stayed various proceedings and actions against the Company and its Group Companies and
enabled value preservation of the IL&FS Group’s assets and provides time to the New Board to
evaluate, prepare and implement a resolution plan for the Company and its group companies in
an orderly manner, keeping in mind the interest of the various stakeholders.
3. Reopening of Books of Account
NCLT Tribunal ordered reopening of Books of Account vide it order, Section 130 of the
Companies Act allowed reopening of accounts for the past 5 years.
4. Progress Reports
The New Board has submitted five Progress Reports from time to time to the Union of India who
in turn had filed them with NCLT. The Company is classified as a "Red" entity, indicating that it
is not able to meet all obligations (financial and operational) including payment obligations to its
senior secured financial creditors. Accordingly, under the resolution mechanism, the Company is
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permitted to make only those payments necessary to maintain and preserve a going concern
status.
5. Central Government’s Resolution Framework
The NCLAT has approved the Central Government’s resolution framework in March 2020. The
resolution plan was to be implemented within 90 days. While accepting Centre’s framework
which provides for a pro-rata distribution of assets, the Appellate Tribunal has opined that it was
not inclined to follow the procedure of Insolvency & Bankruptcy Code (IBC) in the case,
including Section 53, due to public interest involved in the case.
Under Section 53 of IBC, senior secured creditors’ loans are cleared first and any surplus that
remains thereafter is given to unsecured or subordinated creditors and thereafter to the equity
owners. While accepting Centre’s framework which provides for a pro-rata distribution of assets,
the Appellate Tribunal has opined that it was not inclined to follow the procedure of IBC in the
case, including Section 53, due to public interest involved in the case.
5.2 Description of charges
The following list provides the list of charges filed against IL&FS:
● Charge No. 1: Fraud Punishable Under Section 447 of The Companies Act, 2013 And
Section 417, 420 R/W 120B OF The Indian Penal Code, 1860.
● Charge no. 2: Vviolations attracting section 36 R/W 447 of Ccompanies Aact, 2013 and
section 68 of the companies act, 1956
● Charge no. 3: Failure in discharging statutory Auditors duties under Section 143 of The
Companies Act, 2013 punishable under section147 of Ccompanies Aact, 2013.
● Charge no. 4: Liability u/s 211 R/W Section 628 of The Companies Act, 1956 R/W 477a
of IPC, 227/233 R/W section 628 of Ccompanies Aact, 1956 and U/S 129 r/w section 448
of The Companies Act, 2013 as Balance Sheets and Profit and Loss accounts of IFIN do
not give true and fair view of affairs.
● Charge no. 5: Liability U/S 184 of The Companies Act, 2013 as Ramesh C Bawa
Director of IFIN failed to disclose his interest.
6 IL&FS Impact on Economy

IL & FS crisis was compared to the 2008 Lehman Brothers crisis and considered as “too big to
fail”. It was a dark time for the Indian financial markets when a company like IL&FS which has
a vast exposure to the financial system defaulted. IL&FS crisis had its impact on Indian
Economy:
● IL&FS bankruptcy has wiped out Rs. 8.48 lakh crore investors wealth and caused tremors in
the financial markets.
● IL&FS being a major player in many infrastructure projects (estimated Rs 1.75 lakh cr.
completed projects & 13000 km road constructed) could damage the overall infrastructure
sector which could be a hurdle for the economic growth of the country.

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● Budget 2019-20 highlighted that NBFC’s stress is the reason for the financial year 2019
slowdown.
● 33 different funds like mutual funds, short-term bond funds, liquid funds, etc. were exposed
to the IL&FS crisis. It also affected the credibility of other NBFC’s and their borrowing
capacities despite their financial soundness. This led to a fall in their shares.
● Hitting by IL&FS crisis, 25-30% of the funding for NBFCs was coming from Mutual funds
decreased their investments in NBFC, which is normally 25-30% of their portfolio.
● Commercial bank exposure to IL&FS is around Rs. 44,075 crores (47% overall debt) of the
debt. It aggravated the NPA burden on the banking sector which had already been struggling.
● Affected by the liquidity, banks were reluctant to lend to NBFC’s. This impacted the NBFC
lending to consumers who prefer NBFC over normal bank due to instant loan approval.
● NBFC had impacted auto sector, steel, housing, construction, Iron & Steel industries and thus
employment.
7 Indian Law and Regulatory Framework Impact
7.1 Changing Legal Scenario impact on Indian Business

A major reason behind IL&FS troubles is that the prolonged projects in clearance & delay of
land acquisitions majorly associated withdue to enforcement of Right to Fair Compensation and
Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The IL&FS
episode indicated that organizations need to have proper contingency plans & business models to
combat the changing political & legal scenarios which are lagging with IL&FS especially for the
infrastructure projects.
7.2 Taxation Ambiguity & Amendment to IT Act

Infrastructure companies are in dispute with the tax department on whether these companies can
apply a special rate of depreciation allowed by GoI. GoI left it to interpretations of the taxman &
companies. The new amendment to Section 79 of the Income-tax act allow buyers to carry
forward losses in companies where the government has seized control, this will support the
buyers to set off historical losses in IL&FS and its subsidiaries against future profits, lowering
taxable income, these kind of more reforms in legal frameworks will support in handling the
compels issues like IL&FS.
7.3 Legal Maze

IL&FS case raised the questions on the jurisdiction of NCLT, limitations of Section 140(5) of
The Company Act with reference to imposition ban on auditors & few other legal interpretations
of the section Sections 132 and 447. These kind arguments make this case as never-ending legal
maze, which signifies the bringing the simplified clear legal framework & guidelines to support
the business & interest of the equity holders & common public.

