Before The Supreme Court of Bharatvart: Team Code

TEAM CODE -
TEAM CODE – LC-99
LEX COMMUNIQUE 2021: NATIONAL LAW FEST BY THAKUR RAMNARAYAN COLLEGE OF LAW,
MUMBAI
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF

BHARATVART
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEALNO. ……/
2021
IN THE MATTER CONCERNING SECTIONS OF THE

INDIAN P ENAL C ODE, 1860
IN THE MATTER OF
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANS.

(PETITIONER)
v.
RATAN AND ORS.

(RESPONDENT)
ON SUBMISSION B EFORE THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF

BHARATVART
AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES OF
THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF
BHARATVART
MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

LEX COMMUNIQUE 2021: NATIONAL LAW FEST BY THAKUR RAMNARAYAN COLLEGE OF LAW, MUMBAI
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... 2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES...................................................................................................... 3
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... 5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION.......................................................................................... 6
STATEMENTS OF FACTS ...................................................................................................... 7
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ....................................................................................................... 9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................. 10
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................. 11
I. WHETHER THE DECISION OF HIGH COURT TO PUNISH THE RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION
307 R/W 34 OF IPC IS JUSTIFIABLE OR NOT? ............................................................................ 11
A. It Is Fallacious To Charge The Said Accused U/s 307 r/w 34 Of IPC. ..................... 11
B. The Act Must Be Capable Of Causing Death ........................................................... 12
C. Absence Of The Intention On the part of The Said Accused And Family Member To
Cause Death: ..................................................................................................................... 12
II. WHETHER THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO PUNISH THE RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION
304 R/W 34 OF IPC IS APPROPRIATE OR NOT?....................................................................... 15
A. Physical Presence Of The Said Accused Has Not Been Established ........................ 16
B. Absence Of Common Intention (S.34) ...................................................................... 17
C. There exists a reasonable doubt ................................................................................ 19
III. WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIAL COURT OF PUNISHING RESPONDENT
UNDER SECTION 120-B OF IPC IS MAINTAINABLE? ............................................................. 21
A. Prosecution Could Not Establish Conspiracy As Alleged. ....................................... 21
PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. 26
Page | 2
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
1. Akhila Parida v. State of Orissa, 1987 CrLJ 609 ............................................................... 16

2. Baldev singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 6 SCC 564 ........................................................... 22
3. Ramesh Bhai and Anr. V State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12 SCC 603 .................................... 16
4. Ajay Aggarwal v. UOI (1993) 3 SCC 609. ........................................................................ 21
5. andurang v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216 ........................................................... 17
6. Arul Raja v. State of T.N. (2010) 8 SCC 233 .................................................................... 21
7. Babu v State of Kerala, JT 2010 (8) SC 560:2007 AIR SCW 5105. ................................. 16
8. CBI/SIT v. Nalini (1999) 5 SCC 253................................................................................. 24
9. Chamanlal v. State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 2972 ............................................................ 23
10. Dharam Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir, 2004 CrLJ 1704. ................................................. 22
11. Dharnidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 7 SCC 75 .................................................... 17
12. Hari Mohan Mandal v. St. of Jharkhand, (2004) 12 SCC 220........................................... 12
13. Hari Mohan Mandal v. State of Jharkhand, (2004) 12 SCC 27 ......................................... 14
14. Hari Singh vs. Sukhbir Singh (1988)4 SCC551: AIR 1998 SC 2127 ............................... 13
15. Hyderabad v. K. Narayana Rao JT 2012 9 SC 359 ........................................................... 21
16. Ishwari Lal Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh: 2020 (206) AIC 243 .................... 17
17. Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366 ........................................................... 11
18. Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1988 SC 1883 ..................................... 24
19. Krishnan v State represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15S SCC 430 ...................... 16
20. Mohan Singh v. State of Bihar (2011) 9 SCC 272 ............................................................ 21
21. Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal (2002) 7 SCC 334 ................................................ 21
22. Nagar Prasad v. State of UP., 1998 CrLJ 1580 (All.) ........................................................ 16
23. Nokul Nushyo, (1867) 7 WR (Cr) 27 ................................................................................ 16
24. Om Prakash v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1782 .................................................. 14
25. Parsuram Pandey and Ors.v. The State of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 5068 ............................... 14
26. Prakash Chandra Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2007) 13 SCC 134 ........................................ 14
27. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 9 SCC 27 ............................................................... 14
28. Pratap Bhai Hamirbhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat., (2013) 1 SCC 613 ........................... 23
29. R Venkatakrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737. ............................................................... 22
30. Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai Cr LJ 2004 SC 36 ................................................................ 20
31. Razak Jinnesab Karajagi vs. State of Karnataka, (2009) 13 SCC 522. ............................. 17
Page | 3
32. Sardari lal v. State of Punjab 2003 CrLJ 383..................................................................... 22

33. Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR (1965) SC 843. .......................................................... 12
34. Satyavir Singh v. State of UP 2016 CriLJ 4863 ................................................................ 23
35. Sharif Ahmed Alias Achhan, (1956) 2 ALL 188 ............................................................... 17
36. Shiva Sahai v. State of UP 1990 CriLJ 102 (NOC) 15 ...................................................... 16
37. Shyamlal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2012 SC 3339. ........................................ 17
38. State (NCT) of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC .......................... 23
39. State of H.P. v. Gian Chand 2002 CrLJ 949 (HP) ............................................................. 22
40. State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah 2005 CrLJ 918 SC. ........................................................... 22
41. State of M.P. v. Sheetla Sahai (2009) 8 SCC 617.............................................................. 22
42. State of Maharashtra v. Balram Patil 1938CrLJ 331(SC).................................................. 12
43. State of Maharastra v. Kashirao, (2003) 10 SCC 434........................................................ 11
44. State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114: AIR 2005 SC 1000 .......................... 16
45. State v. Shaquila and Ors. (2002) 55 DRJ 713 .................................................................. 21
46. State v. V.C. Shukla 1980 CrLJ 965 .................................................................................. 22
47. Subramaniam v State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 415: ............................... 16
48. Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 1, 244........................................................ 22
49. Sukhlal Sarkar v. Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 703 ........................................................ 15
50. Sumer Singh Umed Singh Rajput v. State of Gujarat: AIR 2008 SC 904;........................ 14
51. Surender Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2000) 4 SCC 110................................... 18
52. Surendra Kumar Sinha Alias Surendra Kumar v. The State of Jharkhand Criminal Revision
No....................................................................................................................................... 21
53. Vasant Vithu Jadav v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 9 SCC 31. ........................................ 14
54. Vijaya Shankar v. State of MP 1989 CrLJ NOC 151 (MP) ............................................... 20
55. Y. Venkaiah v. State of A.P. (2009) 12 SCC 126 .............................................................. 22
OTHER AUTHORITIES
David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, (13th Edition, Oxford University
Press,2011) ............................................................................................................................... 16
Page | 4
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
S. NO. ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORMS

1. AIR ALL INDIA REPORT
2. ANR. ANOTHER
3. A.P. ANDRA PRADESH
4. ART. ARTICLE
5. HON’BLE HONOURABLE
6. GUJ. GUJARAT
7. INDLAW INDIA LAW
8. IPC INDIAN PENAL CODE

9. LNIND LEXIS NEXIS INDIA
10. MAD. MADRAS

11. GOVT. GOVERNMENT
12. HC HIGH COURT
13. ORS. OTHERS
14. P. PAGE
15. SLP SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION
16. SC SUPREME COURT
17. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES
18. SEC SECTION
19. DSI DEMOCRACTIC SOCIETY OF INDIANA

20. S.C.R. SUPRERME COURT RECORDS
21. U.P. UTTAR PRADESH
22. v. VERSUS
Page | 5
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Respondent humbly submits that, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has the inherent jurisdiction
to try, entertain or dispose of this matter under Article 134A1 of the Constitution of India, 1950.
1
134A. Certificate for appeal to the Supreme Court Every High Court, passing or making a judgment, decree, final
order, or sentence, referred to in clause (1) of Article 132 or clause (1) of Article 133, or clause (1) of Article 134;
(a) may, if it deems fit so to do, on its own motion; and
(b) shall, if an oral application is made, by or on behalf of the party aggrieved, immediately after the passing or
making of such judgment, decree, final order or sentence, determine, as soon as may be after such passing or
making, the question whether a certificate of the nature referred to in clause (1) of Article 132, or clause (1) of
Article 133 or, as the case may be, sub clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 134, may be given in respect of that case.
Page | 6
STATEMENTS OF FACTS
-: BACKGROUND :-
Ratan, a high caste farmer, is living with his wife Madhu, son harsh and daughter Palak in a
village of Andhra Pradesh. Madhu and his son harsh helped Ratan to earn living respectfully,
however harsh was not very bright academically. Palak joined a law college which was 6km
from her house and used to go college by auto or bus. Tushar who worked as a data entry
operator in a private company located in same town where Palak's college is situated, they
often use same public transport and got access to each other and eventually became good
friends and developed liking towards each other.
On 10th of December 2020, it came in the knowledge of Ratan about the relationship of the
two, hence Ratan warned Tushar. On a different instance harsh took 50,000/- from Tushar.
On December 20, 2020, harsh called Tushar to repay the amount in full settlement. About
8:30 Tushar visited their house, upon meeting harsh refused to return 50,000/- and parted for
the night.
When Tushar was leaving, Palak ran towards him and hugged him and asked him to take her
away, Ratan pulled and locked her inside the room. Palak's family mistreated and frightened
Tushar if he ever tried to contact her. Soon Palak escaped through the window and the family
started to search her in state of confusion.
After few hours a passer-by found Palak and Tushar lying severely injured on the road, girl
was pronounced dead upon arrival to Hospital. Post-mortem reports stated injuries on head
and fracture of 3 ribs. According to which none of these injuries independently was sufficient
to cause her deaths, while ‘they cumulatively were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary
course of nature’.
Tushar implicated this incident over Ratan, Gagan and harsh.
-: CHARGES FRAMED :-
Ratan, Gagan and harsh were booked u/s. 302 r/w. 34, 120-B of IPC in relation to death of
Palak and they were also charged u/s. 307 r/w 34, 120-B IPC, 1860 for an attempt to murder
of Tushar.
Page | 7
-: FINDINGS OF SESSIONS COURT :-
Sessions Court convicted all the 3 accused and imposed death sentences for causing death of
Palak and 7 years imprisonment to cause attempt to murder Tushar.
-: FINDINGS OF HIGH COURT :-
HC changed the conviction and reduced the charges from ‘murder’ to ‘culpable homicide not
amounts to murder’ in relation with death of Palak under grave and sudden provocation.
-: CURRENT SCENARIO :-
Agitated with the decision of HC a student body organization (LCRSO) filed an appeal in
Hon’ble SC challenging the order passed by the HC and Parallelly aggrieved by the decision
of Hon’ble High Court the said accused and his family have preferred a cross appeal to Hon’ble
Supreme Court.
Page | 8
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE :- I
WHETHER THE DECISION OF HIGH COURT TO PUNISH THE RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION 307
R/W 34 OF IPC IS JUSTIFIABLE OR NOT?
ISSUE :- II
WHETHER THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO PUNISH THE RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION
304 R/W 34 OF IPC IS APPROPRIATE OR NOT?
ISSUE :- III
WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIAL COURT OF PUNISHING RESPONDENT UNDER
SECTION 120-B OF IPC IS MAINTAINABLE?
Page | 9
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1
WHETHER THE DECISION OF HIGH COURT TO PUNISH THE RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION 307
R/W 34 OF IPC IS JUSTIFIABLE OR NOT?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the said accused and his family member
are not liable to be punished under section 307 IPC as they have not participated in commission
of offence by any means. Moreover, it is further contented that their presence at the crime scene
is not established by any means of evidence. Thus, it is vexatious to charge them for the alleged
crime. As when this particular incident occurred, the presence of accused is not established by
the prosecution by any means or types of evidence.
ISSUE 2
WHETHER THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO PUNISH THE RESPONDENT UNDER SECTION
304 R/W 34 OF IPC IS APPROPRIATE OR NOT?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the said accused and his family member
are not liable to be charge under section 304 r/w 34. It is unreasonable to consider that the
purported act has been done by the said accused and his family member. Moreover, the lacunas
in investigation are so paramount which makes the prosecution’s case more futile and it shall
be proved by the further contention.
ISSUE 3
WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIAL COURT OF PUNISHING RESPONDENT UNDER
SECTION 120-B OF IPC IS MAINTAINABLE?
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble SC that the said accused and his family have been
falsely charged with the offence under section 120-B of IPC. For the said accused to be charged
and punished for the offences under the section, the prosecution must prove the act of criminal
conspiracy beyond any doubt and should explain the agreement that binds them to the offence.
This section applies to those who are the members of the conspiracy during its continuance.
Page | 10
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
I. WHETHER THE DECISION OF HIGH COURT TO PUNISH THE RESPONDENT UNDER

