1

Mink and Swine and Deer, Oh My:

Addressing the Zoonotic Character of SARS-CoV-2

Cover image: A mink, one of the many species of animals that are vulnerable to infection with SARS-CoV-2. 1

Jasmine Mackley

ENGL 138T, Section 005

Professor Babcock

04/24/2022
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The COVID-19 Pandemic and SARS-CoV-2

As of April 22, 2022, 6,213,876 people have died due to confirmed infection with the

causative virus of COVID-19.2 This number is a tragic reminder of the power of novel infectious

agents, and it demonstrates the importance of preparedness in addressing public health threats.

However, looking solely at loss of human life neglects another very important factor of

SARS-CoV-2: its impact on animal populations. In order to prevent the spread of the disease, up

to 17 million mink were culled in Denmark after the species was shown to carry the virus.3

Furthermore, since its discovery, the pathogen has been confirmed to infect a range of other

species, such as swine, horses, cattle, camels, cats, dogs, and rodents.4 While medicine often

focuses on preserving human health, looking at disease solely through the lens of protecting

people raises the risk of missing the wider picture. The relative success of global health efforts is

evident across the United States, with the Centers for Disease Control easing requirements for

masking and many states showing a decline in cases of COVID-19.5 However, despite these

advancements, there is still a need for vigilance. While there has been a substantial focus on

SARS-CoV-2 as a human illness, the United States must also consider its zoonotic character and

implement greater surveillance and public education in order to prevent the development and

spread of additional variants and ultimately protect human health.

While there is still uncertainty about the exact origins of SARS-CoV-2, the predominant

theory proposed by the World Health Organization is that the virus likely arose among bats and

was spread to humans by an intermediate animal host species.6 This is known as a spillover event

(Fig. 1), in which a virus spreads from one species to another by overcoming biological

obstacles, such as inherent differences in the characteristics of different animals’ cells. 7 The

details of this event continue to be a point of dispute, but the involvement of animals in this
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process are vital in understanding both

the virus and potential variants that

could emerge. Because coronaviruses

are able to spread from vertebrate

animals to humans and vice versa, they

are considered zoonoses.8 Often

spillover events are influenced by

human behaviors; for instance, the

meat trade increases farmers’

interactions with livestock, and deforestation and related habitat destruction deplaces animal

populations, leading them to interact with residents of urban environments more frequently.10

These novel pathogens tend to disproportionately impact developing countries, where there is a

lack of medical resources and less information available to promote health behaviors.11 This

creates a dangerous cycle, in which low socioeconomic status leads to infection, and infection

leads to lower income for the country due to the decrease in healthy individuals. It is important

that the United States takes action to mitigate the pandemic and prevent further strain

development, so that additional novel diseases will not batter developing nations. One such form

of strain development results from the virus reinfecting animal hosts, among which it can

develop a range of mutations.

This risk of mutation is exacerbated by the structure of the virus itself. As a single

stranded RNA virus, SARS-CoV-2 has a greater rate of mutation. This heightened rate occurs

because of its RNA-dependent RNA polymerase (RdRp), the enzyme it uses for replicating its

genetic material. While DNA polymerases, the enzymes used by humans and DNA viruses, have
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proofreading capabilities, RdRp lacks this mechanism.12 As unchecked errors gradually

accumulate in the virus’s RNA sequence, the viral structure and function changes in a process

known as antigenic drift. Additionally, coronaviruses are also capable of recombination (Fig. 2),

in which two different strains simultaneously infect the same cell, where their genomes are

meshed together.13

Although mutations are not inherently

positive or negative for the virus, there is the

possibility that the pathogen will acquire changes

that increase its transmissibility or disease

severity. This leads to the development of new

variants, or different versions of the same virus

that have mutated to have slightly different

characteristics.14 For instance, as of April 2022,

the Omicron variant of SARS-CoV-2 is the

dominant form of the virus circulating globally.16

This variant has 50 accumulated mutations; this makes it the most substantially mutated when

