Civil Procedure Outline Summary

Civil Procedure Outline
 Federal Rules – rule 1 “just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination

o Just = accurate
o Speedy – “justice delayed is justice denied”/but if too fast can’t have just and accurate decision
o Inexpensive – “less” expensive; in US each side pays its fees
Assignment 1: A Survey of the Civil Action; Illustrative Cases; C. 1-27, 27-34, 70-74, U.S. Const. Art. III, FR 1
Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials

Chapter 1: A Survey of the Civil Action
1. Selecting a Proper Court
 Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the person and must
have proper venue
o Federal system: US District Courts  13 US Courts of Appeals  US Supreme Court
o State System: geographic districts with courts of general jurisdiction (handle cases with
claims over a certain dollar amount) and courts of inferior jurisdiction (like municipal courts)
 courts of appeal
o Jurisdiction of District Courts involves cases where there is a diversity of citizenship or more
than $75,000 is at stake
2. Commencing the Action
 Plaintiff must give notice of the commencement of the action by service of process; usually
summons – directs defendant to appear and defend under penalty of default
3. Pleading and Parties
 First pleading often referred to as the “complaint” – written statement that will contain the claim
against defendant
 Detail required in complaint depends on purpose the pleadings are expected to serve
4. The Conclusiveness of Judgments
 After appeal or after time for appeal expires, the judgment is final (res judicata – a thing decided)
Illustrative Cases
1. The Authority of the Court to Proceed with the Action
 Jurisdiction over subject matter and person of the defendant
Capron v. van Noorden (US Supreme Court, 1804)
I. Parties
 Capron – Plaintiff - appellant
 Van Noorden – Defendant - appellee
II. Citation
 Capron v. van Noorden, Supreme Court of the United States, 1804. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
126, 2 L.Ed. 229.
III. Facts
 Capron sued van Noorden in federal court in North Carolina. Capron originally sued for
damages on“trespass on the case” (type of tort case – old common law form of action
used to recover for indirect injury caused by defendant in wrongful way). Judgment was
found for Defendant. Plaintiff appealed arguing the federal court lacked jurisdiction.
Court did not establish citizenship of Capron, therefore did not establish Federal
jurisdiction (if Capron not from NC, then Federal, but if he was then State court). Capron
alleged that van Noorden was from North Carolina, but Capron did not allege his
citizenship.
o Appellate court does not find new facts – especially on writ of error – had to
review based on facts in below court; may “take judicial notice” of certain type of
public fact (undisputed public record) – so court couldn’t ask Capron where he
was from
IV. Legal Issues
 Capron brings a writ of error – mandatory review in appeal – person who brings the writ
is the “plaintiff in error” and “defendant in error” is respondent
o Today will call appellant “petitioner” and “respondent” the appellee
 In cases brought in courts created pursuant to Article III, is judgment rendered in said
court effective if there is no clear statement alleging subject matter jurisdiction?
V. Holding
 No. Judgment reversed – vacated decision; Capron could bring another lawsuit. Courts
created pursuant to Article III of the U.S. Constitution are courts of limited jurisdiction.
In order for the court to have jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, then both
parties must be citizens of different states but the court did not establish this. Lack of
subject matter jurisdiction invalidates a decision regardless of the procedural stage at
which such issue is raised. Courts have an obligation to raise this issue.
o They have to reverse – Supreme Court believes article 3 categories are important
– they limit federal power, so must fall within one of the 9 categories.
o Today, plaintiff is required to include basis for federal jurisdiction in complaint
under rule 8
o 99% of time you cannot raise an issue on appeal that you did not raise in court
below (“preserving the right to appeal”) – unlike in Capron who raised the issue
in appeals court
Tickle v. Barton (Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1956)
I. Parties
 Tickle – Plaintiff
 Barton - Defendant
II. Citation
 Tickle v. Barton. Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1956. 142 W. Va. 188, 95
S.E.2d 427.
III. Facts
 Barton (from VA) ran into Tickle (from WV) on private road in WV. Tickle’s attorney
invited Barton to banquet in WV. Barton files plea in abatement – technical objection –
contesting way he was served. Tickle’s attorney demurred (says that he has insufficient to
proof to say he was tricked).
 Tickle, Plaintiff, sued Barton, Defendant, for trespass on the case. Plaintiff made a first
attempt to serve Defendant, the validity of which was still pending (trying to sue under
statute). Plaintiff’s attorney procured an alias summons. Defendant was indisputably
served with this summons by the local sheriff. Defendant, however, filed a plea in
abatement, alleging that Plaintiff’s attorney called Defendant and lured him to the
location where he was served by informing him that a party would occur there. Defendant
alleged that he would not have gone to that location if he knew he was speaking to
Plaintiff’s attorney and that the purpose of inviting him to the party was to serve him with
process. Plaintiff filed a demurrer to the plea, which the circuit court overruled. Plaintiff
appealed.
o Could have sued Barton in Virginia – always personal jurisdiction in the state
where the defendant lived – but didn’t bc didn’t want sympathetic jury
IV. Legal Issues
 If Plaintiff or Plaintiff’s attorney lied to Defendant in order to have him show up at a
certain location for the purpose of serving him with summons for a pending lawsuit, shall
the service be effective?
o Is service valid?
V. Holding
 Affirmed. Service of process procured through deceitful means caused by the plaintiff is
improper and the court should not exercise jurisdiction over the party served.
o Dissent – agrees with rule of law, but does not believe the attorney’s actions
qualified as deceit, fraud, or wrongdoing
 Here, the court has jurisdiction but is declining to use it on public policy grounds
o If you are voluntarily in the state, then you can be served. In this case was he
there voluntarily?
*Holding versus Dictum
 Want to identify holding, to do that determine what legal question is being decided. Facts
important to holding. “On these facts, where it’s alleged an attorney makes up an
invitation and invites them to dinner on behalf of the organized where not authorized to
do it, it is considered a form of trickery or fraud and then serviced, it is not a legal
service.”
5. Conclusiveness of Judgments
 Fetter v. Beal (1122) – Court said that because Fetter had already brought case against Beal for
assault and was awarded damages, he could not bring another case for the this injury and that if
he had not been so hasty he might have been awarded more for the loss of skull that occurred
later
 Statute of limitations – if you bring a suit against someone, they can use affirmative defense
“statute of limitations” – must be raised in the response to a complaint (if you do not raise an
affirmative defense in the response defendant waives their right to it)
Des Moines Navigation & Railroad Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co. (US Supreme Court, 1887)
I. Parties
 Iowa Homestead Co. – Plaintiff
 Des Moines Navigation & Railroad Co. - Defendant
II. Citation
III. Facts
 In first suit, Iowa Homestead is suiting Des Moines and some NY companies – start in
Iowa state court but is removed to federal court bc diversity jurisdiction (NY and Iowa).
Defendant win, no recovery for the plaintiff.
o But in complete diversity statute, no plaintiff can be from same state and any
defendant. – lack of statutory subject matter jurisdiction
o Did not raise this issue at any point through US Supreme Court. Case ends, race
judicata.
 Then in a separate case, Iowa sued Des Moines Navigation in Iowa state court. Plaintiff
argues that because Plaintiff and Defendant were both Iowa corporations and
consequently citizens of the same state, the federal court had no jurisdiction to render
judgment in the previous action, making the previous judgment void.
IV. Legal Issue
 Can they bring a second case in state based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the
first case?
V. Holding
 No, once a case is final, and did not bring objection in that case, then the case is over.
Second suit is barred by race judicata. Error assigned to the Supreme Court of
Iowa. Although federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, they are not courts of
inferior jurisdiction. When a federal court finally disposes of a case on the merits and
such disposition is upheld on appeal, subject matter jurisdiction is impliedly recognized.
The Full Faith and Credit clause requires any court in a subsequent case based on the
same facts involving the same parties to be bound by the previous judgment.
Assignment 2. The Traditional Basis for Jurisdiction C. 75-86, U.S. Const. Art. IV
 Personal Jurisdiction – power of the court over the individual defendant; to bind defendant to judgment
and make it enforceable over them; full faith and credit given by other states
 Types of personal jurisdiction:
o In personam – against the person
o In rem – against the property; binding on the entire world so must give broad notice (ex. dispute
about the particular property; ex. action to quiet title – who has legal title over property)
 True in rem – subject to minimum contacts test but unclear how rigorous this will be
 Quasi in rem – claim about something else where property can be used to satisfy the judgment (ex.
Pennoyer v. Neff; judgment limited to value of the property in state – with a personal judgment, you can
attached any assets anywhere in the US to execute judgment)
 Quasi in rem is essentially in personam – same minimum contacts test
 Summary of Cases
o Pennoyer v. Neff – territorial jurisdiction – any state has power over people and property within
their state; no state has power over persons or property outside their borders
 With property, not much change since Pennoyer on jurisdiction. But some types of
property raise questions – intangible property (debts, bank accounts – debt follows
debter Harris), Shaffner v. Heitner – Internation Shoe applies to in rem/quasi in rem
suits
o International Shoe – if claim arises out of conduct this is sufficient for personal jurisdiction =
minimum contacts - If you purposely engage in activity in a state and it is not too unreasonable,
personal jurisdiction; long arm statutes – extends personal jurisdiction outside forum state when
claim arises out of conduct and must be fair/reasonable
o Generally, corporations are not people; citizens in state where they are incorporated and
considered present in the state where they have principle place of business
o Asahi – the claim did not arise out of their actions
o Anticipation that your product will end up somewhere should be sufficient (Brennan dissent in
Asahi); is it even necessary to decide minimum contacts because clearly too inconvenient
(Stevens dissent in Asahi)
o All this leaves lower courts in state of confusion, resort back to WWVW
o Henson v. Denkla & WWVW – cannot have a contact of an action of a third party
o J. McIntyre v. Nicastro – new guidance in 2011 but no majority opinion
 General – suit for any purpose
o physical presence, citizen/domiciliary, incorporated, principle place of business, consent
o Perkins is only Supreme Court case allowing general jurisdiction
o Helicopteros and Daimler are SCOTUS cases that do not allow general jurisdiction
 Specific – arising directly from activities in that state
o 1. Purposeful minimum contacts with forum state out of which claim arises 2. Fair/reasonable
and not inconvenient to defendant
o International Shoe, McGee, WWVW
 Individuals v. Corporations
Chart: Minimum Contacts

General Jurisdiction (pervasive contacts – continuous and systematic; “domicile”)
Specific Jurisdiction
Consistent & systematic No jurisdiction International Shoe
Infrequent & Isolated No jurisdiction McGee
Not arising of contacts Arising out of contacts
Chapter 2: Jurisdiction Over the Parties or Their Property

 Personal jurisdiction – power of a court to enter judgement against a person or a thing
o Affects where a lawsuit can be filed and entertained
o Court can assert jurisdiction if the exercise of power is authorized by statute and is consistent with Due
Process
A. The Tradition Bases for Jurisdiction
Pennoyer v. Neff (US Supreme Court 1877)
 Pennoyer – even though its been superseded still relevant to personal jurisdiction today
I. Parties
 Neff – Plaintiff –> Appellee
 Pennoyer – Defendant --> Appellant
III. Facts
 Suit 1 is Mitchell v. Neff – Mitchell was Neff’s attorney to help him get land in Oregon in 1866 valued
at $15,000 under Oregon Donation Law. Mitchell brought suit in Oregon state court against Neff to
recover $300 unpaid legal fees (breach of contract). Mitchell published notice of the lawsuit in an
Oregon newspaper but did not serve Neff personally. Neff failed to appear and a default judgment was
entered against him. Neff acquired land after beginning of this suit. To satisfy the judgment Mitchell
seized land owned by Neff so that it could be sold at a Sheriff’s auction. When the auction was held
Mitchell purchased it and later assigned it to Pennoyer.
 Suit 2 - Neff sued Pennoyer for ejectment (to throw Pennoyer off the land) in federal district court in
Oregon to recover possession of the property, claiming that the original judgment against him was
invalid for lack of personal jurisdiction over both him and the land. Pennoyer said he had a valid deed.
The court found that the judgment in the lawsuit between Mitchell and Pennoyer was invalid and that
Neff still owned the land. Pennoyer lost on appeal and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
o Writ of execution – to execute judgment through person’s property (land, bank account, jewelry,
etc) to satisfy judgment value
o Neff challenges personal jurisdiction of court in first case. This is allowed because he was
outside the jurisdiction then he can’t be bound by the judgment.
o Lower court wanted to throw out judgment against Neff because they said the newspaper article
was not sufficient. Supreme Court says no this was ok, but there was another problem
IV. Legal Issues
 Can a state court exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident who has not been personally served
while within the state and whose property within the state was not attached before the onset of
litigation?
V. Rule
 2 principles of public law (public law = international law) – States still retain some features of separate
nations – ex. borders, laws differ in some states such as drivers license, age of consent, etc.
o Other states can subject non-residents to their laws when in the state
o Borders matter because the constitution says congress can admit new states but cannot admit new
state out of the territory of another state without that states consent (borders are essentially
fixed); borders are equalizers (ie Senate)
 States have some independence
 First principle: every state possess exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory
 Second: no state can exercise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its
territory (exception – citizens of the state who are outside of the state)
VI. Conclusion and Reasoning
• Court affirmed (for Neff) – Oregon never had jurisdiction over Neff. A court may enter a judgment
against a non-resident only if the party 1) is personally served with process while within the state, or
2) has property within the state, and that property is attached before litigation begins (i.e. quasi in
rem jurisdiction).
o The Oregon court did not have personal jurisdiction over Neff because he was not served in Oregon.
The court’s judgment would have been valid if Mitchell had attached Neff’s land at the beginning of
the suit. Mitchell could not have done this because Neff did not own the land at the time Mitchell
initiated the suit. The default judgment was declared invalid. Therefore, the sheriff had no power to
auction the real estate and title never passed to Mitchell. Neff was the legal owner.
o Pennoyer – territorial jurisdiction; property not attached at beginning of suit, not a citizen
 Needed to attached it at beginning bc otherwise no property and nothing to adjudicate for in
rem/quasi in rem; ensures that it will be there (so it can’t be sold or transferred)
 Airspace counts as part of territory – Grace v. MacArthur (p. 84)
 State can exert jurisdiction over its out of state residents – Milliken v. Meyer (p. 84)
Assignment 3.The Expansion of Personal Jurisdiction Casebook: pg. 86-96
Chapter 2: Jurisdiction Over The Parties or Their Properties

B. Expanding the Bases of Personal Jurisdiction
 Kane v. New Jersey (1916) – US Supreme Court held that NJ could require out-of-state driver to file
formal instrument appointing a NJ agent to receive process as a condition of using the state’s highways
(could appoint someone to be served in your stead from that state)
Hess v. Pawloski (US Supreme Court, 1927)
I. Parties
 Pawloski - Plaintiff
 Hess - defendant
II. Procedural History
 Plaintiff in error appeared to contest jurisdiction, and made motion to dismiss on ground that if
sustained, would deprive him of his property without due process of law; supreme judicial court held
statute to be valid exercise of police power and affirmed order.
III. Facts
 Hess (D), a resident of Pennsylvania, negligently struck and injured Pawloski (P) while driving in
Massachusetts. Pawloski brought this action against Hess in Massachusetts. The court established
personal jurisdiction over Hess under a statute whereby non-resident motorists involved in accidents in
Massachusetts consented to the appointment of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles as the driver’s agent for
service of process. Process was served on the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (implied consent of
appointment set up by statute) as Hess’s agent and Hess received actual notice of the suit. Hess
contested jurisdiction. The trial court and the Supreme Judicial Court on appeal held that the court’s
jurisdiction was valid. Pawloski won the case on the merits in a jury trial. Hess appealed to the Supreme
Court on the grounds that the Massachusetts court did not have personal jurisdiction over him and the
method of service of process used violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
IV. Legal Issues
 Does Massachusetts enactment contravene due process clause of the 14th amendment?
 Was the Massachusetts law that stated that out of state drivers gave implied consent to the appointment
of the Registrar as agent for service of process constitutional?
V. Rule

 Affirmed. State has the power to legislate that non-residents who use its highways consent to the
appointment of a third party as agent for the service of process in that state for actions arising from use
of the highways.
o Can someone give prior notice that they do not consent to agent appointment? No, can’t opt out
of the law.
C. A New Theory of Jurisdiction
 Territorial theory of jurisdiction does not readily apply to corporations
 Theories of jurisdiction over corporations
o Consent – corporation could transact business in a state in which it was not incorporated only
with that state’s consent
o Presence – a corporation engaged in activity within a state established a presence there for
jurisdictional purposes
 Under both theories must establish whether the corporation was “doing business”
International Shoe Co. v. Washington (US Supreme Court, 1945)
I. Parties
 Washington State
 International Shoe Co. – appellant
o What is a corporation? “artificial person” in contemplation of law
 Special appearance – contest whether they should be there; object to jurisdiction
o Federal Rule 12b (federal special appearance rule) allows you motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction at beginning; lose right to contest jurisdiction if do not file at the beginning
o Doctrine of forum non-convenience – forum is not good for defendant
III. Facts
 Incorporated in DE, office in Missouri. Some salespeople in Washington. Showing shoes to take request
for order – only have one of each shoes (no pair). Customer makes an offer to buy the shoes. In St. Louis
offer is accepted (ie they mail shoes). Washington has unemployment compensation law. Serve
salesperson and mail copy to St. Louis.
IV. Legal Issues
 Whether, within the limits of due process, the appellant (a Delaware corporation) has by its activities in
the state of Washington rendered itself amenable to proceedings in the courts of that state to recover
unpaid contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund exacted by statutes
 Whether the state can exact those contributions consistently with the due process clause of the 14th
amendment
V. Rules
 New test: Minimum Contact between person/corporation and state
 Affirmed. State has power to lay tax and subject appellant to suit to recover it. ISC came into state to do
business, and now that they are in that state they have to be responsible including unemployment tax
because they have employees there
VII. Notes and Questions
1) Why, based on Pennoyer, is it important to serve International Shoe within the state? “court may enter a
judgment against a non-resident only if the party 1) is personally served with process while within the
state, or 2) has property within the state, and that property is attached before litigation begins (i.e. quasi
in rem jurisdiction).”
 With corporation, harder to know where they are compared to people. Difficult to apply Pennoyer
to corporations. Technically, corporations only exist in the state where they are incorporated (old
thinking). It’s not really presence, it’s really whether they have enough contacts with the
forum state – look at activities and whether case arises from those contacts
 here, activities were systematic and continuous; large volume of interstate business; regularly in
Washington with the shoes (3 yr presence)
 Can Int’l shoe be sued for any reason? No. Must arise from connection of contacts to lawsuit to
justify jurisdiction. Here, lawsuit arises from their activity in the state. Territorial connection
present but expanded – here they can tax within their territory.
Personal Jurisdiction
 Specific personal jurisdiction – only jurisdiction over action that was committed – contacts with forum state
are the basis for the lawsuit
 General jurisdiction – person or company has so many contacts with the state, you can sue it for claims not
related to contacts in the state (analogous to presence in the state for individuals)
o Companies like microsoft can be sued under general jurisdiction
 International Shoe extends jurisdiction from Pennoyer
o First full paragraph p. 93
 Statutes after International Shoe take advantage of long-arm of the law
o Some statutes are specific and others are super broad
o Due process – must have authority and the authority must be constitutional
o Long arm statutes – may have less personal jurisdiction than due process would allow to prevent
overburdening of the judicial systems; some states may try to exercise more jurisdiction that DP allows
(ie if you make a lot of money in our state someone can sue you for something that happened in another
state – this is unconstitutional)
Assignment 4. Purposeful Availment and Foreseeability. Casebook 97, 103-20; Walden v. Fiore, S. 410-13
Chapter 2: Jurisdiction Over the Parties or Their Property