SECTION 307 R/W 34 OF IPC IS JUSTIFIABLE OR NOT?
1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the said accused and his Family
members are not liable to be charge under section 307 r/w 34 and to buttress the aforesaid
contention, argument has been divided onto three parts, i.e., (1.1.1) It is fallacious to charge
the said accused under section 307 r/w 34 of IPC; (1.1.2) The act must be capable of
causing death; (1.1.3) Absence of the Intention on the part of the said accused to cause
death.
A. It Is Fallacious To Charge The Said Accused U/s 307 r/w 34 Of IPC.

2. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the said accused and his Family
members are not liable to be punished under section 307 IPC as theyhave not participated
in commission of offence by any means. Moreover, it is further contented that their
presence at the crime scene is not established by any means of evidence. Thus, it is
vexatious to charge them for the alleged crime.
3. In order to prove the crime u/s 307, analysis of different stages of crime is important. The
first stage is the intention to commit the crime, secondly, the preparation to commit the
crime; and thirdly, an attempt to commit it. It is to be noted that the essential elements of
Sec. 307 are as follows:
• The act must be capable of causing death, 2
• The existence of the intention of the offender to cause death. 3
4. Firstly, there were no bodily injuries on the deceased prior to this incident and it can be
inferred from the factsheet that there are no major consistencies with the fact that the said
accused were present at the spot where the alleged offence has taken place or they had any
such preparation or motive to commit any sort of crime against the victim. Hence, it is
inconceivable that they would have developed an intention to put her to death or have any
intention or knowledge to commit murder at this stage of their lives.
2
State of Maharastra v. Kashirao, (2003) 10 SCC 434
3
Jage Ram v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 366
Page | 11
5. Secondly, that they had the intention to commit an act can be negated as the fact is staunchly
silent and ambiguous on any part of their act. The other element for deciding the offence is
that of the ‘commission of act’ by the accused, which is in the present case has not been
satisfied. As when this particular incident occurred, the presence of accused is not
established by the prosecution by any means or types of evidence.
B. The Act Must Be Capable Of Causing Death

6. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble court that the act of the said accused and his
Family memberswas incapable of causing death. To justify a conviction under Sec 307 IPC,
it is necessary that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted4, but
in the instant case neither the presence of the said accused nor the intention or preparation
by the same has been established, which clearly creates a doubt and poses the same in the
favour of the said accused.
7. It is further submitted that the act of said accused and his Family members is not a crime
as it lacks the essential element of actus reus i.e., wrongful act or criminal act. As in the
present scenario no such kind of criminal act could be established on the part of the said
accused and his family members, as intrinsically there was no criminal or overt act on the
part of said accused and his family members with regard to the purported offence and hence
it clearly gives an inference that accused and his family member have no nexus with the
said offence.
8. In the case of State of Maharashtra v. Balram Patil5Supreme Court held that to convict
under this section it is not necessary to show bodily injury capable of death which was
inflicted the victim only, it has to be proved that whether the act irrespective of its result
was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned under this
section. Contrary to this prosecution has failed to offer any kind of evidence through which
any sort of intention, if any, could be deduced.
C. Absence Of The Intention On the part of The Said Accused And Family Member
To Cause Death:
9. The essential ingredient to constitute an offence under this section is having the intention
or knowledge. The intention or knowledge can be understood as enunciated under Section
300 of the Code6. An act, though sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,
it would not constitute an offence under this section if necessary, intention or knowledge
4
Hari Mohan Mandal v. St. of Jharkhand, (2004) 12 SCC 220
5
State of Maharashtra v. Balram Patil 1938CrLJ 331(SC).
6
Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR (1965) SC 843.
Page | 12
is lacking.7 Intent expresses mental action at its most advanced point, it shows the
presence of will in the act.
10. To bring a case within the ambit of section 307, the prosecution has to make out the facts
and circumstances envisaged by section 300. If the ingredients of section 300 are wholly
lacking, there can be no conviction under section 307.8 The ingredients of the section are
(1) intention or knowledge relating to commission of murder; and (2) the doing of an act
towards it.9. Where in this case both ingredients are silent hence making an orbit of doubt.
11. For a conviction under this section, it is not necessary that the accused should complete
every stage in the actual offence, except the final action. It is enough if in the attempt he
did an act towards the commission of the offence. 10In the present matter, the Prosecution’s
case is liable to be dismissed because of heavy reliance on uncorroborated confession and
moreover no evidence with regard to the said act has been presented, all creating the
existence of a reasonable doubt for the alleged crime.
12. In the case of State Of U.P vs Indrajeet11 the murder case u/s 300 IPC was dismissed on the
ground that there was no intention, in the absence of any motive or intention to kill and
having regard to the type of weapon used and the number as well as the nature of injuries
found inflicted, the case on hand could not appropriately be said to be one warranting the
application offset 302 IPC. In the present case, no intention or motive could be deduced
and hence it would be implausible to base their conviction.
13. It is further contented that, for the conviction under this section more importance has been
given to mens rea or the intention than the actus reus or the actual act itself. As stated in
sec. 307, the act attempted should be of such a nature that if not prevented or intercepted,
it would lead to the death of the victim. In the present case it is apprised before the Hon’ble
court that without any knowledge or intention for causing death failing in which do not
constitute the offence of attempt to murder under S.307 of IPC.
14. In the case of Hari Singh vs. Sukhbir Singh12the SC added that the intention or knowledge
of the accused must besuch as is necessary to constitute murder. The intention is to be
gathered byall circumstances & not merely from the consequences that ensue. It is stated
7
Abhiram Mukhi v St. of Orissa, 1996 Cri LJ 2341.
8
Hingu v State of UP, 1998 Cr LJ 365: AIR 1998 SC 198 [LNIND 1997 SC 1528]; Chhota Master v State of
Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 3185 (Ori); Balakrishna Tripathy v State of Orissa, 1998 Cr LJ 3591 (Ori); Raja v State, 1997
Cr LJ 1863 (Del); Pulkit Purbey v State of Bihar, 1997 Cr LJ 2371 (Pat); Arjun Thakur v State of Orissa, 1994 Cr
LJ 3526 (Ori); Hemant Kumar Mondal v State of WB, 1993 Cr LJ 82 (Cal).
9
Sumer Singh Umed Singh Rajput v State of Gujarat, (2007) 13 SCC 83 [LNIND 2007 SC 1450].
10
Raghunath alias Ram Singh, (1940) 16 Luck 194.
11
State Of U.P vs Indrajeet @ Sukhatha on 25 August, 2000.
12
Hari Singh vs. Sukhbir Singh (1988)4 SCC551: AIR 1998 SC 2127
Page | 13
that, the charges of the said offence do not stand fit to be maintainable and in such situation,
the accused should be given the benefit of doubt as the whole case where, motive and
intention being a significant element, could not be established.
15. Furthermore, it is submitted that for the purpose of Section 307 what is material is the
intention or the knowledge and not the consequence of the actual act done for the purpose
of carrying out the intention.13 Intention cannot be proved from direct evidence but it is to
be ascertained from facts and circumstances of each case. Some of the relevant
considerations may be the nature of the weapon used, the place where injuries were
inflicted, the nature of the injuries and the circumstances in which the incident took place.14
16. Lastly it is concluded that, in the instant case, the said accused and his family didn’t have
any intention or knowledge to commit the alleged crime. All the evidences presented by
the prosecution in order to support their case, stand inadmissible and non-credible since
they suffer from various discrepancies and infirmities which makes them unable to prove
the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which is essential in a criminal trial, and thus it forms a
conjecture. Therefore, it is apprised that the said accused and his Family members shall be
acquitted from the alleged offence of Section 307 IPC.
13
Sumer Singh Umed Singh Rajput v. State of Gujarat: AIR 2008 SC 904; Parsuram Pandey and Ors.v. The State
of Bihar, AIR 2004 SC 5068; Om Prakash v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1782; Prakash Chandra Yadav
v. State of Bihar, (2007) 13 SCC 134; R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, (2004) 9 SCC 27; Hari Mohan Mandal v.
State of Jharkhand, (2004) 12 SCC 27; Vasant Vithu Jadav v. State of Maharashtra, (2004) 9 SCC 31.
14
IBID.
Page | 14
II. WHETHER THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT TO PUNISH THE RESPONDENT UNDER
SECTION 304 R/W 34 OF IPC IS APPROPRIATE OR NOT?
1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the charges framed against the said
accused under section 304 r/w 299 r/w 34 of the IPC are not maintainable and therefore,
they are not liable to be punished under the same. The arguendo for the antecedent
contention is in three-fold i.e. (2.1.1) Physical presence of the said accused has not been
established; (2.1.2) Absence of Common Intention; (2.1.3) There exists a reasonable doubt.
2. Section 304, IPC divides the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder into
two categories according to intensity and gravity of the crime for the purpose of awarding
the sentence. In one case, (which is more serious and graver in nature) the liability is proved
on the basis of intention to be inferred from all the circumstances; whereas in the other case
(of less serious nature) liability does not depend on intention.
3. For proving an offence under culpable homicide not amounting to murder the prosecution
must prove- that there existed knowledge of the act which in proximity likely to cause
death. It is unreasonable to consider that the purported act has been done by the said accused
and his Family members. Moreover, the lacunas in investigation are so paramount which
makes the prosecution’s case more futile and it shall be proved by the further contention.
4. The expression ‘grave’ indicates that provocation be of such a nature so as to give cause
for alarm to the accused. ‘Sudden’ means an action which must be quick and unexpected
so far as to provoke the accused. The question whether provocation was grave and sudden
is a question of fact and not one of law. Each case is to be considered according to its own
facts.15 The ingredient of sustained provocation is a series of acts more or less grave spread
over a certain period of time.
5. It is also necessary that the provocation must be enough to make the reasonable person to
do what the accused did. The requirement is necessary. In the application of this
requirement, the accused persona’s personal provocability is equally important. For the
conviction under this section more importance has been given to mens rea or the intention
than the actus reus or the actual act itself caused with the intention of causing death but are
not grave enough to cause death do not come under this section.
15
Sukhlal Sarkar v. Union of India, (2012) 5 SCC 703.
Page | 15
6. The act must be done whilst the person doing it is deprived of self-control by grave and
sudden provocation. That is, it must be done under the immediate impulse of provocation. 16
In the present case, the circumstances do not support the “grave and sudden provocation”
theory which is alleged by the prosecution and hence forth it would be unsafe to base the
conviction of the said accused and his family members.
7. It is further submitted by the defence that Respondent and his family are not liable for the
culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It is contented that in the case of defence, if it
can be proved that even one of the elements that constitute the crime has not been
successfully proved by the prosecution, then the accused cannot be held criminally liable
for that act. Therefore, when the prosecution puts forth a case, the facts need not only be
consistent with the guilt of the accused but also leave no reasonable doubt of his
innocence.17
A. Physical Presence Of The Said Accused Has Not Been Established

