NAGUIAT V.

NLRC

Are private respondent-employees of petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Inc., who were separated from
service due the closure of Clark Air Base, entitled to separation pay and, if so, in what amount?
Are officers of corporations ipso facto liable jointly and severally with the companies they
represent for the payment of separation pay?

These questions are answered by the Court in resolving this petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolutions of the National Labor Relations Commission
(Third Division) 1 promulgated on February 28, 1994,2 and May 31, 1994.3 The February 28,
1994 Resolution affirmed with modifications the decision4 of Labor Arbiter Ariel C. Santos in
NLRC Case No. RAB-III-12-2477-91. The second Resolution denied the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners.

The NLRC modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay to herein
individual respondents in the increased amount of US$120.00 for every year of service or its
peso equivalent, and holding Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T.
Naguiat, jointly and severally liable with Clark Field Taxi, Inc. ("CFTI").

The Facts

The following facts are derived from the records of the case:

Petitioner CFTI held a concessionaire's contract with the Army Air Force Exchange Services
("AAFES") for the operation of taxi services within Clark Air Base. Sergio F. Naguiat was CFTI's
president, while Antolin T. Naguiat was its vice-president. Like Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises,
Incorporated ("Naguiat Enterprises"), a trading firm, it was a family-owned corporation.

Individual respondents were previously employed by CFTI as taxicab drivers. During their
employment, they were required to pay a daily "boundary fee" in the amount of US$26.50 for
those working from 1:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon, and US$27.00 for those working from 12:00 noon
to 12:00 midnight. All incidental expenses for the maintenance of the vehicles they were driving
were accounted against them, including gasoline expenses.

The drivers worked at least three to four times a week, depending on the availability of
taxicabs. They earned not less than US$15.00 daily.

In excess of that amount, however, they were required to make cash deposits to the company,
which they could later withdraw every fifteen days.

Due to the phase-out of the US military bases in the Philippines, from which Clark Air Base was
not spared, the AAFES was dissolved, and the services of individual respondents were officially
terminated on November 26, 1991.
The AAFES Taxi Drivers Association ("drivers' union"), through its local president, Eduardo
Castillo, and CFTI held negotiations as regards separation benefits that should be awarded in
favor of the drivers. They arrived at an agreement that the separated drivers will be given
P500.00 for every year of service as severance pay. Most of the drivers accepted said amount in
December 1991 and January 1992. However, individual respondents herein refused to accept
theirs.

Instead, after disaffiliating themselves from the drivers' union, individual respondents, through
the National Organization of Workingmen ("NOWM"), a labor organization which they
subsequently joined, filed a complaint5 against "Sergio F. Naguiat doing business under the
name and style Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., Army-Air Force Exchange Services (AAFES)
with Mark Hooper as Area Service Manager, Pacific Region, and AAFES Taxi Drivers Association
with Eduardo Castillo as President," for payment of separation pay due to termination/phase-
out. Said complaint was later amended6 to include additional taxi drivers who were similarly
situated as complainants, and CFTI with Antolin T. Naguiat as vice president and general
manager, as party respondent.

In their complaint, herein private respondents alleged that they were regular employees of
Naguiat Enterprises, although their individual applications for employment were approved by
CFTI. They claimed to have been assigned to Naguiat Enterprises after having been hired by
CFTI, and that the former thence managed, controlled and supervised their employment. They
averred further that they were entitled to separation pay based on their latest daily earnings of
US$15.00 for working sixteen (16) days a month.

In their position paper submitted to the labor arbiter, herein petitioners claimed that the
cessation of business of CFTI on November 26, 1991, was due to "great financial losses and lost
business opportunity" resulting from the phase-out of Clark Air Base brought about by the Mt.
Pinatubo eruption and the expiration of the RP-US military bases agreement. They admitted
that CFTI had agreed with the drivers' union, through its President Eduardo Castillo who
claimed to have had blanket authority to negotiate with CFTI in behalf of union members, to
grant its taxi driver-employees separation pay equivalent to P500.00 for every year of service.

The labor arbiter, finding the individual complainants to be regular workers of CFTI, ordered the
latter to pay them P1,200.00 for every year of service "for humanitarian consideration," setting
aside the earlier agreement between CFTI and the drivers' union of P500.00 for every year of
service. The labor arbiter rejected the allegation of CFTI that it was forced to close business due
to "great financial losses and lost business opportunity" since, at the time it ceased operations,
CFTI was profitably earning and the cessation of its business was due to the untimely closure of
Clark Air Base. In not awarding separation pay in accordance with the Labor Code, the labor
arbiter explained:

To allow respondents exemption from its (sic) obligation to pay separation pay would be
inhuman to complainants but to impose a monetary obligation to an employer whose
profitable business was abruptly shot (sic) down by force majeure would be unfair and unjust to
say the least.7

and thus, simply awarded an amount for "humanitarian consideration."

Herein individual private respondents appealed to the NLRC. In its Resolution, the NLRC
modified the decision of the labor arbiter by granting separation pay to the private
respondents. The concluding paragraphs of the NLRC Resolution read:

The contention of complainant is partly correct. One-half month salary should be US$120.00
but this amount can not be paid to the complainant in U.S. Dollar which is not the legal tender
in the Philippines. Paras, in commenting on Art. 1249 of the New Civil Code, defines legal
tender as "that which a debtor may compel a creditor to accept in payment of the debt. The
complainants who are the creditors in this instance can be compelled to accept the Philippine
peso which is the legal tender, in which case, the table of conversion (exchange rate) at the
time of payment or satisfaction of the judgment should be used. However, since the choice is
left to the debtor, (respondents) they may choose to pay in US dollar." (Phoenix Assurance Co.
vs. Macondray & Co. Inc., L-25048, May 13, 1975)

In discharging the above obligations, Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, which is headed by Sergio F.
Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat, father and son at the same time the President and Vice-President
and General Manager, respectively, should be joined as indispensable party whose liability is
joint and several. (Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court)8

As mentioned earlier, the motion for reconsideration of herein petitioners was denied by the
NLRC. Hence, this petition with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order. Upon
posting by the petitioners of a surety bond, a temporary restraining order9 was issued by this
Court enjoining execution of the assailed Resolutions.

Issues

The petitioners raise the following issues before this Court for resolution:

I. Whether or not public respondent NLRC (3rd Div.) committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the appealed resolution;

II. Whether or not Messrs. Teofilo Rafols and Romeo N. Lopez could validly represent herein
private respondents; and,

III. Whether or not the resolution issued by public respondent is contrary to law. 10

Petitioners also submit two additional issues by way of a supplement 11 to their petition, to
wit: that Petitioners Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were denied due process; and that
petitioners were not furnished copies of private respondents' appeal to the NLRC. As to the
procedural lapse of insufficient copies of the appeal, the proper forum before which petitioners
should have raised it is the NLRC. They, however, failed to question this in their motion for
reconsideration. As a consequence, they are deemed to have waived the same and voluntarily
submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the appellate body.

Anent the first issue raised in their original petition, petitioners contend that NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in unilaterally increasing
the amount of severance pay granted by the labor arbiter. They claim that this was not
supported by substantial evidence since it was based simply on the self-serving allegation of
respondents that their monthly take-home pay was not lower than $240.00.

On the second issue, petitioners aver that NOWM cannot make legal representations in behalf
of individual respondents who should, instead, be bound by the decision of the union (AAFES
Taxi Drivers Association) of which they were members.

As to the third issue, petitioners incessantly insist that Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc. is a
separate and distinct juridical entity which cannot be held jointly and severally liable for the
obligations of CFTI. And similarly, Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin Naguiat were merely officers
and stockholders of CFTI and, thus, could not be held personally accountable for corporate
debts.

Lastly, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat assail the Resolution of NLRC holding them solidarily liable
despite not having been impleaded as parties to the complaint.

Individual respondents filed a comment separate from that of NOWM. In sum, both aver that
petitioners had the opportunity but failed to refute, the taxi drivers' claim of having an average
monthly earning of $240.00; that individual respondents became members of NOWM after
disaffiliating themselves from the AAFES Taxi Drivers Association which, through the
manipulations of its President Eduardo Castillo, unconscionably compromised their separation
pay; and that Naguiat Enterprises, being their indirect employer, is solidarily liable under the
law for violation of the Labor Code, in this case, for nonpayment of their separation pay.

The Solicitor General unqualifiedly supports the allegations of private respondents. In addition,
he submits that the separate personalities of respondent corporations and their officers should
be disregarded and considered one and the same as these were used to perpetrate injustice to
their employees.

The Court's Ruling

As will be discussed below, the petition is partially meritorious.

First Issue: Amount of Separation Pay

Firmly, we reiterate the rule that in a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, which is the only way a labor case may reach the Supreme Court, the
petitioner/s must clearly show that the NLRC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. 12

Long-standing and well-settled in Philippine jurisprudence is the judicial dictum that findings of
fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only great
respect but even finality; and are binding upon this Court unless there is a showing of grave
abuse of discretion, or where it is clearly shown that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in
disregard of the evidence on record. 13

Nevertheless, this Court carefully perused the records of the instant case if only to determine
whether public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in granting the clamor of private respondents that their separation pay should be
based on the amount of $240.00, allegedly their minimum monthly earnings as taxi drivers of
petitioners.

In their amended complaint before the Regional Arbitration Branch in San Fernando,
Pampanga, herein private respondents set forth in detail the work schedule and financial
arrangement they had with their employer. Therefrom they inferred that their monthly take-
home pay amounted to not less than $240.00. Herein petitioners did not bother to refute nor
offer any evidence to controvert said allegations. Remaining undisputed, the labor arbiter
adopted such facts in his decision. Petitioners did not even appeal from the decision of the
labor arbiter nor manifest any error in his findings and conclusions. Thus, petitioners are in
estoppel for not having questioned such facts when they had all opportunity to do so. Private
respondents, like petitioners, are bound by the factual findings of Respondent Commission.

Petitioners also claim that the closure of their taxi business was due to great financial losses
brought about by the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which made the roads practically impassable to
their taxicabs. Likewise well-settled is the rule that business losses or financial reverses, in
order to sustain retrenchment of personnel or closure of business and warrant exemption from
payment of separation pay, must be proved with clear and satisfactory evidence. 14 The
records, however, are devoid of such evidence.

The labor arbiter, as affirmed by NLRC, correctly found that petitioners stopped their taxi
business within Clark Air Base because of the phase-out of U.S. military presence thereat. It was
not due to any great financial loss because petitioners' taxi business was earning profitably at
the time of its closure.

With respect to the amount of separation pay that should be granted, Article 283 of the Labor
Code provides:
. . . In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations
of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the
separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for
every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be
considered one (1) whole year.

Considering the above, we find that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that individual respondents were entitled to separation pay 15 in the amount $120.00 (one-half
of $240.00 monthly pay) or its peso equivalent for every year of service.

Second Issue: NOWM's Personality to

Represent Individual Respondents-Employees

On the question of NOWM's authority to represent private respondents, we hold petitioners in

estoppel for not having seasonably raised this issue before the labor arbiter or the NLRC.
NOWM was already a party-litigant as the organization representing the taxi driver-
complainants before the labor arbiter. But petitioners who were party-respondents in said
complaint did not assail the juridical personality of NOWM and the validity of its
representations in behalf of the complaining taxi drivers before the quasi-judicial bodies.
Therefore, they are now estopped from raising such question before this Court. In any event,
petitioners acknowledged before this Court that the taxi drivers allegedly represented by
NOWM, are themselves parties in this case. 16

Third Issue: Liability of Petitioner-

Corporations and Their Respective Officers

The resolution of this issue involves another factual finding that Naguiat Enterprises actually
managed, supervised and controlled employment terms of the taxi drivers, making it their
indirect employer. As adverted to earlier, factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies are binding
upon the court in the absence of a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

Unfortunately, the NLRC did not discuss or give any explanation for holding Naguiat Enterprises
and its officers jointly and severally liable in discharging CFTI's liability for payment of
separation pay. We again remind those concerned that decisions, however concisely written,
must distinctly and clearly set forth the facts and law upon which they are based. 17 This rule
applies as well to dispositions by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies.

Naguiat Enterprise Not Liable

In impleading Naguiat Enterprises as solidarily liable for the obligations of CFTI, respondents
rely on Articles 106, 18 107 19 and 109 20 of the Labor Code.
Based on factual submissions of the parties, the labor arbiter, however, found that individual
respondents were regular employees of CFTI who received wages on a boundary or commission
basis.

