on \ i The Tragedy Mi of Great | Mi Power Politics | John J. Mearsheimer | University of Chicago‘eerabte 216200 by sete Mente fra eV as ote i pubsbedars Nana apt 2003 ‘Sevan we fess WW te Sanya Sorta ence ew Yrs M0 otc ten a inaccurate "SEES 2 nectar aS wtp ec dine ESS nore atest IAN SrEo39ner 4p 1 Wexovlon 6 company 00 vee NewYork 10110 W wexeton€ compu 14 cade see, tang WID 385 CONTENTS Liv of Maps Lat of tables Prof othe Update Eton Preface he First Raton Acknotedgmenes Introduction “Anarchy and the Struggle for Power ‘Wealth and Power “The Primacy of Land Power Strategies for Survival ‘reat Powers in Action ‘The Offshore Balancers ‘Balancing versus Buck Posing ‘The Causes of Great Power War (Cen China Rise Peseefully? ies 267 34 360 “4DCan China Rise Peacefully? rh he ed of the Cold War in 1989 and he subsequent co lupe ofthe Soviet Union two yest le the United Snes emerged atthe most powerul sate on the planet. Many ‘commentators sald we ar ving in. 2 unipolar woud for the fee te a history whic sanotber way ofsying America isthe only reat power in ‘the itemaional stem. I tat satement i tue it makes le ene 19 tak sbout peat power pls, since there jut one great power ‘Rut even fone Believes. af do tht China and Rua ee gest pow: ex they ae sl lar weaker han the United States and in no poston 12 allege it in any meaning way, Therefor, interactions among the ‘reat powers are not going tobe nea as prominent feature of inte ‘onal psa hey were before 1989, when there were slays two or ‘more formidable great omer competing With each other ‘highligh this point coats tbe post-Cold Wor world with the ist inty years of the went century, when the Und Sates was deeply ‘commited to containing potential peer competion uch as Wilhelmine Germany, imperil Japan Na Germany andthe Soviet Union Dug that period the Ute Sates fought two wad was end engaged ith the Soviet Union ta an latense seeusty competion that spanned she lobe ‘Aer 1988, however, Ameican policymakers hardly had 0 worry shout iting spans rival peat power, and thus the United States was fee i wage wars aginst minor powers without having t0 Wory teh (can China Rise Peacetully? shout the atons ofthe other gre powers. Indeed has fought st wars since the Cold War ended: Ing (199), Bona (1995), Koso¥9 (1939), Afghanistan (2001-preem), Iraq again (2003-11), and Libya (2011), I has alo been consumed with Sahin terrors acres the lobe since September 1, 2001. Not suprisingly, there has been lle icerest i eat power pois ince the Soviet zest wired aay “The tke of China appears to be changing this stuaton, however, because tis development has the potent t9 fundamentally ater che arctecrre ofthe interatonal sytem, I the Chinese economy contin ues groming ae be lip i he nex ewe decd, the United States wil once spin face a potential peer compettor. and grea pomer polis wll return sul ore. Rist an open question at whether China's eco omy wl continue is specacular rise o even continue growing at more ‘modes, but til imoresive rate, There are inteligent armen on both sigs of tls ebaeandt shard now whos ght! ut shoe who are blith on China ace coe. il almost er tainly be dhe mos important geopolial development ofthe tment ceonury for Cina wl etraformes nto an enormous poweetul oun ty. Te aendant question that wl concer every maker of oe poy sd student of iterations pois i 2 simrle but profound ove: can (China nse peaceful? The alm ofthis chapter isto answer that question ‘opreicrie fuze in Ag one need heey fntermatnal pll- ‘cs dat explains ow rstag reat powers are Ukely 1 act and how che ter ates the sytem wl ea to them. We must rly on teary because many aspects of the future are anknowss we have few Secs out she frre. Thomas Hotbes put the point we: “The present only has eng in nature: things past ave being i the memory ony But things to come have no beng a all Ths, we mis se theories ore ic what ey co wanspie in woo pois lfessive realism ofers important insights into China's e.My aru sent na nutel eat China coaiaues to grow economical wil aempt © dominate Asa the way the Unted Stes dominates the Wester Hemisphere. The United Stes, however, wil goto enormous length t9 prevent China from achieving reponal hegemony. Most ofBeling’s nelghbors, Inding Ina, Japan, Singapore, South Kores Rosia and Vetam, loin with the Unies Stats to conta Chinese Dover. The res il bean intense Secure competion wit conser: ble potent for war. short, China’ ie likely to be wang Iris important emphasize tha my feu not aa how Chine wil behave in the immediate fae, but Stead on how it wl at fn the Toager erm, when ew be far more powers than it today The fact ‘tha preent day China des not poses signa military power: inary forces ae inter 19 those ofthe United States, Being would be msiang » huge mistake fo pick a gh wih the US. sntery nowadays ‘contemporary China in eher word, onsiine by the ital alance ‘ot power whic scat sacke in Ameri’ favor. Among other advan tapes the United Sates has many consequential ales aro the weld ‘le China bes virally sone. But we ate ao concemed ith that Son here. Inset, she focus on future world in which te balance of over hs hited sharly agains the United Sates, where China cote ‘uch more relative power than does today, and where China i roughly the same economic and mitary league asthe United States. tn fesenc, we ae tallng about wodl im whieh Chinas much Tes sine ant 8. ‘The remainder of the chiptrs organized a allows. The next secon comin a bret review ofthe core elements of my theory which ead cut in dea in Chapter 2 Then summmare my discussion of Amerir’s ve for hegemony inthe Western Hemisohere, leh i consdeed x engin Chapter 7 ti ear fom ts sory that the United States as sce accorng fo te cats of tlensve reasn for most of ts Binary. ‘Me subsequent secon focuzet on how a increas power Chins ey to Behave mala that 90, il et ccnding 10 my theory, ich is another way of saying Ic wil eectiey emulate the Untied States tn the nex section, I explain why the United state ay well Defings neighbors are lkely to form a balancing eoson to consin (Cina, Then conser the chances tat a Sino-Ameican war wl Beak ot, making the ngument chat cs more Lely than a war between the superpowers was during the Cold War In the penultimate ecto, 1 ‘amemptto refute the two main counterarguments to my gloomy foreccet, (Can Cina Rise Feacetlly? 363 nal Yarge ina brie condusion tha he bes eson to think a Pog nosis may be wong has odo wih the ns soil scence hey ts spl form, my theory maintains hat the basi srucure of he eraatonal system forces sates concemed about ter security 10 ‘ampere with enc other for power. The ulimate goal of every great omer to matimize share of wolé power and evenly demiate ‘he sat. In yeti tems, thls means thatthe mos powerful sates ck oesablish hegemony in her eon ofthe word wie dso ens ing that no na reat pomer dominates another aa. ‘The theory bepns with fie assumptions about the wold which ae si reasonable approximations of rary. Fst of all sates are te Key cos fn fntermationl pode, and no higher eutody stands above them. There no uate ater oe Bviathan in the stem tha sates in fur of hey get itn touble ad nee ep. This lle an ana cic rte, a posed ta hierarchic one ‘The next two astumptions del with capabies and ttentons sespeivly. Al states have ofesive mitary capitis, although some Dave more than others, fadeed smetines many more than others ‘capabies are eesonabiy easy o measure because they are largely com posed after objets that an be sen, seed and ound Tntetions are a ferent mater utes can never be erin abou the Intentions of other sates, because ntensons ae nse the hes of ad ‘sand hus viral impose to see and ial to measure In partic ‘lar snes can never know with complete contdence whether moet ste might ave fs gun shits on them for one reais ov anotee The problem of discerning ate’ tenons is specially ace when one Fon des tek fare ftenions since is dios impale wo knw who the lenders of any country wil be five ot more year from now, mud less at the wil think ss foreen pic “Te theory lasses that tts rank suv asthe ost impor ‘tant soal, This 1s not to sav it is their only goel, for states invariably havedet tHE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS numerous ambidoas Howeves, whet push comes to shove, suns ‘mumps ll ther goal, Bascal Dense fate does at survive tea ‘pursue tho other gals. Sorel means moce han merely maintain ing sates terra iateey, although that goal sof fundamental ‘nmportance it alo mean preserving the sutenomy ofa state's polcymak Ing process. ally, sates ze assumed tobe rational actors, wich s 10 say the ae reasonably elec at designing suaeis that anime thei chancerof sve These assunpios, when combined, cause sates to behave in ptr ‘i ways. Specially i. word where there some chance—even just 2 ‘all one—that cer sates might have malign intentions as wll r= ‘mile llenaivemitary capa, ates ent fear each ober) Tha fears compounded by wha ell he “9-1-1" probleme fet that ‘here sno night yates ia an anarchic tem whom tates can ali trouble comes knoe thls door. Acndinly, they recognize they st ook out for tet owe survival, a the bes way t6 do tat sto Be ‘speci power ‘he loge here i sisghlorward: the more powerful a ste satire tots competitors the lee Beely i survral wil be ars No vunty in the Wesem Hemisphere, for example, would dare azack the United Sates, becnse it 0 made svonger than any ofits neghbors. This re soning érives get powers to look for opportunites t move the balance fof pomer in tet favor, as wel a @ prevent oxber states fom zing power thei expense The ums alm is 0 be the egmon: thai, the only est power inthe ser When people ak about begemony today they ae usualy efening to the United States, which Is often deserted a « lobe hegemon However, Ida not believe i posse for any country—incuding the United Sttesio achieve global Regerony. One abstade to world domination is tha tf very lett ro