D. Specific Jurisdiction and State Long-Arm Laws
1. The Development of Long-Arm Laws
 Long-Arm/Single-Act Statutes – authorize the exercise of power over non-residents who cannot be
found and served in the forum
o Emphasis on contacts with forum state (ie. International Shoe) encouraged states to expand
jurisdictional reach
2. Due Process and Long-Arm Statutes
 After a court has established that a statute authorizes exercise of power, it then must assess whether its
exercise is consistent with the Due Process clause of the Constitution
McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. (1957)
I. Parties
 McGee – Plaintiff
 International Life Insurance Co. - Defendant
 CA court made judgment in favor of Plaintiff
III. Facts
 Franklin (deceased, CA resident) had insurance policy of which McGee was the beneficiary. Franklin
and ILIC (in Arizona) corresponded via mail. When he passed away, ILIC refused to pay. They did
not appear to have any other office or agent in CA and had not solicited business there other than
policy with Franklin. McGee sued ILIC in CA state court under Unauthorized Insurer’s Process Act,
which subjects foreign corporations to suit on insurance contracts with in-state residents. McGee tried
to enforce the judgment in her favor in Texas. Texas court refused to enforce, holding it void under
14th amendment on grounds CA court could not assume jurisdiction without service of process within
its boundaries.
o Life insurance policies – if you die, money is distributed to beneficiaries (3rd party
beneficiary contract)
IV. Legal Issue
 Did CA have personal jurisdiction? If so, was their exercise of jurisdiction consistent with due
process?
V. Rule
 14th Amend - Due Process clause – “…nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws”
 Supreme Court held that the exercise of jurisdiction by CA was proper
o State has right to defend its citizen’s contracts
o It was sufficient that the suit was based on a contract which had substantial connection with
that state; CA has manifest interest in providing effective means of redress for its residents
when insurers refuse to pay claims
Hanson v. Denckla (1958)
I. Parties
 Florida court ruled it had jurisdiction over the trustee (Delaware bank), concluded the trust was
invalid, held that the power of appointment was ineffective to pass title, and held that property
would pass as in the will
III. Facts
 Dora Donner, a PA resident, established a trust in DE naming a DE bank as a trustee. During her
lifetime, income from the trust would go to her and upon her death the remainder would pass to
whomever she had appointed as beneficiaries. She retained the power to change the appointed
beneficiaries at any time. Later she moved for FL. In her will, she left most of her estate to two
daughters, Katherine and Dorothy. On the same day she signed her will, she made two of her
grandchildren beneficiaries of the trust.
 1st suit: Daughters Katherine and Dorothy argued appointment of their sister’s children as
beneficiaries of the trust was ineffective. The defendants argued the case could not go forward
because FL had no jurisdiction over the DE trustee.
 2nd suit: Before FL rendered their decision, Elizabeth (3rd daughter of deceased) brought action in
DE, as executor of the estate to determine who was entitled to share the trust assets. Delaware court
held the trust and exercise of the power of appointment valid under DE law.
o Trusts – bank account – legal arrangement whereby you transfer the legal title to property to
someone else with instructions that they have to use the property for the benefit of the
beneficiary. Legal title goes to the trust, the trustee has a fiduciary duty to use the money
properly.
IV. Legal Issue
 Who had jurisdiction to make a ruling?
V. Rule
 Because DE trustee’s contacts with FL had been less than minimal, FL could not assert personal
jurisdiction over it, and therefore DE was justified in refusing to give full faith and credit to the FL
decree. Since FL didn’t have jurisdiction, they did not have jurisdiction over an indispensable party
(trustee) and could not make a ruling without this.
o Trustee is indispensable party; had to bring suit against the person with the money; without
personal jurisdiction over him he can’t be bound to the judgment (FL had no personal
jurisdiction)
 In McGee, insurance company purposefully entered a contract with a CA resident;
here, the trustee in DE did not intentionally enter into business with her in FL but
rather in PA (trusts are permanent – once title is transferred it’s done)
o Dissent – FL has considerable connection as Ms. Donner resided there 8 years and kept in
contact with trustee. Additionally, as she passed in FL and the place where the individual
lived at time of death is place to determine validity of will and distribute the property they
had a serious interest in what property would be distributed under the will.
 This doesn’t matter because the defendant had to purposefully avail himself of the
laws of FL, not decedent.
World Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson (US Supreme Court, 1980)
I. Parties
 Supreme Court took certiorari to review case
 OK state and appellate court found for plaintiffs again car company
III. Facts
 Robinsons purchased Audi from local NY dealer where they lived in 1976, moving to AZ, had
accident on way to AZ in OK. Claim design defect b/c car blew up. Sue designer Audi Int’l
(Germany), importer (VW of American; Germany) – these two don’t contest personal jurisdiction;
regional tri-state distributor (WWVW; NY, CT, NJ), dealer in NY (Seaway; NY) – local so contest
personal jurisdiction. Sue in OK bc that’s where the accident was, some family members in OK
hospital and may have needed $ from medical bills, state court was known to be friendly to
plaintiffs, witnesses to the crash. Why did they include distributor and dealer? The designer and
importer have all the money. But, because the family is from NY they are still citizens of NY when
they sue. Because there are NY on both sides of the suit, the case cannot be removed to federal
court b/c not complete diversity of jurisdiction and they wanted state court so that’s good for the
Robinsons.
o Joint and separate liability – all are liable to pay the full judgment together (in some form –
ex. Audi could pay all 1million; or each could pay 250 thousand)
o Indemnification – can try to get money back from other defendant’s
 State trial judge (Woodson) – in order to challenge jurisdictional rule immediately the WWVW had
to seek writ of prohibition to prohibit judge from proceeding. Writ of prohibition is kind of like
suing the judge.
IV. Legal Issue
 Personal Jurisdiction
V. Rule
 Reversed. WWVW/Seaway not under jurisdiction of OK state. No minimum contact between
Oklahoma and the car company; foreseeability is not a sufficient benchmark for personal
jurisdiction under due process – requires reasonable anticipation of being haled to a court in X state.
Did not purposefully (knowingly/intentionally) avail themselves of OK – no conduct directed at the
forum state (ie no effort to sell cars to people in OK). This has taken the place of “presence” to
some extent. Bad precedent – makes jurisdiction to wide – goods becomes minimum contact. Want
predictability of jurisdiction for the states.
o Due process requires 1. minimum contacts in sense of purposeful contacts and claim arises
out of those contacts and 2. it cannot be too inconvenient
o Dissent – the Court’s opinion gives too little weight to the strength of the forum State’s
interest in the case and fail to explore whether there would be any inconvenience to the
defendant; should be foreseeable bc that’s the point of cars (to drive elsewhere)
 Note 3. In Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Keeton brought a libel (false statement written/slander
when spoken; must be published towards a 3rd person) suit in New Hampshire federal court. She
had one “connection” to NH, and argued Hustler also connected bc it sold magazines there.
Supreme Court reversed lower court decisions that there was no jurisdiction. The issue of minimum
contacts is important here, regardless of whether the magazine had an independent distributor.
 Note 4. Kulko v. Superior Court – man let his daughter live in CA with ex-wife. Wife sent the son
a plane ticket also without his knowledge. Supreme Court ruled that minimum contacts test in
domestic context was misplaced. Mom sued for increased child support. Is there personal
jurisdiction? No, should not apply commercial rules to family law – daughter is a person who made
a decision.
 Note 5. Calder v. Jones – Supreme Court ruled 1st amendment rights were not relevant to
determining jurisdiction
Civil Procedure Supplement

Recent Supreme Court Cases
Walden v. Fiore (US Supreme Court, 2014)
I. Parties
 Fiore, Gibson – plaintiffs - appellees
 Walden – defendant - appellants
 Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant in US District Court in Nevada, seeking damages; allege 4th
amendment rights were violated
 Federal court held that they did not have jurisdiction – granted motion to dismiss
 Appellate court held that Nevada did have jurisdiction
III. Facts
 Plaintiffs were professional gamblers. Had connecting flight home from San Juan in Atlanta. In Atlanta
they were searched and questioned, and after a drug sniff test, DEA seized $97,000 in cash. Petitioners
sue police officer in Nevada.
IV. Legal Issue
 Does Nevada have personal jurisdiction over defendant in this case?
V. Rule
 Due process – new test - Purposeful availment for min contacts and inconvenience to defendant
 Reversed. Supreme Court unanimously held that Nevada does not have personal jurisdiction over
defendant.
o Minumum contact – relationship must arise out of contacts the defendant creates in forum state
(protect liberty of nonresident defendant – WorldWide Volkswagon Corp.). Demonstrating
contacts between the plaintiff and forum state are not enough. Relationship also defined with
state not with person’s who reside there. Plaintiff cannot be only link between defendant and the
state. Relationship must be determined by defendant’s contacts with the state itself. Did not
purposefully target Nevada, would have confiscated the $ no matter where they were going. (this
is a pretty strict ruling)
Assignment 5. Inconvenience to the Defendant. Casebook 120-132
Chapter 2. Jurisdiction Over Parties or Their Property

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (US Supreme Court, 1985)
I. Parties
 Burger King - plaintiff
 John Rudzewicz & Brian MacShara – defendant
 FL District Court rejected jurisdictional arguments by defendants and entered judgment against them
 Appeals court reversed, holding jurisdiction breaches due process
III. Facts
 Suit between Michigan based franchisee for breach of franchise (right to use someone’s brand)
agreement with Burger King, a Florida company. Contracts provided that relationship was established in
Miami and governed by Florida law and called for payment of all monthly feed and forwarding of
notices to the Miami headquarters. Defendant from Michigan entered into franchise agreement to
operate restaurant in Michigan but fell behind in monthly payments. Burger King sued in Florida federal
court.
o They want to move jurisdiction to Michigan because their local people will be jurors; in FL
jurors may be biased towards Burger King because of the revenue in the area
o Choice of law – laws of other states can be applied or other countries (so if held in Michigan, FL
law could still apply)
IV. Legal Issue
 Did the Florida court have personal jurisdiction over defendant?
V. Rule
 Florida Statute – authorizes jurisdiction over any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of the state,
who breaches a contract in the state by failing to perform acts that the contract requires to be performed
there.
 Supreme Court reversed. Contract can count as contact for jurisdictional purposes – because the contract
can have substantial connection with the state – signed agreement with FL corporation and so can be
sued in that state. They have negotiation of contract, signed contract, and performed under contract
(“contract +” in Brennan’s opinion)
o Why focus on negotiation? BK doesn’t really negotiate – unequal bargaining power so worried
about the consumer
o Why contract +? Intentionally entered the contract. Maybe concerned about small consumers
ordering things and then being sued by a company in another state and then having default
judgment entered.
o Dissent – unfair to make the franchisee defend a case in a forum chosen by the franchisor
 “contract plus” analysis – all communications and transactions between parties, before, during and after
the consummation of the contract, to determine the degree and type of contacts the defendant has with
the forum apart from the contract alone
o Does it affect McGee? No because in addition to the “contract” for insurance, they had
correspondence that the court ruled was the “plus” in that case.
 The inclusion of the choice of law legislation in the contract is important because it helps establish that
the franchisee was aware that they could be brought to trial in Florida and established interest by
Florida.
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court (US Supreme Court, 1987)
I. Parties
 Zurcher – plaintiff
 Cheng Shin (Taiwan) – defendant/cross-claim against Asahi [indemnification – if CS held responsible,
want Asahi to pay them for equivalent of settlement with Zurcher]
 Asahi (Japan) - defendant
 CA Superior Court denied motion to quash summons (Asahi loses)
 CA Court of Appeal issues peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Superior Court to quash
service of summons (Asahi wins)
 CA Supreme Court reversed and discharged the write issued by the Court of Appeal (Asahi loses)
III. Facts
 Gary Zurcher and his wife (deceased from accident) injured when his bike crashed. He claimed the
accident was caused by a sudden loss of air and an explosion in the rear tire of the motorcycle, and
alleged that the tire, tube, and sealant were defective. He named Cheng Shin Rubber Industries, who
filed a cross-complaint seeking indemnification from codefendant and petitioner here, Asahi Metal
Industry Co. (makes the tube’s valves). All other claims were settled and dismissed, leaving Cheng
Shin’s indemnity action against Asahi. Case in CA, so Asahi says no personal jurisdiction.
IV. Legal Issue
 Does mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant that the component it manufactured, sold, and
delivered outside the US would reach the forum state in the stream of commerce constitutes “minimum
contacts” between the defendant and the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice?
V. Rule
 Stream of commerce
 Due Process
 No other case by SCOTUS has never let any defendant off the hook on inconvenience of forum in any
other case.
 Supreme Court reversed and remanded (Asahi wins). Very inconvenient forum, CA has no interest in
deciding this case. Minimum contact must be based on an act of the defendant (World Wide VW).
Substantial connection between defendant and forum state necessary for a finding of minimum contacts
must come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum state. Awareness
of stream of commerce is not sufficient. Therefore exertion of personal jurisdiction exceeds limits of due
process.
o Also, may be afraid to offend Japanese government. Constitutionally, we have federalist
concerns about state to state jurisdiction. But here the issue is CA encroaches on sovereignty of
another nation which is much worse. Foreign policy is the job of the executive branch.
 P. 129 should be harder to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign companies
o Determination of reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction depends on several factors: burden on
defendant, interests of forum state, plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief, and interstate judicial
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, shared interest in
furthering fundamental social policies
 Lower courts should follow section II-B as it is an opinion; lower courts should take the narrowest view
in issues that are not “opinions” but still give “guidance”. Given the disagreement, the court’s decision
will stand as the law, while the other opinions can be used persuasively in other contexts.
Assignment 6. The Stream of Commerce Problem. Casebook 133-150
Chapter 2. Jurisdiction Over Parties or Property

J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro (US Supreme Court, 2011)
I. Parties
 Nicastro – plaintiff, appellee, respondent
 J. McIntyre – defendant, appellant, petitioner
 NJ Supreme Court ruled that NJ had jurisdiction over J. McIntyre
 Supreme Court delivers opinion of the court – but only 4 agreed so it’s just the judgment not technically
opinion of the court (judgment - 6-3 no personal jurisdiction)
III. Facts
 Nicastro was injured using a metal-shearing machine made by J. McIntyre (England) and filed products-
liability suit. McIntyre has independent distributor, McIntyre Machinery America, Ltd. with separate
management and ownership.
o Independent contractor is a separate company
IV. Legal Issue
 Does NJ have personal jurisdiction over this foreign company in this case?
 Stream of commerce problem – specific jurisdiction
V. Rule
 Due Process
 Precedent of Asahi
 Reversed.
o On minimum contact – an independent company sold the machine to the US, no J. Mc officials ever
came to NJ, only 4 machines ended up in NJ
o Imprecision in Asahi stems from statement that related jurisdiction and the “stream of
commerce”- this meant simply that in some cases the defendant may be subject to
jurisdiction without entering the forum. Principle inquiry here is whether defendant’s
activities manifest intent to submit to power of the sovereign. In Asahi, discarded concept
of sovereign authority for considerations of fairness and foreseeability. Reject the latter in
favor of former test (actions of defendant)
 Personal jurisdiction requires analysis for each case; defendant may be subject to
jurisdiction in US but not to a particular state.
 Petitioner’s contact with NJ, not the US, are relevant here bc NJ is exercising jurisdiction
 Respondent has not established J. Mc engaged purposefully with NJ
 Due process supersedes all other tests/rules
o Kennedy (plurality) – Asahi was confusing. O’Conner was correct, Brennan was wrong.
Purposeful activity in US does not subject to jurisdiction in all states – must direct action towards
the particular state. Did not purposely avail themselves of NJ.
o Breyer (concurring) – case by case analysis; reluctant to opine on questions not really presented in
the case – here there are no forum contacts so why delve further into the issue
o Nicastro failed to show there was NJ jurisdiction and this could be figured out based just
on SCOTUS precedent
o NJ notion that globalization has removed borders of trade would allow every state to
establish personal jurisdiction in any products-liability suit
 Dissent - Ginsberg
o Marketed products “throughout US” – then you purposely avail yourself of the whole
market, intended to sell products in all states
o When industrial accidents happen, statutes typically permits long arm of the law to assert
jurisdiction
o In WWVW the court said that had the foreign manufacturer of the car objected to OK
jurisdiction, the court would have affirmed jurisdiction – “reasonable to subject [foreign
manufacturer] to suit in any one of those states if its allegedly defective product has been
the source of injury”
 Why does state always have jurisdiction over people who live there? Citizenship.
 Corporations are artificial people for purposes of law – “citizens” of state where they are incorporated
(general jurisdiction in that state) and principal place of business (HQ – corporate HQ where officers
and directors are or place with most activity; general jurisdiction in that state)
Assignment 7. General Jurisdiction. Casebook 150-158; Supplement 395-404.
Civil Procedure Cases and Materials