compared to several other versions of the virus (namely the Alpha, Beta, Gamma, and Delta

variants).17 Of these mutations, 32 impact the virus's spike protein, which is used for viral

attachment to host cells; this is especially problematic, as the spike protein is the target of the

immune system’s antibodies.18 Thus, due to these changes to the viral genome, the Omicron

variant is more easily spread, and it is better able to evade the immune system.19 This poses

potential challenges for efforts to mitigate the virus’s spread, and it could decrease the efficacy of

treatment options.
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While the development of variants within human populations is problematic, the virus

can also mutate within animal hosts. For instance, though it is not entirely clear where the

omicron variant emerged from, some researchers suggest that it could have mutated within an

animal. Immunologist Kristian Andersen describes this process as “reverse zoonosis followed by

new zoonosis,” in which the mid-2020 strain of SARS-CoV-2 would have infected an animal, for

example a rodent, and acquired mutations while circulating among the animal population.20 This

example showcases the importance of understanding animal reservoir species and the dynamics

of animal-human interactions. A reservoir is a species that the virus can replicate in, oftentimes

without causing infection (though this is not always the case).21 Generally, the infection of

domestic animals is of lesser concern than wild animals. This is because humans are better able

to control disease prevalence among livestock; for example, infected animals can be slaughtered

in a similar manner to the mink mentioned prior. In contrast, it is far more difficult to manage

wild animal populations, in part due to the controversy and impracticality of culling wildlife.22

Most approaches for wildlife disease control focus on prevention, vaccination, selective culling,

and controlling arthropod vectors. However, in order to implement any of these strategies, there

must be a means for monitoring the prevalence of diseases in a given population.23

Policy Recommendations

Based on the current situation, possible policies to limit the impact of novel coronavirus

strains originating in animals fall under two categories: surveillance and education. Both

methods come with their own associated benefits and drawbacks; ultimately, they would likely

be most effective if implemented together.

The proposed surveillance programs would fall under the jurisdiction of the United States

Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
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National Wildlife Disease Program. Currently, the USDA APHIS maintains surveillance

programs for an array of diseases among both livestock and wildlife. Some of the infectious

agents monitored in wild animal populations include bovine tuberculosis, plague, and tularemia.

Additionally, there is surveillance of diseases specific to wild birds and feral swine that could

pose issues to agricultural operations if they were to spill over into domestic animal

populations.24

In order to achieve surveillance, the USDA APHIS partners with federal and state

agencies, plus universities, laboratories, and different animal health organizations.25 By

collecting samples from wild animal populations, the department can generate a better

understanding of the current pathogens spreading among wildlife. From there, they can

determine the best course of action to mitigate any possible threats to public health.

Although the USDA APHIS has not officially added SARS-CoV-2 to their list of

pathogens to monitor in wildlife, this has not stopped researchers from looking into the matter.

Investigators from across the country have taken samples from animals ranging from deer to

bears. Currently, the virus has been identified among wildlife populations in 24 states, and of the

species tested, deer are one of the most noteworthy candidates for a reservoir.26 In fact, it has

been found that around a third of the white-tailed deer in the United States have been infected

with SARS-CoV-2, as indicated by them having antibodies targeting the virus.27 Thus far, there

have been documented occurrences of human-to-deer transmission and likely deer-to-deer

transmission.28 There has also been a potential case of deer-to-human transmission in Canada,

though the research on the instance is still under review as of March 2022.29 Researchers are

concerned that if a full-fledged reservoir is established among wild deer populations, it could

create problems for halting the spread of SARS-CoV-2. Namely, it would mean that the virus
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would continue to circulate with the risk of it spreading back to human populations, and there is

the potential for the pathogen to acquire mutations while in deer hosts. This type of mutation has

already been documented; scientists have found that while in white-tailed deer, one strain of the

virus had alterations to its genes encoding for its spike protein.30 If these mutated strains jumped

to humans, they could threaten the efficacy of treatment and prevention measures currently in

place. Thus, it is vital that the government at least monitors the spread of SARS-CoV-2 among

white-tailed deer populations. This type of surveillance is not without precedent, given that the