conquer and subdue distant iret pomers, becaaee ofthe problems astocited with projecting and Sostaning power over hue distances, especially across enormous bod jes of wate ke the Atlantic and Facile Oceans. Tis problem is Ist fcute when deling with minor: pavers, but even so. the power of ‘rationalism mnakes it extremely difficult to occupy and rule a hostile (Can China Rise Pescefally? county, The paramount goal 2 great pore can ata selon bege- ‘mony, which means dominating one's surrounding neighborhood. The United States. for example, {5 @ regional hegemon in the Westen Hemisphere. Although 1s plainly the most posterfl sate on the planet by fart nota slobal egen, ‘Once a state achieves region] hegemony {tha a further aim: pres ‘vent other great powers fom dominating their geographical resins. ‘otter words, no reponalhegemon wan a peer compete. The main ‘reasons that regional hepemens—becnus hey sr 4 nant in thelr ‘eihberhood—ae fe to roam around the globe and intererein eter repiong of the worl. This situation implies tht regional hegemons are ey toy to cause rouble teach other's backed. Thus, any wate that schevesreponal hegemony wl want to rake sure that no other great power schieves a iar postion, eng that counterpart fo roam ito ighbotiood ‘Most Amercans never think about but one ef the mal esons the ‘nied States sable to sion multary Fores all around the globe and ineade inthe pois of virwally every regon ls that fees no serious threats in the Western Hemisphere. H the United States ha dangerous foes n sow backyard, would be much less capable of roaming ito ‘isan repons ‘cite sate achleves regional dominance the goal willbe end sshepemony as expetiousy at potble, The razon imple: much smote propitious to have ewo or moze great powers la all the ober Key ‘eas fhe wos thatthe get powers here wl have to woz aout ach oer and ths be ls abet inefere inthe distant hegemon’s own cyt Bn um, the Dest may to uve in nernconal snare 60 be the sole reson heer. 1 ated States the onl eponlhepemon in moder hoy ve ‘other great pomers—Nepoleanie ance, Wielmine Germany, impe- rial Japan, Nazt Germany, and the Soviet Union—made serious attemats|10 dominate hee especve regions, but they all ied The United State 4 not end up dominating the Wesem Hemisphere tn ft of absent mindedness, On te conway the Founding Fathers a thet sucesso concously and deliver sought 0 achieve hegemony nthe Americas Im esence, they aed in accordance withthe cats of etesive rain ‘When the Unie Stes finaly gene it independence fom Bala 1 1783, se was a elavely weak country whe people were largely eon ‘ned 10 the Allantc vabeurd. The Bish and Spenish ecpres wu. rounded the new country. and hosle Neve Ameria ties conoled ‘much of the eratory beoween the Appalachian Mountabs and the ssp! River: ras a dangerous neighborhood for sue, ‘ver the newt seven decades, the Americans ipod ots rea ‘ous stuton by marching aos thet cone othe Pee Ocean, rea ing a huge and powertl coun in the proces, T ene ther sealed ‘Muniles Destiny, hey mardered lage numbers of Nahe Ameicns and sine tc land. bought Perla tom Spin (1819) and wt no the cen ter the Usted Ste fom Pance (102), They anneted Teas 1843 snd then weat to war with Mec fa 1846, ting wit i ody the -Amesian southwest ar the detested foe, They sa dea ws Ban 0 ‘inthe Pac nonhwest in 1846 and Eoally n 1853, sated addon ‘era fom Mexico With the Gadsden Purse ‘he United States ao gave seus thought ro conquering Canada Throughout much of te aineeeath cer. Indeed, the Ameians ‘invaded Canada i 1812 with thst goa im ad. Some ofthe sendin the ‘crbbean would probly have Beame pr of the United Sates af not been for the fac that numerous aves were in tht aces and the northern sates ld nt want mor svchost inthe Ualon. The lin ut stk the necenth century the supposedly peace otng ited snes compled a record of extol agganderent hat bas ew onl in recorded inary Ie not sup that Adolf Hier fre squendy refered to Amedcss westward expansion a moved ater Gemaay invaded the Soviet Union in June 1942. “tere tn the Eat be said “a sia proees wil repeat ise for = recon ie as in the con guest of Ameren” ‘can China nice Peaetliy? 367 ‘There was another jb lo be dane t achive reglona hegemony: push ‘he Buropean gieat powers out of the Westem Hemisphere and keep ‘hem out. This goals whet she Monroe Docne Ia about The United Sates wasnt power enogh a at on thse prt when resent James Monroe articulated them in 1423; but bythe end of the nineteenth ceucy. the Buropean great pavers had Become minor players inthe Ameri. The United States had achieved regional hegemony, which ade remarkably secure great power. ‘Ares powers works not dane once I achiees regional hegemony. emus then ensure thar no other great power flows suit and dominates som aes of the wodd, Dung the Gveaeth century, far county had he ead to sive for regional hegemony: Wilhelmine Germaay 890-1918), imperial Japan (1957-48), Nast Genany (1933-45), end the Sowet Union (1943-90). Not supra, each ed to mich wnt the United Sates achieved inthe Wetem Henptere in he prea Ing cen. ov di he United Sates eu in ech ie, it plyed = key oe tn (efeating and dsmantng those airing hepemene ‘Te United tts entered Would Wat Tn Apt 1917, when it looked sf thelmine Germany might win the war and rle Europe, Armescan ‘woop layed x rel ole in tpping he balance agaist he Kaierech, which colapsed in November 1918, in the ely 1940s, Tesideat Roosevele went ogres lengths to maneuver the United Sits ato Wold ‘Wart hart pans ambitions in Asia and epeilly Germany’ ons tm Europe, ter entering the war in December 194%, the United State helped o demotsh bot Ax powers Since 1945, American poi} sakes have ken considerable pains ot the mary capabilites of Germany and Japan. Pinal he United Stes seaadly worked to pe vet the Seve: Union oss dint Bursa during the Cad Wat a then elped relegate i 0 the sep esp of tory Benreen 1969 and Sony ater the Gold War ended. Genet H.W. Rus aminsaton boi sated in ts famous “Defense Guance”o 1992 hich wes leaked 2 {he pres that the United States ws row the Ine superpower inthe Woeod planed to remain nts exed poston American pollgnnakers, fer words, oid not olente the meence of 2 new peer comes. That same message was repeated inthe eqaly-tamons Natimal Sriy “SrangyIsued by Geoige W. Bushs admiration in Sepember 20027 ‘Tere has much citi o tat document pedal clans about the ‘ue cl-peemptive mat” But bard Wor of potest as ase regarding the eseron ht the Unie Sats should che sng pomers and malta is commanding pation the gobal blance of poe. “ee ine thatthe Caled Sates worked ar for over # etary to gin hegemony in the Weer Hemipere, ands 50 for sound Snaepc esos, Aer avg regal dominance i has wosked equally Indo keep ober rest power rom controling ether Asa or Buope What does america's past behavios rel us about te se of Chins? in parteuar ow should we expect Chine conduct self grows more power? And bow should we expect the United States and chin’ neighbors eac oa suong China? FOLLOWING IN UNCLE SAM'S FOOTSTEPS China cocunues ts srkang ccanomlc growih over tbe next few decades ts ike to atin acordance withthe lagi of lleasve ea ‘sm, which & to say & wil atempt to imizte the United State Specify ly to dominate Asa the way the United States dom sts the Wester Resphere- I wll doso pearly beers such omi- ation offers the best way Ho suvive under intemstinal snare. ‘tion, China is involved in vations tetova putes andthe more oweral i the beter able i wl be to sete chose disputes on terms fovaable to Being. ‘Furchennore, Ike th Ualed States a powerful Chin is ute wo ave secu ineess ound the lobe, waich wil prompt Ito deveep the Capabliy so projec mltary power into region fr beyond Asi. The Penian Gull wil rank high of the new superpomers sof stately ‘portant eres, buts wl the Wesers Hensphere.lnged, Chisa wil havea ested increta eating secuty problems forthe Unie Stats MAP 10In the Western Hemisphere, 031 nit the Aasecanmitry reer roam ino othe replons,especlly Asa, Let us consider thee mates sn gemer de (chinese Realpolitik ‘my theory is correc, China wl sek o maxi the power sep with its neighbor, especally larger counties ke Is, Japen, and Russ ‘Chia wi want o make sure isso powerful tit ao stat in Ase ha the whetevitha co tuesten i 5 wnely that China al pute maitary superiors hat It can go ona rampage and congue other At coun- ‘ees, One major difeence between Chiba end the United Stats that “Amein stared ou a 2 ater small and wen county lcated along the ‘Adan coustine that hd o expand weer inode to become ge nd poweral sate that cou dominate the Wester Hemisphere Fr the Void States, eonquest and expansion were necessary to exablch regional hegemony Chin, in const already age county and does ot need to conquer more terry te enable isla a elon hese ‘mon ona pe withthe Usted States (ce Bap 10.1), ‘of cous it isalays posse in parca cunstances that Chinese lenders wil conclude that i imperative to aac another county to ‘dhleve regional hegemony. I more ely bowever that Chin wal ek ‘9 grow is economy and bene so power hat can dct the bound tries of sce behavior elghbodng coun, and mak it clea they il pay a baal pie they do or flow de rules. Ater ats what he Uated Sister har done in the Wester Hensipere. Fak example, in 1962. the Kenedy adnisseaion lt Yoh Cabs andthe See Uno ‘no hat tou ot tolerate nude weapons a Cae Adin 1970, the ‘Noxon adminsreon told thas sme tro counties tat bling a Soviet av fairy a Gienfgos was unacepabe Puthermore, Washington has nerve inthe domes pots of numerous Latin Aeterna coun- tester to prevent the we of lads who were prec tobe ant “Ameen ot ovenbrow them if they bad gsed poeta shor. the ‘United states as wielded. ean hand in the Westem Hemi. can China Rice Fescefaly? [A much more powerfl hina can also be expected toy to push the United Stes out of the AsiaPac vegion, much atthe United States pushed the European great powers out