Chapter 2. Jurisdiction Over Parties or Property
Section E. General Jurisdiction and State Long-Arm Laws
 General Jurisdiction – power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when jurisdiction is based on
relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum and person(s) whose legal rights are to be affected
 Specific Jurisdiction – power to adjudicate issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy
that establishes jurisdiction
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown (US Supreme Court, 2011)
I. Parties
 Brown & Helms - Plaintiffs – Appellees
 Goodyear USA (does not contest personal jurisdiction – not part of this) – Defendant
 Goodyear Luxembourg Tires, SA, Goodyear Lastikleri TAS, & Goodyear Dunlop Tires France SA –
Defendants – Appellants
 North Carolina State Trial Court – denied motion to dismiss on lack of personal jurisdiction
 North Carolina Appellate Court - Affirmed
III. Facts
 Two teen boys, Brown and Helms, were killed in France when a bus overturned outside Paris due to a
faulty tire. Parents brought suit for wrongful death, alleging negligence in the design, construction,
testing, and inspection of the tires.
 Defendants allege the type of tire in the accident is not distributed in North Carolina, and only a small
percentage of their tires end up there. They are not registered to business in NC.
IV. Legal Issue
 No specific jurisdiction – bus in France, no reason to foresee being sued in the US
 Are foreign subsidiaries of a US parent corporation amenable to suit in state court on claims unrelated to
any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum state? (ie subject to general jurisdiction)
V. Rule
 International Shoe – general jurisdiction requires continuous and substantial activity of a corporation in
the forum state in order to bring a cause of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those
activities
o Examples: see Perkins and Helicopteros
 Reversed. Did not established “continuous and systematic” affiliation necessary to empower courts with
general jurisdiction.
o “Flow of commerce” can bolster affiliation related to specific jurisdiction, but cannot determine
based on those ties that the forum has general jurisdiction (see World-Wide Volkswagon –“every
seller of chattels does not by virtue of the sale, ‘appoint the chattel his agent for service of
process’.”) – stream of commerce only relevant when claim arises out of the contact, in general
jurisdiction there must be so many contacts that stream of commerce is not relevant.
 Note 5. Goodyear did not resolve whether general jurisdiction could be exercised over a foreign
corporation based on the fact that a corporate subsidiary performs services or sells goods in the foreign
state.
Daimler AG v. Bauman (SCOTUS 2014) – in supplement
 Claim that during argentinian war (76-83) mercedes benz (MB) collaborated with argentina state
security to kill MB Argentina employees, suing german parent company, Daimler, in California on basis
of general jurisdiction. Mercedes US is a distributor that operates throughout US.
o Even assuming that you can attribute MB USA’s contacts to the parent company, Daimler
(Germany), Daimler not “at home” in US. General jurisdiction is in Germany, not USA.
o If accept jurisdiction, would cause friction with other countries (ie Germany) – this is like Asahi
 Alien Tort Statute – gives federal courts jurisdiction over torts committed by US citizens
over friendly aliens in the US
o Sotomayor – writes concurrence, thinks there is general jurisdiction but would be unreasonable
(like in Asahi) for CA to assert general jurisdiction because there are foreign plaintiffs suing a
foreign defendant.
 This seems strange – saying they are at home in CA but it’s unreasonable to sue them
there
 Ginsberg, in footnote, responds – general jurisdiction does not focus on in-state contacts
or reasonableness, calls for an appraisal of corp’s activities in their entirety
Assignment 8. Technology and Personal Jurisdiction. Casebook 158-165
Chapter 2. Jurisdiction of Parties or Property

Section F. Internet and Other Technological Contacts
 How do virtual contacts impact jurisdictional doctrine?
 Same rules of personal jurisdiction also apply to the internet
Community Trust Bancorp, Inc. v. Community Trust Financial Corp. (US District Court, District of
Kentucky, 2011)
I. Parties
 Community Trust Bancorp – Plaintiff (Kentucky)
 Community Trust Financial Corp and subsidiaries Community Trust Bank and Community Trust Bank
of Texas – Defendants (Texas and Louisiana)
 Federal Trial Court – Defendants filed motion to dismiss on lack of jurisdiction
III. Facts
 Plaintiff uses “COMMUNITY TRUST” on their webpage (ctbi.com); defendants use “COMMUNITY
TRUST” and “COMMUNITY TRUST BANK” on their page (ctbonlinecom). Plaintiff asserts that the
use of “COMMUNITY TRUST” mark by defendants is likely to confuse consumers into believing
plaintiff is the operator of the defendant’s website or that they are somehow affiliated with their
services. Brought claim of trademark infringement. Texas bank had 4-6 customers who opened accounts
in TX and moved to KY and opened online account to access existing account.
IV. Legal Issue
 Are defendants subject to personal, specific jurisdiction in Kentucky based on their provision of banking
services to Kentucky residents?
V. Rules
 Criteria for specific jurisdiction (Southern Mach., 1968)
o Defendant must purposely avail himself of privilege of acting the forum state
o Cause of action must arise from defendant’s activities in forum state
o Acts of defendant or consequences caused must have substantial enough connection with forum
state to make exercise of jurisdiction reasonable
 Kentucky has jurisdiction. But then 6th circuit reverses (see note 1 below).
o Defendant purposely availed themselves – took actions in Kentucky that created “substantial
connection” with the state; defendant made contract with Kentucky residents
 Zippo (1997) – sliding scale - websites can establish jurisdiction if defendant purposely
avails itself of the privilege of acting in a state through its website if the website is
interactive to a degree that reveals specifically intended interaction with residents of the
state” – here, they provided passwords to Kentucky residents for access of accounts
thereby creating continuing relationship and obligations with Kentucky residents (Burger
King)
 Passive website – least good contact
 Websites that enter into contracts with residents of the forum state that involve
knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the internet – best
contact
o Action arises from defendant’s activities in Kentucky – substantial connection through providing
online banking services to Kentucky residents through their website
o Reasonable exercise of jurisdiction
 Reasonableness: burden on defendant, interest of the forum state, plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining relief, and interest of other states in securing the most efficient resolution of
controversies – here, although burden greater if defending in Kentucky, the state has
legitimate interest in protecting business interest of its citizens. Plaintiff obviously has
interest in obtaining relief and even though states where bank branches are located have
an interest, jurisdiction by Kentucky is not unreasonable.
 Note 1. 6th circuit overruled this judgment – no substantial connection between three or four Kentucky
residents accessing online banking and underlying trademark infringement claim so claim cannot arise
out of the contacts (hence no specific jurisdiction). No one signed up to TX bank accidentally instead of
KY bank, because it’s not possible - it has to be opened up in a branch in person in TX.
o If a customer had actually been confused and signed up for the wrong bank, there is potential for
specific jurisdiction in that case
 Note 3. Case BE2 LLC v. Ivanov (2011)– online dating service brought action in Ill. Against NJ
businessman, alleging trademark infringement. Insufficient evidence that 20 Ill. Residents using
defendant’s website availed him of privilege of doing business in the state.
 Note 4. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Tech, Inc. (2011) – FL photo company brought claim of copyright
infringement in CA against OH company for posting plaintiff’s photos on website that had substantial
viewership in CA. Court found purposeful availment because defendant had caused harm knowing it
would be suffered in CA.
 Hypo – what if HuffPost, exclusively online, posts a defamatory article? National Inquirer can be sued
in CA for defamation. Does the server know where its readers are? Specific jurisdiction – minimum
contacts purposeful directed towards forum state (purposeful availment) and claim arising from
activities (contacts) in state. Did they purposely send it to CA? If so, defamation claim arises out of
distribution in CA. What if you post something and your friend tweets it and it goes viral? Should test
apply here?
Assignment 9. Jurisdiction Over Property. Casebook 165-180.

Chapter 2. Jurisdiction of Parties or Property
 Real property – immovable and tangible
 Intangible property – bank account, stocks, intellectual property
 When you put money in the bank you are the creditor and the bank is the debtor
G. Jurisdiction Based Upon Power Over Property
 Pennoyer (see above) – territorial jurisdiction
 Pennington v. Fourth National Bank (SCOTUS 1971) – Pennington challenged garnishment of bank
account to pay alimony – in rem applies to real property and intangible property; he did not live in the
forum State but court held attachment his in-state bank account did not violate due process. 14th
amendment does not abridge jurisdiction of states over property within its borders regardless of
residence or presence of the owner.
 Harris v. Balk (SCOTUS 1905) – Harris owed Balk $180 (both from NC), and Balk owed Epstein $344
(latter from MD). 1st suit (MD) – Epstein attaches debt Harris owes to Balk. On August 6, 1896, Harris
was in Baltimore and Epstein instituted a garnishee proceeding in a MD court, attaching the debt Harris
owed Balk. Harris consented to entry of judgment and paid Epstein $180. 2nd suit (NC) - On August 11,
1896, Balk brought action against Harris in NC, Harris said he no longer owed balk the $180 and that
the MD judgment and his payment thereof is entitled to full faith and credit. Trial court ruled for Balk
and appellate court affirmed. SCOTUS reversed. Being served in personam confers jurisdiction on the
state where service is issued and jurisdiction over his debt (debt follows the debtor). Also have to give
notice to Balk about first suit – which they did.
Shaffer v. Heitner (SCOTUS 1977)
I. Parties
 Heitner – plaintiff – appellee
 Greyhound, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and 28 (only the 21 with stocks actually in suit) present or
former officers or directors – defendants - appellants
 Heitner filed shareholder’s derivative suit (suing as the company against the managers/directors;
equitable action) and a motion for order of sequestration of the Delaware property of the individual
defendants
o Limited appearance – for quasi in rem, can appear and only be limited to the amount
presently contested but nothing greater – but in DE no limited appearance at that time
o So officers say not fair, they shouldn’t have personal jurisdiction over us
o Shareholder derivative claim for misconduct is unrelated to the suit; quasi in rem unrelated to
the property
 Court of Chancery ruled for Heitner, Delaware Supreme Court affirmed
 Appellants claim ex parte sequestration procedure did not accord them due process and property
seized was not capable of attaching.
III. Facts
 Heitner filed suit following Greyhound’s loss of antitrust judgment. Greyhound is incorporated in
Delaware and principal business is in Phoenix, AZ. Pursuant to sequestration order, 82,000 shares of
Greyhound common stock were seized (stock considered to be in DE and subject to seizure).
IV. Legal Issue
 Did Delaware have jurisdiction over defendant’s and their property?
o Should the standard of minimum contacts from International Shoe be held to govern quasi in
rem actions in addition to in personam?
 Why didn’t they try to get personal jurisdiction? DE didn’t have a long-arm statute
 Constitutionality of DE statute for quasi in rem jurisdiction over property
V. Rule
VI. Decision and Reasoning
 Reversed. Holding – minimum contacts should apply to (quasi) in rem in addition to in personam.
As applied to the facts of this case, rule they do not meet International Shoe test.
o Post international shoe, suing for something unrelated to property. Legal fiction – suing the
property, but really suing the owners of the property and no limited appearance. This forces
them to appear in personam anyway, so basically the same thing.
o Why would you want to sue quasi in rem? Want in personam because can collect full value
of suit, while quasi in rem can only collect up to value of property which might not be full
amount. One reason is if property is worth more than suing for, easy way to get relief.
Another is that in rem can attach assets at the beginning and they can’t be moved. In
personam, they can move their funds and you have to track it down. Quasi in rem used to be
substitute for in personam, but with this standard makes it so you have to have some proof as
in in personam.
 No limited appearance in DE. Defendants can either 1. appear to defend property
rights they are subject to general jurisdiction (and then can enforce judgment
anywhere in country for any assets they have) or 2. forfeit the property. Greater
potential for recovery either way.
o Marshall delivered opinion - Holding – minimum contacts should apply to (quasi) in rem in
addition to in personam. If you’re claiming you own property, then you have minimum
contacts.
 Quasi in rem jurisdiction based on attachment or seizure of property present in the
jurisdiction but not related to claim. In rem applies to property that is the object of the
suit.
 Ex. quiet title cases – this case doesn’t affect in rem because anyone who
claims interest in real property, that is their contact with the state – claim
arising out of “who owns the property”
 Given minimum contacts standard, did Delaware have jurisdiction? No. Delaware
statute bases jurisdiction on the presence of property in the state and is therefore
unconstitutional under this standard. Defendant’s had nothing to do with DE, and DE
does not have a statute that treats directorship as consent to jurisdiction.
o Powell, concurring – reserve judgment on whether ownership of some forms of property in a
state may provide necessary contacts, particularly regarding real property
 Concern over the 2 prong test of international shoe having to be applied to true in
rem proceedings
 This case doesn’t address the fair/reasonableness part of the International
Shoe test
o Brennan – concurring in part and dissenting in part – Join I-III, dissent IV.
 Concerns: 1) inquiry into minimum contacts depends on details of contacts between
forum state and controversy in question. Here, no such factual inquiry was made. 2)
this ruling will affect jurisdiction in all states, and would normally caution against
over-reaching
 Believes states has jurisdiction to adjudicate action centering on conduct and policies
of the directors and officers of a corporation chartered by that state – because
company is incorporated in DE, the officers of the company has contacts with DE,
and should know they are attached to this.
 Public policies furthered by assertion of jurisdiction: 1) state has substantial
interest in providing restitution for its local corporations that have allegedly
been victimized by fiduciary misconduct, even if the decisions occurred
outside the state. 2) state courts have legitimately read their jurisdiction
expansively when a cause of action centers in an area in which the forum state
possesses a manifest regulatory interest. 3) states have recognized interest in
affording convenient forum for supervising and overseeing the affairs of an
entity that is purely the creation of that state’s law
o Note 1. DE changed statute to provide than non-resident officer or director of DE
incorporated company is deemed to consent to jurisdiction.
 Jurisdiction by consent (not International Shoe minimum contacts)
 With stream of commerce you have to intentionally direct your conduct to the forum state, if you’re
officer and cause damages outside forum state, the corporation in the forum state will be harmed.
Assignment 10. Transitory Jurisdiction. Casebook 180-191
Chapter 2. Jurisdiction Over Parties and Property

H. Transient Presence in the Forum
Burnham v. Superior Court (SCOTUS 1990)
I. Parties
 Defendant (Mr. Burnham) made special appearance in CA moving to squash service of process on
ground that court lacked personal jurisdiction because his only contacts with CA were a few short trips
there. Court and appellate court denied.
 How did this case get to SCOTUS?
o After Shaffer, some people thought you should apply minimum contacts to in personam
jurisdiction when served in the state (bc Shaffer on 173 says apply International Shoe to “all
assertions” of personal jurisdiction – but in International Shoe it is specifically for non-present
defendants – “if not present and served in state”)
III. Facts
 Burnhams got divorced and she moved to CA with the kids. They agreed to divorce on grounds of
irreconcilable differences. He filed for divorce in NJ on grounds of desertion, but she was not served.
She filed for divorce in CA. In January 1988, he was in CA for a work trip and to visit his kids. While
there he was served with a CA court summons and divorce petition.
IV. Legal Issue
 Whether due process denies CA courts with jurisdiction over a non-resident who was personally served
with process while temporarily in the state, in a suit unrelated to his activities in the state.
V. Rule
 General Jurisdiction - in personam jurisdiction applies to people served in the state
 Affirmed. Scalia judgment of court - Traditionally, service in person is sufficient to establish
jurisdiction. State did not need to establish continuous and systematic contacts with the forum and
therefore nonresident can be subject to judgment in matters arising not only from contacts.
o International Shoe applied to absent defendants.
o Shaffer said that quasi in rem and in personam should be considered the same
o Scalia on Brennan’s concurrence – suggested standard of “contemporary notions of due process”
is too subjective; Brennan’s discussion of defendant voluntarily present has reasonable
expectation he is subject to suit there is just idea of tradition masked as fairness
o Brennan, concurring – takes independent inquiry of state in-service rule. Rules of jurisdiction
must satisfy contemporary notions of due process. History is relevant in that American courts
have announced that being voluntarily present in a state is notice that he is subject to suit in the
forum. By visiting the forum state, a transient defendant avails himself of the benefits of that
state and is therefore subject to its laws.
 Brennan earlier (WWVW?) said he thinks it should only be issue of fairness, minimum
contacts don’t matter. But minimum contacts doesn’t apply here b/c he has no contacts
with the state other than being there, and being there is general jurisdiction not specific.
 Argument here is over the process, not the conclusion. Traditional v. contemporary
o Stevens, concurring – Did not join court opinion in Shaffer because of concern it was
unnecessarily broad and believes that this is also broad. Precedent and common sense and
fairness make this an easy case.
Assignment 11. Consent, Personal Jurisdiction in Federal Court, Challenging Personal Jurisdiction. Casebook
191-200.
Chapter 2. Jurisdiction over Parties or Property

