Emotion Regulation in Couples and Families Pathways To Dysfunction and Health

Emotion Regulation in
Couples and Families

Pathways to
Dysfunction
and Health
EDITED BY
Douglas K. Snyder, Jeffry A. Simpson, and Jan N. Hughes
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Emotion regulation in couples and families : pathways to dysfunction and health / edited by
Douglas K. Snyder, Jeffry A. Simpson, Jan N. Hughes.— 1st ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 1-59147-394-2
1. Emotions. 2. Emotions—Social aspects. 3. Interpersonal relations. I. Snyder, Douglas
K. II. Simpson, Jeffry A. III. Hughes, Jan N., 1949-
BF531.E4955 2006
152.4—dc22 2005031777
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A CIP record is available from the British Library.
Printed in the United States of America

First Edition
To my wife, Linda, and to Christopher, Eric, Natalie, and Jason,
for your love and support.
—Douglas K. Snyder
To Cindy, Chris, and Natalie, for your support and

the many good times that we have shared.
—Jeffry A. Simpson
To Mrs. Harding, my kindergarten teacher, for a good start.

—Jan N. Hughes
CONTENTS
About the Editors xi

Contributors xiii
Introduction: Cross-Disciplinary Approaches to
Emotion Regulation 3
Jeffry A. Simpson, Jan N. Hughes, and Douglas K. Snyder
I. Emotion Regulation: Theoretical Perspectives 11

Chapter 1. Emotion Regulation in Everyday Life 13
James J. Gross, Jane M. Richards, and
Oliver P. John
Chapter 2. Emotional Intelligence and the Self-Regulation
of Affect 37
Dais;y Grewal, Marc Brackett, and Peter Salovey
Chapter 3. Adult Attachment Theory and Affective
Reactivity and Regulation 57
Paula R. Pietromonaco, Lisa Feldman Barrett,
and Sally I. Powers
II. Linking Emotion Regulation to Dysfunction and

Weil-Being Across the Life Span 75
Chapter 4. Attachment Bases of Emotion Regulation and
Posttraumatic Adjustment 77
Mario MilcuJincer, Phillip R. Shaver, and
Neta Horesh
Chapter 5. Happy Victimization: Emotion Dysregulation
in the Context of Instrumental, Proactive
Aggression 101
William F. Arsenio
Chapter 6. Parenting and Children's Adjustment: The Role

of Children's Emotion Regulation 123
Garbs Valiente and Nancy Eisenberg
Chapter 7. Family and Peer Relationships: The Role of

Emotion Regulatory Processes 143
Ross D. Parke, David]. McDowell, Mina Cladis,
and Melinda S. Leidy
Chapter 8. Marital Discord and Children's Emotional

Self-Regulation 163
E. Mark Cummings and Peggy S. Keller
Chapter 9. Individual Differences in Emotion Regulation

and Their Relation to Risk Taking During
Adolescence 183
M. Lynne Cooper, Mindy E. Flanagan,
Amelia E. Talley, and Lada Micheas
III. Clinical Interventions in Emotion Regulation Processes . . . 205
Chapter 10. Emotion Regulation Processes in Disease-

Related Pain: A Couples-Based Perspective . . . 207
Francis]. Keefe, Laura S. Porter, and
Jeffrey Labban
Chapter 11. Promoting Emotional Expression and Emotion

Regulation in Couples 231
Rhonda N. Goldman and Leslie S. Greenberg
Chapter 12. Intervening With Couples and Families to

Treat Emotion Dysregulation and
Psychopathology 249
Alan E. Fruzzetti and Katherine M. Iverson
Chapter 13. Who Took My Hot Sauce? Regulating

Emotion in the Context of Family Routines
and Rituals 269
Barbara H. Fiese
CONTENTS
IV. Integration 291
Chapter 14. Family Emotion Regulation Processes:

Implications for Research and Intervention . . . 293
Douglas K. Snyder, Jan N. Hughes, and
]effry A. Simpson
Author Index 307
Subject Index 319
CONTENTS ix
ABOUT THE EDITORS
Douglas K. Snyder, PhD, is a professor and the director of clinical psychol-

ogy training at Texas A&M University. He received the American Psycho-
logical Association's 2005 award for Distinguished Contributions to Family
Psychology for his work on empirical approaches to assessment and interven-
tions with distressed couples. He is the author of the widely used Marital
Satis/action Inventory and is coeditor of Treating Difficult Couples. He received
the American Association for Marriage and Family Therapy's 1992 Outstand-
ing Research Award for his 4-year follow-up study comparing behavioral and
insight-oriented approaches to couple therapy, funded by the National Insti-
tute of Mental Health. Dr. Snyder is a fellow of the American Psychological
Association and has served as associate editor for the journal of Consulting
and Clinical Psychology and the Journal of Family Psychology.
Jeffry A. Simpson, PhD, is a professor of psychology at the University of

Minnesota, Twin Cities Campus. His primary research interests center on
adult attachment processes, models of human mating, idealization processes
in relationships, the management of empathic accuracy in relationships, and
social influence strategies. He is a fellow of the American Psychological
Association and the American Psychological Society. From 1998 to 2001,
he served as editor of the journal Personal Relationships and currently serves
as an associate editor for the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology:
Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes. In addition, he has served on
grant panels at the National Science Foundation and the National Insti-
tute of Mental Health. His various programs of research on close relation-
ships have been funded by grants from the National Science Foundation, the
National Institute of Mental Health, and the Marsden Foundation in New
Zealand.
Jan N. Hughes, PhD, is a professor of educational psychology at Texas A&M
University. She is a distinguished research fellow in the College of Educa-
tion and Human Development, and her primary research interests center on
the development and treatment of childhood aggression, teacher-student
relationships as developmental resources, the development of social and
emotional competencies, and peer relationships. The National Institute of
Child Health and Human Development, the National Institute on Drug
Abuse, and the U.S. Department of Education have funded her research.
She serves on the editorial boards of the Journal of Clinical Child and Adoles'
cent Psychology and the Journal of School Psychology. A fellow of the American
Psychological Association, she has served in numerous leadership roles in-
eluding president of the division of School Psychology.
xii ABOUT THE EDITORS

CONTRIBUTORS
William F. Arsenic, PhD, Ferkauf Graduate School of Psychology,

Yeshiva University, New York
Lisa Feldman Barrett, PhD, Department of Psychology, Boston College,
Boston, MA
Marc Brackett, PhD, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New
Haven, CT
Mina Cladis, PhD, Department of Psychology, Vassar College,
Poughkeepsie, NY
M. Lynne Cooper, PhD, Department of Psychological Sciences,
University of Missouri, Columbia
E. Mark Cummings, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Notre
Dame, IN
Nancy Eisenberg, PhD, Department of Psychology, Arizona State
University, Tempe
Barbara H. Fiese, PhD, Department of Psychology, Syracuse University,
Syracuse, NY
Mindy E. Flanagan, PhD, Roudebush Veterans Administration Medical
Center, Indianapolis, IN
Alan E. Fruzzetti, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Nevada,
Reno
Rhonda N. Goldman, PhD, School of Professional Psychology, Argosy
University, Schaumburg, IL; The Family Institute at Northwestern
University, Chicago, IL
Leslie S. Greenberg, PhD, Department of Psychology, York University,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Daisy Grewal, MS, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New
Haven, CT
James J. Gross, PhD, Department of Psychology, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA
xm
Neta Horesh, PhD, Department of Psychology, Bar-Han University,
Ramat-Gan, Israel
Jan N. Hughes, PhD, Department of Educational Psychology, Texas
A&M University, College Station
Katherine M. Iverson, MA, Department of Psychology, University of
Nevada, Reno
Oliver P. John, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of California,
Berkeley
Francis J. Keefe, PhD, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences
and Psychology: Social and Health Sciences, Duke University
Medical Center and Duke University, Durham, NC
Peggy S. Keller, MA, Department of Psychology, University of Notre
Dame, Notre Dame, IN
Jeffrey Labban, BA, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences,
Duke University Medical Center, Durham, NC
Melinda S. Leidy, MA, Department of Psychology, University of
California, Riverside
David J. McDowell, PhD, Department of Clinical and Social Psychology,
University of Rochester, Rochester, NY
Lada Micheas, MS, Department of Psychological Sciences, University of
Missouri, Columbia
Mario Mikulincer, PhD, Department of Psychology, Bar-Han University,
Ramat-Gan, Israel
Ross D. Parke, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of California,
Riverside
Paula R. Pietromonaco, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst
Laura S. Porter, PhD, Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences,
Duke University Medical Center, Durham, NC
Sally I. Powers, EdD, Department of Psychology, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst
Jane M. Richards, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of Texas,
Austin
Peter Salovey, PhD, Department of Psychology, Yale University, New
Haven, CT
Phillip R. Shaver, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of
California, Davis
Jeffry A. Simpson, PhD, Department of Psychology, University of
Minnesota, Minneapolis
Douglas K. Snyder, PhD, Department of Psychology, Texas A&M
University, College Station
Amelia E. Talley, MA, Department of Psychological Sciences, University
of Missouri, Columbia
Carlos Valiente, PhD, Department of Family and Human Development,
Arizona State University, Tempe
CONTRIBUTORS
Emotion Regulation in
Couples and Families
INTRODUCTION:
CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPROACHES
TO EMOTION REGULATION
JEFFRY A. SIMPSON, JAN N. HUGHES, AND DOUGLAS K. SNYDER
In recent years, there has been growing interest in emotion regulation

processes within different areas of psychology. This interest has been sparked
both by the development of new theoretical models of emotion regulation
processes and by the growing realization that poor or inappropriate regula-
tion of emotions often constitutes a core component of common individual
and interpersonal problems. Indeed, the ability to effectively control and
manage emotions during social interactions—especially interpersonally caus-
tic negative emotions—may assume a pivotal role in keeping individuals and
their significant relationships happy and functioning well. New theoretical
approaches to understanding emotion regulation (e.g., chaps. 2 and 3, this
volume) and new process models outlining exactly how emotions might be
regulated (e.g., chap. 1, this volume) have begun to illuminate when, how,
and why people succeed or fail to regulate certain emotions in social con-
texts. This theoretical work is also beginning to identify some of the impor-
tant processes, both intrapersonal and interpersonal, that may be associated
with successful versus unsuccessful emotion regulation. For example, more
emotionally intelligent individuals, who are particularly skilled at control-
ling and managing negative emotions, tend to be better adjusted on many
different dimensions than those who are less emotionally intelligent. In ad-
dition, more emotionally intelligent, well-regulated people are often more
likely to be involved in happier and better-functioning relationships, includ-
ing romantic and family-based ones.
3
From an applied standpoint, a deeper understanding of how emotion
regulation processes operate in both community and clinical populations could
eventually help practitioners to more effectively treat a wide range of inter-
personal problems and disorders, many of which may originate, at least in
part, from poor or deficient emotion regulation. As several chapters in this
volume highlight, delineating how various emotion regulation processes and
psychological mechanisms vary across community and clinical populations
may shed important light on some of the conditions that initiate, sustain, or
potentially ameliorate several comorbid interpersonal disorders.
When we convened the Texas A&M University Conference on Emo-
tion Regulation in Couples and Families in February 2004, on which this
volume is based, our overarching goal was to bring together some of the top
international scholars who were conducting important, cutting-edge research
on emotion regulation in different fields of psychology. We anticipated that
these individuals would (a) openly propose and discuss how the construct of
emotion regulation should be optimally conceptualized, defined, and mea-
sured; (b) share and critique the major theories, ideas, and knowledge on im-
portant emotion regulation processes and outcomes in their respective fields;
and (c) begin to develop some cross-disciplinary theories, models, hypotheses,
or new ways of thinking about emotion regulation that would facilitate cross-
disciplinary work among different fields in psychology (e.g., clinical, develop-
mental, educational, family studies, social-personality, and quantitative-
methodological). This book is the legacy of that successful conference.
The inability to regulate emotions can increase an individual's risk for
problems in many social, interpersonal, academic, work-related, and health
domains. This book covers a wide range of important theoretical, concep-
tual, and methodological issues that are critical to understanding both nor-
mal and adaptive emotion regulation processes as well as more dysfunctional
ones. In particular, the chapters in the book present empirical findings rel-
evant to emotion regulation processes both within and between individuals
involved in different types of relationships across the life span. The chapters
also contain myriad insights and implications for clinical intervention, pub-
lic policy, and directions for future research. Because the chapter contribu-
tors hail from different academic disciplines and have diverse theoretical
perspectives regarding the role that emotion regulation processes might play
in both healthy and dysfunctional outcomes, the book should be relevant to
a broad range of people who share an interest in emotion regulation, includ-
ing clinical and counseling psychologists, developmental psychologists, so-
cial and personality psychologists, and communication and family studies
scholars, to name a few. In addition to focusing on recent research findings,
the book also highlights therapeutic and public policy issues. Thus, it should
also be quite useful to practitioners who are working with children, adoles-
cents, adults, couples, and families, especially those who struggle with emo-
tion regulation difficulties.
4 SIMPSON, HUGHES, AND SNYDER

CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES
Because intense research interest in emotion regulation is a recent phe-

nomenon and emotion regulation has broad relevance to many domains of
human functioning across the life span (including emotional and physical
health, learning, work, and social relationships), it is not surprising that a
consensus definition of emotion regulation has not yet emerged. Whereas
some researchers decry the lack of theoretical consensus and operational defi-
nitions (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004), at this point in the development of
the science of emotion regulation, a degree of pluralism in theoretical
conceptualizations, definitions, and measures prevents the premature nar-
rowing of research foci and methods.
The authors in this volume agree on much concerning the construct of
emotion regulation yet also differ in important ways. Whether explicitly or
implicitly, they agree that the construct of emotion regulation includes con-
scious and unconscious, voluntary and less-than-voluntary, physiological,
behavioral, and cognitive processes that permit individuals to "influence
which emotions they have, when they have them, and how these emotions
are experienced and expressed" (chap. 1, p. 14). Furthermore, emotion regu-
lation is viewed as functionally adaptive in that it facilitates attainment of
one's goals. As a corollary, emotion regulation, which is adaptive, is distin-
guished from emotion control, which can be adaptive (e.g., when suppress-
ing a display of anger toward one's boss) or maladaptive (e.g., in the case of
an inhibited boy who suppresses his expression of both positive and negative
emotions, resulting in poor peer relationships and restricted exploration of
his environment). In addition, regulation can involve the initiation, main-
tenance, and expression of positive emotions as well as the avoidance, mini-
mization, and masking of negative ones. Generally, the authors accept Gross
and colleagues' distinction in chapter 1 between antecedent-focused emo-
tion regulation, which involves regulatory processes that precede and antici-
pate an emotional reaction, and response-focused regulation, which occurs
in response to an activated emotion. The authors also concur that emotion
regulation is only one aspect of "an interrelated family or cluster of abilities
that work together" (chap. 7, p. 145) to achieve interpersonal and intraper-
sonal goals.
Despite these areas of general consensus, the authors' conceptualizations
of emotion regulation diverge explicitly or implicitly in important ways that
reflect points of disagreement discussed in recent literature (e.g., Bridges,
Denham, & Ganiban, 2004; Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004; Cole et al,
2004). For example, how much "voluntariness" over some activity is required
for it to be considered emotion regulation? Grewal, Brackett, and Salovey's
definition of emotion regulation (chap. 2) emphasizes conscious and volun-
tary aspects (i.e., "the ability to monitor and label one's own feelings effec-
tively and self-efficacy about the ability to modify these feelings, as well as
INTRODUCTION 5
the knowledge and motivation to use effective strategies to alter emotions,"
p. 41). Mikulincer, Shaver, and Horesh (chap. 4), however, view emotion
regulation as an aspect of an individual's attachment system that operates
predominantly outside of conscious awareness and influences individuals' emo-
tional reactions to threats to their security. Valiente and Eisenberg (chap. 6)
engage the "voluntariness" issue head on, distinguishing between reactive
control, which is considered an aspect of temperament evident in early in-
fancy, and effortful control, which is more voluntary, emerges toward the
end of the first year of life, is more influenced by socialization experiences,
and becomes increasingly important with age in contributing to individual
differences in coping with emotions.
In addition, the authors also differ in their relative focus on discrete
emotional, cognitive, or physiological responses to emotionally arousing situ-
ations versus organized patterns of responding. The field appears to be mov-
ing more to configurations of emotion expression and regulation (see chaps.
8 and 13). As the field moves in this direction, it will be important to differ-
entiate between processes associated with the initial arousal of emotions (e.g.,
individual differences in general emotional reactivity) and those associated
with emotion regulation processes per se (see chap. 1). To date, insufficient
attention has been focused on questions of whether or how emotion regula-
tion processes might be influenced by stable individual differences in the
tendency to initially experience stronger versus weaker emotional reactions
in response to specific stimuli. Effective emotion regulation may, for instance,
be more difficult to achieve for individuals who habitually experience strong
emotional reactions to certain stimuli or events.
Given the lack of consistency in operational definitions of emotion
regulation, it is important that researchers clearly link their measurements of
emotion regulation to theoretical conceptualizations, a goal that is met to
varying degrees by the authors in this volume. For example, Valiente and
Eisenberg (chap. 6) achieve this when they distinguish between two aspects
of emotion regulation that differ in voluntariness. Cummings and Keller
(chap. 8) accomplish this by studying emotion regulation in one context
(marital conflict) and interpreting their findings within the broader frame-
work of the emotional security hypothesis, which has strong empirical and
theoretical support. Gross and his colleagues (chap. 1) classify emotion regu-
lation strategies in terms of when they have their primary impact on the
emotion-generation process. Adopting an attachment framework,
Pietromonaco and her colleagues (chap. 3) distinguish between two affect-
based processes that underlie working models of attachment: affect reactivity
and affect regulation.
The emotion regulation area will benefit from continued efforts to de-
fine and operationalize key constructs. For example, when does another
person's attempt to modify an individual's emotions constitute emotion regu-
lation? Do strategies initiated by or perhaps imposed on another individual

constitute emotion regulation, such as a parent reminding her daughter that
her unkind remark to another child resulted in the other child feeling sad
(an example of an intrapersonal attempt to up-regulate empathy)? Does the
common inference of "poor emotion regulation" when individuals display
problematic or disruptive behavior overextend the construct, limiting its use-
fulness? Rejecting this concern, Cooper, Flanagan, Talley, and Micheas (chap.
9) assert that adolescent risk-taking behavior (e.g., alcohol abuse and aspects
of sexual behavior) reflects an effort to regulate the quality of both positive
and negative emotional experience. In a similar way, Arsenio (chap. 5) pro-
poses a phenomenon of "happy victimization" as an indicator of poor emo-
tion regulation, arguing that such victimizing behavior reflects either a fail-
ure to experience empathy that inhibits aggression or a moral or emotional
deficit.
By bringing together in one volume scholars from diverse fields, one
gains an appreciation of the wide range of conceptualizations, definitions,
and measures of emotion regulation that exist across different contexts, ages,
and purposes, ranging from understanding the origins of individual differ-
ences in emotion regulation to teaching one member of a couple how to
relieve chronic pain experienced by his or her partner. We hope that the
opportunity this volume provides to understand how different disciplines are
approaching common issues in emotion regulation will lead to refined
conceptualizations and measures that will be valuable both from scientific
and clinical perspectives.
EMOTION REGULATION IN THE CONTEXT

OF FAMILIES AND CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS
Attention to the role of parenting in the socialization of children's

emotional competencies has a long history in child development. The au-
thors in this volume contribute to this rich tradition by delineating how
both specific parenting practices (see chaps. 6 and 7) and repetitive patterns
of family interaction (chaps. 8 and 13) are associated with children's abilities
to manage their emotions. Scholars from diverse backgrounds present con-
verging evidence that secure mental representations of parent-child and fam-
ily interactions may be responsible for some of the connections between family
interactions and children's emotion regulation. The authors in this volume
also "raise the bar" for research on how parenting socialization affects emo-
tions, from studies demonstrating bivariate associations among various
parenting behaviors and children's emotion-related skills to longitudinal stud-
ies testing causal pathways. Such designs are contributing greatly to our knowl-
edge and understanding of how children's emotion regulatory skills and abili-
ties both mediate and moderate the effects of parenting on children's social
competence. These studies also permit the testing of bidirectional causal path-
INTRODUCTION 7
ways between child and parent behaviors. Moreover, several research find-
ings reported in these chapters highlight the fact that parenting and emotion
regulation occur within a cultural context, and that links between parent
emotion-related socialization behaviors and children's social competencies
often differ across cultures.
Chapters in this volume also address the importance of emotion regula-
tion in close relationships. As several chapters highlight, poor or inadequate
emotion regulation at the intrapersonal level (i.e., within individuals) or the
interpersonal level (i.e., between relationship partners) might be one of the
primary grounds for relationship dissatisfaction and dissolution (see chaps.
2-4 and 11-12). Much more is currently known about how emotions are
regulated intrapersonally (within individuals) than interpersonally (between
individuals). Investigators are only beginning to propose and test dyadic
models specifying how the emotion regulation abilities, skills, and styles of
each relationship partner are related to important relationship outcomes ex-
perienced by one or both partners (e.g., perceptions of commitment, trust,
satisfaction, or relationship longevity). Recent models derived from attach-
ment theory, for example, suggest that having securely attached partners who
regulate their emotions in a constructive, problem-focused manner may buffer
even insecurely attached individuals from a host of negative interpersonal
outcomes (see chap. 4). Nevertheless, our knowledge and understanding of
when, how, and why certain individuals are proficient at managing their
emotions in the service of calming and soothing their distressed partners
whereas others are not remain surprisingly limited.
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS
Because poor emotion regulation is linked with impaired social, emo-

tional, and physical health across the life span, it is important to develop,
test, and disseminate interventions to improve individuals' abilities to man-
age their emotions. The authors in this volume offer considerable guidance
toward this effort. As Cummings and Keller (chap. 8) and others suggest,
emotion-relevant socialization behaviors constitute organized patterns of re-
sponding that both affect and are affected by relationship schemas and repre-
sentations. Thus, parent-focused interventions that extend beyond manag-
ing children's behavior to creating relationships characterized by warmth,
acceptance, and mutuality are likely to pay larger dividends in terms of im-
proving long-term child outcomes. Mikulincer et al. (chap. 4) report find-
ings suggesting that interventions that help people to access secure mental
representations in times of stress will increase their resiliency. The authors in
the third section of the volume report promising outcomes from emotion'
focused couples and family intervention research. For example, Keefe, Por-
ter, and Labban (chap. 10) present evidence that supports their intervention

targeting partner-assisted pain coping skills, which focuses on helping both
patients experiencing persistent pain and their partners regulate emotional
processes. Their intervention protocol involves training in both up-regulating
positive emotions as well as down-regulating negative ones. Fruzzetti and
Iverson (chap. 12) focus on a number of intrapersonal and interpersonal
emotion regulation skills important to couple and family functioning, par-
ticularly as these relate to more serious emotional difficulties or psychopa-
thology. Goldman and Greenberg's attention in chapter 11 to both process
and outcome variables in intervention research ensures the continued re-
finement of emotion-focused treatments for distressed couples. Moving to a
"whole family" approach, Fiese (chap. 13) reports findings indicating that
interventions that help families establish or maintain family routines may
enable families to better meet the demands of providing medical care to asth-
matic children.
PLAN OF THE BOOK
The book is organized into four major parts. The chapters in Part I
focus on cutting-edge theoretical and conceptual issues that are associated
with emotion regulation processes. Each chapter adopts a slightly different
theoretical stance toward understanding and explaining how individual dif-
ferences and normative aspects of emotion regulation are likely to operate,
both within individuals and between relationship partners. In chapter 1, for
example, Gross, Richards, and John provide an overview of a newly devel-
oped emotion regulation process model that specifies when and how positive
and negative emotions might be regulated, from before a discrete emotion is
experienced (antecedent-focused strategies) to well after it has been felt (re-
sponse-focused strategies). In the second chapter, Grewal, Brackett, and
Salovey showcase recent theoretical and empirical work on emotional intel-
ligence, a higher-level construct that subsumes emotion regulation processes.
In chapter 3, Pietromonaco, Feldman Barrett, and Powers adopt an attach-
ment theory perspective toward understanding and explaining emotion regu-
lation processes.
Chapters in Part II of the book explicate some of the basic empirical
linkages of family interactions and their mental representations with bio-
logical predispositions and individual differences in emotions and emotion
regulation. In chapter 4, Mikulincer, Shaver, and Horesh present empirical
evidence that indicates the way in which attachment processes are associ-
ated with individuals' responses to traumatic events and posttraumatic ad-
justment. Arsenio, in chapter 5, discusses how the lack of a mutually recipro-
cal, cooperative parent-child relationship may contribute to the phenomenon
of "happy victimization." Valiente and Eisenberg (chap. 6) and Parke,
McDowell, Cladis, and Leidy (chap. 7) present findings on connections be-
INTRODUCTION 9
tween parenting and children's emotional development. Rather than focus-
ing on the discrete strategies that parents use to influence their children's
emotion regulatory abilities, Cummings and Keller (chap. 8) move to the
representational level and test predictions from the emotional security hy-
pothesis. In chapter 9, Cooper, Flanagan, Talley, and Micheas propose that
risk-taking behaviors result from efforts to regulate the quality of both posi-
tive and negative emotional experiences.
The chapters in Part III center on how different aspects of individual
and relationship functioning can be targeted by different clinical treatments
and the specific mediating mechanisms that may underlie different interven-
tions. Keefe, Porter, and Labban (chap. 10) discuss the role of emotion regu-
lation processes within a broader biopsychosocial model, focusing on the
experience and management of chronic pain. Goldman and Greenberg (chap.
11) examine basic processes of emotional expressiveness and responsiveness,
including the ways in which expressiveness and responsiveness relate to couple
intimacy and distress. Fruzzetti and Iverson (chap. 12) accentuate the impor-
tance of understanding and intervening in emotion regulation processes in
couples and families, particularly when one member struggles with
dysregulated emotions. In chapter 13, Fiese moves beyond a dyadic emphasis
by adopting a "whole family" approach to examining emotion regulation in
family routines and rituals.
In Part IV of the book, we (the editors) explicate implications of previ-
ous chapters for couple- and family-based research and intervention. In do-
ing so, we offer several observations and recommendations regarding the most
critical conceptual, methodological, and application issues that emotion regu-
lation researchers will need to address and resolve in the future.
REFERENCES
Bridges, L. J., Denham, S. A., & Ganiban, J. M. (2004). Definitional issues in emo-
tion regulation research. Child Development, 75, 340-345.
Campos, J. J., Frankel, C. B., & Camras, L. (2004). On the nature of emotion regula-
tion. Child Development, 75, 377-394.
Cole, P. N., Martin, S. E., & Dennis, T. A. (2004). Emotion regulation as a scientific
construct: Methodological challenges and directions for child development re-
search. Child Development, 75, 317-333.

I
EMOTION REGULATION
THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES
EMOTION REGULATION
1
IN EVERYDAY LIFE
JAMES J. GROSS, JANE M. RICHARDS, AND OLIVER P. JOHN
Sometimes, our emotions lead us to do the oddest things. Grown men

pull over so they can brawl over which driver is the bigger idiot. Parents lose
their cool and bark hateful things at their children that they later regret.
Adolescents who were best friends before a jealous spat vow never to speak
again. And children throw tantrums as if on cue at the supermarket candy
display.
Moments such as these are reminders of the fundamental role that emo-
tion regulation plays in civilized life. Emotions can be helpful, providing
crucial information about the state of one's interactions with the world (Clore,
1994) or speeding one's responses in life-threatening situations (Frijda, 1986).
However, people frequently experience strong emotions that need to be man-
aged if they are to keep their appointments, careers, and friendships. Indeed,
successful emotion regulation is a prerequisite for adaptive functioning. To
get along with others, one must be able to regulate which emotions one has
and how one experiences and expresses these emotions.
Over the past 2 decades, emotion regulation has become the focus of
intense research activity in both child (e.g., Thompson, 1991) and adult
(e.g., Gross, 1998) literatures, as demonstrated by the chapters in this vol-
13
ume. What is not yet clear, however, is (a) how to best conceptualize the
potentially overwhelming array of emotion regulatory processes, and (b) how
people actually regulate their emotions in everyday life. In this chapter, we
first discuss how we are using the slippery terms "emotion" and "emotion
regulation." Next, we present a process model of emotion regulation and
review experimental and individual-difference data relevant to two impor-
tant forms of emotion regulation. Then, we examine the question of how
people regulate their emotions in everyday life, presenting new data from
studies that represent three major empirical approaches to this issue. We
conclude by considering what these findings might tell us about the larger
issues related to emotion regulation as it occurs in everyday life.
CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL,
AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Our starting point is a conception of emotion that is shared with a

number of prior theorists (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Frijda, 1986). According to
this conception, the emotion-generative process begins when an external or
internal event signals to the individual that something important may be at
stake. When attended to and evaluated in certain ways, these emotion cues
trigger a coordinated set of response tendencies that involve experiential,
behavioral, and central and peripheral physiological systems. Once these
emotion response tendencies arise, they may be modulated in various ways,
thereby shaping the individual's observable responses.
Emotion regulation refers to attempts individuals make to influence which
emotions they have, when they have them, and how these emotions are ex-
perienced and expressed. Such efforts may be relatively automatic or con-
trolled, conscious or unconscious. It has also been asserted (but not empiri-
cally demonstrated) that emotion regulation may involve the up- or
down-regulation of various aspects of negative or positive emotions (Parrott,
1993). Thus conceived, emotion regulation is one of several forms of affect
regulation, all of which involve attempts to alter some aspect of the interplay
between the individual and the environment that is coded by the individual
in a valenced (good or bad) manner. Emotion regulation may be distinguished
from three other forms of affect regulation: coping, mood regulation, and
psychological defenses (for a more detailed exposition of these differences,
see Gross, 1998).
Coping refers to the organism's efforts to manage its relations with an
environment that taxes its ability to respond (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).
Coping and emotion regulation overlap, but coping includes nonemotional
actions taken to achieve nonemotional goals (e.g., studying hard to pass an
important exam), whereas emotion regulation is concerned with emotions
in whatever context they may arise. Mood regulation refers to attempts to
]4 GROSS, RICHARDS, AND JOHN

alter a second important class of affective responses, which, compared with
emotions, are typically of longer duration and lesser intensity and are less
likely to involve responses to specific "objects" (Parkinson, Totterdell, Briner,
&. Reynolds, 1996). Thus, the focus in mood regulation research is typically
the activities people engage in to reduce negative mood states (e.g., running,
sleeping well). A third type of affect regulation is psychological defense, long a
focus of psychodynamic theorizing and research. As with coping, the domain
of psychological defenses overlaps with the domain of emotion regulation,
but defenses typically refer to relatively stable characteristics of an individual
that operate outside of awareness to decrease the subjective experience of
anxiety and other negative affect. Studies of emotion regulation, by contrast,
have as their focus the full range of emotions and consider both stable indi-
vidual differences and the basic processes that operate across individuals.
A PROCESS MODEL OF EMOTION REGULATION
If emotions are seen as involving a coordinated set of responses that

arise during an organism—environment interaction, emotion regulation strat-
egies may be differentiated along the timeline of the unfolding emotional
responses (Gross, 1998, 1999, 2001; John & Gross, 2004). That is, emotion
regulation strategies may be distinguished in terms of when they have their
primary impact on the emotion-generative process. We have proposed a pro-
cess model of emotion regulation that embodies this approach, shown in
Figure 1.1.
At the broadest level, this model distinguishes between antecedent-
focused and response-focused emotion regulation strategies. Antecedent-
focused strategies refer to things one does before the emotion response ten-
dencies have become fully activated and have changed one's behavior and
one's peripheral physiological responding. The goal of such antecedent-fo-
cused strategies is the modification of future emotional responses. For ex-
ample, on hearing a noxious comment from an acquaintance, one might
cognitively reevaluate the comment (e.g., as a sign of insecurity) and thereby
alter the entire emotion trajectory, feeling pity for the acquaintance rather
than anger. By contrast, response-focused strategies refer to things one does
once an emotion is already underway, after the response tendencies have
already been generated. The focus of such response-focused strategies is the
management of existing emotions. For example, one might try to appear
unfazed by a noxious comment despite underlying feelings of anger.
As shown in Figure 1.1, five families of more specific strategies can be
located along the timeline of the emotion process (Gross, 1998, 2001). Situ-
ation selection, denoted in Figure 1.1 by the solid line toward one situation
(SI) rather than another (S2), refers to approaching or avoiding certain
people, places, or activities so as to regulate emotion. Once a situation is
EMOTION REG L/LATJON IN EVERYDAY LIFE J5

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selected (e.g., SI), situation modification acts on it so as to modify its emo-
tional impact, creating different situations (Six, Sly, or Slz in the figure).
Third, situations have many different aspects (e.g., al, a2), and attentional
deployment can be used to pick which aspects to focus on. Once one is focused
on a particular aspect of the situation, cognitive change constructs one of the
many possible meanings (e.g., ml, m2, m3) that may be attached to that
aspect. Finally, response modulation refers to attempts to influence emotion
response tendencies once they already have been elicited. Response modula-
tion is illustrated in Figure 1.1 by decreasing (-) rather than increasing (+)
expressive behavior but may also involve altering experience or physiology.
TWO SPECIFIC STRATEGIES:

COGNITIVE REAPPRAISAL AND EXPRESSIVE SUPPRESSION
Rather than studying all types of emotion regulation at once, our re-
search strategy has been to focus on a smaller number of well-defined strate-
gies. We considered three factors when selecting which strategies to study:
(a) strategies should be used commonly in everyday life; (b) strategies should
lend themselves to both experimental manipulation and individual-difference
analyses; and (c) because the distinction between antecedent-focused and
response-focused strategies is so central to our model, we wanted to include
one exemplar of each in our studies. Two specific strategies met these crite-
ria: cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression.
Cognitive reappraisal is a form of cognitive change that involves con-
struing a potentially emotion-eliciting situation in a way that changes its
emotional impact. This form of emotion regulation was the subject of early
work by Lazarus and colleagues, who showed that leading participants to view
a potentially upsetting surgical procedure in more analytical and detached
terms decreased their subjective and physiological responses (Lazarus & Alfert,
1964). Cognitive reappraisal also was implicated in Mischel's early work on
delay of gratification, which showed that leading children to think about
food treats in ways that made them more abstract (e.g., putting a mental
"picture frame" around a cookie) decreased children's impulse to eat the
cookie, allowing them to obtain a preferred but delayed reward (Mischel &
Moore, 1973).
Expressive suppression is a form of response modulation that involves
inhibiting ongoing emotion-expressive behavior (Gross & Levenson, 1993).
It has been observed repeatedly that outwardly inexpressive individuals are
often more physiologically responsive than their more expressive counter-
parts (e.g., Jones, 1950). Along similar lines, behavioral inhibition associ-
ated with interpersonal deception leads to heightened physiological responses
(DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 1996). Until recently, how-
ever, few studies have experimentally manipulated expressive suppression
EMOTION REG ULATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE J7

and observed how suppression actually affects the components of the unfold-
ing emotional response.
AFFECTIVE, COGNITIVE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

OF REAPPRAISAL AND SUPPRESSION
Because reappraisal occurs early in the emotion-generative process, we

hypothesized that it should be able to modify the entire emotional sequence
before emotion response tendencies have been fully generated. This suggests
that reappraisal may lead to reductions in negative emotion experience and
expression, require relatively few additional cognitive resources to imple-
ment, and produce interpersonal behavior that is appropriately focused on
the interaction partner and is perceived by such partners as emotionally en-
gaging and responsive. Suppression, by contrast, comes relatively late in the
emotion-generative process and primarily modifies the behavioral aspect of
the emotion response tendencies, without reducing the experience of nega-
tive emotion. Because suppression comes late in the emotion-generative pro-
cess, it requires the individual to effortfully manage emotion response ten-
dencies as they continually arise. These repeated efforts should consume
cognitive resources that could otherwise be used for optimal performance in
the social contexts in which the emotions arise. Moreover, suppression may
create a sense of discrepancy between inner experience and outer expression,
leading to feelings of inauthenticity and impeding the development of emo-
tionally close relationships.
In a series of experimental and individual-difference studies, we have
tested these hypotheses regarding the affective, cognitive, and social conse-
quences of reappraisal and suppression (for a review of these studies, see Gross,
2002; Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004). Across experiments, we
have found that reappraisal effectively decreases emotion experience and
expressive behavior in negative-emotion-eliciting contexts, and it does so
without appreciable cognitive, physiological, or interpersonal costs. In indi-
vidual-difference studies, we have found evidence that individuals who make
more frequent use of reappraisal show enhanced functioning in the domains
of emotion and interpersonal functioning, without any detectable cognitive
or social costs.
Suppression, by contrast, is effective in down-regulating expressive be-
havior but fails to provide subjective relief in the context of negative emo-
tions. Moreover, suppression has substantial physiological and cognitive costs.
Specifically, experiments show that suppression leads to increased sympa-
thetic activation of the cardiovascular system, worse memory for social infor-
mation such as names or facts about individuals seen on slides (Richards &
Gross, 2000), and social interactions that are less satisfying for both suppres-

sors and their interaction partners (Butler et al., 2003). Over the longer term,
individuals who make more frequent use of suppression show worse function-
ing in emotional, interpersonal, and well-being domains. In addition, sup-
pressors show worse memory for conversations, as well as for emotion-eliciting
events previously described in a daily diary.
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS:
EMOTION REGULATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE
These studies demonstrate the divergent impact of differing forms of

emotion regulation such as reappraisal and suppression. Now what is needed
is a broader understanding of when and how individuals actually regulate
their emotions in everyday life. A number of pressing questions need to be
addressed. First, which emotions are actually the target of regulation? Intu-
itively, negative emotions such as anger seem likely candidates. Parrott (1993)
has suggested that positive emotions also are regulated, although the evi-
dence for this proposition is not yet in. Second, given that emotions have
many aspects (e.g., behavioral, experiential, physiological), which aspects
are typically targeted? Hedonic accounts suggest that people generally want
to feel good, not bad. These accounts suggest that people want to change the
inner experience of emotion. Ekman's (1972) notion of "display rules" high-
lights another important target for regulation, namely expressive behavior.
Third, what strategies are actually used to regulate emotion in everyday life?
We have focused on two particular forms of regulation, but we do not yet know
how frequently these and related strategies are used in everyday life. To illus-
trate how such questions might be addressed, we describe recent work that
represents three complementary approaches to studying emotion regulation.
Approach 1: The Semistructured Interview
One approach to studying emotion regulation is to ask people about

their emotion regulatory efforts. To illustrate this approach, we present a
study based on semistructured interviews in which young adults described a
time in the past 2 weeks when they regulated their emotions. This approach
is attractive for several reasons. First, although emotion regulation includes
nonconscious aspects, its conscious aspects are salient and important (Gross,
1999), and an interview format provides insight into people's regulatory goals
and activities. Second, using a relatively recent time frame makes it possible
to capture events while they are still fresh. Third, a semistructured interview
format permits participants to describe events in their own words but also
makes it possible to cover roughly the same ground with each participant.
Our questions were as follows:
EMOTION REGULATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 19

1. Would each participant recall an emotion regulatory episode ?
2. If so, which emotions would be selected for regulation?
3. Which aspects of these emotions would be targeted, and would
participants be trying to up- or down-regulate?
4. Which emotion regulation strategies would be used?
5. Would these emotion regulatory efforts vary by social con-
text?
To answer these questions, we interviewed 91 participants (70 women),

using the following prompt:
I would like you to think of a time in the past week or two when you tried
to alter your emotions. Go ahead and take a few moments to think of a
time when you tried to alter your emotions. When you're ready, I'd like
you to describe this time to me in as much detail as you can.
Participants were videotaped as they described the episode in their own words.
Interviews typically lasted about 15 minutes. Prompts were used as needed to
ensure that our core questions were answered.
Transcripts of the interviews were coded independently by two trained
raters. Coding categories included (a) the primary target emotion (e.g., an-
ger, amusement); (b) the response system primarily targeted (e.g., behav-
ioral, experiential, physiological) and the direction of regulation (up- or down-
regulation); and (c) the strategy used. In addition, coders rated the social
context (social or nonsocial), and, for social emotion regulation episodes,
coders indicated who was with the participant (e.g., stranger, friend). Target
emotions were subsequently coded independently by the first two authors. In
a first step, the 35 target emotions collectively generated by the participants
were combined into 24 distinct emotions by combining highly overlapping
terms (e.g., anger included "mad," "irritated," and "angry"). In a second step,
emotions were coded as negatively valenced, positively valenced, or neither.
Our first question was whether participants would be able to describe
recent emotion regulation episodes. Indeed, we found that all of our 91 par-
ticipants were able to describe a time in the past 2 weeks when they had tried
to regulate their emotions.
Regulation Episodes and Target Emotions

The episodes described by participants varied substantially. Some par-
ticipants described episodes in which they changed their thinking to decrease
negative emotion:
Yesterday I was life guarding... a n d . . . I fell into the pool wearing all my
clothes... [I] could've gotten really mad but I just decided to laugh it off
... I suppose [I] altered my anger into amusement. [I was trying to change]
my response to the situation. Changing my outlook on what happened
throughout the day when I could've been angry about everything. But I

decided to laugh about it—just kind of blow it off. So basically I thought
about it and put it in perspective.
Other participants described episodes involving positive emotions. For
example, one participant concentrated his efforts on changing his expressive
behavior:
We had a paper that was given back in my class and my roommate actu-
ally is in that class also. And we got very conflicting grades. He got a very
bad grade, and I got a very good grade. . . I didn't work very hard on this
paper, so ... I was surprised. My roommate actually did some work and
didn't get a good grade, so he was very, very down about it. So I kind of
had to cover my emotions. Instead of acting happy and surprised, I ...
had to kind of cover up—I was very happy inside, but at the same time,
I didn't want to show up my roommate because he's my friend too. So I
kind of put on my depressed face and you know, my academic sad face
and said, "Oh well, I didn't do well either." I guess I was trying to [change]
my expressions on my face more than anything.
Across the 91 respondents' regulation episodes, 24 types of emotion
were represented. The three most common were anger (23%), sadness (22%),
and anxiety (10%). Together, these accounted for more than half of the
emotion regulation episodes. The majority of the episodes described con-
cerned negative emotions (81%). However, as predicted by Parrott (1993),
there were also instances of regulating positive emotions (9%), including
three instances of regulating happiness, two instances each of regulating ro-
mantic attraction and excitement, and one of regulating interest, as well as a
number of episodes involving the regulation of less clearly valenced emo-
tional states (10%), with two instances each of regulating surprise, tiredness,
and apathy, as well as one instance each of boredom, confusion, and shock.
Emotion Response Systems and the Direction of Regulation

Emotions involve changes across multiple systems, including behav-
ioral, experiential, and physiological response systems (Lang, Greenwald,
Bradley, & Hamm, 1993). It is not clear, however, which aspects of the emo-
tional response people typically regulate. Our findings show that regulation
efforts focused almost equally on expressive behavior and subjective experi-
ence. Forty-eight percent of episodes involved changes to expressive behav-
ior (37% involved nonverbal behavior alone, 1% involved verbal behavior
alone, and 10% involved changes to both nonverbal and verbal behavior).
Fifty-three percent of episodes involved changes to subjective experience.
Only 2% of episodes involved changes to physiological responses. These per-
centages total more than 100% because some episodes involved changes to
more than one response system. In terms of the direction of change, all but
one instance of emotion regulation (which involved behavioral regulation)
primarily involved emotion down-regulation.
EMOTION REG ULATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21

Emotion Regulation Strategies
Our process model of emotion regulation (Figure 1.1) suggests that
emotion regulatory processes can be categorized on the basis of when a given
emotion regulation strategy has its primary impact on the emotion-generative
process (Gross, 2001). Within the broader rubric of antecedent-focused and
response-focused emotion regulation we have argued that five more specific
families of emotion regulation strategies may be discerned.
How frequently are these five emotion regulation strategies used in ev-
eryday life? We found that whereas situation selection and situation modifi-
cation were rare, each represented by only one exemplar, the other three
types of regulation were much more common. Attention deployment was
used in 39% of episodes. Cognitive change was used in 33% of episodes, and
a full 83% of these involved cognitive reappraisal (25/30), including the first
example given earlier. Finally, response modulation was used in 53% of epi-
sodes, and 40% of these (19/48) involved expressive suppression, including
the second example given earlier. Although situation selection and modifi-
cation may be less prototypic, or may occur outside of awareness, these find-
ings nonetheless provide strong evidence for the common use of three major
families of emotion regulation strategies (attentional deployment, cognitive
change, response modulation) in everyday life.
Social Context
Emotion researchers have long emphasized the social embeddedness of
emotional responding (Scherer, Summerfield, & Wallbott, 1983). Consis-
tent with this view, we found that 98% of the emotion regulation episodes
took place in the presence of other people, and in only 2% of episodes were
the respondents clearly alone. Furthermore, episodes that occurred in a so-
cial context appeared to follow a "closeness gradient." Regulation episodes
that were described by participants in the interviews most commonly in-
volved friends (19%), romantic interests (14%), roommates (11%), or fam-
ily members (10%), and were least likely to involve mere acquaintances (3%)
or disliked others (2%).
Approach 2: The Survey
The interview data derived from our first approach suggest that emo-
tion regulation in everyday life predominantly involves negative emotions
(e.g., anger, anxiety, sadness), whose behavioral and experiential aspects
participants try to down-regulate. However, there were also instances of the
up-regulation of emotion and the regulation of positive emotion. The rich-
ness of the emotion regulation episodes captured by these interviews suggests
the need to cast a very broad net indeed when examining emotion regulation
in everyday life, even when one focuses—as we have done here—primarily
on consciously accessible emotion regulation processes.

One limitation of our interview-based approach, however, is that we
did not standardize the emotions we asked participants to consider when
selecting their emotion regulation episode. A second limitation is that we
cannot be sure how representative these episodes are, given that our strategy
was to ask participants to describe the most salient episode of emotion regu-
lation during the past 2 weeks. A third limitation of the interview-based
approach is that it typically limits samples to relatively small sizes. Because
conducting, transcribing, and coding interviews is terribly time-consuming,
interview-based studies often use such small samples that robust tests of group
differences (e.g., sex, ethnicity) are not possible.
To address these issues, we next used survey methods to present a stan-
dardized set of potential targets of emotion regulation to 500 undergraduates
(305 women) in a mixed-ethnic sample (4% African American, 35% Asian
American, 39% Caucasian, 13% Latino, and 9% other). We asked partici-
pants to describe not a single emotion regulation episode, but rather if and
how they generally regulate the experience and expression of 15 discrete
emotions in everyday life. Finally, we examined the role played by sex,
ethnicity, and social context.
To assess frequency of emotion regulation, we asked participants how
frequently they regulated their emotions each week: "At times, people try to
alter their emotions by influencing which emotions they have, when they
have them, or how these emotions are experienced or expressed. How often
do you try to alter your emotions (number of times per week)?"
To examine the role of social context, we asked participants how fre-
quently they regulated emotion in each of four types of social contexts: "With
people I don't know," "With friends," "With family," and "When I'm by
myself," rated on a scale where 1 = Not at all, 2 = A little bit, 3 = Sometimes, 4
= Most of the time, and 5 = All of the time.
To determine the valence of the emotion being regulated, we asked
participants whether they tried to regulate positive or negative emotions more
frequently. Specifically, we asked: "Which do you try to alter more often,
positive or negative emotions?"
Given our interest in the use of reappraisal and suppression, we asked
participants how much they used these strategies in the past 2 weeks on a
scale where 1 = Not at all and 7 = A great deal. The following definitions were
offered: Reappraisal is
when you try to think about a situation differently to change your emo-
tions. An example of reappraising is recalling that air travel is statisti-
cally safer than driving to reduce your anxiety about being on an air-
plane. Another example is thinking that a friend's weak compliment is
probably the nicest thing he's ever said to anyone.
Suppression is
when you try not to show on the outside an emotion you feel on the inside.
An example ... is biting your tongue and not letting your feelings show

when someone insults you. Another example is concealing your happiness
with a "poker face" after being dealt an unbeatable hand of cards.
For both reappraisal and suppression, separate ratings were made for "nega-
tive emotions" and "positive emotions."
We also wished to learn about the specific emotions that were being
regulated and which of the components (experience and expression) of each
emotion was targeted for regulation. We did this by asking: "To what extent
do you generally try to alter the experience of the following emotions?" This
was followed by a list of the 15 emotions. Then participants were asked "To
what extent do you generally try to alter the expression of the following
emotions?" This was followed by the same 15 emotions presented in a differ-
ent order. Both the regulate-experience and regulate-expression items were
rated on 7-point scales (0 = Not at all to 6 = A great deal). We focused on
these two aspects of emotional responding (experience and expression) be-
cause our first approach had previously shown that these two components
were overwhelmingly favored as targets for emotion regulation.
Frequency of Emotion Regulation
How frequently did participants report regulating their emotions? The
mean frequency of emotion regulation was 6.6 times per week, that is, almost
once a day. However, there was considerable variability in responses, as re-
flected in a standard deviation of 12.5, and a range of 0 to 100. Nonetheless,
most participants reported at least some use of emotion regulation; only 4%
of participants reported that they did not regulate their emotions at all (regu-
lation of 0 times per week). Given this substantial variability, we also com-
puted measures of central tendency less sensitive to outliers, including the
5% trimmed mean (4.6 times per week) and the median (3.5 per week).
Social Context for Regulating Emotion
We found that the frequency of emotion regulation varied by context,
with frequency ratings of 3.1 for strangers, 2.5 for friends, 2.3 for family, and
1.7 for alone. One noteworthy finding is that these survey data indicated
that emotion regulation was more frequent with strangers than with better-
known partners. This finding is at odds with the "closeness gradient" de-
scribed in the interview approach, which found that emotion regulation epi-
sodes were more likely to be reported in the context of close relationships
than in more distant relationships. One possible explanation for this discrep-
ancy is that emotions may be more frequent and intense in close than in
distant relationships, leading to a larger absolute number of effortful and sa-
lient regulation episodes in close than distant relationships (interview ap-
proach). However, when expressed as a fraction of the total number of emo-
tions experienced, as in the survey approach, emotion regulation may be
more likely to occur in distant than in close relationships.

Valence of the Emotion Being Regulated
We expected participants to regulate negative emotions more frequently
than positive emotions. Indeed, 84% of participants said they tried to alter
negative emotions more frequently than positive emotions, and only 16%
indicated greater regulation of positive emotions.
Use of Reappraisal and Suppression

Both reappraisal and suppression were used quite frequently, with mean
ratings of 3.8 for each. Consistent with participants' general reports of greater
regulation of negative than positive emotions, negative regulation was more
frequent than positive regulation for both reappraisal (M negative reappraisal
= 4.2, M positive = 3.3) and for suppression (M negative suppression = 4.6,
M positive = 3.0).
Specific Emotions Being Regulated, Separately for Experience and Expression

Participants indicated the extent to which they regulated the experi-
ence and expression of 15 specific emotions. Table 1.1 shows the mean rat-
ings of control of experience and Table 1.2 shows the means for expression.
The most striking finding was the difference between negative and positive
emotions: Even the most-regulated positive emotion (pride) was regulated to
a lesser extent than the least-regulated negative emotion (disgust). A second
finding is that the survey approach replicated the results of the interview
approach for the specific emotions most often targeted for regulation. The
top five regulated emotions were sadness, anger, embarrassment, anxiety, and
fear. Among the positive emotions, the two most regulated were pride and
love. A third noteworthy finding is how closely ratings of regulating emotion
experience and emotion expression traveled together. Mean levels of control
of experience and control of expression differed in only 2 of 15 instances,
with expressive behavior being regulated more tightly than experience in
each case.
Group Differences: Sex and Ethnicity

Sex and ethnicity are both factors that have been associated with dif-
ferences in emotional responding in prior research (Gross & John, 2003). To
examine the impact of ethnicity on emotion regulation, we selected the two
largest ethnic groups (Asian American and European American) and revis-
ited each of the aspects of emotion regulation described in the previous
section.
We found no effect of sex or ethnicity for overall frequency of emotion
regulation. With respect to the social context for regulating emotion, we
found that with strangers, Asian Americans (M = 3.0, SD = 1.4) reported
levels of emotion regulation similar to those reported by European Ameri-
cans (M = 3.2, SD = 1.1). For the other three social contexts, however, Asian

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Americans reported significantly greater emotion regulation than European
Americans with friends (M = 2.7, SD = 1.1 vs. 2.3, SD = 0.9), family (M =
2.6, SD = 1.1 vs. M = 2.1, SD = 1.0), and alone (M = 1.9, SD = 1.3 vs. M =
1.5, SD = 0.8). There were no sex effects.
We also considered whether sex and ethnicity affected the valence of
the emotion being regulated. We found no sex differences: 82% of men and
85% of women reported controlling negative emotions to a greater extent
than positive emotions. However, we did find ethnic differences: 90% of
European Americans reported controlling negative emotions more than posi-
tive emotions, whereas only 76% of Asian American participants did so.
That is, only 10% of European Americans reported controlling positive emo-
tions more than negative emotions, versus 24% of Asian Americans. In terms
of the specific emotion regulation strategies that participants used, we found
no sex differences, but Asian Americans did make greater use of suppression
(3.3) than European Americans (2.7) for positive emotions.
For control of emotion experience, Asian Americans reported signifi-
cantly greater control of five of the six positive emotions (all except pride,
which still showed the same trend toward relatively greater control by Asian
Americans). There were no ethnic differences for the negative emotions. As
shown in Table 1.1, there was only one sex difference: Women reported less
control of amusement experience than men. For control of emotion expres-
sion, ethnic effects paralleled those found in the experience domain: Asian
Americans again reported greater control of five of the six positive emotions
(all except pride, which, as with emotion experience, showed the same trend
toward greater control by Asian Americans). There were no ethnic differ-
ences for the negative emotions. As shown in Table 1.2, sex differences were
more pronounced: Women reported less control of amusement expression
than men, but greater control of anger, contempt, and sadness expression.
This general pattern of women exerting less control over positive emotions
than men is born out by the significant difference in mean control of positive
emotion, which is 2.1 for women and 2.4 for men. The tendency for women
to report more control of negative emotions than men was not significant,
reflected in an overall mean difference of 3.2 for women and 3.0 for men.
Approach 3: The Laboratory Experiment
Our survey approach suggested that in everyday life Asian Americans

regulate positive emotions to a greater degree than European Americans.
These findings jibe nicely with previous research (Tsai, Chentsova-Dutton,
Freire-Bebeau, & Przymus, 2002) showing that Asian Americans express less
positive emotion than do European Americans. Given that Asian Ameri-
cans seem to regulate their positive emotions more frequently than European
Americans (e.g., by hiding their positive emotion-expressive behavior), we
might expect Asian Americans to show a practice effect when asked to sup-

press their emotion-expressive behavior under controlled conditions. By dint
of their prior accumulated experience with suppressing positive emotions,
Asian Americans should find it less difficult to inhibit positive emotions
than European Americans. Given that ethnic differences seem to be evident
only for positive emotions, no such differences in emotion regulation diffi-
culty should emerge in other emotional contexts (e.g., in negative or neutral
emotional contexts).
To test this hypothesis, an experimental approach is needed. To illus-
trate this method, we present secondary analyses of a data set examined ear-
lier by Gross and Levenson (1997), focusing on a subset of 127 women who
were either European American (58) or Asian American (69). In this study,
participants had watched films drawn from a set of standardized film stimuli
(Gross & Levenson, 1995) in individual experimental sessions. One film
elicited a relatively neutral affective state, whereas the other films elicited
either amusement (a stand-up comedy routine) or sadness (a funeral scene).
Of interest here is the viewing condition, in which participants had been
told to "watch the film carefully" and also told "if you have any feelings as
you watch the film clip, please try your best not to let those feelings show"
(the Suppression condition). After each film, participants rated how diffi-
cult it had been to suppress their behavioral responses: "On a scale from 1 to
10, where 1 is not at all difficult and 10 is very difficult, how difficult was it for
you to hide your feelings during the film clip you just saw?"
Using these suppression difficulty ratings, we now tested whether, rela-
tive to European American participants, Asian Americans would find it easier
to suppress their emotions during a positive-emotion-eliciting film, but not
in the negative or neutral film contexts (reflecting a practice effect due to
prior experience suppressing positive emotions). As predicted, we found that
for the positive film, Asian Americans indeed reported less difficulty (M =
6.0, SD = 3.1) than European Americans (M = 8.0, SD = 2.0). It is important
to note that this effect of ethnicity was specific to the positive emotion con-
dition: There were no ethnic differences for either the Neutral film (M = 2.6,
SD = 2.4 vs. M = 2.8, SD = 2.3), or the Sadness film (M = 4.0, SD = 2.9 vs. M
= 4.9, SD = 2.8). These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that ev-
eryday practice in regulating positive emotion makes it easier for Asian
Americans to regulate a positive emotion such as amusement when called on
to do so in a specific situation.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Considered together, these three studies illustrate how multiple meth-

ods (interview, survey, and experiment) are needed to achieve a more com-
plete understanding of emotion regulation. Our findings converged in show-
ing that in general people try to regulate negative emotions (especially anger,

sadness, and anxiety) much more frequently than positive emotions, with a
particular focus on regulating both experiential and behavioral, but not physi-
ological, aspects of emotion. Although a large number of emotion regulation
strategies may be discerned, two of the most common ones are cognitive
reappraisal and expressive suppression. Results from these three studies also
showed that emotion regulation efforts vary by context (occurring more fre-
quently in close than distant relationship contexts) and by ethnicity (with
greater regulation of positive emotions in Asian Americans than European
Americans). Although these studies represent an initial step toward eluci-
dating the ways emotions are regulated by young adults in everyday life, they
nonetheless have several limitations. In the sections that follow, we consider
these limitations and suggest directions for future research and implications
for policy.
Implications for Health and Dysfunction
One notable limitation of the present studies is that we asked partici-

pants to recall a single recent emotion regulation episode (Approach 1), to
make general ratings concerning their typical emotion regulation (Approach
2), or to regulate on command in a specific laboratory context (Approach 3).
One direction for future research will be to use other methods to better char-
acterize emotion regulation in everyday life. This will make it possible to
address the important question of what health implications chronic use of
particular emotion regulation strategies might have. In a series of individual-
difference studies (Gross &. John, 2003), we have begun to link use of reap-
praisal and suppression to various indicators of health and dysfunction, in-
cluding emotion, social support, depression, life satisfaction, and well-being.
Our findings suggest that everyday use of reappraisal is related to greater
experience of positive emotion and lesser experience of negative emotion.
Reappraisers also have closer relationships with their friends and are better
liked than individuals using reappraisal less frequently. In terms of maladap-
tive symptoms, individuals who habitually use reappraisal show fewer symp-
toms of depression. They are also more satisfied with their lives and more
optimistic. In terms of Ryffs (1989) domains of psychological health,
reappraisers have higher levels of environmental mastery, personal growth,
and self-acceptance, a clearer purpose in life, a greater sense of autonomy,
and better relations with others.
By contrast, everyday use of suppression is related to lesser experience
of positive emotion and greater experience of negative emotion. These el-
evations in negative emotion appear to be due to suppressors' greater feelings
of inauthenticity. Greater use of suppression is also linked to lesser social
support in general, and to lesser emotional support in particular. In terms of
symptoms, suppression is related to elevated levels of depressive symptoms.
Suppressors have lower levels of satisfaction and well-being, as one would

expect from their keen awareness of their inauthenticity, less life satisfac-
tion, and a less optimistic attitude about the future, consistent with their
avoidance and lack of close social relationships and support. In terms of Ryff s
(1989) six domains of psychological health, suppressors showed lower levels
of well'being across the board, with the biggest effect for positive relations
with others. Overall, this pattern of findings shows that the use of reappraisal
is associated with multiple indicators of healthy functioning, and that the
use of suppression is associated with multiple indicators of unhealthy func-
tioning. What is needed now, however, are prospective studies in which ini-
tial patterns in emotion regulation use predict subsequent functioning across
multiple life domains.
Development: Stability and Change
A second important direction for future research is to examine stability

and change in emotion regulation processes. There is growing evidence that
emotion regulation varies over the course of childhood (e.g., Eisenberg &.
Morris, 2002) and adulthood (e.g., John & Gross, 2004), and that there are
both individual and group differences (e.g., Gross & John, 2003; Tsai et al.,
2002) in emotion regulation. The present studies focused on normative varia-
tion in emotion regulation in a particular age group, namely college-aged
adults. However, our work on individual differences suggests that, even within
the normal range of functioning, individuals vary greatly in how much they
use emotion regulation strategies such as reappraisal and suppression.
Thus, although we sometimes summarize our findings by referring to
"reappraisers" and "suppressors," we do not conceive of these patterns of typical
emotion regulation as fixed. Indeed, in our college samples, the 3-month
test—retest stability of reappraisal and suppression is about .70 (Gross & John,
2003), which suggests substantial room for change, especially over longer
periods of time. If nothing else, increasing life experience and wisdom re-
garding the relative costs and benefits of different forms of emotion regula-
tion suggest that changes will take place with age (Gross & John, 2002). In
particular, as individuals mature and gain life experience, they might in-
creasingly learn to make greater use of healthy emotion regulation strategies
(such as reappraisal) and lesser use of less healthy emotion regulation strate-
gies (such as suppression).
This speculation is broadly consistent with the fact that emotionally,
older individuals fare surprisingly well in later years, despite a host of unde-
sirable changes to physical health and social networks (Carstensen, Gross, &
Fung, 1998). This hypothesis is also consistent with data that suggest that
relative to younger adults, older adults report considerably less negative emo-
tion (e.g., Helson & Klohnen, 1998), and with cross-sectional research show-
ing that older individuals report greater emotional control than younger adults
(Gross etal., 1997).