United States government actively monitors chronic wasting disease, a prion disease similar to

bovine spongiform encephalopathy (or “mad cow disease”), among deer populations.31

Another possible species of concern are mink. As mentioned prior, there has been focus

on mink infections with SARS-CoV-2, resulting in drastic control measures such as the culling of

farmed animals. Furthermore, evidence suggests that mink-to-human transmission is one of the

first types of animal-to-human transmission to emerge during the pandemic, given that at least

four Michigan residents were infected with a strain of the virus from farmed mink in October

2020.32 While it is recommended that any mink that shows symptoms of COVID-19 or that have

been exposed to a person infected with the virus get tested, there is no mandatory surveillance in

place.33 This is in stark contrast to the monitoring strategies that have been implemented in

Europe in response to the prevalence of the virus among the farmed animals.34 By officializing

surveillance measures of mink, greater consistency in testing procedures can be implemented

across the states, and more regions can be tested. In doing so, the nation can gain a better

understanding of potential threats to public health and make more educated moves to address

these issues.
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Surveillance is not without its challenges. Conducting active investigations tends to be

costly due to the time and manpower required, and some of the species tested can be dangerous if

handled improperly.35 For instance, some biologists have been sampling hibernating bears or

captured wolves; this process is not without its risks.36 However, in many respects, this risk is

outweighed by the potential benefits and increased safety for the American public.

Implementation of an official SARS-CoV-2 surveillance program is further supported by

the World Health Organization, which issued a joint resolution with the Food and Agriculture

Organization and the Organization for Animal Health on March 7, 2022. Within this resolution,

they acknowledged that the causative agent of COVID-19 has shown a propensity to infect a

range of host species, and they encouraged the implementation of programs to monitor the

spread of SARS-CoV-2 among wild animals. To achieve this, they suggested collaboration

among national authorities and encouraged governments to educate citizens on the current safety

recommendations.37

Thus, the other proposed strategy, education, is also vitally important. This approach

would be the responsibility of a range of public health agencies, including but not limited to state

health departments and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. The WHO places an

emphasis on providing recommendations to those who are in close contact with animals, such as

hunters and butchers, as well as with the public in general. Suggestions for the general public to

stay safe include avoiding coming into contact with wild animals, particularly those who are

sick, and ensuring that any waste is properly disposed of, so that the scent does not attract

animals.38 By disseminating these types of advice and guidelines, the government can ensure that

people are taking fewer high-risk behaviors, thereby decreasing the likelihood of

animal-to-human spread of SARS-CoV-2.

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While there are many ways to distribute this information, including government agencies

simply posting a list of suggested guidelines to their respective websites and leaving it at that, the

most effective method would be to organize a public health campaign. These campaigns serve to

spread awareness and promote specific health behaviors among an identified target population.

Understanding this intended demographic’s values and beliefs allow public health professionals

to create a campaign that the audience will likely be receptive to.39 Though these campaigns can

be distributed in a variety of formats, such as television, the Internet, or physical installations like

billboards, the most effective campaign to reach a broad subsection of the American public

would include a mix of mediums. In particular, the recommended campaign would involve

utilizing both physical billboards and the Internet. Some have suggested that using digital

technology to create targeted campaigns could be important to future public health campaigns

due to the increased possibilities and the

capacity for live feedback on the

program’s performance.40 The Centers for

Disease Control and Prevention have

already taken advantage of this medium,

such as with their How Right Now

campaign that focuses on providing

mental health resources to address

pandemic-related stress (Fig. 3).42 Taking

advantage of the unique character of the Internet and social media, with the potential for content

to go viral and the wide audience that it can reach, can allow for an effective campaign,

especially when paired with more traditional methods.

