HIDALGO ENTERPRISES VS BALADAN, 91 PHIL 488

Topic: Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance

This case is about that whether or not a water tank is an attractive nuisance.

Facts:
Hidalgo Enterprises was the owner of an ice-plant factory in San Pablo, Laguna. In the
factory, there were two tanks full of water, both 9-ft deep, for cooling purposes of its
engine. There was no fence or top cover; the edges of the tanks were barely a foot high
from the surface of the ground. The factory itself was surrounded with a fence.
However, the wide gate entrance was continually open, and anyone could easily enter
the factory. There was no guard assigned on the gate.
Around noon on April 16, 1948, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 3 years old, was
playing with other boys his age when he entered the factory premises through the gate.
Mario Balandan then took a bath in one of the tanks of water and, later on, sank to the
bottom of the tank. He died of “asphyxia secondary to drowning.” The CFI and CA ruled
that Hidalgo Enterprises maintained an attractive nuisance and neglected to adopt the
necessary precautions to avoid accident to person entering its premises.

Held:
Hidalgo Enterprises Inc.’s water tanks are NOT classified as attractive nuisance. Other
issues such as whether it exercised reasonable precautions, and if the parents were
guilty of contributory negligence are immaterial. Appealed decision reversed. Hidalgo
Enterprises is absolved from liability.

Ratio:
One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of
a character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to
prevent children from playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender
years who is injured thereby, even if the child is technically a trespasser in the
premises. This is the doctrine of attractive nuisance. The principal reason for the
doctrine is that the condition or appliance in question although its danger is apparent to
those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years as to induce them to
approach, get on or use it, and this' attractiveness is an implied invitation to such
children.
DE ROY VS. CA - G.R. NO. 80718, JANUARY 29, 1988

Topic:  There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding.

This case is about whether there is a law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding.

Facts:
Petitioner Feliza De Roy was the respondent in a civil case for damages filed by Luis
Bernal.

In the civil case, the RTC found De Roy grossly negligent and awarded damages to
Bernal for the injuries he sustained and for the death of his daughter caused by the
collapse of a burned-out building’s firewall owned by De Roy.

The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.

On the last day of the 15-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for an
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.

The CA denied the motion by applying the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises v.
Japzon that said period cannot be extended.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made
to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the decision in the Official
Gazette when the CA decision was promulgated.

Held:
There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made
to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the
Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law requiring the publication of
Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a
condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports
of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court
Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND MS. LYDIA GERONIMO - G.R. NO. 110295, OCTOBER 18, 1993

Topic: Quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the Civil code

This case is about whether or not the action for damages by the proprietress against the
soft drinks manufacturer should be treated as one for breach of implied warranty under
Article 1561 of the Civil Code which prescribes after six months from delivery of the
thing sold.

Facts:

Private respondent was the proprietress of Kindergarten Wonderland Canteen in

Dagupan City. In August 1989, some parents of the students complained to her that the
Coke and Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and other foreign
substances. She brought the said bottles for examination to DOH and it was found out
that the soft drinks “are adulterated.” As a result, her per day sales of soft drinks
severely plummeted that she had to close her shop on 12 December 1989 for losses.
She demanded damages from petitioner before the RTC which dismissed the same on
motion by petitioner based on the ground of Prescription. On appeal, the CA annulled
the orders of the RTC.

Held:

The Petition Denied. The SC agrees with the CA’s conclusion that the cause of action in
the case at bar is found on quasi-delict under Article 1146 of the CC which prescribes in
four years and not on breach of warranty under article 1562 of the same code. This is
supported by the allegations in the complaint which makes reference to the reckless
and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption."
BPI V. CA  216 SCRA 51

Topic: Article 1980 of the Civil Code

This case is about whether BPI can demand the payment of the loan despite the
existence of the Holdout Agreement and whether BPI is still liable to the private
respondents on the account subject of the withdrawal by the heirs of Velasco.

Facts:

Private respondents Eastern Plywood Corporation and Benigno Lim as officer of the
corporation, had an “AND/OR” joint account with Commercial Bank and Trust Co
(CBTC), the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands. Lim
withdraw funds from such account and used it to open a joint checking account (an
“AND” account) with Mariano Velasco. When Velasco died in 1977, said joint checking
account had P662,522.87. By virtue of an Indemnity Undertaking executed by Lim and
as President and General Manager of Eastern withdrew one half of this amount and
deposited it to one of the accounts of Eastern with CBTC.

Eastern obtained a loan of P73,000.00 from CBTC which was not secured. However,
Eastern and CBTC executed a Holdout Agreement providing that the loan was secured
by the “Holdout of the C/A No. 2310-001-42” referring to the joint checking account of
Velasco and Lim.

Meanwhile, a judicial settlement of the estate of Velasco ordered the withdrawal of the
balance of the account of Velasco and Lim.

Asserting that the Holdout Agreement provides for the security of the loan obtained by
Eastern and that it is the duty of CBTC to debit the account of respondents to set off the
amount of P73,000 covered by the promissory note, BPI filed the instant petition for
recovery. Private respondents Eastern and Lim, however, assert that the amount
deposited in the joint account of Velasco and Lim came from Eastern and therefore
rightfully belong to Eastern and/or Lim. Since the Holdout Agreement covers the loan of
P73,000, then petitioner can only hold that amount against the joint checking account
and must return the rest.

Held:

Yes, for both issues. Regarding the first, the Holdout Agreement conferred on CBTC the
power, not the duty, to set off the loan from the account subject of the Agreement.
When BPI demanded payment of the loan from Eastern, it exercised its right to collect
payment based on the promissory note, and disregarded its option under the Holdout
Agreement. Therefore, its demand was in the correct order. Regarding the second
issue, BPI was the debtor and Eastern was the creditor with respect to the joint
checking account. Therefore, BPI was obliged to return the amount of the said account
only to the creditor. When it allowed the withdrawal of the balance of the account by the
heirs of Velasco, it made the payment to the wrong party. The law provides that
payment made by the debtor to the wrong party does not extinguish its obligation to the
creditor who is without fault or negligence. Therefore, BPI was still liable to the true
creditor, Eastern.

Ratio:

Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "fixed, savings, and current
deposits of money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions
concerning simple loan." In Serrano vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, we held that
bank deposits are in the nature of irregular deposits; they are really loans because they
earn interest. The relationship then between a depositor and a bank is one of creditor
and debtor. The deposit under the questioned account was an ordinary bank deposit;
hence, it was payable on demand of the depositor.
AIR FRANCE V CARRASCOSO G.R. NO. L-21438, SEPTEMBER 28, 1966

Topic: Quasi-Delict vs. Breach of Contract

This case is about Whether Rafael Carrascoso is entitled to damages arising from tort.

Although the relation of

Facts:

passenger and carrier is

"contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act
that breaks the contract may be also a
tort".
The contract of air carriage, therefore,
generates a relation
attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the
carrier's employees, naturally, could
give ground for an
action for damages.
Facts:

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila
for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine
Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to
Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he
was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to
vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion
ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and
pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man"; and plaintiff reluctantly gave
his "first class" seat in the plane.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00
by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing
the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip
Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of
the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of
suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20
to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations
for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first-class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a
first-class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first-class seats.

Held:

Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made
him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give
way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this
is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior purpose."

For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must
answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes
loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by
the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature"
nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The stress of
Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a
violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages
are proper.

The judgment of the lower courts did not suffer reversible error.

Ratio:

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature”
nevertheless “the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort”

The Contract of air carriage, therefore. Generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action for damages