In a recent test of the idea that there is a normative shift toward healthier
emotion regulation in later adulthood, we used retrospective and cross-
sectional designs to examine individual differences in reappraisal and sup-
pression (John & Gross, 2004). Using a retrospective design, the same older
adults rated their use of reappraisal and suppression twice, once with respect
to how they were now (early 60s), and once with respect to how they had
been in their early 20s. We found that use of reappraisal increased from the
20s to the 60s, whereas use of suppression decreased from the 20s to the 60s.
Using a cross-sectional design, we replicated these effects by comparing use
of reappraisal and suppression in this older-adult sample to that of individu-
als now in their 20s. Here, too, we found that compared with younger partici-
pants, older participants reported greater use of reappraisal and lesser use of
suppression. Together, these findings are consistent with the idea that, with
age, individuals make increasing use of reappraisal as an emotion regulation
strategy and decreasing use of suppression; that is, they show an increasingly
healthy pattern of emotion regulation. What is needed now are longitudinal
studies in which emotion regulation use is assessed at multiple time points
using the same instruments.
Interventions and Policy Implications

A third important direction is applying our emerging understanding of
emotion regulation to relieve existing human suffering (Gross & Munoz,
1995). For it is one thing to make the claim that many forms of psychopa-
thology are characterized by emotion dysregulation, and quite another thing
to actually work out the precise nature of the deficits (Rottenberg & Gross,
2003). The challenge is to describe how these conditions develop, clarify the
underlying mechanisms, and use this knowledge to fashion better interven-
tions to help those in need of assistance.
In particular, if natural changes in typical use of different emotion regu-
lation strategies can be documented in adulthood, then we ought to be able
to harness these same change processes in targeted interventions. One cru-
cial early point of intervention may be influencing how parents shape their
children's early emotion regulation. For example, parents differ in their meta-
emotion philosophies, defined as "an organized set of feelings and thoughts
about one's own emotions and one's children's emotions" (Gottman, Katz,
& Hooven, 1996, p. 243). The emotion-coaching philosophy is held by par-
ents who attend to and positively evaluate emotions, and discuss explicitly
with their children how to best manage one's emotions. This parental phi-
losophy, we predict, should encourage children to rely more on reappraisal to
regulate their emotions. The dismissing philosophy, by contrast, is held by
parents who view emotions as dangerous and focus on avoiding and minimiz-
ing them. Here we suggest a link to using suppression as the habitual regula-
tion strategy. The finding that emotion coaching by parents was related to

children showing less stress during emotionally challenging situations is con-
sistent with our findings regarding the well-being and health consequences
of using reappraisal rather than suppression (Gottman et al., 1996).
In the context of our studies of young adults, we have found that for
many young adults, thinking explicitly about their own emotion regulation
goals and the strategies they use to achieve these goals was a novel experi-
ence. This observation suggests that one simple form of preventive inter-
vention would be to increase awareness and offer information about emo-
tion regulation, for example, using contemporary research on emotion
regulation to inform and enrich curricula in high school and college that
typically do not include information on emotion and emotion regulation.
Analogous to Writing 101, Mathematics 101, and Psychology 101, it may
be time to offer Emotion 101—an introductory course on the nature and
regulation of emotion.
Individuals who are at elevated risk for undesirable well-being and health
outcomes might benefit from targeted emotion regulation intervention stud-
ies. For example, interventions could be designed that teach individuals to
increase their use of reappraisal or decrease their reliance on suppression.
Such interventions could be modeled after a study (Giese-Davis et al., 2002)
that randomly assigned breast cancer patients to either a control group or a
group that encouraged the expression of emotions and then followed pa-
tients to assess subsequent outcomes. Through such interventions—whether
during early childhood in the family, during later childhood or adulthood at
school, or in support groups at the clinic—it may be possible to shape indi-
viduals' emotion regulatory tendencies in ways that powerfully and benefi-
cially affect their subsequent mental and physical health.
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2
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND
THE SELF-REGULATION OF AFFECT
DAISY GREWAL, MARC BRACKET!, AND PETER SALOVEY
Western psychology places enormous value on the ability to control

one's emotions. Stacks of self-help books published each year offer tips and
strategies on how to manage one's emotional reactions and accompanying
behaviors in a variety of situations. People clearly believe that managing
emotions has direct implications for the quality of their lives, especially
through the impact that emotion regulation has on relationships with oth-
ers. Emotions researchers ask many questions regarding the ability of indi-
viduals to regulate emotion and how it affects important life outcomes. Are
there "better" and "worse" ways of handling one's emotions? And if so, can
we teach people about better ways to handle their own emotions? These are
the questions we attempt to answer in this chapter with the aid of empirical
work within the framework of emotional intelligence.
To explore these questions, we first trace the historical trends that led
to changing views about the role of emotions and the development of the
Preparation of this chapter was supported by grants to Peter Salovey from the National Cancer Institute
(R01-CA68427), the National Institute of Mental Health (P01-MH/DA56826), the National Institute
of Drug Abuse (P50-DA13334), and the Donaghue Women's Health Investigator Program at Yale. We
wish to thank Eric Uhlmann for his helpful comments on earlier drafts of this chapter.
37
concept of emotional intelligence. We then discuss how the ability to regu-
late one's emotions effectively fits in with the profile of an emotionally intel-
ligent person. We then report on current knowledge regarding the measure-
ment of emotional intelligence and how findings thus far support the idea
that the skills linked to emotional intelligence are directly associated with
positive social interaction and well-being. We also discuss how, conversely,
the absence of such skills can result in negative outcomes. Finally, we discuss
the social implications of these findings and offer ideas for programs that may
help increase emotional intelligence in both children and adults, and within
families.
The concept of emotional intelligence represents the convergence of

two historical trends in psychology: changing views about the functional "ra-
tionality" of emotions, including their role in cognitive processes, and chang-
ing definitions of what abilities constitute "intelligence." A dichotomy be-
tween emotion and reason can be traced back to ancient Greece, where Stoic
philosophers espoused the idea that emotions interfere with rational thought.
Such a view continued to exert an influence in psychology as evidenced by
early researchers who believed that emotions have the potential to interfere
with desirable thought processes (Shaffer, 1936; Young, 1940). In recent de-
cades, particularly in the last 10 years, this view has been changing as mod-
ern cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists have begun to incorporate in
their research measures that reflect the important influence of emotions on
activities such as decision making (Damasio, 1994; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee,
& Welch, 2001; Mellers, Schwartz, & Ritov, 1999), stereotyping and preju-
dice (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Siisser, 1994), problem solving (Isen &
Daubman, 1984; Isen, Daubman, 6k Nowicki, 1987), and creativity (Getz &
Lubart, 1998, 2000). Furthermore, views of human intelligence have greatly
expanded in recent years because of the efforts of Gardner (1983), Sternberg
(1985), and other investigators who have argued for broader definitions of
what it means to be smart. These two converging trends set the stage for the
introduction of a new kind of intelligence—one that would recognize the
functional utility of emotions in everyday life and people's differing abilities
in harnessing them.
What Is Emotional Intelligence?
Salovey and Mayer (1990, p. 189) proposed an initial scientific defini-

tion of emotional intelligence as "the ability to monitor one's own and others'
feelings, to discriminate among them, and to use this information to guide
one's thinking and action." Their model outlined the following components:
38 GREWAL, BRACKETT, AND SALOVEY

EXHIBIT 2.1
The Four-Branch Model of Emotional Intelligence
Branch 1: Emotional Perception and Expression (Perceiving Emotions)

• Ability to identify emotion in one's physical and psychological states.
• Ability to identify emotion in other people.
• Ability to express emotions accurately, and to express needs related to those
feelings.
• Ability to discriminate between accurate/honest and inaccurate/dishonest feelings.
Branch 2: Emotional Facilitation of Thought (Using Emotions)

• Ability to redirect and prioritize one's thinking on the basis of associated feelings.
• Ability to generate emotions to facilitate judgment and memory.
• Ability to capitalize on mood changes to appreciate multiple points of view.
• Ability to use emotional states to facilitate problem solving and creativity.
Branch 3: Emotional Understanding (Understanding Emotions)

• Ability to understand relationships among various emotions.
• Ability to perceive the causes and consequences of emotions.
• Ability to understand complex feelings, emotional blends, and contradictory states.
• Ability to understand transitions among emotions.
Branch 4: Emotional Management (Managing Emotions)

Ability to be open to feelings, both pleasant and unpleasant.
Ability to monitor and reflect on emotions.
Ability to engage, prolong, or detach from an emotional state.
Ability to manage emotions in oneself.
Ability to manage emotions in others.
Note. From Emotional Development and Emotional Intelligence: Educational Implications (p. 11), edited by P.
Salovey and D. Sluyter, 1997, New York: Basic Books. Copyright 1997 by P. Salovey and D. J. Sluyter.
Adapted with permission of Basic Books, a member of Perseus Books, LLC.
appraising emotions in the self and in others; regulating emotions in the self
and in others; and using emotions to facilitate thinking, reasoning, problem
solving, and creativity, as well as to motivate behavior. The model stimu-
lated research attempting to find out more about how emotion can facilitate
cognitive processes such as perceiving and reasoning (Mayer, DiPaolo, &
Salovey, 1990; Mayer, Gaschke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992) and how indi-
vidual differences in emotional intelligence might be captured empirically
(Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1998, 1999). After a few years of such explor-
atory research, the original model of emotional intelligence was refined so
that four distinct but separate abilities are now thought to fall under the
framework of emotional intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997): (a) perceiv-
ing emotions, (b) using emotions to facilitate thought and language, (c) un-
derstanding emotions, and (d) managing emotions in the self and in others.
These four abilities make up the four domains of emotional intelligence (see
Exhibit 2.1). We now discuss each of these components with a special focus
on the fourth branch, managing emotions, as it fits within the overarching
model of emotional intelligence.
EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 39
The first domain of emotional intelligence, perceiving emotions, in-
volves the ability to detect and accurately perceive emotions in faces, voices,
art, music, and stories. Perhaps the most basic skill involved in emotional
intelligence, perceiving emotions in both the self and others, makes all other
processing of emotional information possible. A severe deficit in the ability
to perceive emotions in the self may be associated with alexithymia (Apfel
&. Sifneos, 1979) as well as increased ambivalence over emotional expres-
sion (King, 1998; King & Emmons, 1990). Furthermore, perceiving emo-
tions accurately in others may have important implications for creating and
sustaining important social relationships (Lopes, Salovey, Cote, & Beers,
2005).
The second domain of emotional intelligence, the ability to use emo-
tions to facilitate both thought and language, is demonstrated by findings
that have shown how emotions can play an adaptive role in many important
cognitive processes (Palfai & Salovey, 1993; Schwarz, 1990). For example,
emotions can help people focus on important information when trying to
solve problems (Easterbrook, 1959; Mandler, 1975; Simon, 1982) and come
up with creative ideas and solutions (Isen & Daubman, 1984; Isen et al.,
1987). The emotionally intelligent person might more easily recognize how
a slightly depressed mood can help deductive reasoning (Schwarz, 1990) and
use this information to better accomplish certain tasks.
Understanding emotions, the third domain of emotional intelligence,
is the ability to label emotions linguistically as well as understand complex
relationships among emotions. For example, it entails the ability to recog-
nize blends of different emotions as well as temporal and progressive associa-
tions among emotions, such as that between irritation and rage. The third
branch is therefore linked to an individual's knowledge of emotion and use of
emotion terminology.
The fourth domain of emotional intelligence, managing emotions, is
the component of emotional intelligence most relevant to the themes of this
chapter. It entails the adaptive ability to regulate emotions optimally both in
the self and in others. However, it is important to note that an optimal out-
come of emotion regulation involves more than the simple goal of decreas-
ing negative emotions and increasing positive ones. Although this might
seem counterintuitive, eliminating negative emotions may not always serve
adaptive purposes (Bonnano, 2001; Parrott, 2002). For example, in some
circumstances we may need to experience grief to show support for a friend's
loss or use angry feelings to take necessary steps toward fighting injustice.
Therefore, managing emotions also includes the ability to increase negative
emotions or decrease positive emotions, depending on the context. Its defi-
nition may also be seen as very similar to the concept of response modulation
developed by James Gross and his colleagues (see chap. 1, this volume).
Emotion management has received particular attention in the field of psy-
chology because of its wide-reaching implications for many subfields such as

clinical, developmental, and health psychology. For example, those individuals
interested in solving mental health problems increasingly have focused on
how problems with managing emotions result in various psychological disor-
ders (Gross & Munoz, 1995). Furthermore, as we shall see, this domain plays
an important role in maintaining good interpersonal relationships.
Managing Emotions
Before we discuss findings supporting the importance of managing emo-

tions in real-world contexts, we need first to try to specify what this ability
entails and the best ways to measure it. We believe that managing emotions
involves several skills, including the ability to monitor and label one's own
feelings effectively and self-efficacy about the ability to modify these feel-
ings, as well as the knowledge and motivation to use effective strategies to
alter emotions. Managing emotions can be distinguished from coping in that
the regulation attempt involves attention to one's own subjective state rather
than to the specific life events that may be causing the unpleasant emotions
(Larsen, 2000). Therefore, the study of emotion management seems espe-
cially important in contexts in which rearranging circumstances may not be
feasible; close interpersonal relationships, especially with one's children, rep-
resent one such context. For instance, a child's poor performance in a sports
game requires encouragement and emotional support rather than direct in-
tervention by the parent.
What types of behavior constitute managing emotions? Under the frame-
work of emotional intelligence, we consider any action an attempt at man-
agement if the specific goal when committing the action is the desire to
manipulate one's own or others' emotions. People use an enormously broad
range of strategies to regulate their emotions, ranging from listening to music
to drinking caffeinated beverages to withdrawing from social interaction.
Parkinson and Totterdell (1999) classified various emotion regulation strat-
egies on the basis of conceptual similarities and produced the following four
categories: avoidance, distraction, confrontation, and acceptance. Creating
a taxonomy of strategies based on functionality, rather than similarity, seems
an important first step in trying to assess the different goals people seek to
gain relief from emotions. For example, two people might seek social support
for two very different reasons: One person may desire emotional support,
whereas the other may be seeking problem-solving information. Classifica-
tion schemes based on the purpose behind the action will help us better
understand the complicated processes that accompany such regulation.
Although classification of strategies remains an important first step in
understanding emotion regulation, the emotional intelligence framework is
more concerned with questions of effectiveness than with typologies. What
emotion regulation strategies work better than others? We believe that for
most emotion regulation researchers, this is the question of ultimate interest.
Given the great number of strategies that people use to regulate emotions,
this question is a challenging one. However, whereas labeling specific emo-
tion regulation strategies as better than others may be premature, some re-
search has demonstrated that there are clearly different consequences linked
to different types of strategies (Gross & John, 2002). For example, people
who engage in rumination following an upsetting situation may find them-
selves more depressed than those who use distraction as a strategy (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993). Thayer, Newman, and McClain (1994) found that active
techniques combining relaxation, stress management, reappraisal, and exer-
cise may reap the most benefits for people experiencing a bad mood.
Pennebaker (1989,1993,1997) has conducted numerous studies demonstrat-
ing how emotional disclosure through writing can promote both mental and
physical health. Nevertheless, at times intuition fails to capture the truth:
Other researchers have shown that what sometimes seems to be a maladap-
tive regulation strategy can later have little to no negative effect on an
individual's functioning. For example, Bonnano (2001) has demonstrated
that repressing emotions after traumatic abuse or a personal loss does not
necessarily lead to poor adjustment later. Therefore, though we hesitate to
draw firm conclusions about which strategies seem best, we adhere to the
position that we can make rough generalizations about what kinds of regula-
tion techniques are more likely to lead to adaptive outcomes. Identifying the
absolute best strategies for regulating emotions would be impossible because
each situation requires attention to the specific circumstances at hand.
For the purposes of defining emotional intelligence, we make no spe-
cial distinction between emotions and moods, although we adhere to the
generally accepted definitions that emotions are more specific responses to
particular events, whereas moods can be seen as more diffuse. The skills per-
tinent to emotional intelligence may be relevant to both emotions and moods;
for example, strategies for changing either an unwanted emotion or an un-
wanted mood both fall under the fourth branch of emotional intelligence,
emotional management.
We must also carefully make a distinction between intra- and interper-
sonal forms of managing emotions, both of which are included in the fourth
domain of our model of emotional intelligence. In contrast to intrapersonal
regulation, which focuses on one's own subjective state, interpersonal regu-
lation represents a far more complex set of dynamic processes because it in-
volves interaction with and subsequent feedback from another person. The
field of emotion regulation thus far has been overwhelmingly focused on
intrapersonal management, although some research, mostly conducted by
developmental psychologists, has argued for the important role of the social
context in managing both one's own and others' emotions (Fox & Calkins,
2003; Thompson, 1994, 1998). We believe that interpersonal regulation is
more likely to depend on the harnessing rather than the suppressing of emo-

tion in others as a means for persuasion (Salovey, Mayer, & Caruso, 2002).
Individuals successful at interpersonal management may also possess skills
necessary for soothing distressed others. Such skills might involve the ability
to remain calm themselves, offer strategies for help, and provide comfort
while remaining empathetic to their partner's situation.
For the sake of simplicity, we define intra- and interpersonal regulation
as forming two separate but related components of the fourth domain of
emotional intelligence. One can easily imagine an individual who is quite
skilled at regulating her own emotions but fumbling and inadequate in cheer-
ing up a friend or handling conflicts between team members. In a similar
way, an individual might successfully influence and regulate the emotions of
others while failing miserably in managing his own depression or impulsivity
(certain eminent politicians, such as Winston Churchill, may serve as ex-
amples of this latter condition).
Researchers have found individual differences in the ability to manage
emotions (Cantanzaro & Greenwood, 1994; Gross & John, 2002; Salovey,
Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995); therefore, our current model of
emotional intelligence predicts that individuals will vary significantly in their
abilities to manage their own emotions, which in turn has an important im-
pact on life outcomes. Although most research has focused on differences in
intrapersonal regulation, we think that research focusing on interpersonal
regulation will reveal such differences as well. It is also worth mentioning
that the studies previously cited used self-report rather than ability-based
measures. There is a difference between people's beliefs about their emotion
abilities and their actual knowledge of emotions or ability to deal effectively
with emotions. We also believe there is a significant difference between
people's knowledge of emotion regulation strategies and their actual ability
to apply those strategies to real-world situations. For example, one might
recognize that exercising will more effectively change a bad mood than drink-
ing alcohol but for a variety of reasons choose to head to a local bar, rather
than the gym, after an upsetting situation. Before we discuss our evidence
demonstrating that individual differences in emotional intelligence signifi-
cantly impact life outcomes, we first explain the pros and cons of measuring
emotional intelligence through self-report inventories and task-based per-
formance tests.
METHODOLOGICAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS
Measuring emotional intelligence reliably and accurately is vital to

understanding its application to important life outcomes. In this section, we
discuss how emotional intelligence is measured as an ability and how scores
on such measures can predict the quality of social interaction.
How Do We Measure Emotional Intelligence?
Research on emotional intelligence has proliferated mainly because of

the use of self-report measures that are relatively easy to design, test, and
implement as compared with ability-based measures. Examples of the more
frequently used self-report tests of emotional intelligence are the Emotional
Quotient Inventory (Bar-On, 1997) and the Self-Report Emotional Intelli-
gence Test (Schutte et al., 1998). Although ease of administration poses a
huge advantage over ability-based tests, self-report tests of emotional intelli-
gence suffer from lack of construct validity, with research showing that they
cannot be properly differentiated from well-established measures of person-
ality such as the Big Five (Brackett & Mayer, 2003). Furthermore, self-report
tests based on the four-part model of emotional intelligence suffer from the
limitation that people may not have the capacity or willingness to provide
accurate information about their own emotional skills (Brackett & Mayer,
2003; Mayer et al., 1999). For example, in a recent study, the correlation
between a self-report test of emotion regulation and an ability test was quite
small (Rivers, Brackett, & Salovey, 2004). Because of these limitations asso-
ciated with self-report tests, we favor the use of ability-based or performance
measures of emotional intelligence.
The first ability-based test of our model of emotional intelligence was
called the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Test (MEIS; Mayer et al., 1999),
which eventually led to the development of the Mayer Salovey Caruso Emo-
tional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2002). The
MSCEIT offers a number of advantages over its predecessor. Problematic
items were eliminated, and the test itself was made shorter and easier to use
by way of computer-based administration. The MSCEIT assesses the four
domains of Mayer and Salovey's (1997) emotional intelligence model (per-
ceiving, using, understanding, and managing emotions) through eight sepa-
rate tasks, two for each of the domains. A researcher can, therefore, easily
compare an individual's scores on each of these abilities and isolate particu-
lar sets of skills when examining associations with different outcomes.
The MSCEIT has good discriminant validity. It is distinct from com-
mon measures of personality, correlates only slightly with analytical intelli-
gence, and shows only modest overlap with self-report tests of emotional
intelligence (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Brackett, Mayer, & Warner, 2004;
Lopes, Salovey, & Straus, 2003). Scores on the MSCEIT are not associated
with the Big Five traits of conscientiousness, extraversion, and neuroticism
and seem to be only moderately associated with the traits of agreeableness
and openness (Brackett & Mayer, 2003). Furthermore, with respect to ver-
bal intelligence, only Branch 3, understanding emotions, produces a sig-
nificant correlation, usually around r = .30 (Grewal, Ivcevic, Lopes, Brackett,
& Salovey, 2004; Lopes et al., 2003). This association seems reasonable
and expected, considering the conceptualization of Branch 3 as measuring

knowledge and use of emotion terminology. A lack of overlap with self-
report tests, which tend to correlate highly with personality measures
(Brackett & Mayer, 2003), also distinguishes the MSCEIT from common
measures of personality.
Confirmatory factor analyses of the MSCEIT have demonstrated that
the four branches load onto four distinct factors. Notably, the fourth branch,
managing emotions, combines intra- and interpersonal management into one
factor. However, a self-report test of emotional intelligence based on the
four-branch model (developed by Brackett) revealed factor analyses that dis-
tinguished the intra- and interpersonal dimensions of the fourth branch (man-
aging emotions). We believe that although the two dimensions can be suc-
cessfully combined as a single factor on ability-based tests, people's
self-knowledge of emotion regulation may be more compartmentalized, lead-
ing them to make an important distinction between the two.
Although we believe that ability-based measures of emotional intelli-
gence pose distinct advantages over self-report measures, we would like to
add a cautionary note against always interpreting ability-based findings as
more indicative of true emotional skill. In some particular instances, people's
self-knowledge of their own emotional skills may provide better predictions
for various life outcomes. This may be especially true for the Managing Emo-
tions subscale of the MSCEIT, because this skill is presumably the most dif-
ficult, complex, and context dependent. Ability measures may not capture
the intricacies of emotion regulation in terms of time, place, event, and spe-
cific emotions. In some cases, especially when provided with specific ques-
tions about particular contexts, we might expect participants to be able to
provide a better idea of their tendency to regulate poorly because they, in
fact, do know themselves best.
Emotional Intelligence and Social Interaction
Managing emotions, as defined under the framework of emotional in-

telligence, entails the optimal regulation of emotions in both intra- and in-
terpersonal situations. The latter, in particular, suggests that the emotionally
intelligent individual who excels at this particular domain of emotional in-
telligence ought to experience greater levels of success and satisfaction in
the domain of social interaction. Research conducted thus far, which has
used the fourth subscale of the MSCEIT to measure the ability to manage
emotions, appears to support this assumption.
Several positive findings using the MSCEIT directly link the fourth
domain of emotional intelligence, managing emotions, with positive social
outcomes. The fourth subscale of the MSCEIT measures people's ability to
manage emotions in both the intra- and interpersonal domains. Lopes,
Salovey, and Straus (2003) found that higher scores on the Managing Emo-
tions subscale were positively related to self-reported positive interaction with
friends and negatively related to self-reported negative interaction with
friends. Furthermore, individuals who scored higher on the fourth subscale
reported a greater level of perceived parental support, a finding with signifi-
cant implications for how such skills impact the emotional development of
families.
The skills involved in managing emotions may be especially relevant to
maintaining high-quality relationships with peers. MSCEIT Managing Emo-
tions scores correlated positively with friendship quality (Lopes, Brackett, et
al., 2004). Specifically, individuals who scored higher on managing emo-
tions were rated as more supportive and caring friends in reports provided by
two friends. Higher scores were also related to self-rated quality of the friend-
ships with those two same friends. In a second study, Managing Emotions
scores correlated positively with the self-perceived quality of interaction with
individuals of the opposite sex.
One of the more significant social challenges for most college students
is learning to live with roommates peacefully—a task that undoubtedly re-
quires a great deal of emotion regulation, particularly when circumstances
include relative strangers in tight quarters. A study conducted in a large un-
dergraduate class looked at whether MSCEIT scores were related to interac-
tion among roommates and close friends (Lerner & Brackett, 2004). Higher
scores on the Managing Emotions subscale were related to participants' self-
reported tendency to provide emotional support to their roommates. Fur-
thermore, such scores were also negatively related to participants' self-re-
ported tendency to leave in response to their roommates' behavior.
In the Lerner and Brackett (2004) investigation, relationships with close
friends were analyzed for those students not currently living with a room-
mate. Higher Managing Emotions scores were positively related to self-
reports of providing emotional support and promoting conflict resolution.
Higher scores were negatively related to self-reported "exit" behavior (i.e.,
physically leaving at signs of trouble in the relationship), as well as neglect-
ing and mistreating the friend. These results are especially interesting be-
cause they point to potential mediators of the relationship between emo-
tional skills and the quality of relationships.
In addition, residential college students who scored higher on Manag-
ing Emotions were viewed more favorably by other students in their college
(Lopes, Salovey, Cote, 6k Beers, 2005). For example, students with higher
Managing Emotions scores received more friendship nominations from oth-
ers, signifying that these individuals seemed to be more popular than their
lower-scoring peers. Furthermore, these individuals received more positive
than negative peer ratings overall. Both of these results remained significant
after controlling for Big Five personality traits.
Another important and interesting domain for analyzing how emotion
regulation impacts social interaction is the workplace. Early emotional Intel'
ligence research using the MEIS indicated that customer satisfaction related

positively to the level of emotional skill possessed by individual employees
(Rice, 1999). Lopes, Grewal, Kadis, Gall, and Salovey (in press) adminis-
tered the MSCEIT to the employees of a Fortune 400 insurance company,
who were also asked to rate their peers and supervisees on a number of social
and emotional skills such as stress tolerance, conflict management, and lead-
ership ability. Employees scoring high on the Managing Emotions subscale
experienced fewer negative interactions with others, as reported by their peers.
They were also rated highly by their peers for contributing to a positive work
environment and for being in a cheerful mood much of the time while at
work. Higher scores on the Managing Emotions subscale were positively re-
lated to supervisor ratings of interpersonal sensitivity, sociability, contribut-
ing to a positive work environment, stress tolerance, and leadership poten-
tial. Of note, the Managing Emotions subscale was also positively related to
salary and rank within the company. This suggests that the ability to manage
emotions well contributes to both professional and personal success at work.
These results are particularly compelling because Lopes et al. (in press) used
a naturalistic sample of working men and women, in contrast to the college
student samples used in the other studies reviewed here.
The ability to manage emotions may also have a significant impact on
romantic relationships. Brackett, Warner, and Bosco (2005) examined how
scores on the MSCEIT related to the quality of young adults' romantic rela-
tionships. Couples in which both partners were low on emotional intelli-
gence (MSCEIT total score) self-reported the least amount of emotional
depth, partner support, and overall relationship quality. They also appeared
to experience the greatest amount of relationship conflict and, overall, rated
their relationships more negatively than couples with higher emotional
intelligence.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The field of emotional intelligence requires a great deal of additional

research to develop better and more refined measures of the construct and to
use such tests to determine how, when, and where these skills are important.
Although the MSCEIT has demonstrated appropriate reliability and predic-
tive validity, improvements still need to be made to capture the complicated
and context-based processes involved in emotional intelligence. The develop-
ment of emotion-specific measures may be helpful, as there is good reason to
suspect that individuals differ not only in their general abilities with regard to
emotion regulation but also in the extent to which they can regulate particu-
lar emotions (Rivers et al., 2004). An individual may successfully deal with
anger but fall apart at the slightest twinge of sadness or guilt, for example.
Furthermore, the possibility remains that certain mediators may con-
tribute to the exhibition of emotional skills, and such mediators may even
interact with particular contexts. The Lerner and Brackett (2004) investiga-
tion that was discussed previously demonstrates how a search for mediators
between the possession of certain emotional skills and specific outcomes might
shed new light on how and when these skills operate. Future research might
investigate the importance of other mediators that may contribute to rela-
tionship quality, such as the status of the relationship partners (e.g., as de-
fined by gender or professional position) combined with the environmental
setting in which the social interaction is taking place. For example, a person
might be particularly good at reading the facial expressions of those superior
to him or her at work while being less successful at attending to the feelings
of coworkers.
Another important avenue for further research, touched on earlier in
this chapter, is the important distinction between one's knowledge of how to
manage emotional situations and one's ability to apply that knowledge suc-
cessfully in real-world settings. Although the Managing Emotions subscale
of the MSCE1T goes beyond the typical content of self-report tests of emo-
tional intelligence, the extent to which it taps directly into ability requires
further attention. Even if the material covered on the test does successfully
measure people's ability to manage their emotions in situations similar to the
hypothetical ones given, the test is still limited in terms of its content. Of
course, it is doubtful that any measure could successfully capture all of the
complex processes people engage in when confronted with unexpected emo-
tional situations. Such situations involve a myriad of complicated stimuli
including, but not limited to, facial expressions, tone of voice, familiar and
unfamiliar others, and, most important, a heightened sense of personal rel-
evance. As Shields (2002, p. 6) has summarized: "Emotion is 'taking it per-
sonally,'" and we cannot, therefore, expect to achieve in the laboratory the
sense of urgency and impact that go along with most emotional events. We
can only hope to approximate such processes.
However, therein lies a challenging yet exciting task for emotions re-
searchers: to find ways both inside and outside the laboratory to capture the
processes of emotion regulation as accurately as possible. If emotion is indeed
"taking it personally," then many regulation attempts most likely revolve
around some of the most important aspects of people's lives, including fam-
ily—and particularly, children. Therefore, the development of new measures
of emotional intelligence that will successfully provide us with the type of
information we need to understand emotion regulation carries with it the
added bonus of studying some of the more important issues that directly af-
fect people's everyday lives.
Additional studies are also needed to examine the development of emo-
tional intelligence over the life span, a topic of particular interest to psy-
chologists who study children and adolescents. As with analytical intelli-
gence, a number of factors most likely contribute to the development of
emotional intelligence, and identifying such factors has important implica-

tions for those who want to increase the emotional skills of vulnerable chil-
dren. Prospective studies might consider the use of longitudinal designs to
assess how children of differing backgrounds and family environments de-
velop emotional skills over time. Such studies would help illuminate the role
of significant others, including teachers and parents, in a child's develop-
ment of emotional competencies.
We would also like to offer some suggestions for areas in which the
application of emotional intelligence research may prove especially fruitful.
The first domain is in the field of clinical psychology, in which a growing
number of researchers have begun to recognize the important role that emo-
tional skills play in a number of different pathologies (Cicchetti, Ackerman,
& Izard, 1995; Gross &. Munoz, 1995). Berenbaum, Raghavan, Le, Vernon,
and Gomez (2003) have even proposed a new taxonomy of mental disorders
using problems with emotion as a central feature of diagnosis. We believe
that emotional intelligence may have much to contribute in the assessment
of mental health by pinpointing specific deficits in emotional skills that cli-
ents may possess. Furthermore, emotional intelligence tests such as the
MSCE1T may serve as a treatment outcome measure in longitudinal studies
of therapies aimed at helping people manage their emotions better. The de-
velopment of new tests of emotional intelligence may help clinicians distin-
guish how people who suffer from certain disorders differ from controls in the
way they appraise and handle emotion, which may even lead to diagnosing
certain vulnerabilities in emotion regulation before they become severely
problematic.
Another domain of particular interest for the application of emotional
intelligence is in the schools, where children spend a great deal of their time,
not only acquiring knowledge but also learning how to negotiate with and
handle their emotions with those outside of their families. Although families
themselves clearly have an impact on how children interact with strangers,
we also believe that an integration of social and emotional programs offers
the potential for great benefit to numerous children (Lopes & Salovey, 2004).
This is not a new idea, and there has already been some research demonstrat-
ing that teaching social and emotional competencies can induce significant
and important changes in pupils (Aber, Brown, & Henrich, 1999; Aber, Jones,
Brown, Chaudry, & Samples, 1998).
Educational interventions aimed at promotion of social and emotional
learning have incorporated findings from psychology to build curriculums
that attempt to both reduce and prevent behavioral and emotional problems
in students. One important program, the PATHS (Promoting Alternative
THinking Strategies) curriculum, draws on psychoanalytic, social-cognitive,
and neurocognitive theories in the formulation of its lessons. Topics for such
lessons include the development of self-control, emotional and interpersonal
understanding, and problem solving. There is also a focus on building posi-
tive self-esteem in children and building peer relationships within the class-
rooms. Randomized trials involving extensive data collection have demon-
strated that the PATHS curriculum successfully improves problem-solving
ability, cognitive planning abilities, self-reported conduct problems, and self-
reported anxiety and depression in both normal and at-risk populations of
students (Greenberg, Kusche, & Riggs, 2004).
Other programs aimed at increasing emotional intelligence in the class-
room that have also demonstrated encouraging results include the Child
Development Program (Schaps, Battistich, & Solomon, 2004), the Resolv-
ing Conflict Creatively Program (Brown, Roderick, Lantieri, & Aber, 2004),
the Social Decision Making and Social Problem Solving program (Elias, 2004),
and the Seattle Social Development Project (Hawkins, Smith, & Catalano,
2004). Each of these programs offers detailed methods for classroom-based
interventions that attempt to improve the emotional abilities of school-age
children. Our contribution to such efforts is to offer the four-branch emo-
tional intelligence model, with a special focus on learning to regulate emo-
tion, as an important guideline in designing future programs.
One such program currently undergoing testing is Emotional Literacy
in the Middle School: A six-step program to promote social, emotional, and
academic learning in middle school students (Maurer, Brackett, & Plain,
2004). Of particular interest to this program is the inclusion of classroom
projects that prompt students to explore the regulation of both anger and
sadness. Students are asked to think of a situation that caused them to feel
angry or sad and write a story about the event. In the story, they are asked to
explore questions related to the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that ac-
companied the episode of anger or sadness and the events and persons that
helped them feel better about the situation. The second half of each project
asks students to explore how other people handle their anger or sadness
through discussion and through actual interviews of the student's friends and
families. This task stresses the skills involved in the interpersonal aspect of
emotion regulation and promotes the development of empathy by having
students adopt another's perspective. A recent experiment using this cur-
riculum showed that students who received the intervention for 7 months
(compared with students in the control group) were rated by their teachers
to be more prosocial and less anxious and depressed. The students in the
intervention group also had higher grades at the end of the school year
(Brackett, Rivers, & Salovey, 2005). Much more formal evaluation is needed
to determine how successful both the previously mentioned programs and
others currently being implemented across the nation are at reducing con-
flict and improving emotional skills in the classroom.
The training of adults in emotional intelligence remains an important
application as well. We believe that emotional intelligence comprises skills
that can be learned rather than fixed abilities or personality traits, and that it
is subject to improvement with effort and the acquisition of new knowledge.
Workplace interventions focusing on the development of emotional skills in

employees are already popular in the corporate world, and although we think
any focus on emotional training is better than none at all, we are cautious
about programs not based on sound scientific research. We advocate the de-
velopment of workplace training programs emphasizing the particular skills
of the four-part emotional intelligence model, which, as discussed in a previ-
ous section, seem to be directly related to several important employee out-
comes. As more research is conducted on how the management of emotion
impacts the welfare of individual employees and the company as a whole, we
believe that this knowledge has great potential to improve the working envi-
ronment through training programs that increase the emotional intelligence
of a company's employees.
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ADULT ATTACHMENT THEORY
3
AND AFFECTIVE REACTIVITY
AND REGULATION
PAULA R. PIETROMONACO, LISA FELDMAN BARRETT,
AND SALLY I. POWERS
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1979, 1980) emphasizes the

emotional nature of close bonds between two people. Bowlby's original theory,
which focused on understanding the close, enduring bonds between infants
and their caregivers, highlighted two ways in which emotion is implicated in
attachment. First, when infants experience emotional distress, they seek prox-
imity to their caregiver. Second, caregivers who are sensitive and responsive
are able to help infants regulate their feelings of distress, enabling them to
experience an emotional sense of well-being or "felt security" (Sroufe &
Waters, 1997). Research on attachment in adult close relationships (e.g.,
romantic relationships), which are the focus of this chapter, also has high-
lighted the connection between attachment and emotion (e.g., Kazan &
Shaver, 1987; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 2000). Like children, when
adults become distressed in the face of a threat, they may seek out an attach-
ment figure in an attempt to regain an emotional sense of felt security
(Simpson & Rholes, 1994).
57
Although researchers have examined the link between adult attach-
ment and emotion, the precise role of emotion in attachment processes re-
mains unclear. Most researchers have assumed that mental representations
of the self in relation to others, or internal working models (Bowlby, 1973),
trigger the experience and regulation of emotion. However, the object rela-
tions tradition from which Bowlby emerged reflects a conception of working
models as part of a dynamic system that is organized by both the experience
and regulation of emotion (Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 2000; Reis &
Patrick, 1996). Following this perspective, we (Pietromonaco & Feldman
Barrett, 2000) have proposed that emotion and regulation strategies are for-
mative in the development and maintenance of working models, and that
emotion is an organizing force in working models rather than an outcome of
them. Accordingly, we assume that two affect-based processes underlie work-
ing models of attachment and the operation of the attachment system:
(a) affective reactivity, defined as the frequency with which individuals expe-
rience a feeling of threat, thereby activating the need for felt security, and
(b) affect regulation strategies, defined as the patterns of relationship behavior
that individuals enact in an attempt to maintain or restore felt security. We
use the terms affective reactivity and affect regulation rather than emotional re-
activity and emotion regulation because we are referring to the experience and
regulation of global feelings of distress (i.e., global negative affect) rather
than to the experience and regulation of specific emotions (e.g., fear, anger).
The goal of this chapter is to assess the affective underpinnings of adult
attachment. We evaluate the current evidence, elaborate our theoretical
perspective, and present new evidence from our ongoing research program.
In addition, we propose several directions for future research, evaluate the
potential for interdisciplinary collaboration, and discuss the implications of
understanding the affective bases of attachment for clinical interventions.
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF ATTACHMENT THEORY

AND AFFECT REGULATION
Attachment theory, at heart, concerns the experience and regulation

of emotion. Several fundamental assumptions underlie the theory (for a com-
prehensive discussion of the theory, see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). First,
the attachment system, as conceived by Bowlby (e.g., 1969, 1973), fulfills
the evolutionarily adaptive function of keeping human infants close to their
caregivers. Infants and children who remain physically close to their caregivers,
or who seek proximity when a potentially dangerous situation arises, are more
likely to survive and to reproduce in adulthood. Second, Bowlby proposed
that the attachment-behavioral system is a hard-wired regulatory system that
directs infants to seek out their caregivers in the face of threat. Thus, the
attachment system is particularly likely to be activated when infants per-
58 PIETROMONACO, FELDMAN BARRETT, AND POWERS

ceive either a physical or psychological threat. When a threat is perceived,
infants will seek contact with their primary caregiver. If the caregiver is not
available or is insufficiently responsive, then the infant is likely to experi-
ence distress (fear, anxiety). If the caregiver is available and responsive, then
contact should help to reduce distress and to restore a sense of emotional
safety, or felt security. Third, children learn from their interactions with at-
tachment figures, and this knowledge develops into mental representations,
or internal working models, that include information about whether attach-
ment figures will be available and responsive (view of others) and whether
the self is worthy of love (view of self). These mental representations are
assumed to guide thoughts, feelings, and behavior and to shape the nature of
affect regulation attempts in subsequent situations. Thus, children learn what
to expect from attachment figures, and given the particular characteristics of
their partnership, they learn which strategies are most likely to enable them
to cope with distress (Cassidy, 1994).
Although Bowlby focused on the operation of the attachment-behavioral
system during infancy and childhood, he viewed the system as enduring over
the life course (Bowlby, 1979). Kazan and Shaver (1987) elaborated on
Bowlby's original theory by conceptualizing adult romantic relationships as
attachment bonds governed by processes similar to those that occur in
infant-caregiver relationships. Thus, romantic partners may seek out each
other in the face of distress, and they may help or hinder each other's efforts
to regulate distress. Adults also hold working models of their romantic at-
tachment relationships, and these models may include knowledge from ear-
lier attachment relationships as well as additional knowledge acquired from
interactions with attachment figures in adulthood (e.g., romantic partners).1
Individual Differences in Adult Attachment Style
Adult attachment theory (e.g., Fraley & Shaver, 2000; Hazan & Shaver,
1987; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003), like the original developmental theory
(Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1973), assumes that
individual differences exist in the degree to which people use attachment
figures as sources of security and in the degree to which they are able to
achieve felt security. These individual differences are thought to arise from
actual differences in recurring interaction patterns with attachment figures,
and they are reflected in the content of internal working models.
In their pioneering work, Hazan and Shaver (1987) proposed that indi-
vidual differences in adult attachment styles paralleled the three behavioral
'Although adult attachment theory (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) assumes that some continuity exists
between working models developed during childhood and those later in life, the degree of continuity
remains an open question (Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 2000). Attachment processes (e.g.,
seeking proximity when distressed), however, appear to operate in similar ways in childhood and
adulthood (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).
ADULT ATTACHMENT THEORY 59

patterns (i.e., secure, anxious-ambivalent, avoidant) that Ainsworth
(Ainsworth et al., 1978) observed in infant-caregiver relationships.
Ainsworth's investigations using the Strange Situation and home observa-
tions revealed that securely attached infants were easily comforted when they
were reunited with their caregiver after a separation, and they appeared to
have caregivers who were available and responsive. Anxious-ambivalent in-
fants became intensely distressed when separated from their caregiver, and
they were not easily comforted when the caregiver returned. Their caregivers
appeared to respond inconsistently, and this pattern of responding over time
may have heightened the distress reactions of these infants. Avoidant in-
fants did not show much distress when they were separated from the caregiver,
and they tended to ignore the caregiver when the two were reunited. The
caregivers of avoidant infants tended to be distant or unavailable. Each of
these behavioral patterns is thought to reflect an affect regulation strategy
that is functional in that particular kind of relationship (Cassidy, 1994;
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). Infants with responsive caregivers (secure in-
fants) are able to restore a sense of well-being or felt security by seeking
proximity to the caregiver. Those with inconsistently available caregivers
(anxious-ambivalent infants) appear to rely on hyperactivating strategies (in-
tense distress, repeated protest, heightened vigilance), and those with distant
or unavailable caregivers appear to use deactivating strategies (detachment,
self-reliance). Attachment patterns in adult romantic relationships show simi-
larities to those observed in infants (Hazan & Shaver, 1987). Secure adults
evidence comfort with closeness and intimacy, anxious-ambivalent adults show
an excessive concern with closeness and worry that partners will leave, and
avoidant adults evidence discomfort with closeness and intimacy.
Although initial work on adult attachment focused on these three at-
tachment styles, more recent work has conceptualized individual differences
in adult attachment in terms of four prototypes (i.e., secure, preoccupied,
fearful-avoidant, dismissing-avoidant; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991) or
in terms of two dimensions underlying the categories (Brennan, Clark, 6k
Shaver, 1998; Fraley, Waller, & Brennan, 2000). These dimensions are of-
ten characterized as anxious-ambivalence and avoidance. People high in
anxious-ambivalence desire closeness and intimacy, but they are unable to
achieve a stable sense of closeness and security. People high in avoidance are
reluctant to rely on others and prefer to maintain emotional distance.
The interaction between the two dimensions yields four attachment
prototypes identified in previous research (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991).
Thus, people who are low on both the anxious-ambivalence and avoidance
dimensions, who fall within the secure prototype, are comfortable with close-
ness and able to rely on others when the need arises. People high in anxious-
ambivalence but low in avoidance, who fall within the preoccupied (or anx-
ious-ambivalent) prototype, desire a high degree of closeness, are preoccupied
with relationships, and worry about being abandoned. People high in anx-

ious-ambivalence and high in avoidance, who fall within the fearful-avoidant
prototype, both desire and fear closeness, whereas those high in avoidance
and low in anxious-ambivalence, who fall within the dismissing-avoidant pro-
totype, are reluctant to rely on others, self-reliant, and prefer to maintain
emotional distance. These patterns are assumed to represent an adaptive re-
sponse to the demands of a particular attachment relationship, and they are
thought to reflect underlying working models.
Affect-Based Processes
In our view, two affect-based processes, affective reactivity and regula-

tion, underlie working models. We tie affective reactivity specifically to sen-
sitivity to threat because threat is assumed to activate the attachment system
(Bowlby, 1973; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Simpson & Rholes, 1994). People
experience a feeling of threat when they feel unable to cope, and this experi-
ence may be triggered externally by factors in the environment, or internally
from negative affect (see Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 2000). The im-
plication is that people who are more emotionally reactive will more fre-
quently perceive a threat, thereby leading them to experience more frequent
activation of the attachment system, and as a consequence, a more frequent
need to regulate their feelings of distress. In addition, the regulation element
in our model focuses specifically on interpersonally based affect regulation
(i.e., approaching or avoiding others) rather than on a wider range of regula-
tory strategies.
The reactivity and regulation elements in our model should be con-
nected to individual differences in attachment style in predictable ways. Fig-
ure 3.1 depicts the two dimensions of affective reactivity and affect regula-
tion through reliance on others and their link to each of the adult attachment
style prototypes. People who are high in anxious-ambivalence (i.e., preoccu-
pied or fearful-avoidant) are predicted to more frequently experience a feel-
ing of threat, and as a consequence, they will more frequently need to engage
in behaviors that will help them to restore felt security. Affect regulation
strategies for people high in anxious-ambivalence will differ depending on
whether they are high or low in avoidance; those low in avoidance (i.e.,
preoccupied prototype) are likely to rely on others to restore felt security,
whereas those high in avoidance (i.e., fearful-avoidant prototype) will be less
willing to rely on others. People who are low in both anxious-ambivalence
and low in avoidance (i.e., secure prototype) are expected to experience threat
less often; when they do, however, they will be willing to rely on others to
restore felt security. People high in avoidance and low in anxious-ambivalence
(i.e., dismissing-avoidant prototype), who may use defensive strategies to
suppress threat (Fraley, Davis, &. Shaver, 1998), are expected to be less likely
to experience a feeling of threat, and when they do, they will be less likely to
rely on others.

HIGH RELIANCE ON OTHERS
SECURE PREOCCUPIED
(Anxious-ambivalent)
•Low reactivity •High reactivity
•High perceived coping ability •Low perceived coping ability
•More willing to rely on others •More willing to rely on others
LOW HIGH
REACTIVITY *- REACTIVITY
DISMISSING-AVOIDANT FEARFUL-AVOIDANT
•Low reactivity •High reactivity
•High perceived coping ability •Low perceived coping ability
•Less willing to rely on others •Less willing to rely on others
LOW RELIANCE ON OTHERS
Figure 3.1. Connection between affective reactivity and regulation through reliance
on others and adult attachment prototypes.
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS
It follows from our model that people who more frequently perceive
threats in the environment should be more likely to experience emotional
distress. Most of the evidence relevant to this proposition comes from studies
in which participants provide self-reports of their emotional experience. In
general, this work has shown that people higher in anxious-ambivalence (pre-
occupation) experience greater emotional reactivity. For example, people
with an anxious-ambivalent attachment style consistently report more in-
tense emotions (e.g., Collins & Read, 1990; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett,
1997), greater fluctuations in their emotions (Hazan & Shaver, 1987), and
greater emotional expressivity (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). In con-
trast, people with a more avoidant style report little emotionality
(Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Collins & Read, 1990; Hazan & Shaver,
1987; Pietromonaco & Carnelley, 1994; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett,
1997).
In addition, we would expect that people high in anxious-ambivalence
would show greater emotional reactivity than others across more contexts
because they perceive a wider range of contexts as threat related. The few
62 P/ETROMONACO, FELDMAN BARRETT, AND POWERS

relevant studies (Mikulincer, Birnbaum, Woddis, & Nachmias, 2000;
Mikulincer, Gillath, & Shaver, 2002; Simpson, Rholes, & Phillips, 1996)
are consistent with this idea. Findings from these studies suggest that, regard-
less of whether the context was defined experimentally as threatening, people
higher in anxious-ambivalence show greater emotional reactivity; they re-
port greater distress (Simpson et al., 1996), and they respond more rapidly to
the names of attachment figures (Mikulincer et al., 2002) and to proximity-
related words (Mikulincer et al., 2000). Given that all of the experimental
contexts in these studies concerned attachment, it may be that such con-
texts, in themselves, trigger a feeling of threat for those with an anxious-
ambivalent style.
We also have proposed that the way in which adults regulate affect
(e.g., through approaching or avoiding others) differs with attachment style.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with our model. People higher in anx-
ious-ambivalence are more likely to turn to others for help with regulating
their negative feelings, whereas those who are more avoidant distance them-
selves from others (e.g., Collins & Feeney, 2000; Mikulincer, 1998;
Mikulincer, Florian, & Weller, 1993; Mikulincer, Orbach, &. lavnieli, 1998;
Ognibene & Collins, 1998; Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, in press;
Simpson, Rholes, &. Nelligan, 1992). Indeed, for people high in attachment
anxiety, the experimental activation of attachment security (i.e., by sublimi-
nally priming the word love), which may evoke a representation of an attach-
ment figure, appears to provide a comforting or soothing effect by reducing
the accessibility of terror-related words (see chap. 4, this volume).
Many questions about the link between attachment and affective reac-
tivity and regulation remain unanswered. One key question concerns what is
defined as an attachment-relevant threat by people of different attachment
styles (Pietromonaco, Greenwood, & Feldman Barrett, 2004). Are some in-
dividuals more likely to perceive threat in what may be normatively non-
threatening situations (Quigley & Feldman Barrett, 1999)? If so, how is this
more frequent experience of threat connected to the ability to benefit from
attempts to regulate negative affect?
A second key question concerns how efforts to regulate affect vary de-
pending on characteristics of the partner (e.g., partner's affective reactivity
and preferred regulation strategies). Some work (Carnelley, Pietromonaco,
& Jaffe, 1996; Collins & Feeney, 2000; Feeney & Collins, 2001; Simpson et
al., 1992; Simpson, Rholes, Orina, & Grich, 2002) suggests that one partner's
attachment style may contribute to the other partner's ability to regulate
emotional distress. For example, more avoidant men have been found to be
less likely to provide support when their female partner displays greater emo-
tional distress (Simpson et al., 1992), and thus their female partners may be
slower to recover from such distress. Other work (Simpson et al., 2002) sug-
gests that more securely attached women respond more flexibly to their
partner's needs; secure women provide more support when their male part-

ner desires support, but they provide less support when the male partner does
not desire it. In addition, work examining behavior during conflict interac-
tions (for a review, see Pietromonaco et al., 2004) suggests that couples are
more adept at communicating during conflict when both partners are secure;
for example, their interactions show greater synchrony in the timing of be-
haviors and less asymmetry in dominance (Bouthillier, Julien, Dube, Belanger,
6k Hamelin, 2002), and they report less withdrawal and verbal aggression
during conflict (Senchak & Leonard, 1992). In addition, couples including
at least one secure partner evidence more constructive behavior (e.g., ex-
press greater validation, greater affection, less contempt; Creasey, 2002) when
negotiating conflict than do couples including two insecure partners (see
Pietromonaco, Greenwood, et al., 2004). Resolving conflict in a construc-
tive manner may be facilitated by the ability of secure partners to behave in
ways that reduce their partner's distress. Furthermore, characteristics of the
partner should be especially important for individuals who more frequently
regulate their feelings by relying on others.
A third key question is whether people higher in anxious-ambivalence
show greater affective reactivity when reactivity is assessed through non-
self-report or more implicit measures. Evidence from studies that do not rely
on global self-reports suggests that avoidance also may be associated with
greater reactivity. For example, two diary studies (Pietromonaco & Feldman
Barrett, 1997; Tidwell, Reis, & Shaver, 1996) have found that in immediate,
online reports following social interactions, avoidant individuals (but not
anxious-ambivalent individuals) evidenced more negative emotion than
did secure individuals. This pattern was evident across social interactions
in general (Pietromonaco & Feldman Barrett, 1997; Tidwell et al., 1996)
as well as during high-conflict interactions (Pietromonaco & Feldman
Barrett, 1997) and interactions with different kinds of partners (e.g., same-
sex, opposite-sex; Tidwell et al., 1996). Although researchers have rarely
examined the link between adult attachment and any kind of physiological
response, a few studies (e.g., Feeney 6k Kirkpatrick, 1996; Mikulincer, 1998)
assessing cardiovascular measures suggest that individuals with an insecure
romantic attachment style (i.e., anxious-ambivalent or avoidant) show greater
physiological reactivity than do those with a secure romantic attachment
style.
Findings from our recent research begin to address the last two key ques-
tions raised here. One study (Pietromonaco, Feldman Barrett, 6k Holmes,
2005) examined the degree to which individuals' own attachment style as
well as the attachment style of the romantic partner predicted individuals'
self-reported patterns of affective reactivity and regulatory strategies in re-
sponse to attachment-related threats. Another study (Powers, Pietromonaco,
Gunlicks, 6k Sayer, in press) examined the link between attachment and
affective reactivity assessed through a physiological measure, and it also con-
sidered the contribution of the partner's attachment style.

Attachment and Self-Reported Affective Reactivity and Regulation
In one study (Pietromonaco et al., 2004), we directly tested the idea

that differences in affective reactivity and regulation are connected to adult
attachment patterns in theoretically predicted ways (see Figure 3.1), and we
examined whether the partner's attachment style contributed to individuals'
patterns of affective reactivity and regulation. Although previous work has
investigated self-reported patterns of affective reactivity and regulation strate-
gies, this study extended that work by examining a wide range of attachment-
relevant threatening situations, and by investigating whether the partner's
attachment style, alone or in combination with the individuals' attachment
style, predicted responses. If attachment figures help people to regulate their
feelings, then the strategies that a person uses may be shaped, to some ex-
tent, by how emotionally responsive, available, and sensitive his or her part-
ner is. For example, people paired with a more avoidant partner, who may be
less willing to discuss problems, may feel less equipped to cope with a threat-
ening event in the relationship.
In this study, both partners in dating couples (N = 76 couples) sepa-
rately read a variety of potentially threatening, attachment-relevant scenarios
(e.g., "Your romantic partner didn't comfort you when you were feeling down";
"Your romantic partner was just offered a great job in another part of the
country and may be making plans to move") and imagined themselves expe-
riencing each situation. After reading each scenario, participants reported
on how distressed they would feel in the situation, the degree to which they
felt able to cope with the situation (appraisal of their coping ability), and the
extent to which they would use different coping strategies (e.g., trying to
change the situation, talking to someone for support or reassurance, sup-
pressing one's feelings).
Consistent with the predictions advanced in our model, individuals who
scored higher in anxious-ambivalence reported that they would experience
more emotional distress and that they felt less able to cope with the situa-
tions. Attachment avoidance was not associated with reported distress. In
addition, individuals higher in anxious attachment were more likely to deal
with the problem by relying on others. In contrast, individuals higher in
avoidance were less likely to report that they would rely on others (e.g., they
were less likely to talk to someone for reassurance). They also were more
likely to distance themselves by trying to suppress their feelings. Overall, in
line with our model and with other research, people higher in anxious at-
tachment were more likely to use others in the interest of regulating their
feelings, whereas those higher in avoidance were less likely to do so.
In addition, the degree to which individuals' own attachment avoid-
ance predicted their perceived ability to cope and their use of particular cop-
ing strategies was moderated by their partner's attachment avoidance. People
who were low in avoidance felt less able to cope when their partner was more

avoidant. In contrast, people who were high in avoidance generally felt well
able to cope, and their perceptions were not associated with their partner's
degree of avoidance. In a similar manner, people low in avoidance who were
paired with a highly avoidant partner were less likely to try to distract them-
selves by taking their mind off the situation and more likely to try to get
information from someone else to cope with the situation. In contrast, people
high in avoidance who had a highly avoidant partner were more likely to
distract themselves and less likely to try to get information from someone.
These findings suggest that how a person copes with emotional distress and
whether that method is effective or not needs to be evaluated within the
context of the relationship. People low in avoidance who are paired with
avoidant partners may feel less able to cope because their partners are likely
to be unwilling to confront the situation, and they may believe that they
must take an active stance to achieve any kind of resolution. People high in
avoidance who are with avoidant partners may benefit (at least some of the
time) by using distancing strategies.
Overall, these findings suggest that affect regulation strategies need to
be considered not only in terms of an individuals' own attachment style but
also within the interpersonal context of the specific attachment relation-
ship. Perceptions of the ability to cope and the preference for particular strat-
egies appear to depend, to some extent, on the attachment styles of both
partners involved in the relationship.
This study focused on people's conscious, self-reported feelings and regu-
latory strategies. Self-report measures provide information about these more
conscious aspects of affective experience, but it is also important to examine
the affective underpinnings of attachment by looking at less consciously con-
trolled response systems.
Attachment and Physiological Reactivity and Regulation
In another study, we (Powers, Pietromonaco, Gunlicks, & Sayer, in

press) investigated whether individuals' own attachment style and their dat-
ing partner's attachment style predicted physiological responses to a stressful
situation. This work focused on a physiological measure that taps into a ma-
jor stress-response system, reactivity of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal
(HPA) axis (assessed through salivary cortisol). The stressful situation con-
sisted of a standard conflict discussion in which dating couples discussed and
tried to resolve an issue that represented a significant source of disagreement
in their relationship. Conflict interactions generally induce stress, and they
are likely to activate attachment behavior because they often raise concerns
about the partner's emotional availability and responsiveness (Simpson et
al, 1996).
In this study, dating partners (124 couples) provided seven saliva samples
over the course of the session. These samples allowed us to assess partici-

pants' stress responses shortly before they entered the lab, through anticipa-
tion of the conflict discussion (i.e., after the experimenter provided a de-
tailed description of the conflict task), during the discussion, and throughout
a recovery period of 40 minutes after the discussion.2
In line with previous work examining adult attachment and cardiovas-
cular reactivity, we found that people with a more insecure romantic attach-
ment style showed greater cortisol reactivity. However, the type of insecure
attachment (i.e., anxious-ambivalence or avoidance) associated with reac-
tivity differed for women and men. Women high in avoidance entered the
lab with higher cortisol levels, and their cortisol levels remained high through-
out the conflict task. Men higher in anxious-ambivalence showed greater
reactivity in anticipation of and during the conflict than did men lower in
anxious-ambivalence. The nature of the conflict task may contribute to this
gender difference in the link between attachment and cortisol reactivity.
Women typically initiate and guide discussions about relationship problems,
a task that may be particularly stressful for avoidant women. Men high in
anxious-ambivalence may show greater stress reactivity because their desire
to express relationship concerns runs counter to gender role norms for such
interactions.
We also examined the extent to which the romantic partner's attach-
ment style predicted individuals' patterns of cortisol reactivity and recovery.
If partners help each other with affect regulation, then the partner's attach-
ment style is likely to contribute to the extent to which people show reactiv-
ity to threat. In particular, individuals with more emotionally responsive
partners (i.e., secure partners) should show less HPA reactivity in the face of
conflict, whereas those with less responsive (e.g., more avoidant) partners
should show greater HPA reactivity. We found the predicted pattern for men,
but not for women. Men with more secure partners (i.e., partners low in
anxious-ambivalence and low in avoidance) evidenced the lowest levels of
cortisol throughout the session. Furthermore, men with more insecure part-
ners (i.e., high in avoidance and low in anxiety, high in anxiety and low in
avoidance, or high in both anxiety and avoidance) showed greater reactivity;
their cortisol levels remained higher through the session than those for men
with a more secure partner. Thus, men with partners who were likely to be
more emotionally responsive (e.g., secure partners) showed less HPA reac-
tivity in the face of conflict, suggesting that their secure partners may help
them to feel less distressed in a normatively stressful situation.
Overall, these findings differ somewhat from those obtained with self-
report measures of affect. Although self-report studies have generally found
similar patterns for men and women, this study suggests that the link be-
2
Cortisol appears in the saliva approximately 15 to 20 minutes after it is secreted from the adrenal
gland. Thus, each salivary sample indexed participants' cortisol reactions about 15 to 20 minutes prior
to the time of collection. For example, the sample taken when participants entered the lab indicated
their stress response about 5 to 10 minutes before their arrival at the lab.

tween attachment style and less conscious measures of affective reactivity
may differ for men and women. Even though men and women interacted in
an objectively similar situation, they may have differed in their perceptions
of the situational context, which in turn may have contributed to their pat-
terns of physiological reactivity. This work highlights the importance of ex-
amining the link between attachment and affective reactivity and regulation
using a wider range of measures that tap into different response systems.
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH
Our work suggests several directions for future research on the role of
affect in adult attachment. In addition, our work has implications for inter-
disciplinary collaboration and clinical interventions. We discuss each of these
topics in the following sections.
Research on the Affective Bases of Attachment
Our work (Pietromonaco et al., 2004; Powers et al., in press) suggests

that individuals' own attachment style as well as their partner's attachment
style contributes to their ability to regulate negative affect. Future work should
examine these processes over time to capture the reciprocal nature of affect
regulation efforts in adults' attachment relationships (see Diamond, 2001).
In particular, it will be important to examine how the characteristics of both
partners facilitate or impair attempts to regulate emotional distress, and
whether these effects vary across different interpersonal stressors.
In addition, we know little about the conditions under which turning
to an attachment figure reduces negative affect or increases feelings of emo-
tional security. For example, under what conditions do people high in anxious-
ambivalence benefit from seeking help from an attachment figure, and under
what conditions do such efforts exacerbate their distress? What makes it pos-
sible for a partner to serve as an effective source of comfort, and does the
nature of this ability vary depending on the recipient's attachment security?
It also will be important to examine more directly whether people higher
in anxious-ambivalence or avoidance are more sensitive to threat. If so, is
this sensitivity specific to attachment-relevant contexts, or does it also ex-
tend to non-relational-threatening contexts? Moreover, do people who have
different attachment styles differ in their base rates for perceiving threat in
situations that most people view as benign? And what mechanisms (e.g., the
ability to effortfully control attention or to inhibit an inappropriate response)
are implicated in threat sensitivity?
Many of these questions concern whether individual differences in tem-
perament, which has also been defined in terms of emotional reactivity and
self-regulation (e.g., Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992; Rothbart, Ahadi, & Evans,

2000), underlie attachment styles. Although considerable controversy exists
about the degree of overlap between temperament and attachment, tem-
perament serves as part of the context in which attachment relationships
develop (Rothbart et al., 2000). For example, infants who are prone to dis-
tress may differ from those less prone to distress in their experiences in
attachment-related situations, and their greater reactivity may make it
harder for caregivers to respond to them sensitively. Likewise, adults who
are prone to emotional distress may construe attachment-related situations
differently from those who are less distress prone, making it more difficult
for distress-prone individuals to use emotion regulation strategies (Quigley
& Feldman Barrett, 1999) and for their partners to help them regain emo-
tional well-being.
Implications for Interdisciplinary Collaboration and

Clinical Intervention
Our work is grounded within social and personality psychology, but the
study of the affective bases of attachment cuts across multiple areas. We see
a pressing need for interdisciplinary collaborations with developmental and
clinical psychologists and cognitive neuroscientists. We make this claim for
several reasons. First, attachment theory is rooted in developmental psychol-
ogy, and any comprehensive view of attachment processes in adulthood must
be tied to those in childhood. Collaborative work with developmental psy-
chologists (particularly behavioral geneticists) will be critical for understand-
ing the trajectory of emotional reactivity and regulation in attachment rela-
tionships from childhood to adulthood.
Second, attachment theory evolved, in part, from observations of clini-
cal phenomena. Most of the work in social and personality psychology has
examined attachment processes in young adults who fall within the normal
range of psychological adjustment. However, work in this area would be in-
formed by examining these processes in individuals in whom affective pro-
cesses have broken down (e.g., in people who have anxiety or depressive
disorders). Furthermore, much work has focused on young dating couples
who vary in relationship length and commitment. It would be advantageous
to extend this work to married couples, particularly those experiencing some
type of distress. In a similar way, couples who are facing normative stressors
(e.g., the birth of a child) or atypical stressors (e.g., impaired physical health)
provide an excellent context for investigating affective reactivity and regu-
lation under clinically significant conditions.
Third, knowledge in this area will be advanced by investigating the
neuropsychological mechanisms that support emotional reactivity and regu-
latory processes in attachment relationships (see Diamond, 2001).
Several barriers must be overcome to facilitate such collaborations. For
example, a lack of consensus exists between some developmental and social

psychologists in the conceptualization of attachment phenomena and how
those phenomena should be studied. Also, collaborations between social psy-
chologists and neuroscientists are not as frequent as they might be, in part
because researchers in these subareas must become familiar with vastly dif-
ferent knowledge bases. In addition, even though social-personality and clini-
cal researchers share much in common, pragmatic issues such as access to
organizations and patient populations also impede such collaborations.
If individuals with heightened sensitivity to threat perceive threat in
situations that are normatively nonthreatening, intervention efforts will need
to address how to alter such patterns. Changing emotional reactivity to rela-
tionship threats is likely to be difficult (Quigley & Feldman Barrett, 1999)
because emotional associations are not completely unlearned through ex-
tinction or counterconditioning. Instead, change often occurs through the
development of more deliberate strategies to regulate emotion and through
training to recognize biases that lead to the inappropriate identification of
threat cues (Quigley & Feldman Barrett, 1999). For example, cognitive in-
terventions that encourage couple members to generate alternative interpre-
tations of threatening events (e.g., Epstein & Baucom, 2002) may disrupt
affective reactivity and instill more deliberate affect regulation strategies.
Another type of intervention that may alter perceptions and responses to
threat is emotionally focused therapy (Greenberg & Johnson, 1988). Emo-
tionally focused therapy, which is grounded in attachment theory, aims to
alter the affect underlying attachment representations by providing signifi-
cant affective experiences within marital therapy. In particular, this therapy
seeks to promote the expression of each partner's needs for closeness and
security and to facilitate interactions that increase security and bolster the
ability of each partner to be available and responsive to the other's needs
(i.e., to serve as a secure base). As partners develop a more secure relation-
ship, they may perceive threats less frequently. This may permit individuals
to regulate their emotional distress by relying more on their partners, who
have learned to be more responsive and emotionally available.
Research that tests the efficacy of these interventions should provide
important information about the mechanisms underlying the regulation of
emotional distress. In turn, a more precise understanding of the mechanisms
that lead some individuals to experience difficulty with distress regulation in
attachment relationships should facilitate the development of more refined
interventions.
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729-745.