We find no reason to make a contrary finding. Labor-only contracting exists where: (1) the
person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the
form of tools, equipment, machinery, and work premises, among others; and (2) the workers
recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the
principal business of the employer. 21 Independent contractors, meanwhile, are those who
exercise independent employment, contracting to do a piece of work according to their own
methods without being subject to control of their employer except as to the result of their
Work. 22

From the evidence proffered by both parties, there is no substantial basis to hold that Naguiat
Enterprises is an indirect employer of individual respondents much less a labor only contractor.
On the contrary, petitioners submitted documents such as the drivers' applications for
employment with CFTI, 23 and social security remittances 24 and payroll 25 of Naguiat
Enterprises showing that none of the individual respondents were its employees. Moreover, in
the contract 26 between CFTI and AAFES, the former, as concessionaire, agreed to purchase
from AAFES for a certain amount within a specified period a fleet of vehicles to be "ke(pt) on
the road" by CFTI, pursuant to their concessionaire's contract. This indicates that CFTI became
the owner of the taxicabs which became the principal investment and asset of the company.

Private respondents failed to substantiate their claim that Naguiat Enterprises managed,
supervised and controlled their employment. It appears that they were confused on the
personalities of Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual who was the president of CFTI, and Sergio F.
Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., as a separate corporate entity with a separate business. They
presumed that Sergio F. Naguiat, who was at the same time a stockholder and director 27 of
Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Inc., was managing and controlling the taxi business on behalf of
the latter. A closer scrutiny and analysis of the records, however, evince the truth of the
matter: that Sergio F. Naguiat, in supervising the taxi drivers and determining their employment
terms, was rather carrying out his responsibilities as president of CFTI. Hence, Naguiat
Enterprises as a separate corporation does not appear to be involved at all in the taxi business.

To illustrate further, we refer to the testimony of a driver-claimant on cross examination.

Atty. Suarez

Is it not true that you applied not with Sergio F. Naguiat but with Clark Field Taxi?

Witness

I applied for (sic) Sergio F. Naguiat.

Atty. Suarez

Sergio F. Naguiat as an individual or the corporation?

Witness

Sergio F. Naguiat na tao.

Atty. Suarez

Who is Sergio F. Naguiat?

Witness

He is the one managing the Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises and he is the one whom we believe as
our employer

Atty. Suarez

What is exactly the position of Sergio F. Naguiat with the Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises?

Witness

He is the owner, sir.

Atty. Suarez

How about with Clark Field Taxi Incorporated what is the position of Mr. Naguiat?

Witness

What I know is that he is a concessionaire.

xxx xxx xxx

Atty. Suarez

But do you also know that Sergio F. Naguiat is the President of Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated?

Witness

Yes, sir.

Atty. Suarez
How about Mr. Antolin Naguiat what is his role in the taxi services, the operation of the Clark
Field Taxi, Incorporated?

Witness

He is the vice president. 28

And, although the witness insisted that Naguiat Enterprises was his employer, he could not
deny that he received his salary from the office of CFTI inside the base. 29

Another driver-claimant admitted, upon the prodding of counsel for the corporations, that
Naguiat Enterprises was in the trading business while CFTI was in taxi services. 30

In addition, the Constitution 31 of CFTI-AAFES Taxi Drivers Association which, admittedly, was
the union of individual respondents while still working at Clark Air Base, states that members
thereof are the employees of CFTI and "(f)or collective bargaining purposes, the definite
employer is the Clark Field Taxi Inc."

From the foregoing, the ineludible conclusion is that CFTI was the actual and direct employer of
individual respondents, and that Naguiat Enterprises was neither their indirect employer nor
labor-only contractor. It was not involved at all in the taxi business.

CFTI president
solidarily liable

Petitioner-corporations would likewise want to avoid the solidary liability of their officers. To
bolster their position, Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat specifically aver that they were
denied due process since they were not parties to the complaint below. 32 In the broader
interest of justice, we, however, hold that Sergio F. Naguiat, in his capacity as president of CFTI,
cannot be exonerated from joint and several liability in the payment of separation pay to
individual respondents.

A.C. Ransom Labor Union-CCLU vs. NLRC 33 is the case in point. A.C. Ransom Corporation was a
family corporation, the stockholders of which were members of the Hernandez family. In 1973,
it filed an application for clearance to close or cease operations, which was duly granted by the
Ministry of Labor and Employment, without prejudice to the right of employees to seek redress
of grievance, if any. Backwages of 22 employees, who engaged in a strike prior to the closure,
were subsequently computed at P164,984.00. Up to September 1976, the union filed about ten
(10) motions for execution against the corporation, but none could be implemented,
presumably for failure to find leviable assets of said corporation. In its last motion for
execution, the union asked that officers and agents of the company be held personally liable for
payment of the backwages. This was granted by the labor arbiter. In the corporation's appeal to
the NLRC, one of the issues raised was: "Is the judgment against a corporation to reinstate its
dismissed employees with backwages, enforceable against its officer and agents, in their
individual, private and personal capacities, who were not parties in the case where the
judgment was rendered!" The NLRC answered in the negative, on the ground that officers of a
corporation are not liable personally for official acts unless they exceeded the scope of their
authority.

On certiorari, this Court reversed the NLRC and upheld the labor arbiter. In imposing joint and
several liability upon the company president, the Court, speaking through Mme. Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, ratiocinated this wise:

(b) How can the foregoing (Articles 265 and 273 of the Labor Code) provisions be implemented
when the employer is a corporation? The answer is found in Article 212(c) of the Labor Code
which provides:

(c) "Employer" includes any person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly.
The term shall not include any labor organization or any of its officers or agents except when
acting as employer.

The foregoing was culled from Section 2 of RA 602, the Minimum Wage Law. Since RANSOM is
an artificial person, it must have an officer who can be presumed to be the employer, being the
"person acting in the interest of (the) employer" RANSOM. The corporation, only in the
technical sense, is the employer.

The responsible officer of an employer corporation can be held personally, not to say even
criminally, liable for nonpayment of back wages. That is the policy of the law. . . .

(c) If the policy of the law were otherwise, the corporation employer can have devious ways for
evading payment of back wages. . . .

(d) The record does not clearly identify "the officer or officers" of RANSOM directly responsible
for failure to pay the back wages of the 22 strikers. In the absence of definite Proof in that
regard, we believe it should be presumed that the responsible officer is the President of the
corporation who can be deemed the chief operation officer thereof. Thus, in RA 602, criminal
responsibility is with the "Manager or in his default, the person acting as such." In RANSOM. the
President appears to be the Manager. (Emphasis supplied.)

Sergio F. Naguiat, admittedly, was the president of CFTI who actively managed the business.
Thus, applying the ruling in A.C. Ransom, he falls within the meaning of an "employer" as
contemplated by the Labor Code, who may be held jointly and severally liable for the
obligations of the corporation to its dismissed employees.

Moreover, petitioners also conceded that both CFTI and Naguiat Enterprises were "close family
corporations" 34 owned by the Naguiat family. Section 100, paragraph 5, (under Title XII on
Close Corporations) of the Corporation Code, states:
(5) To the extent that the stockholders are actively engage(d) in the management or operation
of the business and affairs of a close corporation, the stockholders shall be held to strict
fiduciary duties to each other and among themselves. Said stockholders shall be personally
liable for corporate torts unless the corporation has obtained reasonably adequate liability
insurance. (emphasis supplied)

Nothing in the records show whether CFTI obtained "reasonably adequate liability insurance;"
thus, what remains is to determine whether there was corporate tort.

Our jurisprudence is wanting as to the definite scope of "corporate tort." Essentially, "tort"
consists in the violation of a right given or the omission of a duty imposed by law. 35 Simply
stated, tort is a breach of a legal duty. 36 Article 283 of the Labor Code mandates the employer
to grant separation pay to employees in case of closure or cessation of operations of
establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, which is
the condition obtaining at bar. CFTI failed to comply with this law-imposed duty or obligation.
Consequently, its stockholder who was actively engaged in the management or operation of the
business should be held personally liable.

Furthermore, in MAM Realty Development vs. NLRC, 37 the Court recognized that a director or
officer may still be held solidarily liable with a corporation by specific provision of law. Thus:

. . . A corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its directors, officers and
employees. Obligations incurred by them, acting as such corporate agents, are not theirs but
the direct accountabilities of the corporation they represent. True, solidary liabilities may at
times be incurred but only when exceptional circumstances warrant such as, generally, in the
following cases:

xxx xxx xxx

4. When a director, trustee or officer is made, by specific provision of law, personally liable for
his corporate action. (footnotes omitted)

As pointed out earlier, the fifth paragraph of Section 100 of the Corporation Code specifically
imposes personal liability upon the stockholder actively managing or operating the business
and affairs of the close corporation.

In fact, in posting the surety bond required by this Court for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order enjoining the execution of the assailed NLRC Resolutions, only Sergio F.
Naguiat, in his individual and personal capacity, principally bound himself to comply with the
obligation thereunder, i.e., "to guarantee the payment to private respondents of any damages
which they may incur by reason of the issuance of a temporary restraining order sought, if it
should be finally adjudged that said principals were not entitled thereto. 38
The Court here finds no application to the rule that a corporate officer cannot be held solidarily
liable with a corporation in the absence of evidence that he had acted in bad faith or with
malice. 39 In the present case, Sergio Naguiat is held solidarily liable for corporate tort because
he had actively engaged in the management and operation of CFTI, a close corporation.

Antolin Naguiat not personally liable

Antolin T. Naguiat was the vice president of the CFTI. Although he carried the title of "general
manager" as well, it had not been shown that he had acted in such capacity. Furthermore, no
evidence on the extent of his participation in the management or operation of the business was
preferred. In this light, he cannot be held solidarily liable for the obligations of CFTI and Sergio
Naguiat to the private respondents.

Fourth Issue: No Denial of Due Process

Lastly, in petitioners' Supplement to their original petition, they assail the NLRC Resolution
holding Sergio F. Naguiat and Antolin T. Naguiat jointly and severally liable with petitioner-
corporations in the payment of separation pay, averring denial of due process since the
individual Naguiats were not impleaded as parties to the complaint.

We advert to the case of A.C. Ransom once more. The officers of the corporation were not
parties to the case when the judgment in favor of the employees was rendered. The corporate
officers raised this issue when the labor arbiter granted the motion of the employees to enforce
the judgment against them. In spite of this, the Court held the corporation president solidarily
liable with the corporation.

Furthermore, Sergio and Antolin Naguiat voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter when they, in their individual capacities, filed a position paper 40 together
with CFTI, before the arbiter. They cannot now claim to have been denied due process since
they availed of the opportunity to present their positions.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
February 28, 1994 Resolution of the NLRC is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

(1) Petitioner Clark Field Taxi, Incorporated, and Sergio F. Naguiat, president and co-owner
thereof, are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, the individual respondents their separation
pay computed at US$120.00 for every year of service, or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment or satisfaction of the judgment;

(2) Petitioner Sergio F. Naguiat Enterprises, Incorporated, and Antolin T. Naguiat are ABSOLVED
from liability in the payment of separation pay to individual respondents.

SO ORDERED.
GARCIA V. SALVADOR

This is a petition for review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the February 27, 2004
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia
liable for gross negligence; and its June 16, 2005 Resolution4 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

On October 1, 1993, respondent Ranida D. Salvador started working as a trainee in the

Accounting Department of Limay Bulk Handling Terminal, Inc. (the Company). As a prerequisite
for regular employment, she underwent a medical examination at the Community Diagnostic
Center (CDC). Garcia who is a medical technologist, conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B Surface
Antigen) test and on October 22, 1993, CDC issued the test result5 indicating that Ranida was
"HBs Ag: Reactive." The result bore the name and signature of Garcia as examiner and the
rubber stamp signature of Castro as pathologist.

When Ranida submitted the test result to Dr. Sto. Domingo, the Company physician, the latter
apprised her that the findings indicated that she is suffering from Hepatitis B, a liver disease.
Thus, based on the medical report6 submitted by Sto. Domingo, the Company terminated
Ranida’s employment for failing the physical examination.7

When Ranida informed her father, Ramon, about her ailment, the latter suffered a heart attack
and was confined at the Bataan Doctors Hospital. During Ramon’s confinement, Ranida
underwent another HBs Ag test at the said hospital and the result8 indicated that she is non-
reactive. She informed Sto. Domingo of this development but was told that the test conducted
by CDC was more reliable because it used the Micro-Elisa Method.