ofthe Western Hemaiphere in the Inlneteenth century. We should expec Chiba to evs is ove vnon of ‘he Monroe Doctine 35 imperil Jpan di te 1930s. In face, we ae slready seeing inkling of tt poly or example, Chinese leader have sade lear hey donot chink the Used Sats ht aight fo tert tn spues over the mame boundars ofthe South China Sa, a ste ‘aly imponant body of water tht Being electvely cis ass own (see Map 102)Fast China ‘china aso objected in July 2010 when the Unit State planned eo conduct naval exes fn the Yellow Sea, whic & located enween {China andthe Korean Penasula (See Map 10.3). In parla the US. ‘avy planned to vend the sera acer USS George Waring nt the ‘alow Sea. Those maneuvers were not erected at Chin: they were imed instead at North Kore, which was believed to have sunk South Kovean naval ese. the Chonan, inthe Yellow Sea, Komevt, ‘vigorous protest from China forced the Obema admninisvation fo move the exerlses oat of the Yellow See and farther east nto the Ses of Japan, Sounding lot hike Present Monroe, a Chinese spokesperson ‘succincly summed up Belling’s thinking: “We finmly oppose foreign First and\ Island Chains. —stacy vessels or planes catering the Yellow Ses and ater waters adjacent China t engage sacivies hat would impact on seu. rp and ares" ‘More general there i consdeabe evdence that Chinese leaders would ike to develop the api 1 push the US. Navy Beyond he “fs land chat" whch is wualy taken to inde the Grete Sunda ‘tends, Japan. the Poppins, and Taiwan If this were to happen, China would be ales off he Hast Cina Sethe South Chis Se, sd the Yow Sea and it would be aos ips forthe US. Nay to readh Korea in the event of war Tete i even ta in China about feventuly posing the US. Nary beyond the “second iat chal” ‘whlch rons fom the eater cart of Japan to Guam and thea down to the Molucan Isms, t would aio Saude the smal land group ke ‘the Bonin Caroline and Marianas Islinds. Ute Chinese were neat Japan and the Philippines would be ct of rom Americen nave support (se Map 10.4) ‘These ambious goals make good stele sense for Chin akthoug "his not to say China wal necessary Ye able to achieve them, Bling should want ality weak an slated I, pen, and Rusa a8 eihbors just asthe United States prefers «many sk Canada end Merco on ts boeders. What rae ia It right mind would rant ciber Domest counesleated in ts vegon? All Chinese surely remember ‘wa happened over the las ceamury when Japan was powerte and (Cina war weak ‘Pamhemnare, wh woulda pore Chine acep US mllay frees operating ints backyard? American poticymaker object mhen ober ree ‘omer send milary forces into the Wester Hemisphere, bectse they ‘ew those foreign forees as potenti treats t» American security The sume loge shoul aly to Chins, Why mould Chine fee ste wth Us forces deployed on is doorstep? Following the logic of the Monzoe ‘Doctine, would not Ching’s seeuty be beter served by pushing the American military out of the Asa-Pacie rein? Al Chinese surely remember what happened inthe hundred years beeen the ist Ops, Wir (1839-42) andthe end of World War 1 (2945) when the United States end the Buropean great powers took advange of « weak China (can China Rise Peaceflly? 375 cd not only violated is soveretgnry bu alo posed uni teats cn and esplte economical Wi should we expec China to act dierey than the nied Stars? Are the Chinese mere ringed than we ate? More excl? Ate hey less ‘naonalise? Less concerned about thes survival They are none ofthese ‘hing of cours, whichis why Choa i key to allow base elt ote and atempt to became azegional egemion ia Asia, Although maxinieng ts prosper of survival the princi reson {Cina wil sek to dominate Asa, there is another reason rete to edn’ tetra putes with some oft elghors. As Tylor Fravel points out, chins has managed t vee mt of ts border conf sce 1949—seventeen out of twenty-three goed par because it bas been llag to make some sigucant conceisons 10 the other side NNeverieless China Is sx outcanding triton dlgtetnents, and ‘ere Une reson least atti unctare—t0 hnk the involved par es wil ind a clever plomad luton them, Probably China's mos mnpertant dpe over san, which Beling 's dep commited to making an itera par of Chion ence agin! The resent goverment on Taiwan, bower belive ite 2 sovereign coun ‘ny and hap no interest in being rentgrted into China. vanes lenders o not adverse thei independence, for fart wil provoke Chinato ‘nvede Taiwan, In addon, Chins as ongoing depts with Vietnam lover contol of the Paracel lands im the South China Sea, and wth ‘Brunel Malaysia, the Faiipines.Twan, and Veta over the Spretly Islands, which are also focated ie the South Chin Sa (ae Map 10.2), ‘Mote genera China maintains that it has sovereignty over alot lh of the South Chins Sea adam Asputed tony by te nelghbers but by ‘he United stats as well arher tothe aor ia he FOS China See Befing bas a ite feud with Japa.over who cons hdl of sal Islands that Tokyo calls the Sen sande ad Chine labels the Dias ‘Mans see Map 103). ‘inaly, China has lan border depts with Rita and idl, ta {ec China and indi fought a war over the dpe teritory in 1962, and the cwo sides have engaged im provocative tons on numerous ‘oceasions since then {see Map 10.4). For example, New Delhi maintainsS16 THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER POLITICS there were 400 Chinese incursions ito Tngan-comtoled tentory duc. Jing 2012 alone: and in mid-April 2013, Chinese uoops—or the fst ‘ime since 1986 —relused wo eetrm to Chins fer they were dlecovered fon the Ilan sde ofthe Line of Actual Coat 1 appear that China Ina been stepping up cos-borer raisin cet yeas responce 10 fecceased Indian woop deployments and an accompanying growth Ia ‘ofrasrorire ‘Given the inportance ofthese tential puesto China, coupled oth the apparent dif of resbing them rough the sve snake of inlomacy, te bes way fr Chast sete ther on favorable terms i probably va coercion. Speccaly. 2 China thats much mae poet ‘an any of neighbors wl ein a good pasion to we itary threat 19 force the other sd t ecep deal Iarpdly on Chin's tems. Andi hat does nt work Ching can always unsheate the sor and got wae to gets ay score ely that everdon or the actual eo foc the only plansble way china sping to regain Tawan. In shot, becoming a regional Regemon ithe bes pathway for Chinato rslve asiou stor pats on tevorable terms eis worth nong that im aden to these tonal apts, china night become emriled in coast with it neighbors ove weit, The Theta Plate, whlch i laced within Chin’ borders isthe tind Inrger cepostory of feshwater in the word ranking bein the Arce sd Antareea (ce Map 104). ndee. Wis sometine refered a the thind pole fi a the main source of many of Ass ret sve ‘ncling the Brabmaputa the Inswday, the Mekong. the Sabween the Sit, th Yang, andthe Yellow: Mos ofthese ness ow ito neigh boring counees, where hey havea profound elect on the diy ves of ‘many mains of eore* ‘recent yeas Being as shown much interest a rerouting water from these vers 1 heavy populated sees in extern and nonhera| CChlna, Tomar that end, China has bulk canal, as, iistion systems, sd pipeline. Thi plan ns ey stages and na et to cage the om ofthese vers in meaningfl fashion. Bur the potent for touhe it ‘santa, becuse the neighboring counts dowasteam are kel 12 sc marked retucion intel wate upp overtime, whic could have can China Rise Peaceflly? 377 sevasatng economic and socal consequeaces, For example, the Chinese tue interested la veg the Brahmapua River aoniward nto the ying Yelow River If this happens it would cause major problems In tnala ad epecily n Bangladesh China aio working to reaec wate from the Mekong River, iverson that i almost cera to case big problems in Soumeast Asin counts ike Cambodia, Los, Tala. ae 1s efos to bein seruting the eves owing out ofthe Tbe stem China has aced anata and shown Ide intrest in buiing ‘eterationalistutigne that cam help manage the eating problems ‘ven thar water is becoming an neeasnly scarce resource in Asa. thi problem ie Hkey to get worse with ie and, ven the enormous sakes Involved. might even lad to war betneen Cina and one or more fs eightos. In adon to pursuing regional hegemony. sing China wil have suatege lnteress cutie of At, just a the United Sates has important Interests beyond the Western Kemispere. In keeping with he dates of fenivecelism, Chins wil have god reason to interfere inthe polis ofthe Amercs 50 as to cause Washington touble ins own backyard us mang t more discl forthe US. itary to move ely around ‘he won Duriog the Cold ia, the Soviet Union formed «cose aiance with ‘cuba in god pat or dhe purpose of teeing in Amerie’ backyard." Inthe futoe,relasone between the United States and = county lke ‘rar wil pertaps worten, cating an oppor for China ro fom ‘bse ses with Brazil and maybe even staon mitary fores in the ‘Wester Hemisphere. Adstoally, China wil have powerful incentives to forge es with Canada an Mexico and do whatever it cam to weaken ‘Amedesdomnaaice in North America, an wll not be to tres the American homeland directly, bat her to dat the United States ‘tom looking aroed and fore It focus increased attention on is om neighborhood "Ts chim may sound implausble at present, but remember thatthe Soviets tied to put nuceararmed mises in Cuba in 1962, bad mote ‘han 4,000 oops in Cuba hase year, a ao proved Cubs wih «|vie vane of eopbested conventional weapons” And donot forget, ‘hat the Dated States alealy has 2 mage miazy presence in Chia’ ‘China wl ebviously want co lmic Americ’ ably opie power &senere,morder a improve Being’ prospects of achieving regional hegemony in Asia. Hveever, China has other rezone for wasting opin ove the United states 2s much as posible inthe Western Hemisphere. (Can Chin Rise Peaceflly? ‘m partelas, Chios has major economic and pote ateret in Ate, bic sem ikl to increase a the future. Even more imporant, chine Isheavly dependent ono rom the Pesan Gui and har