ATTACHMENT BASES OF
4
EMOTION REGULATION AND
POSTTRAUMATIC ADJUSTMENT
MARIO MIKULINCER, PHILLIP R. SHAVER, AND NETA HORESH
Attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982,1973,1980) is one of the most

useful contemporary conceptual frameworks for understanding emotion regu-
lation. Bowlby (1973) highlighted the anxiety-buffering function of close
relationships and emphasized the importance of interpersonal experiences as
a source of individual differences in psychological resilience, emotion regu-
lation, and adjustment (see also chap. 3, this volume). In this chapter, we
explore the relevance of attachment theory for understanding emotion regu-
lation specifically during traumatic events and posttraumatic adjustment. We
also review recent findings concerning the involvement of attachment-
related processes in posttraumatic disorders.
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS
According to Bowlby (1969/1982, 1973) human beings are born with

an innate psychobiological system (the attachment behavioral system) that
motivates them to seek proximity to significant others (attachment figures) in
77
times of need as a way of protecting themselves from threats and alleviating
distress. Bowlby (1973) also described important individual differences in
attachment-system functioning that result from social experiences with at-
tachment figures beginning in childhood. Interactions with attachment fig-
ures who are available and responsive in times of need promote a sense of
attachment security, a feeling or sense—"felt security" (Sroufe & Waters,
1977)—based on expectations that attachment figures will be helpful when
needed. These expectations are parts of relatively stable working models: mental
representations of self and others in the context of close relationships. When
attachment figures are not reliably available and supportive, however, a sense
of security is not attained, negative working models of self and/or others are
formed, and strategies of affect regulation other than appropriate proximity
seeking are encouraged. These secondary attachment strategies can be concep-
tualized in terms of two major dimensions, avoidance and anxiety. The first
dimension, avoidance, reflects the extent to which a person distrusts relation-
ship partners' goodwill and strives to maintain behavioral independence and
emotional distance from partners. The second dimension, attachment-
related anxiety, reflects the degree to which a person worries that a partner
will not be available in times of need. People who score low on these two
dimensions are said to be secure or securely attached.
Attachment styles begin to be formed in interactions with primary
caregivers during early childhood, as a large body of research has shown
(Cassidy 6k Shaver, 1999), but Bowlby (1988) claimed that memorable in-
teractions with others throughout life can alter a person's working models
and move the person from one region of the two-dimensional space to an-
other. Moreover, although attachment style is often conceptualized as a single
global orientation toward close relationships, and can definitely be measured
as such, a person's attachment orientation is actually rooted in a complex
cognitive and affective network that includes many different episodic, con-
text-related, and relationship-specific attachment representations, as well as
fairly general ones (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). In fact, research shows that
attachment style can change, subtly or dramatically, depending on context
and recent experiences (e.g., Baldwin, Keelan, Fehr, Enns, & Koh Rangarajoo,
1996; Mikulincer 6k Shaver, 2001).
Attachment-System Functioning in Adulthood
On the basis of an extensive review of adult attachment studies,

Mikulincer and Shaver (2003) proposed a three-phase model of attachment-
system dynamics in adulthood (see Figure 4.1). In this model, the monitor-
ing of experiences results in activation of the attachment system when a
potential or actual threat is registered. Once the attachment system is acti-
vated, an affirmative answer to the implicit or explicit question "Is an at-
tachment figure available and likely to be responsive to my needs?" height-
78 MIKULINCER, SHAVER, AND HORESH

NO
Activation of the
attachment system
Seeking proximity to external or

internalized attachment figure
Is an
" attachment figure
available, attentive,
responsive, etc?
Attachment security;
effective coregulation
Attachment insecurity
(compounding of distress)
proximity seeking a
viable option?
Hypervigilance regarding threat-

and attachment-related cues
Figure 4.1. An integrative model of the activation and dynamics of the attachment
system.
ens the accessibility of the sense of attachment security and facilitates the
application of security-based strategies of affect regulation (Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2003). These strategies are aimed at alleviating distress, maintaining
supportive intimate relationships, and bolstering a person's sense of love-
worthiness and self-efficacy. They also foster optimal functioning of other
behavioral systems (such as exploration, sexuality, and caregiving) and are
an important part of personality development and social adaptation.
ATTACHMENT AND POSTTRAUMATIC ADJUSTMENT 79

Security-based strategies consist of declarative and procedural knowl-
edge about the self, other people, and affect regulation. The declarative knowl-
edge consists of optimistic beliefs about distress management, optimistic and
trusting beliefs about others' goodwill, and a sense of self-efficacy about deal-
ing with threats (Shaver & Hazan, 1993). The procedural knowledge is orga-
nized around three coping strategies: acknowledgment and display of distress
without personal disorganization, support seeking, and problem solving
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). These tendencies are characteristic of secure,
or securely attached, people—those who score relatively low on measures of
attachment anxiety and avoidance.
Perceived unavailability of an attachment figure results in attachment
insecurity, which compounds the distress aroused by the appraisal of a situa-
tion as threatening. This state of insecurity forces a decision about the viabil-
ity of further (more active) proximity seeking as a protective strategy. The
appraisal of proximity as feasible or essential—because of attachment history,
temperamental factors, or contextual cues—results in energetic, insistent at-
tempts to attain proximity, support, and love. These attempts are called
hyperactivating strategies (Cassidy & Kobak, 1988) because they involve up-
regulation of the attachment system, including constant vigilance and intense
concern until an attachment figure is perceived to be adequately available and
supportive. Hyperactivating strategies include attempts to elicit a partner's in-
volvement, care, and support through clinging and controlling responses (Davis,
Shaver, & Vernon, 2003); overdependence on relationship partners as a source
of protection (Shaver &. Hazan, 1993); and perception of oneself as relatively
helpless at emotion regulation (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).
Hyperactivating strategies cause a person to remain vigilant about threat-
related cues and cues of attachment figures' unavailability, the two kinds of
cues that activate the attachment system (Bowlby, 1973). Hence, once they
become the focus of a person's attention, they more or less guarantee that the
attachment system will remain continuously active. Hyperactivation also in-
tensifies negative emotional responses to threats and heightens mental rumi-
nation on threat-related concerns. As a result, psychological pain is exacer-
bated and doubts about one's ability to achieve relief are heightened. These
aspects of attachment-system hyperactivation account for many of the em-
pirically documented correlates of attachment anxiety (Mikulincer & Shaver,
2003).
Appraising proximity seeking as unlikely to alleviate distress results in
deliberate deactivation of the attachment system, inhibition of the quest for
support, and commitment to handling distress alone, especially distress aris-
ing from the failure of attachment figures to be available and responsive.
These strategies of affect regulation are called deactivating (Cassidy & Kobak,
1988) because their goal is to keep the attachment system down-regulated so
as to avoid the frustration and pain of attachment-figure unavailability. De-
activating strategies include avoidance of intimacy and dependence in close
80 MJKULINCER, SHAVER, AND HORESH

relationships and maximization of emotional distance from others. They also
involve dismissal of threat- and attachment-related cues, and suppression of
threat- and attachment-related thoughts, because such cues and thoughts
automatically reactivate the attachment system. These tendencies are fur-
ther reinforced by assuming a self-reliant stance that decreases dependence
on others and discourages acknowledgment of personal weaknesses and faults.
These strategies account for the empirically documented correlates of at-
tachment avoidance (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003).
Attachment, Mental Health, and Adjustment
Individual differences in attachment-system functioning are highly rel-

evant to mental health and adjustment. The sense of being loved and sup-
ported by significant others results naturally in positive mental representa-
tions of others, a stable sense of self-esteem and self-efficacy, and adoption of
constructive coping strategies (see Shaver & Kazan, 1993; Mikulincer &
Shaver, 2003, for reviews). These assets, in turn, act as resilience resources
during periods of stress. Moreover, people with positive mental representa-
tions of attachment experiences tend to feel generally safe and protected,
allowing them to benefit from what we, following Fredrickson (2001), call a
"broaden and build" cycle of attachment security, which, beyond bolstering
psychological resilience, broadens a person's skills and interests (by virtue of
what Bowlby, 1969/1982, called the exploration behavioral system) as well
as his or her prosocial tendencies (through the caregiving system). In this
way, securely attached people are able to devote mental resources that would
otherwise be used in defensive maneuvers to activities that facilitate the de-
velopment of a "fully functioning personality" (Rogers, 1961, pp. 187-192).
Bowlby's (1973, 1980) theory also implies that insecure attachment is a
risk factor that reduces resilience in times of stress, fosters negative affectiv-
ity, and contributes to emotional problems, maladjustment, and psychopa-
thology. The early attachment experiences of insecure people (whether anx-
ious, avoidant, or both) are characterized by unstable and inadequate distress
regulation (Bowlby, 1973; Shaver & Kazan, 1993), which can interfere with
the development of inner resources necessary for coping successfully with
life's problems and maintaining mental health. With regard to anxious indi-
viduals, such experiences encourage hyperactivating strategies that exagger-
ate threats and intensify the sense of helplessness and vulnerability. With
regard to avoidant individuals, they foster deactivating strategies that block
access to emotions and discourage acknowledgment of needs, even though
needs are present.
Chronic reliance on hyperactivating strategies places anxious individuals
at risk for a variety of emotional and adjustment problems, because
hyperactivation impairs the regulation of negative emotions and encourages
intense distress, even after actual threats subside. As a result, attachment-

anxious people are subject to prolonged and uncontrollable negative thoughts
and moods, which can lead to cognitive disorganization and, in some cases,
psychopathology, especially strong depressive reactions to losses. Moreover,
problems in emotional control may be manifested in angry outbursts and
personality disorders. These negative psychological outcomes of
hyperactivating strategies have been documented in dozens of cross-sectional
and longitudinal studies (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Shaver & Hazan,
1993, for reviews).
Avoidant individuals' deactivating strategies can also be a source of
emotional and adjustment problems (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). Although
these strategies encourage a defensive facade of security and strength, they
block access to emotions, leave suppressed distress unresolved, and impair
one's ability to confront many of life's adversities. This impairment is par-
ticularly likely to be noticeable during prolonged, highly demanding stressful
experiences that require active confrontation of a problem and mobilization
of external sources of support. In such cases, deactivating strategies can col-
lapse, revealing a sense of inadequacy in coping and a marked decline in
functioning. In addition, although deactivating strategies involve suppress-
ing the conscious experience and display of distress, distress can still be indi-
rectly manifested in somatic symptoms and health problems. Several studies
have documented emotional and adjustment problems associated with at-
tachment avoidance (see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003; Shaver & Hazan, 1993,
for reviews).
Beyond documenting the association between insecure attachment and
emotional problems, a number of studies have examined psychological vari-
ables—including both declarative and procedural knowledge associated with
hyperactivating and deactivating strategies—that mediate this association.
For example, with respect to declarative knowledge, Roberts, Gotlib, and
Kassel (1996) and Reinecke and Rogers (2001) reported that negative work-
ing models of the self, others, and the future mediated both cross-sectional
and prospective associations between attachment insecurity and depression,
and Whisman and McGarvey (1995) found that negative beliefs about per-
formance evaluation and others' approval mediated the association between
attachment anxiety and depression. With regard to procedural knowledge,
the association between attachment anxiety and negative affectivity is me-
diated by heightened reliance on emotion-focused coping and rumination
on threat-related thoughts, whereas the association between avoidance and
negative affectivity is mediated by heightened reliance on distancing coping,
high levels of emotional control, and reluctance to engage in support seeking
(e.g., Berant, Mikulincer, &Florian, 2001; Cozzarelli, Sumer, 6kMajor, 1998).
Attachment, Trauma, and Posttraumatic Processes
The mental health implications of attachment-system functioning are
highly pertinent to understanding a person's psychological reactions to trau-

matic events. Clinical and empirical evidence consistently indicates that
traumatic experiences, such as rape, assault, car accidents, floods, war, and a
host of other natural and manmade disasters, require the mobilization of in-
ternal and external resources for coping with trauma and place people at risk
for short-term and long-term emotional and adjustment problems (see
Horowitz, 1982, for a review). In some cases emotional balance is restored
when or shortly after a traumatic event ends, but in other cases there may be
profound and prolonged mental health sequelae including posttraumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (4th ed., DSM-/V; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), PTSD
is characterized by repeated reexperiencing of the traumatic event (unwanted
intrusion of trauma-related material into conscious thoughts, mental images,
and dreams), numbing of responsiveness to or reduced involvement with the
external world (trauma-related avoidance responses), and a variety of auto-
nomic, affective, and cognitive signs of hyperarousal.
On the basis of previous research on individual differences in attach-
ment, we advance three theoretical propositions concerning the involve-
ment of the attachment system in the formation and course of PTSD. Our
first proposition is that the attachment behavioral system is automatically ac-
tivated when a person is exposed to natural or human-caused traumatic events.
According to Horowitz (1982), a person's state of mind when undergoing trauma
is characterized by overwhelming shock and intense feelings of panic, vulner-
ability, helplessness, and exhaustion. According to our three-phase model of
attachment-system dynamics (see Figure 4.1 and Mikulincer 6k Shaver, 2003),
these are conditions that automatically activate the attachment system at a
high level, impelling a person to search for external or internalized attach-
ment figures that can protect one from trauma. This attachment-system acti-
vation is likely to be experienced as an intense cry for help.
Our second proposition is that individual variations in attachment-
system functioning play a crucial role in determining the extent to which
PTSD ensues from exposure to trauma. Optimal functioning of the attach-
ment system can allow even a highly threatened person to feel relatively safe
and secure, thereby decreasing the likelihood of long-term PTSD. A nor-
mally secure person's mental cry for help during distress should result in mo-
bilization of internal representations of security-providing attachment fig-
ures or actual external sources of support. As a result, the secure person is
likely to activate optimistic and hopeful representations of self and others,
rely on constructive strategies of affect regulation, deal effectively with the
trauma, and restore emotional balance. In other words, the sense of attach-
ment security should act, at least to some extent, as a protective shield against
PTSD. Moreover, contextual activation of mental representations of attach-
ment security, due to symbolic or actual encounters with security-providing
attachment figures, during or after a traumatic event, should help a trauma-
tized person more readily restore emotional equanimity.

By the same token, disruptions in optimal functioning of the attach-
ment system can prevent restoration of emotional equanimity and thereby
contribute to PTSD formation. In such cases, a traumatized person may fail
to find inner representations of security or external sources of support and
comfort, which may then interfere with the regulation of distress. This regu-
latory failure may initiate a cascade of mental events—including strong feel-
ings of loneliness and rejection as well as negative working models of self and
others, intensification of distress, and reliance on less effective
(hyperactivating or deactivating) strategies of affect regulation—that pre-
vents resolution of the trauma and enhances the likelihood of prolonged
PTSD. In other words, an insecure attachment style (anxious, avoidant, or a
combination of the two, called fearful avoidance), reflecting chronic disrup-
tion of attachment-system functioning, can predispose a traumatized person
to PTSD. Furthermore, contextual activation of mental representations of
attachment insecurity, due to symbolic or actual encounters with rejecting
and unsupportive figures, during or after trauma exposure can increase the
likelihood of PTSD.
Our third proposition is that variations in attachment-system function-
ing shape the posttraumatic process and the specific form that PTSD takes.
According to Horowitz (1982), the posttraumatic process is defined by two
kinds of intrapsychic manifestations of PTSD: intrusion and avoidance. In-
trusion refers to unwanted and uncontrollable thoughts, images, emotions,
and nightmares related to the traumatic event. Avoidance refers to psychic
numbing, denial of the significance and consequences of the traumatic event,
and behavioral inhibition. The relative salience of intrusion versus avoid-
ance is not constant (Horowitz, 1982). Intrusion is generally experienced
immediately after the trauma, but the two states can alternate during the
posttraumatic period until successful "working through" of the trauma is
achieved.
Attachment-related strategies are important in regulating the intensity
and frequency of posttraumatic intrusion and avoidance tendencies. On one
hand, security-based strategies can help people work through trauma, reduc-
ing the frequency and intensity of both intrusions and avoidance responses.
On the other hand, insecure attachment may render a person insufficiently
equipped for working through the trauma. Hyperactivating strategies facili-
tate reactivation of the traumatic experience and the frustrated cry for help,
which encourage what Horowitz (1982) called intrusive responses. Deactivat-
ing strategies incline a traumatized person to deny the trauma and avoid
direct or symbolic confrontation with trauma reminders, thereby encourag-
ing posttraumatic avoidance responses.
This analysis of the attachment system's role in traumatic and posttrau-
matic processes can be summarized in five hypotheses. First, traumatic events
trigger attachment-system activation. Second, mobilizing external or inter-
nal security-providing attachment figures during a traumatic period or epi-
84 MIKUUNCER, SHAVER, AND HORESH

sode helps a person to resolve the trauma and prevents the development of
PTSD. Third, failure to resolve a trauma results not only in feelings of help-
lessness and vulnerability but also in feelings of loneliness and rejection, be-
cause the trauma can shatter both a person's sense of personal safety and his
or her confidence in attachment figures' protection and support. Fourth, in-
secure individuals are more likely than their relatively secure counterparts to
develop PTSD, and anxiously attached people are more likely to suffer from
posttraumatic intrusion symptoms whereas avoidant people are more likely
to suffer from posttraumatic avoidance symptoms. Fifth, the actual or sym-
bolic mobilization of security-providing attachment figures during a post-
traumatic period can help a person heal traumatic wounds and restore emo-
tional balance.
In the following section, we review existing empirical findings con-
cerning the association between attachment style and PTSD. We also present
new findings of our own that reveal the contribution of global attachment
style and contextually activated mental representations of attachment secu-
rity to explicit and implicit manifestations of PTSD.
Researchers who study adult attachment and psychopathology have only

begun to examine posttraumatic stress. The first systematic attempt to docu-
ment attachment-style differences in the severity of PTSD symptoms con-
cerned the reactions of young adults to Iraqi Scud missile attacks on Israel
during the 1991 Gulf War (Mikulincer, Florian, & Weller, 1993). One hun-
dred and forty Israeli undergraduates were approached 2 weeks after the end
of the Gulf War and asked to complete a series of self-report measures of
attachment style, coping with the missile attacks, and PTSD symptoms. The
study revealed emotional and adjustment problems associated with attach-
ment anxiety and avoidance. Specifically, as compared with participants who
self-reported a secure attachment style, participants with an anxious attach-
ment style exhibited heightened reliance on maladaptive emotion-focused
coping, experienced higher levels of depression and anxiety after the war,
and had more severe PTSD symptoms of intrusion and avoidance. Partici-
pants with an avoidant attachment style relied more on distancing coping
with the missile attacks, denied or suppressed anxiety and depression, and
expressed distress indirectly through higher somatization and hostility after
the war and more severe posttraumatic avoidance responses.
The association between insecure attachment and PTSD-symptom se-
verity has also been observed among adults who were abused as children
(Alexander et al, 1998; Muller, Sicoli, & Lemieux, 2000) and among former
prisoners of war (POWs) in both the United States and Israel (Dieperink,
Leskela, Thuras, & Engdahl, 2001; Solomon, Ginzburg, Mikulincer, Neria,

&. Ohry, 1998). For example, Solomon et al. (1998) interviewed 164 Israeli
ex-POWs of the Yom Kippur War 18 years after hostilities ended. Partici-
pants in the study completed self-report measures of attachment style and
PTSD symptomatology and provided retrospective accounts of their experi-
ence of captivity. Anxious and avoidant ex-POWs reported more severe PTSD
symptoms than ex-POWs who were relatively secure. It is important to note
that attachment-style differences were also found in a content analysis of
accounts of the traumatic experience of captivity. On one hand, securely
attached ex-POWs reported having dealt with captivity by recruiting posi-
tive memories of, or imagining positive encounters with, significant others.
That is, they coped with the trauma by seeking symbolic proximity to, and
comfort from, internalized attachment figures. In contrast, anxious persons
mainly remembered suffering and pain, and their accounts were full of feel-
ings of helplessness, abandonment, and loss of control, which seemed to re-
flect their hyperactivation of distress and threat-related thoughts. The narra-
tives of avoidant ex-POWs reflected deactivating strategies, containing little
information about experiences during captivity but being laced with hostile
feelings about the army in which they had served.
In a recent study, Kanninen, Punamaki, and Qouta (2003) examined
the association between attachment style and PTSD among 176 Palestinian
former political prisoners living in the Gaza Strip. The statistical association
was observed mainly among political prisoners who had been exposed to high
levels of physical torture and ill treatment. In this group, participants classi-
fied as anxious or avoidant by an interview method (on the basis of the Adult
Attachment Interview; Hesse, 1999) reported more severe PTSD symptoms
than participants classified as secure. This difference was not significant among
prisoners who had been exposed to high levels of psychological torture in-
volving interpersonal cruelty. It seems that whereas secure attachment acts
as a protective safeguard against the development of PTSD following physi-
cal torture, it is less effective when the torture is interpersonal and involves
the shattering of positive working models. Perhaps this kind of torture cre-
ates or activates negative representations of self and others that successfully
undermine the protective action of a previously secure attachment style.
Although these correlational findings are compatible with the proposi-
tions we derived from attachment theory, they do not necessarily reveal a
causal connection between attachment-related processes and the formation
and course of PTSD. This is because the studies did not include assessment or
manipulation of cognitive accessibility of attachment-related representations
during or following trauma, and attachment style was not measured until
after the traumatic experience. Hence, psychological processes other than
those related to attachment may explain the observed associations between
attachment style and PTSD. In the following sections we review findings
from two new studies that examined the causal role of attachment-related
processes in the development and course of PTSD.
86 MIKULJNCER, SHAVER, AND HORESH

Daily Fluctuations in the Sense of Attachment Security and
the Course of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
In a recent study, Mikulincer, Horesh, Berant, and Gillath (2004) ex-

amined Israelis' psychological reactions during the 2003 U.S.—Iraq war. The
authors were particularly interested in Israelis' feelings about Iraq's threat to
launch nonconventional missiles against Israel in response to an American
offensive. Although no such missiles were actually launched, the Israeli gov-
ernment and media were convinced that such an attack was imminent and
that the country was once again as vulnerable as it had been during the 1991
Gulf War. During the first week of the 2003 war, Israelis therefore took many
precautions to try to cope with impending missile strikes.
Mikulincer et al. (2004) examined the effects of global, dispositional
attachment anxiety and avoidance measured before the beginning of the war
on the intensity of trauma-related symptoms (intrusion, avoidance, and
hyperarousal) during the war. These potential symptoms were assessed daily
for 21 days. In addition, each participant's feelings of being comforted and
supported by, and connected to, others (i.e., daily, context-specific feelings
of attachment security) were also assessed daily throughout the same pe-
riod. This allowed examination of two additional issues: (a) the contribu-
tion of attachment security on a given day to the intensity of trauma-re-
lated symptoms on that day and the next day, and (b) the extent to which
the actual or symbolic mobilization of security-providing figures during the
traumatic period (the daily sense of attachment security) moderated the det-
rimental effects of global attachment anxiety and avoidance on trauma-
related symptoms.
The sample included 51 Israeli undergraduates (37 women and 14 men)
who volunteered to participate in a study comprising two stages. In the first
stage, 2 months before the war, participants completed the Experiences in
Close Relationships Scale (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998), which assesses
global attachment anxiety and avoidance in close relationships. In the sec-
ond stage, 5 to 7 days before the beginning of the war, participants who had
agreed to participate in the study were asked to complete daily diary mea-
sures for 3 weeks. They completed a questionnaire each evening for 21 days.
Each day, they received 32 items dealing with war-related thoughts and feel-
ings and posttraumatic symptoms, and they were asked to rate the extent to
which they experienced each of these thoughts, feelings, and symptoms that
day. Six items tapped the unwanted intrusion of war-related feelings, thoughts,
and memories (e.g., "I thought about the war when I didn't mean to," "Im-
ages of the war popped into my mind," "I had a nightmare about the war").
Six items tapped defensive avoidance of war-related thoughts and feelings
(e.g., "I tried to remove the war from my memory," "I stayed away from re-
minders of the war," "I tried not to talk about the war"). Four items tapped
posttraumatic hyperarousal symptoms (e.g., sleep difficulties, hyperalertness,

concentration problems). Finally, four items tapped the daily sense of at-
tachment security—feelings of being supported and connected to others ("I
felt that I had someone who would be there for me," "I felt strongly con-
nected to other people").
Preliminary analyses revealed significant inverse correlations between
the global attachment dimensions and the average sense of attachment secu-
rity across the 21 days (-.41 for attachment anxiety and -.32 for avoidance).
In support of a traitlike conceptualization of attachment style, the daily re-
port of attachment security was associated with global reports of attachment
anxiety or avoidance at the beginning of the study. The correlations were
only moderate in strength, however, and large portions of the variance in the
daily reports of attachment security were not explained by global attachment
style, suggesting that the daily sense of attachment security fluctuated across
the 21 days, presumably as a result of contextual factors. This conclusion fits
with a representational network model of attachment orientations (Baldwin
et al., 1996; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003), in which incongruent attachment
orientations can coexist at chronic—global and transient—episodic levels of
the network.
The effects of global attachment style and daily attachment security on
trauma-related responses were analyzed using hierarchical linear modeling
(HLM). The data were conceptualized in terms of two levels, the lower level
included variables that could change daily and the upper level focused on
traitlike individual differences in attachment anxiety and avoidance. At the
lower level, the main question was whether the sense of attachment security
on a particular day was associated with less intense war-related distress re-
sponses—intrusion, avoidance, and hyperarousal—on that day. At the upper
level there were two questions: (a) whether global attachment anxiety and
avoidance contributed to the intensity of intrusion, avoidance, and
hyperarousal responses across the 21 days, and (b) whether these war-related
responses were shaped by interactions between global attachment style and
contextual activation of the sense of attachment security on a particular day.
With regard to daily variations in war-related intrusion, the HLM analy-
sis revealed that the sense of attachment security on a given day made a
significant unique contribution to the intensity of unwanted intrusions of
war-related feelings and thoughts on that day: The higher the sense of being
supported and connected to others, the weaker the war-related intrusions. In
addition, global attachment anxiety contributed significantly and uniquely
to war-related intrusions: The higher the attachment anxiety, the stronger
the unwanted intrusions of war-related thoughts and feelings across the 21
days. However, these two significant main effects were qualified by a signifi-
cant interaction between global attachment anxiety and the daily sense of
attachment security. Activation of attachment security on a given day was
significantly associated with weaker war-related intrusions on that day mainly
among participants who scored high on attachment anxiety. More securely

attached participants were not so strongly affected by fluctuations in the sense
of attachment security across the 21 days. Looking at the same results in a
different way, the detrimental effect of attachment anxiety on war-related
intrusions was weakened on days when participants felt comforted and con-
nected to others. No significant main effect or interaction was found for the
attachment avoidance dimension.
With regard to war-related avoidance, viewed as a particular kind of
coping response, the HLM analysis revealed that the sense of attachment
security on a given day made a significant unique contribution to the inten-
sity of war-related avoidance on that day: The higher the sense of being sup-
ported and connected to others, the weaker the avoidance of war-related
thoughts and feelings. In addition, global attachment avoidance made a sig-
nificant unique contribution to war-related avoidance: The higher the at-
tachment avoidance, the stronger the avoidance of war-related feelings and
thoughts across the 21 days. It is interesting to note that the interaction
between attachment avoidance and the daily sense of attachment security
was not significant. That is, the detrimental effect of attachment avoidance
on war-related defensive avoidance remained significant even on days when
participants felt more comforted and connected to others. No significant
main effect or interaction was found for the attachment anxiety dimension.
With regard to hyperarousal symptoms, the HLM analyses revealed that
the higher the sense of being supported by and connected to others on a
given day, the weaker the hyperarousal symptoms that day. In addition, both
attachment anxiety and avoidance had a significant effect on the intensity of
hyperarousal symptoms: The higher the attachment anxiety or avoidance,
the more intense were these symptoms across the 21 days. Although the
interaction between attachment avoidance and the daily sense of attach-
ment security was not significant, the HLM analysis yielded a significant
interaction between attachment anxiety and this daily sense of security. The
form of the interaction was similar to that found for war-related intrusions.
The detrimental effect of attachment anxiety on posttraumatic hyperarousal
symptoms was weakened on days when participants felt comforted and con-
nected to others. In contrast, the detrimental effect of attachment avoidance
remained significant even on days when participants felt a strong sense of
attachment security.
In these analyses, the associations between daily fluctuations in attach-
ment security and war-related responses were based on participants' same-
day reports. The findings can therefore be interpreted just as well by saying
that the experience of intense trauma-related symptoms on a given day in-
terfered with the sense of being comforted and connected to others on that
day. To evaluate this possibility, additional HLM analyses were conducted to
examine the contribution of the sense of attachment security on a given day
to war-related responses the next day. War-related responses on the previous
day were introduced as a covariate so that the unique contribution of the

sense of attachment security to war-related responses the next day could be
determined while controlling for war-related responses the previous day. In
other words, these HLM analyses examined the contribution of the sense of
attachment security on a given day to changes in war-related responses from
that day to the next. The results were identical to the findings previously
reported: The sense of attachment security on a given day led to more posi-
tive changes in war-related responses from that day to the next. Moreover,
the prospective effects of daily attachment security on intrusion and
hyperarousal were stronger for people who scored high on global attachment
anxiety than for people who scored low.
In the analyses reviewed so far, the data included participants' reports
across 3 weeks (1 week before the war and 2 weeks after the war's onset).
However, Mikulincer et al. (2004) also considered the possibility that 1 week
after the war's onset, Israelis began to believe that no missiles would be
launched against Israel. Therefore the intensity of PTSD responses in the
first week of the war was compared with the intensity of these responses
during the following week, and the contribution of attachment-related vari-
ables was examined separately for each of these two periods.
The findings revealed stronger war-related intrusions, avoidance, and
hyperarousal responses during the first week of war than during the second
week. In addition, HLM analyses conducted on the data for the first week
revealed similar main effects and interactions to those found in the analysis
of the 21 -day data. However, HLM analyses conducted on data from the
second week revealed that the main effects of attachment anxiety and the
interactions between attachment anxiety and the daily sense of attachment
security on war-related intrusion and hyperarousal responses were no longer
significant. However, the detrimental main effects of attachment avoidance
on war-related avoidance and hyperarousal symptoms were still significant
during the second week of war. Moreover, the healing effects of daily attach-
ment security on war-related defensive avoidance and hyperarousal symp-
toms were significant during the second week of war. Again, no significant
interaction was found between attachment avoidance and the sense of at-
tachment security during the second week of war.
The findings support our theoretical propositions and have important
implications for understanding the involvement of the attachment system in
traumatic and posttraumatic processes. Both chronic (personality) and tran-
sient (contextual) processes shape trauma-related responses. That is, both
global attachment orientations and daily fluctuations in the sense of attach-
ment security have significant and unique effects on trauma-related responses.
From a personality perspective, chronically insecure people are more likely
to suffer trauma-related reactions than chronically secure people, with anx-
iously attached individuals exhibiting more intrusion symptoms and avoidant
individuals exhibiting more avoidance symptoms. It is interesting to note
that, at least in this study, the detrimental effects of attachment avoidance

on trauma-related responses lasted longer than the detrimental effects of at-
tachment anxiety and were observed even after the greatest danger of missile
attacks subsided. From a contextual perspective, daily activation of the sense
of attachment security helped people heal traumatic wounds and weakened
the intensity of trauma-related symptoms. Moreover, this contextual activa-
tion seemed to weaken the effects of anxious individuals' hyperactivating
strategies and inhibit these strategies in a particular context (e.g., causing an
anxious person to react to the trauma of war with fewer intrusions and
hyperarousal responses than usual).
The findings also indicate that the beneficial effects of the daily sense
of attachment security on PTSD symptoms were not moderated by disposi-
tional avoidance and that the detrimental effects of attachment avoidance
on trauma-related avoidance and hyperarousal responses did not depend on
daily fluctuations in attachment security. That is, although the daily sense of
security had beneficial effects among both high and low scorers on the avoid-
ance dimension, more avoidant people did not exhibit greater benefits than
less avoidant people from feeling supported and comforted. This result has
both a bright and a dark side. On the bright side, contextual heightening of
attachment security seemed to weaken PTSD symptoms even for avoidant
individuals. On the dark side, attachment avoidance was associated with more
severe PTSD symptoms even on days when people felt relatively well sup-
ported and comforted. This makes it seem that avoidant people's deactivat-
ing strategies sometimes continue to operate even when actual or symbolic
attachment figures are available and supportive. This pattern of findings both
supports our hypothesis about the healing effects of attachment security and
encourages us to search for more effective security-based interventions to
reduce the detrimental effects of dispositional avoidance.
Experimental Activation of Attachment Security and

Implicit Responses to Trauma
The attachment system's involvement in posttraumatic processes was

also documented in a recent study by Miterany (2004), which focused on
Palestinian terrorist attacks on Israeli cities, a source of trauma to which
most Israelis have been directly or indirectly exposed for several years. The
study was designed to determine whether global and contextual attachment-
related representations affect explicit and implicit responses to trauma.
Explicit trauma-related responses were assessed with a self-report scale
tapping the kinds of posttraumatic symptoms previously discussed: intrusion,
avoidance, and hyperarousal. Implicit trauma-related responses were assessed
by measuring the cognitive accessibility of trauma-related mental represen-
tations in a Stroop color-naming task. Specifically, accessibility was
operationalized by the time needed to name the color in which a trauma-
related word was printed: The higher the latencies for naming the colors of

these words, the higher the accessibility of trauma-related thoughts was in-
ferred to be, because such thoughts apparently interfered with color naming.
Previous researchers have considered longer reactions times for naming the
colors of trauma-related words to reflect implicit manifestations of PTSD
and have found that individuals experiencing posttraumatic symptoms take
longer to name the colors of trauma-related words (see Emilien et al., 2000;
McNally, 1998, for extensive reviews). Using this implicit measure, Miterany
(2004) examined the unique and interactive effects of global attachment
style (self-reports of attachment anxiety and avoidance) and contextual ac-
tivation of attachment-security representations (subliminal priming with a
security-related word immediately before presentation of a trauma-related
word) in a Stroop task.
The study included three sessions. In the first session, which occurred
at the beginning of a semester, 120 Israeli undergraduates completed the
Experiences in Close Relationships Scale (Brennan et al., 1998), tapping glo-
bal attachment anxiety and avoidance in close relationships. In the second
session, conducted 1 month later, all 120 participants completed the PTSD
Inventory (Solomon, Neria, Ohry, Waysman, & Ginzburg, 1994), a 21-item
self-report scale based on DSM—IV symptom criteria, with regard to Palestin-
ian terrorist attacks. Participants rated the frequency with which they had ex-
perienced posttraumatic intrusion, avoidance, and hyperarousal responses re-
lated to these attacks during the previous month. On the basis of their PTSD
scores, two distinct groups of people were selected to participate in the third
session. One group—the PTSD group (n = 30)—comprised participants who
scored above the 75th percentile. The other group—the non-PTSD group (n
= 30)—contained participants who scored below the 25th percentile.
After an interval of 2 to 3 weeks, the 60 participants were invited to an
experimental session in which they performed a computerized Stroop task.
In this task, they were asked to name the color in which a target word was
presented on a computer monitor. The target words included 10 Hebrew
words connoting terror (e.g., Hamas, car bomb), 10 negatively valenced He-
brew words not related to terror (e.g., theft, illness), and 10 emotionally neu-
tral Hebrew words (e.g., table, picture). Each of these words was printed, on
different trials, in four different colors (green, blue, yellow, red) and pre-
sented randomly across 12 trials (for a total of 360 trials). Participants per-
formed each trial while being sublirninally primed with a Hebrew attach-
ment-security word (love), a positively valenced but non-attachment-related
Hebrew word (success), or a neutral Hebrew word (hat). The prime word love
was presented for 20 ms before the target word on 120 trials, the prime word
success was presented on another 120 trials, and the prime word hat was pre-
sented on the remaining 120 trials. These primes were presented in randomly
ordered blocks of trials across participants.
Findings related to self-reports of posttraumatic symptoms replicated
the previously observed association of these reports with global attachment

anxiety and avoidance. Attachment anxiety was significantly associated with
more frequent terrorism-related intrusions and hyperarousal symptoms. At-
tachment avoidance was significantly associated with more frequent defen-
sive avoidance of terrorism-related thoughts. In line with our theoretical
propositions, these findings indicate that chronically insecure people were
more likely than their more secure counterparts to suffer from PTSD symp-
toms, with anxiously attached people experiencing more intrusion symptoms
and avoidant people experiencing more avoidance symptoms.
With regard to the Stroop task, statistical analyses performed on laten-
cies for neutral and negative words revealed no significant effects of PTSD
status (non-PTSD, PTSD) and prime type (attachment security, positive,
neutral). However, the analysis of color-naming latencies for terror-related
words (after controlling for latencies associated with neutral and negative
words) revealed a significant main effect of PTSD status. This effect repli-
cated previous findings in the literature concerning the accessibility of trauma-
related thoughts among people experiencing PTSD symptoms (see Emilien
et al., 2000; McNally, 1998, for extensive reviews). Specifically, participants
in the PTSD group produced longer color-naming latencies for terror words
(higher accessibility) than participants in the non-PTSD group. However,
this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction with prime type.
The effect of PTSD status was significant only when participants were primed
with a neutral or positive word. The effect was not significant following prim-
ing with an attachment-security word (love). Therefore, priming with an at-
tachment-security word reduced the accessibility of terror-related thoughts
and eliminated the difference between PTSD and non-PTSD groups in color-
naming latencies for terror-related words. This result suggests that activation
of attachment-security representations countered a cognitive manifestation
of PTSD.
Interesting associations were also obtained between attachment anxi-
ety and avoidance, on one hand, and color-naming latencies for terror-
related words in each PTSD group and prime category, on the other. In the
non-PTSD group, attachment scores were not significantly associated with
color-naming latencies. In the PTSD group, attachment scores were signifi-
cantly correlated with the accessibility of trauma-related representations.
Specifically, attachment anxiety was significantly associated with longer
color-naming latencies for terror words (higher accessibility) following
neutral or positive priming but not following subliminal presentation of
the security-related word love. Attachment avoidance was significantly as-
sociated with longer color-naming latencies for terror words in all three
priming conditions.
The findings concerning color-naming latencies for terror words imply
that the attachment behavioral system is involved in the shaping of implicit
trauma-related responses. First, chronic attachment insecurity assessed in
terms of the anxiety and avoidance dimensions was associated with greater

accessibility of trauma-related thoughts among people with PTSD symptoms.
Second, symbolic mobilization of attachment-security representations dur-
ing the Stroop task (attachment-security priming) seemed to have a sooth-
ing or healing effect, lowering the accessibility of trauma-related thoughts
even among people who usually suffered from PTSD symptoms, and counter-
ing the detrimental effects of attachment anxiety on the accessibility of these
thoughts. However, security priming failed to reduce the detrimental effects
of attachment avoidance. The link between attachment avoidance and dis-
tress reactions was significant even following security priming, suggesting
that avoidant people's defensive strategies for dealing with trauma remain
active even when comforting representations are potentially available.
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The reviewed empirical evidence supports our theoretical proposi-

tions. Most important, the two recent studies support the hypothesis that
mobilizing external or internal forms of felt security during traumatic and
posttraumatic periods reduces the likelihood and intensity of PTSD symp-
toms, which helps to explain why dispositionally secure people are less likely
than their insecurely attached counterparts to develop PTSD. The research
both documents and helps to explain the fact that anxiously attached people
suffer from more severe posttraumatic intrusion symptoms and avoidant
people suffer from more severe posttraumatic avoidance symptoms. These
different kinds of symptoms are compatible with anxious and avoidant in-
dividuals' respective strategies of hyperactivating or deactivating their at-
tachment systems.
The studies also show that traumatized individuals respond favorably to
actual support offered by familiar others in their immediate environments
and to the attempted contextual manipulation of their immediate sense of
attachment security. It is significant that this healing effect was observed
regardless of variations in dispositional attachment avoidance and anxiety,
although it was more pronounced among anxiously attached people. Anx-
iously attached individuals appear to be very responsive to contextually aug-
mented mental representations of love, support, and security. This finding
fits with those from previous studies of marital relationships, interactions in
groups, and postpartum depression (Mikulincer, Florian, & Hirschberger,
2002; Rom & Mikulincer, 2003; Simpson, Rholes, Campbell, Tran, 6k Wil-
son, 2003) and highlights the importance of love, kindness, and support for
buffering the detrimental effects of attachment anxiety. At the same time, it
is important to note that although highly avoidant persons also seemed to
benefit from contextual activation of the sense of attachment security, they
still showed more severe PTSD symptoms than less avoidant people during
and following security augmentation.

The discovery that more chronically avoidant individuals appear to be
less influenced than chronically anxious individuals by either the amount of
support they receive on a given day or by subliminal exposure to attachment-
security words deserves further attention and elaboration. Together, these
findings imply that highly avoidant individuals are less amenable to security-
based changes in coping strategies than are highly anxious individuals. It
seems possible, on the basis of child-developmental studies (beginning with
Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978), that caregivers of avoidant in-
fants consistently rebuffed or deflected the infants' attachment behaviors,
and that, because of this early rejection, highly avoidant people need stron-
ger "doses" of support and attachment-figure availability to prevent the de-
velopment of PTSD following traumatic experiences. Alternatively or in
addition, avoidant individuals' relative impermeability to security-enhancing
stimuli may directly reflect their deactivating strategies. According to our
model (see Figure 4-1), these strategies interfere with the monitoring of cues
concerning the availability or unavailability of attachment figures, increas-
ing the likelihood that genuine and clear-cut signals of attachment-figure
availability and support will be missed or deemphasized. This impermeability
has not been evident in all of our previous studies of experimental security
enhancement (e.g., Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001), so it may be due to particu-
lar circumstances in which avoidant people are coping with distress. Future
research should be directed at understanding the nature and contextual vari-
ability of avoidant barriers to security-enhancing experiences as well as at
creating and evaluating security-enhancing interventions tailored especially
for avoidant people who have been traumatized.
Although the studies we have reviewed here constitute important ini-
tial steps in understanding the role played by the attachment system in trau-
matic and posttraumatic mental processes, more research is needed on our
hypothesized equation of traumatic helplessness with feelings of loneliness
and rejection. It is important to determine whether such feelings actually
arise during and after trauma, whether they intensify PTSD symptoms, and
whether interventions aimed at enhancing a person's sense of connected-
ness, belonging, and community can reduce or prevent PTSD symptomatol-
ogy. Beyond preventing PTSD, attachment security may contribute to the
reconstruction and strengthening of comforting, health-sustaining beliefs
shattered by trauma—that is, to posttraumatic growth (Tedeschi & Calhoun,
2004). In fact, attachment security has already been associated with cogni-
tive openness and creative exploration of personal memories and experiences
(Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003). Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) view these quali-
ties and activities as important ingredients of posttraumatic growth. Finally,
future research should examine the healing effects of actual or symbolic en-
counters with security-providing figures (e.g., family members, therapists,
God) during the posttraumatic process and explore how best to use such
encounters to improve outcomes for PTSD victims.

The study of attachment-related processes related to the etiology,
course, and treatment of PTSD is an ideal arena for interdisciplinary col-
laboration. Because attachment theory was originally conceptualized as a
theory of social and emotional development, and because attachment'
related processes are manifested most directly in family contexts, attach-
ment-oriented research on trauma and posttraumatic adjustment can cre-
ate useful bridges between personality and social psychology, developmen-
tal psychology, clinical psychology, and family psychology. More
interdisciplinary research guided by attachment theory should be conducted
on the ways in which adaptive and maladaptive strategies of emotion regula-
tion are developed within families.
In the same way that "attachment injuries" have proven useful as a
focus for marital therapy (Johnson, 2004, p. 378), it would be worthwhile to
examine the role of attachment wounds in the development of attachment
insecurity and vulnerability to trauma and PTSD. Attachment theory leads
us to expect that major failures of support during previous traumatic events
(e.g., being abandoned by a parent, exploited by a trusted teacher, or cuck-
olded by a spouse) will cause a person to feel especially vulnerable to a lack of
support during subsequent traumas. As Bowlby (1969/1982) so forcefully ar-
gued when criticizing his psychoanalytic colleagues' emphasis on fantasy rather
than reality, working models of attachment are tolerably accurate reflections
of a person's actual experiences. Overcoming working models based on ac-
tual attachment injuries and providing countervailing experiences and im-
ages of love and support should be major goals of parenting, mentoring, coun-
seling, and marriage.
Research has demonstrated that attachment theory applies beyond the
realm of close relationships to social life more generally. In the preceding
chapter of this volume, Pietromonaco and colleagues emphasized the inter-
personal aspects of attachment and the attachment system's role in regulat-
ing interpersonal conflict in close relationships. In this chapter, we have
focused on intrapsychic aspects of attachment-system functioning and the
healing effects of attachment security during and following exposure to trau-
matic events, while showing indirectly how community-level and even in-
ternational events can affect and interact with attachment-related processes.
These chapters should be integrated with our previous writings (e.g.,
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2003), which showed that people who are either se-
cure in a dispositional sense or induced to feel more secure in a particular
context are less threatened than their insecure counterparts by novel infor-
mation and are better able to tolerate intergroup diversity, more likely to
maintain broadly humane values, more able to creatively and flexibly ex-
plore their own beliefs and feelings, and more likely to regard others compas-
sionately and behave prosocially. In light of this research it seems likely that
if human beings were helped by their families, communities, schools, reli-
gious institutions, and cultural media to become more secure, they would be

better able to avoid manmade disasters, cope effectively with natural ones,
and perhaps even grow from unavoidable trauma and adversity.
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HAPPY VICTIMIZATION:
5
EMOTION DYSREGULATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF INSTRUMENTAL,
PROACTIVE AGGRESSION
WILLIAM F. ARSENIO
In their review of the extensive literature on emotion regulation, Cole,

Martin, and Dennis (2004) recently attempted to clarify how and why emo-
tions, which are supposedly regulatory and biologically adaptive to begin with,
often need to be regulated. Numerous commentaries following their review
then proceeded to debate the nature, origins, and consequences of children's
emotion regulation in ways that reveal how much remains to be learned about
these emerging abilities. Yet, despite the numerous unresolved questions raised
in this debate, a working consensus seems to have emerged regarding two
major issues: (a) individual differences in children's abilities to regulate their
emotions are related to variations in their social competence as well as their
risk for psychopathology; and (b) parents, other caregivers, and the larger
sociocultural context have a substantial influence on children's emerging
abilities to regulate emotions.
This chapter focuses on children's emotion experiences and their abili-
ties to regulate these emotions in the context of aggressive interactions. The
101
fact that "many studies of emotion regulation center on the control of ag-
gressive or hostile behavior" (Campos, Frankel, & Camras, 2004, p. 385) is
not surprising given the major social and individual costs of aggression and
other disruptive behaviors (see Dodge & Pettit, 2003, for a review). To date,
however, nearly all of the developmental research has addressed the role of
children's frustration, anger, and other dysregulated negative emotions. Al-
though this classical view of reactive or "hot-headed" aggression has long
historical roots, there is also a growing interest in a more instrumental, pro-
active form of aggression (Coie & Dodge, 1998) that may have very different
connections with children's emotions and emotion regulatory abilities.
Much of the research my students and I have conducted suggests that
children's and adolescents' positive emotions also play an important role in
their aggressive tendencies. As described in the following sections, we have
found that preschoolers typically expect to feel happy following successful
acts of victimization (i.e., harming others for physical or psychological gains),
and our observational research suggests that preschoolers who actually dis-
play more frequent positive emotions during aggressive interactions are both
more aggressive and disliked by their peers. Moreover, recent work reveals
that behaviorally disruptive adolescents expect to feel more positive than
their peers following acts of aggressive victimization.
I argue that, collectively, this research raises several themes that are
especially relevant for research on emotion regulation in families:
1. Most emotion regulation research addresses children's need
to control or modulate already experienced negative emotions.
How does "happy victimization" fit into this framework? Are
the display and expectation of positive emotions in aggres-
sive contexts related to difficulties in regulating ongoing emo-
tions or to children's problematic emotion-related appraisals?
2. What are the parental and cultural forces implicated in the
developmental emergence of happy victimization? Are these
different from the contributors already implicated in children's
angry aggressive trajectories? Does the disruption of early at-
tachment relationships and empathic ties play a unique role
in happy victimization?
CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION
Happy Victimization—Theory and Early Research

[Many of our behavioral decisions are influenced by] an anticipation of
the way we will feel in some future situation. A child's readiness to go to
school, to brave the dentist, to seek out a new friend, or to run away from
punishment is based on an appraisal of how he or she will feel when
facing those situations. (Harris, 1985, p. 162)
J 02 WILLIAM F. ARSENIC)
Almost 20 years ago, some moral development researchers began to
focus on children's understanding of moral emotions and what that knowl-
edge might reveal about the connections among moral reasoning, emotions,
and behavior. Much of this work was implicitly guided by the reasoning re-
flected in the preceding quote by Harris. In brief, children often remember
the emotional antecedents and consequences of events, and this information
can be very useful for anticipating the emotional outcomes of different be-
haviors. Moral development researchers were aware that the events they stud-
ied, ranging from aggression and victimization to transgressions of social con-
ventions, were especially likely to elicit strong emotions that would be easily
remembered and stored in memory as part of children's affect-event repre-
sentations (see Arsenic, Gold, & Adams, 2006).
In one early study on this topic, Nunner-Winkler and Sodian (1988)
proposed that moral events were likely to produce intense but conflicting
emotions, including some happiness and satisfaction resulting from the gains
resulting from victimization, as well as sadness, guilt, and other negative
emotions from observing the consequences for others. Instead, however, re-
sults of this three-part study revealed that young children uniformly expected
victimizers to feel happy, although by age 8 nearly all children expected vic-
timizers to feel a mix of negative emotions. Moreover, another study (Barden,
Zelko, Duncan, & Masters, 1980) revealed that most young children ex-
pected to feel happy when they themselves were placed in the hypothetical
role of the victimizer (e.g., successfully stealing someone's candy).
Although my colleagues and I obtained similar findings in some of our
initial research, we shared Nunner-Winkler and Sodian's (1988) expecta-
tion that even young children's representations of moral victimizers must
include both positive and negative emotion expectancies. Perhaps young
children's happy victimizer conceptions were just the result of some combi-
nation of methodological limitations and children's underlying cognitive
difficulties with the task. To address these issues we (Arsenic & Kramer,
1992) asked 4-, 6-, and 8-year-olds to judge the likely emotional consequences
of acts of victimization and to provide rationales for those judgments for
both victims and victimizers. And to increase the moral salience of these
events, story characters were described as good friends, making it less likely
that the victimizer would simply be seen as a bully. Finally, after eliciting
these initial emotion attributions, children were probed regarding other pos-
sible emotional reactions of the victimizer, using a series of increasingly di-
rect questions (beginning with "Could [the victimizer] be feeling anything
else? What?").
Results revealed that all but 2 (out of 32) 4- and 6-year-olds still ex-
pected victimizers to feel happy, as did about one half of the 8-year-olds,
even though almost all children expected victims to feel exclusively nega-
tive emotions. The probe-related findings, however, indicated that nearly all
of the 8-year-olds who initially expected victimizers to feel happy and three
HAPPY VICTIMIZATION 103

quarters of all 6-year-olds responded to the least direct probe ("anything else?")
by providing an additional negative-valence emotion ("She was happy she
got the candy but sad that her friend might not talk to her"). By contrast, two
thirds of the 4-year-olds insisted that victimizers could only feel happy, even
after being explicitly directed to the loss and suffering experienced by the
victim on the final probe. (A separate assessment indicated that probing did
not change children's views of victims' feelings, suggesting that probing, per
se, did not lead to a change in victimizers' emotions.)
On the basis of these and other related findings, I concluded that 4-
year-olds appear to view victims and victimizers as having two noninteracting
sets of emotional responses to this single victimizing act (perhaps because of
cognitive constraints involving the coordination of mixed, i.e., positive and
negative, emotion-event representations [Harter & Buddin, 1987]). By con-
trast, the findings that 6- and 8-year-olds so easily changed from positive to
negative emotion attributions for victimizers suggested an age-related moral
attributional shift. That is, the emotions attributed to victimizers appear to
be influenced by the expected emotional reactions of victims. Furthermore,
this age-related shift could reflect a changing developmental understanding
of a basic moral conflict—to victimize is to gain desirable outcomes and to
feel happy, but to be victimized is to lose what is yours and to feel sadness,
anger, and other clearly negative emotions.
If correct, these claims support a view of moral development as involv-
ing an underlying ability and spontaneous tendency (Hoffman, 1981, 2000)
to integrate the two halves of this moral conflict, that is, both understanding
and feeling that the victims' pain and loss will moderate one's own happiness
regarding the gains produced by victimization. At a cognitive level, these
empathic tendencies depend on children's ability to recognize and under-
stand others' emotional states, as well as children's understanding that they
are responsible for producing the other person's current distress. At an affec-
tive level, these empathic tendencies depend on an emotional response to the
distress that has been inflicted on the victim: "I feel your pain and it affects
me." As a consequence, disruptions in either the cognitive or affective as-
pects of this integration are likely to have significant effects on children's
victimizing behavior (see the following section for more information).
Observational Studies Involving "Happy Victimization"

Although there are more than 20 studies on various aspects of children's
"happy victimization" to date (see Arsenio et al., 2006, for a review), ques-
tions have been raised about the psychological meaning and significance of
these findings (e.g., Keller, Lourenco, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003). One obvi-
ous initial question is whether young children, in fact, do display frequent
positive emotions when initiating aggressive and victimizing acts. To address
this issue, my colleagues and I have conducted a series of observational stud-
J 04 WILLIAM F, ARSENIO
ies on the emotions that young children display in the context of peer con-
flicts and aggression.
The most extensive of these studies (Arsenio, Cooperman, &. Lover,
2000) was designed to address the connections between 51 preschoolers'
emotional dispositions and knowledge, and aspects of their aggression and
social competence. Over the course of a year observational assessments were
made of the emotions preschoolers displayed both during and outside of their
aggressive interactions with peers, as well as of children's involvement in
aggressive encounters. Additional assessments addressed children's emotion
knowledge (e.g., recognition and labeling) and ratings of how much they
liked their peers, as well as teacher ratings of children's social competence.
Substantial differences were found in the connections between children's
emotional dispositions (i.e., their tendency to display happiness or anger)
and their aggressive behaviors, depending on the context in which those
emotions were observed. Specifically, children with higher levels of happiness
outside of aggression (as a percentage of emotions displayed) initiated fewer
aggressive acts, but, as expected, children who displayed more aggression-
related happiness initiated more aggression. Furthermore, although children
often displayed either anger or happiness when initiating aggression, only
their tendency to display more happiness was associated with greater aggres-
siveness and peer disliking. Mediation analyses also revealed that only aggres-
sion-related happiness had somewhat of a direct connection with peer liking,
with the rest of the connections between emotion-related variables and peer
liking being mediated by children's aggressiveness. Finally, victims of aggres-
sion were more distressed (showed more displays of sadness or anger) when
aggressors were happy than when aggressors displayed other emotions.
Similar findings by Miller and Olson (2000) support the role of ob-
served happy victimization in predicting children's social competence. In
that study, young children who engaged in more "gleeful taunting" during a
structured peer interaction task at the beginning of the year were rated 9
months later as less socially competent by peers and teachers. Moreover, in a
composite measure of children's problematic behavior, gleeful taunting ac-
counted for more than six times the variance of any other emotion variable.
Collectively, the results of these studies suggest that young children's fre-
quent normative tendency to be happy when initiating aggression is consis-
tent with children's conceptions that victimizers are often happy. In addi-
tion, however, this observational research indicates that individual differences
in children's actual tendencies to be happy victimizers are strongly connected
with their peer-related aggression and overall social competence.
Reactive and Proactive Aggression

The work previously described raises a number of questions, beginning
with how this focus on happy victimization can be reconciled with the long-

standing traditional emphasis on the close ties between anger and aggression
(e.g., see Bradley, 2000). One resolution begins with Dodge's social informa-
tion processing (SIP) model of children's social adjustment and competence
(e.g., see Dodge, Lochman, Harnish, Bates, & Pettit, 1997). In this model
children's reasoning and behavior involving aggressive events are described
in terms of six more or less sequential information-processing steps (i.e.,
encoding, interpretation, clarification of goals, response access and selec-
tion, and behavioral enactment). Research based on this model (see Coie
& Dodge, 1998, for a review) has been particularly successful in explaining
how children's aggression is related to various biases and deficits during
their "on-line" social reasoning about potentially provocative social events.
Perhaps the best-known finding involves the "hostile attributional bias," that
is, some children's tendency to (mis)attribute hostile intentions to others in
ambiguous provocation situations is a major predictor of their hostile aggres-
sive behavior.
Subsequent SIP research, however, suggests that this hostile attributional
bias characterizes only one important subtype of aggression, reactive aggres-
sion, which is linked with classical frustration-aggression-anger theories. On
the basis of both observational assessments and teacher ratings, a second
more "proactive" form of aggression has also been identified—a type of ag-
gression that is thought to be motivated more by expectations of reward than
by anger or deficits in intention—cue detection. Although assessments of proac-
tive and reactive aggression typically show high levels of overlap, proactive
aggression appears to be associated with a unique set of social-information-
processing biases and deficits. Specifically, compared with their peers, proac-
tive aggressive children exhibit a preference for instrumental rather than
social goals, a bias toward viewing aggression as an effective means for ob-
taining goals, and a belief in their own efficacy for enacting aggressive be-
havior (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001).
Although reactive aggression is sometimes described as "hot-headed"
and proactive aggression as "cold-blooded," research on the emotional as-
pects of these forms of aggression is really just beginning. For proactive ag-
gression, a single emotional correlate has been studied, although it is one
with direct relevance for understanding children's conceptions of happy vic-
timization. Children are sometimes asked to rate how they would feel (from
"very bad" to "very good") after responding aggressively to a peer's hypo-
thetical provocation. Results from one study (Dodge et al., 1997) indicate
that proactive aggressive children expect to feel more positive following their
proactive aggression than either reactive or nonaggressive children.
Adolescents' Emotion Attributions
In a recent study, my colleagues and I (Arsenio, Gold, & Adams,

2004) sought to extend the Dodge et al. (1997) research by examining
106 WILLIAM F. ARSENIO

adolescents' conceptions of the emotional outcomes of different types of
aggression and non-aggression-related events. Our goals were both to ob-
tain a normative picture of participants' expected emotional consequences
and to examine whether adolescents with behavior problems would view
the consequences of such events differently from their peers. (Adolescents
were chosen because of the lack of research on their conceptions of moral
emotions.) Another focus was on examining whether adolescents' emotion
expectancies had different connections with reactive and proactive aggres-
sive tendencies.
A total of 100 adolescents (about two thirds boys, all African Ameri-
can or Latino) from a low-income urban environment participated. One half
of the adolescents had previously been diagnosed by school psychologists as
meeting DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th
ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria for either conduct dis-
order or oppositional defiant disorder. The comparison group came from the
same public school system attended by the behaviorally disruptive (BD) ado-
lescents, and the two groups did not differ in terms of age, gender, ethnic
composition, or socioeconomic status.
Adolescents were individually administered a multipart interview that
included an assessment of their verbal abilities, as well as assessments of their
emotion expectancies regarding both proactive aggression and non-aggression-
related events. Participants judged how they expected to feel as a conse-
quence of these different story scenarios by dividing 10 plastic chips as de-
sired between 5 emotion categories—happy, sad, mad, scared, and neutral
affect (e.g., 7 chips on happy and 3 on neutral affect). For proactive aggres-
sion stories, adolescents were asked to imagine themselves in the role of the
person who initiated the aggression, and for nonaggression stories adoles-
cents assumed the role of the central character in events expected (on the
basis of previous research) to elicit emotion attributions involving either
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, or a mixture of fear and sadness. Finally, the
adolescents' teachers completed assessments of the participants' reactive and
proactive aggressive tendencies as well as their overall externalizing patterns
(Achenbach, 1991).
Analyses indicated that BD and comparison adolescents expected to
feel quite differently in response to these various types of events. For nonag-
gression stories, BD adolescents were somewhat more likely than their peers to
expect to feel angry in response to events that normatively did not elicit anger
attributions. Furthermore, across all emotion-eliciting categories, BD adoles-
cents expected to feel fewer normative emotions than comparison adolescents.
Finally, as hypothesized, BD adolescents expected to feel significantly happier
than their peers following acts of proactive aggression that produced clear ma-
terial and psychological gains. Although BD adolescents did not rate them-
selves as feeling especially happy following their victimization, it was still
their modal emotion choice (BD 3.31 chips vs. comparison 1.67).

Subsequent regression analyses revealed that this "proactive aggression
happiness" was a unique predictor of adolescents' externalizing tendencies.
Even after accounting for the influence of verbal ability and other forms of
significant non-aggression-related emotion knowledge, adolescents' expec-
tation of happiness following proactive aggression was a significant predictor
of their externalizing tendencies. Moreover, these findings were not moder-
ated by adolescents' behavioral status. In other words, despite mean group
differences for some of these variables, the associations between variables
(e.g., proactive happiness and externalizing) did not differ between the groups.
In terms of adolescents' reactive and proactive aggression tendencies, proac-
tive aggression happiness was uniquely associated with teacher ratings of ado-
lescents' proactive aggression but not their reactive aggression.
These findings involving adolescents' conceptions and the observational
findings for young children collectively support the idea that "happy victim-
ization" plays an important, if little understood, role in the development of
some children's aggressive and socially incompetent behavior. There is also
some initial evidence that this victimization is a form of proactive aggres-
sion, or at least that it is more closely associated with proactive than reactive
aggression. Yet, despite these contributions, almost nothing is known about
how and why this happy victimization first emerges.
The remainder of this chapter provides some first steps toward address-
ing these issues. To anticipate the discussion, the "how" and "why" questions
are seen as closely related, and both are explained in terms of a form of emo-
tion dysregulation that has its roots in pervasive attachment disruptions that
affect children's sense of emotional reciprocity and subsequent empathic ten-
dencies. For the sake of simplicity, however, the "how" question is addressed
first ("How does happy victimization emerge and what does this have to do
emotion regulation?"), followed by an exploration of "why" in terms of pos-
sible family influences.
LINKING EMOTION DYSREGULATION

AND HAPPY VICTIMIZATION
It is easy to see how the classic "frustration-anger-aggression" model

involves emotion dysregulation, with children misinterpreting or overreact-
ing to situations in which they believe someone is deliberately trying to block
a desirable, maybe even legitimate, goal. Intense, excessive anger follows,
and perhaps without their fully realizing it, that anger leads some children to
become aggressive. By contrast, happy victimization seems more controlled,
more intentional, arid the resulting emotion is often a product of the success-
ful instrumental use of aggression to take what belongs to others. Yet, as
Cole, Michel, and Teti (1994) noted, emotion dysregulation involves more
than controlling negative emotions. "Positive emotions can be dysregulatory
I08 WILLIAM F. ARSENIC

Victimizer Victimizer
initially feels then feels
+++ +/- or --
\
but recognizes involuntary
affective response
\
Victim feels
Figure 5.1. Simplified view of victimizers' empathic responses to the pain and loss
experienced by their victim.
and dysregulating... [for example] laughing at another person's distress [when]

positive affect is not modulated so as to take account of the other's distress"
(p. 84; see also chap. 6, this volume, on antecedent regulation, i.e., regulat-
ing emotions before they are elicited). Regardless of whether the resulting
emotions are positive or negative, a child's failure to recognize or to be suit-
ably responsive to the emotional states of others can be a basic cause of emo-
tion dysregulation. In this sense, happy victimization presents a clear, if some-
what complex, problem with children's emotion regulatory abilities.
My colleague Elizabeth Lemerise and I have begun to address some of
these issues as part of a larger discussion (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001, 2004)
on the potential affective underpinnings of aggression. In brief, we have
argued that the social cognitive biases and deficits associated with aggres-
sion and victimization are—at their core—a product of pervasive failures
or disruptions in underlying empathic tendencies. Happy victimization, in
particular, is viewed as stemming from a basic lack of emotional respon-
siveness to others that runs counter to certain biologically rooted empathic
tendencies (Hoffman, 1981). Finally, these empathic difficulties are seen as
resulting from shared adult-child interactional histories (e.g., attachment
patterns) characterized by ongoing problems with emotion regulation and
responsiveness.
Figure 5.1 shows a simplified picture of how empathy typically influ-
ences nonaggressive children's victimization (e.g., see Hoffman, 2000). Young
children may initially start out feeling happy about the potential or realized
gains produced by victimization—the desired toy or the turn on the swing
without waiting. Then, however, as part of a gradual developmental transfor-
mation, they both directly observe or are directed to observe their victims'
emotional responses (by victims themselves as well as by other socializing
agents). Once the victimizer becomes aware of the victim's negative emo-
HAPPY VICTIMIZATION I 09
tions, underlying empathic mechanisms take effect and cause the victimizer
to respond and, to some extent, share the strong negative emotions expressed
by the victim. Along with this affective recognition and response, the vic-
timizing child is aware that (a) he or she is the source of the other child's
pain and suffering and (b) the victimization was intentional and could have
been avoided by choosing an alternative behavior.
With repeated exposures to acts of victimization both as victimizers
and victims, most young children then gradually develop mental representa-
tions of aggressive victimization that include strong mixed emotions and of-
ten guilt. Finally, these representations begin to play an anticipatory role, so
that even contemplating victimization may elicit either hot or cold (i.e., emo-
tionally arousing or nonarousing) cognitions about the negative emotions as-
sociated with these acts (Hoffman, 2000). At times, however, this normative
developmental integration of cognitive and affective contributors to empathy
can fail or become disrupted. At the heart of these empathic difficulties, in
the present model, is the early role of attachment relationships and their
effects on parent-child and child-child emotional reciprocity.
Attachment, Temperament, Empathy, and Behavior Problems
A number of studies have addressed the connections between children's

attachment patterns and their emerging behavior problems and externaliz-
ing tendencies. Although initial studies of this topic provided somewhat mixed
findings, there is a growing agreement that when insecure early attachments
combine with low socioeconomic status (SES) and other sociocultural stres-
sors, affected children are at a greatly elevated risk for behavior problems
(see Greenberg, 1999, for a review). For example, in one longitudinal study
Lyons-Ruth and colleagues followed a high-risk sample that included many
depressed mothers. Results revealed that the majority (55%) of children who
had been classified as disorganized in infancy and who had a mother with
psychosocial problems subsequently exhibited hostile behaviors in kinder-
garten (compared with only 5% of those children without either risk factor).
Other studies also suggest that disorganized attachments may play a unique
role in the emergence of children's behavior problems. This is not surprising
given that disorganized attachments are often associated with parental abuse
and neglect and an inability to develop any effective strategy for attaining
the central biological goal of the attachment system—that is, maintaining
proximity to caregivers (Lyons-Ruth & Jacobvitz, 1999).
Despite the growing support for connections among children's attach-
ment, high-risk status, and externalizing tendencies, there is much less con-
sensus about the mechanisms underlying these connections (Dodge & Pettit,
2003). Furthermore, there is almost no research on the related question that
is the focus of this chapter: Why is it that some children do not alter their
initially positive emotional views of victimization? In what follows, a brief

outline of an explanatory model is offered, a model that borrows freely from
various ideas elaborated in much greater detail by Hoffman (2000), Fonagy
(2004), Cassidy (1994), Kochanska (1995), and others.
The central ideas of this model can be summarized as follows:
(a) children's attachment status is, in large part, the product of a shared pat-
tern of parent-child emotional reciprocity in which adults typically play a
greater role; (b) in some cases, however, children's temperamental and dis-
positional tendencies may have a significant influence on parent-child emo-
tional reciprocity; (c) resulting patterns of emotional reciprocity affect
children's empathic tendencies; and (d) in turn, differences in emotional
reciprocity and attachment are connected with children's mental represen-
tations of victimization and aggression. In this view, patterns of parent-child
emotional reciprocity provide the foundation for children's understanding of
moral reciprocity (i.e., fair and equitable treatment) and influence their sub-
sequent aggressive tendencies.
Secure attachment is typically described as the product of (relatively)
consistent caregiver responsiveness to young children's biological and emo-
tional needs. And as many have noted, emotional factors including children's
"felt security" and caregivers' sensitivity to infants' emotional signals play a
key role in this responsive interplay (Sroufe & Waters, 1977). As securely
attached infants grow into toddlers and preschool-age children, these early
patterns of emotional reciprocity then allow children to freely share both
their positive and negative emotionally charged experiences with caregivers
(Cassidy, 1994). Overall, securely attached children can expect to share nega-
tive feelings, including those directed at their caregivers, within the bound-
aries of a relationship characterized by trust and mutual emotion regulation.
Children's temperament and dispositional tendencies, however, can
have an important influence on both attachment and parent-child emo-
tional reciprocity. For example, Vaughn and Bost (1999) noted that although
attachment and temperament are generally orthogonal, infant irritability in
combination with low parental social or economic resources increases the
likelihood of insecure attachment. In a related vein, Kochanska (1995) has
examined an influential model of how children's temperament, attachment
status, and parent—child emotional reciprocity are linked with the develop-
ment of children's guilt and moral internalization. One key finding is that for
children who are temperamentally relatively fearless, moral internalization
and compliance with adults depend on a history of mutually positive parent-
child interactions and secure child attachment.
Yet, even though attachment and temperament sometimes interact (see
the following section), insecurely attached children, in general, encounter a
very different pattern of parent-child emotional reciprocity than their se-
curely attached peers. For some insecurely attached children, the core im-
plicit message from adults is that children must learn to filter or distort their
emotional experiences before adults will respond. Although many of these

children will develop a more or less successful strategy for maintaining emo-
tional and physical proximity, some insecurely attached children will be faced
with adults who are fundamentally emotionally unresponsive. A combina-
tion of mental disorders (e.g., depression), extreme sociocultural stressors
including poverty, previous abuse and neglect, and related factors makes it
impossible for some parents to provide their children with even minimal
psychologically adequate levels of contingent emotional responsiveness. In
turn, these children are likely to develop severely disrupted attachment pat-
terns and to develop internal working models of these relationships that im-
plicitly reflect messages such as "in this life you're on your own" and "others
are out to get me."
Although there is only limited support for this model, the broad out-
lines are consistent with several studies (e.g., see Troy & Sroufe, 1987, on
connections among attachment, empathy, and aggression). In a more gen-
eral sense, the present approach is somewhat related to a model outlined by
Fonagy (e.g., 2004) in which he argued that insecure attachments under-
mine children's understanding of both their own and others' mental states in
ways that increase the likelihood of peer aggression and victimization. In his
view, the lack of contingent responsiveness between caregivers and infants,
in particular, acts to weaken insecurely attached children's understanding of
others' mental states. Because less responsive adults inadvertently make their
needs, beliefs, and desires somewhat more opaque to their children, these
children develop less elaborated theories of mind involving these mental
states than securely attached children. As a consequence, insecurely attached
children are less likely to consider or understand the needs and feelings of
others, and they are subsequently more likely to victimize their peers.
Returning to Figure 5.1, Fonagy's model is especially helpful for ex-
plaining the behavior of those children who are aggressive because of a rela-
tive inability to recognize or understand victims' emotions, which then re-
sults in a failure to activate underlying empathic tendencies. There are,
however, some aggressive children who do not appear to be experiencing
failures in either their mentalizing or other social cognitive abilities (e.g., see
Sutton, Smith, & Swettenham, 1999). As noted earlier, this other group
may be characterized by a more "cold-blooded" proactive form of aggression
in which some children may be quite aware of the consequences of their
actions for the victim but be emotionally unmoved and unaffected by those
reactions. For these children, the problem is more one of emotional respon-
siveness than of social understanding, per se (see also Arsenic & Lemerise,
2001, 2004).
Empathy and Aggression: Further Distinctions
This distinction between being relatively unaware versus unconcerned

regarding the emotional costs of victimization for victims is important for
112 WILLIAM F. ARSENIC

addressing the next set of questions: What are the specific empathic mecha-
nisms associated with proactive aggression and happy victimization? What
role do parents' and children's temperaments play in these connections? To
date, there is neither empirical nor theoretical work on these specific ques-
tions. As a consequence, what follows is necessarily more suggestive than
definitive.
Fonagy's account of the empathically unaware seems consistent with
descriptions of more reactively aggressive children. Because these children
have deficits in understanding the needs, beliefs, and desires of others, they
are also likely to have difficulty understanding others' intentions and, conse-
quently, to exhibit the hostile attributional biases typically associated with
reactive aggression. In other words, these children often assume others are
being deliberately provocative and aggressive when, in fact, they are not. At
an affective level, the empathically unaware are likely to respond with what
they believe is legitimate (i.e., provoked) anger, frustration, and retaliatory
aggression. By contrast, children who are more proactively aggressive are less
likely to have difficulties in recognizing or understanding the emotional re-
actions of others. So, although they are less likely to engage in "misfired"
aggression, their lack of emotional responsiveness to victims makes it easier
for them to use aggression instrumentally and to feel emotionally positive
about the resulting physical and psychological gains.
What about the attachment and parenting antecedents of these pat-
terns? The model presented to this point does not really explain these differ-
ent paths to aggression (i.e., "empathically unaware" is associated with reac-
tive aggression, whereas "empathically unconcerned" is linked to proactive
aggression). Part of what may be missing is an understanding of how child
temperament or dispositional characteristics combine with particular aspects
of parenting. For example, one promising approach (Frick, O'Brien, Wootton,
& McBurnett, 1994) begins by distinguishing two groups of children with
behavior problems, "[those] prone to poor impulse control (e.g., becomes
angry when corrected) [versus those] characterized by a lack of guilt, lack of
empathy, and superficial charm" (p. 704). In subsequent studies, these re-
searchers (Wootton, Frick, Shelton, & Silverthorn, 1997) examined how
ineffective parenting, including inconsistent discipline and lack of parental
involvement, was related to these two types of problems—impulsivity versus
callous-unemotional [CU] traits—in a group of mostly clinically referred 6-
to 13-year-olds. As expected, ineffective parenting was associated with higher
levels of conduct problems, but, unexpectedly, this held only for those chil-
dren without CU traits: Children high in CU traits had high levels of con-
duct problems regardless of parental effectiveness.
Kochanska's research with normally functioning children provides a
potential explanation for this last finding involving children high in CU
traits. As mentioned earlier, Kochanska (1995) found that temperamentally
more fearless toddlers develop higher levels of moral internalization (and

presumably less victimization) when they are securely attached and when
parents have developed reciprocal affectively positive relationships with their
children. In a subsequent longitudinal study Kochanska (2004) confirmed
the importance of what she calls the two-process model of conscience devel-
opment. Children's secure attachment at 14 months increased the cumula-
tive positive influence of effective parenting (e.g., nonpunitive responsive-
ness) when children were between 14 and 45 months of age and resulted in
higher levels of both moral conduct and reasoning when children were 56
months of age. Extrapolating from these findings, it may be that for children
prone to CU traits, secure attachments in infancy (which were not assessed
by Wootton et al., 1997) act as a necessary precondition for responsiveness
to parents' subsequent attempts at moral socialization.
In summary, pervasive early failures in parent—child emotional reci-
procity (with attachment reflecting that reciprocity) may promote children's
victimizing behaviors by undermining nascent empathic tendencies in one
of two ways: (a) some children may become so self-focused they do not easily
recognize their victims' pain and losses and (b) other children may learn to
view their victims' emotional reactions as simply irrelevant when they con-
flict with the victimizer's own desires and goals. The second set of empathic
failures (i.e., a lack of empathic concern or responsiveness) is expected to be
especially predictive of higher levels of "happy victimization" and proactive-
instrumental aggression. In terms of the origins of this pattern, these chil-
dren may be temperamentally less responsive to parenting that utilizes power
assertion and other fear-inducing techniques, especially when that parenting
is built on an earlier base of insecure child attachment. Over time these
parents may attempt to escalate their ineffective punitive socialization ef-
forts, leading to even more disrupted parent-child emotional reciprocity, and
a severing or truncation of childrens' emotional responsiveness to others (in-
cluding potential victims).
Potential Parental Contributors to the Model
Up to this point, a somewhat complex model has been proposed in

which children's conceptions and behaviors involving happy victimization
are seen as the product of parent—child emotional patterns and child tem-
perament affecting children's attachment, internal working models, and
empathic tendencies. Although some aspects of this model have been as-
sessed by Kochanska (e.g., 1995, 2004), Frick (e.g., Frick et al., 1994), and
others, almost nothing is known about other essential components of the
model, such as the unique developmental origins of children's proactive and
reactive aggressive tendencies (Coie & Dodge, 1998), and especially paren-
tal and other sociocultural contributors to children's happy victimization.
To date, my research on this last issue has focused on a much more
modest, reduced version of the model described previously. In my initial re-
114 WILLIAM F. ARSENIC

search, I (Arsenio, Ramos-Marcuse, & Hoffman, 2006; Ramos-Marcuse &
Arsenic, 2001) have attempted to examine the connections of preschoolers'
conceptions of happy victimization and other moral emotions with parental
disciplinary strategies. Participants included a group of developmentally at-
risk, lower-SES African American and Latino 4- and 5-year-olds and their
mostly single parents. About one half of the 63 children had been referred to
a university-based clinic because of early behavioral problems, and the other
children came from preschools in the same area served by the clinic. The
groups did not differ in terms of gender, race and ethnicity, SES, or expres-
sive language abilities.
Previous research has shown so little variability in preschoolers' con-
ceptions of happy victimization (in contrast to adolescents) that it has been
difficult to examine connections between those conceptions and young
children's emerging aggression and behavioral problems. As a consequence,
my colleagues and I adapted techniques from the widely used MacArthur
Story Stem Battery (MSSB), in which children are presented with the begin-
ning of some story or event and then asked to enact what they expect to
follow using engaging, age-appropriate materials. An extensive literature has
shown this technique provides an especially sensitive and effective way of
getting at young children's underlying mental representation of emotionally
charged relationships (Emde, Wolf, & Oppenheim, 2003). This study modi-
fied a moral version of this assessment (Kochanska, Padavich, & Koenig,
1996) so that children were presented with situations in which they had
victimized another child (e.g., taking his or her bike), and participants were
then asked how they would feel and what would happen next.
In addition to this child assessment, parents and other adults (teachers
or therapists) completed appropriate versions of the Child Behavior Check-
list (e.g., see Achenbach, 1991). Parents also completed the Parenting Di-
mensions Inventory (PDI), which assesses several self-reported dimensions
of parenting style including parental support, control, and specific disciplin-
ary techniques. Multiple studies have shown that the PDI predicts important
variations in low-SES adults' parenting style as well as various aspects of
children's behavior (see Power, 1992).
Children's judgments about how they would feel as victimizers in these
stories were consistent with previous literature, although contrary to initial
expectations. In nearly 80% of their judgments, both clinic and nonclinic
children said they expected to feel happy (clinic M = 3.15 vs. nonclinic M =
3.21 out of 4 stories), which both groups typically justified by referring to the
desirable gains produced by victimization. Coding of children's subsequent
responses ("What happens then?"), however, revealed important group dif-
ferences for one broad category. Nonclinic children were nearly twice as likely
as clinic children (23% vs. 12% of all responses) to say they would make
reparations to their victims, a category that included offering apologies, re-
turning stolen or seized property, or admitting blame (e.g., "I would say sorry

and give him his bike back"). It appears that although neither group was able
to resist the initial salience of the (hypothetical) gain and happiness result'
ing from victimization, nonclinic children quickly saw a need to address the
victims' losses.
The parenting strategies of the two groups also differed in some reveal-
ing ways. A factor analysis of the parenting scale resulted in several broad
categories that are generally consistent with previous PDI research, includ-
ing parental warmth, amount of control, focus on child input, and use of
reasoning. Only a single group difference emerged, however, in relation to
these factors: Nonclinic parents described themselves as being warmer to
their children than clinic parents. Subsequently, guided by research on
parenting styles, my colleagues and I combined warmth and a form of control
into a single measure of an authoritative ("loving but firm") parenting style.
Nonclinic parents also scored higher than clinic parents on this overall mea-
sure. In addition, however, subsequent analyses revealed that (a) higher lev-
els of authoritative parenting were associated with children's tendencies to
offer more reparations for their aggression in the MSSB interview and
(b) this connection was not moderated by clinic versus nonclinic status. In
other words, despite mean group differences in children's use of reparations
and parents' authoritative parenting style, in both groups parents who were
more authoritative had children who were more likely to try to make amends
to the victims of their hypothetical victimization.
Other parts of the study (Ramos-Marcuse & Arsenio, 2001) also re-
vealed that children's attachment representations (combining parent and
other adults) and their moral reasoning both contributed to adult ratings of
children's behavior problems. Contrary to expectations, however, there was
no evidence that children's emotionally charged moral reasoning mediated
the connection between children's attachment representations and their
behavior problems.
FUTURE RESEARCH AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
After almost 20 years of research, there is a growing awareness that

children's and adolescents' conceptions and behaviors involving happy vic-
timization are more than a curious exception to frustration-anger models of
childhood aggression. In this chapter, I have attempted to show that much of
the behavior noted in this literature can best be understood as a form of
proactive aggression with regard to the reactive-proactive distinction (e.g.,
Dodge et al., 1997). Furthermore, I have examined this "happy proactive
aggression" in relation to the two major themes of this book: (a) the impor-
tance of children's emotion regulatory abilities for explaining broad differ-
ences in their psychological functioning and (b) the role of parents and other
contributors to individual differences in these abilities.