Thus, Ranida went back to CDC for confirmatory testing, and this time, the Anti-HBs test
conducted on her indicated a "Negative" result.9

Ranida also underwent another HBs Ag test at the Bataan Doctors Hospital using the Micro-Elisa
Method. The result indicated that she was non-reactive.10

Ranida submitted the test results from Bataan Doctors Hospital and CDC to the Executive
Officer of the Company who requested her to undergo another similar test before her re-
employment would be considered. Thus, CDC conducted another HBs Ag test on Ranida which
indicated a "Negative" result.11 Ma. Ruby G. Calderon, Med-Tech Officer-in-Charge of CDC,
issued a Certification correcting the initial result and explaining that the examining medical
technologist (Garcia) interpreted the delayed reaction as positive or reactive.12

Thereafter, the Company rehired Ranida.

On July 25, 1994, Ranida and Ramon filed a complaint13 for damages against petitioner Garcia
and a purportedly unknown pathologist of CDC, claiming that, by reason of the erroneous
interpretation of the results of Ranida’s examination, she lost her job and suffered serious
mental anxiety, trauma and sleepless nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost business
opportunities.

On September 26, 1994, respondents amended their complaint14 by naming Castro as the
"unknown pathologist."

Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence and incompetence and reiterated the
scientific explanation for the "false positive" result of the first HBs Ag test in his December 7,
1993 letter to the respondents.15

For his part, Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to CDC and only when a case
was referred to him; that he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results bore only his
rubber-stamp signature.

On September 1, 1997,16 the trial court dismissed the complaint for failure of the respondents
to present sufficient evidence to prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. It held that
respondents should have presented Sto. Domingo because he was the one who interpreted the
test result issued by CDC. Likewise, respondents should have presented a medical expert to
refute the testimonies of Garcia and Castro regarding the medical explanation behind the
conflicting test results on Ranida.17

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court’s findings, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
ORDERING defendant-appellee Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. to pay plaintiff-appellant Ranida D.
Salvador moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 and attorney’s fees in the amount of P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.18

The appellate court found Garcia liable for damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs Ag
result. On the other hand, it exonerated Castro for lack of participation in the issuance of the
results.

After the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Garcia filed the instant petition.

The main issue for resolution is whether the Court of Appeals, in reversing the decision of the
trial court, correctly found petitioner liable for damages to the respondents for issuing an
incorrect HBsAG test result.

Garcia maintains he is not negligent, thus not liable for damages, because he followed the
appropriate laboratory measures and procedures as dictated by his training and experience;
and that he did everything within his professional competence to arrive at an objective,
impartial and impersonal result.

At the outset, we note that the issues raised are factual in nature. Whether a person is
negligent or not is a question of fact which we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on
certiorari which is limited to reviewing errors of law.19

Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,20 whereby
such other person suffers injury. For health care providers, the test of the existence of
negligence is: did the health care provider either fail to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent health care provider would not have done; and that failure or action caused
injury to the patient;21 if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.

Thus, the elements of an actionable conduct are: 1) duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate
causation.

All the elements are present in the case at bar.

Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have the duty to comply with statutes, as well as
rules and regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and promote the health of the people
by preventing the operation of substandard, improperly managed and inadequately supported
clinical laboratories and by improving the quality of performance of clinical laboratory
examinations.22 Their business is impressed with public interest, as such, high standards of
performance are expected from them.

In F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we found the owner of a furniture shop liable for
the destruction of the plaintiff’s house in a fire which started in his establishment in view of his
failure to comply with an ordinance which required the construction of a firewall. In Teague v.
Fernandez, we stated that where the very injury which was intended to be prevented by the
ordinance has happened, non-compliance with the ordinance was not only an act of negligence,
but also the proximate cause of the death.23

In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence. Where the law imposes upon a person the
duty to do something, his omission or non-performance will render him liable to whoever may
be injured thereby.

Section 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4688, otherwise known as The Clinical Laboratory Law,
provides:

Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person to be professionally in-charge of a registered clinical
laboratory unless he is a licensed physician duly qualified in laboratory medicine and authorized
by the Secretary of Health, such authorization to be renewed annually.
No license shall be granted or renewed by the Secretary of Health for the operation and
maintenance of a clinical laboratory unless such laboratory is under the administration,
direction and supervision of an authorized physician, as provided for in the preceding
paragraph.

Corollarily, Sections 9(9.1)(1), 11 and 25(25.1)(1) of the DOH Administrative Order No. 49-B
Series of 1988, otherwise known as the Revised Rules and Regulations Governing the
Registration, Operation and Maintenance of Clinical Laboratories in the Philippines, read:

Sec. 9. Management of the Clinical Laboratory:

9.1 Head of the Clinical Laboratory: The head is that person who assumes technical and
administrative supervision and control of the activities in the laboratory.

For all categories of clinical laboratories, the head shall be a licensed physician certified by the
Philippine Board of Pathology in either Anatomic or Clinical Pathology or both provided that:

(1) This shall be mandatory for all categories of free-standing clinical laboratories; all tertiary
category hospital laboratories and for all secondary category hospital laboratories located in
areas with sufficient available pathologist.

xxxx

Sec. 11. Reporting: All laboratory requests shall be considered as consultations between the
requesting physician and pathologist of the laboratory. As such all laboratory reports on various
examinations of human specimens shall be construed as consultation report and shall bear the
name of the pathologist or his associate. No person in clinical laboratory shall issue a report,
orally or in writing, whole portions thereof without a directive from the pathologist or his
authorized associate and only to the requesting physician or his authorized representative
except in emergencies when the results may be released as authorized by the pathologist.

xxxx

Sec. 25. Violations:

25.1 The license to operate a clinical laboratory may be suspended or revoked by the
Undersecretary of Health for Standards and Regulation upon violation of R.A. 4688 or the rules
and regulations issued in pursuance thereto or the commission of the following acts by the
persons owning or operating a clinical laboratory and the persons under their authority.

(1) Operation of a Clinical Laboratory without a certified pathologist or qualified licensed

physician authorized by the Undersecretary of Health or without employing a registered
medical technologist or a person not registered as a medical technologist in such a position.
And Section 29(b) of R.A. No. 5527, otherwise known as The Philippine Medical Technology Act
of 1969, reads:

Section 29. Penal Provisions.- Without prejudice to the provision of the Medical Act of 1959, as
amended relating to illegal practice of Medicine, the following shall be punished by a fine of not
less than two thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or imprisonment for not less
than six months nor more than two years, or both, in the discretion of the court:

xxxx

(b) Any medical technologist, even if duly registered, who shall practice medical technology in
the Philippines without the necessary supervision of a qualified pathologist or physician
authorized by the Department of Health;

From the foregoing laws and rules, it is clear that a clinical laboratory must be administered,
directed and supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the Secretary of Health, like a
pathologist who is specially trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the medical
technologist must be under the supervision of the pathologist or a licensed physician; and that
the results of any examination may be released only to the requesting physician or his
authorized representative upon the direction of the laboratory pathologist.

These rules are intended for the protection of the public by preventing performance of
substandard clinical examinations by laboratories whose personnel are not properly supervised.
The public demands no less than an effective and efficient performance of clinical laboratory
examinations through compliance with the quality standards set by laws and regulations.

We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with these standards.

First, CDC is not administered, directed and supervised by a licensed physician as required by
law, but by Ma. Ruby C. Calderon, a licensed Medical Technologist.24 In the License to Open
and Operate a Clinical Laboratory for the years 1993 and 1996 issued by Dr. Juan R. Nañagas,
M.D., Undersecretary for Health Facilities, Standards and Regulation, defendant-appellee
Castro was named as the head of CDC.25 However, in his Answer with Counterclaim, he stated:

3. By way of affirmative and special defenses, defendant pathologist further avers and plead as
follows:

Defendant pathologist is not the owner of the Community Diagnostic Center nor an employee
of the same nor the employer of its employees. Defendant pathologist comes to the
Community Diagnostic Center when and where a problem is referred to him. Its employees are
licensed under the Medical Technology Law (Republic Act No. 5527) and are certified by, and
registered with, the Professional Regulation Commission after having passed their Board
Examinations. They are competent within the sphere of their own profession in so far as
conducting laboratory examinations and are allowed to sign for and in behalf of the clinical
laboratory. The defendant pathologist, and all pathologists in general, are hired by laboratories
for purposes of complying with the rules and regulations and orders issued by the Department
of Health through the Bureau of Research and Laboratories. Defendant pathologist does not
stay that long period of time at the Community Diagnostic Center but only periodically or
whenever a case is referred to him by the laboratory. Defendant pathologist does not appoint
or select the employees of the laboratory nor does he arrange or approve their schedules of
duty.26

Castro’s infrequent visit to the clinical laboratory barely qualifies as an effective administrative
supervision and control over the activities in the laboratory. "Supervision and control" means
the authority to act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a
subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review, approve,
revise or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units.27

Second, Garcia conducted the HBsAG test of respondent Ranida without the supervision of
defendant-appellee Castro, who admitted that:

[He] does not know, and has never known or met, the plaintiff-patient even up to this time nor
has he personally examined any specimen, blood, urine or any other tissue, from the plaintiff-
patient otherwise his own handwritten signature would have appeared in the result and not
merely stamped as shown in Annex "B" of the Amended Complaint.28

Last, the disputed HBsAG test result was released to respondent Ranida without the
authorization of defendant-appellee Castro.29

Garcia may not have intended to cause the consequences which followed after the release of
the HBsAG test result. However, his failure to comply with the laws and rules promulgated and
issued for the protection of public safety and interest is failure to observe that care which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would observe. Thus, his act or omission constitutes a
breach of duty.

Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply with
the mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was terminated from the service for failing
the physical examination; suffered anxiety because of the diagnosis; and was compelled to
undergo several more tests. All these could have been avoided had the proper safeguards been
scrupulously followed in conducting the clinical examination and releasing the clinical report.

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
The foregoing provision provides the legal basis for the award of damages to a party who
suffers damage whenever one commits an act in violation of some legal provision.30 This was
incorporated by the Code Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers damage
because another has violated some legal provision.31

We find the Court of Appeals’ award of moral damages reasonable under the circumstances
bearing in mind the mental trauma suffered by respondent Ranida who thought she was
afflicted by Hepatitis B, making her "unfit or unsafe for any type of employment."32 Having
established her right to moral damages, we see no reason to disturb the award of exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees. Exemplary damages are imposed, by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages,33 and attorney’s fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary
damages are awarded.34

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58668 dated February 27,
2004 finding petitioner Orlando D. Garcia, Jr. guilty of gross negligence and liable to pay to
respondents ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00
as attorney’s fees, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS V. TUAÑO

In this petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioners
Peter Paul Patrick Lucas, Fatima Gladys Lucas, Abbeygail Lucas and Gillian Lucas seek the
reversal of the 27 September 2006 Decision2 and 3 July 2007 Resolution,3 both of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666, entitled "Peter Paul Patrick Lucas, Fatima Gladys Lucas,
Abbeygail Lucas and Gillian Lucas v. Prospero Ma. C. Tuaño."

In the questioned decision and resolution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 14 July 2000
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 150, Makati City, dismissing the complaint
filed by petitioners in a civil case entitled, "Peter Paul Patrick Lucas, Fatima Gladys Lucas,
Abbeygail Lucas and Gillian Lucas v. Prospero Ma. C. Tuaño," docketed as Civil Case No. 92-
2482.

From the record of the case, the established factual antecedents of the present petition are:

Sometime in August 1988, petitioner Peter Paul Patrick Lucas (Peter) contracted "sore eyes" in
his right eye.

On 2 September 1988, complaining of a red right eye and swollen eyelid, Peter made use of his
health care insurance issued by Philamcare Health Systems, Inc. (Philamcare), for a possible
consult. The Philamcare Coordinator, Dr. Edwin Oca, M.D., referred Peter to respondent, Dr.
Prospero Ma. C. Tuaño, M.D. (Dr. Tuaño), an ophthalmologist at St. Luke’s Medical Center, for
an eye consult.

Upon consultation with Dr. Tuaño, Peter narrated that it had been nine (9) days since the
problem with his right eye began; and that he was already taking Maxitrol to address the
problem in his eye. According to Dr. Tuaño, he performed "ocular routine examination" on
Peter’s eyes, wherein: (1) a gross examination of Peter’s eyes and their surrounding area was
made; (2) Peter’s visual acuity were taken; (3) Peter’s eyes were palpated to check the
intraocular pressure of each; (4) the motility of Peter’s eyes was observed; and (5) the
ophthalmoscopy4 on Peter’s eyes was used. On that particular consultation, Dr. Tuaño
diagnosed that Peter was suffering from conjunctivitis5 or "sore eyes." Dr. Tuaño then
prescribed Spersacet-C6 eye drops for Peter and told the latter to return for follow-up after one
week.