dependence ‘apt to grom sgniicnty overtime. Ching ke the sited Sates, almost eran to reat the Persian Gu as aval senegic Interest Bch ‘means Deng and Washington wil eventually engige in seriou secu ‘ty competion in that region, much athe two superpower dé Gang ‘he Cold War. Creating wouble for the United States in the Western ensphere wil nit ts abilry to project power into the Persian Cul snd Acs, ‘Totake thin of analyse fartber moet ofthe ofthat Chine ‘mos om the Gul is wansgerted by ss For al setae abou moving at by pipelines and raoads through Myanmar and akan, the act ‘shat marie anspor a much easier and cesper option. However for Chinese ships to rech the Gul aswell as Af tam Chis mor ors slong is easter coast, they have og ome te Sout China Sea {nto the tndan Ocean, which are sepacated by various Southeast Asan counties (see Map 10.1), The only way foc Chneze ships to move eteen these to lag bodies of waters ogo through three major pt st, Spatially, they can go through he Sra of Mac, which ser rounded by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, or they can go farther south and tvere either the Lambok or the Sand Sir, each of which us through Indonesia and leas ito the open waters of the nin (Ocean just tothe nonhwer of Asai (ee Map 10.5.2 ‘Chinese stipe then have to traverse the indian Ocean andthe Arian Sex to reach the Peran Gull Alter that they have to sem to china isthe same rou. Chinese leaders wl suey wat to conta hese ses ne of communion, js os the United States emphasize the por tance of consoling primary ea routes. Ths irharly suing at here i widespread suppeet in Chins for buling »Blue-maer avy hich would alow Chia to projet power around the wld and eet ‘smn saline of communi. 'm bret, Chins continues its rapid economic srt wil mst cenainly Become a superpower, which means I wil build the power ‘projection capability necessary to compete with the United States eneendS60 THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT PowER POLI {he globe. The nwo testo whichis Mey o pay the genet aention se the Western Hemisphere and the Peis Galt alhough Ac wala be of marked imponance Being In ato, Chins wil undoxbeety| ey to buld miltary and naval feres hat would alow to each those ‘antrepons, much tbe way the United Suresh pursued ea coo Why China Cannot Disguise Its Rise ‘One might argu tha ye, China sue to anes demain Aa bu there clever sutegy it am pursue to achieve that end peace Specfcly, should folow Deng XSeopngs four mam that China| 1eep alow prot and avid becoming embroled in nrernaonal confi as much a pole. His exact words were “Hide our exper and ide ‘ou tie, ba ao get some things done The reason t makes sense for ‘Cina bide is ine tate avoids wouble and merely comin roving economically, I wil eventually became so powerfl tht ican jus gets way in Asa Is hegemony willbe fat accom. But even that does nt happen and China eventual has 0 we ore or the test of ore to achieve Regemony and reve is outanding dps, wl ‘le well posonel to push is neghbors and the United States around Staring © war now, or even engaging in serious secuty competion, ake ite sere for Bejing. Coc rns theif amaping the Chinese sconomye moteover Chia mitary woul not fae wellaganet the Une ‘Stes ands cent lies. 14 becerfo Cina to wat un ts power as Incest snd i na beter poston to ake on the Ameen mit. ‘Simply pu, dine io Caines de, which mean hold puma for ‘ey foreign poly so 8 nator sugpcon among ts neigh. In praiethis means Caine should do whatever can 0 signal 0 ‘the outside wld that has benign intentions and doesnot plan 1 bud formidable and ventening itary foros. ts wr of ehetoi, Chinese leaders should constantiy empbasze their peaceful tnteaons and make ‘he case that China ease peace beause of eh Conan cal ‘ue. At the sane tine, they should work hard to keep Chinese otis from wing Rant loguage to dscibe the United Sates ad other Asia outrey om making testening tatements od the. Ga China Rice Pesce? 1 terms of actu behavior China should no inti any cites with Itsnephorsor the United States, o ad fel to hei If anathercoutey Drovokes a criss with China, For example, Seng should go ost of ‘way 0 avoid troable over sovereignty sues regard the South China Sea and he SenkakwDlaoy ands, I ehoul odo what itcan to Sit elense spending so as not to appear thresening while woding 10 Jncresteeconoml intercourse with is neighbors as well a dhe United Sates. Chinese leaders, according to th lol, hol empaze ht ei alto the good that china i groeing cbr and econemi terdepend ence son the Hse, because thse developments wl eee a powertl force for peace. Aral starting @ war Ina gly connected an rot eros wort i widely beeved to be the eqivlet of ling te poe that ays the golden ees. Filly, China shold playa active and cooper save roe in as many itemationalnstusons axponbe and wrk wih "he United tates to Kee the North Korean problem under control. ‘hile this approach is inzulely trace wl ot worn peace. Indeed we already have evidence that China cant succes employ ‘Deng sop’ presebed form poy over the Jong run. Before 200, esing i a prod ob of keeping ow role and not geueating tea eer smong it neighbors rin the United tates. Sac then, bowevet Chia as been involved in a numberof contentious tent dapues an isin tng sen av seine rea by othe countesin Asia ‘his deterioration in Chine’ relations with oer counties i ne art to the tc that, no mamer what Bing does to sgn good ate ‘ons they cana be sre what ks eal imenions ae now let aloe inthe fut. deed we cannot know ho wl bei change of Chinese foreign, polly inthe years bead much les what their inteations wil be toward ‘ther counties in the region or the United Site. On top ofthat Chine ‘at serous terol disptes with a number af is neighbors. Therelore, CCtna's neighbors sed focus mainly on Befing's capabilites, whieh means they lok at apy growing economy an inceningly oridn le milary ores. Not surprsagly, many other counries im Asa wll ‘become deeply worded because they know heya uobbly ging oe ‘up Dring next door to ruperpomer that might one day bave malign Intentions toward then.“tis poem exacerite bythe “secu emma” which tll thatthe mearre sat aks to inceas is own security usually wind tap decrsang the ect of cher states, When a county adopts a polcy orbs weapons that thinks ae delesive in mature, potent a ‘nvacably thnk thar those eps ae ofensve In nature. Fr example, nen the United Stses moves art cars ner the Tan Stait—as {din 1996—or when it redeploys submarines to the western Pace ‘Aesican eaers hooey Delve those moves are dtenive i nature. ‘China, on the other an, see them as an ofensve ctey of enc een, nota ptt of dleasive suateg of contain” Thus, ot sampning thatthe Pasomierepored im 2002, “A esired Chinese ‘likened she Amescan navy to# man With eal coed "wa fering jut ouside the ante of fara home ‘All tis eto sy that amos anything Chin dest inpove sm icy capabes wil be sen fm Beling a defensive fm ate, but fa ‘vigo, Hani, aad Washingon it wil appr offensive km matic. Tat means Chiaw's neighbors are ikly 1 iverpret any sep i kes 10 cence fis military poste as evidence that Belling not only is bet oa ‘scaucngsgicantofensive capalies but has ffesive intentions at tre And that ielades itances where China ie merely responding 10 [Hep taken y te nelghbors or te United States to enhance tbe hang omer. Such asesment me amos impossble or Chines leaders © ‘nplement Deng Msoping’s deve foreign poi. "addin, Chin’ nelghbors understand tha nel aot working ia thet fvor, a the lance of power siting agaist them a8 wll a the ‘ited States, They thereore have an ncensve to provoke ite over dt ted tenors eas now, When Cina Is elavely weak aher than rst uni Becomes a sperpovter I seems cer that Being har not rowed the recent eres with is neighbors. As Cul Tania. ove of ‘Chines ening splorat, puts “We never provoked anyhing. We ae ssl onthe path of peacefl developmen: If you look czefuly a what Inapened in the La couple of yeas, you wl se tha other sated ll the dputes" He is esentally come It 1S Ching’s nelghbers, not eling that have ben sting most ofthe woube in een! yes ‘Can China ise Peacetliy? Nevertheless ti mainly Chin's responte to thee ces that has ‘used is neighbors a wel the United Stats o view China in «mare ‘menacing ght than was the case beloe 2009, Speci, Chinese lng ‘oshave fet competed eat vigorously andsomesiesherslybecie the disputes “concern China's sovereignty and tro) iney, end ‘here is strong pubic sentiment oa thee Jeres™ At Suisheng Zhao ote, since 2008, the Chinese goverment "has become teensy relicunt 10 conszain the exesion of popular nanan and mote wang to ow the pope national cl for confrontation asst the Wester powers and t-nlghbor, ‘This meas in practice hat Being oily cesta is his and ph snes no only that there sno rom for empromise it that t wl gh 10 defend what consis tobe sovereign Chinese terry, In some ees, 'e Chinese fee competed to deploy malar or pramay fre to ake ‘hee postdon etl cae, as happened in Ap 2012, when acs aed ‘upbesween Chiza andthe Pipne over onl of Seber Shoal. a som and in the South Chine Sea (se Map 102). The sme kind of ‘nciidnting behavior was on ala er Sepeer 2012, When China nd span became embroled in 2 cise over the Seniaku/Daoye ans ‘The Chinese govemment ha lo shoe ite heaton in etenng or ‘opoying economic sanctions agli rai Nataly, suck ard nosed pronouncements an acioas ase the tempeatre and underne Chinese flocs pusue alow role frig ol, ‘Rally, at the most base level. the United States and almost all of China's neighbors have powerful incentive to conan i ss, hich means they wil carefully mositor sprout aud move to check it sooner ‘athe han later. Let us look more dosely at how the United Sates ad {he other counties in Asa ae kel reac 0 Cho's ascendancy, {THE COMING BALANCING COALITION 1 histori record clseydemonsts how American plcymakers vl etc China tempts domizate Asa Since becoming » getbower the United Sutes has never tleted peer competes. AS it Aeronsuated throvghost the tenet century i determined to emaln the world’s only eelonal egeron. Therefore the United States ‘vil got reat legis to contain China ani do what it an to ree it sncapile of ring the os in Asa. sence, dhe United Stes key tp behave toward China lily the way it behaved toward the Soviet ‘Ualon during he Cold War ‘China nlghbore ae cera o fea sea well an they 0, wil fo whatever they cant prevent t fom achieving regional hegemony. Indeed, there is akesdy sobsandal evidence that counzes ike [nda “Japan, spt Rao, 22 el os sealer powers ike Singapore, Sous Koes, snd Veiam, are wore sbout Chin's ascendancy andar looking fr vay ro contin ff the end, they yl ln Ameria balancing ‘onion to check China's se, much the way Briain, France, Germany, aly pan, and eventually China, joined forces withthe United Stats rng the Cold War o conan the Soviet Union. ‘Uncle Sam versus the Dragon (China i sl lar from the point where ches the maltary capably to ‘make a run at resonal hegemony. This not 1 day there ze good sa ons 0 wey sbout potent oats breaking ox tony over tes ke ‘Rian aod dhe South Chins Sear but tht isa diferent mater" The nied States obviously has a deep-seated intevest in making sure that ‘China does not become 3 eco hegemon. Of eure, th leads t93 it ‘eal portant question: wha Americ’ bes statey for prevenng (China om dominating ASS? ‘he optima strategy fr dealing witha ning China fs containment It cls forthe United Sse to concentuate on keping Being om ung ite riltary fore o conquer terntory and more general expend its no- face in Asa, Toward that end, Amevcan policymakers would seek 19 form a blsceg coaiton with as many of China's neighbor as pose ‘Te limite ai would beto bul an aliance acre long the es of NATO, which was «highly etletve instrument for containing the Soviet ‘Union during the Cold Wa. The United States would alto work to maine (Can China Rise Peaceflly? tain Ms domination ofthe weeds cosans hur making i aif fr (Chins to project power realy ito dian eons ike the Persian Gull and especialy the Weer Hersphere ‘containment is essen & defensive stacy, sae i des not cal for staring wat psinst China. fae. eantsinment ean alee to var agus acing China. Neverhele, wars aays a potty. There Sno reson the United States cannot have substantial economic late ‘ourse wi Chin athe same ume implements &contalnaent sees, ‘Altera Briain France, and Rasa rade extensively with Wilhelmine {Gemany inthe to decades befor World War L although they had so ‘eesti the Tipe Bente for the purpose of containing Germany, Even so, there wil probaly be some reaicions an tade fr aatonl sears reasons. More general, China and the Unies Stats can cooperate 90 variety of ues inthe caatet of a containment ste, bat at ret, reltonsbetveen the wo counties wil be competitive, ven is ich history a a olshore bance, the ideal este fo the ‘United aes would be to say in the hecground as mich spose and Jer Chin’ neighorsasume mos ofthe burden of containing Chios. in ‘esence, America would buck pass the contre lated i Aa that fear Chin. But thas Br geing to happen, fr twa ren. Mos ipo ‘ant, Chine’ eighbox wil not be pewertl enough by themes to ‘cc Chin. The United states vl therefore ave lite choice ut to lend the effort aptns Cina and fous aud of formidable pomer on that goa. Furthermore, great stances separate many ofthe counties in Asa ‘hat willbe par ofthe bland calon agains Chins—thin of ad “open, ap Veta. Thus, Washington Wl be needed t coordinate tele ‘flrs and fashion an eflecivealianee sytem. Of cour, the United ‘utes was ina snlar sation during the Cold Ws, when it had no ‘oie bu to assume dhe burden of ning the Soviet Unio in Europe swell a in Nonbeast Asa In esenee, offer balances tus come onshore when the local powers cana contain the potential heen by hems ‘here are thre aematv sates to containment. The fst tw nh sac twang Chinas nse ee by iunching 4 preventive war ot by pus sug polices sled at sowing Chinese economic growth. Neither Sat aesxy, omever, 63 wale option fr the United Stats. The hed alters ‘ve, rolliac, ease seatgy tut the pap would be minimal ‘reveal war isan unworkable option simply Beaute China as nuclear deterrent. The United State isnot gong to lunch devas ng srk agsins the homelané ofa county that can retaliate galas it for iy alles with nuclear weapons. But even if China didnot have clea weapons it would sil be bard imagine any American pres dent launching a preventive war The United States ts ceranly not sing to Invade China wich has @ huge aemys and cipling China ‘with massive air sulkes would almost certainly reguire the use of nuclear weapons. That would mean turning Chins into a “smoking. dieing run. to Boerow a phrase trom the Cold War that captures ‘event of hooting War.” The mucea fallout alone from such an aac sabes ita sonstarter Parthemore, it hard to know for sure whether {China wil consi We rap ee, a thus whether wll evenly bee thent to dominate Ai, That uncertainty about the future aso ‘Showing dorm Chine economic row i ceranly a more atracive option than nodlear war but it oo is nt feasible, The main problem i ‘hat there i no rata way of sowing the Chinese economy witout sino damaging the American economy. One might argue thatthe Chinese ‘economy would sulle greater damage, hus improving Ames elatve power postion viri-vis China atthe site tine Chinee grow wis slackening. Sut thats ely to aypen only if the United Stes can find ‘ew tadng parmers a Ching cannot Bot condiuons ze necessary ‘Unforsnatly, many counts around the world would be eager © Increase i efonom nterouese wits Ching, thas ling the vaso seed by Washington tors to cat back its uade Wid and invesment fm China, Fr example the cotter ia Europe ich wonld not be ex cosy threatened by China, would be prime candidates to take Amerce’s ‘ace and continue fling Chinese economic grow In shor, bese Chinn cannot be alate economically the United Sates cannot sow is conti roth in any meaning wey ‘Britain setually faced the same problem with a rising Germany before ‘cn china Rise Feacefelly? 387 ‘Wort War Ic was widely secoguized inthe British exabshment that Geomany’ economy mas growing et «more Tad pace than Stl’, ‘hich meant the bolance of power between te tv counties was sf Ing in Germanys favor Serce debe ensued about whether Bal ‘oud uy to slow German econamie om hy sharply curling eo om intercourse between the two counties. Bish plimakers con luted har tis policy would hur Briain more tata Germany ge at because Germany coud tr to bes cutis thet woul ake the expo itsent to Brain. a wel as provide most ofthe impr Gemsy recrved fom Brn. At the same tine, te Bish economy would be ‘mdi hur by the oso nports from Germany, wich woud be had to replace. So, Suan ceotinued to trade with Germany—even though Germany gazed per a Briain’ expense—simply becuse it Was the leas-bad aeracive” ‘he thd aerasve suategy 1 contatmen rob in wich the ‘ne States would seek ro weaken China by oping reps tat ae ‘sendy to Being ad yesps even by fomentog nouble inde China Sor examples Pakisan is fly t Chin’ cup, witch cera pos, sible in the fur, Washingon could steko help bring abou rege ‘change in samabad and help pu in place a pro-American leader OF the United Sates nah actempt tos up unre inde Chins by supporting eden groups Kiang of Tht. Although te United Sues mainly puued » containment sepy ‘tsi the Soviet Union in the Cold War we now know thts engaged in emens of robe as well Not ony dt uy to foment ate! nse ‘he Soviet Union suring te late 194 nd exly 1950 bus cals ed © overthrow numerous goverment letders aotnd the world Who were Detsived to be pro-Sovet. i fac. Washington lauached severe covert, ‘penton cageting China dec inthe 1950 nd 19605 Tue efor rol Ba only sal effect on te balance of power terneea the ‘wo superomers and di ee to Basen the demise ofthe Sevit Unlon. Sill American leaders pursued volbde where and when they could, nd there i ile reson to dink furre poeymakert in Washingon wil ‘cichew this poy agaist a powetul Chin, However containment wi be “America's most effective sategy by far‘theca sal posiity China wil eventually become so powers thatthe United Sines wl not beable to contain i and prevent from dominating Asia, even ifthe Ameria ealtary remains forvaré deployed in that region, Chins might someday have far ore latent power than any of the four pote hegemont the United States cononte in he nven ‘eth century. Ia tems of both population ze and weakt—ihe buldng Dosks of miitery power-nether Wielaine Gemany, nor impel Japan, noe Nani Germany, norte Sovet Union came eos 0 matching the Ualted Stats. Given that Chine now has more tan four times 35 many pevple asthe Unite stats and is projected to have more than ‘2uce tines as many in 2050, Beting would enjoy a sialcant advantage fn neat power i ad per eapa GN (ross national income) ul lent tothat of either HongKong or South Korea TA that stent power would alow China co aio a decisive malta sdvanage over is prada alin ss, especl when yu conser that China mod be operating in its backyard wile the Unites States would be operating moe thes 6000 mak rom California tat creumstance ii (fu o see how he Urted Sates cold prevent China fom becoming & regional hegemon, Moteover, China woud probably be the more formi ‘superpower in he ensuing label compeston with the Uae Sts ‘But even if China's GNI doer not sie to those levels and tends up vith not quite af much Intent power asthe United Sues t would tl be fa god poston fo make a um at hegemony in Al of ties us the United Sites hat a profound interest is secng Chinese economic ‘growth dow corey the yeas ahetd That outeme might not be ood for American propery, meh los for lb respesty, But would ‘be good for Ameen sec, whch what maners most ‘Wnat Will the Neighbors Do? Regaring Chinas neighbors. the key queton is whether they wl tn forces wth