Much of the discussion on these last two points has been admittedly
speculative. On one hand, there is evidence linking attachment difficulties
and behavior problems in otherwise at-risk children and some support for
the role of empathy in these connections. The specific interplay between
happy victimization, disruptions in parent-child emotion reciprocity, child
temperament, and active disregard for victims' emotions, however, is mostly
theoretical at this point. But before offering a few specific directions for
future research on these connections, it might be worth addressing some
more basic questions: Why bother? What does the work on happy victimiza-
tion really add to the voluminous literature on aggression that warrants fur-
ther exploration?
The simplest explanation requires a brief reexamination of Dodge and
colleagues' distinction between reactive and proactive aggression. As I have
argued elsewhere (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2001, 2004), children who are more
reactively aggressive appear to share a central moral concern with their
nonaggressive peers: "It's not OK for someone to hurt or victimize me on
purpose." The problem for reactively aggressive children is not with their
"moral values," per se, but with the social reasoning they used to judge the
intentionality of others' behaviors. In provocative but ambiguous situations,
these are the children who (mis)perceive hostile intentions in their peers.
As a consequence, some of the treatment and social policy implications for
these children are relatively clear: Design anger management and other so-
cial cognitive interventions that attempt to alter underlying deficits in their
social reasoning. And, of course, these programs do exist and are at least
somewhat effective at addressing these problems (e.g., see Lochman &
Lenhart, 1993).
By contrast, for proactive aggression the problem "may lie in the values
of the bully rather than the accuracy of the cognitions" (Sutton et al, 1999,
p. 122). Although not all proactively aggressive children are necessarily bul-
lies, the available research indicates that, as a group, bullies believe that
aggression is an effective means of getting needs met, that they themselves
are "good" at aggression, and that they will feel happy afterward, or "it's easy,
it works, and it makes me feel good." Moreover, these children seem to un-
derstand the importance of others' intentions while still initiating inten-
tional aggression of their own. Given that more than two thirds of all aggres-
sive children are mostly (about 10%-15% of children) or at least partly (about
50%) proactively aggressive (e.g., see Dodge et al., 1997), the need for a
better understanding of this form of aggression becomes clearer.
With these issues in mind, several directions for future research can be
offered. One suggestion involves the need for more explicit research on the
connections between happy victimization and proactive aggression. At a theo-
retical level, there is no question that the unprovoked acts of instrumental
aggression used to assess happy victimization are a form of proactive aggres-
sion. To date, however, only a couple of studies have shown an empirical

connection between children's conceptions of happy victimization and rat-
ings of their proactive aggression. More work is needed to examine specific
connections between happy victimization, which has emerged from the moral
development literature, and proactive aggression, which has emerged from a
more "value neutral" SIP model (see Arsenic & Lemerise, 2004, on such an
integration).
It would also be helpful if research on the connections between children's
attachment patterns and their behavior problems focused more explicitly on
underlying mechanisms. Does this connection really depend on the sort of
empathic mechanisms outlined previously? Specifically, are proactive happy
aggressors more "numb" than "blind" to their victims' reactions, and is this
pattern perhaps more likely to emerge in children with certain types of early
temperaments? It may be especially useful to combine some of the work by
Kochanska and Frick and their colleagues to address these issues. For ex-
ample, are temperamentally more fearless young children who develop inse-
cure attachments (and who also experience pervasive sociocultural risks)
subsequently more likely to be high in CU traits? And given the nature of
those callous-unemotional traits (e.g., "absence of guilt . . . failure to show
empathy, use of others for one's own gain"; Frick et al., 2003, p. 247), are
these children more likely to exhibit higher levels of instrumental-proactive
aggression and happy victimization than their peers?
It may be easier to excuse the aggression of a child who loses his or her
temper and hits a peer than the aggression of a child who looks happy after
pushing a peer down to get a quicker turn on the swing. The first child is seen
as failing to control his or her emotions, whereas the second child is not
typically seen as having problems with emotional control. Much of the present
chapter, however, has been an attempt to explain happy victimization in
terms of disruptions in parent-child emotional reciprocity that have a last-
ing effect on children's empathic tendencies. In this view, the emotional
reciprocity that children experience within their larger environment under-
lies both their emotion regulatory abilities (including antecedent emotion
appraisals) and their emerging sense of moral reciprocity. Moreover, inter-
ventions that attempt to address happy victimization as just another social
cognitive bias are unlikely to address the deeper affective and moral roots of
this potentially important form of aggression.
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PARENTING AND CHILDREN'S
6
ADJUSTMENT: THE ROLE OF
CHILDREN'S EMOTION REGULATION
CARLOS VALIENTE AND NANCY EISENBERG
In the last decade the topics of emotion and emotion regulation have
been a focal issue in the study of children's social development. Once viewed
as a nuisance variable, emotion regulation is now viewed as a key construct
in some developmental models and many research programs. A large body of
literature links emotion regulation to measures of social functioning; a smaller
literature highlights the role socializers play in fostering emotion regulation;
and an even smaller, but growing, literature considers how parenting and
children's emotion regulation simultaneously contribute to children's qual-
ity of social functioning.
Our goal in this chapter is to provide an overview of our work on
parenting, children's emotion regulation, and children's social and emotional
development. A focus of our work, like that of many other developmentalists,
has been to explain individual differences in indices of children's problem
behaviors, social competence, and empathy-related responses. Initially our
Work on this chapter was supported by grants from the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH 1
R01 MH 60838 and 2 R01 MH60838), as well as a Research Scientist Award to Nancy Eisenberg.
123
work, and the work of others, focused on the direct, linear relations of either
parenting or children's emotion regulation to typical measures of children's
adjustment. This early work laid the foundation for more recent inquiries
that are focused on explaining why relations among these variables exist. In
addition to examining direct effects, we now often test hypotheses involving
mediational chains or moderated models. Moreover, as developmentalists,
we are particularly interested in how the relations among our key constructs
may change as children age and develop.
In this chapter we begin with a discussion of definitions and conceptual
issues, including a brief review of the contribution of emotion regulation to
adjustment, and then turn our attention to a review of empirical findings on
the relation between parenting and children's emotion regulation and ad-
justment. Next, we discuss ideas for future research, and finally, we conclude
with thoughts on the clinical, social, and public policy implications of this
line of research,
CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL, AND

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
On the basis of a large body of literature linking regulation with devel-

opmental outcomes, a 2000 National Academy of Sciences committee re-
port, From Neurons to Neighborhoods, concluded that "the growth of self-
regulation is a cornerstone of early childhood development that cuts across
all domains of behavior" (Shonkoff & Phillips, 2000, p. 3). Huffman,
Mehlinger, and Kerivan's (2000) NIH-funded report concerning risk factors
for academic and behavioral problems at the beginning of school similarly
concluded that "children's competency also seems to depend on social skills
and emotion regulation capacities" (p. 4). Despite the importance of self-
regulation to one's social functioning, research devoted to understanding how
individual differences in self-regulation emerge is somewhat limited, although
this is changing rapidly.
Given the variance in views on emotions and on how they are regu-
lated, one would expect to find a number of different definitions of emotion
regulation. Despite differences, there are a number of similarities in how
emotion regulation is defined. For example, Thompson (1994) defined emo-
tion regulation as the "extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for moni-
toring, evaluating, and modifying emotional reactions, especially their in-
tensive and temporal features, to achieve one's goals" (pp. 27-28). Included
in Thompson's discussion of emotion regulation were neurophysiological re-
sponses, attention processes, construals of emotionally arousing events, en-
coding of internal emotion cues, access to coping resources, regulating the
demands of familiar settings, and selecting adaptive response alternatives.
Emotion regulation has also been defined as "the intra- and extraorganismic
] 24 VALIENTE AND EISENBERG

factors by which emotional arousal is redirected, controlled, modulated, and
modified to enable an individual to function adaptively in emotionally arous-
ing situations" (Cicchetti, Ganiban, & Barnett, 1991). Cicchetti et al. em-
phasized the role of emotion regulation in maintaining internal arousal "within
a manageable, performance-optimizing range" (p. 15).
Building on the work of Thompson (1994), P. M. Cole and colleagues
(Cole, Michel, & Teti, 1994), Campos, Mumme, Kermoian, and Campos
(1994), and others, we define emotion-related regulation (henceforth called
emotion regulation for brevity) as "the process of initiating, avoiding, inhibit-
ing, maintaining, or modulating the occurrence, form, intensity, or duration
of internal feeling states, emotion-related physiological, attentional processes,
motivational states, and/or the behavioral concomitants of emotion in the
service of accomplishing affect-related biological or social adaptation or
achieving individual goals" (Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004, p. 338). This defi-
nition is broad because we believe emotion regulation can occur in regard to
numerous aspects of functioning and at various times before, during, and
after the occurrence of emotion. In thinking about emotion regulation, we
have found it useful to distinguish between antecedent and concurrent emo-
tion regulation, control versus regulation, and voluntary control-regulation and
less voluntary, reactive control
Antecedent and Concurrent Emotion Regulation
In our view, individuals can regulate emotion before its elicitation, while
it is being elicited, or after the elicitation of emotion (Eisenberg & Spinrad,
2004). This difference is consistent with the distinction between antecedent-
focused emotion regulation (e.g., the management of emotion before the
emotion response tendencies are fully activated) and response-focused emo-
tion regulation (e.g., activities one uses after emotion is elicited; Gross, 1999;
chap. 1, this volume). Drawing on the coping literature, one can view proac-
tive coping, defined as "efforts undertaken in advance of a potentially stress-
ful event to prevent it or to modify its form before it occurs," as a form of
antecedent emotion regulation (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997, p. 417). Ante-
cedent emotion regulation involves managing emotional reactions before
they occur by using not only proactive coping but also attentional and cogni-
tive processes to choose the situations that are focused on and how they are
interpreted (Gross, 1999).
Control Versus Regulation
For both theoretical (Eisenberg & Spinrad, 2004) and empirical rea-
sons (Valiente et al., 2003), we also find it useful to distinguish between
control and regulation. Control can be defined as inhibition or restraint (re-
gardless of the cause of the inhibition) and is presumed to increase in a linear
PARENTING AND CHILDREN'S ADJUSTMENT 125

manner from low to high restraint. Control (i.e., constraint or inhibition) is
part of regulation when it is voluntary, but regulation involves more than
voluntary inhibition (e.g., it includes the abilities to activate behavior and
shift attention, as well as planning). Adaptive regulation includes optimal
amounts of control as well as the ability to initiate action as needed. Like
others (Block & Block, 1980), we believe well-regulated individuals are not
overly controlled or undercontrolled and that they are quite flexible in how
they manage emotions. From our perspective, regulation is adaptive, whereas
control may be adaptive or maladaptive, depending on its flexibility and
whether it can be voluntarily managed.
Voluntary Control-Regulation and Less Voluntary, Reactive Control
When considering relations between emotion regulation and measures

of socialization (as well as other constructs), we find it useful to consider the
degree to which the control or regulation is voluntary. Children who are
well-regulated are believed to be able to voluntarily control their attention
and behavior as needed. Voluntary control overlaps considerably with
Rothbart's construct of effortful control, defined as "the ability to inhibit a
dominant response to perform a subdominant response" (Rothbart & Bates,
1998, p. 137) or, more recently, as the "efficiency of executive attention,
including the ability to inhibit a dominant response and/or to activate a sub-
dominant response, to plan, and to detect errors" (Rothbart & Bates, in press).
Voluntary control involves the "effort" or "will" to control or modulate tem-
peramental reactivity, including emotionality. Although the use of effortful
control does not always involve highly conscious cognitions (indeed, its use
may be somewhat automatic in many situations), the individual can willfully
modulate its use. Measures of effortful control typically include the abilities
to voluntarily shift and focus attention and inhibit or activate behavior as
needed to adapt or behave appropriately (processes believed to be controlled
by the anterior cingulated gyrus and prefrontal cortical systems), even if the
individual is not motivated to do so. For example, in tasks that tap effortful
control, participants are often required to engage in behavior (e.g., persisting
on a difficult task when one could easily cheat or stop working) when an-
other behavior would be more appealing. Past early infancy, well-regulated
people usually should be high in effortful control because it can be used at
will and is flexible (although excessive voluntary suppression of emotion may
be problematic; Gross, 1999). In our view, emotion regulation involves
effortful control and perhaps other skills that include, but are broader than,
effortful control (e.g., proactive coping).
Whereas effortful control is viewed as voluntary, reactive control is more
difficult to voluntarily modulate. Included in this domain are types of impul-
sivity and approach behavior (e.g., based on interest or potential rewards) or
rigid overcontrol, such as that evidenced by children who are timid and con-
126 VAL1ENTE AND E1SENBERG

strained and lack flexibility in novel or stressful situations (Derryberry &
Rothbart, 1997). The systems related to reactive control are believed to be
primarily subcorticol (Pickering & Gray, 1999).
Effortful control and reactive control are considered aspects of tem-
perament; they therefore have a biological basis, although they also are influ-
enced by the environment (Rothbart & Bates, 1998). We believe the dis-
tinction between effortful control and reactive control is useful in many
situations but think it is especially important when considering possible so-
cialization correlates because we expect parenting to be more strongly re-
lated to children's effortful control than reactive control. We would expect
a weaker relation between reactive control and parenting, perhaps because
the effect of parenting on reactive control is indirect, through effortful con-
trol. More specifically, we would predict that as effortful control increases
one would be able to mask the overt expressions of reactive tendencies,
especially as one ages. In contrast to the more complex relations of parenting
and reactive control, we expect direct, and stronger, relations between
parenting and children's effortful control. Therefore, failing to distinguish
between effortful and reactive control is likely to result in inconsistent and
weak findings.
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS: THE KNOWN AND UNKNOWN
Direct relations between measures of parenting and children's social

functioning have been noted in thousands of published studies. Frequently,
significant relations are reported between parents' warmth or negativity, con-
trol or permissiveness, and style of parenting (e.g., authoritative vs. authori-
tarian) and measures of children's social and emotional adjustment (Parke &
Buriel, 1998). However, generally these relations are modest in magnitude,
and the reader is often left wanting more of an explanation for why the rela-
tions were significant (or not significant).
In an effort to organize and summarize a large portion of the socializa-
tion literature, especially literature on the topic of children's experience,
expression, and regulation of emotion, Eisenberg, Spinrad, and Cumberland
(1998) developed the heuristic model presented in Figure 6.1. In their model,
Eisenberg et al. reviewed the concept of parents' emotion-related socializing
behaviors (ERSBs) and identified four ways parents socialize their children's
emotions: (a) parents' reactions to children's emotions, (b) parents' discus-
sion of emotion, (c) parents' expression of emotion, and (d) parents' selec-
tion or modification of situations. Parents' ERSBs are hypothesized to have
both indirect effects (e.g., through their effect on children's emotional arousal)
and direct effects on children's experience, expression, understanding, and
regulation of emotion. Eisenberg et al. argued that if parental ERSBs pro-
mote optimal levels of emotional arousal, they are likely to foster learning

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128 VAUENTE AND EISENBERG

and constructive behavior; if they overarouse the children, they will tend to
undermine opportunities for learning about emotions and their regulatory
capacities. In addition, it is predicted that children's regulatory abilities have
direct effects on their adjustment and can also mediate or moderate the rela-
tions between emotion-related parenting practices and children's social be-
havior and social competence. We now turn our attention to reviewing find-
ings on this topic,
Children's Effortful Control and Developmental Outcomes
If children's effortful control mediates the relations of parenting and

children's adjustment, it is likely to be a significant predictor of their adjust-
ment (although this need not always be true; see MacKinnon, Lockwood,
Hoffman, West, & Sheets, 2002). Empirical findings are consistent with the
premise that regulation or control is related to children's quality of social and
psychological adjustment. Because a thorough review of these relations is
beyond the scope of this chapter, and is available elsewhere (Eisenberg, Fabes,
Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000; Rothbart & Bates, 1998), we only briefly highlight
some robust relations. For example, children who are viewed as well regu-
lated typically are low in externalizing problems and internalizing problems,
and high in social competence, prosocial behavior, compliance, and sympa-
thetic responses (Eisenberg et al., 2000; Eisenberg, Gershoff, et al, 2001;
Eisenberg & Valiente, 2002; Kochanska, Murray, & Harlan, 2000; Valiente
et al., 2004). These relations often can be found at early ages, later in adoles-
cence, across time (i.e., longitudinally), and when different reporters or meth-
ods are used to assess the relevant constructs (Eisenberg, Valiente, et al.,
2003; Murray &. Kochanska, 2002). Because of the strong evidence that indi-
viduals' abilities to manage emotion are important to their social and emo-
tional development, we believe it is useful to hypothesize that children's
effortful control (or other aspects of emotion regulation) may mediate or
moderate the relations between parenting and children's adjustment.
Parents' Emotion-Related Socializing Behaviors and

Children's Effortful Control
There are numerous reasons that interactions with socializers might

promote children's effortful control, social competence, and adjustment.
Children who have higher-quality relationships with socializers are likely to
be emotionally attached to them and to believe that the socializers are con-
cerned with their welfare; consequently, they are likely to be motivated by
feelings of trust and reciprocity (Dix, 1991) and to comply with socializers'
standards of self-regulation (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994). Moreover, sensi-
tive, responsive socializers model positive ways of responding, whereas so-
cializers who express high levels of negative emotion model hostility and

dysregulation (P. M. Cole et al., 1994). Investigators have also suggested
that negative, nonsupportive behavior by socializers is associated with
children's emotional reactivity and dysregulation (Buck, 1984; Eisenberg,
Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998; Eisenberg, Spinrad, et al., 1998; Gottman,
Katz, & Hooven, 1997), which can undermine the learning of socially ap-
propriate behavior and cognitive or language skills. Parents can also influ-
ence how their children cope with stress by protecting them from stressors
(e.g., inappropriate stressors for their age) and by influencing how they ap-
praise a stressful event (Power, 2005).
Recently we have used data from two different samples to test some of
the predictions depicted in Eisenberg et al.'s heuristic model. In our at-risk
sample (selected to oversample children with problem behaviors), at Time 1
(Tl), we collected data from 214 children (M age = 6 years), their parents,
and their teachers. Of the 214 children, 74 had t-scores below 60 on the
Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist for both internalizing and externaliz-
ing, 36 had t-scores above 60 for internalizing (but not externalizing), 30 had
scores over 60 for externalizing (but not internalizing), and 74 had scores
over 60 for both externalizing and internalizing. Scores of 60 to 63 are viewed
as indicating moderate risk for clinical problems. The other sample is an
unselected group of 199 schoolchildren (M age = 7 years at Tl; assessments
are 2 years apart). In each study we have taken a multimethod approach to
assess the key constructs. To measure socialization, we generally collect both
parent-reported and observational data. Children's effortful control has been
assessed with parent- and teacher-report data (inhibitory control, attention
shifting and focusing), as well as an observational measure of persistence.
Overcontrol and children's externalizing or internalizing problem behaviors
generally are assessed with parents' and teachers' reports. These same report-
ers also report on children's social competence and sometimes on sympathy.
Stemming from early work highlighting the role of parenting in the
development of children's adjustment, and later work demonstrating the
important role effortful control likely plays in fostering adaptive adjustment,
we, like others, have been interested in studying how parenting and effortful
control jointly contribute to children's outcomes. Sometimes we have re-
ported significant relations between parents' effortful control and their
offspring's effortful control (Cumberland-Li, Eisenberg, Champion, Gershoff,
& Fabes, 2003), but more often we have examined the relation between mea-
sures of parents' ERSBs (mostly parents' warmth or negativity or their expres-
sion of emotion [both positive and negative]) and children's effortful control.
We now turn our attention to the role of effortful control as a mediator and
moderator of the relation between ERSBs and children's adjustment.
The Mediating Role of Children's Effortful Control

In general, we and others have found that positive, supportive parenting
is related to children's social competence, prosocial and empathic behavior,
130 VALIENTE AND E/SENBERG

and adjustment, and that this relation tends to be mediated by children's
effortful control. For example, with the at-risk sample we used structural equa-
tion modeling (SEM) to test if 5- to 8-year-old children's effortful control
mediated the relation between mothers' expression of emotion and children's
adjustment at the initial assessment (Time 1 or Tl; Eisenberg, Gershoff, et
al., 2001). Consistent with expectations, we found that high levels of moth-
ers' expression of positive emotion and low expression of negative dominant
(e.g., displays of anger or hostility) emotion predicted higher levels of
children's effortful control, which in turn predicted high levels of children's
social competence and low levels of externalizing problems (findings for in-
ternalizing problems were not quite significant). Consistent with Eisenberg
et al.'s (1998) heuristic model, follow-up tests indicated that effortful control
mediated the relations between parents' expressivity and children's external-
izing problems and social competence.
Two years later (T2), we reassessed the constructs with the same mea-
sures and in a concurrent SEM found that children's effortful control medi-
ated the relation between mothers' positive expressivity and children's ex-
ternalizing problems and social competence (Eisenberg, Valiente, et al., 2003).
In regression analyses (although not in SEM, likely because of low power) we
found that children's effortful control continued to mediate the relation be-
tween mothers' positive expressivity and children's adjustment even when
controlling initial levels of the variables. Finding mediation at T2 when con-
trolling for the Tl variables is important because it suggests that the findings
at T2 were not simply due to consistency in the pattern of relations as chil-
dren aged. In other words, the data are consistent with the notion that pa-
rental positive expressivity continues to have an effect on children's effortful
control as children age. Similar to a previous finding that parental negative
expressivity was positively related to teachers' reports of children's compli-
ance at school (M. T. Greenberg, personal communication, July 2, 2001), we
found that mothers' reported negative expressivity was positively related to
teachers' reports of children's effortful control. This unexpected finding may
have emerged because teachers view compliant children as well regulated; it
also highlights the possible moderating effect of child age (or developmental
level) on the relation between ERSBs and child characteristics.
Although these findings are consistent with theory, the sample con-
tained many children who had borderline or clinical levels of problem be-
haviors. Thus, in a more normative sample (the unselected sample), we
examined the relations among ERSBs, children's expressivity, and exter-
nalizing problem behaviors (Eisenberg, Losoya, et al., 2001). The pattern
of relations, consistent with those found in the at-risk sample, suggested
that warm parents and parents who talked about emotions and linked oth-
ers' emotions to the child's own experience had children who typically regu-
lated the expression of emotion and, in turn, were relatively low in exter-
nalizing problems.

Using the same sample, we used longitudinal data to examine the me-
diational sequence: Maternal warmth and positive expressivity to slides —>
child's reactive overcontrol —> children's tendency to express high (and of-
ten inappropriate) levels of emotion (Eisenberg, Zhou, et al., 2003). In con-
current models at Tl and T2 (assessments were at 2-year intervals), parental
warmth or positive expression of emotion predicted high levels of children's
reactive overcontrol, which in turn was negatively related to children's ten-
dency to express high levels of emotion. When Tl and T2 data were com-
bined into a longitudinal panel model, there were strong paths from the Tl
to T2 variables (indicating high levels of consistency); nevertheless, the re-
lation between children's T2 reactive overcontrol and expressivity remained
significant and negative (indicating that associations at T2 were not simply
due to the stability of relations as children age). In summary, cross-sectional
and longitudinal data, from both the at-risk and more normative samples,
suggest that relations between parents' expressivity and measures of children's
social functioning are mediated by children's ability to manage emotion.
Other investigators have also found that parents' emotional expressivity
and emotion-related beliefs are related to children's emotion regulation. For
example, Garner (1995) found that mothers' reported positive expressivity
in the family was related to higher levels of toddlers' self-soothing behavior,
whereas mother-reported sadness was inversely related to self-soothing. In
older children, maternal acceptance and support have been linked to suc-
cessful coping (Hardy, Power, & Jaedicke, 1993; Kliewer, Fearnow, & Miller,
1996), and college students and adults from negatively expressive families
report less control than their peers over feelings of anger, even when con-
trolling for its intensity (Burrowes & Halberstadt, 1987; Power, 2005). More-
over, consistent with Eisenberg et al.'s (1998) model, and with findings
reviewed earlier (Eisenberg, Gershoff, et al., 2001), Brody and Ge (2001)
found that parents' nurturance versus negativity predicted high levels of
children's self-regulation, which subsequently predicted low levels of
children's adjustment problems (e.g., depression, hostility, low self-esteem).
Furthermore, in a study of parents' emotion-related beliefs and teachings,
Gottman et al. (1997) found that parents' supportiveness of the expression
of emotion and coaching of emotions predicted high levels of children's emo-
tion regulation.
Issues of Directionality
Trying to uncover the direction of effects between ERSBs, children's
regulatory abilities, and adjustment is, for a variety of reasons, very difficult
(it is often impractical or unethical to change ERSBs). In our program of
research we have adopted two ways to overcome some of these obstacles.
Initially, we tested both parent-driven and child-driven models. By compar-
ing the fit (primarily the Akaike information criteria; Kline, 1998) as well as
13 2 VAL1ENTE AND EISENBERG

paths, one is in a better position to discuss issues of causality. For example, in
addition to using SEM to test the premise that ERSBs —» children's regula-
tory abilities —> adjustment, we have tested child-driven models in which
child characteristics predict ERSBs. On several occasions we have found that
child-driven models generally do not fit the data as well as the hypothesized
parent-driven models (Eisenberg, Gershoff, et al., 2001; Eisenberg, Losoya,
et al., 2001), although this is not always the case (Eisenberg, Zhou, et al.,
2003).
One is in a better position to discuss issues of directionality when sup-
ported by longitudinal data. Thus, more recently we have begun using three
waves of longitudinal data to test if effortful control mediates the relation
between ERSBs and children's adjustment. This way, we can test, for ex-
ample, if ERSBs at the initial assessment predict children's effortful control
at the second assessment (controlling for effortful control at Assessment 1),
which in turn would predict adjustment at Assessment 3 (see Figure 6.2 and
D. A. Cole & Maxwell, 2003, for a thorough discussion of this analytic strat-
egy). The methods described by Cole and Maxwell should allow researchers
to move beyond predictions for which there is evidence (see the dotted circle
in Figure 6.2) to hypotheses that have either received less attention or for
which there is little empirical support. In addition, Figure 6.2 displays dashed
paths to note areas that require further exploration. When following the
procedures outlined by Cole and Maxwell (2003), we are finding further evi-
dence that children's effortful control mediates the relations between ERSBs
and children's adjustment.
A related issue is whether there are bidirectional relations between the
variables of interest. Although the most widely accepted view is that there
are bidirectional relations between parenting and children's characteristics
or behavior, there are very few data on this topic. However, in a study in-
volving a longitudinal sample not previously discussed, we obtained a pat-
tern of findings consistent with the conclusion that children's emotion regu-
lation at age 6 to 8 years predicted mothers' punitive reactions to children's
negative emotion 2 years later, and mothers' punitive reactions at ages 8 to
10 predicted children's regulation when they were age 10 to 12 years (Eisenberg
et al., 1999). Thus, there is some, albeit limited, evidence that children's
emotion regulation influences socializers' behaviors.
Cultural Issues
The data reviewed thus far pertain to the role of effortful control in
samples of children from the United States. Given evidence that norms for
emotional expressivity and the regulation of emotion differ across cultures,
especially in collectivistic, Eastern cultures versus Western cultures, it is in-
teresting to examine if a similar mediation process operates in non-Western
samples. To address this question, Eisenberg, Liew, and Pidada (2001) ob-
PARENTING AND CHILDREN'S ADJUSTMENT J 33

H \
134 VALIENTE AND EISENBERG

tained self-reports of Indonesian parents' (mostly mothers') emotional
expressivity, parents' and teachers' reports of children's attentional control
and inhibitory control, and adults' or peers' reports of quality of social func-
tioning (e.g., externalizing problems, popularity, and sympathy). In contrast
to findings in U.S. samples, parents' positive expressivity was unrelated to
children's effortful control. This finding may stem from positive emotion
being less valued in Asian cultures (Tsai, 2004). Moreover, the relations
between parents' negative submissive (e.g., sulking, expressing sorrow, cry-
ing) expressivity and children's quality of social functioning were mediated
by children's effortful control (in U.S. samples, negative submissive
expressivity is inconsistently related to children's effortful control; Eisenberg
& Fabes, 1998; Eisenberg, Gershoff, et al., 2001). However, consistent with
findings in U.S. samples, children's effortful control at least partially medi-
ated the relations between parents' negative dominant expressivity and the
quality of children's social functioning. When the correlations among the
measures in the Indonesian sample and the U.S. at-risk sample were exam-
ined, parents' positive expressivity was more consistently positively related
to children's effortful control in the U.S. sample than in the sample from
Indonesia, whereas negative submissive expressivity was a more consistent
negative predictor of effortful control and social functioning for the Indone-
sian sample. It is possible that expressions of submissive negative emotion
are viewed as more undesirable in Indonesia than in the United States and
therefore that such expressions promote dysregulation in Indonesia (perhaps
because they reflect unregulated parental behavior). Correlations of parents'
negative dominant expressivity with effortful control and adjustment were
quite similar across the samples.
In a study conducted in the People's Republic of China with first and
second graders, we tested effortful control as a mediator of the relations of
authoritative (i.e., supportive, involving the use of reasoning and construc-
tive methods of control) and authoritarian (nonsupportive, controlling)
parenting to quality of children's social functioning (Zhou, Eisenberg, Wang,
& Reiser, 2004). Consistent with findings involving parents' expressivity,
authoritative (positive) and authoritarian (negative) styles of parenting pre-
dicted children's effortful control, which in turn predicted children's social
functioning. In follow-up tests, over 50% of the effects for authoritative and
authoritarian parenting on children's social functioning were mediated by
children's effortful control.
A number of investigators have found that children's ability to regulate
emotion is related to high levels of parents' expression of positive emotion
(at least in the United States) or support and low levels of their expression of
negative emotion. These relations have been found in both normative and
clinical samples. In addition, the pattern of relations has been partially repli-
cated in China and Indonesia (although some differences have also been
found).

Interactions Between Children's Emotion Regulation and Emotion-
Related Socializing Behaviors
A growing body of research supports the premise that ERSBs and

children's effortful control jointly (e.g., interactively) contribute to aspects
of children's social functioning. For example, we have found links between
children's sympathy and parenting in our at-risk sample that illustrate
(a) socializes' positivity and negativity both are modestly related to children's
empathy-related reactions, although such relations are not necessarily lin-
ear, and (b) children's effortful control might moderate such relations
(Valiente et al., 2004). In our 2004 article, we, and our colleagues, used the
at-risk sample to examine whether parents' positive and negative expres-
sions of emotion and children's effortful control interact statistically when
predicting children's sympathy or personal distress (a self-focused, aversive
emotional response to others' need or distress). Children viewed empathy-
inducing films to assess situational sympathy or personal distress (and re-
ported their situational reactions); dispositional (personality) sympathy was
assessed with children's self-reports. Prediction of children's sympathy from
parents' negative expressivity was significant and negative at low levels of
children's effortful control and nonsignificant at medium and high levels of
children's effortful control. Prediction of children's situational personal dis-
tress from parents' negative expressivity was strongest (and positive) at high
levels of children's effortful control (because personal distress tended to be
higher for all unregulated children, regardless of parenting). In essence, we
believe that children high in effortful control are able to avoid becoming
overaroused when exposed to intense negative (or positive) emotion, and
thus they are able to learn from these experiences. Consequently they may
be better equipped to manage negative emotion and to understand and re-
spond to another's needs in other circumstances than those low in effortful
control. A key finding of the study was that prediction of children's empathy-
related responses from parents' expressivity differed depending on whether
effortful control was taken into consideration.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH AND DIRECTIVES FOR

INTERDISCIPLINARY COLLABORATION
In summary, existing data are consistent with the premise that parents'
behaviors contribute to the development of their children's emotion regula-
tion. Some data also suggest that prediction of developmental outcomes can
be improved by considering both measures of parenting and children's emo-
tion regulation. Although emotion regulation has a genetic, temperamental
basis that may place some limits on how well children regulate their emo-
J 36 VALIENTE AND E/SENBERG

tions, it also seems likely that parents can promote (or inhibit) the develop-
ment of high levels of children's emotion regulation.
Future research endeavors need to develop and test more explicit mod-
els explaining why there are relations between ERSBs and aspects of children's
emotion regulation and adjustment. The availability of these data, especially
when embedded in a prospective study that spans relevant developmental
stages, offers the best hope of generating theoretical advances. It will be par-
ticularly important to design longitudinal studies capable of describing the
reciprocal nature of relations among parenting, children's emotion regula-
tion, and their adjustment and social functioning. It seems quite possible
that parenting practices play a prominent role early in childhood, but that
parents' influence diminishes as their child ages and becomes exposed to the
influence of other socializers (e.g., peers).
In addition, genetically informed data sets, and those including vari-
ables such as parental personality (which likely reflect, in part, parental ge-
netics), would provide insights into the biological bases of the relations of
parenting to children's emotion regulation, social competence, and adjust-
ment. Longitudinal data are also useful in making distinctions between the
types of regulation or control discussed earlier. For example, as children age
and develop, one would expect effortful control to be more strongly related
to outcomes than reactive control, a hypothesis with some support (Valiente
et al., 2003). Only with longitudinal data that span from early childhood to
early (or late) adolescence can one thoroughly test this hypothesis.
Methodological improvements will continue to be an important com-
ponent driving advances in this area of research. Whereas paper-and-pencil
measures of children's effortful control are fairly well developed and allow
multiple informants (e.g., parents, teachers, and children) to report on effortful
control, more refined observational measures are necessary to make distinc-
tions between effortful control and reactive control. Kochanska et al. (2000)
have developed a battery of measures of regulation or control for younger
children, but additional measures are needed for older children and adoles-
cents. Moreover, investigators need to consider whether they are assessing
effortful or reactive control, or both.
The use of electronic daily diaries can provide a rich set of data that can
be used to examine more moment-to-moment processes that are key to un-
derstanding how parents can promote or inhibit children's emotion regula-
tion and adjustment. Recent work by Cummings and colleagues highlights
the usefulness of this type of approach (Cummings, Goeke-Morey, & Papp,
2002). Moreover, as new measures are developed, their usefulness with high-
risk populations, as well as middle-class study participants, requires system-
atic examination.
Perhaps of most importance, intervention and prevention programs need
to be designed to test the premises suggested in correlational studies. In in-
PARENTING AND CHILDREN'S ADJUSTMENT 13 7

terventions, investigators can experimentally change parents' and other so-
cializers' behavior with children and assess the effects of these changes. Re-
search concerning the role of children's regulation in the success of interven-
tions is sparse, although such an approach is consistent with Huffman et al.'s
(2000) recommendations for future research examining risk in the early school
years.
It seems that interdisciplinary efforts could be especially important when
developing and conducting interventions that target children's ability to
manage emotion (and quality of social functioning that is linked to these
abilities). Given the focus on promoting school success and links among
children's regulation, social competence, and academic success, interdisci-
plinary interventions in schools involving scholars in educational and devel-
opmental psychology (as well as statisticians with expertise on clustering
data within classrooms) could be particularly fruitful. In a similar way, inter-
ventions in the home with parents naturally combine the talents and knowl-
edge of individuals in the developmental and family sciences. Funding re-
sources are available to support this type of research, but large amounts of
money are needed to conduct well-designed intervention studies. When seek-
ing large project grants involving investigators with different training and
experiences, it may be challenging to overcome the use of different languages
and jargon when outlining conceptual issues, making predictions, and select-
ing methods. Investigators must also overcome some inherent difficulties in
deciding how many (and which) auxiliary measures of relevant and related
constructs can be included without having to implement an intervention
that is too large.
CLINICAL, SOCIAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The relatively consistent finding that children's abilities to regulate

their emotions are related to their social and emotional development and
that parenting likely can promote (or inhibit) regulatory abilities has social
and public policy implications. Clinicians working with children exhibiting
behavioral problems may wish to integrate methods for improving children's
regulatory abilities into therapy while also considering targeting the parent-
child relationship as a way to produce change. At a broader level, data from
intervention studies are necessary to elucidate the ERSBs that are most suc-
cessful in promoting children's regulation. Although data from existing in-
terventions indicate that one can successfully intervene in children's lives
and even promote emotion regulation (Greenberg, Kusche, Cook, &
Quamma, 1995), investigators do not know enough about how interventions
designed to promote children's regulation actually work. Indeed, although
researchers may feel comfortable advising policymakers that teaching social-
izers to be positive and supportive and to express negative emotion appropri-
138 VAL1ENTE AND EISENBERG

ately can promote children's adjustment, it would be difficult to precisely
explain why these relations exist, and at what ages one can most successfully
intervene (Power, 2005). The continued support of policymakers would al-
low the work currently underway the opportunity to provide answers to a
number of the remaining questions.
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FAMILY AND PEER RELATIONSHIPS:
7
THE ROLE OF EMOTION
REGULATORY PROCESSES
ROSS D. PARKE, DAVID J. McDOWELL,
MINA CLADIS, AND MELINDA S. LEIDY
The acquisition of social skills in childhood appears to be a key devel-

opmental task that is linked to successful adjustment over the life span. Re-
search has established links between poor peer relationships in childhood
and a range of negative consequences for adaptation and competence in later
life, including delinquency, poor academic achievement, and dropping out
of high school, as well as criminality and other forms of social and emotional
disorders in adulthood (Parker & Asher, 1987). Recently, scholars have be-
gun to identify the developmental pathways through which children acquire
social skills and behavioral styles that promote interpersonal competence
with peers during the early school years (Parke et al., 2002; Parke & Ladd,
1992). A growing body of literature identifies a number of modes by which
children's early socialization experiences are linked to peer competence in
early and middle childhood.
In this chapter we briefly review literature concerning ways in which
families are hypothesized to influence social adaptation in childhood and
adolescence. In doing so, we emphasize recent work from a longitudinal study
143
of familial influences on children's social development currently being con-
ducted in our laboratory. Specifically, we examine the role that parents play
as interaction partners and review research on the processes that account for
relations between experiences with familial social partners and social com-
petencies in childhood, with an emphasis on emotion regulatory processes
and attention regulatory processes. We illustrate each mediational process
with data from our work and related work by others. Our own studies are
based on the University of California, Riverside (UCR) Social Development
Project, a longitudinal study aimed at understanding links between children's
experiences in their families from early childhood to early adolescence and
their developing competence with peers. Measures of family interaction as
well as indices of a variety of social and emotional abilities were assessed
yearly from kindergarten through sixth grade. A final follow-up was com-
pleted when the children were in eighth grade. Sociometric assessments and
teacher ratings provided independent indices of peer social competence. The
sample consisted of approximately 120 children and their mothers and fa-
thers. The socioeconomic status of the families ranged from lower to upper-
middle class; 50% of the sample was Euro-American, 40% Latino, and 10%
African American, Asian American, or other. Attrition rates were relatively
modest (15%—20%), and no evidence of attrition-related bias was found. For
each study, the age of the child is noted. For a detailed description of the
project and related findings, see Parke and O'Neil (1999).

To set the stage for our chapter, we outline several conceptual and
methodological assumptions that guide our work in this area. As noted, our
research program has focused on the links between family and peer systems
with a view to describing both the nature of these relations and the processes
that may account for them. Various phases of this work can be distinguished.
In the first phase the link between parental relationship qualities and peer
competence was the focus. Two research traditions illustrate this approach.
First, in the child attachment tradition, the focus has been on the impact of
infant-mother attachment on social adaptation to the peer group (Sroufe &
Fleeson, 1986). The second tradition is illustrated by studies of the effect of
particular child-rearing styles (Baurnrind, 1973) or parent-child interaction
patterns on children's social competence with peers (MacDonald & Parke,
1984). Together, studies of parent-child relationships and children's peer
competence in early childhood suggest that parents who are responsive, warm,
and synchronous have children who are better accepted by peers (Harrist,
Pettit, Dodge, & Bates, 1994). In contrast, parents of children who are low in
peer acceptance can be characterized as more directive and demanding, ex-
144 PARKE ETAL.

pressing more negative affect, eliciting more negative affect in their chil-
dren, exhibiting less ability to engage in and sustain play interaction with
their children, and displaying less ability to modulate their level of playful
stimulation with their children (Harrist et al, 1994; Parke et al., 2002). Family
interaction patterns not only relate to concurrent peer relationships but also
predict children's competence with peers over time (Earth & Parke, 1993).
Another aspect of this first phase was the focus not only on family interac-
tion patterns in general but specifically on the affective quality of the
parent-child relationship as indexed by the display of positive or negative
affect during interactions between parents and children (see Parke & O'Neil,
1999, for a review).
In a second phase, the focus shifted from a descriptive phase to an ex-
amination of the mediating processes that could account for the links be-
tween parent-child interaction patterns and peer competence. Specifically,
it was assumed that in the course of parent-child interaction, children ac-
quire a variety of emotional competencies or skills that, in turn, are influen-
tial in their subsequent interactions with peers. Several sets of emotional
processes are assumed to be important for successful social interaction, in-
cluding encoding and decoding, understanding the causes and consequences
of emotions, understanding and utilizing display rules, and regulating emo-
tional expression and level of emotional arousal. Our view is that these emo-
tional skills represent an interrelated family or cluster of abilities that work
together in achieving successful enactment of social behavior with a variety
of social agents, including both families and peers. Although conceptualized
as distinct aspects of emotional competence, which can be measured and
evaluated independently, these emotional skills operate in a coordinated fash-
ion in real-life situations. In a similar way, social cognitive skills such as
choices of goals and strategies and response solutions and enactment func-
tion together in accounting for social behavior (Crick & Dodge, 1994). Our
guiding assumption that emotional components form a family or cluster of
skills is compatible with Salovey's multicomponential concept of emotional
intelligence (see chap. 2, this volume). We briefly review three of these com-
ponents (encoding and decoding, emotional understanding, and emotional
expressiveness) to illustrate the multiply determined nature of the links be-
tween emotional competence and social competence. Consistent with the
theme of this volume, we focus in more detail on two components of emo-
tional competence: emotion regulatory and attention regulatory processes.
Figure 7.1 provides a conceptual model that guides our work.
A further assumption that guides our work in this area is that emotional
and attentional competencies are acquired over the course of children's de-
velopment. The rudiments of these processes are acquired in infancy and
childhood, whereas more sophisticated understanding of complex emotions
and social rules for emotional expression develops over middle childhood
and adolescence. For example, according to Parker and Gottman (1989), the
FAMILY AND PEER RELATIONSHIPS I45

Parental
parent-child interaction
Marital
marital satisfaction or conflict
modeling
child exposure to marital conflict
emotional coaching
encouragement of focused attention
Child's Emotion Regulatory

Abilities Child's Attention Regulatory
encoding/decoding Abilities
understanding emotional causes selective attention
and consequences sustained attention
display rules ability to shift attentional focus
affect regulation joint attention abilities
Z
Children's Peer Relationship Competence
Figure 7.1. Emotional and attentional mediators of the family-peer interface.
emotional tasks of early and middle childhood differ from the tasks of adoles-
cence. In early childhood, the major affective goal is "management of arousal
interaction." In middle childhood, the affective task is to acquire "display
and feeling rules," and in adolescence the affective task is the management
and regulation of self'disclosure and intimacy.
Third, we recognize the importance of not only demonstrating links
among parenting, various aspects of emotional competence, and children's
social competence but also exploring the causal pathways among these com-
ponents. Specifically our goal is to begin to better understand the mediating
role of emotional competence in accounting for these linkages between
parenting and social competence.
Fourth, our work is guided by the assumption that both fathers and
mothers play complementary as well as distinctive roles in both the acquisi-
tion of emotional competencies and in the development of social compe-
tence with peers. Because the prior literature has focused largely on mothers
as socialization agents, we view our focus on fathers as well as mothers as an
important corrective to this earlier maternal bias. Our assumption is that
mothers and fathers have distinctive interactive styles which, in turn, result
in distinctive contributions to children's emotional and social competence
(Parke, 2002). To demonstrate the unique roles of mothers and fathers, it is
important to control for the effects of one parent to determine if there is
unique variance associated with the behavior of the other parent. As we note
in the following section, we have followed this guideline in our work and
146 PARKE ET AL.

found that mothers and fathers do indeed make independent contributions
to both emotional and social competence in children.
Fifth, our work is guided by a family systems theoretical framework that
highlights the role not only of multiple parental agents but also of multiple
subsystems, including parent—parent or marital subsystems, as well as the
parent-child subsystem. As we illustrate, and consistent with research by
Cummings and colleagues (Cummings & Davies, 1994; chap. 8, this vol-
ume), variations in children's emotional and social competence are, in part,
determined by the quality of the marital interaction patterns to which they
are exposed.
Methodologically, several assumptions guide our work in this area. It is
important to assess parenting, marital, and child outcomes at multiple time
points so that shifts in parenting or the quality of marital relationships can be
linked to changes in child competence. Many of the studies that we present
are longitudinal to address this limitation in earlier studies. In addition, it is
critical to use multimethod, multireporter designs to avoid the confounds
that are found when parents report both on their own parenting and on
child competencies. In our studies, we use independent assessments of
parenting—either self-report or observations of parent-child interactions,
child or parent reports of emotional competencies, or experimental assess-
ments of these skills. Finally, to assess social competence, we rely on teacher
or peer reports of children's social acceptance and behavioral characteristics.
Our use of longitudinal designs involving multiple measures and reporters
should increase confidence in our results and move the field to a firmer meth-
odological footing.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF EMOTIONAL PROCESSES
In this section, we summarize the empirical support for the role of the
emotional processes outlined in Figure 7.1. We briefly examine emotional
encoding and decoding, emotional understanding, and emotional expressive-
ness but focus the bulk of our review on recent empirical findings concerning
emotion regulatory abilities and attention regulatory skills.
Emotion Encoding and Decoding
One set of skills relevant to successful peer interaction is the ability to

encode emotional signals and to decode the emotional signals of others. These
skills are part of the "perceiving emotions" branch in the model of emotional
intelligence discussed by Grewal, Brackett, and Salovey in chapter 2 of this
volume. Arousing physical play is thought to be a particularly important con-
text for the development of encoding and decoding skills. Through physi-
cally playful interaction with their parents, especially fathers, children may
FAMILY AND PEER RELATIONSHIPS J 47

learn how to use emotional signals (encoding) to regulate the social behavior
of others. For example, during the course of physical play children may signal
through a facial display of displeasure (i.e., scowl or fear) when a father is
playing too roughly. They may also learn how to decode the social and emo-
tional signals of other social partners. For example, a child will monitor the
emotional expressions of a play partner to modify his or her own play style
during a play interaction. Earlier work has found that variations in parent-
child interaction are related to emotional encoding and decoding skills (Parke
Cassidy, Burks, Carson, & Boyum, 1992), and that these skills, in turn, are
related to children's sociometric status (Cassidy, Parke, Butkovsky, &
Braungart, 1992; Parke et al., 1992). Together, these two sets of evidence
suggest that emotion production and recognition skills may serve as mediat-
ing mechanisms between early experiences with parents and the quality of
interaction with peers. Other recent work (Parke et al., 1992) suggests that
the families of peer-rejected children may use idiosyncratic or "family centric"
affect cues that are recognized within the context of the family but are not as
well recognized outside the family.
Emotional Understanding
Evidence also suggests that successful peer functioning requires an un-

derstanding of the causes, consequences, and meaning of emotional experi-
ences. (See the concept of understanding emotions in the four-branch model,
chap. 2, this volume.) Cassidy et al. (1992) found that higher levels of social
competence among 5- and 6-year-olds were associated with the ability to
identify emotions, the ability to describe appropriate causes of emotions, the
acknowledgment of experiencing emotion, and the expectation that they
would respond appropriately to the display of emotions. Denham, McKinley,
Couchoud, and Holt (1990) similarly found that children's understanding of
the type of emotion that would be elicited by different situations was posi-
tively related to peer likeability. These findings confirm the findings of other
research that suggests connections between other components of social un-
derstanding and peer relations (Hubbard & Dearing, 2004). However, the
early familial antecedents of emotional understanding are unclear and need
closer scrutiny (Denham, 1998).
Emotional Expressiveness
A growing body of research indicates that parental patterns of emo-

tional expressiveness are associated with children's own expressiveness styles,
social behavior, and acceptance by peers (Boyum & Parke, 1995; Cassidy et
al., 1992). However, studies typically have assessed emotional expressiveness
with self-report measures and have tended to focus exclusively on maternal
expressiveness (see Halberstadt, Denham, & Dunsmore, 2001, for a review
148 PARKE ETAL.

of this literature). Research in our lab using observational assessments of
mothers' and fathers' affect expression provides evidence in support of the
role of emotional expression in regulating social interaction (Carson & Parke,
1996). Carson and Parke found that patterns of reciprocated negative affect
between children and their fathers, but not their mothers, were linked to
child verbal and physical aggression with peers. Other research (Isley, O'Neil,
& Parke, 1996) has extended this work to older children (7- to 9-year-olds)
and found that negative paternal affect expressed in the context of parent-
child interaction was correlated with lower peer social acceptance and social
competence. These data underscore the importance of examining fathers as
well as mothers.
EMOTION REGULATORY ABILITIES
In this section, we examine two issues, namely the links between emo-
tion regulatory abilities and children's social competence with peers and the
familial correlates of emotional regulation. Following Thompson (1994),
emotional regulation is defined as "the extrinsic and intrinsic processes re-
sponsible for monitoring, evaluating and modifying emotional reactions, es-
pecially their intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one's goals"
(pp. 27—28). Moreover, it is important to distinguish between intrapersonal
and interpersonal emotional regulation. In the case of intrapersonal emo-
tional regulation, the goal is to modulate one's emotional reaction, for ex-
ample, increasing or decreasing one's level of excitement or upset to en-
hance positive and reduce negative emotional feelings. In the case of
interpersonal emotional regulation, the goal of the modulation is to control
the evaluative reaction of a social audience who may be witness to the elicit-
ing event and to the actor's emotional response. In our work we have exam-
ined several aspects of this issue. In one series of studies we focused on
children's ability to control their level of emotional arousal and the strate-
gies that they use to cope with their emotional upset; these studies could be
viewed as explorations of intrapersonal emotional regulation. In a second
series of studies we examined children's understanding of and utilization of
emotional display rules; these investigations could be viewed as examples of
interpersonal emotional regulation. Again it is recognized that these two
approaches are tapping different aspects of emotional regulation and reflect
the multifaceted nature of this construct (Cole, Martin, & Dennis, 2004).
Links Between Emotional Regulation (Arousal Modulation)

and Peer Social Competence
Children's skill in regulating emotions is important to successful devel-

opment of peer relationships. To evaluate emotional regulation, children's
FAMILY AND PEER RELATIONSHIPS 149

strategies for coping with emotionally charged events were assessed using
children's responses to a series of vignettes (Kim, McDowell, & Parke, 2004;
McDowell, Kim, O'Neil, & Parke, 2002; McDowell & Parke, 2005). Five
vignettes that were designed to generate anger, frustration, or excitement
were presented to the children. Interviewers asked children to respond to a
series of closed-ended items that assessed intensity of emotion ("How upset
or excited would this make you feel?"), latency ("How long would it take
you to calm down?"), and ease of calming ("How easy or hard would it be
for you to calm down?") following an event using a 10-point, barometer-
type response scale (lower scores are indicative of a lower level of excite-
ment or agitation and a higher ease of calming down). In the Gross model
(chap. 1, this volume), these measures are examples of response-focused
emotional regulation; specifically, these actions illustrate the concept of
response modulation.
In a study with fourth and fifth graders, using these same vignettes, our
data indicate that the ability to control the level of emotional arousal and
the strategies selected for coping with high levels of emotional arousal are
related to a number of indicators of children's social competence with peers
(Kim, McDowell, et al., 2004; McDowell et al, 2002; McDowell & Parke,
2005). Fourth- and fifth-grade children who rated themselves as higher in
emotion regulation were rated by teachers and peers as more socially compe-
tent (McDowell et al., 2002; McDowell 6k Parke, 2005). In a similar way,
children who responded to the arousing vignettes with a negative emotion
regulatory strategy (anger, sadness, or nervousness and fidgeting) were rated
by peers and teachers as less socially accepted (McDowell 6k Parke, 2005)
and less socially competent (Kim, McDowell, et al., 2004).
It is important to distinguish between positive and negative emotion
regulatory strategies (Gross, 2002). Children who endorsed positive regula-
tory strategies (reasoning, thinking of alternative responses) were rated by
both teachers and peers as more accepted by their classmates (McDowell 6k
Parke, 2005). Parental reports of children's coping with emotionally arous-
ing situations yielded a similar picture. Mothers and fathers who reported
that their children used negative coping strategies (avoidance, engaging in
problem behavior) were rated as less socially competent by teachers and peers
(Kim, McDowell, et al., 2004). In short, similar results were evident across
both child and parent reports of emotional regulation.
Nor are the relations evident only at one time point, but rather the
links between emotional regulation and child competencies are evident across
time as well. Moreover, children who report using reasoning or trying to
understand the problem in response to distressing situations were better ad-
justed in the classroom (as rated by teachers) 1 year later—in fifth grade
(Kim, McDowell, et al., 2004). More evidence that emotional regulation has
cross-time effects comes from recent longitudinal analyses (Leidy 6k Parke,
2004). Sixth graders who reported poor emotion regulatory abilities (as as-
150 PARKE ETAL.

sessed by the barometer-type measure previously described) were rated by
themselves and by their parents as higher on the Child Behavior Checklist
Internalizing scale 2 years later when they were in eighth grade. In sum,
emotional regulation conceptualized as arousal regulatory ability is linked
both cross-sectionally and longitudinally with indices of peer social compe-
tence and adjustment.
Family Correlates of Emotional Regulation
Recent investigations indicate that the extent to which parents toler-

ate the expression of negative emotions and assist their children with the
resolution of emotional upset is associated with children's emotion regula-
tory abilities as well as their social competence (Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992).
Furthermore, in a rare examination of the role that fathers play in the social-
ization of children's emotion regulatory abilities, Gottman, Katz, and Hooven
(1996) found that father acceptance and assistance with children's sadness
and anger when children were 5 years old was related to children's social
competence with peers at 8 years of age. Although it is assumed that the
direction of effect flows from parent to child, it is feasible that children's
behavior elicited the parental responses as well.
Findings from the UCR Social Development Project also suggest that
the strategies parents use to manage children's negative emotion are associ-
ated with children's emotional reactivity, coping, and social competence
(O'Neil, Parke, Isley, & Sosa, 1997). When mothers reported that they en-
couraged the expression of negative affect when their fourth-grade child was
upset, children indicated that they would be less likely to use social with-
drawal as a strategy to deal with emotional upset. In a similar way, mothers
who reported that they would help the child find solutions to deal with emo-
tional distress had children who reported that they would be more likely to
use reasoning to cope with emotional upset. Mothers who expressed more
awareness and sensitivity to their child's emotional state in a family problem-
solving task had children who expressed less positive affect and more nega-
tive affect in the problem-solving task. When mothers modeled problem-
solving approaches to handling disagreement and upset, children were less
likely to report becoming angry when faced with an upsetting event. More-
over, children of problem-solving mothers were less likely to express nega-
tive affect during the parent-child discussion task, clearer in their emotional
expressions, and more likely to adopt problem-solving strategies in the dis-
cussion task. Fathers' regulation of children's emotions was only modestly
related to social competence. Fathers who reported being more distressed by
their child's expressions of negative affect had children who were more likely
to report using anger and other negative emotions to cope with distressing
events. When fathers reported using strategies to minimize distressing cir-
cumstances, children were more likely to report using reasoning to cope with

a distressing situation. Fathers who reported emotion- and problem-focused
reactions to the expression of negative emotions had children who were de-
scribed by teachers as less aggressive and disruptive.
Moreover, both parental control and affect were related to children's
emotional regulation and coping. Using data from the UCR Social Develop-
ment Project, McDowell and Parke (2005) examined this issue. Children's
strategies for managing emotionally charged events were assessed using a
barometer-like scale described earlier. When fathers were more control-
ling, their fourth-grade children exhibited less emotion regulation. How-
ever, more paternal positive affect and less paternal negative affect were
associated with more positive coping strategies on the part of their chil-
dren. In a similar manner, when mothers exhibited more positive affect,
children were rated as higher in emotional regulation and endorsed fewer
negative coping strategies.
Links Between Display Rule Knowledge and Use and

Peer Social Competence
During early and middle childhood, children acquire and use rules for
the socially appropriate expression of emotion. Emotional display rule use
can be viewed as another form of emotional regulation as children learn to
hide or suppress their feelings about an event and express a socially accept-
able overt emotional expression. For example, children learn to hide their
disappointment when receiving an unwanted or undesirable gift, or on re-
ceiving a poor grade or losing a competitive event. In the Gross model (chap.
1, this volume), display rule use is a further example of response-focused
emotional regulation; specifically, response modulation occurs as children
attempt to decrease or hide their expressive reactions to the event. Most
work in this area has focused either on the developmental course of display
rule acquisition (Saarni, 1984) or on individual differences in display rule
knowledge within the preschool and elementary school years (Gamer, 1996).
A few studies have examined links between display rule knowledge and so-
cial competence. McDowell and Parke (2000) examined the links between
display rule knowledge and children's social competence. Third-grade
children's display rule knowledge was assessed from responses to several hy-
pothetical situations in which it would be appropriate for children to use
display rules. Children indicated both how the child in the story would feel
and how the child's face would look and why the child would look that way.
Data concerning children's display rule knowledge and their reasons for their
responses were generated from these interviews. Social competence was as-
sessed by peer sociometric ratings and by teacher ratings of children's likeability
and behavioral attributes. These investigators found that children who had a
better knowledge of the display rules for both positive and negative emotions
were rated as more competent by both teachers and peers.
152 PARKE ETAL.