8. It is most respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court, that the offence U/s 304
requires the bodily or physical presence of the accused at the scene where the said offence
has occurred. The physical element of a crime or behaviour connected to the crime is called
the actus reus.18In the present matter, the Prosecution’s case is liable to be dismissed
because of heavy reliance on uncorroborated confession as no eye witness was present there
which could establish the presence, all creating the existence of a reasonable doubt.
9. A person must participate in all the acts necessary to constitute a particular crime in order
to be guilty thereof. The only concept known to law is crime; and the crime exists only
when actus reus and mens rea coincide. 19 It is further stated that, there is no establishment
that the said accused were present at the spot, moreover evidence offered to ascertain the
same lacks reliability, which makes their allegations more fallacious.
10. In the present case, there has been no corroboration by the evidences that the accused were
responsible for the alleged crime. Moreover, mens rea and actus reus for the same is purely
absent and evidence for the same has not been offered. It is further stated that, motive being
a significant element, could not be established. Henceforth, there is not even any evidence
16
Nokul Nushyo, (1867) 7 WR (Cr) 27; Akhila Parida v. State of Orissa, 1987 CrLJ 609; Nagar Prasad v. State of
UP., 1998 CrLJ 1580 (All.)
17
Shiva Sahai v. State of UP 1990 CriLJ 102 (NOC) 15.
18
David Ormerod, Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law, (13th Edition, Oxford University Press,2011)
19
State of Uttar Pradesh v Satish, (2005) 3 SCC 114: AIR 2005 SC 1000; Krishnan v State represented by
Inspector of Police, (2008) 15S SCC 430; Ramesh Bhai and Anr. V State of Rajasthan, (2009) 12 SCC 603; AIR
2009SC (Supp) 1482; Subramaniam v State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 415: AIR 2009 SC (supp)
1493 and Babu v State of Kerala, JT 2010 (8) SC 560:2007 AIR SCW 5105.
Page | 16
offered to prove even the bodily presence of the said accused and his family members to
commit the said crime.
11. Most importantly, due to lacunas in the investigation by the police there exists a reasonable
doubt over the pre-requisites factors with regard to said offence of the said accused.
Moreover, the burden of proving the alleged crime is upon prosecution to which they fail,
resulting onto making their allegations more fragile. Lastly, it is stated that the essential
elements for the crime viz., mens rea and actus reus, are not present which makes it unsafe
to base the conviction of the said accused and his family members.
B. Absence Of Common Intention (S.34)

12. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in the present case there has been a
gross failure of justice on part of the lower courts. It is firstly contented that since the
definition of necessitates the act to be a result of pre-arranged plan.20 The Section 34 of
IPC is intended to meet cases in which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts
of the individual members of a party or to prove what part was exactly taken by each of
them in furtherance of the common intention of all.
13. The common intention must exist prior to the commission of the act in a point of time. The
burden lies on the prosecution to prove that participation of more than one person for
commission of criminal act was done in furtherance of common intention.21 To constitute
common intention, it is necessary that the intention of each one of the accused was known
to the rest of them and was shared by them.
14. Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. 22
It must be proved that the criminal act was done in concert pursuant to the pre-arranged
plan. The test to decide if the intention of one of them is common is to see whether the
intention of one was known to the other and was shared by that other. It comes into being
prior to the commission of the act in point of time, not be in long gap. 23
15. The underlying principle of Section 34 is that a person must be physically present at the
actual commission of the crime for the purpose of facilitating or promoting the offence, the
commission of which is the aim of the joint criminal venture. Such presence of those who
in one way or the other facilitate the execution of the common design is itself tantamount
20
Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad AIR 1955 SC 216.
21
Ishwari Lal Yadav and Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh: 2020 (206) AIC 243.
22
Dharnidhar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2010) 7 SCC 75; Shyamlal Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2012
SC 3339.
23
Sharif Ahmed Alias Achhan, (1956) 2 ALL 188; Ramchander, 1970 CrLJ 653; Razak Jinnesab Karajagi vs.
State of Karnataka, (2009) 13 SCC 522.
Page | 17
to actual participation in the criminal act. The essence of Section 34 is simultaneous