As instructed, Peter went back to Dr. Tuaño on 9 September 1988. Upon examination, Dr.
Tuaño told Peter that the "sore eyes" in the latter’s right eye had already cleared up and he
could discontinue the Spersacet-C. However, the same eye developed Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis (EKC),7 a viral infection. To address the new problem with Peter’s right eye, Dr.
Tuaño prescribed to the former a steroid-based eye drop called Maxitrol,8 a dosage of six (6)
drops per day.9 To recall, Peter had already been using Maxitrol prior to his consult with Dr.
Tuaño.

On 21 September 1988, Peter saw Dr. Tuaño for a follow-up consultation. After examining both
of Peter’s eyes, Dr. Tuaño instructed the former to taper down10 the dosage of Maxitrol,
because the EKC in his right eye had already resolved. Dr. Tuaño specifically cautioned Peter
that, being a steroid, Maxitrol had to be withdrawn gradually; otherwise, the EKC might
recur.11

Complaining of feeling as if there was something in his eyes, Peter returned to Dr. Tuaño for
another check-up on 6 October 1988. Dr. Tuaño examined Peter’s eyes and found that the right
eye had once more developed EKC. So, Dr. Tuaño instructed Peter to resume the use of
Maxitrol at six (6) drops per day.

On his way home, Peter was unable to get a hold of Maxitrol, as it was out of stock.
Consequently, Peter was told by Dr. Tuano to take, instead, Blephamide12 another steroid-
based medication, but with a lower concentration, as substitute for the unavailable Maxitrol, to
be used three (3) times a day for five (5) days; two (2) times a day for five (5) days; and then
just once a day.13

Several days later, on 18 October 1988, Peter went to see Dr. Tuaño at his clinic, alleging severe
eye pain, feeling as if his eyes were about to "pop-out," a headache and blurred vision. Dr.
Tuaño examined Peter’s eyes and discovered that the EKC was again present in his right eye. As
a result, Dr. Tuaño told Peter to resume the maximum dosage of Blephamide.
Dr. Tuaño saw Peter once more at the former’s clinic on 4 November 1988. Dr. Tuaño’s
examination showed that only the periphery of Peter’s right eye was positive for EKC; hence,
Dr. Tuaño prescribed a lower dosage of Blephamide.

It was also about this time that Fatima Gladys Lucas (Fatima), Peter’s spouse, read the
accompanying literature of Maxitrol and found therein the following warning against the
prolonged use of such steroids:

WARNING:

Prolonged use may result in glaucoma, with damage to the optic nerve, defects in visual acuity
and fields of vision, and posterior, subcapsular cataract formation. Prolonged use may suppress
the host response and thus increase the hazard of secondary ocular infractions, in those
diseases causing thinning of the cornea or sclera, perforations have been known to occur with
the use of topical steroids. In acute purulent conditions of the eye, steroids may mask infection
or enhance existing infection. If these products are used for 10 days or longer, intraocular
pressure should be routinely monitored even though it may be difficult in children and
uncooperative patients.

Employment of steroid medication in the treatment of herpes simplex requires great caution.

xxxx

ADVERSE REACTIONS:

Adverse reactions have occurred with steroid/anti-infective combination drugs which can be
attributed to the steroid component, the anti-infective component, or the combination. Exact
incidence figures are not available since no denominator of treated patients is available.

Reactions occurring most often from the presence of the anti-infective ingredients are allergic
sensitizations. The reactions due to the steroid component in decreasing order to frequency are
elevation of intra-ocular pressure (IOP) with possible development of glaucoma, infrequent
optic nerve damage; posterior subcapsular cataract formation; and delayed wound healing.

Secondary infection: The development of secondary has occurred after use of combination
containing steroids and antimicrobials. Fungal infections of the correa are particularly prone to
develop coincidentally with long-term applications of steroid. The possibility of fungal invasion
must be considered in any persistent corneal ulceration where steroid treatment has been
used.

Secondary bacterial ocular infection following suppression of host responses also occurs.

On 26 November 1988, Peter returned to Dr. Tuaño’s clinic, complaining of "feeling worse."14 It
appeared that the EKC had spread to the whole of Peter’s right eye yet again. Thus, Dr. Tuaño
instructed Peter to resume the use of Maxitrol. Petitioners averred that Peter already made
mention to Dr. Tuaño during said visit of the above-quoted warning against the prolonged use
of steroids, but Dr. Tuaño supposedly brushed aside Peter’s concern as mere paranoia, even
assuring him that the former was taking care of him (Peter).

Petitioners further alleged that after Peter’s 26 November 1988 visit to Dr. Tuaño, Peter
continued to suffer pain in his right eye, which seemed to "progress," with the ache intensifying
and becoming more frequent.

Upon waking in the morning of 13 December 1988, Peter had no vision in his right eye. Fatima
observed that Peter’s right eye appeared to be bloody and swollen.15 Thus, spouses Peter and
Fatima rushed to the clinic of Dr. Tuaño. Peter reported to Dr. Tuaño that he had been suffering
from constant headache in the afternoon and blurring of vision.

Upon examination, Dr. Tuaño noted the hardness of Peter’s right eye. With the use of a
tonometer16 to verify the exact intraocular pressure17 (IOP) of Peter’s eyes, Dr. Tuaño
discovered that the tension in Peter’s right eye was 39.0 Hg, while that of his left was 17.0
Hg.18 Since the tension in Peter’s right eye was way over the normal IOP, which merely ranged
from 10.0 Hg to 21.0 Hg,19 Dr. Tuaño ordered20 him to immediately discontinue the use of
Maxitrol and prescribed to the latter Diamox21 and Normoglaucon, instead.22 Dr. Tuaño also
required Peter to go for daily check-up in order for the former to closely monitor the pressure
of the latter’s eyes.

On 15 December 1988, the tonometer reading of Peter’s right eye yielded a high normal level,
i.e., 21.0 Hg. Hence, Dr. Tuaño told Peter to continue using Diamox and Normoglaucon. But
upon Peter’s complaint of "stomach pains and tingling sensation in his fingers,"23 Dr. Tuaño
discontinued Peter’s use of Diamox.24

Peter went to see another ophthalmologist, Dr. Ramon T. Batungbacal (Dr. Batungbacal), on 21
December 1988, who allegedly conducted a complete ophthalmological examination of Peter’s
eyes. Dr. Batungbacal’s diagnosis was Glaucoma25 O.D.26 He recommended Laser
Trabeculoplasty27 for Peter’s right eye.

When Peter returned to Dr. Tuaño on 23 December 1988,28 the tonometer measured the IOP
of Peter’s right eye to be 41.0 Hg,29 again, way above normal. Dr. Tuaño addressed the
problem by advising Peter to resume taking Diamox along with Normoglaucon.

During the Christmas holidays, Peter supposedly stayed in bed most of the time and was not
able to celebrate the season with his family because of the debilitating effects of Diamox.30

On 28 December 1988, during one of Peter’s regular follow-ups with Dr. Tuaño, the doctor
conducted another ocular routine examination of Peter’s eyes. Dr. Tuaño noted the recurrence
of EKC in Peter’s right eye. Considering, however, that the IOP of Peter’s right eye was still quite
high at 41.0 Hg, Dr. Tuaño was at a loss as to how to balance the treatment of Peter’s EKC vis-à-
vis the presence of glaucoma in the same eye. Dr. Tuaño, thus, referred Peter to Dr. Manuel B.
Agulto, M.D. (Dr. Agulto), another ophthalmologist specializing in the treatment of glaucoma.31
Dr. Tuaño’s letter of referral to Dr. Agulto stated that:

Referring to you Mr. Peter Lucas for evaluation & possible management. I initially saw him Sept.
2, 1988 because of conjunctivitis. The latter resolved and he developed EKC for which I gave
Maxitrol. The EKC was recurrent after stopping steroid drops. Around 1 month of steroid
treatment, he noted blurring of vision & pain on the R. however, I continued the steroids for
the sake of the EKC. A month ago, I noted iris atrophy, so I took the IOP and it was definitely
elevated. I stopped the steroids immediately and has (sic) been treating him medically.

It seems that the IOP can be controlled only with oral Diamox, and at the moment, the EKC has
recurred and I’m in a fix whether to resume the steroid or not considering that the IOP is still
uncontrolled.32

On 29 December 1988, Peter went to see Dr. Agulto at the latter’s clinic. Several tests were
conducted thereat to evaluate the extent of Peter’s condition. Dr. Agulto wrote Dr. Tuaño a
letter containing the following findings and recommendations:

Thanks for sending Peter Lucas. On examination conducted vision was 20/25 R and 20/20L.
Tension curve 19 R and 15 L at 1210 H while on Normoglaucon BID OD & Diamox ½ tab every 6h
po.

Slit lamp evaluation33 disclosed subepithelial corneal defect outer OD. There was
circumferential peripheral iris atrophy, OD. The lenses were clear.

Funduscopy34 showed vertical cup disc of 0.85 R and 0.6 L with temporal slope R>L.

Zeiss gonioscopy35 revealed basically open angles both eyes with occasional PAS,36 OD.

Rolly, I feel that Peter Lucas has really sustained significant glaucoma damage. I suggest that we
do a baseline visual fields and push medication to lowest possible levels. If I may suggest
further, I think we should prescribe Timolol37 BID38 OD in lieu of Normoglaucon. If the IOP is
still inadequate, we may try D’epifrin39 BID OD (despite low PAS). I’m in favor of retaining
Diamox or similar CAI.40

If fields show further loss in say – 3 mos. then we should consider trabeculoplasty.

I trust that this approach will prove reasonable for you and Peter.41

Peter went to see Dr. Tuaño on 31 December 1988, bearing Dr. Agulto’s aforementioned letter.
Though Peter’s right and left eyes then had normal IOP of 21.0 Hg and 17.0 Hg, respectively, Dr.
Tuaño still gave him a prescription for Timolol B.I.D. so Peter could immediately start using said
medication. Regrettably, Timolol B.I.D. was out of stock, so Dr. Tuaño instructed Peter to just
continue using Diamox and Normoglaucon in the meantime.

Just two days later, on 2 January 1989, the IOP of Peter’s right eye remained elevated at 21.0
Hg,42 as he had been without Diamox for the past three (3) days.

On 4 January 1989, Dr. Tuaño conducted a visual field study43 of Peter’s eyes, which revealed
that the latter had tubular vision44 in his right eye, while that of his left eye remained normal.
Dr. Tuaño directed Peter to religiously use the Diamox and Normoglaucon, as the tension of the
latter’s right eye went up even further to 41.0 Hg in just a matter of two (2) days, in the
meantime that Timolol B.I.D. and D’epifrin were still not available in the market. Again, Dr.
Tuaño advised Peter to come for regular check-up so his IOP could be monitored.

Obediently, Peter went to see Dr. Tuaño on the 7th, 13th, 16th and 20th of January 1989 for
check-up and IOP monitoring.

In the interregnum, however, Peter was prodded by his friends to seek a second medical
opinion. On 13 January 1989, Peter consulted Dr. Jaime Lapuz, M.D. (Dr. Lapuz), an
ophthalmologist, who, in turn, referred Peter to Dr. Mario V. Aquino, M.D. (Dr. Aquino),
another ophthalmologist who specializes in the treatment of glaucoma and who could
undertake the long term care of Peter’s eyes.

According to petitioners, after Dr. Aquino conducted an extensive evaluation of Peter’s eyes,
the said doctor informed Peter that his eyes were relatively normal, though the right one
sometimes manifested maximum borderline tension. Dr. Aquino also confirmed Dr. Tuaño’s
diagnosis of tubular vision in Peter’s right eye. Petitioners claimed that Dr. Aquino essentially
told Peter that the latter’s condition would require lifetime medication and follow-ups.

In May 1990 and June 1991, Peter underwent two (2) procedures of laser trabeculoplasty to
attempt to control the high IOP of his right eye.

Claiming to have steroid-induced glaucoma45 and blaming Dr. Tuaño for the same, Peter,
joined by: (1) Fatima, his spouse46; (2) Abbeygail, his natural child47; and (3) Gillian, his
legitimate child48 with Fatima, instituted on 1 September 1992, a civil complaint for damages
against Dr. Tuaño, before the RTC, Branch 150, Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 92-2482.