I. Another Basis of Jurisdiction: Consent
1. Consent by Appearance in Court
 Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie Des Bauxites de Guinee (SCOTUS 1982) – Plaintiff
CBG, defendant ICI. CBG is incorporated in DE but does business only in Guinea. CBG purchased
business-interruption insurance from domestic insurer in PA and foreign insurance co.’s through London
brokerage. Mechanical failure forced halt in production, CBG filed claim that insurers refused to pay so
CBG filed suit in PA. The companies failed to comply with court orders and imposed sanction
consisting of a presumptive finding that the insurers were subject to its jurisdiction because of business
contacts in PA. SCOTUS affirmed: By submitting to jurisdiction of the court for purpose of challenging
jurisdiction, defendants agreed to abide by court’s determination on jurisdiction. Defendant’s failure to
supply requested information about their contacts to PA court supports “the presumption that the refusal
to produce evidence… was an admission” of sufficient contacts by defendant.
o Defendant may waive objections to a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction, may forfeit
opportunity to raise objections to jurisdiction, or may be estopped from raising the issue
2. Consent by Registration in State
 Most states have statutes that require foreign corporations to register as a condition of doing business in
the forum state – not sufficient for general jurisdiction
o Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories (4th Cir. 1971) – held that a foreign corporation that regularly sent
salesmen into SC was not amenable to suit in that state even though it had filed an application
and been given authority to do business in the state and had appointed an in-state agent for
service of process. “Applying for the privilege of doing business is one thing, but the actual
exercise of that privilege is quite another. The principles of due process require a firmer
foundation that mere compliance with state domestication statutes.”
3. Consent by Contract
 Defendant may consent to jurisdiction by assenting to forum-selection clause in private agreement.
However, court traditionally did not give effect to forum-selection clauses when they mandated a forum
and so purported to oust all other courts of power.
o M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. (SCOTUS 1972) – Plaintiff Zapata (Houston) contracted
with Unterweser (German) to tow Zapata’s drilling rig from Louisiana to Italy. Contract
contained provision that all disputes were to be litigated in a London Court of Justice. Rig was
damaged off FL coast, and Zapata brought suit in FL. Unterweser, citing the forum-selection
clause, moved to dismiss or stay action pending submission to High Court of Justice in London.
Unterweser sued Zapata for breach of contract in London. District Court and Court of appeals
refused to dismiss or stay the action. SCOTUS reversed: more weight and effect should be given
to the forum-selection clause. US foreign business would suffer if they insisted disputes must be
resolved under US courts and laws.
o Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc v. Shute (SCOTUS 1991) – Plaintiffs Shutes purchased passage on
cruise through Washington state travel agent. Ticket included provision that all litigation take
place in FL. Mrs. Shute injured herself when she slipped on a deck matt and filed suit in
Washington. SCOTUS addressed enforceability of forum-selection clause. Including such clause
in contract permissible because: 1. Cruise has special interest in limiting the fora in which it
could be subject to suit because it has guests throughout the US, 2. Dispels confusion about
where suits arising from the contract must be brought and defended, 3. Passengers benefit in the
form of reduced fares reflecting savings that the cruise line enjoys by limiting fora in which they
can be sued.
 Forum selection clauses are prima facie valid and should be enforced unless enforcement
is “unreasonable” under the circumstances
K. Challenging a Court’s Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the Person or Property
 Federal Rules 12 (b) (g) and (h).
1. Raising the Jurisdictional Issue Directly
 Special Appearance – procedure at common law by which defendant presented a challenge to court’s
exercise of personal jurisdiction without submitting to the court’s jurisdiction for any other purpose
2. Collateral Attack on Personal Jurisdiction
 Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men’s Ass’n (SCOTUS 1931) – respondent attempted to attack a
judgment rendered against it in a MO federal district court. Company made special appearance in prior
suit and moved to set aside service and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction which was denied, so
collaterally attacking this judgment in present suit. End of litigation – judgment is binding.
o However, defendant who makes no appearance remains free to challenge collaterally a judgment
of personal jurisdiction.
3. The Limited-Appearance Problem
 Limited Appearance – allows defendant in action commenced in quasi in rem basis to appear for the
limited purpose of defending its interest in the attached property without submitting to full in personam
jurisdiction of the court
o Without provision for limited appearance, defendant must choose between appearing and risking
possibility of in personam judgment in excess of value of attached property, or not appearing and
suffering forfeiture of his property
Assignment 12. Service of Process: The Requirement of Reasonable Notice. Casebook 201-215.
Chapter 3. Providing Notice and an Opportunity to be Heard

 Pennoyer – must serve within the state
 Long arm statutes and communications advances - notice has become separate due process requirement
 Two conditions to satisfy due process:
o Notice: must receive adequate notice of commencement of action
o Opportunity to be Heard: must have adequate opportunity at an appropriate time to present their
side of a dispute
 To bring a suit
o file a complaint –“on april 5 2014 defendant Ms Smith was driving negligently on maple street
and ran into my car causing damages of 100,000 to my person and my property” – enough to
give notice to defendant about what case is about.
o Then serve complaint and summons (order from court to appear before the court) to defendant as
notice
o Procedures for how to proceed once notice is served
A. The Requirement of Reasonable Notice
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (SCOTUS 1950)
I. Parties
 Central Hanover – plaintiff - appellee
 Mullane (representing the 113 beneficiaries) – defendant - appellant
 Action to settle common trust (pool small trust into a larger one)
 Mullane is appointed by court to represent the people who are interest beneficiaries (versus principal
beneficiaries)
o As in Shaffer where can’t trust directors to sue themselves, can’t expect trustees to correct
themselves
 Defendant made special appearance, objecting that notice by publication, allowed under the statute, was
inadequate to afford due process under 14th amend and therefore jurisdiction was lacking
 NY Court of Appeals overruled objections that statutory notice contravenes requirements of 14th
amendment
III. Facts
 Appellee, Central Hanover Bank & Trust, set up common fund pursuant to a New York statute allowing
the creation of common funds for distribution of judicial settlement trusts. There were 113 participating
trusts. Appellee petitioned for settlement of its first account as common trustee. Some of the
beneficiaries were not residents of New York. “Notice” was by publication for four weeks in a local
newspaper. Appellee had notified those people by mail that were of full age and sound mind who would
be entitled to share in the principal if the interest they held became distributable. Appellant was
appointed as special guardian and attorney for all persons known or unknown not otherwise appearing
who had or might thereafter have any interest in the income of the common trust fund.
IV. Legal Issue
 Was there constitutionally sufficient notice? Did defendant have opportunity to be heard?
V. Rule
 NY Statute requires at 18 months and then every 3 years must settle the trust – court approves what the
company has done. Once settled, cannot be challenged. Regular opportunity for beneficiaries to object to
way trust is being run (ie money stolen).
 Holding: notice of judicial settlement of accounts required by NY Banking Law is incompatible with
requirements of 14th amendment
o For known plaintiffs - Rule: must provide notice reasonably calculated to provide actual
notice
o For unknowable plaintiffs – constructive notice is okay
o For unknown but knowable plaintiffs – Rule: cost-benefit analysis – action that’s reasonable
in circumstances in case (weigh cost of giving notice with benefit)
 Here, no extra effort was necessary because there are so many plaintiffs that there’s a
fiscal cost to finding these people to provide notice (which will come back in the form of
fees for the beneficiaries) and that whose who are known will represent the unknown and
any issues will be uncovered
o If you already know their address, send them mail.
 Several issues:
o Does court have jurisdiction over non-NY residents? Yes. It is in the interest of each state to
provide means to close trusts that exist under its laws and administered under its courts.
o Was there sufficient opportunity for beneficiaries to contest? This proceeding does or may
deprive beneficiaries of property. Cuts off rights to have trustee answer for negligent or illegal
impairments of their interests and their interests are presumably subject to diminution in
proceeding by allowance of fees and expenses to one who, in their names but without their
knowledge, may conduct a fruitless or uncompensatory contest.
 Was notice sufficient? Right to be heard is not useful unless they know of the suit.
 Note 3. Statutes should impose plaintiff with duty of communication by mail or otherwise to defendant.
Non-resident statutes violate due process when they do not require notice to be given to the non-resident
but is only given to an authorized in-state service recipient.
 Note 5. Actual or mailed notice required for mortgaged property must have personal service or mailed
notice if known address, even if defendant knew of delinquency of non-payment. Constructive notice is
constitutionally insufficient.
o If you can reasonably ascertain address, must do it. Why different than Mullane? cost-benefit –
person’s house is at stake and they only have to find 1 person.
 Note 6. Greene v. Lindsey – posted eviction notices are not sufficient, service by mail required.
 Note 7. Dusenbery v. US – adequacy of notice to prisoners – FBI published noticed in newspaper, sent
letter to federal prison, his residence at time of arrest, and address of his step-mother. This was
sufficient.
 Note 8 – issues with service by mail. Jones v. Flowers – certified mail (requires signature) notice was
returned without claim. Court required additional reasonable steps (ie resend notice by regular mail so
signature is not required) to ensure receipt of notice before property is reclaimed. However, it would be
unreasonable to require them to find new address. Dissent says that one mailing was sufficient – method
of notice determined ex ante (from viewpoint of plaintiff when notice is sent) and due process does not
require actual process so that when notice has failed, no obligation to take additional steps. Pagonis v.
US – IRS did not violate due process despite taking no additional steps when notice of tax deficiency
sent by certified mail was returned. Marion County Auditor v. Sawmill Creek LLC – Indiana Supreme
Court declined to order additional steps to notify taxpayer of tax sale because it would be prohibitively
expense for the county due to the number of returned tax notices. Does this suggest that their system of
notice in constitutionally inadequate? Does this suggest that the people receiving them don’t want
them?
 Note 9. Covey v. Town of Somers – Court held that notice by mail of foreclosure proceeding, although
normally sufficient, would not satisfy due process when mailed to someone known insane and without
guardian.
 Note 10. Dobkin v. Chapman – NY Court of Appeals upheld court-ordered service by ordinary mail to
last known address when current whereabouts unknown was sufficient
 Note 12. If service member does not appear, court must determine if the person is in the military before
any adverse action can be taken. If they are in the military, the court cannot enter a default judgment
without first appointing the service member an attorney.
 Note 13. Content on notice – Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co. – notice did not say that they could
appear by written pleading or that they had right to request change of venue. This was insufficient.
 Note 14. Notice must have enough information for recipient to mount a response
 Note 15. A party may waive receiving notice in advance of litigation or after litigation has commenced.
Cognovit note (debtor authorizes his or her creditor's attorney to enter a confession in court that allows
judgment against the debtor) must be assessed on case-by-case basis with regard to (lack of)
consideration and inequality of bargaining power
Introduction to Notice
 Supreme Court makes the federal rules of civil procedure
 Rule 4 – how you give notice (p. 13 supplement)
o Summons
 Court issued summons
 To deliver summons must be over 18, not party to the claim
o Service
 In some states, suit commences at service. If statute of limitations is approaching,
defendant may not waive and try to wait it out [but can still be served within the time].
 Statutes of limitations serve 2 functions – gives defendants repose, keep old cases
out of courts.
 To serve an individual, can use state service laws (4)(e)(1) or (e)(2) deliver copy to
individual personally, leave a copy at dwelling or usual place of abode with a person of
suitable age and discretion who resides there, deliver to agent authorized by appointment
 To serve a corporation (4)(e)(1) state law or (2) by delivering to officer, manager, general
agent or any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of
process
Assignment 13. The Mechanics of Providing Notice. Casebook 216-229, 234-236. FR 4, 5, 6

Chapter 3. Providing Notice and an Opportunity to be Heard
B. Mechanics of Giving Notice
1. Introduction
 Notice of a suit is given by service of process upon the defendant
2. Specific Applications of the Service Provisions
a. Federal Rule 4(d) – Waiving Service
 Rule 4(d) encourages waiver of formal service. Under this, an action commences when plaintiff sends a
waiver form through reliable means that defendant has 30 days to return
 Now, encourage defendant waive right to service via mailed waiver – this waives service of summons
and appear voluntarily. If they do not waive, the defendant has to pay for cost of service (disincentive).
If they do waive, often get more time to respond to claim (incentive).
b. Federal Rule 4(e) – Personal Delivery on Natural Persons
 “place and leave with” is legal phrase for delivery of summons
c. Federal Rule 4(e)(2)(B) – Service on a Person Residing in Defendant’s Dwelling or Usual Place of Abode
 As alternative to personal delivery, this rule permits service by leaving a copy of summons or complaint
at his dwelling with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there
 National Development Co. v. Triad Holding Corp. – Left service with housekeeper at NYC
apartment. Lawyer argued it is not his usual place of abode because he has 12 houses. The point of the
rule is to give notice, and he was there and got notice so court’s like no bad argument. Don’t
unnecessarily annoy the judge.
d. Federal Rule 4(e)(2)(C) – Delivery to an Agent Authorized by Appointment
 This rule allows service by delivering copy to agent of defendant who is authorized by appointment or
by law; must be evidence the defendant intended to confer such authority upon the agent
National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent (SCOTUS, 1964)
I. Parties
 National Equipment Rental – plaintiff – appellant
 Szukhent – Defendants - appellees
 Claim that defendant had defaulted under farm equipment lease
 District Court quashed service of process holding that although Weinberg promptly notified defendants,
the lease agreement did not explicitly require her to do so.
 Court of Appeals affirmed.
III. Facts
 Defendants signed lease for farm equipment in 1961, contract for lease provided that lessee designates
Weinberg as agent for purpose of accepting service within NY. Marshal delivered two copies of
summons and complaint to Weinberg, who mailed it to respondents that day. Plaintiff also notified
defendants by certified mail of service of process on Weinberg.
IV. Legal Issue
 Whether person upon whom summons and complaint were served was an agent authorized by
appointment when there is no clause that says she must provide them with notice
 Conflict of interest – she is married to the companies owner, but she is supposed to represent them –
court says this is not conflict because the business wants them to receive service and the defendant
wants to receive service so no default judgment
V. Rule
 Rule 4(e)(2)(C) – service to agent gives personal jurisdiction
 Reverse. Weinberg was authorized agent by appointment to receive service of process. Private contract
appointed her as the agent. Issue is really one of contract.
o Compare to Wuchter – p. 210 – state law issue
 Dissent (Blackmun)– Disagrees because concern that defendants were denied due process. Concerned
that the holding allows large companies to make contracts with someone that forces that person to try to
defend themselves in a distant place where business enterprises are concentrated. This is far reaching,
burdensome, and unjust.
 Dissent (Brennan) – Deny validity of appointed agent whose interest conflict with principal and require
appointment include condition that agent transmit process forthwith to principal and would not hold
individual to contract without proof individual understood he was consenting to being sued in state not
of his residence.
e. Federal Rule 4(h) – Serving a Corporation, Partnership, or Association
 This rule allows service on corporations, partnerships, or unincorporated associations by permitting
service by delivery of process to an officer, managing agent, or general agent
 Insurance Co. of North America v. S/S Hellenic Challenger (NY 1980) – US marshal gave summons
and complaint to claims adjuster at defendant’s office. Adjuster was not expressly authorized to accept
process, only officers and claims manager were authorized by company. Adjuster lost the summons and
defendant was unaware of pending lawsuit until bank accounts were attached by plaintiff. Court denied
motion to set aside judgment on basis of improper service of process. Rule allows service to made upon
a representative so integrated in the organization that he will know what to do with the papers. Plaintiff’s
method of service was reasonably calculated to alert defendants. Adjuster was familiar with service of
process.
o Is this consistent with the rule? Purposive analysis – purpose is to give notice to someone in the
corporation who should be capable of giving the notice
 Rule vs. Standard – Rule - No dogs in the park vs. Standard - No pets/dangerous animals
in the park
 Making rule into a standard. This standard is very vague – who is “integrated”?
 Current SCOTUS does not approve. They are more textual in interpreting statutes
o Fashion Page Ltd. v. Zurich Ins. Co. – Gave service to secretary to executive Vice President.
She said she could take it. Was she authorized? She’s not managing agent or officer. Court said
she was authorized by (implied) appointment by company because she regularly accepted
summonses.
 If this was first time she took a summons, court would have said no she was not
appointed – can’t appoint herself.
4. Service of Process and Statutes of Limitations
 Statutes of limitations – plaintiff loses opportunity to invoke assistance of courts to obtain relief for an
otherwise valid claim
 When a suit is commenced:
o federally – under rule 3 – when copy of complaint is filed with district court
o state – state law differs – in some, it is when process is served
 Rule 4(m) requires federal court to dismiss action when defendant has not been served within 120 days
of filing complaint if plaintiff does not show good cause for not completing service in that time
 Improper summons – question of whether property service is likely
 Note – rule 4(m) exception does not apply if plaintiff did not attempt to serve defendant in foreign
country; under rule 4(f) plaintiff has unlimited time for service
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
 Whether court has right to hear a type of case
o Diversity jurisdiction asks citizenship of both parties
 9 categories in Article III Section 2. 1. Ambassadors/ministers, 2. Admiralty and maritime, 3. US as a
party [federal claims court], 4. Between states [go to SCOTUS automatically], 5. Between state and
citizens of another state, 6. Between citizens of different states [diversity jurisdiction], 7. Between
citizens of same state over land, 8. Between state/citizen and foreign state/citizen [foreign
diversity/alienage jurisdiction] 9. Arising under
o One way congress limits federal judicial power is by giving a financial minimum
o Why is diversity jurisdiction good? Prevent bias or perception/fear of bias in state court [ruling
for in-state party], larger jury pool [federal districts larger than state districts], federal judges
appointed for life so more independent [state judge favor in-state interest for reelection]
o State court subject matter jurisdiction – sometimes divided among state courts, there is usually at
least one state court that can hear any type of case
o Why would they limit subject matter in federal system? Preserve autonomy of states, handle
matters states couldn’t handle (foreign affairs, treaties, war) or are better handled at federal level
Diversity Jurisdiction
 Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction
o Eerie Doctrine – substantive state law governs [state where federal court is located]
o People want to get rid of diversity jurisdiction. Congress added minimum amount to go to federal
court - over $75,000 - to limit jurisdiction and limit burden on federal courts
 We should keep it because states are very different, state judges still elected
o Diversity of citizenship is concurrent jurisdiction – plaintiff is allowed to bring case in state or
federal court [both have jurisdiction]
 Removal jurisdiction – allows defendant a limited right to transfer case from state to
federal court
 Cannot remove to federal court if the plaintiff brings case in defendant’s domicile
state court [can only remove if suit brought in state where defendant is not from]
o Ex. plaintiff from NY brings suit in AL state court, defendant is
domiciliary of AL. Cannot remove.
 Cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction in federal court, but have certain amount of time
to raise the issue in state court before waive right to federal trial
o In WWVW, out of state plaintiffs (NY) sued in state court (IL) – why? State court more
sympathetic to their injuries. Added NY plaintiffs so not complete diversity and could not be
removed to federal court.
o Complete diversity – no diversity jurisdiction of any plaintiff is a citizen of same state as any
defendant
 Complete diversity is a statutory requirement (Constitution does not require
complete diversity)
 Exception: congress can allow for minimal diversity (satisfied when at least one
plaintiff and defendant are from different states) in federal courts in some class
actions over $5 million and 100 plaintiffs
 Why else would you choose state court of out of state plaintiff? Backlog in federal courts
o Corporations – domicile – place of incorporation and principal place of business
 Where is principal place of business? Nerve center of corporation [corporate HQ]
 Unincorporated association – takes on citizenship of all its members
Assignment 14. Casebook 259-260, 266-282, 285-289; US Constitution Article III; 28 USC Section 1332