Other work on our project examined the relations between children's
use of socially appropriate rules for displaying negative emotions and social
competence with peers (McDowell, O'Neil, & Parke, 2000). We used Saarni's
(1984) "disappointing gift paradigm," which enables the assessment of
children's ability to mask negative emotions in the face of disappointment.
In this paradigm, children were presented with an age-inappropriate gift, and
their resulting emotional displays were monitored to determine if they masked
their feelings of disappointment by displaying neutral or positive emotional
expressions. Although Saarni's work suggests that this ability improves with
age and may be a critical component of successful emotional regulation, to
date, researchers have not examined the links between individual differences
in the ability to mask or control negative emotions and children's compe-
tence with peers. Our data indicate that among fourth graders, children who
displayed negative affect or behavior following the presentation of a disap-
pointing gift (thus, not using display rules) were rated by teachers as more
socially withdrawn. Girls who were able to maintain levels of positive affect
after receiving a disappointing gift were viewed as more socially competent
by teachers and peers. Children who expressed more tension and anxiety in
response to a disappointing gift were described by peers as more socially
avoidant and rated as more aggressive or disruptive by teachers. Moreover,
emotional display rule utilization is linked with social competence not only
concurrently but across time as well, controlling for baseline competence
and display rule utilization (McDowell & Parke, 2005). These longitudinal
results provide support for our implicit assumption that skill in the utiliza-
tion of emotional display rules leads to social competence.
Parental Correlates of Display Rule Knowledge and Utilization
What role do parents play in accounting for the individual differences

in display rule knowledge and utilization? To assess this issue, McDowell and
Parke (2000) examined the role of parental control of their children's emo-
tions in the development of children's display rule knowledge. The PACES
questionnaire developed by Saarni (1989) that taps the degree to which par-
ents are controlling or accepting of children's hypothetical emotional dis-
plays was used to measure parental control. Our findings indicated that chil-
dren whose mothers and fathers were more controlling were less likely to
endorse the use of display rules. Parental control was more consistently linked
with knowledge of display rules for negative emotions than for knowledge of
display roles for positive emotions. Parents' controlling emotional displays
rather than accepting and exploring emotions (described by Gottman et al,
1996, as emotional coaching) was consistently linked with poorer emotion
regulatory outcomes. Furthermore, fathers' control significantly predicted
knowledge of display rules above and beyond mother's control. Finally, and
consistent with previous work (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Murphy, 1996), we found

that children whose parents were more controlling of emotional expression
were rated as less socially competent. This suggests that parents who are more
controlling are providing children with fewer opportunities to "try out" dif-
ferent emotional responses that are shaped by natural consequences in peer
social encounters.
Not only are there links between parenting and children's knowledge
of display rules, recent evidence suggests relations between parental behav-
ior and children's display rule use as well. Recently, McDowell and Parke
(2005) examined this issue using fourth- and fifth-grade children from the
UCR Social Development Project. To assess display rule use, the disappoint-
ing gift paradigm was used (Saarni, 1984; refer to previous description). A
triadic discussion task involving mother, father, and child was used to assess
the following parental behaviors: affect (positive and negative affect, clarity
of expression, intensity of expression, and awareness of child's feelings) and
control (regulation of child's emotions, controlling interaction style). Pa-
rental affect played a clear role in predicting children's display rule use. Both
mothers' and fathers' observed affect was related to higher display rule use
(more positive and fewer negative behaviors) during the disappointing gift
session. Moreover, parental control predicted children's positive and tense
behavior in the display rule context. Fathers' affect and control predicted
children's positive and negative responses to disappointment over and above
mothers' affect and control assessments.
The Marital Relationship and Children's Emotional Regulation
Consistent with a family systems view, it is clear that a variety of sub-

systems beyond the parent—child subsystems, such as the marital subsystem,
are linked to children's peer relationships. As Cummings (chap. 8, this vol-
ume) and others (Fincham, 1998) have recognized, there are clear links be-
tween marital conflict and children's adjustment. In this section, we briefly
demonstrate that the relation between marital conflict and peer competence
is, in part, mediated by children's emotion regulatory abilities.
To assess this issue we measured children's perceptions of marital con-
flict, children's emotion regulatory abilities, and peer competence. Prior evi-
dence suggests a reliable relation between both self-report and observed indi-
ces of parental marital conflict and children's perception of marital conflict
(see Parke et al., 2002, for a review). As a first step, we examined the links
between indices of marital conflict and children's emotional regulation. Ac-
cording to Kim, Parke, and Leidy (2004), fifth-grade boys' perceptions of
marital conflict properties (frequency, intensity, content, resolution of con-
flict, and feeling of threat from conflict) were associated with poor emotion
regulatory skills (engaging in problem behaviors). In a similar way, girls' self-
blame for marital conflict was positively associated with engaging in prob-
lem behavior in response to emotionally arousing challenges and negatively
154 PARKE ETAL.

related to cognitive problem solving as an emotion regulatory strategy. Simi-
lar findings are evident for sixth graders as well. Both parental reports of
marital conflict and children's perceptions of marital conflict were negatively
related to emotional regulation (Leidy &. Parke, 2004).
As a next step we examined the relation between marital conflict,
children's emotional regulation, and their social competence with peers. Kim,
Parke, and Leidy (2004) found that children's reports of marital conflict were
related to a variety of outcomes. For boys, self-reported depression and both
peer- and teacher-rated social competence were linked with marital conflict.
For example, boys' reports of marital conflict and their tendency to blame
themselves were positively related to peer and teacher ratings of aggression
and gossip. In turn, marital conflict was negatively related to maternal re-
ports of emotional regulation. For girls, marital conflict was positively corre-
lated with teacher ratings of social competence and negatively related to
their friendship qualities. In turn, attributions of self-blame for marital con-
flict were related to poor emotional regulation. Finally, there was evidence of
the mediating role of children's emotion regulatory strategy between marital
conflict and children's social competence. Boys' emotion regulatory skill
mediated the link between perceptions of marital conflict and teacher rat-
ings of aggressive behavior and peer-rated gossip.
In sum, marital conflict as well as parent-child interaction patterns are
correlates of children's peer competence. Moreover, just as in the case of
parent—child relationships, emotion regulatory abilities mediate, in part, the
links between marital conflict and peer competence.
ATTENTION REGULATION AS A POTENTIAL

MEDIATING MECHANISM
In concert with emotional regulation and other emotional processes,

attention regulatory processes have come to be viewed as an additional mecha-
nism through which familial socialization experiences might influence the
development of children's social competence. These processes include the
ability to attend to relevant cues, to sustain attention, to refocus attention
through such processes as cognitive distraction and cognitive restructuring,
and other efforts to purposefully reduce the level of emotional arousal in a
situation that is appraised as stressful (chap. 1, this volume). Attentional
processes are thought to organize experience and to play a central role in
cognitive and social development beginning early in infancy (Rothbart &
Bates, 1998). Thus, Wilson and Gottman (1994) aptly considered attention
regulatory processes as a "shuttle" linking emotional regulation and
sociocognitive processes because attentional processes organize both cogni-
tions and emotional responses, and thus influence the socialization of rela-
tionship competence.

Although studies are only beginning to emerge, evidence suggests that
attention regulation may have direct effects on children's social functioning
(Wilson & Gottman, 1994). In support of direct influences, Eisenberg and
colleagues (1993) found that children who were low in attention regulation
were also low in social competence. Other work (Eisenberg et al., 1995) sug-
gests that attentional control and emotional negativity may interact when
predicting social competence. Attention regulatory skills appear to be more
critical among children who experience higher levels of emotional negativ-
ity. Eisenberg et al. argued that when children are not prone to experience
intense negative emotions, attention regulatory processes may be less essen-
tial to positive social functioning. In contrast, the social functioning of chil-
dren who experience anger and other negative emotions may only be under-
mined when these children do not have the ability to use attention regulatory
processes such as cognitive restructuring and other forms of emotion-focused
coping.
Work emanating from the UCR Social Development Project also sug-
gests that attentional processes may work in tandem with emotion regulatory
abilities to enhance social functioning (O'Neil & Parke, 2000). Parenting
style may be an important antecedent of children's abilities to refocus atten-
tion away from emotionally distressing events. Data from fifth graders in our
study indicated that when mothers adopted a negative, controlling parenting
style in a problem-solving discussion, children were less likely to use cogni-
tive decision making as a coping strategy. In addition, these children were
more likely to report greater difficulty in controlling negative affect when
distressed. Lower levels of cognitive decision making and higher levels of
negative affect, in turn, were associated with more problem behaviors and
higher levels of negative interactions with classmates (as reported by teach-
ers). Similarly, when fathers adopted a negative, controlling style, children
were more likely to use avoidance as a mechanism for managing negative
affect. In addition, fathers who reported expressing more negative dominant
emotions such as anger and criticism in everyday interactions had children
who reported greater difficulty controlling negative emotions. Avoidant cop-
ing and negative emotionality, in turn, were related to higher levels of par-
ent-reported problem behaviors.
Recent findings from the NICHD study of child care and youth devel-
opment also bear on this issue (NICHD Child Care Research Network, 2003).
The role of attention in a laboratory task as a mediator between parenting
and peer outcomes was examined. A sample of nearly 1,000 children and
parents from 10 states across the United States was used. Parenting was mea-
sured by the HOME Scale, by maternal sensitivity, and by cognitive stimula-
tion. Attention regulation was indexed by sustained attention and impulsiv-
ity. Both were measured using the Continuous Performance Task (CPT), in
which children viewed a matrix of familiar objects and were required to note
when an object appeared and to refrain when a nontarget stimulus was pre-
156 PARKE ETAL.

.18
Parental Social
Composite B -j]2_^ Competence
A) Home Scale Attention
B) Maternal -.18 A) CPT errors
Sensitivity B)CPT C2
C) Maternal impulsivity r—- ^ Externalizing
Cognitive . • >
—i ' -
Stimulation -.17
Figure 7.2. Relations among maternal parenting, attention regulation, and social
competence (NICHD Child Care Research Network, 2003). Attention (B) mediates
the relation between the parental composite (A) and both social competence (C,)
and externalizing behaviors (C2). CPT = Continuous Performance Task.
sented. Errors of omission occurred when children failed to respond to a tar-

get stimulus; errors of commission occurred when children responded to a
nontarget stimulus. Children who had fewer errors of omission had greater
ability to sustain attention; children with more errors of commission were
more impulsive. Social competence and externalizing behaviors were rated
by child care providers at 54 months. There were significant links between
higher-quality family environments, better social competence, and lower
externalizing symptoms. Second, sustained attention and less impulsivity were
associated with higher social competence scores and lower externalizing scores.
Third, impulsivity served as a mediator between family and social outcome
measures (see Figure 7.2).
In a recent follow-up (NICHD Child Care Research Network, 2005)
we found that attention regulation mediated between mothers' and fathers'
parental sensitivity measures and teacher ratings of children's peer compe-
tence and self-reports of loneliness in Grade 1. In this study attention was
measured by both the CPT and by maternal reports of attention regulatory
abilities. Using third-grade outcomes of aggression, exclusion by peers and
friendship, earlier measures (first grade) of mother and father sensitivity pre-
dicted these outcomes. Moreover, attention regulation competence served
as a mediator between parenting (at Grade 1) and later peer outcomes (at
Grade 3). Together these studies provide supportive evidence for the role of
attention as a mediator of the links between family and peer systems.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Several issues remain to be addressed in future research. First, it is im-

portant to specify how emotion and attention regulatory processes are modi-
fied by development. Most of the work with children in this area has focused
on early and middle childhood. More work on the links between these pro-

cesses and social competence in infants and young children as well as in
adolescence would be worthwhile.
Second, the issue of intracultural and cross-cultural variation needs
more attention. It is not clear that these processes operate similarly either
across different ethnic groups in the United States or in different cultures.
Culturally linked differences in temperament are well documented
(Rothbart & Bates, 1998). For example, Asian infants are more proficient
self-regulators than Caucasian infants, but we know less about culturally
linked self-regulatory differences across cultures in older children and ado-
lescents. Also the parental and marital correlates of differences in emotion
regulatory abilities in different cultures remain relatively unexplored. Fi-
nally the links between these processes and social competence in different
cultures needs more attention.
Third, more work is needed to specify the familial pathways through
which children learn emotion and attention regulatory skills. Our focus has
been on parental control strategies, but parental modeling is another avenue
that needs more attention. Studies that provide measures of both parental
and child regulatory skills and strategies would be a worthwhile way of ad-
dressing this issue. Nor should we ignore the contribution of siblings to the
socialization of these regulatory capacities. Needed are genetically sensitive
within-family designs in which two or more siblings in the same family are
measured on the same regulatory processes and parental differences in man-
agement of these issues with different children are noted. This type of design
would begin to address the important issue of genetic contributions as well as
socialization influences on the development of emotional regulation skills.
Fourth, the biological correlates of emotional regulation and attentional
processes are beginning to be examined (chap. 6, this volume), especially the
psychophysiological correlates of these issues. Less is known about the neu-
rological correlates of these processes, especially the role of developmental
shifts in frontal lobe functioning (Nelson & Bloom, 1997). Recent advances
in neuro-imaging will make examination of these issues more feasible and
permit us to understand the neurological underpinnings of individual and
developmental differences in emotional and attentional functioning (see chap.
1, this volume). Moreover, the neurological changes that accompany behav-
ioral shifts in these processes will provide an "online" view of these cross-
level linkages.
Finally, a variety of conceptual issues need further examination. The
concept of emotional regulation needs further refinement, especially the
multifaceted nature of the construct. As others have noted (Cole et al., 2004;
Denham, 1998), it is useful to distinguish among emotional, cognitive and
perceptual, and behavioral components of emotional regulation. As our work
suggests, attentional processes need to be considered as well. The interplay
among these components and the differential integration of these aspects of
emotional regulation across development merit more systematic examina-
158 PARKEETAL.
tion. As our own work suggests, attentional processes merit more examina-
tion not only as correlates of social competence but as a component of emo-
tional regulation as well. The extent to which attention regulation is a more
general process or one that plays a unique role in emotional regulation re-
mains unclear. Application of Gross's (2002) construct of attentional de-
ployment, an antecedent-focused aspect of emotional regulation, to future
development studies would be worthwhile.
Our goal in this chapter was to demonstrate the central role played by
emotional processes, especially emotion and attention regulation, in account-
ing for variations in peer social competence. As our work has shown through
social experience in the family either in the course of parent-child interac-
tion or as a consequence of witnessing marital conflict, children acquire a
variety of emotional competencies that, in turn, are used in their interac-
tions with peers. One of the contributions of our work has been to highlight
the role of fathers as well as mothers in this cross-systems process. The chal-
lenge for future research is to trace more closely how these emotional compe-
tencies shift across development and to better uncover the predictive value
of emotional competence in childhood for later social and emotional func-
tioning in adulthood. In view of the central importance of emotional compe-
tence for successful social adaptation in a wide variety of settings, this is
clearly a worthwhile goal.
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162 PARKE ETAL.

8
MARITAL DISCORD AND CHILDREN'S
EMOTIONAL SELF-REGULATION
E. MARK CUMMINGS AND PEGGY S. KELLER
Although a normal part of every marriage, interparental conflict can

result in serious harm to children's functioning. Children exposed to high
levels of intense, unresolved conflict are at increased risk for social, emo-
tional, and behavioral problems (Grych & Fincham, 1990). Given the preva-
lence of discordant marriages, this represents a significant challenge for our
society. However, simply providing evidence of the link between marital
discord and child adjustment has reached a point of diminishing returns.
Theoretical, process-oriented models accounting for these relationships must
now be tested.
The emotional security hypothesis (ESH; Davies & Cummings, 1994)
posits that children's emotion regulation plays a key role in the deleterious
effects of interparental conflict on children. According to this theory, when
children interpret marital discord as threatening to family stability and per-
sonal well-being, children's emotional security is reflected by patterns of
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral self-regulation in response. However,
consistent with a functionalist perspective on emotions, emotion regulation
is expected to play an especially important role in organizing and directing
children's reactions to conflict and in reflecting the meaning of conflict from
163
the children's perspective (Cummings & Davies, 1996). This chapter exam-
ines how an understanding of these patterns of responding helps account for
how and why marital discord affects children's functioning and development.
CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL,
AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Conflict is inevitable in every relationship, but there is a great variabil-

ity in the ways that couples handle and resolve their disagreements. Some
couples use effective problem-solving skills, demonstrate affection, and show
concern for each other, successfully resolving issues as they come up. Other
couples engage in conflicts of escalating intensity, using threats, insults, and
aggression without resolving problems. Most couples fall somewhere in be-
tween, handling some of their differences poorly and others well, sometimes
using effective and other times maladaptive conflict strategies.
From children's perspectives, these different conflict strategies have
different meanings, and different implications for their long-term adjustment.
Children have adverse reactions to certain conflict tactics such as physical
aggression, verbal hostility, and threats to leave the relationship, whereas
they may potentially benefit from exposure to conflict tactics such as prob-
lem solving, support, and affection (Goeke-Morey, Cummings, Harold, &
Shelton, 2003). According to ESH, children's interpretation of the meaning
of marital conflict as constructive or destructive conflict can be determined
from their emotional, behavioral, and cognitive responding, but emotional
reactions are held to be especially informative. Destructive conflict is linked
with long-term negative child outcomes, including children's social, emo-
tional, and behavioral problems (Grych & Fincham, 1990). According to
the theory, destructive marital conflict is harmful because children perceive
negative implications for the family and for personal well-being. Children
who are exposed to high levels of destructive conflict develop reduced emo-
tional security. Insecure children have negative perceptions and beliefs about
family stability. They are also hypervigilant to conflict, have a lower thresh-
old for the perception of threat, and are preoccupied with the maintenance
of family stability.
Consistent with the view of emotional security as an organizational
construct (Cummings, Davies, & Campbell, 2000), children's emotional se-
curity is operationally defined in terms of several component processes
(Cummings & Davies, 1996; Davies & Cummings, 1994). The first compo-
nent of emotional security is children's emotional reaction to interparental
disagreements. When disagreements are perceived as threatening, children
may react with fear, anger, or sadness. Characteristics of the disagreement
and children's history of exposure to conflict both influence the form, inten-
sity, and duration of these emotions. Children's representations of family
164 CUMMINGS AND KELLER

relationships are a second component of emotional security. These represen-
tations include expectations of parental behavior in both parent-child and
interparental contexts and the consequences of that behavior for the family.
Consistent with attachment theory notions about children's representations
of family (chaps. 3 and 4, this volume), they are based on previous experi-
ence (Cummings et al., 2000). For example, children develop expectations
of how the interparental relationship relates to broader family functioning.
Emotionally insecure children may perceive even positive interactions be-
tween their parents as threatening, believe that conflict between their par-
ents is unlikely to be resolved and may lead to divorce, expect parents who
are angry at each other to take it out on the children, or view themselves as
partially or entirely responsible for the discord. The third component of
emotional security is children's effort to regulate exposure to marital con-
flict. Insecure children may attempt to end the disagreement through their
own involvement, either directly as a mediator or indirectly as a distracter.
In an alternative way, children may remove themselves from the immedi-
ate environment to avoid exposure to destructive conflict. Finally, children's
higher-order patterns of emotional security may reflect meaningful organi-
zations of these several components, adding to the prediction of individual
differences in children's functioning and adjustment (Davies &. Forman,
2002).
These component processes fit with theoretical definitions of emotion
regulation. For example, Thompson (1994) stated that "emotion regulation
consists of the extrinsic and intrinsic processes responsible for monitoring,
evaluating and modifying emotional reactions, especially their intensive and
temporal features, to accomplish one's goals" (pp. 27—28). Regulation occurs
through neurophysiological constituents, attention, cognitive interpretations
of external and internal events, access to coping resources, regulation of en-
vironmental demands, and choice of emotional expressions. More recently,
Cole, Martin, and Dennis (2004) stated that "emotion regulation refers to
changes associated with activated emotions. These include changes in the
emotion itself... or in other psychological processes" and further contended
that "the term emotion regulation can denote two types of regulatory phe-
nomena: emotion as regulating and emotion as regulated" (p. 320). In addi-
tion, Gross, Richards, and John (chap. 1, this volume), have defined emo-
tion regulation as the use of cognition and behavior to determine the quality,
timing, and expression of emotion. In terms of these definitions of emotion
regulation, children with low emotional security devote greater attention to
marital relations and are more likely to interpret marital disagreements as
cause for concern. Negative emotional reactions organize and motivate ef-
forts to cope with marital conflict, including attempts to alter conflict to
protect their own welfare (e.g., mediation). In this way, children's goal-
directed behavior prompts them to create an environment with fewer threats
to emotional security. Their experience of fear, anger, and sadness prompts
MARITAL DISCORD AND CHILDREN'S EMOTIONAL SELF-REG ULATION 165

efforts toward regulation of the environment that, in turn, are aimed at regu-
lating the experience of emotion.
A lower threshold of emotional arousal may in the short term be ben-
eficial by increasing vigilance for potentially harmful situations. Negative
representations about family relationships may also be beneficial by provid-
ing a framework within which children can select and use behavioral strate-
gies that reduce threat. However, a key contention of ESH is that these short-
term benefits are outweighed by the long-term costs in terms of heightened
risk of adjustment problems. From the perspective of emotional intelligence
(see chap. 2, this volume), emotionally insecure children fail to develop the
abilities necessary for adaptive functioning, because insecurity creates po-
tentially maladaptive patterns of responding in multiple contexts and also
diverts resources away from addressing other developmental goals (Cummings
& Davies, 1996). For example, the pattern of insecure responding to
interparental conflict may generalize to peer conflict, leading to inappropri-
ate social withdrawal or aggressive behavior as responding aimed at reducing
the threat other children are perceived as posing. Social adaptation difficul-
ties may translate into romantic difficulties as children emerge into adoles-
cence and adulthood. Increased emotional arousal may contribute to chronic
anxiety or depression. The attention required to monitor family interactions
may reduce resources available for academics. Thus, children's emotional
insecurity may undermine adaptive functioning in multiple domains, increas-
ing the risk for less optimal child outcomes over time.
Recent analyses have begun to distinguish between constructive and

destructive conflict tactics on the basis of children's reactions. As previously
described, research has traditionally focused on a limited number of strate-
gies, such as physical aggression and hostility. However, everyday disagree-
ments include a wide range of behaviors, both positive and negative, such as
humor, support, problem-solving, threat, withdrawal, and pursuit. Accord-
ing to ESH, tactics that threaten family stability will be associated with more
adverse child reactions than tactics that help couples resolve disagreements.
Thus, children's reactions to conflict strategies serve as the basis for deter-
mining whether they are constructive or destructive.
Goeke-Morey et al. (2003) examined a wide range of conflict tactics in
two different cultural contexts using analog procedures. The study included
175 American children ages 8 to 16 and 327 Welsh children ages 11 and 12
living with married or cohabiting parents. The U.S. sample was drawn from
a larger study of 300 mothers, fathers, and children, recruited to achieve a
representative community sample (see also Cummings, Goek-Morey, 6k Papp,
2003, 2004; Cummings, Goeke-Morey, Papp, & Dukewich, 2002; Du Rocher

Schudlich & Cummings, 2003; Papp, Cummings, & Goeke-Morey, 2002),
fostering the generalizability of the results to such samples. The sample re-
flected the demographic characteristics of the county from which it was drawn,
including 83% White, 11% Black, and 3% Hispanic. Annual family income
ranged from less than $10,000 to more than $80,000, with the median in-
come in the $40,000 to $65,000 range. Demographic statistics suggested that
the Welsh sample was similarly representative of the communities from which
it was drawn with regard to family constitution, ethnic representation, eco-
nomic diversity, and parent education (see also Davies, Harold, Goeke-Morey,
& Cummings, 2002).
Children were asked to watch a videotaped series of vignettes in which
an adult enacted a specific behavior toward a second adult of opposite gender
and asked to pretend that the actors were their parents. In half the vignettes
a female portrayed the tactic; in the other half a male portrayed the tactic.
Actors were selected to match the children culturally and ethnically. Each
scene demonstrated only one of the following tactics: humor, support, affec-
tion, problem solving, calm discussion, physical aggression toward an object,
physical aggression toward a person, verbal hostility, nonverbal hostility,
threat, or pursuit. After each scene, children were interviewed regarding their
emotional, cognitive, and behavioral reactions.
Results indicate that American children had more negative than posi-
tive emotional reactions to aggression toward a person, aggression toward an
object, threat, verbal hostility, nonverbal hostility, and pursuit, indicating
that these strategies are destructive or threatening to family stability. Ameri-
can children had more positive than negative emotional reactions to prob-
lem solving, support, and affection, suggesting that these tactics are experi-
enced as constructive. The only tactic that could not be classified on the
basis of reactions by American children was calm discussion. A similar pat-
tern of results was found for Welsh children, with the exception that calm
discussion emerged as a constructive conflict tactic. Consistent with ESH,
children's emotional, behavioral, and cognitive responses yielded similar or-
dering of conflict tactics from relatively most negative (i.e., most destruc-
tive) to relatively most positive (i.e., most constructive). Both American
and Welsh children engaged in more behavioral regulation (attempting to
avoid exposure to the conflict) in response to aggression toward a person,
aggression toward an object, threat, verbal hostility, and pursuit than in re-
sponse to problem solving, support, and affection. Both samples also reported
more negative cognitive representations (greater concern) for aggression to-
ward a person, aggression toward an object, threat, verbal hostility, nonver-
bal hostility, and pursuit than for problem solving, support, and affection.
Cummings et al. (2003) attempted to replicate these findings using a
different method: home diary reports of children's reactions to everyday con-
flict. The diary method allows for a more ecologically valid assessment of
constructive and destructive conflict. This study focused on children's emo-
MARITAL DJSCORD AND CHILDREN'S EMOTIONAL SELF-REGULATION 167

tional reactions. As we noted previously, emotions are seen by ESH as pri-
mary indicators of children's perceptions about the meaning of conflict, and
also as motivating, organizing, and directing children's responses to marital
conflict. Furthermore, analyses included children's specific emotions (anger,
fear, and sadness) as well as overall negativity. The study included 116 fami-
lies with children between the ages of 8 and 16. Parents were trained to
complete diary reports of any major or minor difference of opinion that oc-
curred between them for a period of 15 days. The diaries consisted of a checklist
of various tactics (threat, insult, verbal and nonverbal hostility, defensive-
ness, withdrawal, physical distress, calm discussion, support, and affection)
and children's reactions to the disagreement if they were present. Training
involved verbal, written, and video descriptions of conflict tactics along with
practice using videos of disagreements.
Mothers completed 580 and fathers completed 377 records for disagree-
ments in which children were present. A wide variety of conflict tactics were
reported. The results thus supported the view that everyday conflicts include
a rich array of both positive and negative strategies (Cummings & Davies,
2002). Children responded with greater negativity and less happiness to threat,
insult, verbal hostility, and defensiveness (both mothers' and fathers' reports),
as well as nonverbal hostility, withdrawal, and physical distress (mothers'
report only). Children responded with less negativity and greater happiness
to fathers' and mothers' reports of calm discussion, support, and affection.
Relations with children's specific emotional reactions of fear, anger, and sad-
ness were generally consistent with this pattern, so little support was found
for a specific emotions theory (Crockenberg & Langrock, 2001).
Interesting questions arise about family members' perspectives and clas-
sification of constructive and destructive conflicts. A spouse's perspective on
conflict may influence whether he or she appraises it as constructive or de-
structive. Thus, the marital literature, particularly with regard to pursuit-
withdrawal patterns and power differentials in couples (Loving, Heffner,
Kiecolt-Glaser, Glaser, & Malarkey, 2004), suggests that conflict-management
tactics that are functionally or emotionally advantageous to one partner may
be disadvantageous to the other (Ball, Cowan, & Cowan, 1995). However,
children are less likely to have a strong interest in one parent's perspective in
relation to the other. That is, children are more interested in family stability
and both parents staying together. Accordingly, we hypothesize that chil-
dren are more likely to react in an "expert way" to the meaning of conflict for
the parental (and family) relationship.
Therefore, in terms of appraising family conflicts for their emotional
security implications, especially in terms of their emotional responses, chil-
dren may be more reliable reporters on the relative constructiveness versus
destructiveness of conflict tactics than their parents. As Cummings and Davies
have shown (2002), using theoretically based, operational criteria derived
from ESH, children's responses to most conflict tactics have supported un-

ambiguous classifications as constructive or destructive across cultures (e.g.,
see the typically moderate to high effect sizes reported in Goeke-Morey et
al., 2003, Table 2) that are also generally consistent across children's ages
and gender. In a similar way, parental emotional expressions during conflicts
in the home have been consistently classified as destructive (e.g., anger, sad-
ness) or constructive (e.g., positive affect), respectively, on the basis of
children's emotional (Cummings et al., 2002) or aggressive (Cummings et
al., 2004) responses. It is important to note that responses to nonverbal an-
ger and marital withdrawal in the home indicate that children consistently
respond to these behaviors as destructive, although parents themselves may
sometimes assume that conflict avoidance is "functionally constructive" in
that the immediate threat is minimized.
It is also important to note the long-term impact of destructive mari-
tal conflict on children's emotion regulation. A key tenet of ESH is that
children's emotional security is affected by their previous exposure to mari-
tal conflict. Children who are exposed to high levels of destructive conflict
are proposed to develop a pattern of emotional insecurity in which reac-
tions to conflict are intensely negative. Children develop a pattern of emo-
tional insecurity because their previous exposure has taught them about
the important threat that their parents' conflict poses to family stability. In
this sense, children become "experts" on their parents' conflict styles and
are well equipped to assess both the constructiveness and destructiveness
of a given conflict.
The notion that children become more reactive to conflict over time is
known as the sensitization hypothesis, and it is supported by research
(Cummings, 1994). A series of experiments has demonstrated that children
who have seen intense and unresolved disagreements later have more nega-
tive reactions to conflict than children who have seen constructive and re-
solved disagreements (El Sheikh & Cummings, 1995; El Sheikh, Cummings,
& Reiter, 1996). For example, Davies, Myers, Cummings, and Heindel (1999)
randomly assigned children in three age groups (early childhood, preadoles-
cence, and late adolescence) to see either four intense and unresolved con-
flicts between a couple on videotape, or four mild and resolved conflicts.
Children in both groups then watched a standard conflict of moderate inten-
sity between the familiar couple. Children in all age groups who had been
exposed to destructive conflict had more negative emotional reactions and
showed increased attempts at avoidance of the standard conflict. Late ado-
lescents in the destructive conflict group also demonstrated more negative
representations about relationship stability in response to the standard con-
flict than children in the constructive conflict group. These findings suggest
that children who have witnessed their parents' destructive conflict will, over
the long term, develop an insecure pattern of responding to conflict. Corre-
lational research also supports this suggestion: Research indicates that
children's reactions to conflict in the laboratory setting are related to previ-
MARITAL DISCORD AND CHILDREN'S EMOTIONAL SELF-REG (JLATION 169

ous exposure to marital discord and distress in the home (Davies &. Cummings,
1998).
Additional evidence of the sensitization hypothesis can be found in
children's cognitive representations of marital relationships. Children who
have been exposed to high levels of marital discord may view conflict as
likely to go unresolved, spill over into parent-child interactions, and even-
tually bring about family dissolution. These appraisals help account for
children's angry, fearful, and sad reactions, which then must be regulated or
are used to regulate interparental behavior. One innovative way of assessing
children's cognitive representations of marital conflict was used by Shamir,
Du Rocher Schudlich, and Cummings (2001). Children's experiences within
their families and sense of emotional security are hypothesized to contribute
to beliefs and expectations about family events, which are organized into
mental representations. In this study, 47 children between the ages of 5 and
8 completed a narrative story stem task in which experimenters used dolls to
enact different family events (mother—father conflict, mother—child conflict,
father-child conflict, and mother-father conflict with children present), and
children were then given the dolls and asked to finish the stories. An as-
sumption underlying story stem tasks is that children draw on their existing
mental representations when completing the narrative task. The stories the
children told in response to story stems were videotaped and coded for posi-
tive (sharing, caregiving, affection, helpfulness, forgiving, instructiveness,
collaboration, and conflict resolution) and negative (avoidance, interven-
tion, verbal aggression, physical aggression, stalemating, ignoring, inconsis-
tence, nagging, rejection, neglect, harsh discipline, hostility, helplessness,
and blaming) representations.
Results indicate similarities and differences across the types of stories
(mother—father, mother—child, etc). Frequent negative representations in-
cluded verbal aggression (all story types), physical aggression (parent—child
stories), harsh discipline (parent—child and mother—father—child stories),
blame (mother-father and mother-father-child stories), intervention and
ignoring (mother-father stories), and avoidance (mother-father-child sto-
ries). The use of negative strategies by one person in a story was associated
with greater use of negative strategies by other family members. The same
pattern was found for positive representations. The most frequent positive
representations were of resolution for all conflict story stems. Consistent with
ESH, both mothers' and fathers' reports of stalemating, avoidance, physical
aggression, and verbal aggression during their marital conflict predicted more
negative child representations across all story types. In addition, negative
representations between story types were positively correlated. The same
pattern was found for positive representations.
The results of these studies suggest robust classifications of multiple,
everyday marital conflict strategies as constructive or destructive on the ba-
sis of children's responding across cultures, parental gender, methodologies

(laboratory, naturalistic), and types of responses examined (e.g., emotional,
cognitive). They suggest that disruptions in the marital relationship affect
children's emotion regulation, behavioral regulation, and representations in
response to marital, parent-child, and triadic interactions in both the short
and long term. As hypothesized by ESH, children differentiate between con-
flict through their emotional, behavioral, and cognitive reactions. In addi-
tion, conflict that is most likely to jeopardize family stability, conflict char-
acterized by greater intensity and less resolution, is associated with decreased
emotional security. When children are exposed to destructive conflict styles,
they have more intense negative emotional reactions and develop the nega-
tive cognitive representation that interparental disagreements are a cause for
concern, and attempts by children to mediate or avoid the conflict are evi-
dent. However, there may also be individual differences in how the compo-
nent processes of emotional security are interrelated. Similar to the case of
attachment within the parent-child relationship, specific patterns of emo-
tional security related to the marital relationship may have important addi-
tional implications for children's adjustment.
Davies and Forman (2002) reported on three clusters of children on the
basis of their emotional security in the interparental relationship, examined
across two data sets of children of different ages and assessed across a wide
range of measures of child and family functioning. These clusters correspond
highly to clusters of attachment orientation (Mikulincer, Shaver, & Pereg,
2003). About half of the children were in the secure cluster, which was char-
acterized by mild and healthy concern in the face of destructive conflict and
mental representations of family relationships as stable (i.e., they believed
the conflict would not spill over into the parent-child relationship and that
conflict would eventually be resolved). About a quarter of children fell into
the second cluster, preoccupied children, who experienced intense negative
emotional reactions, viewed relationships as less stable, and attempted to
intervene or avoid the disagreements. Preoccupied children likely have a low
threshold for the perception of threat and have difficulties preserving their
sense of security. The third cluster, dismissive children, was also character-
ized by intense overt negative reactions, avoidance, and involvement, but
when asked about their feelings, representations, and impulses to intervene
or avoid they more closely resembled secure children. This suggests that these
children are highly threatened by conflict but seek to restore their sense of
security by dissociating and blunting their distress.
The three patterns of emotional security differed in a variety of impor-
tant respects, including family characteristics and child outcomes. Secure
children had historically lower exposure to destructive marital conflict than
dismissive and preoccupied children and also came from more cohesive fami-
lies. They also evidenced fewer internalizing and externalizing symptoms,
fewer personality problems, and fewer coping difficulties than children in
the dismissive and preoccupied groups. These children were frequently ex-
MAR/TAL DISCORD AND CHILDREN'S EMOTIONAL SELF-REGULATION 171

posed to conflict handled well and resolved, presumably bolstering their sense
of the family as well equipped to deal with any difficulties that arise and
supporting the child in achieving developmental goals such as interpersonal
skills and coping resources. In contrast, preoccupied children were exposed
to high levels of destructive conflict, and also to high levels of parental con-
trol. Although their families were relatively cohesive, these children were at
heightened risk for developing internalizing problems. From an emotional
security perspective, these children may be drawn into family conflict, with
their feelings of responsibility and guilt hindering their ability to preserve
emotional security, resulting in internalizing problems. Finally, dismissing
children experienced high levels of unresolved marital conflict and the low-
est levels of family cohesion and marital relationship satisfaction. Dismissing
children were at greatest risk for externalizing problems and substance use.
Children who exhibit this pattern of emotional security may view the family
as a source of stress rather than a resource for coping and therefore attempt to
distance themselves from family relationships, especially family conflict. To
preserve their sense of security, their dismissing pattern may reflect efforts to
minimize the threat that interparental discord poses.
Three different types of broad family configurations may coincide with
the three emotional security groups (Davies & Forman, 2002). First, close
healthy families handle disagreements well, foster warm and caring family
relationships, and engage in appropriate parenting strategies, fostering the
development of secure children. Second, enmeshed and discordant fami-
lies have frequent, intense, and unresolved conflicts that draw in multiple
family members and spill over into other dimensions of family functioning,
increasing the likelihood of preoccupied patterns of emotional insecurity
about family relationships. Third, cold and discordant families also have
intense and unresolved conflict. However, they are characterized by a rigid
family structure in which members disengage from one another and little
warmth is present in family interaction. Children from these distant and
highly conflictual homes are at increased risk for developing dismissive pat-
terns of emotional insecurity.
Recently, Davies, Cummings, and Winter (2004) extended this work
toward broader family-wide models of emotional security, distinguishing
among family configurations pertinent to emotional security. Participants
were 235 families with a child in kindergarten (see also Cummings, Keller, &
Davies, 2005). As in the study by Goeke-Morey et al. (2003), described ear-
lier, research staff made efforts to recruit a representative sample of families
by targeting areas with low socioeconomic status and ethnically and racially
diverse populations. Consistent with the demographics of the surrounding
counties, 76% were White, 16.7% were Black, 3.8% were Hispanic, and 2.1%
were of mixed race. Total family income ranged from less than $6,000 a year
to more than $75,000 a year, with the median income between $40,000 and
$54,999 a year.

On the basis of a multi-informant and multimethod procedure, clus-
ter analyses yielded four distinct groups of families. Close to half of the
sample was characterized as cohesive families because of low levels of con-
flict, high levels of relationship satisfaction and effective parenting, and
warm relationships. About one third of the sample fell into the disengaged
cluster; they experienced somewhat elevated levels of conflict and were
extremely low on warmth and affection. The third cluster (17% of the
sample) was similar to the cohesive families, but high levels of psychologi-
cal control were present. This cluster was therefore labeled the controlling
configuration. A small number (8%) of the families were enmeshed; they
were characterized as high in intense conflict, inconsistent discipline, and
parental psychological control but reported moderate levels of acceptance
and affection.
These family configurations differed with respect to children's emo-
tional security and psychological symptoms. Children in enmeshed families
were more emotionally reactive, had more negative mental representations,
and exhibited greater behavioral regulation in response to conflict than chil-
dren from the cohesive group. These children also demonstrated more inter-
nalizing and externalizing symptoms relative to children in cohesive fami-
lies. Children in disengaged families experienced more self-reported distress
and impulses to become involved in the conflict and perceived conflict to be
more threatening than children in the cohesive group. Children in disen-
gaged families also suffered higher levels of internalizing symptoms than chil-
dren in cohesive families. Children in controlling families were similar to
children in the cohesive group. Additional analyses implicate emotional se-
curity as a mediator between family enmeshment and children's internaliz-
ing and externalizing symptoms 1 year later. Thus, evidence has been found
that children develop unique patterns of emotional security that are associ-
ated with their family experiences, especially marital conflict. In addition,
these studies support the role of dimensions of emotion regulation in the
adverse effects of children's exposure to marital conflict.
The role of children's emotion regulation as a dimension of emotional
security in the relationship between marital conflict and child adjustment
has recently been examined relative to other possible theories about media-
tors. One alternative theory of why marital discord is harmful to children is
the social learning theory (Bandura, 1973), which posits that children will
respond with anger and behaviorally imitate the same-sex parent's angry be-
haviors, especially when the parent is physically aggressive. As another ex-
ample of a prediction for children's responding, social learning theory holds
that children will react more aggressively to more aggression between adults
and that the themes of disagreements will otherwise have little impact on
the effects of marital conflict on children. In contrast, ESH contends that
children will react behaviorally to reduce the threat posed rather than imi-
tate the emotions and behaviors of parents. Conflict topics that pose a greater
MARITAL DISCORD AND CHILDREN'S EMOTIONAL SELF-REGULATION 173

threat to security, such as those with child-related themes, will be associated
with more intense negative reactions.
Contrary to social learning theory and consistent with ESH, Davies et
al. (2002) found that children have more negative responses to child-related
than adult-related themes and that conflicts involving an explicit threat to
end the marital relationship are just as disturbing as physically aggressive
conflicts. In fact, boys responded more negatively to disagreements involv-
ing a threat to family intactness than to disagreements involving physical
aggression. Also inconsistent with social learning theory, children responded
with greater fear but not greater anger to physical aggression than to verbal
hostility. Thus, greater support was found for ESH than for social learning
theory processes. Children did not react differently to the anger expressions
of the same- versus the opposite-gender parent, as predicted by social learn-
ing theory. The maladjustment exhibited by children exposed to high levels
of marital discord was not simply a function of behavioral imitation. Chil-
dren were far more likely to intervene in conflict or avoid conflict than to
imitate parental conflict tactics. Thus, the evidence supports the contention
that children view conflict as a threat to the family and their own well-being
and as a result are more likely to attempt to regulate their parents' behavior
in such a way as to preserve emotional security than simply to imitate the
emotions and behaviors of parents.
Another alternative to ESH is the cognitive contextual framework
(Grych & Fincham, 1990). According to the cognitive contextual frame-
work, high levels of marital discord are associated with perceived threat and
self-blame on the part of children. These cognitions are posited to account
for the deleterious effects on children's adjustment. Although the cognitive
contextual framework and ESH have some important similarities, the former
places greater emphasis on cognition, whereas the latter focuses more on
emotion regulation. In a comparison of the two theories, Davies et al. (2002)
tested a model that included children's appraisals of threat, self-blame, and
emotional security as mediators between interparental conflict and children's
internalizing and externalizing symptoms. Cognitive appraisals of threat and
self-blame appeared to play a role in the adverse effects of marital discord on
children. However, emotional security, with its additional focus on emotion
regulation, emerged as the most consistent mediator.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Research on the relationship between marital conflict and children's

emotion regulation has recently made significant theoretical and empirical
progress. However, there are many unanswered questions. For example, apart
from the characteristics of marital conflict and conflict histories, are there
characteristics of children that might influence the meaning they give to

interparental discord? The majority of studies reviewed have found little or
no evidence that child gender acts as moderator of the relationship between
marital conflict and child adjustment. However, sample sizes may not have
been large enough to adequately test this question. Previous studies have
found differences in emotion regulation on the basis of child gender. For
example, Cole, Zahn-Waxler, and Smith (1994) conducted a study in which
preschoolers at low or high risk for adjustment problems were given a dis-
appointing gift. Children's reactions to the gift were observed while the
experimenter was present and absent. High- and low-risk boys differed in
the experimenter-present condition: High-risk boys showed more negative
emotion. Girls differed in the experimenter-absent condition: High-risk
girls showed less negative emotion than low-risk girls. Thus, child gender
may play a role in children's regulation of emotion in the face of marital
discord.
An additional child characteristic that might influence children's ap-
praisals of and reactions to marital conflict is age. Children's emotion regula-
tion abilities and strategies develop over time; initially infants have a limited
repertoire of emotion regulation skills that are eventually replaced with more
flexible, volitional strategies (Cole et al, 2004). There is limited and incon-
sistent evidence regarding how exposure to marital conflict at different stages
might impact this development or how the emotion regulation strategies of
different developmental levels compare in effectiveness (Cummings & Davies,
2002).
In addition to child characteristics, other family characteristics such as
parental mental illness may influence children's perceptions of marital con-
flict. Individuals experiencing psychological disorders often experience high
levels of marital conflict (Cummings et al., 2000), and exposure to destruc-
tive marital discord helps explain why parental symptoms of psychopathol-
ogy are associated with decreased child functioning (Cummings et al., 2005;
Du Rocher Schudlich et al., 2003; El Sheikh & Flanagan, 2001). Additional
research is needed to explore how the combination of exposure to both mari-
tal conflict and parental psychopathology impacts children's emotion regu-
lation. Specifically, what additional meaning might an interparental disagree-
ment have to a child when one of those parents is experiencing depression,
alcohol dependence, or other conditions? How might children's emotional
reactions differ in terms of their content, intensity, duration, and expression?
How would children respond behaviorally in this context? From the emo-
tional security perspective, children in this context may see family stability
as under constant threat from parental mental illness. The additional threat
of marital discord may therefore result in extremely intense negative reac-
tions because children will need to be extremely sensitive to family events.
Children exposed to high levels of marital conflict in combination with pa-
rental mental illness may be even more prone to intervention or avoidance
than those exposed to high levels of destructive conflict alone.

Another important future direction involves child agency. Previous stud-
ies have made it clear that children react behaviorally to interparental dis-
agreements, sometimes avoiding them by leaving the room or psychologi-
cally distancing themselves, other times intervening in conflict by interrupting
or by attempting to resolve the problem themselves. ESH offers a clear theo-
retical explanation for these phenomena: Children are doing their best to
reduce the threat they believe marital conflict poses. This reduction in threat
may be perceptual (psychological distancing) or actual (interrupting parents
might stop them from fighting). The implication is that the relationship be-
tween marital conflict and children's emotion regulation need not be in one
direction. Children's emotion regulation behavior may reduce (or inadvert-
ently increase) levels of marital conflict. Little research has addressed this
possibility. Impulses to intervene in conflict have been reported in previous
studies, and high levels of discord are related to children's decreased feelings
of efficacy in dealing with conflict (Cummings & Schermerhorn, 2003). It is
still unclear how child intervention into conflict or mere presence during
conflict might affect parent behavior. One recent study found that when
children are present, interparental conflict tends to be more destructive (Papp
et al., 2002). However, although based on a substantial sampling of natural-
istic observations in the home, this study was correlational in nature, and
causality cannot be inferred.
Directives for Interdisciplinary Collaboration
Most research in this area, particularly on the role of emotion regula-

tion, has been conducted by developmental and clinical psychologists. Their
expertise has helped bring about a greater awareness of the importance of
marital relations to child development and has resulted in many of the find-
ings described here. Nevertheless, future research will be greatly improved by
collaborative research between developmental psychologists, clinical psy-
chologists, sociologists, cultural anthropologists, physiological psychologists,
and biologists.
There is increasing evidence for the importance of physiology in emo-
tional self-regulation. Researchers now know that the experience of emotion
is associated with a wide range of physiological events, including changes in
skin conductance, heart rate, vagal tone, and hormone levels. Furthermore,
studies show that family interactions are associated with these physiological
experiences of emotion. Collaboration with physiological psychologists and
biologists is therefore a valuable direction for future research. In particular,
the emergence of unique profiles of emotion regulation such as secure, preoc-
cupied, and dismissing may be associated with patterns of physiological re-
sponding. The work of Gross (chap. 1, this volume; Gross, 1998) indicates
that differing strategies of regulating emotion have important consequences
for physiology and long-term adjustment. Specifically, cognitive reappraisals

of events as nonthreatening may decrease physiological arousal, whereas the
suppression of emotional expression might actually increase it. From an emo-
tional security perspective, dismissing children might engage in higher levels
of reappraisal, thereby minimizing the potential threat of marital conflict.
Thus, dismissing children might be expected to have physiological respond-
ing similar to secure children. Preoccupied children, however, make no at-
tempt to reduce their emotional expression and likely are more physiologi-
cally reactive. Collaborative research is needed to formally test these
hypotheses.
Vagal tone and cortisol levels represent two important avenues for such
collaborative research. Vagal tone refers to the activity of the vagus nerve, an
important nerve in the parasympathetic nervous system that connects the
brain with the heart and helps control heart rate. Research indicates that
toddlers with high baseline vagal tone approach strangers more quickly than
other children (Fox & Field, 1989). In addition, the suppression of vagal
tone (which is typically associated with focused attention, such as during a
stressful situation or emotional interaction) may play an important role in
children's emotion regulation (Gottman & Katz, 2002). Cortisol is a stress
hormone that can be detected in saliva. As with vagal tone, individual dif-
ferences in baseline levels of cortisol as well as increases and recovery of
cortisol levels are important. Research indicates that children's cortisol pro-
duction can be influenced by the quality of child care (Dettling, Parker, Lane,
Sebanc, & Gunnar, 2000) and parental maltreatment (Hart, Gunnar, &
Cicchetti, 1995). In addition, cortisol levels are associated with insecure at-
tachment (Lyons-Ruth, 1996).
Another important direction for interdisciplinary collaboration is the
study of how children's abilities to regulate emotion in the face of marital
discord vary from culture to culture. Cultural anthropologists and sociolo-
gists may provide the essential expertise for this endeavor. To date, studies
have examined marital conflict and children's emotional security in Wales
(Goeke-Morey et al., 2003), and Chile (Cummings, Wilson, & Shamir, 2003).
Several similarities in children's reactions have been noted; children across
cultures are adversely affected by marital conflict, especially unresolved con-
flict. However, important differences have also emerged. For example, Chil-
ean children appear to be more sensitive to marital conflict than American
children. Chilean children react with greater sadness to unresolved disagree-
ments and have more negative expectations for future conflict than children
in the United States. A comparison of American and Israeli children re-
vealed a similar pattern: Both groups experienced more negative reactions to
intense and unresolved conflict than to constructive conflict (Shamir,
Cummings, Davies, & Goeke-Morey, 2005). However, Israeli children re-
acted less negatively to unresolved conflicts and less positively to resolved
conflicts than American children, indicating resolution as less meaningful
in the appraisal of conflict.

These studies suggest cultural context as an important factor in the
relationship between marital discord and children's emotion regulation. Fu-
ture research is needed to broaden the number of differing cultures exam-
ined. For example, little research has been conducted on the effects of mari-
tal discord on children in China, India, Russia, or Africa. Collaborative work
with cultural anthropologists and sociologists can help ensure that such re-
search is conducted in a culturally sensitive and relevant format. Further-
more, such collaboration is imperative for the interpretation of results. The
detection of any existing cultural differences represents an important step
forward, but it is equally important to develop insight into why these simi-
larities and differences exist. For example, cultural differences in children's
responding to marital conflict may reflect distinctions between collectivistic
and individualistic traditions. Children in more collectivistic cultures may
view disruptions to family functioning as particularly threatening or may have
been socialized to attend closely to family interactions. However, cultures in
which commitment is highly valued and divorce is discouraged may view
conflict as unlikely to impact family stability. Children's responses to
interparental conflict may also be influenced by cultural beliefs about
children's role in the family. For example, in societies in which children's
submission and obedience are valued, children may be less likely to inter-
vene in marital conflict. Furthermore, ongoing struggles with political or
ethnic violence in communities may contribute to children's emotional in-
security. The understanding of societal or national characteristics and pat-
terns of changes in those characteristics that sociologists and cultural an-
thropologists observe will be essential for the explanation of cultural
differences.
Clinical, Social, and Public Policy Implications
Given both the inevitability of disagreements and the current high rates
of destructive marital discord, children's exposure to marital conflict repre-
sents an important clinical, social, and public policy concern. An additional
concern is that public opinion regarding marital disagreements, as well as
some of the professional advice given to the public, is often inaccurate and
frequently ignores children's perspectives.
Findings indicating that children's emotional self-regulation is an im-
portant mediator of the relationship between marital discord and children's
adjustment have important implications for addressing these concerns. Re-
cent studies identifying the conflict tactics potentially harmful to children's
abilities to regulate emotion can inform parent-education programs designed
to instruct parents how to better handle their disagreements. Parents may
not be aware of how sensitive children can be to disagreements between
their parents, or of how specific conflict strategies that they use may place
their children at increased risk for the development of adjustment problems.

Merely educating parents about these findings may make a difference in fami-
lies. However, prevention programs and therapeutic interventions can also
teach parents to use more constructive conflict tactics as an important way
of addressing this social problem.
Because children's emotional security is based largely on their family
experiences and is hypothesized to serve an adaptive, goal-oriented function
(at least in the short term), it may be both impossible and undesirable to use
child-focused clinical interventions to change insecure children to secure
children. Children's perceptions of marital conflict as threatening may well
be accurate, and the associated emotional, behavioral, and cognitive reac-
tions are designed to reduce the threat children experience. Thus, children
in high-conflict homes might be especially well served by programs targeting
parent behavior to create families that foster emotional security, rather than
directly targeting children's own emotion regulation. Nevertheless, an addi-
tional component to help children better cope with interparental discord
may be a valuable feature of intervention programs. For example, children
might be taught to avoid involvement in their parents' disagreements (in-
volvement may place children at risk for parental retaliation, particularly in
violent homes) and to minimize or reduce contexts for exposure to conflict.
In addition, it is important for children to understand that their parents'
disagreements are not their fault.
It is important that clinicians address these issues in their practice with
couples and families and that public policy incorporate them into programs
for at-risk children. However, development of such interventions is in an
early stage, and the payoff for intervention to improve marital relations and
children's emotional security in families is still unknown.
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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN
9
EMOTION REGULATION AND
THEIR RELATION TO RISK
TAKING DURING ADOLESCENCE
M. LYNNE COOPER, MINDY E. FLANAGAN,
AMELIA E. TALLEY, AND LADA MICHEAS
Risk taking is a prototypic feature of adolescence. Recent studies show

that the majority of adolescents engage in risky behaviors, many on a regular
basis (see Arnett, 1999, for a review). For example, in a national survey con-
ducted in 1998 (Kann et al, 1998), half of all high school students had drunk
alcohol in the past 30 days, and nearly one third had had five or more drinks
on a single occasion during that same period. Fully half of all high school
students had ever had sex, and of these, 30% and 40% of female and male
students, respectively, had had four or more lifetime sex partners. Even though
experts agree that risky behaviors can serve adaptive developmental needs
during adolescence (e.g., Baumrind, 1987), the potentially negative conse-
quences associated with such behaviors are, nevertheless, real. Indeed, acci-
dents are the leading cause of death among adolescents. Homicide and AIDS
also rank among the top five causes of death in this age group (see Sells &
Blum, 1996, for a review).
183
Although heightened involvement in risky behaviors during adoles-
cence is well established, the causes of this increase and its consequences for
later development are less well understood. In the present chapter, we argue
that risk-taking behavior can be usefully understood as an effort to regulate
the quality of both positive and negative emotional experience. We review
past research (both our own and that of others) and present previously un-
published data that bear on the validity of this proposition. We conclude
with a discussion of the implications of this perspective for research and
intervention.
Risk behaviors are volitional behaviors that involve trade-offs between

short-term (usually affective) gains and potential long-term costs (Baumeister
&. Scher, 1988). For example, drinking or using drugs may appeal to an indi-
vidual because of immediate benefits, such as relief from stress or sharing an
enjoyable evening with friends, despite longer-term risks of an intoxication-
related accident or injury. Thus, prototypic risk situations involve two or
more competing goals in which the risk of a more remote, undesirable out-
come is accepted (either implicitly or explicitly) as a cost of achieving a
more immediate, desired outcome.
Risk Taking and the Central Role of Emotion
Traditional models of decision making under risk viewed these trade-

offs in largely cognitive terms. That is, people were assumed to choose be-
tween alternative courses of action by assessing the desirability of each action's
possible outcomes and weighting those outcomes by their probability of oc-
currence (see Edwards, 1954)- Thus, cognitive evaluations were thought to
drive the decision process in a more or less rational fashion. Research over
the past 25 years has clearly demonstrated, however, the inadequacies of this
model for predicting actual behavioral choice in risk situations (see Harless
& Camerer, 1994, for a review).
Two broad categories of explanation for this failure have emerged. First,
it is now widely accepted that people's risk calculus diverges from the norma-
tive expectations of the rational decision model because of cognitive errors
in estimating the likelihood of future consequences and reliance on simplify-
ing cognitive heuristics (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). More important
for the present purposes, however, failures in the predictive validity of this
model also reflect the model's inattention to the role of emotions. Indeed,
emotions are now thought to play at least two crucial roles in the risk deci-
sion process.
184 COOPER ETAL.

First, anticipated emotions—those the individual expects to experience
under different choice scenarios—are thought to drive the weighting of con-
sequences associated with each behavior option. Thus, anticipated emotions
can be viewed as a component of the expected consequences of the decision
even within the rational decision-making framework (Mellers, Schwartz, Ho,
& Ritov, 1997). An individual will accordingly select a risky behavioral op-
tion when he or she believes that the option will lead to desired emotional
outcomes (e.g., enhancing a neutral or positive mood, or relieving a dyspho-
ric one). Although the mood-altering properties of certain risk behaviors are
obvious—for example, recreational drugs whose pharmacological properties
act directly on mood states—virtually all risk behaviors possess this poten-
tial. Taking a joy ride in a stolen car or having sex with an attractive partner
can induce euphoric states or serve as diversions from more troubling mood
states. Thus, to the extent that individuals recognize the mood-altering prop-
erties of risk behaviors, expectancies of positive (or negative) emotional out-
comes associated with behavioral choices under risk should strongly influ-
ence the weighting of these alternatives. These considerations suggest that
individuals may learn to engage in risky behaviors as one way to manage
both positive and negative affective states.
Second, behavioral responses in risky situations can also be driven by
feelings in the moment, such as fear or excitement. According to Loewenstein
and colleagues (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001), immediate
emotions can influence the decision process directly by providing informa-
tion about the relative desirability of the impending decision alternatives, or
indirectly (a) by altering the individual's expectations of the probability or
desirability of future consequences or (b) by changing the way that these
consequences are processed.
For example, consider how emotions experienced in the moment might
shape risk decisions for adolescents at a party. The typically ebullient emotions
experienced in such situations might lead them to accept a drink offered by
peers to the extent that they attribute their positive mood to the prospect of
drinking (cf. Schwartz & Clore's mood-as-information hypothesis, 1983). The
experience of positive emotions might also lead adolescents to underestimate
the likelihood that a negative outcome would result from accepting the drink,
or provide them with false confidence that they could handle whatever conse-
quences followed from having the drink. Finally, if adolescents believed that
refusing the drink might lead to a potentially unpleasant interaction with peers,
the desire to maintain their positive mood might also increase the likelihood
of accepting the proffered drink (Isen, 1993).
Conversely, negative emotions experienced in the moment might also
influence risk decisions. For example, socially awkward adolescents might
approach the same party with feelings of anxiety and apprehension. Such
feelings, in turn, might increase the attractiveness of a drink offered by their
peers, at least to the extent that positive mood-altering properties are attrib-
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION REGULATION 185

uted to alcohol (cf. Leith & Baumeister, 1996). A negative mood state might
also undermine adolescents' confidence in their ability to resist peer pres-
sure, or make even more aversive the possibility of rejection or ridicule by
peers if the drink were refused. Thus, momentary affect—whether positive or
negative—can exert strong influences on the decision process, even when
that affect is incidental (i.e., unrelated) to the decision at hand.
In sum, contemporary perspectives on risk-taking behaviors view
emotions—as experienced in the moment and anticipated in the future—as
central, driving forces behind the risk-decision process. Moreover, both nega-
tive and positive emotions are thought to play a role, influencing risk deci-
sions through distinct motivation-emotion pathways. Finally, although not
all pathways are thought to involve emotion regulation processes (e.g., some
effects may be mediated by changes in information processing), direct efforts
to manage emotions are thought to play an important role in motivating
risk-taking behaviors.
Dual Pathways to Risk Taking
The idea that distinct positive and negative motivation-emotion path-
ways underlie risk-taking behaviors has received little formal attention even
though this view is broadly consistent with major motivational theories of
behavior. According to Gray (1970), two neurologically distinct motivation
systems underlie behavior. The behavioral inhibition system (BIS) regulates
behaviors that involve avoidance or escape from negative or painful experi-
ences (aversive or avoidant behaviors), whereas the behavior activation sys-
tem (BAS) regulates behaviors that involve the pursuit of positive or pleasur-
able ones (appetitive or approach behaviors). Further, individuals are thought
to differ in a stable traitlike manner in the relative sensitivity of the two sys-
tems. People who are high in BIS are especially responsive to threat and
punishment cues, and are therefore predisposed to experience negative affect
and to avoidant and fearful responding. In contrast, individuals who are high
in BAS are especially responsive to reward cues, and are thus predisposed to
experience positive affect and engage in reward-seeking behaviors. Indeed,
high levels of the personality traits neuroticism and extraversion are thought
to derive from overactive BIS and BAS systems, respectively (Gray, 1970).
Consistent with the notion of two distinct pathways, past research in-
dicates that people attribute both positive-mood-enhancing and negative-
mood-altering properties to a wide range of risky behaviors (Fromme, Katz,
& D'Amico, 1997). Perhaps more important, our research shows that people
attribute their own risk behaviors to conscious efforts to pursue positive emo-
tional experiences, as well as to escape or cope with negative ones (Cooper,
1994; Cooper, Shapiro, & Powers, 1998; Jackson, Cooper, Mintz, 6k Albino,
2003). Research from independent labs has not only replicated our findings
for alcohol use (Stewart, Zeitlin, & Samoluk, 1996) and risky sexual behav-
ior (Schachner & Shaver, 2004) but also extended them to other behavioral
186 COOPER ETAL.

domains, including reasons for using tobacco (Cohen, McCarthy, Brown, &
Myers, 2002) and illicit drugs (Boys, Marsden, & Strang, 2001), aggressing
against others (Bushman, Baumeister, & Phillips, 2001), skipping school
(Caffray & Schneider, 2000), and gambling (Cotte, 1997).
In the following sections, we identify and discuss a number of indi-
vidual differences that should, if emotions and efforts to regulate them are
central to risk taking, help us better understand differential vulnerabilities to
diverse risk behaviors during adolescence and young adulthood. We first con-
sider individual differences that are theoretically relevant to understanding
risk taking driven by aversive motivation processes and then follow with a
discussion of individual differences theoretically important to understanding
risk taking driven by appetitive motivation processes. Finally, we discuss an
important individual difference in the ability to self-regulate emotions and
emotionally driven behaviors—impulsivity versus restraint—that we believe
serves as a generalized vulnerability toward risk taking, exacerbating tenden-
cies toward both aversive and appetitively motivated risk behaviors.
Individual Differences in the Experience of Negative Emotions and

Efforts to Regulate Them
The Disposition to Experience Negative Emotions

To the extent that aversive motivation processes drive risk behaviors,
individuals who are chronically predisposed to dysphoric mood states should
engage in higher overall levels of risky behaviors. In addition, chronically
dysphoric individuals—because of their greater BIS sensitivity—should be
more sensitive to the experience (or even the threat of experience) of nega-
tive emotions, and thus less able to tolerate or cope with these emotions in
constructive ways.
Extensive evidence—including results from a number of large-scale,
prospective studies—supports the potential importance of a negative emo-
tion pathway to risk taking. We have shown, for example, that negative
emotions, stressful events that elicit negative emotions, and neuroticism pre-
dict alcohol use (Cooper, Agocha, & Sheldon, 2000; Cooper, Frone, Russell,
& Mudar, 1995; Cooper, Russell, Skinner, Frone, & Mudar, 1992) and risky
sexual behavior (Cooper et al., 2000). Further supporting an emotion-
regulation interpretation of these data, we have also shown that the effects of
negative emotions and neuroticism on alcohol use and risky sex are at least
partly mediated by the use of alcohol and sex, respectively, to cope (Cooper
et al., 2000). Finally, we have also shown that drinking to cope moderates
the impact of stressors on alcohol-related outcomes such that stressors are
more strongly linked to alcohol outcomes among individuals who drink to
cope (Peirce, Frone, Russell, & Cooper, 1996).
The mediation and moderation findings for coping motives in alcohol
involvement have since been replicated using both longitudinal (Wills, Sandy,

Shinar, & Yaeger, 1999) and diary (Hussong, 2003) methods. Similar results
have also been reported linking stressors, negative emotions, and the disposi-
tion to experience negative emotions to tobacco (Cohen et al., 2002; Wills
et al., 1999) and illicit drug use (Wills et al., 1999), violent behaviors (Caspi
et al., 1997), conduct disorder (Krueger, Caspi, & Moffitt, 2000), and risky
sexual behavior (Hoyle, Fejfar, & Miller, 2000). Together these data (in par-
ticular, the mediation and moderation results) suggest that risk taking may
be the product of a person's efforts to down-regulate distress rather than the
experience of emotional distress per se. In the next section, we consider
whether some individuals are more likely than others to engage in risk be-
haviors in an effort to regulate negative affect, and if so, what individual
differences distinguish them.
Individual Styles of Regulating Negative Emotions

Although no single agreed-upon typology of emotion regulation strat-
egies exists, a crucial distinction shared by most typologies concerns strat-
egies to regulate one's negative emotions through active approach or en-
gagement (e.g., analyzing the problem) versus strategies that involve
avoidance or withdrawal from the stressful situation, or denial, minimiza-
tion, or escape from the emotions themselves (Thayer, Newman, &
McClain, 1994). This distinction, though not without its limitations, has
proven to be an important one for discriminating the adaptiveness of emo-
tion regulation efforts.
Indeed, past research shows that avoidant strategies are not only widely
seen as less effective ways to regulate negative emotions (Thayer et al., 1994)
but are also consistently associated with adverse consequences, including di-
verse risk-taking behaviors. For example, avoidant styles of coping with nega-
tive emotions have been positively associated with alcohol use and drinking
problems (Cooper et al., 1995), relapse among recovering alcoholics (Chung,
Langenbucher, Labouvie, Pandina, & Moos, 2001), risky sexual behavior
(Folkman, Chesney, Pollack, & Phillips, 1992), pathological gambling
(Nower, Derevensky, & Gupta, 2004), and broadband indices of multiple
risk or externalizing behaviors (Loesel & Bliesener, 1994)-Whereas the evi-
dence linking avoidance and risk behaviors is robust and relatively consis-
tent across studies, data on the adaptiveness of approach strategies are incon-
sistent. Although the belief is widely held that approach strategies are effective
ways to regulate negative emotions and reduce tension (e.g., Thayer et al.,
1994), studies attempting to provide support for this notion frequently find
no effects (see Carver & Scheier, 1994, for review).
Individual Differences in the Propensity to Seek Arousal and Positive Emotional

Experiences
Thus far, we have focused on the role of negative emotions and efforts
to regulate them. However, traditional theories of risk taking have focused
188 COOPER ET AL.

almost exclusively on the regulation of arousal and positive emotions (e.g.,
Zuckerman, 1983). This perspective views risk taking as an appetitive or
approach behavior in which individuals choose risky options as a way to
achieve optimum arousal, enhance positive emotional experience, or both.
Such a view highlights the role of individual differences in preferences for
seeking arousal and positive emotional experiences but depicts an uncertain
role for stable individual differences in the experience of positive emotions
(i.e., positive emotionality), as well as for the experience of positive emo-
tions as proximal precipitants of risk-taking behaviors.
The possibility that positive (relative to negative) emotional experi-
ence is less consequential for risk-taking behaviors is consistent with well-
documented asymmetries in the motivational consequences of positive ver-
sus negative emotional states (Carver & Scheier, 1990). Negative emotions
have been shown to have strong motivational consequences, prompting cog-
nitive and behavioral efforts aimed at managing, minimizing, or eliminating
the source of the problem or the emotions themselves. In contrast, people
experiencing a positive mood tend to refrain from effortful activity in order
to enjoy their mood (Forgas, 2003). Moreover, although people do report
attempts to regulate their positive mood states, only a small percentage of
naturally occurring mood regulation efforts involve positive affect, and these
efforts more often involve down-regulation (chap. 1, this volume)—a goal
that seems unlikely to be served by risk seeking. For these reasons, the fol-
lowing sections focus on individual differences in reward or arousal seeking
and their relationship to risky behaviors.
Reward (or arousal) seeking (assessed by a variety of measures including
thrill seeking, excitement seeking, sensation seeking, venturesomeness) re-
fers to stable individual differences in preferences for varied, novel, complex,
and intense sensations and experiences (Zuckerman, 1994). It is viewed as a
component of extraversion in the big five model (Costa 6k McCrae, 1980),
and differences in reward (arousal) seeking are thought to be rooted in the
BAS, as previously discussed. Individuals who are high in reward (arousal)
seeking show not only heightened sensitivity to reward cues but also dimin-
ished sensitivity to punishment cues (Gray, 1990). Together these differen-
tial sensitivities are thought to promote risk taking by increasing the attrac-
tiveness (or the weighting) of the short-term benefits promised by a risky
behavioral choice, as well as by decreasing the aversiveness (or the weight-
ing) of its potential long-term costs. Consistent with this analysis, individu-
als who are high in this trait tend to perceive more benefits for a variety of
risk behaviors (including illicit drug use, heavy drinking, and risky sexual
behavior) than do those who are low in the trait (Katz, Fromme, & D'Amico,
2000). They also perceive fewer risks, even for activities they have never
tried, and anticipate experiencing less anxiety if they were to try the activity
(Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000). Overall then, as Zuckerman and Kuhlman
concluded, the approach gradient appears higher and the avoidance gradient

(anticipated anxiety) lower among high reward (arousal) seekers over a range
of risk-taking activities.
It is not surprising that substantial empirical evidence supports a link
between various measures of reward or arousal seeking and multiple risk be-
haviors (see Horvath & Zuckerman, 1993, for a review). Several lines of
evidence also indicate that appetitive motives mediate this link. We have
shown, for example, that the effect of thrill seeking on alcohol use is medi-
ated by enhancement (but not coping) motives for alcohol use (Cooper et
al., 1995)—a finding that was recently replicated using a diary method
(Hussong, 2003). People who strongly endorse drinking to enhance have
also been shown to attend more closely to reward cues in a laboratory task
(Colder & O'Connor, 2002), further underscoring reward sensitivity as a
crucial factor in behaviors driven by appetitive motivation processes.
Individual Differences in Undercontrol or Impulsivity