In their Complaint, petitioners specifically averred that as the "direct consequence of [Peter’s]
prolonged use of Maxitrol, [he] suffered from steroid induced glaucoma which caused the
elevation of his intra-ocular pressure. The elevation of the intra-ocular pressure of [Peter’s right
eye] caused the impairment of his vision which impairment is not curable and may even lead to
total blindness."49
Petitioners additionally alleged that the visual impairment of Peter’s right eye caused him and
his family so much grief. Because of his present condition, Peter now needed close medical
supervision forever; he had already undergone two (2) laser surgeries, with the possibility that
more surgeries were still needed in the future; his career in sports casting had suffered and was
continuing to suffer;50 his anticipated income had been greatly reduced as a result of his
"limited" capacity; he continually suffered from "headaches, nausea, dizziness, heart
palpitations, rashes, chronic rhinitis, sinusitis,"51 etc.; Peter’s relationships with his spouse and
children continued to be strained, as his condition made him highly irritable and sensitive; his
mobility and social life had suffered; his spouse, Fatima, became the breadwinner in the
family;52 and his two children had been deprived of the opportunity for a better life and
educational prospects. Collectively, petitioners lived in constant fear of Peter becoming
completely blind.53

In the end, petitioners sought pecuniary award for their supposed pain and suffering, which
were ultimately brought about by Dr. Tuaño’s grossly negligent conduct in prescribing to Peter
the medicine Maxitrol for a period of three (3) months, without monitoring Peter’s IOP, as
required in cases of prolonged use of said medicine, and notwithstanding Peter’s constant
complaint of intense eye pain while using the same. Petitioners particularly prayed that Dr.
Tuaño be adjudged liable for the following amounts:

1. The amount of ₱2,000,000.00 to plaintiff Peter Lucas as and by way of compensation for his
impaired vision.

2. The amount of ₱300,000.00 to spouses Lucas as and by way of actual damages plus such
additional amounts that may be proven during trial.

3. The amount of ₱1,000,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.

4. The amount of ₱500,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages.

5. The amount of ₱200,000.00 as and by way of attorney’s fees plus costs of suit.54

In rebutting petitioners’ complaint, Dr. Tuaño asserted that the "treatment made by [him] more
than three years ago has no causal connection to [Peter’s] present glaucoma or condition."55
Dr. Tuaño explained that "[d]rug-induced glaucoma is temporary and curable, steroids have the
side effect of increasing intraocular pressure. Steroids are prescribed to treat Epidemic Kerato
Conjunctivitis or EKC which is an infiltration of the cornea as a result of conjunctivitis or sore
eyes."56 Dr. Tuaño also clarified that (1) "[c]ontrary to [petitioners’] fallacious claim, [he] did
NOT continually prescribe the drug Maxitrol which contained steroids for any prolonged
period"57 and "[t]he truth was the Maxitrol was discontinued x x x as soon as EKC disappeared
and was resumed only when EKC reappeared"58; (2) the entire time he was treating Peter, he
"continually monitored the intraocular pressure of [Peter’s eyes] by palpating the eyes and by
putting pressure on the eyeballs," and no hardening of the same could be detected, which
meant that there was no increase in the tension or IOP, a possible side reaction to the use of
steroid medications; and (3) it was only on 13 December 1988 that Peter complained of a
headache and blurred vision in his right eye, and upon measuring the IOP of said eye, it was
determined for the first time that the IOP of the right eye had an elevated value.

But granting for the sake of argument that the "steroid treatment of [Peter’s] EKC caused the
steroid induced glaucoma,"59 Dr. Tuaño argued that:

[S]uch condition, i.e., elevated intraocular pressure, is temporary. As soon as the intake of
steroids is discontinued, the intraocular pressure automatically is reduced. Thus, [Peter’s]
glaucoma can only be due to other causes not attributable to steroids, certainly not attributable
to [his] treatment of more than three years ago x x x.

From a medical point of view, as revealed by more current examination of [Peter], the latter’s
glaucoma can only be long standing glaucoma, open angle glaucoma, because of the large C:D
ratio. The steroids provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier as [Peter] remained
asymptomatic prior to steroid application. Hence, the steroid treatment was in fact beneficial
to [Peter] as it revealed the incipient open angle glaucoma of [Peter] to allow earlier treatment
of the same.60

In a Decision dated 14 July 2000, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 92-2482 "for insufficiency of
evidence."61 The decretal part of said Decision reads:

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant complaint is dismissed for insufficiency of

evidence. The counter claim (sic) is likewise dismissed in the absence of bad faith or malice on
the part of plaintiff in filing the suit.62

The RTC opined that petitioners failed to prove by preponderance of evidence that Dr. Tuaño
was negligent in his treatment of Peter’s condition. In particular, the record of the case was
bereft of any evidence to establish that the steroid medication and its dosage, as prescribed by
Dr. Tuaño, caused Peter’s glaucoma. The trial court reasoned that the "recognized standards of
the medical community has not been established in this case, much less has causation been
established to render [Tuaño] liable."63 According to the RTC:

[Petitioners] failed to establish the duty required of a medical practitioner against which Peter
Paul’s treatment by defendant can be compared with. They did not present any medical expert
or even a medical doctor to convince and expertly explain to the court the established norm or
duty required of a physician treating a patient, or whether the non taking (sic) by Dr. Tuaño of
Peter Paul’s pressure a deviation from the norm or his non-discovery of the glaucoma in the
course of treatment constitutes negligence. It is important and indispensable to establish such a
standard because once it is established, a medical practitioner who departed thereof breaches
his duty and commits negligence rendering him liable. Without such testimony or
enlightenment from an expert, the court is at a loss as to what is then the established norm of
duty of a physician against which defendant’s conduct can be compared with to determine
negligence.64
The RTC added that in the absence of "any medical evidence to the contrary, this court cannot
accept [petitioners’] claim that the use of steroid is the proximate cause of the damage
sustained by [Peter’s] eye."65

Correspondingly, the RTC accepted Dr. Tuaño’s medical opinion that "Peter Paul must have
been suffering from normal tension glaucoma, meaning, optic nerve damage was happening
but no elevation of the eye pressure is manifested, that the steroid treatment actually
unmasked the condition that resulted in the earlier treatment of the glaucoma. There is nothing
in the record to contradict such testimony. In fact, plaintiff’s Exhibit ‘S’ even tends to support
them."

Undaunted, petitioners appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. Their
appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 68666.

On 27 September 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666
denying petitioners’ recourse and affirming the appealed RTC Decision. The fallo of the
judgment of the appellate court states:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.66

The Court of Appeals faulted petitioners because they –

[D]id not present any medical expert to testify that Dr. Tuano’s prescription of Maxitrol and
Blephamide for the treatment of EKC on Peter’s right eye was not proper and that his palpation
of Peter’s right eye was not enough to detect adverse reaction to steroid. Peter testified that
Dr. Manuel Agulto told him that he should not have used steroid for the treatment of EKC or
that he should have used it only for two (2) weeks, as EKC is only a viral infection which will
cure by itself. However, Dr. Agulto was not presented by [petitioners] as a witness to confirm
what he allegedly told Peter and, therefore, the latter’s testimony is hearsay. Under Rule 130,
Section 36 of the Rules of Court, a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
own personal knowledge, x x x. Familiar and fundamental is the rule that hearsay testimony is
inadmissible as evidence.67

Like the RTC, the Court of Appeals gave great weight to Dr. Tuaño’s medical judgment,
specifically the latter’s explanation that:

[W]hen a doctor sees a patient, he cannot determine whether or not the latter would react
adversely to the use of steroids, that it was only on December 13, 1989, when Peter
complained for the first time of headache and blurred vision that he observed that the pressure
of the eye of Peter was elevated, and it was only then that he suspected that Peter belongs to
the 5% of the population who reacts adversely to steroids.68
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated 3 July 2007.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
premised on the following assignment of errors:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE
RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE;

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE

PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST THE RESPONDENT ON THE GROUND THAT
NO MEDICAL EXPERT WAS PRESENTED BY THE PETITIONERS TO PROVE THEIR CLAIM FOR
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AGAINST THE RESPONDENT; AND

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT FINDING THE
RESPONDENT LIABLE TO THE PETITIONERS’ FOR ACTUAL, MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
ASIDE FROM ATTORNEY’S FEES, COSTS OF SUIT, AS A RESULT OF HIS GROSS NEGLIGENCE.69

A reading of the afore-quoted reversible errors supposedly committed by the Court of Appeals
in its Decision and Resolution would reveal that petitioners are fundamentally assailing the
finding of the Court of Appeals that the evidence on record is insufficient to establish
petitioners’ entitlement to any kind of damage. Therefore, it could be said that the sole issue
for our resolution in the Petition at bar is whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible
error in affirming the judgment of the RTC that petitioners failed to prove, by preponderance of
evidence, their claim for damages against Dr. Tuaño.

Evidently, said issue constitutes a question of fact, as we are asked to revisit anew the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, as well as of the RTC. In effect, petitioners would have us sift
through the evidence on record and pass upon whether there is sufficient basis to establish Dr.
Tuaño’s negligence in his treatment of Peter’s eye condition. This question clearly involves a
factual inquiry, the determination of which is not within the ambit of this Court’s power of
review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules Civil Procedure, as amended.70

Elementary is the principle that this Court is not a trier of facts; only errors of law are generally
reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the Court of Appeals.
Questions of fact are not entertained.71
Nonetheless, the general rule that only questions of law may be raised on appeal in a petition
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court admits of certain exceptions, including the
circumstance when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence, but is contradicted by the evidence on record. Although petitioners may
not explicitly invoke said exception, it may be gleaned from their allegations and arguments in
the instant Petition.1avvphi1.zw+

Petitioners contend, that "[c]ontrary to the findings of the Honorable Court of Appeals, [they]
were more than able to establish that: Dr. Tuaño ignored the standard medical procedure for
ophthalmologists, administered medication with recklessness, and exhibited an absence of
competence and skills expected from him."72 Petitioners reject the necessity of presenting
expert and/or medical testimony to establish (1) the standard of care respecting the treatment
of the disorder affecting Peter’s eye; and (2) whether or not negligence attended Dr. Tuaño’s
treatment of Peter, because, in their words –

That Dr. Tuaño was grossly negligent in the treatment of Peter’s simple eye ailment is a simple
case of cause and effect. With mere documentary evidence and based on the facts presented
by the petitioners, respondent can readily be held liable for damages even without any expert
testimony. In any case, however, and contrary to the finding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, there was a medical expert presented by the petitioner showing the recklessness
committed by [Dr. Tuaño] – Dr. Tuaño himself. [Emphasis supplied.]

They insist that Dr. Tuaño himself gave sufficient evidence to establish his gross negligence that
ultimately caused the impairment of the vision of Peter’s right eye,73 i.e., that "[d]espite [Dr.
Tuaño’s] knowledge that 5% of the population reacts adversely to Maxitrol, [he] had no qualms
whatsoever in prescribing said steroid to Peter without first determining whether or not the
(sic) Peter belongs to the 5%."74

We are not convinced. The judgments of both the Court of Appeals and the RTC are in accord
with the evidence on record, and we are accordingly bound by the findings of fact made
therein.

Petitioners’ position, in sum, is that Peter’s glaucoma is the direct result of Dr. Tuaño’s
negligence in his improper administration of the drug Maxitrol; "thus, [the latter] should be
liable for all the damages suffered and to be suffered by [petitioners]."75 Clearly, the present
controversy is a classic illustration of a medical negligence case against a physician based on the
latter’s professional negligence. In this type of suit, the patient or his heirs, in order to prevail, is
required to prove by preponderance of evidence that the physician failed to exercise that
degree of skill, care, and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession; and that
as a proximate result of such failure, the patient or his heirs suffered damages.

For lack of a specific law geared towards the type of negligence committed by members of the
medical profession, such claim for damages is almost always anchored on the alleged violation
of Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which states that:
ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

In medical negligence cases, also called medical malpractice suits, there exist a physician-
patient relationship between the doctor and the victim. But just like any other proceeding for
damages, four essential (4) elements i.e., (1) duty; (2) breach; (3) injury; and (4) proximate
causation,76 must be established by the plaintiff/s. All the four (4) elements must co-exist in
order to find the physician negligent and, thus, liable for damages.