Chapter 4. Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of the Action – the Court’s Competency
Diversity and Alienage Jurisdiction Distinguished
 Alienage jurisdiction is concerned with protecting a discrete class of litigants from prejudice in state
courts and concern that state court rulings could interfere with foreign affairs
 Diversity Jurisdiction – Test: 1. Citizenship of the parties and 2. Amount in controversy in the dispute
1. Determining Citizenship
Mas v. Perry (Court of App 5th Cir 1974)
I. Parties
 Jean Paul (France) and Judy Mas (MS) – Plaintiffs - appellee
 Oliver Perry (LA) – Defendant – appellant
 Appellant made motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which was denied
III. Facts
 Jean Paul is a citizen of France, Judy is a citizen of Mississippi, and Perry is a citizen of Louisiana
 Appeal arises from case awarding the Mas’ damages because the landlord, Perry, had 2-way mirrors in
their bathroom and bedroom.
IV. Legal Issue
 Was there diversity jurisdiction?
o Why is he allowed to wait so long to raise issue? If it was personal jurisdiction, he would have
had to raise it at beginning or waive it.
 Capron v. van Norton – can raise subject matter jurisdiction objection at any point before
case is final – goes to power of court to hear a case – unconstitutional for them to go past
their jurisdiction; can’t waive subject matter jurisdiction
V. Rule
 For diversity, citizenship means domicile not residence
 Domicile is a permanent home to which person has intent to return – cannot change domicile without
new domicile (residence in new domicile with intent to stay there); domicile = resident + intent to stay
indefinitely
o How do you prove intent? Evidence: testimony (“I intent to stay in this state”), circumstantial
evidence (where they vote, car registration, etc.) – may be question for jury/judge
o Evidence – what is admissible in court to prove something
 Affirmed. The Mas’ were not citizens of Louisiana because they were students and lacked intent to stay
there. Mrs. Mas did not lost her citizenship in the USA by marrying a French citizen.
 Note 6. National banks – citizens of States in which they are located (where main office is found). Court
has not decided on whether principle place of business is a place of citizenship.
 Note 12. Dual nationalities – Sadat v. Mertes – plaintiff, dual citizen, could not invoke diversity
jurisdiction because he was domiciled in Egypt and so was not a citizen of any state, and could not
invoke alienage jurisdiction because his US citizenship was dominant given voluntary naturalization and
intent to return.
H.K. Huilin International Trade Co., Ltd. v. Kevin Multiline Polymer Inc. (NY 2012)
V. Rule
 1332 Hanging Paragraph – alien admitted to the US for permanent resident shall be deemed a citizen of
the state in which such alien is domiciled – meaning that a suit between a foreign resident alien and a
domestic resident alien qualified for diversity jurisdiction.
o Problem is that neither are citizens of US
 Clarification Act eliminated this paragraph and took effect on Jan 6, 2012 – this removed what some
courts considered a generally applicable provision that, in some jurisdictions, would expand federal
jurisdiction.
VI. Conclusion and reasoning
 1988 Amendment does not provide jurisdiction over suits between nonresident alien and resident
aliens/US citizens
 Note 5. Rose v. Giamatti – Rose, manager of Reds, filed state court action to enjoin Commissioner
Giamatti from investigating whether he had wagered on ball games. Unincorporated association takes on
citizenship of all its members – adds Reds [OH] and MLB [unincorporated association – citizen of all
places of all its members – includes Cincinnati Reds] to suit to prevent removal from OH state court to
federal court [he’s a legend in OH so wants to stay in state court]. Therefore, plaintiff and defendants
both from OH so no federal jurisdiction. Removed to federal and the court says no, Reds and MLB are
not real parties, just nominal parties. District judge probably concerned with whether state trial would
really be fair, high profile case. In determining diversity jurisdiction, must consider only the domicile of
real parties not nominal parties. Real parties is one who, by the substantive law, has the duty sought to
be enforced or enjoined. A nominal party is one who has no interest in the result of the suit or no actual
interest or control over the subject matter of the limitation.
o These parties aren’t really irrelevant. This is a strange ruling, usually don’t disregard parties as
nominal.
o Lawyers use procedure as a tool in lawsuits
2. Amount in Controversy
Notes and Questions
 Note 1. Amount in controversy must be greater than $75,000. Must allege amount in controversy in
good faith [not lying].
o Damages could be pain and suffering, loss of productivity, property damage, medical bills, etc.
 Note 2. Party invoking diversity jurisdiction has burden to show amount in controversy requirement is
met. To justify dismissal, court must believe it can’t be worth that amount. Hard to get dismissed. Jury
does not have to award over 75,000 in the end.
 Note 4. When single plaintiff sues single defendant, amount in controversy requirement can be met by
aggregating the value of all the claims against the defendant. When multiple plaintiffs sue one
defendant, amount in controversy requirement can be met by aggregating value of only those claims that
are common and indivisible. Common and undivided interest is that if one plaintiff fails to collect his
share, the remaining plaintiffs would collect a larger share. If multiple plaintiffs suing one defendant,
and have undivided interest, might be able to aggregate to reach $75,000
Freeland v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. (6th Cir. 2011)
I. Parties
 Freelands – plaintiffs – appellees
 Liberty Mutual – defendant - appellant
III. Facts
 The Freelands loaned their car to their son, who drove his wife and 3 children when he ran a red light
and struck a police cruiser in an intersection. He and his wife were killed but their 3 children survived
with serious injuries.
IV. Legal Issue
 Plaintiffs claim the insurance owes them the $100,000 single limit coverage for accidents rather than the
$25,000 coverage for uninsured/underinsured motorists
 Declaratory judgment action – statement of law – declares legal rights and obligations of the parties vis
a vis one another. Does not give award or remedy.
V. Rule
 Minimum for federal jurisdiction – claim must be for $75,000.01 or more
 Must remand case to state court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Difference between two
policy coverages is exactly $75,000.
 Note 1. According to Section 1332 sum must exceed $75,000 exclusive of interest and costs
Federal Question Jurisdiction
Assignment 15. Federal Question Jurisdiction. Casebook 291-305; RS 28 USC 1331

Chapter 4. Jurisdiction Over the Subject Matter of the Action – The Court’s Competency
C. The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts – Federal Questions
 28 USC 1331 [1875] – federal question jurisdiction – judicial power “to all cases in law and equity
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the US, and treaties made, or which shall be made under their
authority”
o supremacy clause – the constitution and laws made pursuant to the constitution and treaties made
under it are supreme law of land over contrary state law; anticipated that there would be federal
questions heard in state courts, which is why judges are told to follow constitutional federal law
over contrary state laws
 Osborn v. Bank of the United States (1824) – Bank of US brought suit to prevent auditor of Ohio from
collecting a tax against it that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Auditor argues there is no federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. Congressional act chartering the bank authorized it to sue an be sued in any
circuit court, thus granting jurisdiction in any case where the Bank is a party. Case arises from an act of
Congress.
o Special act [as opposed to general act like section 1331]
o Federally chartered corporations – Bank of the US, GWU, Red Cross, FDIC
o Ingredients test – bank can’t do anything without its charter – always potential federal case
o Note 2. Verlinden BV v. Central Bank of Nigeria (1983) – broad concept of “arising under”
jurisdiction
o Court has more narrowly construed 28 USC 1331 than constitution
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley (SCOTUS 1908)
I. Parties
 Mottley – plaintiff – appellee
 L&N – defendant - appellant
 Claim breach of contract [state law claim] – why federal? Statute by Congress makes it federal issue
 Circuit court judge overruled defendant demurrer and ruled in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals
III. Facts
 Mottleys injured on train, given lifetime free passes [settlement – contract]. Company refused to renew
them in 1907 when Congress passed an act that forbid giving free passes or transportation.
 Plaintiffs argue the statute doesn’t apply because pass isn’t free [they “bought” it with their injury], but
then say even if it does apply, argue it would violate 5th amendment rights [takings clause]
IV. Legal Issue
 Was the issue a federal question, giving federal jurisdiction?
V. Rule
 Ingredients test from Osborn
 Reversed and dismissed. No diversity of citizenship. Plaintiff’s cause of action (breach of contract) is
not based on the laws or Constitution – complaint is anticipating the defense railroad will enter [we
didn’t mean to breach contract, congress said we can’t, federal law (statute) supercedes state law
(contract)] and their answer to that defense. It is not enough that the plaintiff alleges anticipated defense
to his cause of action might be based upon the laws and Constitution.
o federal question must be a necessary component of the complaint (well pleaded complaint)
o statute construed strictly by court
 Note 5. Declaratory judgment – defendant sues to determine legal rights and obligations. Declaratory
Judgment Act - can only get federal question jurisdiction if the case could have been brought by would-
be plaintiff under federal question jurisdiction (so would-be defendant, like the railroad, can raise a
federal issue in declaratory judgment but must stay in state court).
 State courts are of general jurisdiction while federal courts are of limited jurisdiction
T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu (US Appeals 2nd Cir. 1964)
I. Parties
 Harms brought suit over copyrighted songs – breach of contract claim
o Copyright – you own it, people can’t use it without your permission; copyright belongs to the
author but can be assigned to or sold to someone else through a contract
o Patent – when you invent something new or find a new use for something; can give license to
patent [they pay you lots of money to use it]
o Trademark – symbol, name, or phrase associated with the brand
 These are all intellectual property (form of intangible property)
 Created by federal law – given exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases of IP infringement
 Circuit court said no jurisdiction because claim does not arise under copyright act
III. Facts
 Youmans writing song for movie. Gives some rights to studio but keeping publication rights to himself.
Lets studio find someone to write lyrics, Khan and Eliscu. Eliscu assigns his rights to another company,
Ross Jungnickel instead of giving it to Harms [the company Youmans gave his rights to]. So Harms sues
Eliscu for breach of contract. Harms can’t sue for copyright infringement of lyrics because Eliscu is
holder of those rights. He promised Youmans he would give him the rights but when Eliscu renewed the
copyright, he gave the rights to Jungnickel, thus breaching the contract.
IV. Legal Issue
 Does the claim arise from an act of Congress?
V. Rule
 Holmes creation test – a suit arises under the law that creates the case of action
 Affirmed. Federal grant of copyright or patent does not give federal jurisdiction in dispute of ownership
because it can be decided under ordinary principles of contract law. Claim is created under state law.
Copyright Act is not relevant to this case.
o What if someone just used the song without permission from person who owns the rights? Sue
for copyright infringement – exclusive federal jurisdiction. If the person who wrote the song sold
his rights to someone else, not copyrighted anymore – copyright only belongs to the original
songwriter.
o If plaintiff is copyright holder and has a contract, may be able to bring suit for copyright
infringement in federal court and breach of contract (ie if Eliscu brought suit).
 Exclusive jurisdiction is the exception not the rule. Same rules apply – must be a necessary component
of complaint
 Note 2. Congress has given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over securities law class actions,
bankruptcy, patents and copyrights, actions against foreign consuls and vice-consuls, and actions
involving certain seizures.
Note on Private Rights of Action
 Private right of action – suit brought by private person for violation of a statute of constitutional
provision
o Legislation creating private right of action can be express or implied; courts usually use common
law to decide when it is not express
o Bivens v. Six Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics – court implied private right of action
for damages for redress of violation of 4th amendment
 Note 1. In American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. the majority said that when it does not
arise from the act, but from some other wrong behavior, it is a question under state law. Dissent argued
the courts have often exercised jurisdiction over state law claims that include a federal issue.
 Note 2. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter – case involved a federal statute, but court said did not arise
under federal law because fed statute incorporates state law to decide case
 Note 3. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. – although case arose under state law, court held
action arose under federal law because plaintiff’s right to relief depended on the construction or
application of the Constitution and US laws, and that such federal claim rests upon a reasonable
foundation
o Alleged federal bond was invalid to get injunction and statute authorizing the bond is
unconstitutional
 Note 4. Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. – plaintiff said defendant did not comply with
Federal Safety Appliance Act. SCOTUS said no federal question jurisdiction because suit brought under
state statute which defines liability and brings up a duty imposed by the federal statute is not arising
under laws of US.
o Alleged defendant violated Kentucky Employer Liability Act, a state statute. If they are alleging
negligence and negligence per se then they do have to include federal safety appliance act to
show which statute qualifies as negligence per se. Need to know more about development of neg
per se in this state.
Joinder of Claims; Counterclaims
 FR 18 – Joinder of Claims
o May join as independent or alternative claims as many claims as it has against opposing party
 More claims = more jury instructions – jury confusion; jury prejudice
 FR 42(b) – can move to sever claims; court may grant [discretionary]
 Claim – original issue brought by plaintiff
 Counterclaim – opposing party brings claim against plaintiff
o ie car crash – plaintiff sues for negligence but defendant also sues for negligence
 What’s the diff between contributory negligence defense and negligence counterclaim?
Prior means you are all or part liable if found negligent. Latter places blame on plaintiff
and can recover damages if both parties are found negligent.
 Counterclaim – what defendant brings back against plaintiff [can’t get relief without counterclaim]
o Defense – may prevent liability on defendant’s part, but cannot get relief
o Can be permissive or compulsory
 Crossclaim – defendants bring claims against other defendants; permissive claims
 3rd party claim – FR14 – P v. D1, D1 impleads 3rd party defendant
P v. D1 / 3rd Party Plaintiff
v.
rd
3 Party Defendant
 FR 20 Joinder
 FR 19 Required Joinder
o Hansen v. Denkla – couldn’t get personal jurisdiction over trustee from DE in FL because no
minimum contacts, but he was indispensable party so could not try case in FL
o 19(a) necessary – should be joined if feasible
o 19(b) indispensable – if not feasible, need to consider 4 elements
Assignment 16. Claims and Counterclaims. Casebook 659-673. FR 13, 18

Chapter 9. Joinder of Claims and Parties: Expanding the Scope of Civil Action
 Rule that allow multiple claims and parties to be combined in one lawsuit
o Permissive rules – give litigant option of aggregating parties and claims in a single lawsuit
o Mandatory rules – require litigant to aggregate parties and claims (FR 82)
A. Joinder of Claims
1. Historical Limitations of the Permissive Joinder of Claims
Harris v. Avery (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1869)
I. Parties
 Avery – plaintiff
 Harris - defendant
 Avery brought suit on two causes of action – false imprisonment and slander
 District court overruled defendant’s demurrer.
III. Facts
 Plaintiff says defendant called him a thief and said he stole a horse. Defendant took the horse and
arrested Plaintiff and held him in the jail for four or five days.
IV. Legal Issue
 Were the causes of action improperly joined?
V. Rule
 FR 89 – plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same petition when they are included in the
same transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action [series of events]
 Affirm district court overruling demurrer. The causes of action arise out of the same transaction.
2. Permissive Joinder of Claims by Plaintiffs Under FR 18
 M.K. v. Tenet (DC District Court, 2002) – Six former CIA members brought claim against CIA and
director alleging they violated the Privacy Act 1974. Defendants move to sever the claims under FR 21.
Plaintiffs argue under FR 21(a)(1) joinder requirements are satisfied. The court ruled that under
unrestricted joinder provision of FR 18, such joinder of new claims is possible.
o Note 1. FR 18 removes all obstacles to joinder of claims – restriction on joinder is imposed by
jurisdictional requirements. Sporn v. Hudson Transit Line – cause of action for negligence and
malicious prosecution are essentially different in nature and cannot be joined.
B. Addition of Claims by Defendant
1. Counterclaims
o A cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint, as the
foundation of the plaintiff’s claim, or connected with the subject of the action, and
o In an action arising on contract, any other cause of action arising on contract and existing at the
commencement of the action
US v. Heyward-Robinson Co. (US App 2nd Cir. 1970)
I. Parties
 D’Agostino – plaintiff - appellee
 Heyward – defendant - appellant
II(I). Procedural History/Facts
 D’Agostino brought suit against Heyward for payments due for Navy contracting job. Heyward
answered, denying liability and counterclaiming overpayments for both Navy and Stelma jobs.
D’Agostino denied liability on Heyward counterclaims and replied to recover for money alleged to be
due on Navy and Stelma job [supplemental jurisdiction]. At trial, these subcontracts were treated
together. Court ruled for plaintiff.
 Miller act – allows subcontractors to bring suit on federal jobs
o Subject matter jurisdiction on Navy Job – federal question jurisdiction
IV. Legal Issue
 Were the counterclaims compulsory or permissive?
V. Rule
 Must be logical relationship to be compulsory FR 13(a)
o Logical relationship overrules Harris series of events
o For supplemental jurisdiction – must have compulsory counterclaim for federal jurisdiction; no
federal jurisdiction if permissive
o have to assert a compulsory counterclaim or lose right to raise it
 Affirmed. Transaction is flexible in meaning – based upon logical relationship and therefore compulsory
counterclaims. Close and logical relationship between the two subcontracts; based on finances.
o Logical relationship – intuitive, case by case “know it when you see it”
 Note 2. Moore v. NY Cotton Exchange (1926) – transaction has flexible meaning; may comprehend
series of many occurrences, depending not on the immediateness of their connection but on their logical
relationship
 Note 3. 28 USC 1367 – supplemental jurisdiction may be exercised over any counterclaim that is
logically related to the claim over which original jurisdiction exists
The Consequences of Failing to Plead a Counterclaim
 1. Rule 13(a) is silent on effect of failing to plead a compulsory counterclaim. An unasserted
compulsory counterclaim cannot be raised in subsequent suit in federal court
 3. Decision to allow an omitted counterclaim after the statute of limitations has lapsed is governed
exclusively by FR 15
 4. Exceptions to compulsory counterclaim rule: pending action
 5. Southern Construction Co. v. Pickard – governing substantive law (ie statute) requires related
claims to be pled as separate actions in separate districts
 6. Counterclaim is not compulsory if requires adding a party over whom the court cannot acquire
jurisdiction
Joinder of Parties; Crossclaims
Assignment 17. Crossclaims and Joinder of Parties. Casebook 674-680, 683-690. FR 20, 21, 42.
Chapter 9. Joinder of Claims and Parties: Expanding the Scope of the Civil Action
Section B. Addition of Claims by Defendant
2. Crossclaims
Lasa Per L’Industria Del Marmo Societa per Azioni v. Alexander (6th Cir 1969)
I. Parties
 LASA v. Alexander, Marble Int’l, Southern Builders, Continental Casualty Insurance, City of Memphis
[why sue everyone – can sue anyone who got the product]
 Alexander files counterclaim against LASA
 Southern files counterclaim against LASA
o These are about the contract between Alexander and LASA for the marble
 Alexander files cross claim against Southern, Continental, and City of Memphis
 Southern files cross claim against Alexander
 Alexander (3rd party plaintiff) files 3rd party complaint against Aydelott [architect] (3rd party defendant)
o These don’t arise out of same transaction [not related to contract]
 District Court dismissed the two cross-claims and third party complaint – not out of same transaction
III. Facts
 New city hall in Memphis. Southern subcontracted alexander to supply and install marble, alexander
contracted with LASA [Italian] to supply the marble.
IV. Legal Issue
 Do the cross claims/3rd party claim arise out of same transaction as the original claim and
counterclaims?
V. Rule
 FR 13 and 14 – intended to avoid circuity of action and dispose of claims arising out of one set of facts
to be expeditious and economic. Transaction or occurrence is given broad interpretation. Must be
transaction in original claim.
 Reversed and remanded. There is a logical relationship between the claims and the occurrence.
Transaction is building city hall. Can separate claims under FR 42(b) if it becomes too confusing for the
jury.
 Note 3. Liebhauser v. Milwaukee Electric RY & Light Co. – allowed crossclaims when relief sought
was shown to involve or in some manner affect the contract, trasnaction or property that is the subject-
matter of the action. Later removed “subject matter” because crossclaims between defendants may not
impact plaintiff and therefore intrude on the plaintiffs rights.
 Note 4. Danner v. Anskis – 3rd cir upheld dismissal of crossclaim because Rule 13(g) does not
authorize a plaintiff to state as a crossclaim against co-plaintiff a claim arising out of the transaction or
occurrence which is also the subject matter of their common complaint against the defendant.
D. Claims Involving Multiple Parties
1. Permissive Joinder of Parties
Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co. (Supreme Court of SC 1922)
 Pre-FR 20 Plaintiff Joinder Rule
I. Parties
 Ryders – Plaintiff
 Jefferson Hotels, Bickley - Defendants
 Defendant’s demurred that the several causes of action united do not affect all the parties to the action.
Overruled, defendants appeal.
III. Facts
 Ryders stayed at Jefferson hotel, but in middle of the night were woken by rapping on the door. Bickley
insulted Mrs. Ryder and so they left the hotel and had to find another place to stay. Claimed that they
were injured in their reputations, credit, and business and lost of profits in sum of $10,000.
IV. Legal Issue
 Does the complaint contain two causes of action that can be joined?
V. Rule
 When a tort of a personal nature is committed upon two or more, the right of action must be several
unless it affects all parties to the action.
 Reversed. The wife’s cause of action does not affect the husband and vice versa – several injury.
o Joint v. Several – joint injury to their relationship; several – separate personal injuries
 Dissent – plaintiffs were expelled from the hotel under allegation that they were not husband and wife;
denial of their relationship was offense that affected their relationship and is manifestly a joint injury.
o FR 20 would allow for them to bring suit together if arises out of some transaction or occurrence
or series of transactions or occurrences
M.K. v. Tenet (District Court DC 2002)
 See prior notes
IV. Legal Issue
V. Rule
 20(a)(1)(A) – transactional test - defendant’s acts and omissions pertaining to the plaintiff’s obstruction
of counsel claims are logically related events that court can regard as arising out of the same transactions
or occurrences
 20(a)(1)(B) – claims must be related by common question of law or fact
 Grant plaintiff motion to amend and deny defendant motion to sever. Defendants acts were related to
same series of transactions because they were all employment matters and denied requests for
information and established overall pattern of policies and practices aimed at denying effective
assistance of counsel. They are related by multiple questions of law/fact such as restricting access to
records, access to counsel, and common claims under the Privacy Act.
 Note 4. Tanbro Fabrics Corp v. Beaunit Mills Inc. – seller and processor did not want claims
consolidate because they had different relationship to buyer and independent contracts, buyer wants
claims joined because both have common question of who is responsible for defect. They allow
consolidation because identity of duty or contract are not longer bars to joinder.
 Note 5. George v. Smith – held prisoner’s claims of 8th amend violations from failing to provide
medical care, censoring mail, and mishandling application for parole could not be joined because
unrelated and did not arise out of same transaction.
Impleader
 Impleader – type of joinder where can bring in 3rd party defendant who can be held liable for all
defendant’s damages
 FR 14 requires 3rd party defendant (non-party) be brought in within 14 days.
 Who is the “defending party” under FR 14? – original defendant (FR 14(a)); original plaintiff if
defendant brings counter-claim (FR 14(b)); 3rd party defendants
 FR 14(a)(2) – 3rd party defendant must assert defenses under FR 12(b); can assert counter claims under
13(a)/(b) or cross claims under 13(g)
o If it gets to complicated, any party can move to have them separated under 14(a)(4)
 In a state court where there is impleader, they will generally have subject matter jurisdiction. Federal
courts are strictly limited in subject matter jurisdiction, so if there is impleader/joinder, tends to break
down subject matter jurisdiction. May also have issue of personal jurisdiction in federal courts when
joinder.
Assignment 18. Rule 19 Joinder and Impleader. Casebook 696-713. FR 19, 14.
Chapter 9. Joinder of Claims and Parties