the United States and balance against China, or bandwagon swith ¢esing Chins, Some observers might argue that there sa ti option, which eo son the sidelines and remain neural It wil ot be can China Rive Pesefli7? oss, howese for counties in Asef this ane out Almost every state wil have to choose sie, not ju because Beng ad Washington ‘wll put enormous pesrure on them 1 choose her side, but lo because mos of tose sates—which are much weaker than ether China or he United Sates—wl reasonably want 1 have x powerfal protector nthe even ther security threaten, Given the survival imperative, most of Chins’ neighbors wil of to balance again i, much the way mow ofthe counts Norhest Asa ane Europe tar were fee to choo athe Cold War epi to jin with the Unted Say against che Sovet Union The reason ie smple: Chine Doses 2 more serous threat 9 mort cuties ia Aa then the United Sutes does, and states invavablytlance agua thee mort dangeous foe, not bandwagon with 8% China e more threstenins Sor lngely geo: saphta seasons. Specialy, Chin local power in Ah ists ether ight next door or wihin easy skng dance ofthe counties in ts acighbothood. The same was te ofthe Soviet Union dung the Cole War it was adrect heat to conquer West Germany anéJapen, among oer countries in Furope and Northess a. ‘he United states, on the other han. is much les threatening to Chinas neighbors. although Amertes is obviously the most poet player in the Asa-Pactie region and wll ela 0 for sane sine tis 4 alsanc great power thar has never bad submanialreriril desig ‘im ether Asa or Europe The main reson tat i to fa aay to engage in conquest in those xegions. The United States bat poe power over huge dancer at well sto matsive bodies of watet—the Pri and the Atlane Oceaaz—fus to reach those stately igor tant regions. Thus, there ie danger beng enalowed up o¢ dom ‘ied by the United state, a there was with the Sorte Union between 1949 and 1990, and wil be with Chlna a i grows nore power None ofthis ito deny hat the United Sates has wed lary force egans vsious counties to Asa and Burpe, Ater all fought 990 ‘major wats in Asa (Kores and Vitara) during the Cold War. The Bey it, however. thar the American military didnot tretent conguet and subjugate those counties, asa potent China might 40.Another dnension of Amer’ postion ia Asa highs wh es ‘tremening tan Chew’, Asa dant pes pom the Ue Sate as he ‘option of ge refucng fs maltary presence in dat ein, and ico ‘oncelaby bring il of troop home: Chin viously does not have hat ‘pon. Ista the greatest fear Chinas neighbors ave regarding the ‘nied States that ll not be therefor them ia «es, not thatthe [American mary might etc and vanquish them. This the nin reason why the Oban edainsresoe announced ithe fal of 2011 thatthe ‘Une Staes would pvt o Asa which a py way ofa would scaly increases presence im he region = Washington wes ng ores sree Asan les tha despite its focus on the rene Mie Eas and the ‘lomy elite war om teror in the decade ater September I they cul sill depen onthe United States to gua met backs ‘One might argue tat China has an ace i the hoe that wil tow 10 force at lest soe of ts neighbors not wo balance withthe United States snd fntead bandagon wit Beling. A number of Asan counties, incuding Assia Japan, South Keren, and Taiwan wade ecensively ‘pith Chinn and Beolly Inver thereat wel This. ther promenty i Aependent on their msntinng good relations wih China. This suai. to the argument goes, ges China siglcan economic leverage over those trading prner, which means tht they join an Amesca-ed ba ‘cing colton, Befing can threaten o cut economic tes and undermine ‘hei prope. nded, shoud beable vo use tat economic everage 10 coerce hove cvs no joing forces with Chia "eis ingoran: to emphasize that thls story the Chinese economy not serioiy hurt economic intercourse with one or more ofthese seighbors cae or even hale nother words his snot a ise | ‘ual vulerbiy, whic & what underpins tbe theory of economic Incedependcoce, «sujet deal wth below Bere here one ay vel erty, which what gives Beng the cpa to Madama its ih ots and thar uadeine or a least seouy weaken any antChina ‘lenny elton the United tates might uy to organize. th esence, this i a station in whieh economic and poial- rary consdertions are i conf: tat slss an important ques can Chins Ris Pecefully? on: whic factor wl wmately preva? My argument ithe seaty ‘considerations almost always tramp economic considerations an that states opt for Slancing over bandwagoning wheneres they must choote between thot azstepes The underlying loge of my Psion sould be dear by now. Counirles bale against powerf rvls because i is the best way to marinize thelr prospect of survive which mus be their highest goal, Bandwagoning witha tire powerful state, im contrast. lesens the bandwagoners prospects fr survival because the more formidable sae i fee to become even more power fuland thus more dangerous. ‘The economiccoerion argument omever, has a diferent lop: it sreses prospec oversurival The coe claim tha ate wih git at market power can serbusly hur the economy ofthe targt sat ‘tt the ea of economic puiehment il be enough to cence the we ‘nerable country nto bandwagoning withthe mote power ste. There spo question that severe economic an scary prospect but not sr viving toms aan even greater pei Survival in eter words, a store powerful impernve than romper hich is why reat loge wally ‘wumps arguments based on economic rer. tnd why China's neg bors wl balane gana a Indeed, there Is already consderble evidence that ounttes lke Indl, Jpan. sad Rust, long with smaller powers ke Singpore, South ‘ores an Vietnam, are worried about Chin’ escendecy and ae bes gto ook for may to cone India and ape, for example signed 3 “toine Dedaraton on Security Cooperaon” in October 2008, manly couse they are worried about Chinas growing power ina and the ‘ned states, which ad testy reltons throughout the Cold We, have ‘become goo ends over the pst date, ge prt because both feat ‘Chien In July 2010, the Obama aninstation, witch Is populated with Individuals who preach tothe would about the inporance of human his announced that it was resuming relition wih Indonesi’s ee ‘esl lores deste their rich hor of human igh abuses The ree sm forts shuts that Washington wants Indonesia om ees China ‘rows more power, and a the Now York Tine teportd, Indonesianyor Tie TRAGEDY OF GUAT POWER PoLITICs fas ropped hn that he group ght exponeullding tes with the ‘Chinese tay ibe ban remained." Singapore, which seaside the ecaly tmporant Suat of Malaca sod wores about Chin’ growing power badly wants to improve ‘leady dose es wih te United Stats. Toward that end ib a dep ‘nates pera ts Chang Naval Base so thatthe US. Navy cool operate a traf caries out of Singapore fhe eed arose And the deson by Japan in mid-2020 tallow the US, Mains to remain on Okinawa ws ten in part by Tokyo concerns about China's rowing aseravenes the rey andthe sled need to Keep the Ameriansecusty unbeeDa| ‘aml in pace over apn” As China becomes more power elaons among Cine’ nlghbor wil row even doser as wil tbeir ston with the United Sees ‘ily wd abou Taiwan’ rr in oder. Given Taiwan's impr tance for controling te ex-lanet i East Asa the Ualed Stes has a power incentive to event China from sing t® Moreover, American polars care went sbout rein and vepeaion ich makes it ven esky tat he United States would abandon Taiwan * This ot to deny that China might evenly beceme so powertl thatthe US, mi ‘tary cannot defend iat ed tn the meantime, homer Tan key to be par ofan Ameren balancing coslon ained at China, which ol surly inf Chines of a persuasions and intensity the secuty ‘ompeiion beoreen Beng and Washington sum, my theory says f Cina continues Is suking economic sromnh over she next feo decades, i ely co end up in en latense Security competion with the United States and Is nelghbos. have id much sboat the specie pier we would expect the relevant facons to purue. For crample We should expeatto see China arulate {soe version ofthe Monroe Doctrine and seeko push the US. mal tary out of the Asi-Pace region. And we should expect most of Chines neighbors jin an American-led balancing coalton almed at checking Beg. ‘But more must be sald about what 2 secuty competion Benseen ‘China and the Une Stats Would lock ike, Ip paca, we need to Cn China Rise Feacefilly? 393 ‘nov what Indctors to ep an eye ona the yeas ahead to deere ‘whether my predicion proved ote, ‘What Would Security Competition Lask Like? 1 Sino-Amercan secur competion developed moult have reve vain ingrediens. To begin with there would be ce, whch ace mse sdepuesbeoween the to ides in whic herein serous hres that wae vl break on. Cees might ot occur fequerly xt woul be sup tng there were none over lng steht of ine, Arn aces Would be ‘nother cental feature of the rary. Bath superpowers, as well a China's neighbors, ould expend significant amounts of money on etense i order to gain an advantage over the ote side and prevent ‘rom guning an advantage over thers, We should expect ose proxy wars, n which Chinese and Amescan les fight each other backed by thle respective patrons. Beng snd “Washingon are alo likely tobe onthe lockout for opportunites oe ‘trow rege around the wav tha ace endl othe ober side, Mos of those efforts would be cover. although some woud be over. We shoul ao se evidence ofeach side's pursuing eDit-snd eed seateay ‘hen there x opporcnity tour the oer sie moa easy and fo 'sh war. And In eases where thee & no Bang, Bt the other de neve hele finds self in a rotacied war, we would expec 0 ate 3 sa pursue a bloodetig trate, a whic tekst prong the con 3 such a pote Moving away fom the batleeld we would find abundant evidence of government offal in Beng and Washigton denuiing the ober sid 5 their number one threat. Pblic and cased document oxtining mary suategy would dearly depict the oer counny as a dangerous ‘uvenary tht needs to be