When a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-patient relationship is

generated. And in accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that
he has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the
same field; and that he will employ such training, care, and skill in the treatment of the
patient.77 Thus, in treating his patient, a physician is under a duty to [the former] to exercise
that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and
in the same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.78 Stated
otherwise, the physician has the duty to use at least the same level of care that any other
reasonably competent physician would use to treat the condition under similar circumstances.

This standard level of care, skill and diligence is a matter best addressed by expert medical
testimony, because the standard of care in a medical malpractice case is a matter peculiarly
within the knowledge of experts in the field.79

There is breach of duty of care, skill and diligence, or the improper performance of such duty,
by the attending physician when the patient is injured in body or in health [and this] constitutes
the actionable malpractice.80 Proof of such breach must likewise rest upon the testimony of an
expert witness that the treatment accorded to the patient failed to meet the standard level of
care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the same
general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases.

Even so, proof of breach of duty on the part of the attending physician is insufficient, for there
must be a causal connection between said breach and the resulting injury sustained by the
patient. Put in another way, in order that there may be a recovery for an injury, it must be
shown that the "injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the
wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes";81 that is, the negligence
must be the proximate cause of the injury. And the proximate cause of an injury is that cause,
which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.82
Just as with the elements of duty and breach of the same, in order to establish the proximate
cause [of the injury] by a preponderance of the evidence in a medical malpractice action, [the
patient] must similarly use expert testimony, because the question of whether the alleged
professional negligence caused [the patient’s] injury is generally one for specialized expert
knowledge beyond the ken of the average layperson; using the specialized knowledge and
training of his field, the expert’s role is to present to the [court] a realistic assessment of the
likelihood that [the physician’s] alleged negligence caused [the patient’s] injury.83

From the foregoing, it is apparent that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of
expert witnesses belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of
practice as defendant physician or surgeon. The deference of courts to the expert opinion of
qualified physicians [or surgeons] stems from the former’s realization that the latter possess
unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently
evaluating;84 hence, the indispensability of expert testimonies.

In the case at bar, there is no question that a physician-patient relationship developed between
Dr. Tuaño and Peter when Peter went to see the doctor on 2 September 1988, seeking a consult
for the treatment of his sore eyes. Admittedly, Dr. Tuaño, an ophthalmologist, prescribed
Maxitrol when Peter developed and had recurrent EKC. Maxitrol or neomycin/polymyxin B
sulfates/dexamethasone ophthalmic ointment is a multiple-dose anti-infective steroid
combination in sterile form for topical application.85 It is the drug which petitioners claim to
have caused Peter’s glaucoma.

However, as correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, "[t]he onus probandi was on the
patient to establish before the trial court that the physicians ignored standard medical
procedure, prescribed and administered medication with recklessness and exhibited an
absence of the competence and skills expected of general practitioners similarly situated."86
Unfortunately, in this case, there was absolute failure on the part of petitioners to present any
expert testimony to establish: (1) the standard of care to be implemented by competent
physicians in treating the same condition as Peter’s under similar circumstances; (2) that, in his
treatment of Peter, Dr. Tuaño failed in his duty to exercise said standard of care that any other
competent physician would use in treating the same condition as Peter’s under similar
circumstances; and (3) that the injury or damage to Peter’s right eye, i.e., his glaucoma, was the
result of his use of Maxitrol, as prescribed by Dr. Tuaño. Petitioners’ failure to prove the first
element alone is already fatal to their cause.

Petitioners maintain that Dr. Tuaño failed to follow in Peter’s case the required procedure for
the prolonged use of Maxitrol. But what is actually the required procedure in situations such as
in the case at bar? To be precise, what is the standard operating procedure when
ophthalmologists prescribe steroid medications which, admittedly, carry some modicum of
risk?

Absent a definitive standard of care or diligence required of Dr. Tuaño under the circumstances,
we have no means to determine whether he was able to comply with the same in his diagnosis
and treatment of Peter. This Court has no yardstick upon which to evaluate or weigh the
attendant facts of this case to be able to state with confidence that the acts complained of,
indeed, constituted negligence and, thus, should be the subject of pecuniary reparation.

Petitioners assert that prior to prescribing Maxitrol, Dr. Tuaño should have determined first
whether Peter was a "steroid responder."87 Yet again, petitioners did not present any
convincing proof that such determination is actually part of the standard operating procedure
which ophthalmologists should unerringly follow prior to prescribing steroid medications.

In contrast, Dr. Tuaño was able to clearly explain that what is only required of
ophthalmologists, in cases such as Peter’s, is the conduct of standard tests/procedures known
as "ocular routine examination,"88 composed of five (5) tests/procedures – specifically, gross
examination of the eyes and the surrounding area; taking of the visual acuity of the patient;
checking the intraocular pressure of the patient; checking the motility of the eyes; and using
ophthalmoscopy on the patient’s eye – and he did all those tests/procedures every time Peter
went to see him for follow-up consultation and/or check-up.

We cannot but agree with Dr. Tuaño’s assertion that when a doctor sees a patient, he cannot
determine immediately whether the latter would react adversely to the use of steroids; all the
doctor can do is map out a course of treatment recognized as correct by the standards of the
medical profession. It must be remembered that a physician is not an insurer of the good result
of treatment. The mere fact that the patient does not get well or that a bad result occurs does
not in itself indicate failure to exercise due care.89 The result is not determinative of the
performance [of the physician] and he is not required to be infallible.90

Moreover, that Dr. Tuaño saw it fit to prescribe Maxitrol to Peter was justified by the fact that
the latter was already using the same medication when he first came to see Dr. Tuaño on 2
September 1988 and had exhibited no previous untoward reaction to that particular drug. 91

Also, Dr. Tuaño categorically denied petitioners’ claim that he never monitored the tension of
Peter’s eyes while the latter was on Maxitrol. Dr. Tuaño testified that he palpated Peter’s eyes
every time the latter came for a check-up as part of the doctor’s ocular routine examination, a
fact which petitioners failed to rebut. Dr. Tuaño’s regular conduct of examinations and tests to
ascertain the state of Peter’s eyes negate the very basis of petitioners’ complaint for damages.
As to whether Dr. Tuaño’s actuations conformed to the standard of care and diligence required
in like circumstances, it is presumed to have so conformed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.

Even if we are to assume that Dr. Tuaño committed negligent acts in his treatment of Peter’s
condition, the causal connection between Dr. Tuaño’s supposed negligence and Peter’s injury
still needed to be established. The critical and clinching factor in a medical negligence case is
proof of the causal connection between the negligence which the evidence established and the
plaintiff’s injuries.92 The plaintiff must plead and prove not only that he has been injured and
defendant has been at fault, but also that the defendant’s fault caused the injury. A verdict in a
malpractice action cannot be based on speculation or conjecture. Causation must be proven
within a reasonable medical probability based upon competent expert testimony.93

The causation between the physician’s negligence and the patient’s injury may only be
established by the presentation of proof that Peter’s glaucoma would not have occurred but for
Dr. Tuaño’s supposed negligent conduct. Once more, petitioners failed in this regard.

Dr. Tuaño does not deny that the use of Maxitrol involves the risk of increasing a patient’s IOP.
In fact, this was the reason why he made it a point to palpate Peter’s eyes every time the latter
went to see him -- so he could monitor the tension of Peter’s eyes. But to say that said
medication conclusively caused Peter’s glaucoma is purely speculative. Peter was diagnosed
with open-angle glaucoma. This kind of glaucoma is characterized by an almost complete
absence of symptoms and a chronic, insidious course.94 In open-angle glaucoma, halos around
lights and blurring of vision do not occur unless there has been a sudden increase in the
intraocular vision.95 Visual acuity remains good until late in the course of the disease.96 Hence,
Dr. Tuaño claims that Peter’s glaucoma "can only be long standing x x x because of the large
C:D97 ratio," and that "[t]he steroids provoked the latest glaucoma to be revealed earlier" was
a blessing in disguise "as [Peter] remained asymptomatic prior to steroid application."

Who between petitioners and Dr. Tuaño is in a better position to determine and evaluate the
necessity of using Maxitrol to cure Peter’s EKC vis-à-vis the attendant risks of using the same?

That Dr. Tuaño has the necessary training and skill to practice his chosen field is beyond cavil.
Petitioners do not dispute Dr. Tuaño’s qualifications – that he has been a physician for close to
a decade and a half at the time Peter first came to see him; that he has had various medical
training; that he has authored numerous papers in the field of ophthalmology, here and
abroad; that he is a Diplomate of the Philippine Board of Ophthalmology; that he occupies
various teaching posts (at the time of the filing of the present complaint, he was the Chair of
the Department of Ophthalmology and an Associate Professor at the University of the
Philippines-Philippine General Hospital and St. Luke’s Medical Center, respectively); and that he
held an assortment of positions in numerous medical organizations like the Philippine Medical
Association, Philippine Academy of Ophthalmology, Philippine Board of Ophthalmology,
Philippine Society of Ophthalmic Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery, Philippine Journal of
Ophthalmology, Association of Philippine Ophthalmology Professors, et al.

It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the
instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases, he takes the necessary
precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless
the contrary is sufficiently established.98 In making the judgment call of treating Peter’s EKC
with Maxitrol, Dr. Tuaño took the necessary precaution by palpating Peter’s eyes to monitor
their IOP every time the latter went for a check-up, and he employed the best of his knowledge
and skill earned from years of training and practice.
In contrast, without supporting expert medical opinions, petitioners’ bare assertions of
negligence on Dr. Tuaño’s part, which resulted in Peter’s glaucoma, deserve scant credit.

Our disposition of the present controversy might have been vastly different had petitioners
presented a medical expert to establish their theory respecting Dr. Tuaño’s so-called
negligence. In fact, the record of the case reveals that petitioners’ counsel recognized the
necessity of presenting such evidence. Petitioners even gave an undertaking to the RTC judge
that Dr. Agulto or Dr. Aquino would be presented. Alas, no follow-through on said undertaking
was made.1avvphi1

The plaintiff in a civil case has the burden of proof as he alleges the affirmative of the issue.
However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his
favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff’s prima
facie case; otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff.99 The party having the
burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence.100 The concept of
"preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing
than that which is offered in opposition to it;101 in the last analysis, it means probability of
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.102 Rule 133, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence, thus:

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance
of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the
facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the
number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.

Herein, the burden of proof was clearly upon petitioners, as plaintiffs in the lower court, to
establish their case by a preponderance of evidence showing a reasonable connection between
Dr. Tuaño’s alleged breach of duty and the damage sustained by Peter’s right eye. This, they did
not do. In reality, petitioners’ complaint for damages is merely anchored on a statement in the
literature of Maxitrol identifying the risks of its use, and the purported comment of Dr. Agulto –
another doctor not presented as witness before the RTC – concerning the prolonged use of
Maxitrol for the treatment of EKC.

It seems basic that what constitutes proper medical treatment is a medical question that should
have been presented to experts. If no standard is established through expert medical witnesses,
then courts have no standard by which to gauge the basic issue of breach thereof by the
physician or surgeon. The RTC and Court of Appeals, and even this Court, could not be expected
to determine on its own what medical technique should have been utilized for a certain disease
or injury. Absent expert medical opinion, the courts would be dangerously engaging in
speculations.

All told, we are hard pressed to find Dr. Tuaño liable for any medical negligence or malpractice
where there is no evidence, in the nature of expert testimony, to establish that in treating
Peter, Dr. Tuaño failed to exercise reasonable care, diligence and skill generally required in
medical practice. Dr. Tuaño’s testimony, that his treatment of Peter conformed in all respects
to standard medical practice in this locality, stands unrefuted. Consequently, the RTC and the
Court of Appeals correctly held that they had no basis at all to rule that petitioners were
deserving of the various damages prayed for in their Complaint.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Decision dated 27 September 2006 and Resolution dated 3 July 2007, both of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68666, are hereby AFFIRMED. No cost.

SO ORDERED.

BARREDO V. GARCIA

This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo,
liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla,
a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab
driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was
overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the
petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First
Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded
damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with
legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's
negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at
high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:

... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it
is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised
Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against
Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case.
The petitioner's brief states on page 10:

... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to
prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on
applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in
Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising
from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil
Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those
(obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.

The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:

... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him
in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro
Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his
negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903
of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's
negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only
subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and
his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the tangle
that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or
crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies
are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation
of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this
Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several
sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.

Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely
anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:

CIVIL CODE

ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and
omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.

ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.

xxx xxx xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.

ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.

Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.

Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused
by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on
occasion of the performance of their duties.

The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the
damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing
the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody.

The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove
that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the
latter what he may have paid.