D. Claims Involving Multiple Parties
2. Mandatory Joinder of Persons
b. Required Joinder of Persons Under FR 19
Provident Tradesmens Bank and Trust Co. v. Patterson (SCOTUS 1968)
I. Parties
 Dutcher – loaned car
 Cionci – borrowed car – deceased (non-PA)
 Lynch and Harris – passengers in the car – deceased and injured (from PA)
 Smith – truck driver – deceased
 Lumberman Insurance – insurance company for Dutcher
 3 tort claims & present case
o 1. Lynch estate v. Cionci estate – federal diversity jurisdiction – settled $50,000
o 2. Smith est. v. Cionci est., Dutcher, Lynch est. - in abeyance
o 3. Harris v. Cionci est., Dutcher, Lynch est. – in abeyance
o 4. Present case – declaratory judgment action stating legal rights to establish whether Cionci had
permission – Lynch est., Harris, Smith est. v. Lumberman Insurance, Cionci est.
 Don’t add Dutcher as defendant because he’s from PA and so is Lynch est. and don’t
want to lose diversity jurisdiction; don’t want him as defendant because jury might
sympathize with him because it wasn’t really his fault
 District court directed verdict for Smith and Lynch estates and Harris (injured).
 Appellate court reversed on ground not raised in district court – dismissal of declaratory judgment action
for nonjoinder of indispensable party
o They says Dutcher is indispensable party and should be tried in state court
III. Facts
 Dutcher had entrusted car to Cionci, but he made detour from errand for which Dutcher allowed his car
to be taken. Accident caused death of three and one serious injury. Estate of Lynch brought claim
against estate of Cionci. Dutcher had insurance for $100,000 for all claims rising out of single accident.
Policy covered anyone using car with permission. Insurance company declined to defend, believing
Cionci had not had permission and was not covered.
IV. Legal Issue
 Was Dutcher harmed by judgment against the insurance company?
V. Rule
 19(b) – equity and good conscience test
o Four interests to consider: 1, plaintiff has interest in having a forum, 2. Defendant may properly
wish to avoid multiple litigation or inconsistent relief, or sole responsibility for a liability her
share with another, 3. There is the interest of the outsider whom it would have been desirable to
join, 4. Interest of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of
controversies.
 Vacated and remanded. There are two types of potential defendants, those who have an interest and
those whose interest is so integral that a decision cannot be made without affecting their interest. View
case not from perspective of trial judge because whole case has already been argued and no objected at
trial level; so view the four factors above as appellate court not trial court. Danger is that Dutcher would
be subject to be responsible for damages for more than the insurance policy. BUT the plaintiffs have all
agreed to accept limit of all claims to amount of the insurance policy so alleviate possible prejudice
against Dutcher as an absent party.
o Trial court probably would have dismissed the case if someone had raised issue of Dutcher being
indispensable party
E. Impleader
1. Historical Use of Impleader
 Impleader comes from common law vouching to warranty – when A sues B, often there is third party C
who may ultimately be liable to B for all or some part of the damages which A might recover.
2. Third-Party Practice Under FR 14
Jeub v. B/G Foods, Inc. (District Court Minn. 1942)
I. Parties
 Jeub – plaintiff – appellant
 B/G Food (restaurant) – defendant/3rd party plaintiff – appellee
 Swift and Co (ham provider)– third party defendant
 Prior to answering complaint, defendant made ex parte order making Swift a third-party defendant.
o B/G Food defense – we didn’t make the ham, we just opened the can; why add Swift? To be
reimbursed by Swift; more cost efficient because don’t have to wait to see if they are liable to
Jeub and then sue third party; risk of inconsistent judgments when there are multiple lawsuits
 Swift made motion to vacate because plaintiffs had not amended complaints to state any cause of action
against Swift.
o Under state law, there’s only a case against Swift if B/G found liable. FR Civ Pro are not
supposed to change substantive state laws that apply to diversity cases
III. Facts
 Jeub bought ham sandwich at B/G food restaurant that was contaminated and made them sick; produced
by Swift and Co.
IV. Legal Issue
V. Rule
 FR 14(a)(1) permits impleader of a party who is or may be liable
 Motion to vacate denied. Purpose of FR 14 is to allow rights of all parties to be determined in one
proceeding.
o Not changing substantive liability, just procedure – Swift won’t be liable unless the B/G is liable.
o Hypo – if plaintiffs had sued B/G and Swift, B/G could not implead Swift because they would
already be a defendant, but could cross-claim under FR13
Too, Inc. v. Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. (SD NY 2003)
I. Parties
 Too – plaintiff
 Windstar Apparel – defendant
o Want to bring DeCaro and Abraham as 3rd party defendants – they are employees so Windstar
would be responsible anyway but can seek contribution or indemnification from them, and they
are key witnesses so will be testifying anyway so does not make it more burdensome; Windstar
did not join them before 14 days Windstar would need permission to allow 3rd party defendants
to be added
o Too objects to bringing them in; jury might be sympathetic to the employees rather than the
company and not want to find Windstar liable because then employees would have to be
considered liable and pay for it
 Motion for leave to file third party complaint seeking contribution and indemnification from two former
employees, DeCaro and Abraham
III. Facts
 Windstar alleges that former employees knew they were selling copyrighted/trademarked clothes of Too
to other stores like Kohls.
IV. Legal Issue
 Whether the benefits of judicial economy at this state of the case are outweighed by the various concern
of Too.
V. Rule
 Impleader is appropriate when the third-party defendant’s liability to the third-party plaintiff is
dependent on the outcome of the main claim or is potentially secondarily liable as contributor to
defendant.
o FR 14 – have 14 days to add 3rd party defendant; otherwise need permission of court
 Factors to consider when granting motion to leave: 1. Whether the movant deliberately delayed or was
derelict in filing motion 2. Whether impleading would unduly delay or complicate the trial 3. Whether
impleading would prejudice the third-party defendant 4. Whether the third-party complaint states a claim
upon which relief can be granted
 Granted in part and denied in part. Request for leave can be allowed, but request to file third-party
complaint against DeCaro and Abraham for indemnification must be denied because it is clearly without
merit under NY common law – barred where party seeking indemnification was itself at fault and both
violated same duty to plaintiff. Windstar is partially at fault, but Windstar is allowed to add 3rd party
defendants for contribution.
o Indemnification – pay entirety of damages for the defendant (ie insurance)
o Contribution – other defendants held liable contribute to damages
Supplemental Jurisdiction
Assignment 19. The History of Supplemental Jurisdiction. 318-330.
Chapter 4. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter

D. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts – Supplemental Claims and Parties
 Federal court must have subject matter jurisdiction over all claims of action – supplemental jurisdiction
allows jurisdiction over claims lacking independent basis for federal jurisdiction
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs (SCOTUS 1966)
 Consolidated closed one mine and then opened another using a different labor union than those laid off
at first mine. United Mine Works (first union) not happy. Gibbs, who ran this new mine, began losing all
the jobs and suspected UMW was intimidating or otherwise impacting these decisions.
 Gibbs (TN) sued UMW (unincorporated association – diversity – citizenship of all members – UMW
has members in TN). No diversity jurisdiction; brought in federal court because of federal question –
first claim - Section 303 of federal labor management relations act. Second claim – state law – tortious
interference with business relations. Joins claims.
 At trial, jury finds for Gibbs on both counts. Defendant files motion notwithstanding jury verdict. Judge
says federal claim dismissed but will allow judgment of state law claim to stand and adjust damages
awarded accordingly.
 Now, question of whether they could assert jurisdiction over the state law claim
o Ancillary jurisdiction – allowed to hear claim joined with original federal claim
 SCOTUS – looks to the constitution (constitutional basis for supplemental jurisdiction) – this is one case
with multiple claims; if the claims are sufficiently related, and the federal claim is sufficient to give
subject matter jurisdiction, then there is federal jurisdiction
o “case” – claims arising out of common nucleus of operative facts [arising under same facts]
o just because lose federal claim, doesn’t mean there wasn’t jurisdiction over the federal claim and
if the state claim was joined under same case, there is federal jurisdiction
o Power to hear the state law claim – but don’t have to hear it; discretionary
 Discretion – considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to litigants
Note on Pendant and Ancillary Jurisdiction Following Gibbs
 Aldinger v. Howard – statute authorizes jurisdiction where federal claim and additional state-law
claims where there is no independent basis for jurisdiction when brought in same case against same
defendant; cannot bring claim against one defendant with federal jurisdiction and join a claim against
another defendant where there is no federal jurisdiction [not a sweeping declaration, for this case]
o Different from Gibbs because party added claims; here adding defendants with no federal
jurisdiction and claim against them with no fed. juris.
o In this case - statute makes it inappropriate because congress drew line between officers and the
county.
 Owen Equipment & Erection Co v. Kroger – plaintiff Kroger from Iowa, defendant OPPD from
Nebraska, bring suit in federal court. Defendant impleads Owen Equipment from Iowa and drops out.
Plaintiff then amended her claim and adds claim against Owen Equipment. By adding Owen Equipment
to complaint she destroys complete diversity and prevents federal jurisdiction over this case.
 Finley v. US – Finley sues the Federal Aviation Association (arising under jurisdiction), then tried to
amend complaint to add additional defendant City of San Diego and Utility Company. No federal
jurisdiction over the additional parties. Court assumes there is constitutional power under common
nucleus of fact but no affirmative statutory authorization. Scalia says of course Congress can change this
scope of authority. In response, Congress passed 28 USC 1367.
10/21/14 Class Notes
FR 13 compulsory counterclaims
 Must state as counter claim any claim against an opposing party if the claim arises out of subject matter
of opposing parties claim
Supplemental Jurisdiction
 Claim over which federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction joined with a claim over which federal
courts have no independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore need supplemental
jurisdiction to hear the supplemental claim (the claim over which they do not have jurisdiction)
 Constitutional basis – may hear cases over which there is jurisdiction – therefore if multiple related
claims (arising from common nucleus of fact) in one case where there is some federal claim there is
jurisdiction over all claims
 Statutory basis – 28 USC 1367 (a)
o Test – claims to be so related – derived from common nucleus of fact]
 Codifies the constitutional basis in Gibbs
o Explicit authorization for supplemental party jurisdiction
 (b) exception – no supplemental jurisdiction over persons made parties under FR 14, 19,
20, or 24 [ie Kroger] when inconsistent with 28 USC 1332 [diversity jurisdiction]
 Kroger would come out the same
 Finley would be opposite – not 1332 but 1331 [arising under] so (b) does not
apply and authorizes supplemental jurisdiction over the additional parties
 Aldinger would also come out differently because claims in case all arising under
same common nucleus of fact under 1331
 (c) discretionary exceptions – may decline supplemental jurisdiction if 1. Claim raises
novel or complex issue of state law [principles of comity – customary respect for other
sovereigns] 2. Supplemental claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims
where there was original jurisdiction 3. District court dismissed all claims over which it
had original jurisdiction 4. In exceptional circumstances there are other compelling
reasons to decline jurisdiction
o Problems with the statute
 A (VA) v. B (MD) in federal court under 1332 diversity; B impleads C (VA); A cannot
amend claim to include C because diversity claim 1332 and C was brought in under FR
14.
 If C is impleaded and makes counterclaim against A there is supplemental jurisdiction
but then A is required to make compulsory counter claim under FR 13 and the federal
court cannot hear this counterclaim by A
 Just bc FR allows something, there also has to be federal personal and subject matter jurisdiction
Assignment 20. The Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute. Casebook 330 – 339, 343-344; 28 USC 1367.
Chapter 4. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter of the Action

D. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts – Supplemental Claims and Parties
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc. (SCOTUS 2005)
I. Parties
 Exxon Mobile Corp. – defendant
 Assume at least one plaintiff has claim over $75K, while others are less than $75K
o Prior to 1367 each person had to meet the minimum to be heard in federal court for subject
matter jurisdiction [Zahn – class action case]
 10,000 exxon dealers filed class action suit against Exxon Corp in district court, under diversity
jurisdiction
III. Facts
IV. Legal Issue
 Can federal court in diversity action exercise supplemental jurisdiction over additional plaintiffs whose
claims do not satisfy the minimum amount in controversy requirement? – does 1367 change this?
V. Rule
 Yes, there is federal jurisdiction – under section 1367(a) includes any claims or joinder of additional
parties if so related they form part of one constitutional case (FR 20(a)(1) – joinder of plaintiffs). In any
civil action where there is original jurisdiction over the claim, the federal courts will have jurisdiction
over all other claims.
o Dictum [not binding because not the issue in the case] - even though you can add plaintiffs who
do not meet the minimum, you cannot join non-diverse plaintiffs and destroy diversity
 Contamination theory – the two requirements perform different functions – amount in
controversy just ensures that the case is serious enough to be worth the time in federal
court and once there’s one plaintiff with amount in controversy then that threshold is met;
diversity is clearly enumerated by Congress and adding non-diverse party would
undermine the whole point of diversity jurisdiction to prevent bias.
 Otherwise, supplemental jurisdiction (1367) would overrule complete diversity –
don’t want to do that
o Section (b) diversity exception only applies to claims by plaintiffs against defendants joined by
FR 14, 19, 20, or 24 or plaintiffs joined under 19 – not under rule 20 so it’s okay.
 Dissent – supplemental jurisdiction should not overrule Clark and Zahn, which say that each plaintiff
must meet minimum amount in controversy to be joined and any plaintiffs who do not meet the
minimum must be dismissed; civil action refers to original action and whether there was original
jurisdiction over that action. So if they were all joined at the same time, and some plaintiff’s did not
meet minimum then it would not be federal jurisdiction but if all met minimum at original action and
then joined others, there would be jurisdiction.
o Drafters of the statute had the 4 prior cases in mind (Gibbs, Kroger, Finley, and Aldinger) but did
not think about any other scenarios like this.
o Legislative history says they just wanted to undo Finley but did not intend to upset Zahn
 SCOTUS goes to legislative history when statute is not clear; if it is, then there is no reason to do so.
Majority here is saying the statute is very clear – (a) is broad supplemental jurisdiction rule, with the
exceptions in (b) and (c); so clearly intended these exceptions to be specific. Legislative history cannot
contradict the statute when the statute is clear because all Congress votes on statute, but only committee
votes on the history.
o Why have legislative history? To show they agreed/disagreed with something that the statute
does/requires
o Why is Zahn in the legislative history? Some rich person called.
o Zahn rule made it harder to bring class actions to federal court. A lot of plaintiff’s attorney’s
would rather be in state court. Now easier to bring class actions in federal court, which is what
defendant attorney’s want.
Notes and Questions
 343 1. Circuits remain divided over whether there is supplemental jurisdiction under 28 USC 1367(c) –
whether Gibbs factors or statutory factors weigh more
 343 3. California Dept. of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp. – held district court’s discretionary
decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction may be challenged on appeal
1367(c) - discretion
 dispute among circuits on how to interpret
 When federal courts might exercise discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction
 Gibbs mentions jury confusion – so there are other factors than those listed specifically in (c) – could
fall under (c)(4)
 Can decline if
o Novel or complex issue of state law – don’t want to usurps state power or prevent case from
going to state court to be resolved
o Supplemental claim is the main claim and there wouldn’t be original jurisdiction over this claim
o When all federal claims are dismissed – can depend on when dismissed – like in Gibbs, dismissal
of federal claims happened after trial so would be kind of wasteful
o Exceptional circumstances
Venue
To have a case, must have:
 Personal Jurisdiction
 Subject Matter Jurisdiction
o Diversity of Citizenship
o Federal Questions Jurisdiction
o Supplemental Jurisdiction (allows court to hear a claim related to a claim over which it has
subject matter jurisdiction that it otherwise would not have jurisdiction over)
 Venue
Removal
 Defendant removes case from state to federal court
o Exception – defendant cannot remove on basis of diversity jurisdiction if the suit is brought in
the state court of the state he lives in
 Plaintiff cannot remove because they chose the original forum
 In order to remove, must have been a claim that plaintiff could have brought in federal court originally
Challenging Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
 Allowed to challenge subject matter jurisdiction at any point in proceedings [including appeals]; judges
can also raise the issue sua sponte
Assignment 21. Removal, Venue and Forum Non-Conveniens. Casebook 345-352.

