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in an advertisement of that kind makes an offer which must be read by the light of that
common sense reflection. In his offer he impliedly indicates that he does not require
notification of the acceptance of the offer.
In the present case the promise was put forward, I think, with the intention that it should
be acted upon, and it was acted upon. It seems to me that there was ample consideration for
the promise, and that, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the reward.
[A.L. Smith, L.J., delivered judgment to the same effect: Ed].
****

Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemist

(Southern) Ltd. (1952) 2 All ER Rep. 456
LORD GODDARD, C. J. – This is a Special Case stated under R.S.C. Ord. 34, r. 1, and
agreed between the parties and it turns on s. 18(1) of the Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933,
which provides:
―Subject to the provisions of this Part of this Act, it shall not be lawful –
(a) for a person to sell any poison included in Part I of the Poison List, unless – (i) he
is an authorised seller of poisons; and (ii) the sale is effected on premises duly
registered under Part I of this Act; and (iii) the sale is effected by, or under the
supervision of, a registered pharmacist.‖
The defendants have adopted what is called a ―self-service‖ system in some of their shops
– in particular, in a shop at 73, Burnt Oak Broadway, Edgware. The system of self-service
consists in allowing persons who resort to the shop to go to shelves where goods are exposed
for sale and marked with the price. They take the article required and go to the cash desk,
where the cashier or assistant sees the article, states the price, and takes the money. In the part
of the defendants‘ shop which is labelled ―Chemist‘s dept.‖ there are on certain shelves
ointments and drugs, some of which contain poisonous substances but in such minute
quantities that there is no acute danger. These substances come within Part I of the Poisons
List, but the medicines in the ordinary way may be sold without a doctor‘s prescription and
can be taken with safety by the purchaser. There is no suggestion that the defendants expose
dangerous drugs for sale. Before any person can leave with what he has bought he has to pass
the scrutiny and supervision of a qualified pharmacist.
The question for decision is whether the sale is completed before or after the intending
purchaser has paid his money, passed the scrutiny of the pharmacist, and left the shop, or, in
other words, whether the offer out of which the contract arises is an offer of the purchaser or
an offer of the seller.
In Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [(1893) 1 Q.B. 256], a company offered
compensation to anybody who, having used the carbolic smoke ball for a certain length of
time in a prescribed manner, contracted influenza. One of the inducements held out to people
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to buy the carbolic smoke ball was a representation that it was a specific against influenza.
The plaintiff used it according to the prescription, but, nevertheless, contracted influenza. She
sued the Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. for the compensation and was successful. In the Court of
Appeal Bowen, L.J., said [(1893) 1 Q.B. 269]:
―[T]here can be no doubt that where a person in an offer made by him to another person,
expressly or impliedly intimates a particular mode of acceptance as sufficient to make the
bargain binding, it is only necessary for the other person to whom such offer is made to
follow the indicated method of acceptance; and if the person making the offer, expressly
or impliedly intimates in his offer that it will be sufficient to act on the proposal without
communicating acceptance of it to himself, performance of the condition is a sufficient
acceptance without notification.‖
Counsel for the plaintiffs says that what the defendants did was to invite the public to
come into their shop and to say to them: ―Help yourself to any of these articles, all of which
are priced,‖ and that was an offer by the defendants to sell to any person who came into the
shop any of the articles so priced. Counsel for the defendants, on the other hand, contends
that there is nothing revolutionary in this kind of trading, which, he says, is in no way
different from the exposure of goods which a shop keeper sometimes makes outside or inside
his premises, at the same time leaving some goods behind the counter. It is a well-established
principle that the mere fact that a shop keeper exposes goods which indicate to the public that
he is willing to treat does not amount to an offer to sell. I do not think I ought to hold that
there has been here a complete reversal of that principle merely because a self-service scheme
is in operation. In my opinion, what was done here came to no more than that the customer
was informed that he could pick up an article and bring it to the shop-keeper, the contract for
sale being completed if the shop-keeper accepted the customer‘s offer to buy. The offer is an
offer to buy, not an offer to sell. The fact that the supervising pharmacist is at the place where
the money has to be paid is an indication that the purchaser may or may not be informed that
the shop keeper is willing to complete the contract. One has to apply common sense and the
ordinary principles of commerce in this matter. If one were to hold that in the case of self-
service shops the contract was complete directly the purchaser picked up the article, serious
consequences might result. The property would pass to him at once and he would be able to
insist on the shop keeper allowing him to take it away, even where the shop-keeper might
think it very undesirable. On the other hand, once a person had picked up an article, he would
never be able to put it back and say that he had changed his mind. The shop-keeper could say
that the property had passed and he must buy.
It seems to me, therefore, that it makes no difference that a shop is a self-service shop and
that the transaction is not different from the normal transaction in a shop. The shop-keeper is
not making an offer to avail every article in the shop to any person who may come in, and
such person cannot insist on buying by saying: ―I accept your offer.‖ Books are displayed in a
bookshop and customers are invited to pick them up and look at them even if they do not
actually buy them. There is no offer of the shop-keeper to sell before the customer has taken
the book to the shop-keeper or his assistant and said that he wants to buy it and the shop-
keeper has said: ―Yes.‖ That would not prevent the shop-keeper, seeking the book picked up,
from saying: ―I am sorry I cannot let you have that book. It is the only copy I have got, and I
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have already promised it to another customer.‖ Therefore, in my opinion, the mere fact that a
customer picks up a bottle of medicine from a shelf does not amount to an acceptance of an
offer to sell, but is an offer by the customer to buy. I feel bound also to say that the sale here
was made under the supervision of a pharmacist. There was no sale until the buyer‘s offer to
buy was accepted by the acceptance of the purchase price, and that took place under the
supervision of a pharmacist. Therefore, judgment is for the defendants.

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