REVISED PENAL CODE

ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable.

ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal liability
established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this
Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following
rules:

First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any
imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those having
such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or
negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm
has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have
received.

The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each
one shall be liable.

When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the
liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and,
in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or
their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or
causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those
doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from
execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any
other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments,
in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police
regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by
the innkeeper's employees.

ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in the
next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if
it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."

It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits
cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out. It is
this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows
that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising
from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or
culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This
legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the
Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa
aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence
under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer
emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al otro, pero acaescio por su
culpa."

The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one
of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then
article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of
Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the
legal institution of culpa aquiliana.

Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-
delito under the Civil Code are:

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.

2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is
a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any
king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the
penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation
of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant,
"Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)

Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Española" (Vol.
XXVII, p. 414) says:

El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a

diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl
lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la
penal que nace de todo delito o falta."

The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons.
Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any
criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a
result of every felony or misdemeanor."

Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a
collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the
Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in
which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte,
had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could
still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):

Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos
parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los
quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la
accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles
nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito
o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual
la pena misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al
Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el
agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia de los
efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.

Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y
que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u
omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que
acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la
Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del
Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven y
ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del
regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes
legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de
la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las
diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.

Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades
civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen
extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes;
pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean
responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La
obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios,
sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion
de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por
actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la
jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter
subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas
directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.

Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de
nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte
que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de
proceder, habiendose, por añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del
Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el
Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de
21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba,
que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse
que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian
jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se
patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraña a
la cosa juzgada.

As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that
there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the
losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is
based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in
the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give rise
to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor
upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty
itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the
prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages are repaired,
the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects does
not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.

Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code,
from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes.
It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts without the
criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code,
bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and
regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime
under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative
precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed comparison
between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of
civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities
among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil
responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the guilty parties render
service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the wording of the Penal
Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees
of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their
functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the
companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil
responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with
regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.

Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice
and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different
fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch
as the Compaña del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal case
and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice
before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact
when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal,
it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal
prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-
existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon
which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex
lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res
judicata.

Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the
Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the
French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it
implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in
the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or at
least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer)
is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20,
pp. 734-735.)

Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that
the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de
aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a
esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que
realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero
semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que las faltas
son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de
que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por
causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del
dueño o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que
enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan
un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de
negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues,
responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se
exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto,
completamente inadmisible.

Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those
persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is
necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is
a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion
would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal, and that
everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is
imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the
cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or
manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons
enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices)
causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed
an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned
by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in
reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is
subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.

Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil

Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:

Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina
del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas
con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta
responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue
entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y
subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha
de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente
"por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of
those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this
responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes
between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other,
declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary
(articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the
responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for
precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."

Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the
principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and
distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability,
and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible
for the negligent acts of his employee.

One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case,
Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the
"compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case
but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car company,
paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded damages; so the
company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been
declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:

Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el
Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la
muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia
absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto
que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como la de lo
criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era
constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye,
siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no
califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan,
segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los
daños causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo
civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compañia
recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer
los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se
ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni
contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the
trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused by the
death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of
acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact
that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as
the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in question did
not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being
the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is
not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code,
affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the managers of
establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under certain
conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this
latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the
damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with
article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading
attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the
decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)

It will be noted, as to the case just cited:

First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not
been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.

Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme
Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is
not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present
case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his
civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held primarily liable for civil
damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs
are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed
negligence — which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities
of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from
the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under
article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the
second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in
passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because
Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without
property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.

Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held
liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous
criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held
liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted.
The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the
taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the
latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence
of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.

(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)

In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought
against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company,
had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The
Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code,
the court saying:

Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con
relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones facturadas por la compañia
ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian
como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que llegadas a su
destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de la estacion
sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de entrega de estas
expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios en
cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes
por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian
hecho por los remitentes en los envases:

Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran
este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que
nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de
la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes
contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en
que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los
daños y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa
del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la
sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo
Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia demandada como ligada con el causante de
aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.

Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in
relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor
of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be
returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said merchandise reached
their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station agent without
justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when
they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable
importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the
profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:

Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the
original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract
of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any
contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to
asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned
to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant company,
because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by relations of
economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)

The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a
proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.

Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.

In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]),
the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter
had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron
was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:

It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion
from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a
criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and his
employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff should have
procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the
track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by
him and secondarily by his employer.

This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the
Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject
to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:

"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.

"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.

xxx xxx xxx

"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed
or in the performance of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."

As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out
that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the
laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a broader
one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these
scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of
effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion
of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender,
and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions.
Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but
clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of
Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was
formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action
was pending the civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started,
the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or
been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was
prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal
action thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of
articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.

An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles
suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to
be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly
liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek out a
third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.

Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of
prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which liability
arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is not barred
thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding had
been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can
not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here
whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it
or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the
Philippines.

The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the
briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or
negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer
arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived
from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than
this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the
consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to
which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties,
whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to
articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be
found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the
employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to
the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander would
originate in the negligent act itself.

In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child
Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the
death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the
defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:

If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to
stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along
the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be
believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to continue its
way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he
was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on
Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana
Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed,
aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing Real Street and entering
Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of crossing the
latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred
in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body
had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of
about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered Solana Street
from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the horn. If these
precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death
of the child would not have occurred.

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal
case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana
under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act
for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his
crime.

Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and
Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-
year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's
death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening
of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso
with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the same.
After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran
Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by
defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little
girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to
run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant
was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the
action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal,
that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J.
V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the
electric plant. This Court said in part:

Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on
the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing
the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a
ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must
again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his
criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.

In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the
death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in
driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in
the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International
Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas.
Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this
Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised
the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under
article 1903. This Court said:

As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as
appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage,
were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently thoroughly
competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is
clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear.

The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:

Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when the liability shall cease. It says:

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of
a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and
he is relieve from liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on
that of his servant.

The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37
[year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so
negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that
said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903
and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:

The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a
business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his
master's employment as such owner.

Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages
brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way
to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the
boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco Bautista, who
were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the
crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court,
applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:

The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias.
This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
[1918], 38 Phil., 768.)

In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the
plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck
by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):

The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly
licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the
cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by
the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly
responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.

Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of
Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City
of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was
damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the
crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was found
guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio,
the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment,
claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant
had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court
rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this case was governed
by the Penal Code, saying:

With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under
article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or
omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal
Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its
jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence
out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.

xxx xxx xxx

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code.
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to
escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in
the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good defense
to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or
predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said
further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our
deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal
articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)

It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court
of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility
under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's
criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is
predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer
arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court
of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.

Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by
simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum
of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as
employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption
from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in
article 20 of the Penal Code.

The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because
the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability
under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the
defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the
above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle
that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in
character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.

In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to
recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the
Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and
has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.

The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be
set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime.
Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or

culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between
civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent
act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more
concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer —
in this case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even
the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the
letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to
sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling
the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such
a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view
of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated
by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge
that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient
means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws,
courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is
the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these
servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct
for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their
negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such
responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such selection and
who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p.
622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle
of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited
(Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una
sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza."
("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who
employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance
when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked
to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.

CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD

At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in
the employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of
P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line
of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the
city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him
to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20,
1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making,
his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright
guardrail with his right hand for support.

On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement
platform which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the
company's office and extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the
length of several coaches. As the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuñiga,
also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point
where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded
a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he
fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under
the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the
plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a
full stop.

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was
lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the
accident occurred were difficult to discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.

The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff
alighted is found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a
large lot had been brought to the station for the shipment to the market. They were contained
in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The
testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of platform; and
it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these
melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these
objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.

The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that
the injuries which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a
certain hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was
amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to
another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member was again
amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the
sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection
with the process of his curation.

Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence
of the servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the
platform and leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting
from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial
judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the
effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that
the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars,
nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and
was therefore precluded form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the
defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.

It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in
piling these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the
plaintiff to fall as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective
legal cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant
company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's
own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these
conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.

It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract
of carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered
arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to
exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing
essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its
servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the
exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not
applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to
use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual.

Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code,
clearly points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article
1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent,
which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected
by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an obligation
already existing . . . ."

In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the
proposition that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which
constitute the breach of a contract.

Upon this point the Court said:

The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood
to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where
relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract,
then breaches of those duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code.
(Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)

This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in
certain cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence
of their employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the
English Common Law, upon the principle of respondeat superior — if it were, the master would
be liable in every case and unconditionally — but upon the principle announced in article 1902
of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to
another, the obligation of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful
automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of
managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all
the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the damage arises at the
very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his employment causes
the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not been
guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable
for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the
damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master
and the person injured.

It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the
servant relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts — on the contrary, that proof
shows that the responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability
arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A
master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration
the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to
confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third
persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by
reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third
person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a
presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the
presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.

The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico
Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively.
(Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)

This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs.
Litonjua and Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the
extra-contractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the
carelessness of his employee while acting within the scope of his employment. The Court, after
citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of
a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on
the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum
and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and
he is relieved from liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on
that of his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of
course, in striking contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the
negligence of the servant in conclusively the negligence of the master.

The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa
based upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the
defendant personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a
rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who
says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach
of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority existing between the
person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the
cause of it.

On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of
their servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the
breach of a contact, is not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their
selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does
not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.

Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual

obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society
imposes upon it members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of
certain members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal
rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties,
mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other
members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to
mere inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured
party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise
from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful
or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the
parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or
omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect — and our Legislature has so elected —
whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of
public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to
include responsibility for the negligence of those person who acts or mission are imputable, by
a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over
them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual
liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency with respect
to the person made liable for their conduct.

The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service
to another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the
obligation upon which plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the
burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to prove the negligence — if he does not his action fails. But
when the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff,
and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary
for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault
or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract
and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.

As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should
assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based;
while on the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual
obligation, if the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for
him to prove negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).

As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the
breach was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be
in fact the actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the
negligence or omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not
constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a
means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that
person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts,
would be in a better position than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to
watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its
destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the
breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the
watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory
could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically complete immunity from damages
arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent acts as such juridical persons
can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most
instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of such servants. If
one delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the
negligence of some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the
bank to relieve itself of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the
payment of the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction
of the clerk?

This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual
as a mere incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the
supreme court of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13,
1896.) In the decisions of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex
contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the
Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:

These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence,
such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the
defendant's failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .

A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage
done by the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided
that the negligence of the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an
action for damages for breach of contract.

In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage
was not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court
commented on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the
defendant had been negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any knowledge
of his lack of skill or carefulness.

In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the
plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff
which was allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the
performance of a contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if
the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . .
we do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."

In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to
recover damages for the personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur
while driving defendant's automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The court
found that the damages were caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile, but
held that the master was not liable, although he was present at the time, saying:

. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. .
. . The act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such length of
time that the owner by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.

In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep.,
8), it is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article
1903, although the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach
of the duty to him arising out of the contract of transportation. The express ground of the
decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the
negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private individuals and public
enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the
selection or direction of servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of negligence
had not been overcome.

It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as
though founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an
examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact
discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result
must have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's
servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure
to exercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable
for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as
constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69)
whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual
undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking obligation, its essential
characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage due to
carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds
that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in
failing to exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result
is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court
held in the Yamada case that defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its
servants to a person to whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that
the defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the
court would have held that it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented
squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did
in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the servant.

The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative
spheres of contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual
obligation is much more broader than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the
whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric;
that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him
from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the
source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.

The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry
him in safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could
not be excused by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.

The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its
contractual obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct
and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in
failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine
of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by
plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is,
therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.

It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before
alighting, the particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends,
and cites many authorities in support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a
passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its
absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance
with the experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train was barely
moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six
meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under
these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its
platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would
have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's
negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.