Impulsivity is thought to include both the tendency to give in to urges,
impulses, or desires and to respond to stimuli impetuously without reflection
or planning (Revelle, 1997). The relative inability to control one's behavior
is thought to stem from deficits in the self-regulation of affect, motivation,
and arousal, as well as in working memory and higher-order cognitive func-
tions that ordinarily give rise to hindsight, forethought, anticipatory behav-
ior, and goal-directed action (Barkley, 1997). Impulsive individuals have dif-
ficulty inhibiting the prepotent response—that is, the response for which
immediate reinforcement (whether positive or negative) is available. Sub-
stantial empirical support exists for a link between impulsivity and a range of
risk-taking behaviors. For example, in separate meta-analyses of only par-
tially overlapping literatures, both Miller and Lynam (2001) and Gale (in
press) found an average effect in the .35 to .40 range between impulsivity or
disinhibition and delinquent or antisocial behavior, and this was by far the
strongest effect observed for any dimension of personality examined in either
review. In a meta-analysis on personality and sexual risk taking, Hoyle and
colleagues (2000) also found reliable, though more modest (from .10 to .23),
effects on multiple indices of sexual risk taking for both constraint (a reverse
scored index of impulsivity) and impulsivity.
Although most of the studies included in the above meta-analyses were
cross-sectional, longitudinal studies also provide strong support for the role
of impulsivity as a factor in adolescent risk-taking behavior. For example,
undercontrol (variously conceptualized and measured) has been shown to
prospectively predict drug abuse vulnerability (Tarter et al., 2003), the onset
of gambling problems (Vitaro, Arseneault, & Tremblay, 1997), and the num-
ber of sexual partners (Breakwell, 1996) among adolescents. Data from a
study of a complete birth cohort in Dunedin, New Zealand, showed that
individual differences in constraint at age 18 predicted lower rates of sub-
stance dependence, alcohol abuse, conduct disorder, violent crime, unsafe
190 COOPER ETAL.

sexual behavior, and dangerous driving habits 3 years later (Caspi et al., 1997;
Krueger et al., 2000). Perhaps even more impressive, indicators of poor self-
control based on behavioral observations in early childhood were found to
prospectively predict antisocial behavior (e.g., destructiveness, bullying, ly-
ing), as independently evaluated by parents and teachers during middle child-
hood and adolescence (Caspi, Henry, McGee, Moffitt, & Silva, 1995). Thus,
the data are clear in showing that deficits in impulse control play an impor-
tant role in predisposing individuals to risky behavioral decisions.
As previously indicated, we believe that impulsivity (or low constraint)
serves as a general risk factor, promoting risky behaviors undertaken in ser-
vice of both negative affect reduction and positive emotion enhancement
and arousal seeking. Consistent with this view, results of factor analytic stud-
ies of basic personality dimensions reveal that impulsivity or constraint forms
a discrete factor, separable from both positive emotionality and incentive
sensitivity, and negative emotionality and threat sensitivity (Clark & Watson,
1999). This view is also compatible with models that postulate the existence
of an effortful cognitive control mechanism distinct from approach and avoid-
ance systems (Rothbart, Ellis, & Posner, 2004). According to these models,
impulsive behavior might arise from an overactive approach system, an in-
sensitive inhibition system, deficient cognitive control, or a combination of
these.
Although only a few studies have examined the possibility that impul-
sivity interacts with factors reflecting either the approach or avoidance sys-
tem, results tend to support this view. Using data from the Dunedin study,
Caspi and colleagues (1997) showed that the highest levels of involvement
in multiple risk behaviors at age 21 occurred among those who were high on
negative emotionality and low on constraint at age 18 (though the interac-
tion of the two factors was not directly tested). In prospective studies of ad-
justment among children, Eisenberg and colleagues have similarly shown that
high levels of negative emotionality combine with high levels of behavioral
undercontrol to predict particularly poor outcomes, including aggressive and
antisocial behavior (Eisenberg, Fabes, & Murphy, 1995). In one of the most
direct tests of this idea, we found that impulsivity interacted with surgency (a
facet of extraversion that reflects a strong approach orientation) to predict
having sex for enhancement reasons and risky sexual practices, such that
individuals who were high on both impulsivity and surgency were the most
likely to report high levels of both behaviors (Cooper et al., 2000).
Though strongly supporting the role of emotions and efforts to regulate

them as contributing factors to risk-taking behaviors, the present review also
points to several gaps in the literature. First, because the majority of past
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES (N EMOTION REGULATION J 91

studies have focused on one or at most a few predictors at a time, it is not
always clear whether observed effects are independent or overlapping. In a
similar manner, the majority of empirical studies have focused on only one of
the two hypothesized emotion regulation pathways, thus leaving largely un'
answered questions about the independence and relative importance of con-
tributions of the two pathways to risk taking. Likewise, although impulsivity
is thought to operate independently of both negative and positive emotion
regulation pathways, and should therefore exert unique effects on risk-taking
behaviors, only a few studies have simultaneously considered the contribu-
tions of all three sets of factors. Thus, whether impulsivity also exerts unique
effects on risk-taking behaviors remains unclear.
Perhaps more important, focusing on single predictors in isolation em-
phasizes simplistic cause—effect relationships, rather than networks of causal
variables that work together to shape risk-taking behaviors. This unfortu-
nate emphasis has led to a neglect of both mediation and moderation, de-
spite the central role such mechanisms are thought to play in emotion regu-
lation processes. Indeed, the core assumption that the behavioral consequences
of emotion experience are more strongly shaped by people's efforts to regu-
late their emotions than by the emotions themselves implies both mediation
and moderation of the effects of emotion experience on risk taking by regula-
tory efforts, styles, or capacities. Specifically, to the extent that this view is
valid, the effects of emotional experience on risky behaviors should be at
least partly mediated by individual differences in regulatory styles and abili-
ties. In other words, the experience of certain emotions should elicit efforts
to regulate these emotions, which in turn could promote riskier decisions.
Second, to the extent that this view is valid, one would also expect to see
stronger relationships between emotional experience (or other indicators of
reward or threat sensitivity) and risk-taking behaviors among those who rely
on maladaptive styles of regulating their emotions, such as avoidance cop-
ing, or who have specific deficits in their emotion regulation capacities (e.g.,
are impulsive). Presumably those who effectively manage their emotional
experience would find other more adaptive (less risky) ways to regulate their
mood states.
Finally, most studies have focused on a single risk behavior, or occa-
sionally several risk behaviors within a closely related domain (e.g., alcohol
and tobacco use), rather than examining broad indices of involvement in
multiple risk behaviors. Although focusing on individual risk behaviors is
useful when the goal is to understand what drives involvement in that spe-
cific behavior, examining one or only a few closely related risk behaviors in
isolation precludes us from determining whether deficits in emotion regula-
tion lie at the heart of a general predisposition to risk taking, or contribute
more narrowly to specific risk behaviors. Whereas the extant literature cer-
tainly suggests a broad role for emotion regulation processes, including mul-
/ 92 COOPER ET AL.
tiple risk behaviors in a single study would allow for a more direct test of this
possibility.
SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ADDRESSING THESE ISSUES
In the following sections, we summarize the results of two studies—one

recently published and one unpublished—that bear directly on each of these
issues. The data for both studies were taken from an ongoing, longitudinal
study of a random sample of community-residing Black and White adoles-
cents (N = 2,051), age 13- to 19-years-old at Time 1. Before presenting these
data, we briefly describe the methodology of this larger study.
Overview of Study Methodology
Participants in this study were interviewed up to five times over 15

years, using a combination of interviewer- and self-administered (for more
sensitive questions) formats for the first three waves and telephone inter-
views for the last two waves. The recently published study (Cooper, Wood,
Orcutt, & Albino, 2003) used data from 1,978 Time 1 participants (mean
age = 16.7 years) who had complete data on the subset of relevant measures,
as well as from a subset of these respondents who were reinterviewed at Time
2 (mean age = 21.4 years). The unpublished study (hereinafter referred to as
the folloW'Up study) used data from the first four waves of interviews. For
reasons unrelated to the present study, only those participants who were 27
or younger at Time 3 were eligible to participate at Time 4. Thus, the sample
for the follow-up study included 996, 886, 699, and 518 participants, respec-
tively, at Times 1 through 4, with mean ages at successive waves of 15.1,
19.7, 25.4, and 26.9 years. Male and female youths and majority and minor-
ity (predominantly Black) youths were equally represented in the Time 1
sample. However, fewer male than female participants were retained in the
sample over time.
Both studies included measures of involvement in multiple risk behav-
iors, though they were operationalized differently. The published study used
a higher-order factor to model covariance among a set of first-order factors
indexing substance use, risky sexual behavior, delinquent behaviors, and edu-
cational underachievement. In the follow-up study, we created a composite
variable reflecting involvement (at each wave) in each of seven different
risky behaviors, including the number of sexual partners, risky sexual prac-
tices, frequency of heavy drinking, drug use, truant behaviors, property crimes,
and violent behaviors. The multiple-risk variable was created for each wave
by counting the number of behaviors (of 7) for which the individual's score
was at or above the 75th percentile of the distribution. Four individual differ-
1NDMDUAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION REGULATION 193

ence measures were examined as predictors of risk-taking behaviors across
the two studies: the dispositional tendency to experience negative emotions,
avoidance coping, thrill and adventure seeking (TAS), and impulsivity.
The Initial Study
Using structural equation modeling, we examined the independent con-

tributions of negative emotions, avoidance coping, TAS, and impulsivity to
the previously described higher-order risk factor. Results showed that impul-
sivity and avoidance coping, but not negative emotions, significantly pre-
dicted the higher-order factor. Given that the negative emotion composite
was highly correlated with avoidance coping (r = .65), it is possible that the
experience of negative emotions indirectly contributed to involvement in
the higher-order factor by eliciting avoidant coping responses. However, this
possibility was not tested in the data. TAS was unrelated to the higher-order
risk factor (P = .04) in the full sample. Subsequent cross-race models re-
vealed, however, that TAS was a significant positive predictor of the higher-
order factor among White but not Black adolescents. We also tested all pos-
sible two-way interactions among the four predictors. Results showed that
impulsivity interacted with avoidance coping to predict involvement in the
higher-order risk factor. Consistent with expectation, plotting the interac-
tion showed that maladaptive coping was more strongly related to risky be-
haviors among individuals who were high rather than low in impulsivity.
Finally, avoidance coping, but none of the remaining factors, prospectively
predicted the onset of risky behaviors (at Time 2) among the subset of indi-
viduals who reported little or no risk involvement at Time 1 (n = 344).
The FolloW'Up Study
In the follow-up study, we sought to both replicate these findings in a

subsample of the original study and to extend them longitudinally to deter-
mine if differences in the experience and regulation of both negative and
positive emotions during adolescence forecast risk-taking behaviors into young
adulthood. In addition, we wanted to test whether avoidance coping and
impulsivity mediated the effects of negative emotionality on patterns of risk
taking. Finally, we also examined interactions among these factors to deter-
mine if the previously obtained interaction between avoidance coping and
impulsivity was replicated in this subsample and, if so, whether the unique
vulnerabilities created by the intersection of these factors persisted across
time.
Using data from four waves of interviews, a series of random regression
coefficient models (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) was estimated to address these
issues. In all models, change in risky behaviors was modeled by three param-
eters: an initial level or intercept (estimated at age 14), linear change, and
194 COOPER ET AL.

quadratic change. These components in turn were predicted from baseline
(i.e., Time 1) differences in the four predictor variables. Gender and race
were controlled in all analyses.
Do Initial Differences Forecast Patterns of Risky Behavior Into Young

Adulthood?
Results of our first analysis revealed that youths who experienced high
levels of negative emotions, relied on avoidant forms of coping with these
emotions, and were highly impulsive reported significantly higher levels of
risk behaviors at age 14. In addition, youths who were high in TAS reported
marginally higher levels of risk behavior at age 14- None of the four predic-
tors accounted for differences in rates of either linear or quadratic growth,
suggesting that differences that were in place at baseline were maintained
throughout adolescence and into young adulthood.
Do Coping Styles and Regulatory Capacity Mediate the Effects of Emotion

Experience?
Following procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986), we found
evidence of substantial, though not complete, mediation of the effects of
negative emotions on risk behaviors. Specifically, the total effect of negative
emotions on risky behaviors was reduced from b = .40 to b = .17, by control-
ling for impulsivity and avoidance coping. Consistent with the distinction
between aversive and appetitive processes, TAS did not mediate the rela-
tionship between negative emotions and risky behaviors.
Do These Factors Interact to Create High-Risk Subgroups?

In the final analysis, all possible two-way interactions among the four
predictors were added to a model that already included the main effects and
covariates. Results indicated that impulsivity interacted with avoidance coping
to predict average levels of risk behavior at age 14, thus replicating our ear-
lier finding. In addition, avoidance coping interacted with both TAS and
negative emotions to predict the quadratic component of change. Plotting
the interactions revealed important commonalities in the form of the three
interactions. (As an example, the interaction between avoidance coping and
impulsivity is shown in Figure 9.1.) For all three interactions, the subgroup
that was low on both variables reported the lowest levels of risk behaviors on
average across time; the subgroup that was high on both variables reported
the highest levels; and the two low—high subgroups reported intermediate
levels. Moreover, in all cases, the maximum difference between the low-low
and the high-high groups occurred at age 21 or older, suggesting that differ-
ences between the groups extended beyond Time 1, when predictors and
outcomes were concurrently assessed. Finally, for all three interactions, the
absolute size of the maximum difference between the low-low and high-
high groups was large, with effect sizes (d) ranging from .98 (comparing the
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION REGULATION / 95

—— Low Avoid Coping, Low
Impute ivity
-—* High Avoid Coping, Low
Impute ivity
• Low Avoid Coping, High
Impuls ivity
- High Avoid Coping, High
Impuls ivity
13
Age
Figure 9.1. Interaction of avoidance coping and impulsivity with regard to risk
behaviors.
low avoidance coping, low TAS group with the high-high group) to 1.22
(comparing the low avoidance coping-low impulsivity group with the high-
high group). Despite strong similarities, one noteworthy difference was ob-
served between the avoidance-impulsivity interaction. Consistent with the
presence of significant quadratic components for the avoidance-TAS and
avoidance-negative emotions interactions, the differences between the im-
plied subgroups dissipated by their late 20s, whereas the high impulsive-high
avoidance coping group continued to exhibit greatly elevated levels of risk
behaviors throughout their 20s.
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
Broadly speaking, the results of these studies together with the reviewed
literature highlight the importance of two distinct motivational pathways to
risk taking—an aversive pathway driven primarily by the experience of nega-
tive emotions and efforts to down regulate them, and an approach pathway
aimed at up regulating positive emotional experiences. In contrast to earlier
theoretical models that emphasized the role of appetitive behaviors, results
of the present studies suggest that risk behaviors may be more strongly linked
to avoidance than approach phenomena. Indeed, avoidance coping exhib-
ited the strongest relationship to both the higher-order risk factor (in the
initial published study) and to the risk composite (in the follow-up study),
and it was the only factor to predict the onset of risk behaviors in a true
prospective analysis. In addition, avoidance coping interacted with impul-
sivity to define a uniquely vulnerable subgroup that remained at elevated risk
throughout their 20s. Thus, avoidance coping appears to play a uniquely im-
196 COOPER ETAL.

portant role in directly fostering risky decision processes and in exacerbating
risky tendencies among undercontrolled individuals.
In contrast, the experience of negative emotions was not strongly re-
lated to risk taking in either study but instead appeared to indirectly influ-
ence risk taking through its effects on regulatory efforts and capacities. Thus,
consistent with the view that it is what people do to regulate their emotions
that matters, negative emotions appear to indirectly foster risk taking by elic-
iting avoidant forms of coping and by undermining effective self-control.
Our results, along with findings from the larger literature, also indicate
an important role for impulsivity. Theoretically, impulsivity is seen as a re-
leaser of prepotent responses, whether those responses are driven by avoidant
or appetitive impulses. As such, it is thought to be distinct from, but to con-
tribute to, both appetitive and aversive motivational processes. Consistent
with this view, impulsivity made a significant independent contribution to
risk taking in both sets of analyses. However, it interacted only with avoid-
ance coping. Thus, contrary to expectation, our data suggests that impulsiv-
ity may amplify prepotent aversive, but not appetitive, responses.
Finally, the weakest results were obtained for efforts to regulate positive
emotions (in the form of thrill seeking). Of course, we cannot rule out the
possibility that these findings are specific to the measure we used or to our
sample. At least somewhat countering this possibility, we showed in our ear-
lier study that TAS exerted specific effects (over and above its indirect effect
through the higher-order risk factor) on both alcohol use and violent behav-
ior. These data thus raise the possibility that appetitive motivation processes
contribute more narrowly to specific risk behaviors rather than to a broad,
general disposition to risk taking.
The foregoing highlights several important directions for future research.
First, more research including a broader range of measures central to both
pathways is clearly warranted. This is particularly true for the positive emo-
tion-approach motivation pathway, which was represented in our data by
only a single measure (thrill and adventure seeking). Although this measure
is thought to reflect a core component of sensation seeking (Zuckerman,
1994), a broader measure would provide a more definitive test of the contri-
butions of reward (arousal) seeking processes. Inclusion of a measure of posi-
tive emotions would also permit an explicit test of the potential contribu-
tions of positive emotional experience to risk-taking behaviors. Second, it is
possible that our use of composite measures of distinct emotions (e.g., de-
pression, hostility) and distinct coping styles (e.g., avoidance coping, anger
suppression) masked effects specific to individual components. This is of par-
ticular concern for hostility, which some prior research suggests may be an
especially potent predictor of risk-taking behavior (e.g., Caspi et al., 1997).
Future studies should therefore attempt to determine whether the specific
components contribute equally and similarly to risk-taking behaviors (an
assumption underpinning our use of composite measures), or whether spe-
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN EMOTION REGULATION I 97

cific emotions or coping strategies make distinctive contributions. Third,
given the crucial role that avoidance coping appears to play, future research
should attempt to delineate both the immediate and developmental pro-
cesses whereby avoidance coping leads to risky behaviors. Finally, the fact
that some of our findings were discrepant with prior research highlights the
importance of simultaneously evaluating the contributions of approach and
avoidance processes along with those of undercontrol. Indeed, zero-order
correlations between each of these predictors and broadband risk measures
were roughly similar in magnitude, thus suggesting that failure to examine
these factors in concert may lead to an overestimation of the importance of
specific processes or pathways. Obviously this conclusion must be regarded
as tentative pending replication in different samples using a broader repre-
sentation of core constructs within both pathways.
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION
Results of the present study suggest that universal intervention efforts

aimed at promoting more adaptive ways of coping with negative emotions
and of regulating one's impulses could have far-reaching consequences. Con-
sistent with this contention, several highly efficacious intervention programs
focus on just these goals. For example, anger management therapy (reviewed
in Hinshaw, 1996) has been highly successful in reducing delinquent behav-
iors (e.g., fighting, shoplifting) common among children with attention-
deficit/hyperactivity disorder. In this approach, children are first taught to
recognize their own unique signs of impending anger. Once these cues have
been identified, each child selects and then practices a particular cognitive
or behavior strategy that can be used whenever this cue occurs. The
overarching goal is to teach the child alternative responses that not only
lack the negative social consequences common to delinquent behaviors but
also alleviate the negative affect thought to trigger the undesirable behavior.
Anger management therapy has also been effective in reducing alcohol use
among heavy-drinking college students (Deffenbacher & Getting, 2002),
cocaine use among dependent adults (Reilly & Shopshire, 2000), and both
substance use and sexual risk taking among incarcerated juvenile offenders
(St. Lawrence, Crosby, Belcher, Yazdani, & Brasfield, 1999).
Dialectic behavior therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993), an approach that fo-
cuses on treating deficits in emotional control and distress tolerance, appears
equally promising for reducing involvement in a wide range of risk behaviors
during adolescence. DBT approaches, which teach new means of managing
emotional distress and of inhibiting destructive initial response tendencies,
have been proven efficacious in the treatment of borderline personality disor-
der (a disorder characterized by involvement in a variety of risky behaviors),
substance use, and eating disorders (Robins & Chapman, 2004).
198 COOPER ET AL.

Thus, interventions aimed at teaching more effective means of regulat-
ing one's emotions and behaviors appear promising as generalized or univer-
sal intervention strategies. Of course, on the basis of our data alone, we can-
not say whether such approaches would ultimately prove more useful for
children and adolescents who engage in multiple risk behaviors or for those
whose difficulties are manifest primarily in one behavioral arena. The fact
that the efficacy of such approaches has been demonstrated across diverse
risk behaviors bodes well, however, for the utility of this approach both as a
general and specific intervention strategy.
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EMOTION REGULATION PROCESSES
10
IN DISEASE-RELATED PAIN:
A COUPLES-BASED PERSPECTIVE
FRANCIS J. KEEFE, LAURA S. PORTER, AND JEFFREY LABBAN
When a person is diagnosed with a disease such as arthritis or cancer,

one of the biggest concerns they and their families voice is "How much pain
will be involved?" Population-based studies have shown that pain is very
common in arthritis and cancer (Bonica, Bentafridda, & Twycross, 1990;
Jakobsson & Hallberg, 2002). Pain in these diseases is unfortunately often
not managed adequately, or its management is associated with major side
effects such as constipation or fatigue. The impact of a chronic disease on
patients and their families can be profound, particularly when that disease is
painful. Research, for example, shows that partners of cancer patients who
are experiencing pain report significantly higher levels of emotional distress
than partners of cancer patients who are pain free (Miaskowski, Kragness,
Dibble, & Wallhagen, 1997).
Preparation of this chapter was supported in part by the following grants from the National Institutes of
Health: NIAMS AR 46305, AR047218, P01 AR50245, and NIMH MH63429; R21-CA88049-01 and
CA91947-01 from the National Cancer Institute; and NS46422 from the National Institute of Neuro-
logical Diseases and Stroke; and by support from the Arthritis Foundation and the Fetzer Institute.
207
The traditional approach to understanding disease-related pain is based
on a biomedical model (Keefe, Abernathy, & Campbell, 2005). This model
views pain as a sensory event that signals tissue damage. Although the bio-
medical model can be helpful in guiding diagnostic and treatment efforts, it
often ignores or minimizes the role that psychological factors (e.g., emotion)
or social factors (e.g., support from a concerned partner) can play in how
persons adjust to persistent pain. Dissatisfaction with the biomedical model
has stimulated the emergence of newer models (e.g., the biopsychosocial
model) that highlight the fact that pain is a multidimensional experience
that is influenced not only by biological factors such as tissue damage but
also by psychological and social factors.
Over the past 15 years, psychosocial pain researchers have become in-
creasingly interested in the role that partners play in how patients adjust to
pain, and in involving partners in psychosocial pain management efforts
(Keefe et al., 1990; Radojevic, Nicassio, & Weisman, 1992). The purpose of
this chapter is to provide an overview of this recent research and to discuss
its implications for understanding emotion regulation processes in couples.
The chapter is divided into four sections. In section 1, we describe the
biopsychosocial model of pain and highlight the reasons that persistent pain
conditions provide a particularly appropriate context in which to consider
emotion regulation processes in couples. In section 2, we describe and evalu-
ate several recent studies that have tested the efficacy of partner-assisted
pain coping approaches to two common diseases: arthritis and cancer. We
analyze intervention techniques used in these studies from an emotion regu-
lation perspective. In section 3, we highlight future directions for research
on emotion regulation processes in couples who are dealing with persistent
pain. In the final section, we discuss the clinical, social, and public policy
implications of research on couples-based emotion regulation processes in
disease-related pain.
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND
The biopsychosocial model emerged in the 1970s and was applied to

persistent pain conditions in the early 1980s by a number of psychosocial
pain researchers (Keefe, 1982; Turk, Meichenbaum, & Genest, 1983; Turner
& Chapman, 1982). The basic tenet of this model is that pain is a complex
experience that is not only related to biological factors (e.g., underlying tis-
sue damage or injury) but also is strongly influenced by psychological factors
(e.g., cognitive and emotional responses) and social factors (e.g., social sup-
port). Empirical support for the biopsychosocial model has grown substan-
tially over the past 20 years (Keefe, Rumble, Scipio, Giordano, & Perri, 2004),
and studies have now identified specific psychological and social factors that
are associated with pain. Emotional factors are known to play a key role in
208 KEEFE, PORTER, AND LABBAN

the experience of pain and in how persons adjust to persistent pain. Among
the emotional factors most consistently found to be important in persons
having pain are fear of pain (Vlaeyen & Linton, 2000), negative emotional
states such as depression and negative mood (Zautra & Smith, 2001), and
deficits in emotion regulation abilities (e.g., alexithymia, emotional inhibi-
tion, or avoidance; Dalton & Feuerstein, 1989). Numerous studies have shown
that cognitive variables are critical not only in explaining pain but also in
explaining emotional responses to pain. Especially important cognitive vari-
ables are overly negative cognitions (e.g., pain catastrophizing; Keefe et al.,
2000), maladaptive pain beliefs (Jensen, Romano, Turner, Good, & Wald,
1999), and the tendency to appraise pain as uncontrollable (Lefebvre et al.,
1999). Social factors known to affect pain include marital distress (Waltz,
Kriegel, & van't Pad Bosch, 1996), partner responses to pain (e.g., solicitous,
critical, or facilitative response; Keefe, Ahles, et al., 2005), and social sup-
port (Evers, Kraaimaat, Geenen, Jacobs, & Bijlsma, 2003).
A hallmark of the biopsychosocial model is its insistence that there are
reciprocal relationships among the biological, psychological, and social fac-
tors that influence pain. Thus, persistent pain can precipitate an emotional
response (e.g., a major depressive episode) that in turn leads to overly nega-
tive cognitions (e.g., the belief that pain can never be controlled) and changes
in behavior (e.g., reductions in activity level), as well as biological responses
(e.g., physical deconditioning), all of which can heighten the severity and
impact of pain. The biopsychosocial model is based on a systems model of
behavior change (Keefe, Abernathy, et al., 2005). Thus, positive changes in
one part of this system can affect other parts of the system. For example,
patients who learn to use cognitive reappraisal to alter their beliefs can de-
velop a more positive and realistic outlook in the face of pain flares (a cogni-
tive change) and are more likely to be able to maintain a positive mood (an
emotional change) and elicit appropriate emotional support from their part-
ners (a social change).
Treatment protocols based on the biopsychosocial model of pain typi-
cally are directed at the individual having pain and incorporate three basic
elements (Keefe, Abernathy, et al., 2005). First, patients are provided with a
rationale emphasizing the fact that pain is a complex experience and high-
lighting the role that thoughts, feelings, and behaviors can play in how per-
sons adjust to pain. Second, systematic training in coping skills is carried out
over a series of sessions. Skills commonly taught include relaxation training,
imagery, activity pacing, goal setting, cognitive restructuring, and problem
solving. Practice is viewed as essential in mastering these skills, and training
thus emphasizes systematic instruction, guided in-session practice, therapist
feedback, and home practice assignments. Coping skills training is typically
conducted either on an individual basis or in small groups of patients. Fi-
nally, to enhance maintenance, patients are taught strategies for maintain-
ing regular practice of learned skills and for dealing with setbacks and re-
EMOTION REGULATION PROCESSES IN DISEASE-RELATED PAIN 209

lapses in coping efforts. Evidence supporting the efficacy of biopsychosocial
pain management protocols has accumulated over the past 20 years (Keefe et
al., 2004).
Over the past decade there has been growing recognition among
biopsychosocial pain researchers of the need to involve partners in treat-
ment efforts, and heightened interest in addressing relationship factors such
as marital adjustment and social support. Partner-assisted biopsychosocial
pain management interventions have been developed and tested in several
studies. To date, the rationale for these protocols primarily has centered on
the role that the partner can play in assisting the patient in learning pain
control skills (Keefe et al., 1996). Along these lines, involving the partner
has been considered to be useful for enhancing patients' coping efforts and
sense of self-efficacy. Helping partners understand the role that coping skills
can play in managing pain also has been viewed as helpful in preventing
problems such as the partner's enforcing rest, criticizing the use of coping
skills, or insisting that pain medication is the only way to manage pain.
Although the rationale for partner-assisted coping skills training has
mainly centered on the assisting role that partners can play in the patient's
developing and maintaining pain coping skills, this intervention also can
provide a particularly appropriate setting for identifying and modifying pa-
tients' and partners' emotion regulation processes. This notion is supported
by several observations. First, persistent pain is not only emotionally demand-
ing for patients but also quite emotionally challenging for their partners.
Being the caregiver of a person having pain means not only having to help a
loved one manage his or her emotions (e.g., frustration or fear) but also man-
aging one's own emotional reactions (e.g., anxiety, guilt, anger, or depres-
sion). Partners who are overwhelmed by their own frustration, fears, and
feelings of aloneness may not be able to offer the emotional or instrumental
support needed by the person having pain. Second, partners must also learn
to recognize and respond to signals of pain in their loved one. This task is
complicated by the fact that signals of pain often occur in combination
with cues of pain-related emotional distress that signal the need for addi-
tional or alternative types of assistance or support. More effective emotion
regulation by patients and partners may increase their abilities to discrimi-
nate between pain and emotional distress, leading to more effective com-
munication and support. Third, although pain is a personal experience, it
can affect important dyadic processes like the way a couple approaches
tasks such as requesting help, providing emotional and tangible support,
dealing with conflict, and expressing affection and intimacy. Faced with a
pain condition that persists, couples often need to develop a new set of skills
and strategies for managing their emotions and negotiating their interac-
tions. Skills that may have been effective in earlier years of the relationship
may not be that effective in coping with the emotional demands of persis-
tent, often disabling pain.

Partner-assisted pain coping skills protocols typically include training
in a variety of strategies that can help patients and their partners regulate
emotional processes. Although these protocols do not have their roots in
theories of emotion regulation, the model developed by Gross, Richards, and
John (Gross, 2001) provides a useful framework for understanding how the
coping skills taught in these protocols can be helpful in emotion regulation.
Figure 10.1, based on Gross (2001), illustrates the process model of emotion
regulation and depicts how this model potentially can be used to categorize
skills often included in partner-assisted coping skills training protocols. As
shown in Figure 10.1, the coping skills used in these protocols can be grouped
into two broad categories on the basis of whether they are antecedent-fo-
cused or response-focused emotion regulation strategies. Antecedent-focused
skills are those that patients and partners can use to modify potential future
emotional responses. These skills can be thought of as more proactive in that
they attempt to minimize the incidence or severity of emotional distress.
Response-focused skills, in contrast, refer to strategies that can be used to cope
with emotional responses once they occur. Response-focused skills can be
thought of as more reactive and useful in managing emotional distress once
it occurs.
As shown in Figure 10.1, the coping skills used in partner-assisted in-
terventions can be further delineated into five families of specific strategies
on the basis of when they are used in the timeline of emotional processes
(chap. 1, this volume). Situation selection refers to learning to approach or
avoid certain situations or events (e.g., SI rather than S2) so as to regulate
emotion. For example, by learning better skills for pacing their daily activi-
ties, patients can avoid pain flares that can be frustrating and anxiety pro-
voking for both patients and partners. Situation modification skills teach pa-
tients and partners to regulate emotion by modifying the situation itself (SI)
to create different situations (Six, Sly, or Slz). By learning to schedule pleas-
ant activities into the day or set weekly activity goals, patients and partners
can make simple daily activities much more rewarding and thereby increase
positive affect and avoid the depression and discouragement that come when
the patient adopts an overly sedentary and restricted lifestyle.
Attentional deployment skills regulate emotion by teaching individuals to
focus on certain aspects (al, a2, etc.) of a situation (e.g., the pleasant sensa-
tions and experiences that occur in a novel situation) rather than other as-
pects (e.g., increased pain). Training in imagery and distraction methods as
well as learning to use a focal point can also be quite helpful in teaching
patients and their partners how to redirect attention from pain to other sa-
lient neutral or more pleasurable aspects of a situation.
Cognitive change skills are designed to alter pain-related emotions by re-
structuring the meaning (e.g., ml, m2, or m3) attached to situations. Nega-
tive pain beliefs and cognitions (e.g., catastrophizing) are among the most
consistent predictors of poor emotional adjustment to pain (Sullivan et al.,
EMOTION REGULATION PROCESSES IN DISEASE-RELATED PAIN 21J

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2001) and likely exert their effects by constructing overly negative meanings
of events (e.g., "I'm having so much pain sitting today, I'll never be able to
drive again"). Presenting patients and partners with rationales for pain cop-
ing skills such as the gate control theory (Melzack & Wall, 1965) can help
them see pain as a more complex, multidimensional experience that is influ-
enced by feelings, thoughts, and behaviors and reconceptualize their own
abilities to exert control over pain. Cognitive restructuring is also used to
teach patients and partners how to recognize overly negative appraisals of
pain and to replace them with more realistic and adaptive appraisals. These
more realistic appraisals can enhance positive mood and enable patients and
their partners to avoid feeling depressed, guilty, and angry.
Many of the skills used in partner-assisted pain coping skills training
can also be helpful in response modulation, that is, coping with and modifying
emotions once they have occurred. When patients or their partners are over-
whelmed by strong feelings of depression or fear, negative cognitions are quite
prominent and cognitive restructuring of these negative thoughts can be es-
pecially helpful. At times of intense emotion, cognitive restructuring not
only changes emotional responses but also enhances patients' and partners'
willingness to use other learned coping skills that can be helpful in both
emotion and pain regulation. Methods to alter activity patterns (e.g., activ-
ity pacing, pleasant activity scheduling, goal setting) and physiological arousal
(e.g., relaxation training, imagery) can also be used to directly modulate
emotions such as depression or anxiety. By engaging in joint practice ses-
sions with learned coping skills, couples have important opportunities for
learning to help each other modulate emotions brought on by pain flares or
relapses in coping efforts. Communication skills training also provides an
excellent means of helping patients and partners defuse pain-related emo-
tional conflicts.
Finally, social reinforcement skills are especially important when couples
are challenged with applying coping skills during emotionally demanding
situations, and they are applied to coping skills used for both antecedent-
focused and response-focused emotion regulation. Partner-assisted coping skills
training protocols teach partners and patients how to use social reinforce-
ment techniques to enhance the learning and maintenance of coping skills.
For example, partners are often taught how to use attention and praise to
foster the practice and application of learned coping skills. The resultant
shift in the couple's attention from maladaptive coping efforts to more adap-
tive coping can increase the overall level of positive interactions and en-
hance mood and relationship satisfaction.
In sum, the process model of emotion regulation provides one way of
conceptualizing many of the coping skills used in partner-assisted pain cop-
ing skills interventions. The categorization of coping skills described here is
intended to be illustrative of how pain coping skills may be used for emotion
regulation rather than to provide a definitive statement of their function in
EMOTION REG ULATION PROCESSES IN DISEASE-RELATED PAIN 213

this regard. In the next section, we review the empirical studies testing the
efficacy of partner-assisted coping skills training in the management of two
common, painful diseases (arthritis and cancer). We also analyze the train-
ing approaches used from the perspective of the process model of emotion
regulation.
Partner-based approaches to pain management have been evaluated in

a number of studies. In this section, we consider the empirical foundations
supporting the efficacy of partner-based interventions for arthritis pain and
cancer pain.
Partner-Based Biopsychosocial Interventions for Arthritis Pain
The two most common forms of arthritis are osteoarthritis (OA) and
rheumatoid arthritis (RA). Patients with OA and RA often experience per-
sistent and disabling pain (Keefe et al., 2002). Further, conventional medi-
cal and surgical treatments often fail to provide adequate pain control or
have side effects that limit their use (Simon et al., 2002). Finally, there is
evidence that arthritis pain has a substantial impact not only on patients but
also on their partners (Manne & Zautra, 1990).
Radojevic et al. (1992) were among the first to systematically evaluate
a partner-assisted intervention for managing arthritis pain. In this study 65
persons diagnosed as having RA were randomly assigned to receive a psycho-
social pain management intervention with family support, a psychosocial
intervention alone, an education—information intervention with family sup-
port, or no treatment. All treatment was conducted in group sessions, and
patients in the family support conditions attended the group sessions with a
family member, usually their partner. In the psychosocial treatment with
family support condition, patients were provided with a rationale for coping
skills training and then trained in three pain coping skills (cognitive restruc-
turing, imagery, and relaxation training). Their partners were trained in how
to use behavioral principles (e.g., social reinforcement) to help patients ac-
quire and maintain these skills and to avoid reinforcing maladaptive pain
coping responses. The coping skills training provided to partners was based
on a behavioral model (Fordyce, 1976) and was focused on teaching partners
to provide social reinforcement for adaptive coping behaviors (e.g., increas-
ing activity level) while withholding reinforcement for maladaptive coping
behaviors (e.g., spending excessive time in bed). In the psychosocial treat-
ment condition alone, the same training in pain coping skills was provided
to patients, but no family members participated in the treatment sessions. In
the education-information with family support condition, patients and fam-

ily members attended sessions in which they were given extensive informa-
tion about RA and how it is managed but no training in cognitive or behav-
ioral pain coping skills. Treatment outcome was assessed at posttreatment
and follow-up. Results showed that, when compared with the education-
information with family support condition or no treatment condition, both
of the psychosocial interventions produced significant reductions in joint
pain at follow-up. It is interesting to note that the psychosocial intervention
with family support intervention was significantly more effective than the
psychosocial intervention alone in reducing joint swelling at posttreatment.
Taken together, these results suggest that a partner-assisted psychosocial in-
tervention can be effective in managing RA pain and that involving the
partner may have unique benefits.
We conducted the first randomized, controlled study of a partner-
assisted pain coping skills intervention for persons having OA (Keefe et al.,
1996). Eighty-eight OA patients with persistent knee pain and their part-
ners were randomly assigned to (a) partner-assisted coping skills training,
(b) a conventional coping skills training condition alone, or (c) an arthritis
education partner support control condition. As in the Radojevic et al. (1992)
study, all treatment was conducted in group sessions, and patients in the
partner conditions attended the group sessions with their partner. Patients in
the partner-assisted coping skills training condition received training in a
menu of cognitive and behavioral pain coping skills (relaxation, imagery,
distraction techniques, activity pacing, goal setting, and cognitive restruc-
turing), and they and their partners received training in a menu of couples
skills (joint practice, communication skills, behavioral rehearsal, problem
solving, and maintenance training; see Table 10.1 for a full listing of coping
skills). Patients in the conventional coping skills intervention received train-
ing in the menu of cognitive and behavioral pain coping skills but no train-
ing in the couples skills. Patients and partners in the arthritis education so-
cial support control condition received lecture discussion sessions providing
basic information on OA and its medical and surgical management.
Data analyses revealed a consistent pattern of outcomes across six of
the seven outcome measures: Patients in the partner-assisted coping skills
training had the best outcomes, those in the conventional coping skills train-
ing the next best outcomes, and those in the arthritis education social sup-
port control condition the worst outcomes. Correlational analyses were con-
ducted to determine whether changes in marital adjustment were related to
treatment outcome. For patients in the partner-assisted coping skills training
condition, there was a significant relation between improvements in marital
adjustment occurring over the course of treatment and improvements in psy-
chological disability (i.e., anxiety and depression). It is interesting to note
that a 12-month follow-up study also revealed that improvements in marital
adjustment occurring over the initial course of treatment were related to
long-term outcome (Keefe et al., 1999). Specifically, patients who showed

TABLE 10.1
Coping Skills Used in Partner-Assisted Pain Coping Skills Training
Skill Description
Relaxation training Achieving deep muscle relaxation by alternately
tensing and slowly relaxing major muscle groups in
the body
Imagery Mentally focusing on a pleasant or distracting scene
Distraction techniques Intentionally focusing concentration on a specific
activity (e.g., counting numbers backward, viewing a
picture, listening to music) to divert one's attention
Activity pacing Alternating periods of activity and rest throughout the
day to provide regular rest breaks and gradually
build up activity level
Pleasant activity Identifying potentially reinforcing activities (i.e., those
scheduling that provide a sense of pleasure or mastery) and
intentionally scheduling them into the day
Goal setting Identifying, setting, and tracking attainment of a variety
of meaningful short- and long-term goals
Cognitive restructuring Identifying and challenging overly negative,
maladaptive thoughts related to emotional distress
and replacing these thoughts with more realistic and
adaptive thoughts
Joint practice sessions Scheduling and participating in sessions in which
patient and partner practice learned coping skills
together
Behavioral rehearsal Role-playing in which patient and partner practice
applying coping skills to specific challenging
situations
Communication skills Training patient and partner in verbal and nonverbal
training skills to facilitate sharing of feelings and thoughts
Problem solving Teaching patient and partner how to better identify and
analyze problem situations to better develop and
implement problem solutions
Social reinforcement Training patient and partner how to use social
reinforcement (e.g., attention and praise) to change
patient, partner, and couple behavior patterns
Maintenance training Teaching patient and partner how to use relapse
prevention methods (e.g., identifying high-risk
situations using naturally occurring prompts,
developing a plan for dealing with setbacks/relapses)
to maintain learned coping skills
increases in marital adjustment were much more likely to show lower levels
of psychological disability, physical disability, and pain behavior at 12-month
follow-up. Changes in marital adjustment were not related to long-term im-
provements in outcome among patients in the conventional coping skills
training or education social support control condition. These findings sug-
gest that a partner-assisted pain coping skills intervention may have promise
as a method for reducing pain and psychological disability in patients suffer-
ing from OA and that changes in marital adjustment are related to the out-
come of this intervention.

To date, there have been relatively few studies testing the efficacy of
partner-assisted coping skills training for persons suffering from OA and RA.
The studies that have been conducted, however, feature important method-
ological strengths including random assignment to treatment conditions,
comparisons to appropriate control conditions, and use of well-validated
measures. Their results suggest that these protocols are beneficial in reducing
pain and emotional distress.
The coping skills training protocols used in these studies vary in terms
of their comprehensiveness and emphasis on processes of emotion regula-
tion. For example, although Radojevic et al. (1992) provided RA patients
with training in a variety coping skills that could potentially be used in
emotion regulation, the approach they used in training partners was much
more limited. This approach, based on a behavioral model (Fordyce, 1976),
was focused on teaching partners to provide social reinforcement for adap-
tive coping behaviors (e.g., increasing activity level) while withholding re-
inforcement for maladaptive coping behaviors (e.g., spending excessive time
in bed.) As shown in Figure 10.1, social reinforcement can provide a strategy
for enhancing patients' use of both antecedent- and response-focused emo-
tion regulation coping strategies. However, social reinforcement fails to pro-
vide partners with direct training in many other strategies that Gross's pro-
cess model (chap. 1, this volume) suggests could be useful in regulating their
own emotions.
The partner-assisted coping skills protocol used in our own study of OA
patients (Keefe et al., 1996), in contrast, applied Baucom and Epstein's (1990)
broader cognitive-behavioral model of couples interactions to pain coping.
This model maintains that to effectively treat couples one must first under-
stand how they experience emotions, think, and behave when coping with
pain and then systematically train them in couples coping skills for manag-
ing pain-related problems. In our training protocol we taught patients and
their partners a full array of cognitive and behavioral coping skills (see Table
10.1). Although the protocol emphasized the utility of these skills in pain
control, it also underscored the role that each of the skills could play in con-
trolling patients' and partners' own emotional responses to pain and in ad-
dressing important dyadic processes (e.g., improving emotional exchanges
between partners). Several couples skills were used to facilitate and under-
score these skills as techniques for enhancing each couple's coping skills rep-
ertoire (see Table 10.1). A behavioral rehearsal method was used in which
patients and partners role-played ways of coping with emotionally challeng-
ing pain-related situations and were provided reinforcement, feedback, and
(if needed) guidance on alternative coping strategies. Couples also received
formal training in communication skills designed to improve their commu-
nication about problem areas and successes and difficulties in applying newly
learned pain coping skills. Finally, couples were instructed to schedule joint
practice sessions for rehearsing learned coping skills and to use in vivo prac-

tice sessions in which they were to apply the coping skills in particularly
challenging situations.
The coping strategies used in the Keefe et al. (1996) study are also note-
worthy because they provide both patients and their partners with training
in upward and downward emotion regulation strategies. Upward regulation
strategies are those designed to regulate emotion by enhancing positive emo-
tions (e.g., joy) and by promoting optimism, hopefulness, compassion, empa-
thy, and caring support for the other partner's plight. Strategies such as pleasant
activity scheduling or pleasant imagery are upward regulation strategies be-
cause they directly help patients and partners increase the frequency of posi-
tive emotional experiences. Rationales for coping skills training (e.g., the
gate control theory; Melzack & Wall, 1965) that emphasize the role that
emotion, thoughts, and behavior can play in pain also can promote under-
standing and optimism in both patient and partner. Joint practice sessions,
behavioral rehearsal, and communication skills training all provide strate-
gies to help couples develop and foster a more caring and empathic couples
approach to pain coping. Downward regulation strategies, in contrast, are
those designed to regulate emotions by decreasing or minimizing negative
emotions such as depression, worry, fear, anger, or resentment of either part-
ner. Cognitive structuring is a helpful downward regulation strategy because
it decreases the frequency of negative emotional experiences.
The skills used in partner-assisted coping skills training also can be
thought of as varying along a dimension that ranges from intrapersonal to
interpersonal. Some interventions can be considered more intrapersonal in
nature in that they likely exert their effects primarily by helping the patient
or partner manage his or her own pain-related emotions (e.g., relaxation
training, imagery). Other interventions (e.g., communication skills training,
joint practice sessions) can be considered more interpersonal in that they are
designed to assist both partners in regulating the emotions that occur during
their interactions.
To date, partner-assisted pain coping skills training protocols used in
OA and RA have not focused sufficiently on identifying and altering spe-
cific, negative interactional cycles such as those described by Goldman and
Greenberg (chap. 11, this volume). In part, this may be due to the fact that
couples in these studies have generally reported high levels of marital satis-
faction. Nevertheless, persistent pain can threaten emotional connectedness
and separation in ways that can lead to negative interaction patterns. For
example, faced with a patient who is suffering from a flare in RA pain, a
partner may experience a sense of fear and inadequacy about his or her abil-
ity to help the patient and may react by withdrawing. The patient, in turn,
may become angry and escalate attempts to secure support from the partner,
who may react by withdrawing even more. The end result is a maladaptive
negative interaction pattern that contributes to rising emotional conflict.
Techniques derived from emotion-focused couples therapy (chap. 11, this

volume) could be incorporated into pain coping skills training protocols to
better address such negative interactional cycles.
Partner-Based Biopsychosocial Interventions for Cancer Pain
A substantial body of descriptive research documents the impact of can-

cer on the patient's spouse and the patient-spouse relationship as well as on
the patient. Partners of cancer patients having pain have been found to ex-
perience significant levels of psychological distress (Haddad, Pitceathly, &
Maguire, 1996), and there are indications that some spouses suffer more emo-
tional distress than the patient (Northouse, Mood, Templin, Mellon, &
George, 2000). Furthermore, during cancer treatment and recovery, many
cancer patients experience disruptions in their roles within their family or
workplace, which then affect the partner and broader family. For example, it
has been found that family functioning and social support decrease over the
first year after the cancer diagnosis despite improvements in individual ad-
justment (Arora et al., 2001).
There is also a good deal of descriptive research documenting the im-
portance of the spouse's support in contributing to the patient's adjustment.
The bulk of research in this area focuses on the spouse's provision of social
support, which is subcategorized into emotional, instrumental, and informa-
tional support (see Helgeson & Cohen, 1996, for a review). Emotional sup-
port from the spouse has been found to be particularly important in contrib-
uting to the patient's adjustment. There has been little direct attention to
the spouse's role in helping the patient to manage cancer pain symptoms or
side effects of cancer treatments. This role is often subsumed under the larger
umbrella of caretaking tasks, which can include administering medications,
communicating with health care professionals, and assisting with activities
of daily living. However, the spouse, who is often the patient's primary
caregiver, can play a pivotal role in helping the patient manage symptoms,
particularly pain. For instance, spouses often have concerns and misconcep-
tions regarding pain medications that can pose a barrier to the patient re-
ceiving adequate pain relief (Berry & Ward, 1995). Spouses also often at-
tempt to use nondrug interventions such as distraction and help with
positioning, to varying degrees of effectiveness. Thus, it may be advanta-
geous to include spouses in cancer pain management interventions.
There have been very few published biopsychosocial pain management
intervention studies with cancer patients that have taken a couples approach.
The studies that have been conducted have tended to focus exclusively on
reducing psychological distress. For example, Christensen (1983) examined
the efficacy of a couple's communication training protocol for women with
breast cancer and their spouses. The intervention resulted in improvements
in the woman's mood and in the couple's sexual satisfaction following mas-
tectomy. In other studies, the interventions included spouses only (Bultz,

Speca, Brasher, Geggie, & Page, 2000), were conducted separately for pa-
tients and spouses (Donnelly et al., 2000), or included spouses of only some
of the patients (Heinrich & Schag, 1985). None of these interventions, how-
ever, targeted pain symptom management or included measures of cancer
pain symptoms.
We recently completed a study that tested the effects of a partner-guided
pain management intervention for patients having cancer pain at the end of
life (Keefe, Ahles, et al., 2005). In this study, 78 patients having cancer pain
who met criteria for hospice eligibility were randomly assigned to receive a
biopsychosocial pain management intervention or usual care. Because pa-
tients were sick and at the end of life, the intervention was brief (three ses-
sions) and conducted in patients' homes. The intervention, delivered by a
nurse, integrated educational information about cancer pain with training in
three pain coping skills (relaxation, imagery, and activity pacing). Although
these skills were described as pain coping skills, it was also emphasized that
they could play an important role in controlling patient and partner emo-
tional responses and important dyadic challenges (e.g., exchanging feelings)
that occurred in this end-of-life treatment context. Behavioral rehearsal and
joint practice sessions were included in the training to facilitate the ability of
couples to learn these coping skills. Results indicated that patients in the
intervention tended to report reduced levels of pain, although this finding
was not statistically significant. In addition, spouses assigned to the inter-
vention condition showed significant improvements in their sense of self-
efficacy for helping the patient control pain and self-efficacy for managing
other cancer symptoms and tended to report reduced levels of caregiver strain.
These findings are promising and suggest that involving partners in a pain
management program at the end of life may be beneficial.
Our research team is currently conducting another partner-based study
focused on symptom management in patients with early-stage lung cancer.
In this study, 500 patients with early-stage lung cancer and their caregivers
will be randomly assigned to receive either 14 sessions of coping skills train-
ing or 14 sessions of cancer education. The primary aim of the study is to
evaluate whether coping skills training is effective in reducing symptoms of
lung cancer including pain, fatigue, shortness of breath, and coughing. The
caregivers, who are primarily spouses, learn the coping skills along with the
patients and are taught to coach the patient in their use of these strategies.
Numerous descriptive studies have shown that cancer has a substantial
impact on partners' emotional adjustment. Descriptive research also shows
that social support, particularly emotional support, is associated with im-
provements in patients' adjustment to cancer. To date, very few studies have
been conducted on partner-assisted coping skills interventions for cancer
pain management.
Our recent study of cancer patients at the end of life thus represents
one of the first systematic attempts to test the efficacy of partner-assisted

pain coping skills training in the management of cancer pain. Because of the
demands of working with patients and partners at the end of life, the proto-
col used in this study was briefer and less comprehensive than that used in
our study of OA patients. However, it did emphasize that coping skills train-
ing could benefit not only the patient's pain but also the patient's and partner's
emotional life. It is of interest that the major significant effects were on part-
ner outcomes, including improvements in partners' self-efficacy for control-
ling pain, self-efficacy for controlling other cancer symptoms, and caregiver
strain.
The end-of-life context is a particularly appropriate one in which to
study emotion regulation skills in couples. Caring for a partner who has pain
at the end of life is emotionally demanding and can challenge what Goldman
and Greenberg (chap. 11, this volume) have called "couples' emotion sys-
tems." Expressing and sharing emotions in this context can be difficult. In-
deed, some partners' own emotional responses to the patient's cancer (e.g.
their own fear, feelings of abandonment) may be so strong as to hinder their
abilities to effectively provide emotional support. Nevertheless, our own re-
search suggests that couples in this situation are faced with the concrete task
of managing the patient's pain, and that interactions around this task may
provide important opportunities for emotional expression. Anecdotally,
couples in our study reported that the process of learning pain coping skills
did enable them to have valued conversations and interactions that they
may have otherwise avoided.
Given the importance of social support and emotion regulation in can-
cer patients having pain, additional research is needed to explore the ben-
efits of partner-based pain coping skills training interventions.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Although partner-based biopsychosocial interventions for managing

pain are relatively new, they appear to have potential. If this potential is to
be fully realized, however, additional research is needed. In particular, re-
search on partner-based interventions could benefit immensely from a greater
emphasis on emotional and interpersonal processes.
First, those developing partner-based interventions need to more care-
fully consider the emerging literature on pain and emotion. In a recent re-
view we identified four topics in this area that are particularly relevant to
partner-based interventions. First, there is growing evidence from longitudi-
nal studies that interpersonal stress can influence disease-related pain condi-
tions. Interpersonal stress appears to be particularly important for persons
having RA. Zautra et al. (1998), for example, found that interpersonal stress
led to changes in immune function, inflammation, and pain in persons with
RA. It is interesting that another study by this group found that whereas
EMOTION REGULATION PROCESSES IN DISEASE-RELATED PAIN 22]

interpersonal stress was strongly related to physiological changes and depres-
sion in persons with RA, stress of a noninterpersonal nature was not (Zautra,
Burleson, Matt, Roth, & Burrows, 1994). Interpersonal stress also was sig-
nificantly more likely to relate to changes in physiology and depression in
persons with RA than in persons with OA. This suggests that the effects of
interpersonal stress may differ in persons having different disease-related pain
conditions. These findings suggest that stress management interventions fo-
cused on reducing interpersonal stress potentially may be beneficial for per-
sons having RA. To date, however, no studies have tested the effects of a
partner-assisted stress management protocol for patients with RA.
Catastrophizing, an emotionally focused response to pain, has emerged
as one of the most consistent predictors of pain and disability (Sullivan et al.,
2001). The term catastrophizing refers to an individual's tendency to focus on
and exaggerate the threat value of painful stimuli and negatively evaluate
one's own ability to deal with pain (Rosensteil & Keefe, 1983). Persons who
catastrophize have higher levels of pain, increased pain-related disability,
and higher health care use and show more pain behavior (Sullivan et al.,
2001). It is noteworthy that the effects of catastrophizing are evident even
after controlling for pain severity. In a recent study, we examined the social
context of pain catastrophizing in patients with gastrointestinal (GI) cancer
(Keefe et al., 2003). It was hypothesized that patients who were high in
catastrophizing would receive more support from their caregivers but that
these caregivers would also report higher levels of burden and negative re-
sponses toward the patient. Findings supported these hypotheses, suggesting
that patient catastrophizing may serve to elicit support from significant oth-
ers but that it does so at a cost to both the patient's and caregiver's well-
being. Future intervention studies focused on modifying couples' interactions
regarding the patient's methods of eliciting spouse support may be useful for
reducing patient pain catastrophizing and improving individual and relation-
ship adjustment for both patients and spouses.
Recent studies have also highlighted the important role that fear and
avoidance play in the adjustment to pain. Persons who are highly fearful of
pain avoid situations and activities that are associated with pain and as a
result can become inactive, sedentary, and overly dependent on others, re-
sponses that can heighten the behavioral impact of a pain condition (Picavet,
Vlaeyen, & Schouten, 2002). Vlaeyen and his colleagues have recently de-
veloped a graded in vivo exposure protocol designed to help patients over-
come pain-related fears by exposing them to feared situations (Vlaeyen &
Linton, 2000). The protocol involves development of a fear hierarchy, phy-
sician education about unrealistic fears, and sessions in which patients ex-
pose themselves in a graded fashion to progressively more difficult anxiety-
provoking situations. The efficacy of this in vivo graded exposure protocol
has been examined in two studies using experimental single-case designs.
Both studies, conducted with patients suffering from chronic musculoskel-

etal pain conditions, found that exposure led to significant improvements in
pain-related fear, disability, and activity level.
Pain-related fear and avoidance can be a problem not only for patients
but also for their partners and significant others. Partners who are exces-
sively worried about pain may become overly solicitous and interfere with
the patient's efforts to remain engaged in activities. It is surprising that no
studies have tested whether involving partners in an in vivo graded exposure
protocol can reduce their anxieties about pain and improve the quality of
couples' relationships.
Furthermore, there is evidence that persons with pain are more likely
to experience alexithymia—that is, difficulty identifying, understanding, and
communicating their emotions (Sifneos, 1980). Research has shown that
persons with chronically painful diseases such as irritable bowel syndrome,
rheumatoid arthritis, and chronic pain conditions score significantly higher
on measures of alexithymia than do healthy controls (Lumley, Asselin, &
Norman, 1997). These studies have led to interest in interventions designed
to improve adjustment to pain by fostering emotional disclosure. Kelley,
Lumley, and Leisen (1997) conducted a study of RA patients in which they
tested the effects of an emotional disclosure intervention modeled after that
developed by Pennebaker (1993). Patients assigned to this intervention were
instructed to talk privately into a tape recorder about stressful experiences
that they had not shared with others for 30 minutes on 4 consecutive days.
Patients assigned to a control condition were asked to talk about neutral
topics for the same time period. Data analyses revealed that the emotional
disclosure intervention led to immediate increases in negative affect but sig-
nificant improvements in affective disturbance 3 months later. Among pa-
tients in the emotional disclosure condition, those who experienced the largest
initial increases in negative affect had the best outcomes in terms of im-
provement in joint condition at 3-month follow-up. Taken together, these
findings suggest that emotional disclosure may provide a useful strategy for
enhancing adjustment to RA.
Emotional disclosure, however, often occurs in an interpersonal con-
text, and interventions that foster interpersonal emotional disclosure may be
particularly helpful for persons having persistent pain. We are currently test-
ing this possibility in several studies. The first study is designed to evaluate
the efficacy of a nurse-assisted emotional disclosure intervention for RA. In
this study, a nurse who is specially trained to help RA patients identify and
express emotions assists patients during emotional disclosure sessions. In the
second study, we are testing the effects of an intervention designed to in-
crease the degree to which patients with GI cancer disclose their cancer-
related concerns to their partners. We hypothesize that enhancing disclosure
between patients and spouses may be beneficial for increasing the well-being
of both patients and spouses as well as improving aspects of their relationship
such as intimacy.

Patients and theit partners are likely to vary in their response to part-
ner-assisted interventions. Attachment style may be one variable that mod-
erates responses to such interventions. Research has demonstrated that adult
attachment styles can be conceptualized in terms of avoidance and anxiety
(Kazan & Shaver, 1990). Securely attached people tend to be less anxious
and exhibit less avoidant behavior in threatening or stressful situations (Feeney
& Kirkpatrick, 1996). Securely attached individuals are also more likely to
engage in support seeking, because they are confident that others will be
available in times of need (Mikulincer, Florian, & Weller, 1993). Insecurely
attached individuals, in contrast, tend to react with greater anxiety or avoidant
behavior when confronted with stressful situations and are less likely to seek
social support. This stems from their lack of trust in the availability of signifi-
cant others in times of need.
Attachment styles are likely to have important implications for part-
ner-assisted pain coping skills interventions. The experience of pain is a stress-
ful situation that is likely to elicit emotional reactions characteristic of an
individual's attachment style. Partner-assisted interventions are based on the
rationale that pain is a couples issue, and on the belief that teaching couple-
based skills such as communication and joint practice and training the part-
ner in individual skills such as goal setting and maintenance are critical to
the patient's success (Keefe et al, 1996). Insecure attachment can interfere
with partner-assisted interventions at various levels, beginning with the ra-
tionale provided for engaging in couples skills training: that pain is not sim-
ply an individual issue, but a couples issue. To accept this rationale, insecure
individuals must overcome some of the fundamental components of their
attachment style, including distrust of their partner, fear of rejection, emo-
tional distancing, and avoidance of closeness. Insecure reactions to distress-
ing situations on the part of the patient or spouse could interfere with the
ability of the couple to successfully use coping skills. Avoidant attachment
has been linked with denial and suppression of emotion (Mikulincer et al.,
1993) and the maintenance of emotional distance from one's partner
(Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998). This could hinder many components of
skills training. For instance, during behavioral rehearsal, patients provide
feedback concerning the assistance given by their spouse in demanding situ-
ations. Suppression and denial could interfere with the patient providing
constructive feedback, and emotional distancing could hinder a spouse's ability
to prompt use of cognitive coping skills.
Future studies also need to examine other patient and partner charac-
teristics that are related to the outcome of such interventions. Are these
interventions more helpful for younger versus older couples? Are couples
who report high satisfaction with their relationship more responsive to these
interventions than those who do not? Do the effects of these interventions
differ on the basis of the racial or ethnic backgrounds of the participants?

Studies designed to answer these questions can significantly advance our
understanding of the utility of partner-assisted interventions.
CLINICAL, SOCIAL, AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As noted earlier, the study of partner-assisted pain management inter-

ventions is a relatively new development. If future research continues to dem-
onstrate that these interventions are effective, then one needs to more care-
fully consider their implications for clinical, social, and public policy.
At present, psychological interventions in general, and partner-assisted
interventions in particular, are not widely available for patients having pain.
Reimbursement for delivery of psychological services for pain management
has been reduced sharply over the past decade, leading to shortages in care
providers. Thus, a key clinical and public policy issue that is likely to emerge
is how to increase access to partner-assisted pain management interventions.
One way of dealing with this problem is to have nonpsychologists deliver
these interventions. Nurses, for example, are often involved in health educa-
tion efforts for persons with chronic diseases. Over the past decade, there has
been heightened interest in the role that nurses can play in delivering
biopsychosocial pain management interventions, particularly to persons with
cancer (Dalton, Keefe, Carlson, & Youngblood, 2004). Another option is to
devise partner-assisted interventions that can be delivered by less costly meth-
ods such as by telephone or the Internet. Telephone-based and Internet-
based educational interventions focused on self-management have shown
promise in the treatment of arthritis pain and disability, but to date no stud-
ies have adapted these formats to deliver a partner-assisted intervention.
However, in our ongoing NIH-supported research we are testing the efficacy
of a number of protocols that involve a combination of face-to-face and tele-
phone partner-assisted treatment sessions.
Another important clinical issue is the early detection by health care
providers of patients who might benefit from partner-assisted interventions.
Biopsychosocial theory and clinical practice suggest that intervening early is
more likely to be successful than intervening late. Certain couples may have
strengths (e.g., high levels of intimacy, effective communication skills) that, if
detected early in the course of a painful disease, may make them particularly
amenable to couples-based interventions. Other couples may cope with a painful
disease with problematic coping styles, such as emotional avoidance, that could
be more effectively treated if they are detected early before they become en-
trenched. Health care providers (e.g., physicians, nurses, psychologists) who
work with patients having disease-related pain need to be educated about the
benefits of couples-based interventions for pain management and encour-
aged to identify those who are likely to respond to these treatments.

Another important public policy initiative is educating the public about
the link between pain and emotion, and the impact of persistent pain on
family members. All too often pain is viewed by the general public as simply
a sensory event, with little recognition of the important role that emotion
and the social environment play in influencing the pain experience. Efforts
need to be made to inform the public about the results of recent studies on
the association of disease-related pain and emotion. Along these lines, the
American Pain Society has been involved in a broad array of public educa-
tion initiatives as part of the congressionally mandated Decade of Pain Con-
trol and Research (see American Pain Society, n.d.). Information about the
psychosocial aspects of pain is now available to the public through educa-
tional handouts, Web sites, and speakers. These and related efforts are likely
to increase the public's awareness of the important role that partners can
play in the management of pain.
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687-696.