countered, Furthermore, American and (Chinese tink tanks tat deal wih aon security aves would devote « Jaye potion of thls atenton to sesining the rival superpower and ortaying it formidable and threatening adversary. Of couse same peopl im both counties wl sjet tis eantontatonal approach sadinstead secommend deep seated cooperation with the other sd, yezaps ‘even incadig appeasement ofthe adversary on cenain sues. Overtime, sve woul exes these aii o be marginalized inthe discourse and poly debates ‘Bejing end Washington can aso be expected o put tveleseions on sor from thera, the Soviet Union and the United Sates (sing the Col War We woud, urhermoreanspateseing the United Sates bar Chinese student rom studying subjecs a Americas university tha Rave dec rseranc fr the developmen: of weapons and othe technologies that might affect the balance of power between the ro ‘counties th telaed moves, bot countries wo surey place seleed ‘export coils om goods and series that have 2 signtiant national Sesuity dimension. The Lk todel here forthe United Sates is CoCom, Ink ic enblshed using the Cold Watt Unit he waster of ensve technologies tothe Soviet Union. ‘None ofthis 9 deny the Method of substan economic ter couse between Chins ad he United States in the mid ofthe securty ‘ompeton. Nort deny thatthe we superpowers wil cooperate oa 1 handfil of ue. The Bey point, however, is tht the zlalonship| ‘between the rwo counties wl be confltwal at is eet and that she sr ide betmeen them wil manifest self in the ways desebed above. Of fue sy angument 6 not jst chat there yl be an intense secu Competition but thr there wil ao be @seous dance of war benween ‘Chinn and the United stats Le us consirin more deta the postiliy that Chin's ie wl endo 2 sboomng wa 1s WAR LIKELY? 1 Dated States andthe Soviet Unlon fortunately never came to ‘ows duting the Cold Wee ltbough both counes fought was sist llr sates, sme of which were aed wih thes ral. The fae that bo sides bad ge nuclear arsenals sproobly the Key reason the supepomers neve fought mais each ober. Nokes wespons, feral, (can China Rise Pesceflly? 395 sate mor force for peace simply becuse they are weapons of mass donrucion. The consequences of ter use ar so hoele that makes potomakers extemely ceutous if hey think tee even eal hance ‘hey mighbe wed ina conti. Given the history of the Cld War and given shat China and the ‘ited States oth have mules areal, ene might surmise thes ite tance those ro counties wl shot teach other inthe foreseeable fume. That condusion woul be wrong homever, although the presence of aucear weapons certainly crests power ncentves to aol a major war ture Sico-Amercancompettin in Aa wil ake place in at. ting tha more conducive ro War than was Europe dung he Cold Wat 'm particule, bot geography andthe dscbuton of power fer i ways ‘har make war between China and the United Sates more Hkly a ov betveen the superpomes rv 1945 to 199, Of course, one cannot predict the lkelnood ofa Sine-American war ith igh degree of erin, but on an make iformed estimates ‘The Geography of Asia ‘Aldiough the tary Bemieen the SovetUnlon and the Unltd States spanned the globe, is center of gravy mas onthe Brepean cnsnese. where massive armies and air forces equipped with micear weapons ‘nce off guns ach other, Bok superpower cared greatly sbowt oro other rons, Northeast Ala snd the Fenan Gut bu they cred the ‘ot stout the balance of power in Europe Indeed. he core of American snd Soviet mary power was lated ear wat was ald the Cea ‘Front a the heat of Europe, Not suprisingly when the Pentagon tan wargames simulating amgjr sperpoer conf, Europe was the en. sempieeof he ph. 1m the shiny yeas pir wo the Cold Wa, Barope Was rmatkably endregion: infact both the Unked Stats andthe Soviet Union (Rusa ‘elote 1917) fought on the same side n Wost War es wel asin Wold. War I Neverteless. there was no war in Europe after 1943, and stthough there were » hand o rics over Ben, they did not ecleto the we of force, The main reason shat warn he center of Europe ‘would probably have tamed isto WoHd War II with nacear weapons Decaase there wat a serious prospect of inaiverent Mf not purpose cseaon tote nucle level. No paleymakeron either sfe was ring to coumenanee a confi whlch hs or her county sto a reasonable chance of being suaiatd. Tas exevng prospect exlas not aly Sey Barope was so stable dung the Cold War but abo why she serie ao ove: las never ated i each eet, ‘The gna of Aa fundamentally ferent roma hat of rope the Cod Wo Most porns, tere sno equsaen ofthe Central Frnt tm Ala to achor sabi 6 Chin grows more power nsead. Asia as ‘ner of places mere Gibing ght breakout, but Where the magn fade of any individ! war would be nowhere near as great as It would hve been in Burope Between 1945 and 1990. This s de in lve ar 10 the fact hat the keto of nudes ealation in these potential conics ts rch smaler than St was i Europe dng the Cold Wr. Fst ofa ‘here were thowsndsof mie weapons in Europe, and they formed an ime part of NATO dcaratory policy and itary docsinetrosghout the Cold Wa Fartexmore i was widely belved tat vitor ate iil ‘ates ofa Furopean conic weenie profound stn the global tance of power ts convion crated power incentive for the side shat wa losing to ose mia weapons to sage the station, Nudes ‘weapons ae unlikely o phy anywhere nea as prominent 2 ole in Ad's pote troble spots nfl tls mane thatthe ess a the Meehy Ivor Ala il be gical than wha would have bee the oss ‘ole marin he hear of Purope dung the Cold War. Given that the ke hood of war tncesis as the potential cos decree, this makes = Sino- ‘amesiean confi moe ely than was 2 Some American Wat ‘One lsh argue tha her of war sl ow Dees the sakes ‘ese poten Alan war are ater smal, thereby giving China and the United states lie incentive to abt with ech other. Bu a dscused above the sakes na Sino-Amercan secutycompestion ae enormous China's security ould be gest eananced it Gove the Ameren il- tary oot of Asa and esublehed regional hegemony, whe the Uated Sites has a deep Interest fe maining ts present postion in Asa (Can China Rise Peaceflly? ‘Therefore oth pares wil be sensive to eputitonl concer it ally every ass nd unwing to back dv, In essence, leaders wil tendo think tit eventhough the proopecive wars in Asis might be small-scale compared witha war onthe Cente ‘Front all those confi are neverelessclely lake to one another, and thus is imperative att et he omer se preva in any i A {he same tne, bor pares wl be prone ose the costs of using force as tele Tow. Tis stuson& not conducive oat and pace in the resin. Consider the Korean Peninsla, whlch & prey the only place ‘wert China and the United States might conetably end wp iting «| ‘major conventional land war. The odds of sch» conic ae low butt sore ikely than was a war between the seperowes in Eutope. For one thing ts not eiffcalto imagine scenarios where South and North Kores become involved Ina wat, and both Chins andthe United Sttes—vich ‘has shout 19,000 troops staoned in South Korea—get azagged at the fhe, After all that is what happened in 1950: Chinese and American forces then fought gains each ober for alos thee years Fuchermore ‘he sae ofthe war would be les n a fuze Korean confit than it oul have been in a NATO-Warsw ac con tht makes warin Aste more thikable 4m adon co Kores, one can imagine Chia and the United States, fghng ove eontrt of Tan, the South Chia Sex the Seskaku/Danys ‘ands andthe ss lines of communication that run between Chie ed {he Prin Gull. The os aso with these potent] cms (swith ‘he oe in Korea) would Be nowhere nes gest as he cos oa supe over war inthe heat of Europe would have been using the Cold Wa Frhermore, because 2 numberof the posse conf eenio invave fighcng a se2—voherethe ks of miles elton ae ower—it is eset 1 maine war bresking out between China an@ the United Sut thn ‘erween NATO andthe Wassew Pact. ls wash noting tat no rit al dapute etneen the soperpowers—Berininduded nasa laden with tntensenationaitic feelings sTiwan efor Chi, Thus tot kad to imagine war erupang over swan though the od ofthat happening are sothigh‘fina pola sbout nicer wespos isin order. The preceding cus sion empbusted that ma if more Healy Sa Ala than wat in Europe Goring the Cold Wa, n part beease ofthe redaced iso escalation to the nudearlevel Nevertheless, here wilalmay be some chance of na sertent mies we in fuze Asn war and that possi will work toboness ntity ina csi ether words, one should nt thik that nuclear wespons wold have hardy any detent fein Asa Indeed the mee presence of those wespoas ia the arinai of the hey counties in the region wl have «sgnifeantinpect on how the relevant esers ‘vl hn and atin a foto xs. Sl the Mketood af escalation, and ren the consequences wl be much lower than would have been the (cin a NATO- Marsa Pct conic, ts mal forte conventional ‘wat nvlving lou andthe United States amore serous psa. Polarity and War “the secon reason Asa key tbe more warsranethan Burope wet Sharing the Cold War ha 10 do wih che diferent dstsbuion of power ‘beeen the two cases. Bplay preva in Furope, where the Soviet "Union ued the easter bal ofthe continent andthe Uated States domi- rated the western Balt One might think Asis Hkely to be polar if China continue re, wth the Americans on one si and the Chinese on the ote, Bu thi nll, Because these wll be other great pow im Asa, Ras lresdy qualies af one, and if Japan gets nuclear ‘weapons, wl ar wel nla which now has mudear arsenal nt ft fom the pint where tll be considered great power Allo hs to sy hat Asa wil be 2 mulplar sytem. deed willbe an unbalanced Inuhipoar ser, becnote Chins i Wkly 10 be much more power ‘han all the other Aan eat powers, and this qualfy as @ potential Iegeron, "war more Ukely i multiply than tn Mplany. impart beeause ‘here ace more gat powers in multipolar systems and therefore more opportunites for gest powers ght wth each other as wel a with