We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in
Thompson's work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:

The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to
be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the
prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar
circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)

Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil.
rep., 809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances
surrounding the plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a
person of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was
dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist
was contributory negligence.1awph!l.net

As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn
to the effect that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car
without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet
slowly moving. In considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the
plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks
of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty
as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff
had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that
the platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and
this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing
by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks
in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of them adequately so that their presence would
be revealed.

As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case
the following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a
level higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps
of the car to the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was
thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform,
constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even
surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of
young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet
moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the
question of contributory negligence in performing such act — that is to say, whether the
passenger acted prudently or recklessly — the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger
are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and should be considered.
Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting with
safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free
movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the
plaintiff as it was his daily custom to get on and of the train at this station. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he
was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is
that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under
way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory
negligence.

The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a
copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from
continuing that employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is
open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is
approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the
damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also
entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital
services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.

The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum
of P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.

ELCANO V. HILL

Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in
Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant
Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the
son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said
accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to
kill, coupled with mistake."

Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:

1. The present action is not only against but a violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule
III, of the Revised Rules of Court;

2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;

3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved
as guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage.

(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])

was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the
defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:

Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and
after thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be
meritorious and well-founded.

WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering
the dismissal of the above entitled case.

SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)

Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our
resolution the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT -

THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107,
NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111,
RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;

II

THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;

III

THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and

IV

THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee
Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal
because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not
dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants
filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of
the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.

As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:

1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of.
Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his father, was already
legally married?

The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further
clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation which was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In
that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on
the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with
pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians,
and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only
under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:

The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act machinist. come under both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held
to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be
noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73
Phil.). 1

It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal
case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter
either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana,
under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act
for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his
crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his
criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property- through any degree of
negligence - even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only through the principle of civil
liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about
a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to
uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and
such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi
jus Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked
to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms
done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
the better safeguarding or private rights because it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy,
and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73 Phil.)

Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts
from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper
reflection would reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but
that in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein
to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a
case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in
force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that obligations "which are derived from
acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the
underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to
an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the
spirit that giveth lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to
smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo was Chairman
of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted
that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11
not punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts
which are criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter.
Thus, the corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162,
simply says, "Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new
provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:

ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence
and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding
Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent
civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a
quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the
Code) Commission, p. 162.)

Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the
same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift-
rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in
applying the same. And considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new
Civil Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for
acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from
crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent
with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"- to
borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to
hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only
acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided
that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of
the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered
as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished
his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.

Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation by marriage on
the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the
conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article
327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor
(child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the
minor is not really full or absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor
to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue
and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."

Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The
father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that
Reginald, although married, was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the
time of the occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and
dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary
liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of
the parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to
third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a
minor emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance
of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into
transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp.
766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child,
while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married child without their
consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)

Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now
of age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of
his son.

WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.

BAKSH V. CA

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the Decision1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed
in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be
recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of
their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years
old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in
her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married;
they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in
October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's parents in Bañaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987,
the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she
began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards
her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already
married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment
ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00,
reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and
granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the
parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of
knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true
facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither sought
the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not
maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had
deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with
a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is
baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court
and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as
moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4
embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the
defendant is single, Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City
since September 1, 1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of
Medicine, second year medicine proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue,

Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay
Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16
October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to
pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00)
pesos as moral damages.

2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand
(P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses
and to pay the costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and
private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or
questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of
his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason
of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino
customs and traditions — made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the
end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of
the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our
sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the
private respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and
courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if
her claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for
the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a
boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later
proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of
marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of
Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their
submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that
day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he
intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's
parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to marry
their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff
during the few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to
Dagupan City, they continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early
days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to school,
and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day
and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became
pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to
live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that
he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time
plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who
accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her godmother,
and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince
him to marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial,
is that defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his
desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for
the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already invited many relatives and
friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he contended that the trial court
erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to
pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in

toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact,
respondent Court made the following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years
old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a
virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as
described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban
life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the
defendant to marry her." In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant
must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with
defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs.
"D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to
him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that
he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the
town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with
the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.),
and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her
daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in
the serious study of medicine to go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there
was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this special relationship must
indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not
only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this
love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason
why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's
proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must
think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted
that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before
he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In
other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman,
just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful
country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part
that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against
morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and
insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the
hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our
institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused
plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises
therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar.
13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love
or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes
the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the
fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions and
culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses
that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is
excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code
which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not posses good moral character. Moreover,
his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized
in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in
relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit
arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts
would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the
petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of
his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of
witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb
the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the
witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and manner of
testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or values which could alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or
weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are,
however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took
the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures
(Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of
discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590
Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court
of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based
(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of
Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence
on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must
be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would
have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the
Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable
has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of
promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends itself
more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which
has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the
American states. . . . 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined
by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many
victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:

Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old
daughter of "X". A promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The
girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen
years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore,
though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But
under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate
legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight
to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-
delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an
Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it
includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery,
false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned
by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts,
with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite
spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs;
it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that
where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by
a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause
of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention
of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or
inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her
virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he
would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that
made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or
Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only
because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who was around
thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life
insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant
"surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted
to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if
there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not
convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion
were made in the said case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code
Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential
feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise
of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura,
27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and
the woman must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely
from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig.
tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that
effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the
essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of
the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission
of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958
to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with
appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of
the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short
all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the
Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of
First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired
from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal
knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust.
(Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7
Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words,
if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a
chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because
here mutual lust has intervened). . . .

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding
presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the
incorporation of the present article31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission
is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of
deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying
circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly
given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for
indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The
court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under
the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not
constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a
wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the
criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting,
for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is
nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to
Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the
private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship,
it is primarily because of her own doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later.
Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a
waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man
who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN, pp.
51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may
have been offered by the petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the
latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by
good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not have
even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty
words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into
believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing
but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting
his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and
security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner
committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs
every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may
not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner
in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that
she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto
with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in
guilt or in legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has
been brought about by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of
the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the transaction was itself procured
by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one
against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as
applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply
where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40
Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that
this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner
stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the
solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the
higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

CINCO V. CANONOY

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
rendered on November 5, 1970.

The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:

Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch II, for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his
automobile and a jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos
Pepito, the last three being the private respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal
case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising from the same accident. At the pre-trial in
the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the civil action pending the
final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court,
which provides:

(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the same offense
can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found, until
final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered;

The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of
the civil case. Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August
25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
respondent Judge presiding, on September 11, 1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with
grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and
jurisprudence. 2

On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground
that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil
action inasmuch as damage to property is not one of the instances when an independent civil
action is proper; that petitioner has another plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the
law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal case; that the resolution of the City
Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the Petition is defective
inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R"). Petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November
14,1970 (Annex "S" and Annex "U").

Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February
25, 1971. 3

Petitioner makes these:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE
SUSPENDED UNTIL AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID DELAY THE OFFENDED
PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR certiorari IS NOT PROPER,
BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS INTERLOCUTORY.

4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS DEFECTIVE. 4

all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an
independent civil action for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.

From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is
evident that the nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code, which provide:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxx xxx xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.

xxx xxx xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
(1903a)

Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver,
Romeo Hilot, in the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because
of the collision; that there was a direct causal connection between the damages he suffered
and the fault and negligence of private respondents.

Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant,
Valeriana Pepito, observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees,
particularly of her co-defendant Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-
delict. 5

Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and
independent civil action, as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n)

The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is readily discernible
from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil.
607, 620-621, 6 thus:

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence — even
the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil hability arising
from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for quasidelito or culpa
aquiliana We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the
letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring
in articles 1902 to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which cannot be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases,
the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective, and that is, to
sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling
the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining a reliel True, there is
such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view
of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure indicated
by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge
that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyances usually do not have sufficient
means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go
through this round-about, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the
laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is
the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these
servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct
for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their
negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such
responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the such employee because of his confidence in the principal
or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in
the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee
vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien
la emplea y utihza (become as one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in
that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating
the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for
culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
Civil responsibility arising from crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our
laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we
are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to
the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause
the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its
waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient
and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, stations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by
the party wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
(Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug. 31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section
2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, reading:

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action entirely separate and distinct
from the c action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal
case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shag
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in
Article 2177 of the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."

Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in
surrounding the civil action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, supra which refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in the section
just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted), in which case 6 once the criminal action has
being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the
same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and
3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has
been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict

Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides:

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation
"not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code
bolsters this conclusion when it specifically recognizes that:

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

(Emphasis supplied)

It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of
quasidelica as enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes
not only injuries to persons but also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between
"damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage to property" on the other. Indeed, the
word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done.
And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and property since
"harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-delict
in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code
which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be
harmful to persons or property."

In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge
gravely abused his discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu,
suspending the civil action based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally
terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assigned becomes
unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City,
Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that
Court.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANDAMO V. IAC

The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is whether a
corporation, which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances
within its land, thereby causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can be held civilly
liable for damages under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land
situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent,
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial
lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young
man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered
the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants
and other improvements to destruction.

In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action, docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82,
before the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City), against Efren Musngi,
Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation,
for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.

Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed another action against respondent
corporation, this time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for damages with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. 1

On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its answer to the complaint and opposition to
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were conducted including ocular
inspections on the land. However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on respondent
corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend the civil action, issued an order suspending further
hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-
82.

Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court
issued on August 27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 for lack of
jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of
Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be
instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot
be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." 2

Petitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court. 3

On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases Division, promulgated a
decision 4 affirming the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for reconsideration filed
by petitioners was denied by the Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6

Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case No. TG-748 in accordance with
Section 3 (a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.
Petitioners have raised a valid point.

It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the
complaint as constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to
govern it, including the period of prescription, is to be determined not by the claim of the party
filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations
and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its
title or heading but the body of the pleading or complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of
substantial justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as remedial laws should be
liberally construed so that the litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their respective
claims. 9

Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent on the
right side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths starting from
the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening, also constructed by
defendant, thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence situated on the right side
of its cemented gate fronting the provincial highway, and connected by defendant to a man
height inter-connected cement culverts which were also constructed and lain by defendant
cross-wise beneath the tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of the said inter-connected
culverts again connected by defendant to a big hole or opening thru the lower portion of the
same concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of the said cemented gate, which hole or
opening is likewise connected by defendant to the cemented mouth of a big canal, also
constructed by defendant, which runs northward towards a big hole or opening which was also
built by defendant thru the lower portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence which separates
the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point of the
floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the
same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy seasons.

5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land just beside the land of plaintiffs,
defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the base of which is soil, which utilizes the water
being channeled thereto from its water system thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No.
2) and complimented by rain water during rainy or stormy seasons, so much so that the water
below it seeps into, and the excess water above it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of
plaintiffs.

6) That as a result of the inundation brought about by defendant's aforementioned water

conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a young man was drowned to death, while herein
plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as follows:

a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were eroded and converted to deep, wide and long canals,
such that the same can no longer be planted to any crop or plant.

b) Costly fences constructed by plaintiffs were, on several occasions, washed away.

c) During rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are always in danger.

d) Plants and other improvements on other portions of the land of plaintiffs are exposed to
destruction. ... 10

A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are
present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant,
or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the
plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent
corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an
assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage
sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the
basis for the recovery of damages.

In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the
Civil Code and held that "any person who without due authority constructs a bank or dike,
stopping the flow or communication between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing loss
and damages to a third party who, like the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and
enjoyment of the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an indemnity for loss and
damages to the injured party.

While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to
the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or omission of
respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection
between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the
parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.

It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to
injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS. Moreover,
adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each must use his
own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures
must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so that they cannot be
dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature.
If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter
can claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on a person for damage caused by his act
or omission constituting fault or negligence, thus:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-
existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this chapter.

Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not
he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming
the awards made in the two cases vary. 13

The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which states:

Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But
the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

According to the Report of the Code Commission "the foregoing provision though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and
independent negligence, which is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal negligence. Such
distinction between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has
been sustained by decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14

In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime — a distinction exists
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual
under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the
extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is
entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in
the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or acquittal
— would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17, 1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court affirming the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay
City) dated August 17, 1984 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to
reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled "Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs.
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to proceed with the hearing of the case with
dispatch. This decision is immediately executory. Costs against respondent corporation.

SO ORDERED.