PROMOTING EMOTIONAL
11
EXPRESSION AND EMOTION
REGULATION IN COUPLES
RHONDA N. GOLDMAN AND LESLIE S. GREENBERG
The last decade has seen increasing recognition of the importance of

emotion regulation and emotional intelligence in the promotion of health
and well-being. Although the traditional structure of the family has changed
over the last century, the family remains the primary vehicle through which
models for emotional expression are developed. From infancy onward, chil-
dren learn a great deal about emotional expression. Present data suggest that
43% of American couples and 37% of Canadian couples who married in
1996 will divorce. Although there is controversy about the impact of divorce
on children, there is little controversy over the impact of relationship dis-
tress on both children and adults. There is strong evidence that children
are upset by conflict and anger expression in families, and parental conflict
has been linked to a wide range of negative child outcomes (Cummings &
Davies, 1994; see also chap. 8, this volume). Research has shown a link
between relationship distress and clinical depression, as well as anxiety dis-
orders such as posttraumatic stress disorder (Whisman, 1999). Research
has also demonstrated the ill effects of a lack of positive relationships; for
example, loneliness has been linked to heart disease and reduced immune
231
system responsiveness (Kiecolt-Glasser & Newton, 2001). It is thus crucially
important to develop therapeutic strategies to maintain and support stable,
healthy relationships.
A deeper understanding of emotional connections and how they be-
come disrupted in couples and families is of primary importance in helping to
promote therapeutic change. Emotion coordinates experience and provides
it with direction. In other words, emotion tells people what is important, and
knowing what is important tells them what they need to do and who they
are. Emotions provide access to wishes or needs, which in turn are a source of
action. In other words, every feeling has a need, and every need has a direc-
tion for action (Elliott, Watson, Goldman, & Greenberg, 2003; Greenberg,
2002). It is thus essential to access emotions in couple and family therapy to
understand where things are going wrong and to help partners or family mem-
bers identify how to meet their own and each other's needs.
The emotion-focused couples therapy (EFCT) approach views the nega-
tive interactional cycles that couples engage in as a major source of dysfunc-
tion and thus a primary focus of therapy. Conflict stems from failures to re-
solve struggles for identity and security. Generally, negative interactional
cycles are viewed as being driven by secondary emotions that serve to cover
or obscure rapid-acting, primary adaptive emotions. Conflict then results from
escalating interactions that rigidify into negative interactional cycles. The
fundamental task of therapy is to identify negative cycles related to threats to
security and identity and engender positive interactional cycles driven by
primary, adaptive emotions.
The therapist in EFCT is viewed as an emotion coach who helps people
deal more effectively with their emotions (Greenberg, 2002). The key con-
cept in coaching people to resolve conflict in intimate relationships is help-
ing them reveal the primary core, "softer," vulnerable emotions underlying
their "harder" secondary or defensive emotions, thus facilitating de-escalation.
It is important to note that although the metaphor of replacing hard emo-
tions with softer ones is useful in evoking a picture of the change process,
sometimes it can be therapeutic for the so-called harder emotion of anger to
replace a softer emotion of fear or shame, especially in partners prone to
withdrawal or submission. Our goal is to help people reveal the underlying
and generally more vulnerable emotions of sadness, fear, or shame, or—in
the case of persons who exhibit excessive withdrawal or submission—the
empowering emotion of anger. However, people often find it difficult to ac-
knowledge and share some of their more vulnerable or dreaded emotions.
This chapter discusses our view of how change in couples' emotion sys-
tems occurs through emotionally focused couples therapy (Greenberg 6k
Johnson, 1988) and the role of emotion regulation in resolving couples' con-
flict. We outline the major principles of change from an EFCT perspective
and discuss strategies to promote emotional change and emotion regulation
within couples. We also review specific research efforts that describe the
232 GOLDMAN AND GREENBERG

emotion regulation processes that lead to change through the EFCT process.
Finally, we make recommendations for future research on the emotional
change process in couples therapy and further cross-disciplinary collabora-
tion to promote healthier emotion expression within the family system.
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF

EMOTION-FOCUSED COUPLES THERAPY
In this section we outline how emotions are related to core attachment

and identity concerns. In addition, we distinguish among different types of
emotions and outline the principles of emotion regulation and change from
the EFCT perspective.
Emotion Theory
Emotional connectedness and separation are universal factors operat-

ing in systems and are identifiable by the emotions expressed. Emotions or-
ganize both the self and interactions with others. Members in a family are
highly connected to each other through this emotion system. They read each
other's emotional signals with great care and this reading dominates their
interactions. The amygdala, at the core of the emotional brain, has been
shown to be particularly attentive and reactive to subliminal facial expres-
sions of fear and anger, indicating how automatically and rapidly people re-
act to facial expressions of emotion (Schupp et al., 2004). In addition, people
form close bonds through emotion systems. Being close calms fears, regulates
physiology, and provides security (Schore, 2003). Emotions are an important
part of the glue that holds family members and marital partners together.
According to Frijda (1986), emotions are most noticeable as changes
in relational action tendencies that occur in response to events relevant to
personal concerns. For example, it is only in relation to a need or wish to be
close that one feels insecure or afraid when one's partner is rejecting or dis-
tant. Emotions therefore emerge in relation to the social environment, aris-
ing in response to events real or imagined that are appraised as implying
possibilities for gratifying or obstructing needs, goals, and desires.
People not only have emotions but also experience the need to regulate
them. Too much or too little emotion can disrupt effective responding to
environmental challenges. In the narrow sense, emotion regulation refers to
the processes by which people influence which emotions they have, when
they have them, and, most important, how they experience and express them
(see also chap. 1, this volume). Cicchetti, Ackerman, and Izard (1995, p. 4)
have stressed that a central component of emotion regulation is the "inter-
co-ordination of the emotions and cognitive systems." In a broader sense
emotion regulation also describes the ability of the cognitive system to gain
PROMOTING EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION 233

information from the emotion system. Emotion regulation refers to all as-
pects of emotional processing, to its awareness, utilization, and transforma-
tion (Greenberg, 2002). One needs to specify what types of emotion to ac-
cess, which ones to down-regulate, and which to increase.
Emotional Intimacy Within Couples: Attachment and Identity
Humans have been primed by evolution to feel pleasant feelings when

close to caretakers and unpleasant feelings when unwillingly separated from
them. Emotions are the infant's primary signaling system (Bowlby, 1989).
They continue to be a primary form of communication into adulthood, sig-
naling to intimate others how well they are meeting relational needs and
expectations (Sroufe, 1996). Humans are highly interdependent, attachment-
oriented beings. Secure attachment in adulthood, a perception that attach-
ment figures are available, facilitates optimal functioning, promotes a sense
of connectedness, and makes people more likely to seek support as a distress-
regulating strategy. Alternatively, when attachment figures are felt to be
unavailable, a sense of security is not attained and inadequate strategies of
affect regulation such as avoidance and anxiety are sought (see chap. 4, this
volume).
Basic concerns in intimate attachment relationships are proximity ("Are
you there when I need you?"), availability ("Can you give me the things I
need, such as affection, support, care?"), and responsiveness and receptive-
ness ("Can you understand me and what I need?"). Adults have developed
capacities for empathy, sympathy, and motivation to be compassionate (Gil-
bert, 2000a). Intimate caregiving involves concerns with proximity, avail-
ability, and receptiveness. Caregivers try to intuit their partner's needs and
respond to them. When the partner is receptive, the role of successful caring
is achieved and is associated with positive affect. When the partner is not
receptive and there is misattunement, the caregiver often responds with nega-
tive affect and behavior (Gilbert, 2000b; Johnson & Whiffen, 2003).
In addition to attachment and intimacy needs, autonomy and identity
needs also are an important basis of relationships (Greenberg, 2002, in press).
Emotions such as embarrassment, shame, humiliation, and pride reflect con-
cerns about identity and social rank or status (Gilbert & McGuire, 1998).
These identity-related emotions arise when one feels socially threatened.
People have thus evolved to possess emotional capacities that are influenced
by interpersonal experiences forming a complex affective, cognitive, moti-
vational, and behavioral system.
When there are challenges to identity or status, the primary vulnerable
emotions generally are shame at diminishment or invalidation and fear from
threat to one's standing or sense of control. To avoid feeling primary shame,
people often respond with anger. Here anger is a secondary protective or
assertive emotional response that both regulates and obscures the vulnerable

emotional response to identity threats. Therapeutically, helping partners
stimulate positive affect in each other rather than fear or submission is an
important way of allowing each person to maintain position and validate
identity needs. In addition, helping partners learn to tolerate and regulate
their own fear and shame rather than fly into a rage to regulate self-esteem is
an important goal.
Hence, the focus of therapy is to identify maladaptive interactional
cycles and to get underneath the positions people take in them to access
primary attachment and identity-related emotions and the need-based self-
organizations underlying couples' interactions. Core relational needs for at-
tachment and identity drive the cycle. Redefining problems in terms of needs
helps partners be more responsive to each other's vulnerabilities.
Types of Emotion
Not all emotions are the same; hence, therapists don't simply help cli-
ents get in touch with feelings or encourage the expression of all emotions.
Rather, they distinguish among different types of emotions to guide their
interventions. Therapists intervene differentially with members of the fam-
ily, helping them to accept and integrate certain emotions, to acknowledge
but bypass others, to express those that will enhance the relationship, and to
contain and soothe, or explore and transform others. This approach to differ-
ential intervention is based on the premise that some emotional expressions
are adaptive whereas others are maladaptive. For example, anger may be adap-
tive or maladaptive, depending on the function it serves in a given interac-
tion. In the following paragraphs, we briefly explain our typology of emo-
tions (Greenberg, 2002).
Primary adaptive emotions are the person's most fundamental, original
reactions to a situation and are productive. These include rapid-acting emo-
tional reactions that originate from noncortical areas of the brain, such as
the amygdala (LeDoux, 1996). Those underlying attachment and identity-
related emotions need to be acknowledged and communicated in intimate
relationships to help resolve conflict. They include sadness in relation to
loss, anger in response to violation, and fear in response to threat.
Secondary emotions are those responses that are secondary to other, more
primary internal processes and may be defenses against these processes. Sec-
ondary emotions are our reactions to our own emotional responses to a stimulus
rather than the responses to the situation itself. They involve more implicit
and explicit processing than primary responses, are much more influenced by
conscious processing, and involve the evaluation and sometimes the inhibi-
tion or distortion of primary responses. Examples include feeling angry
in response to feeling hurt, feeling afraid about feeling angry, or feeling
guilty about a traumatic event by attributing responsibility to oneself for the
event. In couples' interactions, secondary emotions are generally the harder,

relationship-damaging emotions of anger, disgust, and contempt. Secondary
emotions need to be explored to get at their more primary generators. The
key premise is that it is the awareness of adaptive primary emotions that
promotes bonding, conflict resolution, and problem solving.
Maladaptive primary emotions involve repetitive negative feelings that
resist change. In being the very first reaction one has to one's partner, these
are primary emotions, but they are based on wounds and unresolved past
experience rather than on adaptive responses to present circumstances. These
are feelings such as a core sense of loneliness, abandonment, shame, or worth-
lessness, or recurrent feelings of anxious inadequacy, or the explosive anger
or abusive contempt that destroys relationships. Such feelings result in con-
flict and leave partners feeling stuck, often hopeless, helpless, and in despair.
These are the emotions we want to help clients regulate and transform.
The negative cycle that couples enter on the basis of their maladaptive
responses often involves a dance that they may later refer to as moments of
insanity rather than a representation of how they truly feel. In these dances
both partners may shift into what they later see as "not me" states of emotion
dysregulation. The problem is that these are negative states that are self-
absorbing. Once one is in them, these states often self-reinforce and inten-
sify. These "not me" states are maladaptive emotional states that need to be
transformed.
A good example of this type of maladaptive state is when a husband
wants to be close whereas his wife is distant. He reacts to something she has
said and feels hurt and ignored. He had hoped to be close and make love. In
these states his sense of longing may become physical, and he yearns for some-
thing from her from deep within his body. He feels hurt and angry and sees
her as cold and rejecting. He tries to tell her what he is feeling, maybe indi-
rectly, and gets angry because she won't listen. He describes what she is do-
ing that is so damaging to him and interrogates her about why she does this.
He feels he desperately needs her softness and begins to feel intensely power-
less and then angry. He loses all contact with her and just feels the wall she
has put up between them. He becomes enraged at the wall, and all he can
think of is destroying it because it prevents him from getting what he so
desperately wants. He sees her as cruelly withholding and wishes to destroy
the barrier. He hardly recognizes her expressions, so intent is he on removing
the barrier.
His wife may feel a desperate need to protect herself from destruction.
She just hears his voice, sees that familiar angry expression on his face. She
does not know exactly what happened but just experiences this as dangerous.
She fears becoming overwhelmed by him and sees him as intrusively power-
ful, and she closes up, becomes rigid, and walls out any contact. She feels
tremendously attacked and powerless. He just seems to keep coming at her
with angry words, questions, and accusations. She does not listen; she just
wants him to stop and go away. These extreme states reflect an activation of

TABLE 11.1
Primary and Secondary Emotions in Couples'
Negative Interactional Cycles
Position Primary Secondary

Active Partner
Attachment pear Of abandonment, sadness Anger, contempt
Pursuer at ,oss
Identity Shame at loss of face, fear of Contempt, anger
Dominant threat to position
Reactive Partner
Attachment Anxiety at abandonment, Defensive anger, absence
Withdrawer shame at inadequacy, or of emotion or
anger at intrusion avoidance, depression
or boredom
Identity Fear of inadequacy, anger at Caring, placating
Submitter control
both partners' core maladaptive emotion states. He has entered his feeling of
powerless, anxious abandonment and rages against this. She has entered her
fear of intrusion and annihilation and walls off to protect herself. Both of
these maladaptive states are based on past experience, in which the partners
suffered emotional injuries to their sense of security and identity. These emo-
tional states need to be confronted and transformed.
Couples' conflict results from negative interactional cycles supported
by secondary or maladaptive emotional states (Greenberg, in press). Cycles
of attack and defense are supported predominantly by anger and fear, whereas
dominant and submissive cycles are governed by contempt and shame. Table
11.1 shows both the primary and the secondary emotions in each position. In
the attachment cycle the primary emotion in response to threats to security
in the pursuer is fear, but the expressed secondary emotion is anger. In the
withdrawer the primary emotions are fear of inadequacy or anger, but the
expressed secondary emotions are related to avoidance and involve with-
drawn depression, a cold wall, or defensive rejection. By contrast, when the
conflict is in the identity domain, the threat is not to connection or security
but rather to identity and status. Here the dominant person's social status,
sense of worth, and self-esteem are challenged. As shown in Table 11.1, when
people's dominant roles or views of self are threatened, they respond with
secondary or instrumental anger or contempt to protect their position in
their own and in the other's eyes. In the submissive person one sees second-
ary placating, caretaking, or pleasing expressions, but the more primary feel-
ings are fear and anger. Expressions of underlying shame and fear beget more
empathic and compassionate responses.
This illustrates that one way to regulate emotions is by accessing more
underlying emotions. Once these are accessed and revealed to the partner,

the partner is more likely to respond in a more understanding way, and a
positive cycle is initiated.
Principles of Emotional Change in Therapy
In this section we articulate principles for emotion regulation in EFCT.

Although these principles of emotional change were derived specifically for
EFCT, they are as applicable to and potentially useful for other established
couple therapy approaches, particularly those that include emotional com-
ponents in their treatment. For example, integrative behavioral couple therapy
(IBCT; Dimidjian, Martell, & Christensen, 2002) adopts acceptance strate-
gies that, like EFCT, involve encouraging empathic joining between the part-
ners. Object relations couple therapy (Scharff & Bagnini, 2002) and insight-
oriented couples therapy (Snyder &. Schneider, 2002) involve work to move
beyond defensive processes to access underlying affective processes. Cogni-
tive—behavioral couple therapy has also come to recognize the importance of
working with emotion, helping people to access and differentiate restricted
emotions, and contain overwhelming emotional responses (Baucom, Epstein,
& LaTaillade, 2002).
The empirically grounded principles of EFCT described in the follow-
ing section (Greenberg, 2002) relate to both emotional arousal and emotion
regulation in the broad sense of these terms.
The Therapeutic Relationship

First, therapists join and connect emotionally with couples and fami-
lies. This is important in regulating emotion because a good working alliance
with the family involving a respectful, emotion-validating therapeutic bond
is a crucial element of helping people calm down. Therapists also selectively
attend to primary adaptive emotions and thereby shift clients' focus of atten-
tion and begin to change their manner of processing emotion.
Emotional Awareness and Expression

The therapist helps clients to symbolize emotions in words and express
them to someone. Putting emotion into words can be curative in and of it-
self. In couple therapy this helps partners reveal their inner worlds both to
themselves and to each other in a manner that has not previously occurred.
This type of emotional awareness is not just talking about feeling; it involves
experiencing the feeling in awareness and having one's partner perceive it in
one's face and voice. Accessing and experiencing emotions also are impor-
tant in that they involve overcoming avoidance. Partners learn that by fac-
ing and acknowledging their most dreaded feelings and painful emotions and
surviving they are more able to cope (Greenberg & Bolger, 2001).
There are three ways in which this principle operates within EFCT.
First, helping individuals gain emotional awareness of softer, underlying at-

tachment- and identity-oriented emotions such as fear and shame under-
neath their anger or contempt, and autonomy- or boundary-oriented emo-
tions such as anger under withdrawal, is key to interactional change. In
couples, secondary emotions such as angry, blaming responses tend to fuel
conflict. They represent attempted solutions to the problem of not getting
needs for closeness and autonomy met, but instead these solutions become
the problem. These responses tend to focus on the other person and involve
attack and attempts to destroy. In these states people use "you" language
(i.e., "You are bad, wrong, to blame" and so forth). Expressing secondary
anger that obscures hurt and vulnerability does not dissipate the anger or
enhance communication but rather just tends to lead couples into further
negative cycles and the therapy process in circles. Expression of the more
vulnerable emotions of fear and shame allows partners to draw closer. Thus,
if a partner feels secondary rage, he or she needs to learn how to calm the rage
and access what is at the bottom of it. If one often gets very angry, one needs
not only to control one's anger but also to learn to experience and express
more vulnerable feelings beneath the anger. Usually this involves feelings of
shame, powerlessness, vulnerability, helplessness, sadness, loneliness, or aban-
donment. Expressing underlying fear, shame, or hurt will have a very differ-
ent impact on one's partner than expressing destructive rage. Hence, being
aware and getting in touch with core feelings as they arise are key ways to
prevent the development of destructive rage. Therapists need to help people
develop the ability to soothe their own maladaptive emotional states and
insecurities and also to soothe these states in their partner. One of the best
antidotes to negative escalation is the ability to soothe vulnerability in the
self and other.
Second, awareness of the role of emotional responses in driving inter-
actions leads to the possibility of developing new patterns. When a couple's
attention is brought to the role of their emotions in perpetuating negative
cycles, they can choose to change their interactions and engender new
patterns.
Third, helping couples to explicate beliefs and past experiences around
emotional expression helps partners to reframe each other's emotional be-
havior. Awareness of past socialization around emotional expression can help
partners to depersonalize negative emotional expression. Couples then have
a choice about how to create new, more positive emotional interactions.
Emotion Regulation
Therapeutically, it is important to distinguish between problems of over-
regulation and underregulation. These two types present quite different clinical
pictures and we work with them in different ways. The overregulated person
is highly constricted and avoids feelings, intellectualizes, interrupts any emer-
gent expression, or avoids situations that might evoke feeling. Within couple
therapy, the overregulated person who is highly constricted and avoidant

requires help in increasing emotional awareness and expression. Accentuat-
ing pleasant experience as well as accessing suppressed, unpleasant, or nega-
tive emotional experience is important. For example, a person who has be-
come overly rational will not be able to express warmth and love and help a
partner feel loved.
By contrast, partners who struggle with underregulated emotions de-
scribe emotions as overwhelming, getting the better of them, and making
them feel out of control. They may explode in rage, be overwhelmed by tears,
or shrink into the floor in shame. Emotions that require down'regulation in
couples generally are either secondary emotions such as anger or resignation
or primary maladaptive emotions such as the shame of being worthless, the
anxiety of basic insecurity, or panic. Overwhelming grief or sudden anger
may also need to be regulated.
Therapeutic skills useful in down-regulation with couples involve such
things as helping individuals establish a working distance from feelings of
hopelessness or worthlessness; increasing positive emotions such as joy, hope,
or caring; reducing vulnerability to overwhelming fear, shame, and hopeless-
ness; self-soothing, time-outs, relaxation, development of self-empathy and
compassion, and self-talk. The ability to regulate breathing and the ability to
observe emotions and let them come and go are important in helping to
regulate many types of emotional distress. Skills useful in down-regulating
escalating interactions involve such things as focusing on self rather than
other, learning about and avoiding things that provoke a partner's escala-
tion, being able to step back or see the humor in conflict situations, soothing
one's partner, and soft start-ups—approaching one's partner with more vul-
nerable emotions—in conflict situations.
In fears of abandonment and feelings of shame, two of the most impor-
tant skills for individuals to master are taking an observer's stance to get a
working distance from overwhelming despair and hopelessness and develop-
ing self-soothing capacities to calm and comfort core anxieties and humilia-
tion. Physiological soothing involves activation of the parasympathetic ner-
vous system to regulate heart rate, breathing, and other sympathetic functions
that speed up under stress. At the more deliberate behavioral and cognitive
levels, promoting partners' abilities to recognize and be compassionate to
their emerging painful emotional experience is the first step toward tolerat-
ing emotion and self-soothing. Soothing comes interpersonally in the form
of empathic attunement to affect and through acceptance and validation by
another person.
Re/lection on Emotion
In addition to recognizing emotions, promoting further reflection on
emotional experience allows partners to integrate their emotions into their
own stories. Reflection helps to create new meaning and develop new narra-
tives to explain experience (Greenberg & Pascual-Leone, 1997). Reflection

also allows both people to reframe emotions and take a new position vis-a-vis
one's partner. Thus, rather than expressing one feeling, "I can't survive. I
need you," a person can say, "I need you but 1 see that you have needs too." In
a similar way, reflecting on anger may allow one to change one's position
from "I am angry. I hate you and it is all your fault that I feel so alone and
abandoned" to "Yes, I do feel angry at you but it is not all your fault. 1 realize
some of my anger belongs to my mother."
Transforming Emotion
The final and probably most fundamental change principle involves
the changing of emotion with emotion. Change from this perspective involves
focusing on each individual's maladaptive emotional response, helping part-
ners access the maladaptive emotions at the core of their vulnerabilities, and
then transforming them by accessing more attachment- and identity-related
adaptive emotions. In other words, once the evaluation is made that a person's
response in an interactional cycle is maladaptive and needs to be changed,
the maladaptive emotion needs to be aroused and another, more adaptive
feeling that will help undo or replace the maladaptive state needs to be evoked.
Reason alone or insight into patterns or origins of emotion is seldom suffi-
cient to alter the thoughts and feelings associated with these maladaptive
states. In a similar way, exposure alone is not enough to change these mal-
adaptive states. The maladaptive feeling does not simply attenuate by being
felt. Rather, a new experience that will generate an alternative feeling is
necessary to transform, replace, or undo it.
For example, therapists can help couples identify the negative interac-
tional cycle in which one partner is blaming and critical and the other is
silent and withdrawn. The therapist can help the first partner to identify the
fear of abandonment and desire for emotional closeness that are driving the
attacking behavior. It is ironic that the emotional expression serves to push
the other away. By helping this partner express emotional needs and fears
underlying the hostile attack, the therapist helps the withdrawn partner see
vulnerability and move out of the defensive, withdrawn position into a more
compassionate one. The second partner can similarly articulate the anxiety
and fears of inadequacy that lie behind his or her silent, withdrawn stance.
Specific methods of evoking alternate emotions have been explicated by
Greenberg (2002, 2003). These include such interventions as shifting the
focus of attention to subdominant emotions, accessing needs to get to other
emotions, and changing interactions to evoke new emotions.
EFCT can also be helpful in addressing pathogenic beliefs within the
maladaptive emotions and provide corrective emotional experiences. For
example, in the case of adults who have been sexually abused as children,
they may have learned to associate physical closeness with fear. Therapy can
then focus on evoking the maladaptive emotional response in the one part-
ner from the abuse situation, evoking the positive and nurturing response in

the other partner, and restructuring the interaction so that the partner com-
ing from the abuse situation can see that overtures of physical closeness do
not indicate withdrawal or attack but rather indicate a move toward close-
ness, love, or security.
Therapist Emotional Processes
It is essential that the emotion-focused couple therapist stay attuned to

the ongoing moment-by-moment emotional processes of the couple to main-
tain the therapeutic alliance with both partners, as well as to help partners to
increase emotional awareness and regulate emotion. Therapists need to sus-
pend their own value frameworks and be careful not to reach for closure too
quickly (Rice, 1974). A high tolerance for ambiguity is demanded of the
emotion-focused therapist.
Therapists bring a number of cognitive-affective capacities to their
ability to be empathically attuned, the most important of these being imagi-
nation (Rogers, 1975). By actively imagining clients' experiences, therapists
infer what clients feel, asking what they themselves might feel in response to
the experiences clients describe. This provides the basis for empathic explo-
ration of partners' inner experiences and allows therapists to make process
distinctions between partners' expression of core emotions and other (sec-
ondary or maladaptive) emotions (Watson, Goldman, & Vanaerschot, 1997).
Such attunement requires therapists to be fully congruent, being able
at a given moment to recognize their own emotional experience so that they
can take note of it and use it productively. EFCT therapists therefore need to
be sufficiently emotionally aware so that they do not miss important aspects
of partners' emotional experience or become overwhelmed by their own
emotional experience. It is thus necessary for therapists, at times, to pursue
their own emotion-focused therapy or to seek supervision or consultation if
they do not feel able to be fully present and empathically attuned in such a
relationship.
The central focus of the empirical work on emotion-focused couple

therapy has been to determine its efficacy for treating marital distress. Stud-
ies have examined the impact of EFCT on distressed couples as assessed by a
wide range of indices including psychological and dyadic adjustment, inti-
macy, and target complaints about the relationship. A meta-analysis has been
conducted (Johnson, Hunsley, Greenberg, & Schindler, 1999) on outcome
measures (dyadic adjustment, intimacy, target complaints) reported in four
randomized clinical trials in which couples were seeking treatment for their
relationship distress and were assigned to either an EFCT condition, an al-

ternative form of couples therapy, or a wait-list control group (Goldman &
Greenberg, 1992; James, 1991; Johnson & Greenberg, 1985; Walker, Johnson,
Masion, & Clothier, 1996). The mean weighted effect size across studies was
1.28—a large and clinically meaningful effect size for psychotherapy trials.
Beyond treating general relationship distress, Dessaulles, Johnson, and
Denton (2003) compared 14 sessions of EFCT with pharmacotherapy in treat-
ing wives' major depression in 18 couples randomly assigned to treatment
condition. Both interventions were equally effective in reducing depressive
symptoms, although there was some evidence that women receiving EFCT
made greater improvement following termination than those receiving phar-
macotherapy.
In a recent study, Greenberg and colleagues (Greenberg et al, 2003)
examined the effects of EFCT for 20 couples in which 1 member had an
unresolved emotional injury involving his or her current partner. EFCT treat-
ment was short term, lasting 10 to 12 sessions. At the end of treatment,
couples scored significantly better than wait-list controls on all indices of
change including dyadic adjustment, symptoms of individual emotional or
behavioral distress, forgiveness, and empathy and acceptance toward self and
partner.
In a follow-up task analysis, Greenberg et al. (2003) found that reveal-
ing the impact of the injury and expressing the hurt, pain, and anger from the
emotional injury was an important first step toward resolution. Then it was
important for the injurer to acknowledge and tolerate the partner's distress
and to resist the desire to make the other's distress go away or to minimize it.
It was essential that injurers empathized both with how deeply their partner
was wounded by the injury and with how their initial empathic failure to
respond to the wound constituted another injury, often as important as the
initial one. It was important for the therapist at this stage to create a safe,
supportive, validating environment to model empathy and to help the part-
ners explore and communicate their corresponding roles in the unfolding of
events at the time of the injury as well as before and after the injury hap-
pened. Most important was to promote empathic responsiveness in the in-
jurer to the injured partner's wounds. Empathy is one of the great emotion
regulators in that it soothes the hurt.
After recognizing and empathizing with the partner's woundedness and
pain resulting from the injury, the injurer needed to make an unqualified
apology by taking responsibility for the harm done. In this regard, the injurer's
expression of shame for what was done, in which the action tendency is to
shrink into the ground, was more important than the expression of guilt, in
which the action tendency is to apologize and atone. Expressions of "I'm
sorry" did not help in these situations of betrayal and eventually promoted
frustration in the apologizer. Those partners who expressed shame at what
they had done evoked compassion from their partners. These were the begin-
ning steps toward establishing trust and forgiveness. Whereas shame is usu-
PROMOT/NG EMOTIONAL EXPRESS/ON 243

ally viewed as a self-destructive, problematic emotion that one wants to change
in therapy, in this context it was an adaptive expression that had a positive
impact on the injured partner. When injured partners saw that betrayers
truly felt remorseful and that the betrayers judged themselves to have failed
some standard fundamental to their identities, they were more likely to trust
that the betrayers would not repeat the injury.
The therapist needed to promote the expression of remorse and regret
but be careful not to shame the betrayer. The injurer needed to feel shame
but not be shamed. The therapist also needed to put the injury in the context
of the negative cycle that had preceded it and help identify partners' under-
lying vulnerabilities that were involved in the cycle. It was very important
for the injured partner to acknowledge and own the need for a protective
wall; both the injuring partner and therapist needed to respect the other
partner's need for it. The therapist could help the betrayer to ask for, but not
demand, forgiveness. Finally both partners took responsibility for their own
part in the injury. The injured person then needed to express specifics of
what was needed for him or her to trust again, and the injuring partner needed
to receive these requests without blame.
A handful of studies have investigated the change process in EFCT.
One study (Johnson &. Greenberg, 1987) compared best sessions for three
couples with those of three couples who did not show significant improve-
ment. Videotapes of best sessions (chosen by the couples) were indepen-
dently rated on the Experiencing scale (Klein, Mathieu, Gendlin, & Kiesler,
1969) and for affiliative and autonomous responses using the Structural Analy-
sis of Social Behavior (Benjamin, 1974). In addition, "softenings" were iden-
tified, defined as moments when a previously critical partner expresses vul-
nerability and asks for comfort and connection from his or her partner. The
high-change couples showed significantly higher levels of experiencing in
best sessions. The blaming partner was also more likely to move to a more
affiliative, less coercive position toward the other partner in this session. On
average, five softening change events were found in the sessions of the suc-
cessful couples, and none were found in the sessions of the low-change couples.
A second study (Alden, 1989) compared peak session events to poor
session events in 16 cases of EFCT. Results revealed that in peak session
events, 84% of the statements were affiliative, as opposed to 65% in the poor
session events. Also, peak session events revealed a greater proportion of
self-focused (rather than other-focused) positive statements. Results suggested
that a greater self-focus that involved turning inward to experience one's
responses to situations and acceptance of the other rather than focusing and
blaming the other was important in resolving conflict.
Another study of 16 couples demonstrated that therapist-facilitated
intimate, emotionally laden self-disclosure was more likely to lead to affiliative
statements by the partner than randomly selected responses. That is, reveal-
ing underlying experience in an intimate manner led to a change in interac-

tion (Greenberg, Ford, Alden, & Johnson, 1993). Finally, a recent task analysis
of four EFCT sessions by Bradley and Furrow (2004) found that emotional
experiencing and the disclosure of attachment-related affect and fears were
the key client features of successful softening events; moreover, consistent
with proposed mechanisms of change in EFCT, specific therapist interven-
tions linked to softening events involved intensifying a couple's emotional
experience and promoting intrapsychic awareness and interpersonal shifts in
attachment-related interactions.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH ON

EMOTION-FOCUSED COUPLES THERAPY
Further research needs to be conducted to understand the process of

therapeutic change by examining the effect of EFCT on specific client emo-
tional processes such as overcoming anger and the process of forgiving. In
the forgiveness study described earlier, it appears that dealing with anger and
sadness rather than avoiding it is important as an early step in approaching
forgiveness. In addition, it appears that revealing shame by the wrongdoer is
far more convincing to the spouse than is apology or guilt (Greenberg, Warwar,
& Malcolm, 2003). The effect of dealing with underlying shame and power-
lessness in dominance processes and in certain subgroups of violent men also
needs to be studied.
Cross-disciplinary collaboration with developmental and clinical psy-
chology and family process research would benefit EFCT in a number of ways.
For example, research on the suitability of this treatment for different at-
tachment styles would benefit from collaboration with those who have ex-
pertise in measuring attachment styles. Further research demonstrating the
importance of attachment bonds in promoting resilience in the face of stress
and flexibility in information processing (Mikulincer, Florian, & Weller,
1993) would lend additional support to the EFCT process. Family process
researchers can provide a focus on the effects of emotional disconnection in
families. For example, a recent study (Liddle et al., 2000) revealed the nega-
tive impacts of emotional disconnection in families and the potential for
change when fears about rejection and abandonment are shared.
Additional research should be conducted to examine the effects of EFCT
in engendering conflict resolution that is less damaging to children. For ex-
ample, Gottman and colleagues (Gottman, 1997) hypothesized that the op-
timal approach to parenting involves a positive emotion-coaching philoso-
phy. Such emotion coaching has been related to a number of positive child
outcomes including the ability to self-soothe, academic achievement, and
physical health (Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1997). Further research should
link couples' styles of emotional relating developed through the EFCT pro-
cess to parental emotional coaching styles.

It is clear that further research needs to be done to test the effects of
EFCT with different forms of relational distress and their concomitant prob-
lems, to understand the role of individual differences in resolving emotional
problems, and to delineate the specific aspects of EFCT that are effective and
that prevent relapse. Perhaps most important, future research needs to be
directed toward a further delineation of the specific individual and interper-
sonal processes that lead to emotional change as a result of EFCT.
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701-706.

12
INTERVENING WITH COUPLES AND
FAMILIES TO TREAT EMOTION
DYSREGULATION AND
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY
ALAN E. FRUZZETTI AND KATHERINE M. IVERSON
Couple and family interactions affect individual well-being and psy-

chopathology in a variety of ways. For example, couple and family interac-
tions influence (a) the etiology of individual distress and psychopathology,
(b) the maintenance of distress and disorder, (c) the treatment outcomes,
(d) relapse versus maintenance of treatment gains, and (e) the naturalistic
course of wellness or disorder (cf. Fruzzetti, 1996; Fruzzetti & Iverson, 2004b;
Snyder & Whisman, 2004). In addition, individual disordered behaviors (e.g.,
depression, substance abuse, suicidality, borderline personality disorder) have
been demonstrated to have a deleterious effect on the quality of relationship
functioning, both in couples and in parent-child relationships.
However, the mechanisms through which family processes affect indi-
vidual psychopathology, and through which individual psychopathology af-
fects relationship functioning, have not been clearly established. Whisman
(2001) has highlighted the importance of research aimed at understanding
the specific factors that mediate the relation between psychopathology and
249
relationship dysfunction. In this chapter we maintain that accurate disclo-
sure of private experiences (e.g., emotions, wants, thoughts), along with vali-
dating and invalidating responses to those disclosures, mediates the relation
between individual emotion regulation (and psychopathology) and relation-
ship distress and dysfunction.
To date, research has focused less on identifying the specific family in-
teractions that mediate the relation between individual and couple or family
dysfunction, and more on the role of common relationship events or generic
processes. For example, research shows that physical abuse, aggression, or
domestic violence; poor communication; poor problem solving; nonegalitarian
relationship functioning; low warmth; negative affect; and other relation-
ship processes and events have significant deleterious effects on individual
functioning. However, few studies have tried to explain how these factors
influence individual emotion regulation and well-being. In a similar way,
few attempts have been made to develop unifying models that use tested
mechanisms that explain (rather than simply describe) the relation between
individual disordered behavior and behavior of a partner or family member
with whom the individual transacts. Moreover, given the current Zeitgeist
regarding adult psychopathology in particular, it is almost automatically as-
sumed that one will look at the individual's biology to understand and treat
individual psychopathology. This is evident in the popularity of antidepres-
sants to treat depression and anxiety, despite relatively few advantages in
outcomes compared with placebo (e.g., Kirsch, Moore, Scoboria, & Nicholls,
2002). In the service of improving treatment, it is important for researchers
and clinicians to understand the family and social factors that influence bio-
logical factors both developmentally and cross-sectionally, and how these
processes operate, including the potential impact of reciprocal causality. But
it is also essential to transcend biological and ether linear models of psycho-
pathology and instead evaluate individual problems in their interpersonal or
familial context (Fruzzetti 6k Iverson, 2004b).
Although it addresses many of the same basic questions as other chap-
ters in this volume, the specific purposes of this chapter are (a) to develop a
coherent, scientifically based model that explains how individual emotion
regulation or dysregulation and partner or family member validating and in-
validating responses mediate the relation between individual distress or psy-
chopathology and couple or family dysfunction; and (b) to describe some of
the specific clinical interventions with couples and families that follow logi-
cally from this model.
CONCEPTUAL, THEORETICAL, AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
Although disagreement remains about the essential components of

emotion regulation or dysregulation, there is some emerging convergence
250 FRUZZETTl AND IVERSON

about what is involved. For example, Gross (1998, p. 275) suggested that
emotion regulation includes a variety of specific behaviors and "processes by
which individuals influence which emotions they have, when they have them,
and how they experience and express these emotions." In addition, Thomp-
son (1994) maintained that emotion regulation processes necessarily are in
the service of the individual's larger, long-term goals rather than only in the
service of short-term goals. We agree, and we note that emotion dysregulation
often includes such a high level of experienced aversive emotional arousal
that the individual may engage in problematic behaviors simply to escape
from these short-term unpleasant private experiences (e.g., substance use,
withdrawal, or verbal aggression). Emotion dysregulation occurs when the
individual is not able to accept an emotional experience successfully and
simultaneously is not able to change it effectively (Fruzzetti & Iverson, 2004b;
Fruzzetti, Shenk, Mosco, & Lowry, 2003). Instead, the dysregulated person
engages in behaviors that are problematic either because they exacerbate the
negative arousal in the short term or because they lead to more problems
later on, often interpersonally. For our purposes, emotion dysregulation is
different from simply being upset or having a lot of emotional intensity or
arousal, during which a person can continue to manage his or her situation or
experience in ways that are compatible with both short- and long-term goals.
We will explicate a set of components of emotion regulation and
dysregulation that help to clarify the role of couple and family interactions in
the development of emotion regulation versus dysregulation tendencies and
the development of emotion regulation skills. Although this particular model
of emotion regulation is different in some respects, it is generally compatible
with prominent models of emotion regulation in most ways (e.g., Eisenberg,
Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998; Gross, 1998; Gross et al., chap. 1, this vol-
ume; Linehan, 1993; Plutchik, 1994; Saarni & Crowley, 1990; Southam-
Gerow & Kendall, 2002; Thompson, 1994).
Components of Emotion Dysregulation
The present model for emotion dysregulation includes three major com-
ponents. Although any one component, if sufficiently problematic, could
result in dysregulation, the presence of more than one component signifi-
cantly increases the chance of dysregulation. These components are (a) vul-
nerability to negative emotion, specifically high sensitivity, high reactivity,
and slow return to baseline (cf. Linehan, 1993), which together influence
present-state emotional arousal; (b) deficient emotion-relevant skills or com-
petencies that allow a person to choose situations in which he or she can act
effectively; manage social interactions effectively; be aware of relevant stimuli;
discriminate more relevant from less relevant stimuli; identify, label, toler-
ate, and express private experiences accurately; and manage arousal in ways
that are consistent with long-term goals and values (cf. Fruzzetti et al., 2003);
INTERVENING WITH COUPLES AND FAMILIES 25 j

and (c) problematic responses of others (especially partners and parents) to
expressions of emotion, wants, thoughts, and goals (Fruzzetti & Fruzzetti,
2003; Fruzzetti & Iverson, 2004b; Fruzzetti, Shenk, & Hoffman, 2005). One
can respond to another person's display, expression, or disclosure of an emo-
tion, want or desire, thought, action, or other experience either by validating
or invalidating that experience or behavior. When people acknowledge or
legitimize a person's experience or behavior, they "accept" it as true. Valida-
tion is the communication of this acceptance and understanding, which typi-
cally moderates high emotional arousal. Alternatively, one can ignore, criti-
cize, pathologize, or fail to legitimize a person's actual experience or behavior.
Invalidation occurs when people communicate that they reject or fail to un-
derstand true or legitimate experiences or behaviors, which typically creates
or exacerbates negative emotional arousal.
Next we consider each component in this model of emotion regulation
and dysregulation in more detail.
]. Vulnerability to Negative Emotions

Sensitivity to Relationship Stimuli. Sensitivity refers to an individual's ability
to notice a relevant stimulus and bring it into his or her awareness while not
being overwhelmed with less relevant stimuli. A person is constantly affected
(or not) by available stimuli occurring both in the world "outside" the person
(public events) and events "inside" the person (private events and experi-
ences). These events are happening simultaneously. Each individual's gen-
eral "sensitivity" to stimuli directly contributes to his or her vulnerability to
emotional reactivity and subsequent ability to regulate his or her emotions.
Moderate sensitivity to a broad array of stimuli in one's internal and external
environment contributes to effective self-management processes. Hypersen-
sitive people discriminate emotionally relevant stimuli quickly and exhibit a
low threshold for an emotional reaction (Linehan, 1993); alternatively, hy-
posensitive people may not discriminate very many emotionally relevant
stimuli and have a high threshold for any emotional reaction. Thus, highly
sensitive people may be more vulnerable to becoming emotionally activated.
However, hyposensitive people may be unaware of important events in their
world, sometimes leading to misunderstandings and missed opportunities for
giving and receiving support, problem prevention or problem solving, and
closeness.
Emotional Arousal or Reactivity. Attending to a stimulus usually elicits
some amount of automatic emotional arousal, which typically is considered
reactivity. When individuals react normatively to a stimulus or match the
arousal of others, they are better able to manage their own relationship be-
haviors and ultimately maintain effective communication. Communication
is optimized at moderate levels of arousal. When one has low reactivity, the
response or lack thereof may communicate misunderstanding or a lack of
caring and leave the other person feeling misunderstood or not cared for
252 FRUZZETTI AND IVERSON

(e.g., "he is not taking me seriously") and lead to withdrawal or conflict esca-
lation. However, an emotionally reactive person, although highly supportive
and loving in many situations, may be highly negative in situations of con-
flict or distress.
Slow Return to Baseline. Finally, people with emotion regulation defi-
cits often experience a slower return to emotional baseline once arousal has
been activated (cf. Linehan, 1993). Furthermore, when someone's emotional
reactivity is slower to return to baseline, the impact of hypersensitivity and
hyperreactivity to other relationship events is multiplied. That is, events
that would otherwise elicit a moderate reaction trigger dysregulated responses
when the person's arousal is still high from previous reactions.
The combination of relational sensitivity, reactivity, and slow return to
baseline likely perpetuate the well-known "negative escalation" and "demand
and withdraw" cycles exhibited in distressed couples (Fruzzetti & Jacobson,
1990; Weiss & Heyman, 1990).
2. Deficiencies in Emotion-Relevant Skills

Poor Situation Awareness, Selection, and Management. Some parents and
partners continue blithely to recapitulate problem interactions, perhaps never
learning to discriminate relationally "dangerous" situations or how to nego-
tiate them differently. This task is similar to the strategy of "situation selec-
tion" noted by Gross et al. (chap. 1, this volume) but includes additional,
more relationship-specific skills to manage conflict situations.
Lack of Awareness of Emotion. Skillful behavior involves an awareness
of the fact that one's own emotional arousal is rising. Dysregulated individu-
als are often unaware that their arousal is increasing, especially at lower lev-
els of arousal, and may display labile emotions.
Difficulty Tolerating Primary Emotions. Many dysregulated people "es-
cape" to anger or another emotion to avoid difficult emotions such as disap-
pointment, hurt, guilt, or fear. To label an emotion accurately, a person must
be able to tolerate that emotion until it runs its course and subsides naturally,
or at least tolerate it long enough to use effective change strategies. Primary
emotions are considered the authentic, normative, and accurate emotional
response in a given situation, whereas secondary emotions are considered
learned responses to the primary emotion (cf. Greenberg & Safran, 1989).
Reactivity from secondary emotions, such as anger or defensiveness, usually
functions to exacerbate misunderstanding and arousal and to retard commu-
nication and support. That is, when individuals allow a secondary emotion
to guide their behavior while interacting with another person, they actually
express an inaccurate view of their experience, making understanding and
acceptance by the other person quite difficult. In contrast, when individuals
understand their own emotional reaction ("I'm feeling defensive because my
partner used an accusatory tone"), they are self-validating and will likely be
more able to stop the negative escalation process in the service of relation-
INTERVENING WITH COUPLES AND FAMILIES 253

ship goals. They may also be more able to express their experience accurately
and descriptively rather than blaming the other, increasing the chances of a
validating response from the other person.
Ineffective Attention Control. Because narrow attention to a negatively
arousing stimulus can promote dysregulation, it is more effective either to
place a negative stimulus into a larger context, such that one is responding to
more than just the negative stimulus, or simply to distract oneself from the
arousing stimulus. In contrast, focusing excessively on a negative emotion
per se, rather than titrating attention to the emotion, can further increase
arousal or lead to secondary emotional responses.
Lack of Awareness of the Relation Between the Stimulus and the Emotion.
If a strong negative emotion occurs and one is not able to connect that re-
sponse to a relevant stimulus, one may become more aroused and more likely
to inaccurately attach the emotion to a less relevant but available stimulus.
This may lead to frustrated attempts to problem solve, invalidation from oth-
ers, and further emotion escalation. Instead of reifying thoughts that accom-
pany an emotional reaction, additional mindfulness skills may help one to
realize that thoughts are just thoughts in a context, and that one's reaction
may be different with more information or in a different context (e.g., start-
ing with a lower baseline of arousal).
Inaccurate Labeling of Emotional Responses and Self'Validation. Inaccurate
labels interfere with accurate expression and effective problem solving. It is
easier to become stuck on one emotional response and therefore to engage in
judging self or other, which fuels further and prolonged emotional arousal.
Alternatively, accurate labeling of emotions is itself self-validating, leading
to decreased arousal and reactivity and fewer judgments, thus making it easier
for others to validate (Fruzzetti 6k Iverson, 2004b; Swann, 1997).
Dysfunctional Cognitive Responses. Judgments ("right vs. wrong" or
"should vs. shouldn't") and inaccurate negative attributions are particularly
common and problematic cognitive responses to both emotional stimuli and
to rising emotional reactions. Both judgments and inaccurate negative attribu-
tions exacerbate negative emotional arousal, which in turn makes it easier to
produce more judgments and inaccurate negative attributions. Judgments and
inaccurate negative attributions may be about oneself, the other person, or the
situation. Alternatively, describing emotions and the stimuli that triggered
them is self-validating, helps to reduce negative arousal, and sets the stage for
good communication and problem solving (Fruzzetti & Iverson, 2004b).
Inaccurate Expression. Accurate self-disclosure skills help all individu-
als to state their thoughts and feelings in a precise and accurate manner,
without judgment or hostility. When reactivity is high or a person is feeling
judgmental, it is unlikely that he or she will be able to express feelings in a
manner that the other person is able to receive in a nonjudgmental way. This
often results in heightened vulnerability and increased chances of invalida-
tion by others.

Lack of General Relationship Skills or Motivation to Use Skills. Between
situations of high arousal there are many opportunities for relationship en-
hancement and, conversely, many opportunities to create or exacerbate rela-
tionship malcontent. Building positive and intimate relationship experiences
helps to reduce vulnerability, and practicing the other skills related to emo-
tion regulation under ordinary, low-arousal conditions contributes to improved
skillfulness. Alternatively, avoiding situations that are problematic, or staying
stuck in negative arousal, contributes toward poorer outcomes for the relation-
ship and for the individuals involved. Also, during any interaction, relation-
ship skills will increase the likelihood of understanding and validation and
decrease the chances of invalidation and negative emotion escalation.
3. Problematic Responses of Others

Lack of Acceptance and Validation Skills in the Partner or Family Member.
Invalidating responses communicate that the other's private experiences
(thoughts, feelings, or desires) are not comprehensible, legitimate, or reason-
able, do not make sense, are erroneous, or are otherwise unacceptable. In-
validating responses subtly or overtly challenge the legitimacy of the other
person's thoughts, wants, emotions, beliefs, values, and goals, along with their
disclosure. Because people typically define and value themselves according
to their thoughts, feelings, wants, and behaviors, invalidation functionally
conveys rejection and disregard for the other person's self-repertoire. Fur-
thermore, when a person feels invalidated, arousal goes up and the probabil-
ity of subsequent accurate, vulnerable self-disclosure decreases. In contrast,
there are specific acceptance and validation skills that promote de-escalation
of arousal, attention to the partner or other person, and effective communi-
cation. Skills that are more "accepting" in nature involve acknowledging or
otherwise validating reactions and other behaviors.
Lack of Change or Problem Management Skills in the Partner or Family
Member. There are also many relationship skills that focus on change and
promote de-escalation of arousal, attention to the partner or other person,
and effective communication. More "change-oriented" skills include
proactively targeting behavior for change, staying inclusive and nonblaming
("our problem" vs. "your problem"), defining problems descriptively, actu-
ally solving problems, or simply managing disagreements in ways that are
effective.
Linking Psychopathology and Emotion Dysregulation to

Family Interactions
Problems in emotion regulation always occur in a context, and that

context is likely to be interpersonal (see chap. 1, this volume). Distressed
relationships typically demonstrate both dysfunctional couple or parent-child
processes and individual emotion regulation deficits, at least in the context

of their relationship problems. An individual may be perfectly capable of
effective emotion regulation and communication in some relationships; how-
ever, his or her partner or parent may provide particular stimulus properties
that elicit dysregulated responses. Couple and family therapists experience
the unique challenge of managing each person's emotional reactivity toward
the other, as well as treating each family member's own level of individual
distress (Fruzzetti & Fruzzetti, 2003; Fruzzetti & Iverson, 2004a; Snyder &
Whisman, 2004).
A transactional (reciprocal) model that highlights individual
dysregulation, inaccurate expression, and invalidation provides one set of
links between individual psychopathology and couple or family interactions
(cf. Fruzzetti, Shenk, & Hoffman, 2005). Specifically, this model suggests
that partner and family behaviors that are invalidating may create, maintain,
or exacerbate emotion reactivity and dysregulation and that this heightened
arousal makes inaccurate expression more likely, which in turn makes invali-
dation more likely. Left unchecked, this reciprocal process is self-maintaining
and contributes to increased negative interactions, decreased positive inter-
actions, increased individual distress, and diminished relationship satisfac-
tion. Over time, this pattern may further deteriorate into many of the prob-
lematic behaviors we see in distressed and reactive couples and families. From
an intervention standpoint, targeting an increase in the use of emotion regu-
lation skills, as well as a reduction of invalidating behaviors and increased
validating behaviors, follows logically from this model.
EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS: KNOWN AND UNKNOWN
Despite burgeoning knowledge at the interface of family interaction

and psychopathology, most models of psychopathology are individual mod-
els, and most treatments focus on the individual. It is important to highlight
both what the evidence tells us in support of efforts to build more useful
theories and interventions and what the limitations are in the knowledge
base.
Established Empirical Support: What We Know
The rationale for treating individual distress or psychopathology with

couple and family treatments stems from a substantial amount of research in
which relationship factors have been shown to be relevant to individual psy-
chopathology, and vice versa, in a number of different ways (e.g., Snyder &
Whisman, 2004). For example, people with affective disorders, anxiety dis-
orders, substance abuse problems, and co-occurring disorders are more likely
to report relationship dissatisfaction (Goering, Lin, Campbell, Boyle, &
Offord, 1996; Whisman, 1999; Whisman & Uebelacker, 2003). Furthermore,

couple and family treatments have been shown to be very effective in treat-
ing many forms of both psychological and medical disorders (Campbell, 2003;
Gupta, Coyne, & Beach, 2003; Kelly & Fals-Stewart, 2002; Snyder &
Whisman, 2004).
Although the specific mechanisms responsible for the relation between
individual emotion dysregulation or psychopathology and family interactions
are still unclear, there are many studies that demonstrate the effects of family
responses on emotional arousal. For example, Swann (1997) has shown that
social failure to "verify" or validate individual experiences (including cogni-
tive "self-constructs") leads to affective arousal and dysregulation in general.
Recent work in our lab has found similar effects when evaluating the imme-
diate impact of increasing validating and decreasing invalidating responses
by male partners: Female partners reported decreased negative affect and in-
creased positive affect, and demonstrated increased self-disclosure (Sayrs &.
Fruzzetti, 2005). In a sample of severely and chronically distressed individu-
als, validating partner responses at Time 1 predicted stability or improve-
ment (vs. relapse or deterioration) at Time 2, 3 months later (Thorp &
Fruzzetti, 2005).
We have also found evidence that validating and invalidating partner
behaviors mediate individual distress and relationship satisfaction. In a sample
of 22 couples participating in a six-session couples group focusing on decreas-
ing invalidating and increasing validating responses, increased validating or
decreased invalidating responses pre- to posttreatment predicted decreased
levels of individual and relationship distress posttreatment in a moderately
distressed sample (Fruzzetti & Mosco, 2005).
In addition, treatments specifically targeting emotion regulation, such
as dialectical behavior therapy (DBT; Fruzzetti, 2002; Linehan, 1993), have
demonstrated consistently positive outcomes with adolescents and adults who
are severely distressed, self-injurious, or suicidal or have been diagnosed with
substance abuse or eating disorders (e.g., Linehan, Armstrong, Suarez, Allmon,
& Heard, 1991; Rathus & Miller, 2002; Verheul et al., 2003). DBT is a
cognitive-behavioral approach originally developed to treat the severe emo-
tion dysregulation of borderline personality disorder (BPD; Linehan, 1993).
The biosocial or transactional theory underlying DBT (Fruzzetti et al., 2005;
Linehan, 1993) suggests that BPD is a disorder of emotion dysregulation that
results from, emotionally vulnerable individuals transacting with an invali-
dating social and family environment. DBT includes multiple components
to help clients learn the developmental tasks related to emotion regulation
(Linehan, 1993; Miller, Wyman, Huppert, Glassman, & Rathus, 2000):
(a) mindfulness (to facilitate attention control, decrease cognitive
dysregulation, and increase self-awareness and self-management); (b) inter-
personal effectiveness (to help reduce chaos and invalidation in one's social
environment); (c) emotion regulation (to reduce emotional vulnerability,
reactivity, and misery and to facilitate emotion modulation); and (d) distress

tolerance (to interrupt negative emotion escalation, endure difficult situa-
tions without engaging in dysfunctional behavior, and to "accept" things in
life that are unchangeable).
Lacking Empirical Support: What We Do Not Know
It is clear that there are many things about emotion regulation and its
relation to social and family interaction that we do not know. Perhaps most
important, psychologists lack agreed-on parameters defining emotion regu-
lation and dysregulation, as well as reliable and valid measurement tools to
unify research in this area. Although some aspects or specific components of
emotion regulation are beginning to be measured well (e.g., chap. 2, this
volume), to date there is no reliable and valid omnibus measure of emotion
regulation, nor agreement about what components are crucial and how to
measure them.
In addition, although there is some evidence that validating and in-
validating responses affect emotional responses in both community and clini-
cal samples, and that validating responses predict better outcomes in clinical
samples, we do not know whether (a) validating responses have a salutary
effect (immediate or long term) for persons with many forms of psychopa-
thology or are only important for specific disorders (e.g., depression, border-
line personality disorders); (b) the lack of validating responses or presence of
invalidating responses is important in the development of emotion
dysregulation problems; or (c) altering invalidating processes is compara-
tively more useful in helping to regulate others' emotions than targeting other
family processes for improvement (e.g., expression of positive affect, or con-
structive problem solving).
Furthermore, we do not have enough basic science that describes the
psychophysiological mechanisms mediating the relation between validating
responses and diminished emotional arousal or explains how emotion
dysregulation per se is related to simple emotional arousal. Nor do we know
the long-term impact of validating versus invalidating processes. For example,
the relation may be linear (more validating responses are always better for
emotion regulation) or curvilinear (too much validation leads to reliance on
external regulation; too little leaves the individual both without self-regula-
tion skills and in a stressful family environment). Of course, there are myriad
other unknowns, but these in particular are central to understanding whether
and how family interventions can help reregulate family members who are
chronically dysregulated emotionally.
Dialectical behavior therapy with couples and families (Fruzzetti &
Fruzzetti, 2003; Fruzzetti & Iverson, 2004a; Fruzzetti et al, 2005) is a treat-

ment approach that directly targets reduction of emotion dysregulation in
the context of couple and familial distress in an effort to reduce both indi-
vidual and family distress. That is, individual emotion management skills are
used to facilitate healthier couple and family interactions, and partner and
parent skills are used in family interactions to facilitate individual emotion
regulation. Engaging individuals and families on both sides of this reciprocal
transaction fosters improvements in both individual well-being and relation-
ship quality.
One relevant set of skills has been adapted for couples and families
from the original DBT treatment for borderline personality disorder (Linehan,
1993). These skills are designed to reduce emotional dysregulation that con-
tributes to both individual and relationship distress and interpersonal con-
flict, and also interferes with closeness with others. The second set of skills
includes relationship skills to decrease couple and family distress and en-
hance intimacy between partners (e.g., Fruzzetti & Fruzzetti, 2003; Hoffman
& Fruzzetti, 2005). There is a specific emphasis on skill acquisition to allow
each partner to manage his or her own relationship behaviors while also
managing the relationship. These intervention strategies are designed to fol-
low a hierarchy of intervention targets, to balance acceptance skills with
change skills, and to occur in a context of ongoing functional assessment.
Moreover, once the basic skills are learned, they are used to solve long-standing
problems in couple and family interaction. For purposes of this chapter, we
highlight specific individual and relationship skills vis-a-vis emotion regula-
tion. Other strategies and treatment procedures may be found in Fruzzetti
and Fruzzetti (2003).
Mindfulness
Mindfulness skills are essential to effective emotion regulation and family

interactions. These skills, which facilitate awareness, acceptance, and full
participation in the present moment, are adapted largely from Linehan's
(1993) work. Specifically, individual mindfulness skills increase self-awareness,
including emotional awareness and experiencing, awareness of long-term
goals, and self-management skills. During mindfulness training, partners learn
both what to do when trying to be mindful and how to engage in these be-
haviors in the service of their individual and relationship goals. Mindfulness
training functions in part as discrimination training for internal and external
events that may affect both sensitivity and reactivity. By learning to observe
both internal and external stimuli and then to describe these stimuli, a per-
son may either increase or decrease sensitivity. Furthermore, attention to
problematic or arousing stimuli may be titrated, which may decrease reactiv-
ity. Moreover, mindful description reduces inaccurate attributions and judg-
ments that exacerbate sensitivity and reactivity. Partners and family mem'
bers learn how to become aware of sensory experiences through noticing or

observing and then how to describe them without judgment. For example,
one person may practice describing another person's clothing, facial expres-
sion, or posture in a descriptive and nonjudgmental manner. Family mem-
bers then learn how to discriminate thoughts from feelings, with an emphasis
placed on accurately labeling emotions.
Learning how to engage in an interaction without judgments, or how to
let go of judgments quickly, is an essential part of how to engage mindfully.
Family members are encouraged to recognize judgments and let go of evalu-
ations such as good or bad, right or wrong, and should or shouldn't. The
therapist first blocks and points out the ineffectiveness of such judgments
and models truly descriptive language. Meanwhile, family members are en-
couraged to put their energy into one thing at a time, keeping in mind both
short-term and longer-term goals. Clients learn how to discriminate thoughts
and feelings and sort through this difficult process: "What am I trying to do
right now? What is my true goal? And how am I going to achieve my goal?"
By focusing on observation and description as opposed to quickly reacting
and judging, parents or partners reduce sensitivity, negative reactivity, and
conflict escalation and may also enjoy time together more by noticing things
other than what the other person is doing wrong. Being able to enjoy being
together facilitates a kind of "relationship activation," which allows reactiv-
ity to abate further among all participants (Fruzzetti & Fruzzetti, 2003).
It is important to note that engaging in an interaction mindfully does
not mean giving up emotional reactions. Quite the contrary, mindful en-
gagement means noticing and titrating current reactions in the service of
longer-term goals and includes experiencing emotion and self-validation. For
example, engaging mindfully includes awareness of such thoughts as "This is
the person I love," which puts problematic behavior in a meaningful and
constructive context. Using mindfulness skills, partners can share feelings
and thoughts, including negative ones, rather than letting them build up by
attempting to avoid conflict. Mindfulness sets the stage for emotion manage-
ment and accurate expression (discussed in the following section) because
the ability to accept one's own experiences is required before one can under-
stand and accept another person's feelings or behaviors.
Identifying and Labeling Emotions Accurately
Mindfulness of one's private experiences is essential for the develop-

ment of effective emotion regulation skills. To regulate emotions, partners
must learn how to identify and accurately label their actual emotions. First,
for them to manage their emotions effectively, they must learn to recognize
when emotional arousal and reactivity are increasing. Then, they can learn
to identify the proximal stimulus, antecedents, or "triggers" for an emotional
reaction. Emotions may be triggered by an event (e.g., partner or adolescent
child came home from work late), by an interpretation of an event ("She

came home late because she does not care about me"), or thoughts ("I'm a
bad partner or parent"), memories, or other private events. Reactions may
also be influenced by high vulnerability or high baseline arousal. This height-
ened arousal baseline might be the result of nonrelationship factors (e.g.,
tough day at work, a lot of traffic) or may be related to the relationship (e.g.,
unresolved conflict or recent quick negative escalation in a similar situa-
tion). It is important that parents and partners learn to notice thoughts and
interpretations about an event and remember that interpretations are not
facts. Furthermore, it may be useful to point out when negative, and espe-
cially inaccurate or unbalanced, attributions or interpretations bias interac-
tions and encourage description instead. Depending on the situation, em-
phasis may be placed on identifying bodily responses that accompany different
emotional reactions to help identify the accurate emotions, or on taking a
"third-party" observing perspective. This skill can be enhanced by videotap-
ing problematic conversations and reviewing them in a different context
(Fruzzetti & Fruzzetti, 2003).
Identifying and Managing Action Urges
It is also important for each partner to identify his and her own prob-
lematic action urges when identifying emotions and to tolerate those urges
while engaging in more skillful alternatives. Do certain situations and emo-
tions elicit urges to engage in ineffective strategies: that is, to attack, de-
mand, withdraw, or hide from the other? Often, specific action urges are a
learned response to specific difficult emotions. For example, a person may
have learned to demand attention when feeling sad or to avoid contact with
his or her partner when feeling ashamed. In other words, both partners have
likely learned behaviors that further reinforce emotional distress. Partners
must therefore learn to be aware of interpretations, triggers, and behaviors
associated with emotions to accurately identify and label emotions. Slowing
down and becoming aware of the costs (e.g., further corrosion of the rela-
tionship, exacerbated sensitivity and reactivity), as well as the benefits (e.g.,
immediate relief or escape from a challenging and painful situation), may
facilitate effective alternatives (e.g., accurate expression, validation).
Sorting Out Primary and Secondary Emotional Responses
It is important for clients to learn to discriminate between primary and

secondary emotional responses, and to pay attention to and soothe their pri-
mary emotions while ignoring or letting go of secondary reactions. For ex-
ample, if individuals get stuck on a secondary emotion, they are both ac-
tively invalidating their own primary emotions (e.g., attending to anger while
failing to validate fear, hurt, or love) and making it difficult for a partner or
family member to identify and validate their primary emotion. This requires

considerable practice and skill at description through mindfulness. Part-
ners typically respond to secondary emotions with defensiveness and esca-
lation, whereas they are more likely to respond to primary emotions with
validation (Fruzzetti et al., 2003). Of course, becoming aware of primary
emotions and processing them in a healthy way requires the ability to toler-
ate painful emotions.
Tolerating Painful Emotions: Balance and Self-Validation
To experience and accurately label an emotion, a person must be able

to tolerate the emotion until it naturally dissipates or until he or she can use
effective change strategies. There are a number of strategies and skills that
may facilitate this. First, being able to titrate attention away from the stimu-
lus for the emotion and away from the emotion itself is essential. Extended
focus on the negative stimulus (e.g., "she's late again . . . she's late again . . .
she's late again. . . .") increases arousal without any benefit. Conversely, dis-
tracting attention away from the negative stimulus and the emotion provides
more balance and more opportunity to identify the primary emotion, an ac-
tion that in turn is self-validating and paradoxically enhances tolerance (e.g.,
"she's late . . . I'll work on starting dinner . . . this looks good"; arousal starts
to diminish, which then allows "I'm worried" or "I don't think she knows
how much I worry—we'll have to talk about her letting me know when she's
going to be late").
It may also be useful to counterbalance experiencing a negative emo-
tion with stimuli that elicit different, more positive, emotional experiences.
For example, reading a love note or looking at a picture from a recent holiday
might "recontextualize" a problem by reminding one partner that the other
loves him or her in an experiential way. This might make current frustration
or disappointment easier to tolerate without jumping to a secondary emo-
tional response (e.g., anger), which would elicit judgments and likely lead to
negative escalation.
It is also important to learn how to validate one's own emotions,
thoughts, desires, and goals directly. People who are emotionally dysregulated
tend to invalidate their own emotions, which leads to increased reactivity
and dysregulation (Fruzzetti et al., 2003). Although accurately labeling emo-
tions is self-validating by explicitly acknowledging the emotional response,
legitimizing that experience may be even more validating, and consequently
more soothing. For example, if individuals are able to recognize that they are
feeling sad, as well as to understand the triggers, they may be able to self-
soothe in some way. By recognizing their triggers, they are implicitly saying:
"I feel sad, I am willing to experience this emotion and it makes sense that I
feel this way." However, if they were to identify the sadness but tell them-
selves either overtly or covertly, "I should not be sad, I have nothing to feel
sad about, I need to just get over it," then they would be self-invalidating and
262 FRUZZET77 AND /VERSON

therefore punishing their primary emotional response, making self-soothing
and validation from others less likely. Dysregulated people often criticize and
pathologize their own experiences (e.g., "I'm stupid" or "I'm wrong" or "I
shouldn't feel or want that"), so this kind of self-invalidation is not only
painful itself but is compounded by making invalidation from others more
likely.
Self-invalidation makes it more difficult to stay with the primary emo-
tion. If the partner previously discussed began to say, "She should be home"
rather than "I miss her; I wish she were home," anger would become more
likely, and this would invalidate his disappointment and sadness, resulting in
increased negative arousal. One important function of mindfulness is for part-
ners and other loved ones to accept and experience their own emotions,
which enables them to reduce arousal and keep attention partially focused
on the other person as well, facilitating communication and understanding
as the transaction continues.
Relationship Mindfulness
Like individual mindfulness skills, relationship mindfulness skills pro-

mote awareness and understanding, but in this case the focus is on the part-
ner or family member and the larger relationship goals. Of course, to practice
mindfulness of one's partner or family member, one must integrate mindful-
ness of one's own experience with mindfulness of the other and the larger
relationship context.
Once family members have learned to manage their own emotional
arousal or reactivity in difficult interactions, it is possible to participate in
the relationship mindfully, which includes both listening mindfully and speak-
ing mindfully. Mindfulness and relationship mindfulness decrease reactivity,
negative escalation, criticality, and invalidating responses. Mindfulness of
the other person sets the stage for understanding and is the most basic type of
validation, involving attention, active listening, and noticing without judg-
ments. In general, mindfulness of a partner, child, or other family member
involves noticing the other's behavior (e.g., facial expressions, reactivity,
verbal descriptions), describing his or her behavior, describing the connec-
tion between his or her behavior and one's own reactions, listening, and
participating in the transaction.
Accurate Expression
Accurate expression and self-disclosure have two key components: ac-

curately discriminating among one's thoughts, feelings, and goals privately
and then accurately expressing these private events to one's partner or family
member. Mindfulness is used to help parents and partners become aware of
their own private emotions, wants, or thoughts. Accurate expression involves

using mindfulness, discerning one's own goal in a particular situation, and
expressing emotions, desires, and so on in a nonjudgmental and descriptive
manner. Goals may include (a) sorting out one's feelings, (b) communicat-
ing a desire or opinion, (c) changing the other person's behavior, (d) sup-
porting the other person, and (e) repairing a situation or misstep. Depending
on the goal, different types of expression would be required. Thus, emotion
regulation is enhanced by high awareness of one's own wants, goals, opin-
ions, and emotions and an ability to convey these descriptively without judg-
ment. Accurate self-expression necessarily is easier to hear because it is de-
scriptive rather than accusatory or blaming, requesting rather than demanding,
and communicates openness to understanding rather than rigidity or self-
righteousness. This not only helps keep the person in the expressing or de-
scribing role more regulated, it helps keep the other person more regulated
and makes validation much more likely; by contrast, blame, demands, and
self-righteousness are likely to trigger escalation in the other person.
Validation Skills
Validation is important because it communicates understanding and

acceptance (Fruzzetti & Iverson, 2004b). Thus, validation can transform
potential aversive conflict into understanding in the present and help to
reduce sensitivity and reactivity in the future. Although it may be unusual to
consider the response of others as central to one's own emotion regulation or
dysregulation, social or interactional situations provide the most common
context for emotion regulation and dysregulation.
Validation skills include learning how to find what parts of the other
person's expression are valid, figuring out the ways in which they are valid,
and then communicating understanding of those valid parts. Partner valida-
tion functions to decrease negative emotional arousal and increase positive
emotional arousal (Fruzzetti &Mosco, 2005; Swann, 1997). When someone's
negative emotion is escalating, a partner or parent can use validation skills to
help bring arousal back down to help the other stay regulated or to reregulate.
Any public or private behavior of another person can be legitimized, under-
stood, or acknowledged in some way. Partners and family members can learn
to validate emotions, thoughts, behaviors, wants, beliefs, opinions, and val-
ues. There are at least eight different ways to validate: (a) mindful listening;
(b) reflecting and acknowledging the other's experience; (c) clarifying and
summarizing the other's experience; (d) putting problem behavior in a larger,
more balanced context; (e) normalizing emotional reactions and experiences;
(f) expressing equality and respect, treating the other as an equal; (g) recip-
rocating or matching vulnerability; and (h) responding with effective and
compassionate action (Fruzzetti & Iverson, 2004a). Any of these behaviors is
likely to have a salutary effect on the other person's emotional arousal and
regulation and consequently on the relationship.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN RESEARCH
The research agenda regarding couple and family interventions for

emotion dysregulation is large and should include the following, which are
germane to the model presented in this chapter in particular, but also to the
understanding of emotion regulation more generally: (a) evaluate couple and
family treatment effects of validation for specific populations (e.g., depres-
sion, substance abuse) to determine whether emotion regulation patterns
vary by individual diagnosis or by dysfunctional couple or family processes,
whether mechanisms vary across combinations of individual and family dis-
tress; and whether targeting validation is more useful than other interven-
tions; (b) develop agreed-on measures of emotion regulation and dysregulation
(at least at a component level); (c) evaluate the psychophysiological impact
of validating and invalidating responses naturalistically and longitudinally,
testing for links to emotional arousal and dysregulation; (d) evaluate further
the specificity of self-disclosure and validating response reciprocity across
disorders and in heterogeneous distressed families; and (e) evaluate the role
of validating and invalidating responses in the development of emotion
dysregulation and psychopathology longitudinally.
By integrating our understanding of at least some versions of psychopa-
thology into their social and family context, psychologists contextualize dis-
orders and make them more amenable to broad intervention approaches. If
we better understand the relations among emotion regulation, psychopathol-
ogy, and family interactions, we can engage in primary and secondary pre-
vention efforts and develop more effective treatments. Further research will
be necessary to evaluate hypotheses regarding the specific mechanisms by
which family processes influence individual and relationship dysfunction or
well-being. However, an emerging body of evidence already demonstrates
clearly the importance of couple and family interactions in individual emo-
tion regulation and dysregulation.
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WHO TOOK MY HOT SAUCE?
13
REGULATING EMOTION IN THE
CONTEXT OF FAMILY ROUTINES
AND RITUALS
BARBARA H. FIESE
By their very nature, families are emotional systems. The family, as a

group, is charged with calibrating emotional expression such that family norms
are established, and what is acceptable in one family may be undesired in
another. When children venture out from their homes, they are often sur-
prised by how emotions are regulated differently in their friends' homes. State-
ments like "But John's mom lets him make animal sounds at the dinner table"
reflect how expectations for affective expressions are part and parcel of re-
peated family interactions. Many of the chapters in this book highlight the
ways in which emotion is regulated in a social context. Whether between
parents and children (chap. 6, this volume), in response to marital conflict
(chap. 8, this volume), or in social moments of everyday life (chap. 1, this
volume), emotion is cast as affecting and being affected by the interpersonal
state of affairs.
Preparation of this chapter was supported, in part, by a grant from the National Institute of Mental
Health, 2R01MH051771.
269
The focus of this chapter is on whole-family processes that promote
emotion regulation across members as well as regulation processes that pro-
mote family process. Rather than consider how particular emotions are regu-
lated in the family context or how the family may socialize emotional expres-
sion (Kennedy-Moore & Watson, 1999), this chapter addresses how families,
in their organized collective behaviors, create emotional connections through
their repetitive routines and rituals. Following the outline of the other chap-
ters in this volume, this chapter examines the theoretical and methodologi-
cal issues associated with the study of family routines and rituals. Then, fol-
lowing a brief overview of current empirical knowledge, I address the clinical
implications of this work, with specific guidelines for clinicians and educa-
tors. I conclude with implications for public policy and attention to bolster-
ing family strengths and emotion regulation in challenging societal times.
Throughout the chapter, I use mealtimes as the context for portrayals of
family emotion regulation.
A nagging problem in family research is how to capture group process
as a whole. Certainly, the roots of family studies are based on the assumption
that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Something happens when
family members come together as a group that is not necessarily predicted by
features of any one individual. This belief is widely held by clinicians, yet
difficult to view with a scientific lens. The bulk of what we know about indi-
vidual outcomes arises from direct observations of dyadic interactions and
individuals' self-reports. Indeed, the chapters in this volume represent the
cutting edge of research documenting how attachment and parent-child in-
teraction patterns foster competence (Eisenberg et al., 2003; Mikulincer,
Shaver, & Pereg, 2003; Parke et al., 2002). The work of Cummings and col-
leagues adds to this discussion through their documentation of how the mari-
tal dyad may affect parent—child relationships and child affect regulation
(Cummings, Davies, & Campbell, 2000). How might a consideration of the
family as a group contribute to an understanding of emotion regulation in
families? Typically we consider emotions as residing within the individual
and their regulation as subject to how one individual interacts with another—
such as parent to child, peer to peer, and husband to wife. The framework
proposed in this chapter focuses on repetitive group interactions and inter-
pretations of these events that form a family identity. Unique family identi-
ties may, in turn, be one of the factors that calibrate how emotion is regu-
lated in this social context. Thus, the first problem to be addressed is how to
ascertain whole-family process. Family routines and rituals afford such an
examination.
From the outset, it is important to recognize that family routines and
rituals are not necessarily the best or most parsimonious way to access family
emotion regulation. What I am proposing is that family routines and rituals
make sense to families, they afford the possibility of examining both how
families act and what they believe, and they may be used systematically in
270 BARBARA H. F/ESE

therapeutic interventions. In this regard, the practice of family routines and
the meaning ascribed to family rituals provide access to how the family is
organized as a group and how group and individual processes transact with
each other (Sameroff & Fiese, 2000).