Assignment 22. Challenging Subject-Matter Jurisdiction. Casebook 352-357.
Chapter 4. Jurisdiction over Subject Matter

E. The Subject-Matter Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts – Removal
Note on Removal Jurisdiction
 Removal – allows suit filed in state court to be transferred to federal court; only defendant has right to
removal
 Requirement for removal – district court would have had original jurisdiction had it originally been filed
in federal court
 Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp v. Sheets – plaintiff cannot remove to federal courts even if a defendant
interposes a federal counterclaim. Started in state court; when defendant adds federal counterclaim the
plaintiff wants to remove to federal court. Why would plaintiffs want this? More expertise in applying
federal law. But state courts are competent to hear federal claims.
 Bright v. Bechtel Petroleum, Inc. – cannot block removal by disguising federal nature of the claim; no
federal claim, breach of contract claim. Plaintiff wanted to keep in state court while defendant wanted to
remove. Was removal proper? Can’t remove on a defense raised – federal income tax is required and
implied term of employment contract. But he is challenging a federal rule and defense is asserting that
this is really a federal question. So hard to know what’s going on.
Davis v. City of Shreveport Police Dept. (W. D. Louisiana 2012)
I. Parties
 Plaintiff – David
 Defendants – City of Shreveport Police Department and KSLA
 Claim libel, slander, malicious prosecution, and defamation alleging they violated his due process rights
 Plaintiff brings suit in state court, City of Shreveport removes to federal court but KSLA did not consent
to removal; plaintiff then objects to remand to state court
III. Facts
IV. Legal Issue
 Do both defendants have to agree to removal?
V. Rule
 28 USC 1446(b) - All defendants must agree to remove
 Remanded. KLSA timely raised refusal to consent to removal.
F. Challenging the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Court
Direct Attack on a Court’s Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
 Note 1. Steel Co v. Citizens for a Better Environment – establishing jurisdiction is inflexible and without
exception
o Cannot “assume” jurisdiction and dismiss on the merits because then person would appeal based
on merits but subject matter jurisdiction was not established.
o Dismissal based on lack of jurisdiction [dismissed without prejudice] means suit can be refiled in
any other court that does have jurisdiction; if dismissed on the merits [dismissed with prejudice]
there is not right to bring in other court, which deprives on the plaintiff of relief.
 Note 1. Rurghas AG v. Marathon Oil Co. – inquiry into personal jurisdiction can precede subject-matter
jurisdiction [must have both to bring suit in federal court]
o If dismissed on lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, does not prevent refiling of the
case
 Note 2. Willy v. Coastal Corp – federal courts can impose sanctions on a party even where they might
lack subject matter jurisdiction [ex. require discovery docs to determine jurisdiction]; courts always have
authority to determine whether there is jurisdiction
 Note 4. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis – federal court retained jurisdiction despite lack of complete diversity.
Tried the case. SCOTUS says this is ok because of efficiency. Then in Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global
Group LP – there was no complete diversity but then two dropped out and there was complete diversity,
but at time action was filed there was not so no removal [commencement of action rule]. Reconcile?
Caterpillar – non-diverse defendant was dismissed by court action vs Grupo – two defendants
voluntarily dropped out. If diversity was proper at time commenced then it is kept.
Collateral Attack on a Judgment for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
 Never appear to first case – default judgment against you – try to enforce judgment in place where there
is jurisdiction over you/property [Pennoyer v. Neff]
 Collateral attack – attack judgment when they try to enforce the judgment on you – risky because if you
lose the judgment is enforced and you never got to challenge the case on its merits because gave that up
by not appearing.
Venue
 Location of trial
 Allocates cases within each judicial system (state or circuit)
 Interests and convenience of parties and circumstances of the litigation
 Transfer of venue occurs within one court system
Assignment 24. Venue. Casebook 359-363; 368-382.

Chapter 5. Venue, Transfer and Forum Non Conveniens
A. Venue
General Principles
 Venue State Statutes predicated on:
o Where the subject of the action or part thereof is situated
o Where the cause of action ,or part thereof, arose or accrued
o Where some fact is present or happened
o Where the defendant resides
o Where the defendant is doing business
o Where the defendant has an office or place of business, or an agent, or representative, or where
an agent or officer of defendant resides
o Where plaintiff resides
o Where the plaintiff is doing business
o Where the defendant may be found
o Where the defendant may be summoned or served
o In the county designated in the plaintiff’s complaint
o In any county
o Where the seat of government is located
 Federal Statute – 28 USC 1391 – Venue Generally
o Federal district courts – all in one state – the number depends on the size of the state
Venue in the Federal Courts
Bates v. C & S Adjusters, Inc. (Court of Appeals, 2nd Cir 1992)
I. Parties
 Bates – plaintiff
 C&S – defendant
 Bates brought action under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act in Western District of NY. C&S filed
motion to dismiss for improper venue. District court granted the motion.
o They should have also made a motion for lack of personal jurisdiction. This was huge lawyering
mistake and their lawyer did not pay attention in civ pro.
III. Facts
 Bates incurred debt as a resident in the Western District of PA then moved to Western District of NY.
Postal service forwarded collection notice to Bates’ address in NY.
IV. Legal Issue
 Whether venue exists in a district in which the debtor resides and to which a bill collector’s demand for
payment was forwarded.
V. Rule
 28 USC 1391(b)(2) – allows action to be brought in a judicial district in which a substantial part of the
events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred
 Reverse. Venue in Western District of New York was proper. Notice was sent to NY, which gives rise to
the claim. If the letter had been returned, it is unlikely the claim would have been brought. Contact in the
forum state does not have to be purposeful for venue [unlike personal jurisdiction]. Whether or not they
wanted him to get letter, this is where the unfair behavior took place so venue is proper.
B. Transfer of Venue in Federal Courts
 In state courts, can transfer from one state court to another in the same state. Cannot transfer to another
state.
 In federal courts, can transfer from one federal district court to another in the same or another state
under 28 USC 1404 – change of venue
o Discretionary, must be in interest of justice, convenience of parties and witnesses, in place where
could be brought initially, if all parties consent
Hoffman v. Blaski (SCOTUS 1960)
 Plaintiffs, from IL, bring infringement claim in Northern District of TX district court where defendant
company’s only place of business is. Defendant waives venue and moves to transfer to Northern District
of IL under 1404. TX District Court allows transfer because of convenience, and say that venue is wide
scope. Plaintiff makes motion to remand back to TX. 5th Cir. says venue is ok. Plaintiffs move for writ
of mandamus against the judge to force him to bring case back to TX. 7th Cir says it must have been
“where it might have been brought” in the beginning as a matter of right, not as a matter of defendant’s
permission. Since they could not have brought suit in IL to begin with, must remove back to TX.
SCOTUS affirmed.
o If allow 5th Cir ruling of wide venue scope, potential for gross discrimination in venue practice
because plaintiff would not be able to bring a claim in a certain state, and defendant would be
allowed to remove to any place they want by waiving venue.
o Dissent – requires removal to be in the “interest of justice” – but this is vague; how do you
interpret it?
 Note 2. “interest of justice” – some courts interpret this as giving discretion to consider
other factors such as access to witnesses, access to the forum, docket congestion, speed to
trial, relationship of the community to the dispute, the court’s familiarity with the
governing law, plaintiff’s forum choice, whether the original forum is where plaintiff
resides, and the existence of a presuit venue agreement
o Note 3. Transfer of venue is just change of courtroom – apply the law of the state where the
action was originally brought [depending on the choice of law]; federal court applies substantive
law of the state in which it sits
 Van Dusen v. Barrack – Van Dusen Rule - where defendant seeks transfer, the
transferee district court must be obligated to apply the state law that would have been
applied there if there had been no change of venue; change of courtroom not change of
law
 Ferens v. John Deere Co. – applied Van Dusen Rule to plaintiff initiated transfer;
transfer from MS to PA – must apply MS law. Federal courts must apply the statute of
limitations in the state where they sit. So, because statute of limitations on one of the
claims plaintiff wanted to bring he brought one claim in PA and one in MS because they
have a longer statute of limitations, and then transferred venue back to PA. Must apply
longer MS statute in the PA court. Totally played the system.
 Why can plaintiff transfer venue? Statute does not specify which party has to
request to transfer venue.
o Cases in federal court can also be transferred venue in federal question and diversity jurisdiction
cases
 Diversity jurisdiction – follows Van Dusen rule because each state has different laws
 Federal question - district courts may differ on how they interpret federal laws and they
have to follow the interpretation of the federal laws by their circuit
 Van Dusen Rule does not apply because all circuits apply same federal law, just
following different interpretation
o Note 13. 28 USC 1407 – would be weird for one circuits to apply another circuit’s interpretation
because each has its own authority.
Forum Non Conveniens

 Allows dismissal with assumption that case will be refiled in more appropriate jurisdiction
o another jurisdiction must be available
Multi-factor balancing test balancing private interest and public interest, convenience to witnesses, interest
of the court, etc.
Assignment 25. Casebook 383-396.
Chapter 5. Venue, Transfer and Forum Non Conveniens

C. Forum Non Conveniens
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno (SCOTUS 1981)
 Plane crashed in Scotland, all decedents were Scottish and plane was subject to Scottish air traffic
control. Plane manufactured by Piper in PA and propellers made by Hartzell in OH. Preliminarily found
propeller was defective, but then found pilot error – flying too low over Scottish highlands.
 Sued Piper and Hartzell in CA – appoint legal secretary Reyno to administer case, US has more
favorable damages, attorney in CA probably heard about the crash and contacted the families. Case
brought in Superior Court of CA (state court); defendants remove from state to federal court under
foreign diversity jurisdiction (Scottish plaintiff v. US manufacturer) to Central District of CA. This is
smart because CA state court judges were elected and the local attorneys probably donate. Piper does
not contest personal jurisdiction in CA, but Hartzell argues there is no personal jurisdiction in CA – but
doesn’t matter because transfer to PA and re-served Hartzell in PA. Once in federal court, defendants
make motion to transfer venue to Middle District of PA.
o Van Dusen rule applies differently to Piper and Hartzell – two different choice of law rules with
two different tort laws by moving to PA federal court. For Piper, Van Dusen rule applies – must
apply CA choice of law rules in PA court. For Hartzell, Van Dusen rule does not apply and must
use PA choice of law rules. These choice of law rules would result in different laws and
ultimately PA laws would apply to Piper and Scottish law would apply to Hartzell. This would
confuse the jury.
 Once in PA federal court, moved to dismiss on ground of forum non conveniens. Defendants agree to
waive any statute of limitations defenses and subject themselves to Scottish law. So PA district court is
like yeah totally, let Scotland deal with this and will be much more convenient.
o Why are they doing this? Showing that there is another forum in which case could be tried; no
strict liability in Scotland; better laws in the US for plaintiffs including punitive damages
 3rd Circuit reverses – standard of review: abuse of discretion
o say that dismissal for forum non conveniens should not be granted if it will result in less
favorable forum for plaintiffs
 SCOTUS reverses. This rule by 3rd Circuit is wrong because it would remove doctrine of forum non
conveniens and then everyone would want to litigate in the US. District Court exercised discretion
properly, no abuse of discretion. Scotland is more appropriate alternative forum. Public factors like jury
confusion and court resources and evidence and witnesses point towards Scotland. If try case in the US,
can’t compel evidence/witnesses from Scotland if not parties in the case. Unfavorable change in law is
only a consideration if the alternative forum is so clearly inadequate.
o Note 3. Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi – Pahlavi was the Shah of Iran recognized by the US
government, overthrown in revolution in 1979. He fled to NY for medical treatment for cancer.
While in hospital, served process for NY court for $35 billion from Iran. Pahlavi makes motion
to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Only other court is Iran – problem because they would
probably assassinate him. Court grants motion, saying it would be undue burden of proof on NY
court to force them to take foreign-based actions unrelated to the State merely because a more
appropriate forum is unwilling or unable to accept jurisdiction.
 At the time, Iran was holding US hostages. US does not recognize Islamic Republic of
Iran as legitimate government – so may not actually be allowed to sue because if
president doesn’t recognize a government then the courts can’t recognize them either.
Pleading
 How to start a lawsuit
 Complaint
 Response
 Purpose
o Providing notice of nature of a claim or defense
o Identifying baseless claims
o Setting each party’s view of the facts
o Narrowing the issues
 Traditionally
o Common law pleading in state courts came from England
 Code Pleading – NY first to adopt in late 1800s – required less detail than common law
pleading
 Today, still differs by state
o Statute - Process Act of 1789 in federal courts [should use the forms of proceeding of state courts
in which they sit]
 1872 – Conformity Act – use forms of proceeding of state in which they sit based on
whatever code pleading was in the state at that time
 Modern Federal Pleading
o 1938 - Rules enabling act – rules of practice and procedure in federal courts in civil action -
Federal Rules of Civ Pro
o FR make procedures for starting lawsuit uniform and make it easier
 Burden of pleading – follows burden of proof – party who bears burden at trial bears burden of pleading
elements of the claim; defendant has burden to plead affirmative defenses
o Burden of Proof in Civil Cases – preponderance of the evidence (over 50%); plaintiff has burden
except for affirmative defenses
 FR 8(a)(2) – short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief
o How much detail do you need to include?
o P. 565 Note 4. (a) too vague – doesn’t say anything (b) too vague – doesn’t state relief, the
injury, where, or the conduct (c) still vague – doesn’t state relief, conduct, or injury (d) good –
includes the conduct, damages, injury, date, and place (e) good – but includes specific negligent
conduct and may not be able to raise other negligent conduct later (f) allowable but too specific –
how would they know how fast the roller coaster is going? if jury and/or judge hear specific
allegations in complaint that might bias against plaintiff if can’t prove the exact conduct in the
complaint
o Form 11 – statement of jurisdiction, date and place, conduct, injury
 Can allege negligent conduct in vague way – “negligent in driving car”
 This is pretty broad, but might not know why they were behaving negligently.
This is okay; may come up in discovery or may not be relevant to proving case on
the merits.
 FR 12(b)(6) – motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
o Most defendants will file motion to dismiss before responding to the complaint
 FR 9(b) – heightened pleading requirement – must state with particularity circumstances constituting
fraud [false or misleading statement by someone to another person to induce them to rely on the
statement to their detriment] or mistake
o Particularity – gives notice of the claim against them, prevents frivolous claims that could impair
reputation [allegation of intentional dishonesty and is a crime so this is bad]
Assignment 25. Modern Pleading. Casebook 553-556; 558-579. FR 2, 3, 7,8, 10, 11, 12(e), 84
Dioguardi v. Durning (2nd Cir Appeals 1944)

 Plaintiff denied counsel and did not speak English well. Plaintiff suing a collector of customs (customs
duties).
 District Court dismissed and said you need to get a lawyer and fix this complaint. He said no and
amended it himself.
 According to amended complaint, he paid $5000 for merchandise but dispute of how much customs tax
he would pay; some other things alleged that are unclear.
 2nd Cir. says it says District Court erred in dismissing the amended complaint. He’s saying they
misplaced some of his merchandise and sold some of it inappropriately. But they are also telling the
plaintiff that he will lose if he doesn’t get an attorney.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorea N.A. (SCOTUS 2002)
 Plaintiff from Hungary and 53 yo working for French insurance company headquartered in NY. CEO is
French and demoted plaintiff and hired French national who was 32 yo to take his place to energize the
department.
 Claiming age and ethnic discrimination: Federal Age Discrimination Law - can’t discriminate against
persons over 40
 Must plead intent to discriminate – hard to show
Conley v. Gibson
 Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (SCOTUS 2007)
 Anti-trust law – prevents certain anti-competitive behaviors; can bring private actions or government
can bring action.
o Can’t price fix
 Class action suit suing all phone companies alleging violation of Section 1 of Sherman Act (anti-trust
law) by not competing with each other in provision of phone and internet service. Allege in complaint
that the companies have agreement not to compete on “information and belief” (signal that there is no
information) – no other facts because don’t know anything because it’s a “conspiracy” or no agreement
actually exists. Defendants file 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss – failure to state a claim
o Held – they did not allege sufficient facts and so they only alleged a legal conclusion – that there
was an agreement. No specific information that shows an agreement although behavior is
consistent with an agreement. Must plead facts that make it plausible that there’s a claim.
 Should plaintiffs be allowed to start a case just by saying there is an agreement even if
they don’t know that it exists? It costs a lot of money to do the discovery process.
 Court is concerned about abuse of the system – could sue any industry for anti-competing
agreement without any proof that agreement exists.
 Parallel conduct is not illegal unless you have an agreement to fix the prices
 Dissent – they didn’t even have to deny the allegations because motion to dismiss occurs before
response to complaint.
o DOJ is allowed to investigate anti-trust violations with no information – can subpoena docs and
records without any restrictions
 Procedure:
o Plaintiff files complaint
o Defendant has option to file 12(b) motion to dismiss without responding
o If denied, defendant must answer/deny
o Discovery - $$ millions [case management – judge can have power over discovery but judges are
relatively passive at this stage]
Assignment 26. Modern Pleading Cont’d. Casebook 579-599.