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8 Conclusions/Recommendations

In Summary, whatever IL&FS business model borrows (liability) eventually utilized in funding
long term infrastructure(assets) resulted in mismatch between sources of funds and its
utilization. It implying impaired IL&FS’s inability to repay short-term loans/borrowings.
The aggressive growth of the assets did no’t match the financial health due to external
factors like land acquisition cost, complex holding structure, mismanagement.
Investigations agencies from Government of India (GoI) found challenges in proving any
allegations made against IL&FS leadership. IL&FS case brought the need for robust
corporate governance and enterprise risk management. Activities of NBFCs should be
regulated on the similar lines as of Commercial/PSU Banks. This would help in controlling
and checking of these institutions. Also, Government should appoint some competent
authority (Independent) to conduct special audit of the NBFCs operations on a yearly
basis.

9 References
Contracts References
 Delhi–Noida Toll Bridge https://www.ilfsindia.com/our-work/transportation/delhi-
noida-toll-bridge/
 CMRL Terminates Contracts Over delay https://www.ilfsindia.com/press/cmrl-
terminates-contract-over-delay/
Financial Problems References
 https://thewire.in/business/ilfs-downfall-banking-india-economy
 https://www.cadtm.org/The-Infrastructure-Leasing-Financial-Services-IL-FS-Debt-
Default-Privatize
 https://www.caclubindia.com/articles/the-il-fs-default-part-2-39266.asp
 https://www.readyratios.com/sec/industry/16/
 https://www.foundationsoft.com/financial-ratios-construction-business/
 https://stock-financials.valuestocks.in/en/il-and-fs-fundamental-reports
 https://www.ilfsindia.com/investors/ & Annual reports from 2015 Onwards
 https://www.ilfsindia.com/media/2324/update-on-ilfs-3-apr-2019.pdf
Investigation References
 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/ed-likely-to-probe-
ifin-dealings-after-sfio-charge-sheet/articleshow/69850509.cms?
utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

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  https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/sfio-and-ilfs-board-
probing-why-rating-co-ignored-analysts-concerns/articleshow/69570544.cms?
utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/ed-summons-two-
ratings-firms-in-ilfs-probe/articleshow/70065528.cms?
utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
 https://www.cnbctv18.com/finance/ilfs-crisis-after-mca-sfio-ed-finds-misconduct-by-
rating-agencies-4034291.htm
 https://www.newindianexpress.com/business/2019/jul/03/how-ilfs-colluded-with-
rating-agencies-1998904.html
 https://www.cnbctv18.com/finance/ilfs-crisis-after-mca-sfio-ed-finds-misconduct-by-
rating-agencies-4034291.htm
 https://www.newindianexpress.com/business/2019/jul/03/how-ilfs-colluded-with-
rating-agencies-1998904.html
Impact on Indian Economy
 https://kredx.com/blog/ilfs-crisis-halting-the-growth-of-indian-economy/
 https://blog.finology.in/entrepreneurship/ILFS-Reasons-and-Effects
 https://vakilsearch.com/advice/ilfs-crisis/
 https://www.businesstoday.in/opinion/columns/nbfc-crisis-domino-effect-on-indian-
economy-ilfs-scam-gdp-growth/story/378109.html
 https://qz.com/india/1620385/ilfs-crisis-spreads-to-indias-nbfcs-like-reliance-cap-
dhfl/
 https://groww.in/blog/how-ilfs-crisis-led-to-panic-indian-economy/
 https://qz.com/india/1620385/ilfs-crisis-spreads-to-indias-nbfcs-like-reliance-cap-
dhfl/
Conclusion References
 https://blog.ipleaders.in/land-acquisition-act-2013-might-affect-infrastructural-
development-in-india/
 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/ilfs-case-raj-
thackeray-summoned-by-
 more/articleshow/69951358.cms?
utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/banking/finance/ilfs-scam-auditors-
defend-themselves-question-justification-for-
 https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/change-in-i-t-act-may-
lure-buyers-to-ilfs/articleshow/70121379.cms?
utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

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  https://www.thehansindia.com/posts/index/Opinion/2018-12-28/The-ILFS-
imbroglio-Lessons-to-be-learnt/465524

10 Individual Contribution of Each Team in the ReportMember towards the Project

Each of the team member took the ownership of a section in the project and reviewed the section
of others. Following is the ownership and review of team members.

S.No Activity/ Topic Name Assignee Reviewer

1 IL&FS Overview Rajeev Ranjan Chandury Satya Madhavi
Kumar
2 IL&FS financial analysis Chandury Satya Subbarao Venkata Rama
Madhavi Vemula
3 IL&FS Contracts research InduRajan Rajeev Ranjan Kumar
Kethiri Rakesh Sushovan Mohapatra
Reddy
4 IL&FS Core financial problem Ashutosh Tiwari Vamsi Sagar Naidu
Kethiri Rakesh Reddy
5 National Company Law Tribunal Vamsi Sagar Naidu Ashutosh Tiwari
(NCLT) resolution & revival Sundari Harsha Priya
process Palati

6 IL&FS impact on the economy Sundari Harsha Narayana Dasharathula

Priya Palati

7 IL&FS Investigation by agencies Sushovan Indu Rajan

Mohapatra

8 Conclusions/Recommendations Narayana All Team Members

Dasharathula
9 References All Team Members All Team Members
10 Document consolidation and Subbarao Venkata All Team Members
preparation Rama Vemula

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