consensus of the minds of persons participating in the criminal action to bring about a
particular result.24
16. Section 34 also deals with constructive criminal liability. It provides that where a criminal
act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such
persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it was done by him alone. If the
common intention leads to the commission of the criminal offence charged, each one of the
persons sharing the common intention is constructively liable for the criminal act done by
one of them.25
17. The counsel on behalf of Respondent humbly submits that the acts were not in furtherance
of common intention of the said accused and his Family members. The prosecution has not
proved any sort of communication whatsoever, if any, between the said accused persons
through which any kind of intention could be deciphered. They have relied upon
inexpedient evidence which lacks material corroboration.
18. It is, however, not necessary to show that any overt act must have been done by a particular
accused. The section will be attracted only if it is established that the criminal act has been
done by all or any one of the accused persons in furtherance of common intention. 26 Before
an inference of common intention can be reached in a given case, the incriminating facts
from which such inference is to be drawn should be held to be firmly established but
contrary to this nothing is recognized.
19. It is further stated that, the facts forming ground to invoke the charge of section 34 should
firmly and wholly warrant the inference that more than one accused person acted in
furtherance of common intention of all; they must be wholly incompatible with the contrary
inference; and incapable of being explained on any other reasonable hypothesis. 27 In the
existing scenario prosecution has failed to provide with any kind of incriminating facts
which could give any sort of inference.
20. It is further submitted that due to the lack of evidence on the part of Prosecution it cannot
be conclusively articulated that there existed any sort of intention to commit any illegal act
in furtherance of common intention. It is further delivered that the prosecution is unable to
24
Surender Chauhan v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2000) 4 SCC 110.
25
Nand Kishore v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2011) 12 SCC 120.
26
Rajesh Singh v. State of UP., 2011 (4) SCALE 6; State of UP v. Iftikhar Khan, AIR 1973 SC 863; Surjit Singh
v. State of Punjab, AIR 1983 SC 473; State of Punjab v. Mann Singh AIR 1983 SC 172; Vencil Pushpraj v. State
of Rajasthan, AIR 1991 SC 536.
27
Sayed Ahmad v. State of Maharashtra, 1955 CrLJ 3585 (Bom).
Page | 18
prove a pre-arranged plan and meeting of minds between the said accused and his Family
members for the same.
21. Lastly it is concluded that, in the instant case the said accused are being dragged into the
picture for no justifiable cause and for no fault, participation or involvement of them in the
alleged act in question. Moreover, no evidence is adduced regarding the same which
invalidates the prosecution’s allegation. Lastly, there was no evidence offered which could
establish that prior to the incident there was any common intention shared by all the accused
and hence this charge stands inadmissible.
C. There exists a reasonable doubt

22. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that in there is an existence of reasonable
doubt. It is a fundamental principle of criminal law that a person may not be convicted of
a crime unless the prosecution has proven the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution has to prove its case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In this case
the details of the incident were not completely collected by the prosecution. Benefit of
doubt became inevitable.28
23. The prosecution has to prove the guilt of the Accused beyond all reasonable doubt. Accused
has a profound right not to be convicted for an offence which is not established by the
evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The law does not permit the court to
convict the Accused based on suspicion or on the basis of preponderance of probability. 29
In other words in every case the two elements of crime; actus reus and mens rea have to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.
24. The prosecution’s arguments are leaning towards the fact that the crime ‘may have been
committed by the accused’, however they have failed to connect the link between ‘may
have committed the crime’ and ‘must have committed the crime’ and that gap must be filled
by the prosecution by legal, reliable and unimpeachable evidence before a conviction can
be sustained.30
25. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for
the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all
human probability the act must have been done by the accused, the evidence produced by
the prosecution should be of such nature that it makes the conviction of the accused
28
Abdulwahab Abdulmajid Balach v. State of Gujarat, (2009) 11 SCC 625.
29
Latesh and Ors. vs. The State of Maharashtra, AIR 2018 SC 659; Suresh and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors.
AIR 2018 SC 4045.
30
IV. Nelson R. A., Indian Penal Code, p. 2905, (10th Ed. 2008).
Page | 19
sustainable.31 On the contrary, facts so established in the present case are ambiguous in
nature and leaves many other hypotheses.
26. In light of all the aforementioned arguments, the counsel on behalf of accused humbly
submits that there exists reasonable doubt and hence their conviction of the alleged crime
shall be set aside. The foundation of the Indian criminal justice system is that any doubt or
ambiguity should support the accused a reasonable doubt must not be imaginary, trivial or
merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense arising out
of the evidence of the case. 32
27. Furthermore, it is submitted by the defence that the case of the Prosecution has not been
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and therefore the said Accused and his Family members
shall not be convicted for the alleged crime. It is further stated that, when the case of an
Accused is so inextricably related to that of the other, the acquittal of one would entail the
acquittal of other.33 Lastly, it is concluded that the said accused and his Family members
cannot be held guilty for the said crime and hence the charge of section 304 shall be
abrogated to prevent the miscarriage of justice.
31
Supra, FN 17.
32
Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai Cr LJ 2004 SC 36.
33
Vijaya Shankar v. State of MP 1989 CrLJ NOC 151 (MP)
Page | 20
III. WHETHER THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIAL COURT OF PUNISHING RESPONDENT
UNDER SECTION 120-B OF IPC IS MAINTAINABLE?
1. It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble SC that the said accused and his family have
been falsely charged with the offence under section 120-B of IPC. For the said accused to
be charged and punished for the offences under the section, the prosecution must prove the
act of criminal conspiracy beyond any doubt and should explain the agreement that binds
them to the offence. This section applies to those who are the members of the conspiracy
during its continuance.
2. Section 120-B of IPC provides for punishment for criminal conspiracy. 'Criminal
conspiracy' may be defined as: - When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be
done, - (1) all illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an
agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy. 34 Moreover, for the offence of conspiracy
needs some kind of physical manifestation of agreement is required to be established.
3. The term ‘Conspiracy’ means combination of two or more persons for unlawful purposes.
“Conspiracy is the corrupt agreeing together of two or more persons to do, by concerted
action, something unlawful either as a means or as an end”. It must be remembered that
mere knowledge on the part of a man about conspiracy will not make him “Conspirator”.
There must be a consent of will and endeavour between the conspirators.
4. Furthermore, to constitute the offence of conspiracy there must be an agreement of two or
more persons to do an act which is illegal or which is to be done by illegal means for one
cannot conspire with oneself. A conspiracy is a continuing offence which continues to
subsist till it is executed or rescinded or frustrated by choice of necessity. The conspiracy
is held to be continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever any
member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of common design.
A. Prosecution Could Not Establish Conspiracy As Alleged.