Assignment 27. Pleading Special Matters. Casebook 600-606. FR 9
Chapter 8. Modern Pleading

Section A. The Complaint
Ashcroft v. Iqbal (SCOTUS 2009)
 Pakistani Muslim was in the US illegally and was detained to determine whether they were risk to
national security
 Sue attorney general and director of the FBI because they approved the detention policy
 Background
o Aliens have some but not all constitutional rights of citizens; when government discriminates on
basis of race or religion it is unconstitutional if it is intentional [not if it has disparate impacts on
different groups]
o Qualified immunity for some government officials acting in their official capacity – they can
only be sued if they act in bad faith
 Iqbal alleges intentional racial and religious discrimination. SCOTUS says complaint is not plausible.
o What does “plausible” mean under Twombly and Iqbal? Higher standard than Conley’s “not
impossible” standard. Between possible and probable. Need informational facts to support legal
conclusion.
o Why? Government officials have qualified immunity. Did not satisfy elements because detention
policy was not intentionally discriminatory despite disparate impact and so is not
unconstitutional. No specific allegations beyond general discrimination.
 If it had be intentional discrimination, then gov officials would not have been acting in
good faith and qualified immunity would not apply
o Dissent – thinks there should be law against disparate impact of legislation/policies
Pleading Standards and Pro Se Litigation
 Erickson v. Pardus (SCOTUS 2007) – Prisoner claimed he was denied medical treatment which violated
his constitutional rights and jeopardized his life. Lower court dismissed complaint because it made
conclusory allegations, but SCOTUS reversed saying his allegations are all sufficient.
Pleading Special Standards
Denny v. Carey (E.D. Penn. 1976)
 Allege violations of federal and state securities laws
 What is proper standard under FR 9 [how much more detail than fR8] and how does that apply to facts
of this complaint?
o Only slightly more detail required
o It is sufficient
 Note 2. Denny v. Barber (2d Cir. 1978) – make same allegations against a different bank as in Carey.
2d cir says not sufficient, need more than vague allegations on “information and belief” – they are
describing vague business practices that are illegal but not giving any specific instances
o Form 21. Fraudulent Conveyance – committing fraud on other debtors; bankrupt defendant gets
rid of assets to defraud plaintiff and hinder collection of debt
o It is not sufficient to believe the bank did something wrong, must have facts
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
 After lots of securities fraud cases, have PSLRA to supersede FR9(b) in these types of cases
 heightened pleading requirements than 9(b) – every statement allegedly misleading and facts giving rise
to strong inference of actor’s state of mind [mens rea requirement] with particularity
 What does “strong inference” mean?
Tellabs, Inc. V. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. (SCOTUS 2007)
 Statutory interpretation: to qualify of strong, must be cogent and at least as compelling as any
other inference of non-fraudulent intent
 This looks at the purpose of the statute
o Scalia - concurrence in the judgment – should be more plausible than the inference of
non-fraudulent intent
 Looking at the text of the statute
o Alito – concurring in the judgment – only facts pleaded with particularity can be used to
determine whether there is a strong inference [agrees with Scalia on what is strong]
 Can’t plead on information and belief without pleading facts with particularity
 Note 1. Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo – need to allege causation [that defendant’s
fraud caused the plaintiff’s economic loss]
o hard to prove causation because stock prices move so much
Responding to Complaint
FR 12(b)(2-5) – motions to dismiss on different grounds; waive it if don’t raise it
 Personal jurisdiction – can consent to jurisdiction
 Subject-matter jurisdiction – can’t waive [Capron v. Noorden]; can be raised at any time
 Improper venue
 Insufficient process
 Insufficient service of process
FR 12(b)(6)
 Failure to state a claim
o Test legal sufficiency of a claim
 Not illegal
 Leave out element
o Challenge sufficiency of allegations
 Too vague – don’t give enough notice
If motion to dismiss is denied, must respond to the complaint
FR 8(b)
 (1) in responding to a pleading a party must (A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim
asserted against it and (B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by opposing party
 (5) lacking knowledge of an allegation
 (3) general denial – bad because it denies everything in the complaint – need to admit to some specifics
then can generally deny everything else
Bad Denials
 negative pregnant denial – denies the truth of a proposition without really denying the proposition
o ex. I deny I owe plaintiff $89,000 – are you denying that there was a lesser amount owed?
 conjunctive denial – does not deny the truth of each proposition on its own
o ex. “I deny there was an affair lasting 3 years” – are you denying that there was an affair or the
length of the affair?
Must include Affirmative Defenses
 8(c) – must state any avoidance or affirmative defense [enumerated but not complete list]
o avoidance – not denying allegation, just avoiding liability in some way [immunity]
o Why? Gives plaintiff notice of the claims that prevent liability.
o Defendant has burden of pleading and proving affirmative defenses by preponderance of
evidence
If defendant makes counterclaim to original claim, plaintiff must reply to the counterclaim and include any
affirmative defenses in this.
Assignment 28. Responding to the Complaint - Motions. 610-618. FR 12

B. Responding to the Complaint
1. Time to Respond
 21 days – but waiver of service extends time
2. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim
American Nurses’ Association v. Illinois (7th Cir 1986)
 Under Civil Rights Act discrimination based on gender is illegal
 Claim – traditionally male jobs are paid more than traditionally female jobs
o “comparable worth” [payment for different jobs] is not illegal unless it was maintained with
intent to discriminate based on sex
 difficult because hard to show whether one job is “worth” more than another [ex.
Firefighter vs. teacher]
o Allegations are complicated because historically some jobs have more males or more females.
Need to prove that this was intentional. State study said they were not paying comparable jobs
comparably and then state did not implement recommendations.
o Court allows this claim to go through – under FR 8, intent can be alleged generally
Assignment 29. Responding to the Complaint – Answer. Casebook 619-626. FR 8

B. Responding to the Complaint
b. Affirmative Defenses
Ingraham v. US (5th Cir 1987)
 In Texas, there is a $5,000 cap on pain and suffering damages not applicable to medical and other
expenses.
 Ingraham got judgment in excess of $5,000 for pain and suffering. But government did not raise this
Texas limitation before or during the trial or immediately after trial under rule 60(b) – grounds for relief
from final judgment . Should this have been brought under 8.
o Court rules this is an avoidance and defense did not raise this under 8(c) and therefore no relief.
Taylor v. US (9th Cir 1987)
 Damages awarded in excess of California Civil Code limit on non-economic injuries.
 Held the government did not have to plead this statutory limit as affirmative defense because it operates
under law and is not really an affirmative defense.
These cases show that there is confusion over what constitutes and affirmative defense; or may need to
request amendment
Amendments – FR 15
15(a) amendments before trial
15(b) amendments during and after trial
15(c)Amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading when:
 (1)(A) – law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back (State law questions
 (1)(B) – amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence
set out – or attempted to be set out – in the original pleading
 (1)(C) – changes the party or naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted if 15(c)(1)(B) is
satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint the
party to be brought in amendment by (i) received such notice of the action that will not be prejudiced in
defending on the merits (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against
it but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity
 for defendant to get affirmative relief from plaintiff they have to make a counter claim
 Statute of Limitations – must file complaint within statute of limitations or under 4(m) 120 days that can
extend statute of limitations in some cases
Assignment 30. Amendments. Casebook 627-639. FR 15

C. The Reply
FR 7(a)
D. Amendment
Beeck v. Aquaslide N Dive Corp (8th Cir 1977)
 Kimberly Community ordered a slide and when Beeck was on it, he was injured. Aquaslide insurance
company suggested it was definitely an Aquaslide product. Aquaslide admitted it was their slide in
response to complaint.
 After statute of limitations expired, Aquaslide moved to amend the response to deny that it was their
slide after their president saw the slide and recognized it was not theirs but a knock-off. Plaintiff opposes
the motion because they didn’t sue the distributors and statute of limitations passed [this would have
been a good idea because then the plaintiff can say we don’t know which one of you was negligent or
fraudulent but you guys can decide that amongst yourselves]. Court gives leave to amend, which is
proper because it’s unfair to make defendant pay for something they didn’t do wrong – did not delay,
acted reasonably. Plaintiff can still contest the denial, but up to jury.
o Judge has discretion to give leave to amend. The court of appeals only determines whether it was
an abuse of discretion, not how they would have decided.
 Tolling of statute of limitations – in some types of cases like fraud, the statute of limitations is not
started at the time of misconduct but at the time the plaintiff knew or should have known about the
misconduct.
Note 4. Moore v. Moore - for defendant to get affirmative relief from plaintiff they have to make a counter
claim. Here, she did not make a counterclaim but said custody with the father is bad and awarded her
custody even though she didn’t ask for it. This is appropriate because if a question of who gets custody, and
one loses, presumably the other gets custody. She also got child support because it’s a part of custody and
he got visitation rights and bond [put up money that if he absconds with the child, he loses all the money].
She also got attorney’s fees because they said why not. These were all considered “impliedly consented” to
be decided by the court. However, they denied separate maintenance because she did not ask for anything
via counterclaim and this is outside the realm of child custody because its only for mother’s benefit.
 “implied consent” goes against notice
D. Amendments
Krupski v. Costa Crociere SPA
 Krupski hurts her leg on cruise and brings claim against Costa Cruise. At this point they do not tell her
that Costa Crociere was the correct party. After statute of limitations on response they say Crociere was
correct party. Dismissed Cruise and gave Krupski leave to amend and add Crociere and then Crociere
moved to dismiss because statute of limitations expired and does not relate back under 15(c)
o Argue there was no mistake and Krupski knew about Crociere long before they amend.
o SCOTUS says no, the rule says the defendant (Crociere) knew or should have known it would be
named a defendant but for the plaintiff’s error. Focus on plaintiff’s knowledge was an error of
the lower courts.
 Question is whether Crociere had notice. Probably knew or should have known they
would have been named defendants but for mistake because of corporate structure –
Cruise is marketing agent for Crociere in USA.
 Mistake –the website was misleading so suing Costa Cruise was reasonable but it was a
mistake because Italian Crociere was proper defendant. Costa Cruise may have been
misleading her because they did not initially tell her Crociere was the correct defendant
until after statute of limitations expired and tried to settle. Lower court fixated in delay in
correcting defendant.
 Mistake – companies with similar names both dealing with plaintiff and
understandable plaintiff would make mistake.
o SCOTUS says it doesn’t matter how long it took to amend becaues the
rule requires a mistake, which there was, and all other elements of rule
satisfied
 But why didn’t she amend when Costa Cruise sent response? SCOTUS says it
doesn’t matter.
 Scalia – concurs specially – doesn’t want to rely on advisory committee because
no one votes on it and we [SCOTUS] created the FR’s.
 Note 1. Hypo – guy sues police department and two unknown police officers, and then after statute of
limitations he finds out the names and amends. Officers knew about the lawsuit during the 120 day
extension. Does this relate back? No, not mistake because he just didn’t know the names of the officers;
type of lawsuit does not relate back because standard of liability for police department is policy, not
responsible for rogue officers; waited a really long time to sue. Yes, purpose of rule is to allow for
correction of defendants under sympathetic circumstances.
o “Mistake” has not really been defined by SCOTUS
o In Krupski, the two companies were related. What if it was unrelated companies with similar
names? Pre-filing discovery to figure out who to sue. If you sue one, and then want to substitute
a different one, there’s not really a reason that they should know of the suit so might not fall
under the rule.
o What does it mean that you receive such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced on the
merits and you knew or should have known it would have been brought against you if not for the
mistake?
Integrity in Pleading
 Shareholder Derivative Action – party bringing suit must verify [swear it’s true] complaint [FR 23(1)]
 FR 11 – general requirement for all things filed with the court
o 11(a) Someone has to sign the paper [usually attorney]
o 11(b) signature certifies that good faith basis: (1) not frivolous, (2) legal contentions are
warranted by existing law (3) factual contentions have evidentiary support or likely will after
discovery (4) denials of factual contentions are based on lack of evidence or reasonable
belief/information
o Must make inquiry “reasonable under the circumstances” - how much independent inquiry must
attorney make into their client’s story?
o 11(c) Sanctions for non-compliance are discretionary
 11(c)(2) – before telling court, have to go to opposing party and say this is not based on
good faith and will move for sanctions if not corrected or withdrawn within 21 days
 Scalia dissented from adoption of this rule because thought it made it “toothless”
because people can do it and if caught just withdraw without penalty
 Lawyers have obligation not to file pleadings that do not have basis in law and fact
Assignment 31. Ensuring Integrity in Pleading. Casebook 641-657. FR 11

Section F. Provisions to Deter Frivolous Pleadings
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp. (SCOTUS 1966)
 On advice of her son-in-law, Surowitz bought stock in Hilton. Later they sent letter informing her that
they were going to buy some of their stock back. Her son got suspicious and investigated.
 Mrs. Surowitz said she didn’t really understand during deposition that she had verified and relied on her
son-in-law Brilliant’s advice; she was Polish immigrant who did not speak great English
o Why isn’t Brilliant the named plaintiff? Not sympathetic to jury; she is, because she spent years
saving to be able to buy just a little stock in Hilton
 District Court dismissed with prejudice, appellate confirms.
 SCOTUS reverses – claims were legitimate despite her lack of understanding; the point of 23(b) is to
prevent frivolous suits, but this is not a frivolous suit – she naturally relied on Brilliant’s investigation.
o Harlan concurring – Her attorney verified it so she didn’t have to verify it
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communication Enterprises Inc. (SCOTUS 1991)
 Business Guides allege that Chromatic stole their guide and they knew because they purposely put in
fake listings. But 9 of the 10 “fake” listings were accurate. So Business Guides was sanctioned. Attorney
relied on Business Guides, SCOTUS says they have affirmative duty to conduct reasonable inquiry into
facts and the law before filing.
 Old FR 11 [more strict]
Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp (2nd Cir 1995)
 Hadges wants to sue state actors for constitutional violations; but some of his claims were not true – that
he hadn’t worked in 4 years, that he was scratched from a race following re-issuance of his license
 Sanctioned Hadges and his attorney, Kunstler
o Kunstler and Judge get into fight through letters
 2nd Cir said the lower court was not operating under the new FR 11 – did not give him 21 days to
withdraw [“safe harbor”]
 Notes and Questions
o Note 4. Twobly and FR 11 - If not plausible, can defendant make motion for FR 11 sanctions for
filing the complaint? Probably not just because pleading is dismissed unless showing of knowing
bad faith/misrepresentation/bad motive; judges probably wouldn’t like it if you pull this move.
o Note 5. Congress has imposed some FR 11 requirements on attorney. Special sanctions under
PSLRA – more like old rule [pre 1993] because requires sanctions
o Note 6. 28 USC 1927 – imposes costs on attorney who “so multiplies the proceedings in any case
unreasonably an vexatiously.” Chambers v. Nasco – federal courts have inherent power to
sanction attorneys beyond and outside of any rules or statutes already established

Civil Procedure Outline Summary

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Civil Procedure Outline

 Federal Rules – rule 1 “just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination

Civil Procedure: Cases and Materials

Chart: Minimum Contacts

Chapter 2: Jurisdiction Over the Parties or Their Property

Assignment 3.The Expansion of Personal Jurisdiction Casebook: pg. 86-96

Chapter 2: Jurisdiction Over The Parties or Their Properties

Chapter 2: Jurisdiction Over the Parties or Their Property

Civil Procedure Supplement

Assignment 5. Inconvenience to the Defendant. Casebook 120-132

Chapter 2. Jurisdiction Over Parties or Their Property

Assignment 6. The Stream of Commerce Problem. Casebook 133-150

Chapter 2. Jurisdiction Over Parties or Property

Assignment 7. General Jurisdiction. Casebook 150-158; Supplement 395-404.

Civil Procedure Cases and Materials

Assignment 8. Technology and Personal Jurisdiction. Casebook 158-165

Chapter 2. Jurisdiction of Parties or Property

Assignment 9. Jurisdiction Over Property. Casebook 165-180.

Civil Procedure Cases and Materials

Assignment 10. Transitory Jurisdiction. Casebook 180-191

Chapter 2. Jurisdiction Over Parties and Property

Chapter 2. Jurisdiction over Parties or Property

Chapter 3. Providing Notice and an Opportunity to be Heard

Assignment 13. The Mechanics of Providing Notice. Casebook 216-229, 234-236. FR 4, 5, 6

Civil Procedure Cases and Materials

Civil Procedure Cases and Materials

Civil Procedure Cases and Materials

Assignment 16. Claims and Counterclaims. Casebook 659-673. FR 13, 18

Civil Procedure Cases and Materials

Joinder of Parties; Crossclaims

Chapter 9. Joinder of Claims and Parties

Chapter 4. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter

Chapter 4. Jurisdiction over the Subject Matter of the Action

Assignment 21. Removal, Venue and Forum Non-Conveniens. Casebook 345-352.

Chapter 4. Jurisdiction over Subject Matter

Assignment 24. Venue. Casebook 359-363; 368-382.

Forum Non Conveniens

Assignment 25. Casebook 383-396.

Chapter 5. Venue, Transfer and Forum Non Conveniens

Dioguardi v. Durning (2nd Cir Appeals 1944)

Assignment 26. Modern Pleading Cont’d. Casebook 579-599.

Chapter 8. Modern Pleading

Assignment 28. Responding to the Complaint - Motions. 610-618. FR 12

Chapter 8. Modern Pleading

Assignment 29. Responding to the Complaint – Answer. Casebook 619-626. FR 8

Chapter 8. Modern Pleading

Assignment 30. Amendments. Casebook 627-639. FR 15

Assignment 31. Ensuring Integrity in Pleading. Casebook 641-657. FR 11

Chapter 8. Modern Pleading

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