smalercouses. tn adon,imlances of power are more common ia (Can China Rise Pence? supa, becaose the greater mum of counties in mulplaty Increases the chances that the undertanings of mlary power wil be tsubuted unevenly among the. And when you have power aspnme- tes the strong are hard to deter when they are bent on agpreon Pinaly here i grester penta fr mixalclaton Sn muiplaiy terms of asesing both the resolve of opponents andthe strength of tal ‘Sen and pursued “humane author” instead of “begemonk asthe “Tis pecspectve opr among academics a wll polcskes in ‘china any Chinese elas ke ines hey ee ta an aeratve 0 ‘he frincipa inematonal reasons thevies, which are sid to be FFurocentie and therefore oblvious 10 Ching’s exceptional culture Conucarinm is abil China-cntc theory. For example, Xin Hand ‘erner Worm wit, “Chinese clare advocates moral svengih instead of rlkary power, worships kingly role instead of hegemonic re, and ‘erapaszspermnson by virwe"® Yan Xuetng. who is probaly Chinas ‘est inowa ineritionl relations shore f the West maintains, “The te of China wil mike the world more died... . The care of Confucianism is enevolence This concet encourages Chines rulers to adopt benevolent governance. rather shan hegemonic governance ‘The Chinese concept of “enevolenc’ wil infuence international homme ad ake international society more cz" Chinese potcymakes ofr simular argumens, Fo instance, the for snes premier Wen abso tlé a Harvard audience fs 2003, "Pesce loving ts been a time-bonoed quay of the Chinese nation” And one year Inter, President Sita desaed “China since ancien ines hss had ‘ne tadiion of sneer, benevolence, indses and est towards is neighbors" The clear implication of thee comments i that Chica, ‘nle the ther ret powers in sory, has acted like @ model czen on the worl sage ‘There ae to problems witht theory of Confucianism. sti does not sells how Chinese elues have ecaly talked and thought about Intemational polis over she long history. In other words, snot an ‘an China Rite Peaceflly? accurate description of Chis’s sate eature over the entries. More Importsnt, ter isin bial evidence tat China has acted in aco dance withthe dates of Confudanism. On the contrary. China bos behaves jus tke other great power, which ft ay has ach ony ot acing aggesvely and roa toward nelghbs ‘There i doubles a promizent Confucian Hrand fa Chinese cule ving back more thas 2,00 year. Bute Asst ain Jbimton pois fst & second and mote pomeril srand i at pay in Chinee thinking shout international police He cals the “pannbellum parsdign” ed ote tht it places high degree of value onthe ue of pate ween 0 resale security confit." This paradigm, he emphases, “does not make significa eiterent pedesoos abou bebavior om tat of st ple sutra respi model” Thats why he ses the term “arbel: um paradigm” invechangeably with “clr! ream,” which ithe te of hs book: Very important Johnston’ contenen that Canta snd cultural els “annot dau separate but equal nats in radon CCinese sate thought. Rater the parabeum paralgm i, fr the soe par, donna” ‘he cussion up o now has sume that Confuctatsm sesentaly peaceful and doesnot avocateiaiinting war for any rezon, But thet, sumpuon isnot tue Ar Yan Nuttong takes cles, the hig premium CConfucansm places om moraity doer not rle out employing wr a 30 instrument of stuteraf. Indeed emanates that China be wiling to wage jst wars when another couney& beavng fn was that Chinas exert dem immoral. Yan woes, “Some chim that Coalacus and Mens sdvocte no war’ an.aze opposed t ll arn fc they ate not opposed ‘oll war, omy tounjost war. They support just wars He furthers, “Confucius thinks that eelance on preaching 1 vphold the noms of ‘benevolence ad justice i nadequite Hence he tink the way of wr ‘boul be employed fo punish the princes who go aginst benevolence and josie (F sour, this usticaton for wari emaraty pliable, Ax almost ‘every student of intematoaa poles knoms, polliclleaers and poy ‘maker of al persussons are sled inguin out deve ways offing a| ‘vl county’ tekavor a un or morly depraved. Hence, with he ‘et spnmeierConfucan yeni can be seed to jury agpesive as wel a defensive bebavioe Like Wher in the Unite Stes, Conus makes easy for Chinese leader to pen ike eas and acters ‘Aid tere is abundant evidence that Chine has behaved ageesvely toward ite neighbors whenever i could over the course of slong story. In his survey of Chines foreig poley since the second menus BCE, ‘the higorian Warren Coben wes, Inthe ereation of thelr empl he CChinete were no less arrogant, no lest ruthless than the Europeans, Jepenese or Amertans nthe cetion of mele Hea, “otal, ‘srg Chins har bratized the wesk-and there enon to expe 1 eat aferenly inthe fue, to Behave any Kener than other great powers have in the past The politcal sent Visors Tin bor Kul clyerses tha when we look a Chinese foreign policy over tine, What we ee “the primacy of bate fre rather than ‘ham autos" She ows I afcult to understand such prevalence of miary const throughout Chinese history Hom only the perpecive of Confucian thought ‘Numerous ater scholars make sar anguments. Yuan-Kang Wg, forcxample, woke, “Confucian clare dd not centain Chinese ase of fore: china bas been a pratone a elplik for centres, bebaving ‘much ike ober gest powers have throughout woe Riso... Chinese leaders have peered to use fore to rsave external thea Chin's secur take on = mote alenive pore asthe coun» power srw, nd adopud expensive war ams i the absence of ater ot miltary connaints“™ Fly the historan Mane J. van de Ven write, “No one even sh nly a casa nterest a Chinese history canbe unaze thet Chinas eapacty for wari the at fw cents has proved tay ae some... spin that Chinas istry has in fact een a east lent ss Burepes™ ‘One might concede that China har done ise mre than pay ip ev lee to Confucanism in the past, but rpue that It hat undergone a tpiphaoy ia recent Yeas and now embraces that peaceful worldview (Can China Rize Peacfally? wl reeting balinceof power lope Thee i le evidence, howeret that such a change has ates ple Indeed. it snot unusual for exper ‘on China to note tht ressm ive snd well here. Tote Christensen, for example argues that “China may wel be the high church of repo tk in the post-Cold war word” while Avery Gols ss. “Chinas contemporary leaders, like thelr predecestors in tpl China, prize the practi of elo 1 sum, thee i ite Bas fr the cam that China i a exceptional est power that eschews reais logic an instead behave in asccdance ith the princes of Confucian acts, Amos ell ofthe avaible ev ence ncates tbat Chins has ich sory of tng to maxims rel lve power, Furthennore, here me goo reson to think Chica wil act erent the oe, ‘Make Money, Not War ‘Probably the most frequently heard argument that China's re can be Deacefl based oo the theory of economic independence. This ps spective bas two components, Fit isthe dala that Chinas economy Inerticably Bound to the economies ofits potent ral, ineuding Japan and the United Seats. This linkage meats ot only that Chia and Ss wading partners depend on each cher wo keep propenag bu a tat respesty in tum depends on peaceful rauons among them. A wat ‘nvoling them would have dsasvous economic conzequencs forall the Delgerent. It would be ustanount to mutual seized destruction {AD atthe economic level Second. prosperity i the mtn gs! of modem sats, Pubes day ‘expect thc ede to diver econome grow sey fa they ace ely tote throw out fe. ta some eves there ight be sigan ret at home and the reine elf he thst. This iemerative to ge eh means no atonal leader would tara war. Indee. even secuycompe- tion among the relevant counties i Bly wo be modert, ot Just because Iaders prefer to concenuste on maximizing thelr county’ wea but ao Beause of the danger that an itese vary might nadweeny lead 1 wat In word of economic irerdependen ses, leaders have a matked aversion to conflict for See wil pt an end 0 prosper a wel asthe polite cree. Tr would be wrong eo argue that economic interdependence doesnot sate at allo the fostering of peace Leaders do care gray sot tit country’s prspesiy and in cera cueunstances that concer wl help dampen any eninusiasm they might have frat The key qutton how: ‘vet is whether nich ealesations ae likly odesveyinfence ply maker in wide vary of decumstaners. nother won Wlthe impact of economic interdependence be weighty enough to serve as 2m bass for peace beeen Chin end its potential rivals over along period of time? U believe there are good reatons 10 doubt tht concems about mutual prospec wl ep Asa peacetl a China grows more power. the most ast level ptt cleultoas ote ramp economic aes when they come to confit. Ts cennly ee rgating mater a ronal cy Bee concer about survival ae nvaably a ae ta the secuy ree. and they ae more important than wozies abou por ery As emphasized You donot sure you cannot power Ie wort noting nti ear tt there war mbt] ence interdependence and prosperity among the European great powers before 1914. [everteles, Worl War T bappened. Germany, which was prindoaly espouse for causing tha conf was ben on preventing Rusa tors ring more powerfl while athe ame tte tying to Deore a hege- ‘mon in Europe. Flic overelmed eonemic inthis impart ie. Pos alo tends to win out er concerns abewt prosperity when aonaline affects the sue at stake. Consider Being’ poston on ‘ran. Chinese leaders have seve that they wl goto wari Tan tedares ts independence even hough they believe the ensulg coner would damage China's economy. Of couse, nadanstom iat he core of Chinese inking 0 Tawan; hat sad is onsdered sare eon. One right ale ote that Rory ie ered ith il mas, and in los every case there was substantial economic interdependence betwen the con ‘bans before the iting broke out. But pital aleuatine proved 19 ‘emote inven in he end (Can China Rise Peaceflly? ‘here ae thee oer reasons 1 doubt the ca that econo ner

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