5. It is humbly submitted that in the instant case the evidences do not corroborate together to
form one sequence of events such as to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The question for consideration in a case is did all the accused had the intention and
34
Mohd. Khalid v. State of West Bengal (2002) 7 SCC 334; State v. Shaquila and Ors. (2002) 55 DRJ 713;
Surendra Kumar Sinha Alias Surendra Kumar v. The State of Jharkhand Criminal Revision No. 502 of 2014
decided on 5 August, 2015; S. Arul Raja v. State of T.N. (2010) 8 SCC 233; Mohan Singh v. State of Bihar (2011)
9 SCC 272; C.B.I. Hyderabad v. K. Narayana Rao JT 2012 9 SC 359; Ajay Aggarwal v. UOI (1993) 3 SCC 609.
Page | 21
did they agree that the crime be committed. Meeting of minds is essential. Mere knowledge
or discussion is not sufficient. 35
6. The term agreement is the fon juris of Section 120-B of IPC which makes it clear that there
should be an agreement between the conspirators to do an illegal act by illegal means which
shall be punishable by law. The circumstances proved before and after the occurrences have
to be considered to decide about the complicity of the accused. The circumstances relied
upon should be conclusive and should point towards the guilt of the accused.
7. The essential ingredient of the offence of criminal conspiracy is the agreement to commit
an offence. In a case where the agreement is for accomplishments of an act which by itself
constitutes an offence, then in that event no overt act is necessary to be proved because in
such a situation, criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. In the
present case, there was no such agreement between accused and his family as prima facie
there was no unlawful objective per se.
8. In the absence of an agreement, a mere thought to commit a crime does not constitute the
offence.36 To constitute the offence of criminal conspiracy, there must be an agreement
between two or more persons to do an act which is an illegal from its very inception or
which is done by illegal means.37 The prosecution cannot levy criminal charges against the
accused on weak and vague evidences. A few bits here and a few bits there on which the
prosecution relies cannot be held to be adequate for connecting the accused with the
commission of the crime of criminal conspiracy.
9. In a criminal case however strong the suspicion is, it cannot be taken as a proof. Inferences
from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn only when such
circumstances are incapable of any another reasonable explanation. Thus, onus is on the
prosecution to prove the charge of conspiracy by cogent evidence, direct or circumstantial
evidence.38 The meeting of the minds to form a criminal conspiracy has to be proved by
substantial evidence.
10. In regard to the appreciation of evidence relating to the conspiracy, the court must take care
to see that the acts or conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer
their concurrence as to the common design and its execution.39 Each one of the
35
Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 1, 244.
36
R Venkatakrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737.
37
Dharam Singh v. Jammu and Kashmir, 2004 CrLJ 1704.
38
State v. V.C. Shukla 1980 CrLJ 965; State of H.P. v. Gian Chand 2002 CrLJ 949 (HP); Sardari lal v. State of
Punjab 2003 CrLJ 383; State of M.P. v. Sheetla Sahai (2009) 8 SCC 617; Baldev singh v. State of Punjab (2009)
6 SCC 564; Y. Venkaiah v. State of A.P. (2009) 12 SCC 126; State of M.P. v. Paltan Mallah 2005 CrLJ 918 SC.
39
State (NCT) of Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600.
Page | 22
circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The law is well established that
conspiracy cannot be proved merely on the basis of inferences. The inferences have to
backed by evidence.40
11. A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of
two or more to do an unlawful act by unlawful means.41 A criminal conspiracy must be put
to action inasmuch as so long a crime is generated in the mind of an accused, it does not
become punishable. A distinction is drawn between an agreement to commit an offence
and an agreement of which either the object or the methods employed are illegal but do not
constitute an offence.
12. The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal conduct, not the
execution of it. It is not enough that two or person pursued the same unlawful object at the
same time or in the same place; it is necessary to show a meeting of minds, a consensus to
give effect to an unlawful purpose. 42 This clearly envisages that there must be a meeting of
minds to execute the common objective or to pursue the commission of offence.
13. If there is no ocular version of incident and entire case of prosecution is based on
circumstantial evidence then accused person shall be entitled for doubt.43 Responsibility of
the prosecution in a case of circumstantial evidence is more as compared to the cases where
ocular testimony or the direct evidence is available.44 The paramount essential of this
offence i.e., Criminal conspiracy is the agreement to commit an offence.
14. The meeting of the minds to form a criminal conspiracy has to be proved by adducing
substantive evidence, in cases where the circumstantial evidence is incomplete or vague.
The necessary requisite is knowledge of the main object and purpose of the conspiracy. The
circumstances relied for the purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in point of
time than the actual commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. 45
15. The Court for the purpose of arriving at a finding as to whether the said offence has been
committed or not may take into consideration the circumstantial evidence. However, while
doing so, the Court must bear in mind that the meeting of minds is essential and mere
knowledge or discussion would not be sufficient.46 It is however necessary that a charge of
40
Satyavir Singh v. State of UP 2016 CriLJ 4863.
41
Pratap Bhai Hamirbhai Solanki v. State of Gujarat., (2013) 1 SCC 613.
42
Chamanlal v. State of Punjab, AIR 2009 SC 2972.
43
Raj Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2013 SC 3150
44
Mohd. Arif v. State (NCT of Delhi) ACR 2012 SC 477.
45
Esher Singh v. State of AP., 2004 (11) SCC 585.
46
State v. Nitin Gunwant Shah, 2015 CrLJ 4759.
Page | 23
conspiracy should contain particulars of the names of the place or places where it was
hatched persons hatching it, how was it hatched and what the purpose of conspiracy was. 47
16. An offence of conspiracy cannot be deemed to have been established on mere suspicion
and surmises or inference which are not supported by cogent and acceptable evidence.
Inference from such proved circumstances regarding the guilt maybe drawn only when such
circumstances are incapable of any other reasonable explanation. To establish a charge of
conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal
means is necessary.
17. At this point it is very relevant to note the SC verdict in Kehar singh v. State (Delhi
administration)48 that “it is better to err in acquitting than convicting”. The observation
was made by the Supreme Court by setting free the accused Balbir Singh asserting lack of
incriminating evidence in the Indira Gandhi assassination. In the present case, there is no
presence of any sort of circumstances, incriminating circumstances are the distant thing and
thus it weakens the prosecution’s allegations.
18. It would not be enough for the offence of conspiracy when some of the accused merely
entertained a wish, howsoever, horrendous, it may be, that offence be committed. 49 The
prosecution cannot charge criminal charges against the accused on unreliable and vague
evidence. Several bits here and some parts there on which the prosecution depends cannot
be considered sufficient to bind the accused to the commission of the crime of criminal
conspiracy.
19. In the present case, the prosecution must prove the act of criminal conspiracy beyond any
doubt and should explain the agreement that binds them to the offence. All the evidences
brought by the prosecution are defective and deficient in nature. Just a mere fact that the
said accused and his Family members disagreed for the relationship is not a conclusive
piece of evidence and is not a strong ground for punishing the said accused and his Family
members for such grave offence as alleged.
20. Furthermore, the allegations of Prosecution fall short of reliability and is ambiguous on the
part of agreement, which is the essence of the conspiracy, between the said accused and his
Family members to commit any kind of overt act. It is further stated that, in the present
case it is nowhere deduced that there was any kind of agreement of commit any kind of
47
K.S Narayanam, 1982 CrLJ 1611 (Mad).
48
Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Administration) AIR 1988 SC 1883.
49
CBI/SIT v. Nalini (1999) 5 SCC 253; Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1988) 3 SCC 609 At 731.
Page | 24
overt act by the any actions of the said accused and his Family members. Thus, the charge
of Conspiracy does not stand fit to be maintainable.
Page | 25
PRAYER
Wherefore, it is prayed in the light of issues raised herein above, argument advanced and
authorities cited that the counsel here on behalf of respondent humbly prays before this Hon’ble
SC to kindly adjudge and be please to declare,
1. Reverse the order of Hon’ble HC and set aside the conviction of Ratan, Gagan and
Harsh from Section 304, 307 and 120-B of Indian Penal Code,1860.
And/or
Pass any other order, discretion or relief that may deem fit best in the interest of justice, fairness,
equity and good conscience for which respondent may be duty bound forever pray.
Page | 26