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There are a range of risks with public health campaigns. For one, information must be

disseminated in such a way that it does not tarnish public perceptions of wildlife. Oftentimes,

there are concerns in creating messages about wildlife-associated diseases given the potential for

the public to associate animals with illnesses and danger, potentially resulting in individuals

lashing out at fauna.43 This could be harmful to conservation efforts; however, if the messages

are composed tactfully, these negative impacts should be minimized. Other possible objections

could arise due to varying political perspectives. Researchers have shown that the effects of

political beliefs on citizens’ health behaviors were stronger in the United States compared to an

international sample.44 This suggests the politicization of health behaviors in the U.S., which

could have impeded efforts to mitigate the pandemic. Thus, there is a continued potential for any

public health campaigns to be limited in efficacy thanks to the ongoing polarization of views

regarding the pandemic. However, this does not diminish the importance of government

organizations making an effort to spread awareness of the potential for zoonotic spread of

SARS-CoV-2, especially considering the WHO’s recent recommendations, even if the

effectiveness of such a campaign may be hindered.

The Interconnectedness of Health

Regardless of the exact policy

changes implemented, whether they be for

surveillance, education, or a combination of

the two, it is important that the government

consider the idea of One Health (Fig. 4). One

Health is an approach to public health that

considers the intricacies and connections that

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link together human, animal, and environmental health.46 The concept has been accepted and

implemented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has had a dedicated One

Health Office since 2009.47 Previously, this perspective on disease has been used to understand

pathogens including SARS and influenza H5N1 (also known as bird flu), whose origins in

animals demonstrated the possibility of animal-to-human transmission of novel microbes.48 The

emergence of SARS-CoV-2 has only fortified the importance of understanding and employing a

One Health methodology.

While it is vital to protect human health, it is also imperative to consider how a given

strategy will impact the rest of the world’s inhabitants. Scientists have proposed that urbanization

creates more wildlife-livestock-human interfaces, which allow for opportunities for the spread of

disease and the emergence of novel zoonoses. Through detrimental impacts on habitats, such as

through deforestation and fragmentation of ecosystems as a result of the construction of roads,

humans have increased the number of interactions with now-displaced animals.49 This makes

surveillance of wildlife disease and education of citizens that frequently come into contact with

these animals all the more important. The intersection of human and animal health also

contributes to the significance of ensuring that any policy changes be done tactfully, in such a

way that they will not result in outrage toward wild animal populations. Lashing out at animals

would only serve to further harm ecosystems, feeding into a system that results in more spread of

novel pathogens to humans. Through statistical analysis, researchers have determined that the

current likelihood of experiencing a global pandemic comparable to COVID-19 during one’s

lifetime is relatively high at around 38%.50 They also found that this figure could nearly double

in future decades as a result of changing environmental conditions.51

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Swift Change is Needed

This potential increase in the occurrence of disease emergences underscores the

importance of taking swift and effective action to address the zoonotic character of COVID-19.

In doing so, the national government can set a precedent for how to handle pandemic viruses that

have the capacity to spread to animal populations, and current systems in place for both

surveillance and education can be fortified. Further development of virus surveillance among

wild animal populations can also serve as an additional line of defense in identifying any future

microbial threats to human health. Additionally, as more and more different variants of

SARS-CoV-2 mutate and spread, they demonstrate the need for better systems to handle the

ongoing pandemic. By proactively handling and addressing the wildlife component of

COVID-19, the United States can protect the public’s well being by decreasing risk of new

variant emergence from wildlife populations. Ultimately, this can help to control SARS-CoV-2,

protecting public health in the short-term by working toward the end of the pandemic, and it can

pave the way for a brighter future by increasing national preparedness for other novel zoonotic

diseases.
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 14

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 15

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 16

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 17

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47. Ibid.

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51. Ibid.