Before The Supreme Court of Bharatvart: Team Code

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TEAM CODE -

TEAM CODE – LC-99

BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

IN THE MATTER CONCERNING SECTIONS OF THE

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ANS.

RATAN AND ORS.

ON SUBMISSION B EFORE THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................... 2

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................... 5

STATEMENTS OF FACTS ...................................................................................................... 7

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ....................................................................................................... 9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ............................................................................................. 10

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ................................................................................................. 11

B. The Act Must Be Capable Of Causing Death ........................................................... 12

B. Absence Of Common Intention (S.34) ...................................................................... 17

C. There exists a reasonable doubt ................................................................................ 19

A. Prosecution Could Not Establish Conspiracy As Alleged. ....................................... 21

1. Akhila Parida v. State of Orissa, 1987 CrLJ 609 ............................................................... 16

32. Sardari lal v. State of Punjab 2003 CrLJ 383..................................................................... 22

S. NO. ABBREVIATIONS FULL FORMS

8. IPC INDIAN PENAL CODE

10. MAD. MADRAS

16. SC SUPREME COURT

17. SCC SUPREME COURT CASES

18. SEC SECTION

19. DSI DEMOCRACTIC SOCIETY OF INDIANA

21. U.P. UTTAR PRADESH

Tushar implicated this incident over Ratan, Gagan and harsh.

-: FINDINGS OF SESSIONS COURT :-

-: FINDINGS OF HIGH COURT :-

I. WHETHER THE DECISION OF HIGH COURT TO PUNISH THE RESPONDENT UNDER

A. It Is Fallacious To Charge The Said Accused U/s 307 r/w 34 Of IPC.

• The existence of the intention of the offender to cause death. 3

B. The Act Must Be Capable Of Causing Death

A. Physical Presence Of The Said Accused Has Not Been Established

B. Absence Of Common Intention (S.34)

to actual participation in the criminal act. The essence of Section 34 is simultaneous

C. There exists a reasonable doubt

A. Prosecution Could Not Establish Conspiracy As Alleged.

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