The study of family routines such as mealtime and the beliefs associated
with family traditions such as religious observances may seem out of sync
with the postmodern family. Putnam (2000) presented evidence taken from
national polls conducted from the late 1970s to the late 1990s that suggests
families spend fewer mealtimes together, attend fewer religious services to-
gether, and spend less time "just sitting and talking" together in the late
1990s than they did in the 1970s. Whereas these statistics are often used as
evidence of the demise of the American family (Popenoe, 1993), they do not
tell the whole story of family life. It may be accurate that families spend less
time overall together as group. However, recent polls suggest that families
with children under age 18 eat dinner together always or frequently (77% of
the time; Wolcott, 2001). These polled estimates are consistent with direct
observations of families in their homes (Fiering & Lewis, 1987; Landesman,
Jaccard, & Gunderson, 1991; Martini, 1996). These gatherings are not nec-
essarily elaborate, as most rneals last between 18 and 20 minutes. Thus, if a
family gathers at the table four times a week they are spending time together
that is roughly equivalent to one 90-minute television show.
In a recent epidemiological study of over 4,000 adolescents, frequency
of family mealtimes was found to be associated with a host of adolescent
health outcomes (Eisenberg, Olson, Neumark-Sztainer, Story, & Bearinger,
2004). Approximately 65% of the respondents reported that their family ate
together three or more times per week. Greater frequency of family meals
was associated with less cigarette, alcohol, and marijuana use and fewer de-
pressive symptoms. Thus, the empirical data are contrary to popularly per-
ceived notions that families do not spend time together and that the family
meal is a tradition of the past.
Defining Family Routines and Rituals
The majority of researchers active in the study of family routines and

rituals agree that operationally defining routines and rituals is a challenge, at
best (Boyce, Jensen, James, & Peacock, 1983; van der Hart, 1983; Wolin &
Bennett, 1984). There are several sources for this challenge. First, it is likely
that every family and every family member has an individual definition of
what constitutes a routine or ritual. Indeed, it is this personalized and indi-
FAMILY ROUTINES AND RITUALS 271

vidualized aspect of family organization that may provide special meaning to
group activities and gatherings. Second, rituals are highly symbolic in na-
ture. They are dense with physical, patterned, and affective symbols. Thus,
they are not always detectable by the outsider and often only recognized by
those inside the family. Take, for example, a family who participated in one
of our studies. The family was videotaped during a mealtime and subsequently
interviewed while watching the videotape of their gathering. The family was
instructed to stop the videotape whenever they noted something fairly typi-
cal or something out of the ordinary. One family held a rather lengthy dis-
cussion about peanut butter and jelly sandwiches. The conversation revolved
around who liked jelly on the sandwich and who did not. To the researcher
interviewing the family, this appeared to be a very tedious exchange. How-
ever, the father stopped the tape and remarked that they had this conversa-
tion several times a week. As it turned out, having jelly (or not) on one's
sandwich was not just an indication of food preference but identified person-
ality types and relationships within and outside the family. The father and
older daughter preferred jelly on their sandwich, whereas the mother and
younger daughter did not. The "jellied pair" were known as the cutups in the
family and could be relied on to tell a good joke. The other pair, however,
were the organizers in the family and could be counted on to get things done.
Not only had the family catalogued preferences within the family, they could
also identify neighborhood members by their jelly preferences. This example
serves to illustrate how even relatively mundane comments may hold signifi-
cant meaning when repeated over time in routine settings.
Family rituals involve not only the directly observable practices but
also the personal, subjective, and interior held meanings associated with the
routine events. Rather than consider these two dimensions incompatible with
each other, it is possible to distinguish between the routines of daily living
and rituals in family life.
Routines and rituals can be contrasted along the dimensions of com-
munication, commitment, and continuity (Fiese et al, 2002). Routines typi-
cally involve instrumental communication such that information is conveyed
that this is "what needs to be done." The language of routines is direct, im-
plies action, and often includes designation of roles. Routines involve mo-
mentary time commitment. Once the act is completed, there is little after-
thought and daily life flows on uninterrupted. Routines are repeated over
time, with little alteration, and can be directly observed by outsiders.
Rituals, however, involve symbolic communication and signify that this
is "who we are as a group." The language of rituals is multilayered such that
what may appear to the outsider as a mundane phrase may be dense with
meaning for family members, as in the case of the peanut butter and jelly
family. The affective commitment to rituals provides feelings of belongingness
and felt Tightness to the activity. When routines are disrupted, it is a hassle.
Someone forgets to stop at the grocery store after work, so there is no milk for
272 BARBARA H. FIESE

TABLE 13.1
Definitions of Routines and Rituals
Characteristic Routines of daily living Rituals in family life
Communication Instrumental Symbolic
"This is what needs to be "This is who we are."
done."
Commitment Perfunctory and Enduring and affective
momentary "This is right." The
Little conscious thought experience may be
given after the act. repeated in memory.
Continuity Directly observable and Meaning extends across
detectable by outsiders generations and is
Behavior is repeated over interpreted by insiders
time. "This is what we look
forward to and who we
will continue to be
across generations."
Note. Reprinted from "A Review of 50 Years of Research in Naturally Occurring Family Routines and
Rituals: Cause for Celebration?," by B. H. Fiese, T. Tomcho, M. Douglas, K. Josephs, S. Poltrock, and T.
Baker, 2002, Journal of Family Psychology, 76, p. 382. Copyright 2002 by the American Psychological
Association.
breakfast cereal. When rituals are disrupted, there is a threat to group cohe-
sion. Failure to attend an important family event such as a wedding often
indicates a shift in family alliances and definitions of who is in or out of the
family. The distinguishing features of routines and rituals are presented in
Table 13.1.
Conceptual Challenges
In many ways, there is nothing new about considering directly observ-
able behavior and beliefs as central elements in understanding child devel-
opment and adjustment. Whether referred to as family style and worldview
(Minuchin, 1988), parenting practices and styles (Darling & Steinberg, 1993),
or the practicing and representing family (Reiss, 1989), these theoretical mod-
els share the perspective that family life is organized around repetitive prac-
tices and beliefs that extend across generations and are altered with time. I
have found Reiss's distinction between the practicing and representing family
a useful one and one that is pertinent to this discussion. Family practices are
directly observable and repeated over time and shift in response to develop-
mental changes of the family. Family representations, on the other hand, are
indirectly assessed through the interpretive process of the family and may guide
behavior, particularly in response to a stressor. Ultimately, family practices
and representations affect one another through a series of transactions over
time. Reiss's model may be used as a heuristic to direct our attention to how to
go about studying emotion regulation in families. The model calls for look-
ing directly at how families interact as well as how they interpret or represent
family relationships. To date, the model has not generated clear-cut predic-
tions and may be seen more accurately as a guide for asking questions rather

than a fully formulated theory. The transactional nature of representations
and behavior is gaining some empirical support in the attachment literature
(e.g., Carlson, Sroufe, & Egeland, 2004). Thus, the constructs presented in
this chapter should be considered as part of an organizational framework in
which emotion regulation is part of a transactional process whereby repeated
experiences in the family inform representations that in turn guide behavior.
Families create rules about the expression of emotion when gathered
together as a group. These rules may be expressed directly, as in the case of
expectations for manners. Over time, the rules become internalized and there
is little need to verbally reprimand an emotional display, as a slight raise of
the eyebrow or emphatic use of a person's name may be sufficient to regulate
affect. The research described in this chapter is mainly correlational and
descriptive. We are not yet at the point where it is possible to offer convinc-
ing evidence that certain routines or rituals are causally linked to variability
in emotion regulation. It is possible, however, to consider the interplay be-
tween family practices and representations such that convergences from vari-
ous studies suggest future directions in using more rigorous research designs.
I return to this point when I consider the empirical evidence to date.
Pertinent to the discussion of family regulation is how emotions are
expressed and interpreted during repetitive gatherings. Contrasting how
emotions are directly observed with how emotional experiences are inter-
preted allows us to consider how routines and rituals may provide an organi-
zational framework and, ultimately, suggest avenues of intervention. Let us
first turn to empirical evidence that suggests that predictable routines and
meaningful rituals are associated with the health and well-being of individu-
als and that disruptions in routines may portend poor affect regulation.
Affect Regulation at the Dinner Table
In a previously published report, my colleague and I (Fiese & Marjinsky,

1999) examined how the directly observed behavior at the dinner table cor-
responded to representations of family of origin and current family relation-
ships in a storytelling task. The overall aim of the study was to consider how
directly observed affect in a group setting was related to how parents repre-
sented family relationships in their narratives. Generally, we found that posi-
tive affect at the dinner table was positively related to how parents depicted
the trustworthiness of relationships in their current family and their family
of origin. The reverse held true for negative affect portrayed at the dinner
table. Families who talk about relationships in a positive and rewarding way
also tend to interact in positive and supportive ways when gathered together.
On the one hand, this makes intuitive sense and may just indicate that posi-
tive family features are consistent across different measures (i.e., observa-
tional and narrative). On the other hand, we can speculate on the transac-
tional nature of family practices and representations in regulating affect.

Parents who depict relationships as rewarding carry a working template of
expectations that can be validated through routine interactions. Repeated
interactions that are affectively positive serve to reinforce representations of
relationships as sources of reward and encourage sustained positive interac-
tion. We have not been able to confirm the directional nature of this process
in our cross-sectional studies. It is clear that longitudinal and intervention
research needs to be conducted before direction of effects can be identified.
In addition to examining the transactional process over time, it will be im-
portant to consider other variables that may be moderating the effects. For
example, maternal depression may affect how routines are carried out and
the regulation of affect during family gatherings (Dickstein, St. Andre,
Sameroff, Seifer, & Schiller, 1999).
In an effort to tease apart the role of affect in the narratives and regula-
tion of behavior, we examined the degree to which the affect expressed during
the storytelling task matched the overall theme of the story. We reasoned that
telling a family story not only reveals thematic content but is also potentially
an emotionally evocative task, as parents use affect to highlight different as-
pects of the story. We found that for some parents there is a mismatch between
content and affect. For example, a story of rejecting or harmful relationships
may be marked by nervous laughter and poorly modulated affect. For mothers,
we found that when there was a mismatch between affect and story content
there was a greater risk for their children to develop behavior problems. We
speculated that when children are repeatedly exposed to an affective model
that is marked by poor regulation, they have difficulty managing their own
behavior. It is also possible that a child with poorly modulated behavior also
presents a greater challenge to parents in regulating their own affect.
Children are exposed to emotion and affect in a variety of family set-
tings, and there appears to be cross-situational consistency in the expression
of affect and representation of relationships. In the context of dinnertime,
parents typically negotiate a variety of demands in a relatively short period of
time. This includes expectations for manners and good behavior (Gleason,
Perlmann, & Greif, 1984) as well as regulation of negative affect. For some
families, the collective gathering is marked by negative affect and expecta-
tions that relationships will be unrewarding and a source of irritation. For
other families, the collective gathering is marked by a sense of predictable
order and expectations that relationships will be personally fulfilling. The
following two stories told about mealtimes serve to illustrate.
Story 1: I remember my stepmother and father arguing, and we were
eating corn on the cob. They were fighting at the table, and we ate corn
on the cob, and we had butter smeared all over our faces, and grandpa
was smoking a cigarette at the table. And grandma got mad at him be-
cause they were fighting, and she picked up an ashtray and threw it at
him, and ashes stuck to his whole face because there was butter all over
it. Not the greatest story, but that's the truth.

Story 2: We talk about current events, geography, school activities, their
sports activities. Occasionally we get to some of the most sensitive is-
sues. We might get halfway through dinner and somebody tells a joke,
and everybody is cracking up, and all of a sudden you get into a heavy
conversation. Somebody was just waiting for the right time, and you could
tell this was safe now and it's OK to bring this up now. And so we'll then
sort of change the tone and kinda go with what the person needs to talk
about at that point in time. And sometimes if we start laughing, it just
kinda carries through and milk comes out of everybody's noses.
In the first instance, gathering around the table evokes strong and nega-
tive affect. It was acceptable, although not necessarily desirable, to allow
intense feelings to escalate to the point of potential physical harm. In stark
contrast is the second story, in which dinner is a time for telling jokes but
also a safe place where personal concerns can be aired with the expectation
that the individual will be heard and, perhaps, his or her problem solved.
Children may be particularly sensitive to disruptions experienced dur-
ing routine gatherings. On the one hand, the predictability of routines pro-
vides a sense of order and markers for what is considered expectable behav-
ior. Family rules of conduct may be repeatedly reinforced during a typical
mealtime (Gleason et al., 1984). Thus, the directly observable and predict-
able aspects of family routines provide behavioral guideposts and regulate
the expression of emotion. The symbolic aspects of the ritual gathering, on
the other hand, may provide a sense of belonging and emotional security. As
mentioned in the second story, the meal was seen as a safe gathering where
sensitive topics could be discussed. Over time, the repeated practice of regu-
lar routines evolves into a ritual that suggests connections and bonds built
on positive emotions and feelings of belonging to a group. The repetitive
routine practices serve as the substance of the representations that constitute
a ritual. Oftentimes, these representations are marked by strong emotions
and are dense in meaning. One way to determine whether a routine has turned
into a ritual is to consider whether it is anticipated and would be missed if it
didn't happen, and whether elements are replayed in memory. My colleagues
and I are only just beginning to explore these distinctions in empirical stud-
ies, paying particular attention to how emotion is a key element of rituals
and how the affective aspect of family life may serve to protect individuals
from risk conditions. Let us first examine how children depict routines and
then consider how rituals may promote mental and physical health.
My colleagues and 1 have examined how children respond to disrup-
tions in family mealtimes through the use of a storytelling procedure (Fiese,
Wamboldt, Howell, & Spagnola, 2003). Children, age 5 to 12, were pre-
sented with a picture of a relatively well-organized kitchen (e.g., places are
set at the table, the counter is clear of clutter, and the chairs are arranged
around the table) and asked to tell a story about a family at dinnet in this
kitchen. After the story is told, they are presented with a second picture that
depicts the kitchen in disarray (e.g., trash is overflowing in the garbage, a

chair is turned over, the plants are dead in the windowsill). They are again
prompted to tell a story about a family in this kitchen. Responses to the
organized kitchen scene are overall more affectively positive, relationships
are seen as more rewarding, and routines more clearly identified. In contrast,
children's responses to the disorganized kitchen were more likely to include
negative affect, aggressive behavior, and lack of order. The degree to which
children saw relationships as rewarding in the organized scene was signifi-
cantly related to overall family functioning and negatively related to parent
report of child behavior problems. The following examples, drawn from the
same 8-year-old boy, serve to illustrate.
Organized Kitchen Scene: First of all, the brother sits there, the sister
sits there, and the mother sits there, and the father sits there. And, they
make sure the kids have washed their hands. And then they all sit down
and wait for everybody to get to the table and they just sort of start eating
and talking about their day.
Disorganized Kitchen Scene: Well this family nobody cares if they wash
their hands or not, they just start scarfing down dinner. The brother's
talking about how he wants this video game, and the sister's talking about
how she wants these dolls, and the father's talking about how many times
other states have lost the Super Bowl, and the mother is talking about
how many dishes are in the sink and complaining, and they're all talking
at the same time, so it doesn't make any sense.
These examples illustrate how perceptions of order are associated with
predictability of relationships, and that once the order is disrupted there is a
greater likelihood of negative affect and disappointment, and relationships
don't make any sense. These qualitative distinctions have been supported in
larger quantitative studies examining how routines and rituals may protect
individuals from stressors associated with being raised in alcoholic house-
holds (Bennett, Wolin, & Reiss, 1988; Fiese, 1993; Wolin, Bennett, Noonan,
& Teitlebaum, 1980), reduce the effects of chronic pain on daily activities
(Bush &. Pargament, 1997), and protect children from mental health prob-
lems under conditions of a chronic illness (Markson & Fiese, 2000). A con-
sistent finding in these studies has been the distinguishing roles of routines
and rituals in promoting mental and physical health. For example, in the
Bush and Pargament study of couples in which one member was experienc-
ing chronic pain, it was the affective meaning of family rituals that was most
closely associated with partners' satisfaction with family life and the routine
factor that was most closely associated with patients' satisfaction with family
life and pain-specific adjustment. For individuals experiencing a painful con-
dition, the predictability of routines was associated with fewer pain symp-
toms, perhaps suggesting a more organized and less stressful environment.
For spouses involved in the care of the pain patient, the affective meaning
associated with family rituals may have provided a sense of family identity
that extended beyond the daily care of the patient.

The predictability of routines and amount of perceived burden linked
to routines associated with disease management in the case of a chronic ill-
ness suggests that there is a direct link between routines and emotions. When
parents report that carrying out a routine is a burden, they are more likely to
report a poorer quality of life overall, and their children are more likely to
report emotional distress connected to their physical condition (Fiese,
Wamboldt, & Anbar, 2005). Specifically, we have found that when daily
health-related routines are seen as a chore, then parents also feel overwhelmed
and experience more disruptions in their daily life, and their children are
more emotionally affected by their illness. It is also plausible that when one
is emotionally distressed, it is more taxing to implement regular routines.
To better understand the relative contribution of routines and rituals
to emotional distress and affect regulation in the family, it appears that inter-
vention and longitudinal designs are warranted. Using more rigorous meth-
odologies does not come without challenges, however. For example, inter-
vention trials would need to take into account the individualized nature of
routines and the representational nature of rituals. Thus, merely prescribing
routines without attending to their emotional significance may not be par-
ticularly effective. As outlined in the section on clinical implications, an
accurate assessment of family rituals may suggest tailored rather than uni-
form interventions. We also know very little about the ebb and flow of fam-
ily rituals. Using daily recording techniques such as ecological momentary
assessment (e.g., Smyth & Stone, 2003) may shed light on whether changes
in routines precede or follow alterations in mood and emotions.
Taken together, these examples serve to illustrate several points about
whole-family process and emotion regulation. First, emotions expressed during
routine collective gatherings are calibrated to reflect what is acceptable behav-
ior within a given family. For some families, these repetitive interactions are
marked by open expression of affect within an expectedly secure environment.
For other families, negative affect is allowed to escalate to the point that indi-
vidual members may feel threatened, and there are few guides for acceptable
behavior. Second, over time these repetitive group interactions form the basis
of internalized representations of family identity. Repetitive interaction pat-
terns are dense with symbolic meaning that may only make sense to the family.
Shorthand communication may develop such that a phrase innocuous to the
outsider signifies meaningful exchanges within the family. Third, when faced
with stressors, families are often challenged to reorganize their routines and may
confront a need to redefine their rituals. I now turn to how the reorganization of
routines and redefinition of rituals can be useful to clinicians and educators.
Routines and rituals are readily accessible to clinicians. Not only may
they provide a vehicle for behavior change, they may also aid the clinician in

understanding the context of emotion regulation within a specific family.
The clinical implications of understanding emotion regulation in the con-
text of family routines and rituals are multifold. They can provide guides for
assessment and a framework for family typologies and can be used as a form of
intervention. 1 address each aspect in turn.
Assessment of Family Routines and Rituals
There are several avenues for assessing the relative presence and strength
of family rituals. Several questionnaires exist that include a description of
the frequency with which particular routines are practiced (Boyce et at, 1983)
and the presence of family celebrations (McCubbin, Thompson, &
McCubbin, 1996). My colleague and I have developed the Family Ritual
Questionnaire (Fiese & Kline, 1993), which distinguishes between routine
practices and ritual meaning across seven different settings (dinnertime,
weekends, vacations, annual celebrations, special celebrations, religious
holidays, cultural events). These questionnaires have been used primarily
for the empirical study of routines and rituals in nonclinical samples. Re-
cently, my colleagues and I have developed a subscale that measures dis-
ease management routines that can be used with populations with a chronic
health condition (Fiese et al., 2005). Interviews are more likely to be used in
a clinical setting. Several interviews have been developed that focus on
family routines and rituals. Wolin and colleagues have developed the Fam-
ily Ritual Interview (Wolin, Bennett, &, Jacobs, 2003), whose original ap-
plication was in the study of alcoholic families. The interview attends to
level of ritualization, the role of family heritage effects on current family
practices, purposefulness in creating rituals, adaptability, and maintenance
of rituals. Interviews are coded along the lines of high, medium, and low for
each dimension. Kubicek has developed the Caretaking Routines Inter-
view (Kubicek, 2002), which focuses specifically on routines created to
care for young children. Weisner and colleagues have developed the
Ecocultural Family Interview, aimed at understanding how families orga-
nize the daily routine activities of children (Weisner, 2002). Field workers
provide summaries of the family's activities as well as scoring items in re-
sponse to particular domains of family routines such as support from kin,
role of the father in child care, and availability of resources. My colleagues
and I have gained valuable insights from the work of our peers and have
incorporated several aspects of these interviews into our own work on family
routines and rituals evident in the care and adjustment of families who have
a child with a chronic illness. For illustrative purposes, we describe portions
of the interview we use in our research protocol that can be adapted for clini-
cal purposes, with attention to how problematic family emotion regulation
may disrupt routines or how deliberately planned routines may aid in regu-
lating emotions under stressful conditions.

As part of the Asthma Impact Interview (Wamboldt & O'Connor,
1997), families are asked to tell the story of how the illness has affected their
lives and to "walk us through a typical day" with their family. One of the
features of this interview is the ability to identify whether families deliber-
ately plan around routine care or whether they respond in a way that is cha-
otic and disorganized. We have found that families who create plans and
routines together are more likely to have children with fewer disease symp-
toms and better quality of life than families who respond chaotically and
rarely make deliberate plans (Fiese et al., 2005; Fiese & Wamboldt, 2003).
Two examples serve to illustrate.
Family partnership: At first we could kind of like deal with it, I was kind
of up already on things to do as far as taking carpets out of his room,
changing curtains, things like that to keep him from coughing, watching
for stuff that might be triggering it. The worst part came when he started
having seizures from the medication. That was the worst. That was the
worst because we weren't sure, and even the doctors were a little bit
worried, like what are we going to do? That was really hard for us, really
hard, just really so depressing, and I thought, wow, then I guess the only
thing we could do next was to try and eliminate everything that was
causing it. So we did; he didn't have any carpet in his room. We wet-
mopped the room all the time, we just changed a lot of stuff like that.
The family listens more when they hear stuff about asthma. They see
brochures and they're more aware of what asthma does and you know,
like his brother will say something like "Frank has asthma. We should
watch this. Or listen to this." They're talking about asthma. Uh, I think
it has made everybody just a little bit more aware of stuff like that. We
got information. We picked up a lot of stuff, like at the pharmacy they
have the tapes on how to use your inhalers and stuff like that, and the
kids will pick them up. His brothers and sisters will pick things up. We
just kind of watch out for him.
Reactive style: Well we more or less suspected that she had asthma
for a while. And I guess you know I noticed more that she complained
about feeling tight in her chest or whatever, and she was doing some
wheezing, um, but I come from a family where my mother was a hypo-
chondriac, and I know from my own experience kids do tend to, when
they don't want to go to school or something, make up things about why
they don't want to go, so I just chose to ignore a lot of it. One night she
was upset about something. I think we had an argument or something,
and she was crying. It was late at night, it was about 10 o'clock at night,
and 1 was very angry with her, and she was complaining about this tight-
ness in her chest, and she needed to get to the doctor, and of course I just
thought it was a way to get my attention, and I was ignoring her, but she
kept insisting, so as angry as I was I loaded her in the middle of the night,
we went to the emergency room.
I think about it and I worry because it's been so mild, and it was mild,
and I was hoping she would grow out of it um, and I hope, I worry about

her not using her medications properly, and I hope that it won't cause
her to have an asthma attack.
In the first example, the entire family has rallied around the manage-
ment of the child's condition. There are clear plans executed on a daily basis,
and routine trips to the pharmacist are watchful reminders about daily care.
In contrast, the second example is marked by intense negative affect and
distrust of the child's condition. No plans are evident, and emergency care is
sought after a series of escalating negative exchanges. Worry and anxiety
prevent deliberate planning and organized routines. It should not be surpris-
ing to the reader that the first family scored relatively high on self-report
measures of family routines, whereas the second family scored relatively low.
Lest the reader be left with the impression that an examination of the rela-
tive presence or absence of routines is yet another way to categorize families
into "good" or "bad," let us now consider different typologies of family prac-
tices that may be useful to clinicians and provide another window into fam-
ily emotion regulation.
Family Ritual Typologies
Family therapists have provided several typologies for the practice of
rituals as well as types of rituals useful for therapeutic interventions, Roberts's
(2003) typology is particularly suitable for our discussion. She listed six ways
in which families practice rituals in their daily lives: underritualized, rigidly
ritualized, skewed ritualization, hollow rituals, interrupted rituals, and flex-
ible or adaptive rituals. Families may fall into one or more categories, and
typologies may change given different stressors or during transitions such as
marriage and divorce. Returning to the earlier distinction made between rou-
tines and rituals, one can identify four typologies that vary in their combina-
tion of predictable observable routines and meaningful symbolic rituals.
In this schema, it is possible to identify four subtypes that vary in their
combination of predictable routines and meaningful rituals. (See Figure 13.1.)
Although these subtypes make clinical and intuitive sense, researchers are
only just beginning to empirically examine the relative presence and corre-
lates of these groupings. For illustrative purposes, I provide examples drawn
from our mealtime observations that highlight how emotion is regulated in
these four subtypes.
Chaotic: Who Took My Hot Sauce?
In this mealtime example, there are four children and one mother present
at the table. The father is standing to the side of the table while the others
eat. The meal begins with the father yelling to the children, "Just eat and
shut up." As the children begin to joke with each other, the father follows
with the comment "Next person to talk doesn't get to go to the store." After
battling over food, the children ask if there is any hot sauce. The father re-
sponds that there is just a little bit left and leaves the room. A few minutes

Routines
Low High
Low
Chaotic Rigid and Hollow
High
Flexible and Variable Enriched
Figure 13.1. Four-fold typology of family rituals.
later he returns and asks, "Who took my hot sauce?" When he finds the
bottle almost empty, he grabs the bottle from the child, remarks, "You ani-
mal," and leaves the room again. As the meal ends, the children start to clear
the table, and the father yells from the other room to tell one child to get
down from the table.
In this example, there is no predictable order to the meal and exchanges
are marked by either strong negative affect or an attempt to control positive
emotional expression. Movement in and out of the kitchen and failure to
engage in sustained communication suggests that daily life overall is fairly
chaotic and little planning is involved. Indeed, this family's response to the
Family Ritual Questionnaire endorsed dinnertime as "no big deal" and re-
vealed that "little planning" is involved.
Rigid and Hollow. Eat Your Salad!
In this type of family ritual, there is a strong emphasis on order and
routine, with an absence of emotional connection. One family, in particular,
comes to mind. The meal begins with the table already set and the father
distributing the plates to each of his two children and his wife. Before he sits
down, the children begin to eat the bread. He grabs the bread from the daugh-
ter, scolds her for not eating her salad first, and says that she cannot have
anymore bread until she eats the rest of her food. The father's harsh ex-
changes continue throughout the meal. At the end of the meal, the father
and mother tell the children that the governor has decided to cancel summer
vacation and that they will be going to school throughout the summer months.
In a family accustomed to joking and sarcasm, this might have been an emo-
tionally positive exchange. However, in this family, where controlling and
282 BARBARA H.F1ESE

negative affect predominates, the children are dumbstruck and not allowed
in on the joke.
Whereas chaotic families may have escalation of negative affect, fami-
lies who are more rigid in their routine practices may be more controlling
and attempt to dampen the expression of affect, either positive or negative.
Flexible and Variable: Cheetos in the Mashed Potatoes?

In this example there are four children between the ages of 5 and 22.
The oldest child is home from college. The meal begins with an extended
period of people making their way to the table, children getting up and down,
and the mother distributing dishes from the kitchen. There are multiple con-
versations going on, but there is not a sense of chaos as much as a continuous
flow of engagement. Early in the meal the youngest child says, "Daddy, I love
you" and his father responds, "I love you too." This is followed by a conversa-
tion with the oldest son on conducting site surveys, interrupted by the middle
son showing off his muscles, and then a conversation between the youngest
son and mother as he puts his Cheetos into the mashed potatoes. The affect
is relatively well modulated—there are no extremes in terms of either sus-
tained laughter and joking or squelching of negative affect. Rather there is a
stream of shifting conversations that allows everyone to participate on their
own level and in their own way.
Enriched: Crazy Aunt Jessy

In this family of four, the meal is fairly well ordered. Dishes are passed
in a set order, there are expectations for good manners (son is asked to excuse
himself to blow his nose), and dessert is not shared until everyone at the
table has finished his or her meal. A thread throughout the conversation is
"What makes someone weird?" Discussions ensue about whether a particular
classmate is "weird" and then whether the son and daughter are "weird."
This is all done with kindhearted joking and positive affect. The son makes a
remark about Aunt Jessy and how she would probably do something weird at
the dinner table while they were being taped. The mother jumps in to talk
about Crazy Aunt Jessy and some of her antics. The conversation ends, how-
ever, with "Well, she really is a good person and we love her." In this sce-
nario, the children are allowed to explore the symbolic meaning of what it
means to possess particular characteristics that may be shared across family
members. Clinicians will surely note that in this safe environment the chil-
dren have the opportunity to explore their fears and anxieties without con-
cern about retribution or being told to be quiet. By pulling in the example of
the aunt, there is an enriched tone to the conversation as extended family
members may be illustrative of the larger family identity.
Emotions may be overregulated and controlled as part of the routine, as
in the "salad" family, or they may be the subject of exploration, as in "Crazy
Aunt Jessy's" family. It is clear that more empirical research is needed with

clinical samples to determine whether these typologies provide a reliable and
valid way to examine different styles of routine and ritual practices across
families.
CLINICAL DECISION MAKING
In earlier reports, the potential for routines and rituals to aid in clinical
decision making has been proposed (Fiese & Wamboldt, 2001; Sameroff &
Fiese, 2000). Expanding on Sameroff and Fiese's (2000) three R's of inter-
vention, Fiese and Wamboldt proposed that routine interventions may take
one of four forms: remediation, redefinition, reeducation, or realignment.
All of these interventions are based on the assumption that when a family
faces a stressor there is a potential for routines to be disrupted. Steinglass has
proposed that the first sign of family distress is a disruption in its routines
(Steinglass, Bennett, Wolin, & Reiss, 1987). To illustrate, I consider how
the diagnosis of a chronic illness may affect family functioning and, in par-
ticular, how emotion regulation may be affected when routines are altered or
disrupted. The diagnosis of a chronic illness often calls for a change in daily
routines such that alterations in diet, taking medications, and reducing emo-
tional stressors are often part of medical prescriptions (Fisher & Weihs, 2000).
I focus on how the management of a pediatric chronic illness, asthma, may
disrupt routines and affect emotional regulation in the family. These disrup-
tions are not unique to pediatric asthma, and readers may want to consider
conditions pertinent to their own experiences.
The first step is to determine whether the family's routines have been
disrupted since the diagnosis of the illness. If the routines have been dis-
rupted and the family previously practiced meaningful rituals, then it is im-
portant to redefine the newly created routines so that they fit within the family's
notion of meaningful rituals. For example, previously established bedtime
storytelling may have been replaced with a focus on taking medications. The
child may experience a sense of loss of the ritual and have difficulty soothing
him or herself to sleep. In this instance, it would be important to redefine
activities such that the previously existing routine (bedtime storytelling) and
the new routine demand (taking nighttime medications) can coexist with-
out affective disruption.
If routines have not been disrupted, then it is possible to use preexisting
routines as a way to remediate the situation. For example, if the child regu-
larly and reliably brushes his or her teeth every morning and evening, then
the medicine may be placed next to the child's toothbrush. This does not
cause an alteration in the routine as much as it builds on a preexisting rou-
tine that can be easily altered with little affective disruption.
If there is an absence of routines, then two strategies should be consid-
ered. The clinician needs to first determine whether the family is knowl-
284 BARBARA H. FiESE

edgeable about the importance of routines and whether there are any histori-
cal examples they can draw from. The "chaotic" type of family mentioned
previously is often one that has had little experience with routines in its
families of origin. In these instances, it is important to assist the family in
creating new routines that have the potential to turn into meaningful rituals,
a form of reeducation. Because there have been few historical examples to
draw from, it is important to carefully evaluate the family's tolerance for
implementing family-level change. It may be prudent to begin with a routine
that is time limited and relatively easy to implement. For example, creating
a bedtime routine that is tied to a particular time of the evening may be
easier to implement than creating a mealtime routine for the entire family.
Focusing on routine interventions where there is little previous experience is
important when considering the potential for routines and rituals to be emo-
tionally provocative as well as soothing. This brings us to the fourth form of
intervention: realignment.
For some families, routines are disrupted because there is conflict among
family members about the importance of specific routines. My colleagues
and I have noted that families who have undergone a divorce sometimes
hold disparate views about the importance of their child taking daily-
prescribed medications. In these cases, routines may exist in one household
but not in the other. The child is caught between two sets of expectations,
and often conflict ensues. In this instance, it is important to realign the
parents in the service of a common goal. By reducing conflict over the
importance of the routine, parents may protect the child from the poten-
tially harmful effects of marital disagreements (see chap. 8, this volume). A
decision tree outlining the four types of routine interventions is presented in
Figure 13.2.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
There is no question that families encounter multiple demands on their

time— extended work hours, after-school activities, and lengthy homework
assignments can all disrupt family routines. In this chapter I argue that when
routines are disrupted there is an emotional cost to the family as a whole. It is
essential that policy makers attend to the complexity of family life as well as
aid in promoting healthy practices. Flexible work hours, schools setting aside
a "no homework night" every week, "no TV" nights, and "family game night"
are all examples of opportunities to create meaningful rituals. Inexpensive
and simple interventions such as providing guidelines for structuring meal-
time in a positive way for families on welfare, having schoolchildren talk
about their unique family traditions, and encouraging teenagers to spend three
nights a week at home with their families may have far-reaching effects. Re-
call that rituals need not be elaborate or time consuming. Societal institu-
FAMJLY ROUTINES AND RITUALS 285

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286 BARBARA H. F/ESE

tions, however, should be receptive to their importance and aid families in
setting aside these important times.
Family routines and rituals have multifaceted connections to emotion
regulation. On the one hand, rituals by their very nature are emotional gath-
erings, sometimes evoking sentimentality and also potentially evoking nega-
tively charged interactions in which emotions are constrained or allowed to
escalate out of control. On the other hand, rituals and routines may be used
as an emotion regulation strategy. Expectations for conduct and norms for
affective expression are implicit in the practice of daily routines such as meal-
time gatherings, and they reinforce family values and identity. This dual na-
ture of routines and rituals may complicate our understanding of emotion
regulation as it moves beyond the identification of specific emotions and
individual regulation and force us to attend to the organizing nature of fam-
ily systems. Future efforts may inform how the group's regulation of emotion
transacts with feelings experienced by the individual. As researchers look to
the future, it is relevant to consider Evan Imber-Black's closing statement in
the second edition of Rituals in Families and Family Therapy (2003):
The shape of tomorrow's rituals will, no doubt, look somewhat like today's
and be somewhat different. That there will be rituals—to tell us who we
are to each other, to help us heal, to express our beliefs, to hold dear
what is most human—of that there is no doubt, (p. 419)
Families will continue to regulate emotion as a group, and rituals will con-
tinue to promote emotion regulation, whether through peanut butter and
jelly sandwiches, eating your salad first, or having enough hot sauce—the
processes will no doubt remain the same.
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290 BARBARAH.FIESE
FAMILY EMOTION REGULATION
PROCESSES: IMPLICATIONS FOR
RESEARCH AND INTERVENTION
DOUGLAS K. SNYDER, JAN N. HUGHES, AND JEFFRY A. SIMPSON
Research on emotion regulation in couples and families has the poten-

tial to advance not only basic science regarding family and relationship pro-
cesses but also applications related to promoting individual and family well-
being, preventing disruptions to emotional or physical health, and intervening
with couples and families in distress. For basic and applied research on emo-
tion regulation to progress, investigators will need to address both concep-
tual and theoretical issues and methodological concerns, including measure-
ment and data-analytic strategies and the translational challenges of extending
basic research findings into effective interventions.
Investigators should articulate both their general conceptualization of emotion

regulation and specific components targeted by their research. Research on emo-
tion regulation will best proceed when investigators articulate the nomologi-
cal net (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) that defines their broadband view of
293
emotion regulation as well as their focus on specific components of emotion
regulation processes. Specifically, emotion regulation needs to be differenti-
ated from related constructs of emotional intelligence or understanding,
emotional expressiveness or suppression, affect or mood regulation, affective
reactivity, temperament, effortful versus reactive control, emotion decoding,
coping, interpersonal problem solving, and social competence.
How should emotion regulation be conceptualized within a broader
theory of emotions? Grewal, Brackett, and Salovey (chap. 2, this volume),
for example, define emotion "management" as one of four core components
of emotional intelligence that involve abilities to access, accurately label,
and modify feelings in oneself and others. From this perspective, the man-
agement of feelings is distinguished from related abilities to perceive and
understand emotions and to use emotions to facilitate thought and language.
Others (see, e.g., chap. 1) regard emotion regulation as multifaceted, consist-
ing of diverse cognitive and behavioral responses that include attentional
and interpretive processes both prior to and following emotion arousal.
Common throughout most conceptualizations of emotion regulation is
the premise that, at its most fundamental level, emotion regulation involves
strategies that individuals (alone or in concert with significant others) use to
influence the content, subjective experience, and expression of emotions.
Investigators may vary in the extent to which they emphasize conscious or
automatic mechanisms of emotion regulation, their intrapersonal versus in-
terpersonal components, strategies deployed before versus after emotion
arousal, and efforts to increase versus decrease emotional experience and
expression. To date, research on emotion regulation has emphasized prima-
rily the down-regulation of negative affect (e.g., anger) from an intrapersonal
perspective. Complementary emphases on the enhancement of positive emo-
tions (e.g., empathy and intimacy) from an interpersonal perspective are
equally critical to understanding emotion regulation processes in couples and
families.
Investigation of emotion regulation should attend to both conscious and
nonconscious regulatory responses. An important conceptual issue that receives
insufficient attention in the emotion regulation literature is the distinction
between emotion regulation and initial emotion arousal processes. In gen-
eral, the field of emotion regulation has largely ignored the processes of emo-
tional arousal or initial emotional reactivity, focusing on "the intra- and
extraorganismic factors by which emotional arousal is redirected, controlled,
modulated, and modified to enable an individual to function adaptively in
emotionally arousing situations" (see chap. 6, this volume, pp. 124-125).
Emotional arousal processes would include Gross et al.'s (chap. 1) anteced-
ent-focused, largely conscious strategies deployed prior to confronting an emo-
tionally arousing situation, as well as nonconscious processes that temper
arousal intensity (Fitzsimons & Bargh, 2004). Internal working models and
other knowledge structures that operate outside awareness (see chaps. 4 and
294 SNYDER, HUGHES, AND S/MPSON

8) as well as biological processes that govern the intensity of affective arousal
are examples of nonconscious emotion regulatory processes. Mikulincer et
al.'s experimental studies (chap. 4) suggest the potential value of activating
secure attachment representations, which normally operate outside conscious
awareness, as a means of coping with intense threats to one's security. In
general, sensitive and responsive parenting may affect children's emotion
regulation and social competence indirectly through its effects on children's
social goal orientation, felt security, and other mental structures that operate
largely outside conscious awareness (Heidgerken, Hughes, Cavell, & Willson,
2004).
Investigations of emotion regulation should attend to biological and genetic
processes. Many of the processes subsumed under the term "emotion regula-
tion" have their basis in temperament—that is, "constitutionally based indi-
vidual differences in emotional, motor, and attentional reactivity and self
regulation" (Rothbart & Bates, 1998, p. 109). This conceptualization em-
phasizes the biological bases of temperament, influenced by genetic inherit-
ance but shaped by maturation and experience. Among the individual-
difference variables that have a strong basis in temperament are activity level,
impulsivity, mood, emotional reactivity, fearfulness, affective intensity, ag-
gression, and many other characteristics associated with emotion regulation.
Despite the broad consensus that temperament plays a significant role in
emotion regulation, insufficient research has examined how temperament-
based individual differences interact with the environment in a reciprocal
causal process that accounts for observed differences in emotion arousal and
regulation. Such research holds the promise of early intervention with ap-
proaches tailored to an individual's biological constitution. In addition, the
role of temperament in emotion regulation indicates that the playing field is
not level for all individuals when it comes to controlling impulses and modu-
lating emotional expression.
Investigations of emotion regulation should attend to both intrapersonal and
interpersonal processes. Emotion regulation never occurs in a vacuum and most
often proceeds in an interpersonal context. Hence, emotion regulation pro-
cesses will best be understood when the study of intrapersonal processes is
complemented by research explicating how intrapersonal regulation oper-
ates in concert with situational facets (including interpersonal exchanges)
to generate positive or negative outcomes. The situational context may be
relatively focused (e.g., couple or family based) or broad (e.g., social contex-
tual stressors of poverty or war). In a similar way, emotion regulation should
be viewed as involving individuals' efforts to regulate not only their own
emotions but also the emotions of significant others. Such efforts may entail
strategies to provoke or increase affect in the other (e.g., empathy) or to
minimize or contain the other's affect (e.g., hostility or anguish).
For example, in treating persons struggling with physical pain, Keefe,
Porter, and Labban (chap. 10, this volume) note that some interventions
FAMILY EMOTION REGULATION PROCESSES 295

emphasize intrapersonal mechanisms by helping the patient manage his or
her own pain-related emotions (e.g., through relaxation training or imag-
ery), whereas other interventions (e.g., communication skills training) em-
phasize interpersonal mechanisms to help partners regulate difficult emo-
tions that occur during their interactions.
Research should examine both individual and situational moderators of emo-
tion regulation. Obvious candidates for investigation include individual dif-
ferences in gender, age, and ethnicity. For example, women may be more
aware of emotional processes in intimate relationships and be more willing
and able to regulate them. Among children and adolescents, developmental
differences in emotion regulation are immense, even though research by Gross
and colleagues (Gross et al., 1997; John & Gross, 2004) suggests that a tra-
jectory across age toward increasingly healthy emotion regulation is also ob-
served among adults. Moreover, the specific content of both positive and
negative emotions (glee vs. relief, anger vs. sorrow) is likely to influence
emotion regulation strategies across both antecedent (e.g., attentional) and
consequent (e.g., expressive) phases.
Separate from individual differences are situational features likely to
influence the experience and expression of emotions. Intimate relationships
between spouses or between parents and children, for example, may enhance
both the intensity of emotions and the likelihood of their expression. Even
within intimate dyads, emotion regulation processes should vary as a func-
tion of their privacy (e.g., managing conflict with a spouse or child at home
versus in public) and the degree of emotional security experienced in the
moment (e.g., expressions of vulnerability or tenderness during times of close-
ness vs. conflict).
Interventions promoting well-being or targeting dysfunction may be
enhanced by components that extend beyond intrapersonal strategies to build
on situational contexts that are most conducive to effective emotion regula-
tion. For example, Mikulincer, Shaver, and Horesh (chap. 4, this volume)
cite experimental evidence suggesting that environmental "priming" of se-
cure attachment representations helps individuals remain focused, organized,
and balanced in the face of traumatic events.
Both conceptual and empirical advances in understanding emotion regulation
processes in families will be enhanced when these processes are contextualized within
broader theories of individual and interpersonal functioning. Placing emotion regu-
lation processes within a broader theoretical framework should expand the
potential for formulating testable hypotheses linking emotion processes to a
broader spectrum of individual and interpersonal mechanisms that promote
or impede emotion regulation. Attachment theory provides one such frame-
work particularly relevant to families by emphasizing interpersonal experi-
ences as a source of individual differences in emotion activation and regula-
tion (see Rholes & Simpson, 2004). Basic research from social psychological
perspectives (e.g., see chap. 4, this volume) and more clinical perspectives
296 SNYDER, HUGHES, AND SJMPSON

(e.g., chap. 11) emphasizes the importance of security-based strategies, which
may result in either emotional hyperactivation, the suppression of emotions,
or emotional deactivation. Both attachment theory and other interpersonal
formulations of emotion activation and arousal could profit by integrating
basic research from the cognitive and physiological approaches, which em-
phasize intrapersonal mechanisms of emotion regulation identified in labo-
ratory research. Theories may also be enhanced by incorporating new
biopsychosocial perspectives that extend beyond attachment phenomena to
include broader components of psychological and social functioning (e.g.,
work described in chap. 10).
Advances in understanding emotion regulation are more likely to oc-
cur through collaborations among investigators trained in different theoreti-
cal and methodological traditions. Social psychological perspectives on emo-
tion regulation in community samples, for instance, may benefit from clinical
approaches to conceptualizing individual or relational emotion dysfunction.
In a similar way, family system approaches to emotion regulation might ben-
efit from conceptual and methodological enhancements associated with de-
velopmental and behavioral genetics perspectives.
Emotion regulation processes are best studied using multiple methods that
target diverse components across behavioral, experiential, and physiological domains.
As with many domains in psychology, individual differences in emotion regu-
lation have typically been explored using single-measurement strategies, most
often self-report. Although subjective aspects of emotional experience re-
quire self-report methods, both the susceptibility of self-reports to various
response biases (Messick, 1991) and the importance of other cognitive and
behavioral components of emotion regulation argue for the use of multimodal
measurement strategies across diverse domains. For example, the research
described by Pietromonaco, Feldman Barrett, and Powers (chap. 3, this vol-
ume) indicates that more anxiously attached individuals evince less affective
reactivity when assessed with self-report measures than with hormonal mea-
sures. Hence, multiple strategies that tap into different emotion response
systems are essential—including physiological measures of arousal, labora-
tory and field-relevant measures of emotion attention, and observational strat-
egies for coding emotions in interpersonal interactions.
Related to multiple approaches to measuring emotion regulation are
considerations about including multiple respondents. On the one hand, mul-
tiple informants increase the opportunity to distinguish construct-relevant
variance from measurement method or source variance—a particular con-
cern when one relies exclusively on self-reports of conceptually distinct con-
structs from the same individual. On the other hand, previous research on

measures of emotional and behavioral functioning in children and adoles-
cents has shown considerable divergence across informants (e.g., mothers,
fathers, teachers, or peers). Parents' reports of their children's functioning
may be biased by their own psychological characteristics (e.g., maternal de-
pression; Najman et al., 2001). In a similar way, partner reports of emotion
regulation (or dysregulation) in couples often have poor interrater reliability
(Moffitt et al., 1997). Finally, issues of criterion contamination arise when
measures of emotion regulation and related constructs obtained from the
same informant (e.g., teachers) are used to assess both independent and de-
pendent variables (e.g., emotion regulation and social competence in chil-
dren). Future research may benefit from using data-analytic strategies in which
relevant constructs are treated as latent variables, which are assessed by mul-
tiple measurement techniques that vary in terms of modality and type of
informant.
Emotion regulation should be studied using diverse paradigms that vary in
evocative stimuli, response options, and social-interpersonal contexts. Both the
content of emotion regulation processes and their precursors and consequents
are likely to vary across diverse contexts. For example, the spontaneous or
reflexive processes that occur automatically in response to "everyday events"
may differ dramatically from those that involve deliberate, effortful regula-
tion in response to atypical, laboratory-based stressors or critical relationship
incidents marked by conflict or emotional distress.
The chapters in this volume showcase several diverse paradigms that
could facilitate a more robust theory of emotion regulation, independent of
specific paradigms or experimental contexts. Exemplars of such diversity in-
clude (a) studies of spontaneous emotion regulation processes in daily living
(chap. 1, this volume) versus in response to the trauma of war (chap. 4);
(b) a focus on emotion regulation processes driven by the distress of one
person (e.g., chap. 10, on dyadic responses to physical illness) versus emo-
tion regulation processes in relationships in which the individual is a mem-
ber (e.g., the couple-based research described in chap.ll; the focus on par-
ent-child interactions described in chap. 7) or a proximal observer (e.g., the
work summarized in chap. 8 regarding children's response to marital con-
flict); and (c) studies of emotion regulation within a broader family or social
context as it relates to social competence (e.g., the work described in chap.
6), aggression (chap. 5), or risk-taking behaviors (chap. 9). The paradigms
also vary in their focus on vivid demonstrations of emotion dysregulation in
couples and families (e.g., the research described in chap. 12) as opposed to
emotion regulation in the everyday life of healthy families at the system level
(e.g., chap. 13).
Extensions of emotion regulation research across new or expanded para-
digms are also likely to benefit from consideration of diverse situational and
temporal contexts. Emotion regulation processes observed in attachment-
relevant contexts may not necessarily generalize to emotion processes ob-
298 SNYDER, HUGHES, AND SMPSON

served in nonrelational threatening or arousing contexts. For example, spouses'
abilities to access and disclose vulnerable emotions such as disappointment
or hurt, and partners' abilities to respond empathically, might vary depend-
ing on whether the source of those feelings lies within or outside the rela-
tionship (Gee, Scott, Castellani, & Cordova, 2002). In a similar manner,
emotion regulation processes witnessed in intimate dyads during a hurtful or
distressing exchange may differ considerably from emotion regulation pro-
cesses that occur hours or days afterward. That is, efforts to restore emotional
equilibrium through various relationship-repair strategies can be viewed from
either a proximal perspective (i.e., emotion regulation processes in the mo-
ment) or a distal perspective that regards interpersonal sequences as reflect-
ing emotion regulation processes that unfold across several days. The evolu-
tion of emotion regulation processes at both the individual and the
interpersonal level argues for the importance of longitudinal designs, es-
pecially those that can delineate reciprocal relations among parenting,
children's emotion regulation, and children's social functioning (see chaps. 6
and 7, this volume).
Comprehensive understanding of emotion regulation processes is likely to evolve
from aggregate findings based in diverse sampling strategies. Because emotion regu-
lation processes typically occur in interpersonal or broader social contexts,
robust theories of emotion regulation will require experimental paradigms
that treat individuals, intimate dyads, entire families, and broader social groups
as the units of analysis. For example, work by Pietromonaco and colleagues
(chap. 3, this volume) demonstrates that emotion regulation may be gov-
erned not only by the attachment style of the individual but also by the style
of his or her romantic partner. Fiese's work (chap. 13) regarding the emotion-
regulating function of rituals requires sampling at the family system level,
where such rituals are expressed.
In a similar way, theories of emotion regulation in couples and families
must account not only for emotional processes in college- or community-
based samples but also for emotion regulation (or dysregulation) processes
that occur in clinically distressed couples and families. To date, most of the
basic research on emotion regulation processes in intimate dyads has focused
on young, unmarried couples who may not be representative of more estab-
lished married couples in terms of commitment, history of relationship trauma,
or other situational factors that may contribute to or compromise relation-
ship resilience. Findings regarding strategies for up-regulating positive emo-
tions in nondistressed populations may facilitate intervention and preven-
tion efforts in clinical settings, just as research on down-regulation of
potentially destructive or harmful emotions with clinical samples may facili-
tate interventions with community samples of couples or families struggling
with normative challenges of daily living.
Also, virtually nothing is known about emotion regulation processes in
older adults, for whom the expression or regulation of affect may be limited

by cognitive impairments related to aging. Neither is much known about the
role of culture in how families regulate emotions, or how spouses from di-
verse cultural backgrounds regulate emotions within their marriages.
Research should examine emotion regulation not only as an outcome of indi-
vidual and interpersonal processes but also as a mediator of these processes. Emo'
tions are both regulated and regulating at intrapersonal as well as interper-
sonal levels. For example, individual differences in emotion regulation
processes have been linked to posttraumatic symptoms following exposure to
intense or prolonged social stressors (chap. 4, this volume), interpersonal
aggression in children (chap. 5), and risk-taking behaviors in adolescents
(chap. 9).
Valiente and Eisenberg (chap. 6, this volume) note that, in addition to
having direct effects on their emotional well-being, children's emotion regula-
tion processes can also mediate or moderate the relations between emotion-
related parenting practices and children's social behavior and social compe-
tence. Research described by Parke and colleagues (chap. 7) and by Cummings
and Keller (chap. 8), for instance, highlights how emotion regulation pro-
cesses mediate linkages between marital conflict and children's social com-
petence, possibly through internalized representations of social exchange that
reduce the threshold for perceiving threat and promote either inappropriate
social withdrawal or peer aggression. Fruzzetti and Iverson (chap. 12) extend
this conceptualization by positing dysfunctional partner or family behaviors
such as invalidation, which appears to mediate the relation between indi-
vidual emotion regulation and psychopathology.
Several lines of research suggest that emotion regulation processes may
also interact with other individual or interpersonal factors en route to influ-
encing personal and social well-being. For example, family interactions that
promote emotion regulation abilities may be particularly critical in children
and adolescents who are biologically predisposed to greater emotional reac-
tivity. Parke and colleagues (chap. 7, this volume) argue that to disentangle
genetic contributions from socialization influences on the development of
emotion regulation skills require genetically sensitive designs in which two
or more siblings in the same family are assessed on the same regulatory pro-
cesses. Moreover, differences in how each parent manages emotion regula-
tion issues with each child in a family need to be assessed.
APPLICATION ISSUES
Basic research findings from studies of emotion regulation should be used to

develop programs that promote emotional well-being across the life span. A recur-
rent theme in the chapters of this volume is that emotional and social well-
being in children may be enhanced by fostering emotionally healthy family
contexts. Eisenberg, Spinrad, and Cumberland (1998), for example, have
300 SNYDER, HUGHES, AND SIMPSON

identified four ways in which parents socialize emotions in their children:
(a) through parents' direct reactions to children's emotions, (b) through par-
ents' discussion of emotions, (c) through parents' expression of emotions,
and (d) through parents' selection and modification of emotionally relevant
situations. Research with adults by Gross and colleagues (chap. 1, this vol-
ume) indicates that parents may promote health in their children by serving
as emotion coaches and promoting such emotion regulation strategies as cog-
nitive reappraisal. Research by Parke and colleagues (chap. 7) indicates that
parents who are more intrusive or controlling may actually compromise their
children's emotion regulation abilities by providing them with fewer oppor-
tunities to "try out" different emotional responses.
Programs promoting greater emotional well-being in children by using
parents as emotion coaches require providing skills to parents in a form and
at a time when parents are most amenable to learning such skills. Examples
may include group instruction for couples who are transitioning to parent-
hood and more individualized instruction to parents of children who are strug-
gling with emotional or physical disabilities. It is clear that some parents may
remain ill equipped to serve as emotion coaches, either because of their own
deficits or because of persistent marital conflict. In such cases, alternative
modalities for promoting emotion regulation skills might include church- or
school-based interventions that draw on relationships with healthy adult
mentors or parent surrogates (e.g., Meehan, Hughes, & Cavell, 2003).
Research by Gross and colleagues (chap. 1, this volume) on emotion
regulation in everyday life exemplifies the manner in which basic findings
may be generalized to education and prevention programs with couples and
families. Their finding that cognitive reappraisal is more effective than sup-
pression in regulating affect in negative-emotion-eliciting contexts could be
easily integrated within couple and family prevention programs that target
dysfunctional attributions as principal sources of relationship distress. Re-
search by Fiese (chap. 13) on family rituals as emotion-regulating devices
similarly suggests the potential benefits of promoting such family patterns as
a prophylactic means of fostering more intimate connections and greater
emotional security.
Interventions targeting emotion regulation processes in distressed couples and
families should integrate individual and interpersonal mechanisms and should specify
guidelines for selecting, sequencing, and pacing treatment components. The re-
search with distressed couples and families described in this volume affirms
the need to target both individual and interpersonal processes, whether in-
tervening with couples who are experiencing relationship distress (chap. 11,
this volume), physical illness (chap. 10), or more severe psychopathology
(chap. 12). Intrapersonal mechanisms critical to emotion regulation include
promoting adaptive emotional awareness and expression, particularly relat-
ing to the "softer" or more vulnerable emotions of fear, hurt, disappoint-
ment, and shame (see also Jacobson & Christensen, 1996; Johnson & Whiffen,

2003). Interpersonal processes essential to emotion regulation at the couple
or family level involve disrupting maladaptive recursive cycles of escalating
negative affect and, in their place, promoting partners' empathic responsive-
ness. As Fruzzetti and Iverson note, the precise individual and interpersonal
mechanisms that facilitate rather than disrupt emotion regulation in couples
and families warrant further study. For example, basic research is needed to
explicate the psychophysiological mechanisms mediating the relation be-
tween validating responses and diminished emotional arousal. In a similar
way, additional research comparing alternative intervention strategies is
needed to determine whether altering invalidating processes is more useful
in regulating spouses' or family members' emotions than is targeting other
processes, such as the expression of positive affect or constructive problem
solving.
Just as critical as the content of treatment are the sequencing and pac-
ing of interventions. The treatment of couples or families characterized by
frequent or intense emotion dysregulation, for example, may require alter-
nating attention between individual members to promote emotion regula-
tion abilities that emphasize intrapersonal mechanisms and then targeting
relationship processes to promote members' adaptation to each other's changes
and collaboration in mutually supportive exchanges (Snyder & Whisman,
2003). Deciding which mechanisms to target (e.g., disrupting negative emo-
tions or promoting positive ones) at which level (e.g., individual versus in-
terpersonal) at any given point in treatment requires an explicit organiza-
tional model that integrates multiple facets of family system emotion
functioning.
Existing couple- and family-based treatments will be enhanced by incorporat-
ing basic research on emotion regulation processes. Couple- and family-based
interventions vary considerably in their attention to emotion and emotion
regulation processes. One means of enhancing existing therapies is by comple-
menting behavioral and cognitive treatments with interventions that are spe-
cifically grounded in emotion regulation research. For example, Pietromonaco
and colleagues (chap. 3, this volume) note that changing emotional reactiv-
ity to relationship threats is likely to be difficult because emotional associa-
tions are resistant to extinction and counterconditioning. As a consequence,
such reactivity may be more readily modified by promoting accurate identifi-
cation or alternative interpretations of threatening events. Research described
by Goldman and Greenberg (chap. 11) similarly offers the potential to extend
emotion-focused couple interventions to treatment with couples recovering
from specific relationship trauma such as emotional or physical abuse. Re-
search by Fiese (chap. 13) suggests the incremental benefit of promoting
family routines and rituals for those whose established patterns have previ-
ously been deficient or are challenged by current situational stressors.
Not only may emotion-based strategies complement existing treatments,
they might contribute to new approaches for intervening with couples or

families in which emotion regulation processes constitute a core feature of
specific disorders. Keefe and colleagues (chap. 10, this volume), for example,
note that physical pain is too often viewed as merely a sensory event, with
little recognition of the important role that emotion or the social environ-
ment plays in affecting the perception of pain. Similarly, couple-based emo-
tion regulation interventions might have significant therapeutic effects on
individual disorders in which emotional arousal plays a central role—such as
affective disorders, appetitive disorders such as alcohol or substance abuse,
disorders of sexual desire and arousal, physical aggression, or other impulse-
control disorders. As noted by Fruzzetti and Iverson (chap. 12), additional
research explicating the relations among emotion regulation, psychopathol-
ogy, and family interactions should facilitate both primary and secondary
prevention efforts and the design of more effective treatments for specific
populations.
As may be expected in an emerging field, clinical researchers diverge to
some degree in their recommended interpersonal emotion regulation strate-
gies. Divergence on how to respond to a partner's expressed negative emo-
tions is an example of such apparent inconsistencies. Consistent with cogni-
tive theory, Keefe et al. (chap. 10, this volume) suggest that partners of people
with chronic pain should use cognitive restructuring with them so they can
learn "how to recognize overly negative appraisals of pain and replace them
with more realistic and adaptive appraisals" (p. 213). Alternatively, Goldman
and Greenberg (chap. 11), using an emotion-focused couple therapy approach,
advocate an empathic, validating response to a partner's expression of pain.
Such inconsistencies in clinical applications will be resolved only through
well-designed clinical research studies.
Findings from both basic and applied research should influence public policy
in a manner that protects and strengthens families. Throughout this volume, one
recurring theme has been an emphasis on the importance of emotional con-
nections and a sense of community as vital sources of emotional security and
adaptive emotion regulation. At the family level, emotional connections can
be promoted through the universal delivery of primary prevention programs
that promote emotion regulation in couples and families—for example,
through state-based initiatives funded in part through marriage license fees,
or by mandatory participation in interventions that target collaborative
parenting of children and adolescents to reduce the negative consequences
of divorce. In addition to reducing the deleterious impact of couple distress,
families may be protected and strengthened by corporate policies in the work
setting that are designed to promote family connections—for example, by
encouraging flexible work schedules or aggregating personal leave on a vol-
untary basis to be allocated to employees during times of family crisis. At the
community level, emotion regulation in families might be facilitated by rec-
ognizing families at risk and extending an explicit structure to provide greater
support. Exemplars of such community-based interventions can be found in

support programs for families in the armed services in which one family mem-
ber has been deployed abroad or faces challenges reintegrating into the fam-
ily following exposure to combat.
Widespread delivery of interventions targeting emotion regulation pro-
cesses is not likely to occur without corporate or public policy initiatives that
facilitate the availability of such programs by increasing the number of quali-
fied providers. Keefe and colleagues (chap. 10, this volume) address these
issues in their discussion of partner-assisted pain management interventions.
They accentuate the importance of (a) more efficient identification of couples
who potentially could benefit from targeted interventions by educating health
care providers about available treatment programs, (b) expanding the array
of allied professionals who could deliver such interventions, and (c) extend-
ing the modality of interventions to group formats or to reduced-cost meth-
ods such as telephone- or Internet-based consultation.
CONCLUSIONS
As noted in our introduction to this book, individuals' ability to effec-

tively regulate their emotions—especially in interpersonal contexts that in-
volve potentially caustic exchanges—plays a pivotal role in keeping indi-
viduals and their significant relationships functioning well. Considerable
research is still needed to clarify the basic individual and interpersonal emo-
tion regulation processes in couples and families that make up the core path-
ways to dysfunction or to emotional and physical health. Understanding these
processes requires identifying both the major precursors and the major con-
sequences of emotion regulation across affective, cognitive, and behavioral
domains at both the individual and the interpersonal level. No single re-
search paradigm—whether defined in terms of theoretical context, measure-
ment or sampling techniques, or data-analytic strategy—will yield a compre-
hensive theory of emotion regulation in families. Ultimately, both basic and
applied research on family emotion regulation processes must contribute to
interventions that promote individual and interpersonal well-being; prevent
emotional and physical disorders; and effectively treat dysfunction at the
individual, dyadic, and family levels.
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AUTHOR INDEX
Numbers in italics refer to listings in the references.
Aber.J. L, 49, 50, 51,52 Bar-On, R., 44, 51

Abernathy, M., 208, 209, 227 Barrett, L. R, 52, 54
Achenbach, T., 107, 115, 1J8 Barry, C., 120
Ackerman, B. P., 49, 52, 233, 246 Earth,]. M., 145, 159
Adams, E., 103, 119 Bartholomew, K., 60, 62, 71, 73
Adshead, G., 120 Bates, ]. E., 106, 119, 126, 127, 129, 141,
Affleck, G., 228 144, 155, 158, 160, 162, 203, 295,
Agocha, V. B., 187, 200 305
Ahadi, S. A., 68-69, 73 Battistich, V., 50, 55
Ahles, T. A., 209, 220, 227 Baucom, D. H., 70, 71, 217, 226, 227, 228,
Ainsworth, M. S., 59, 60, 70, 95, 97 238, 246
Albino A., 186, 193,200,201 Baumeisrer, R. R, 184, 186, 187, 199, 202,
Alden, L., 244, 245, 246, 247 202, 305
Alexander, P. C, 85, 97 Baumrind, D., 144, 159, 183, 199
Alfert, E., 17, 35 Beach, S. R. H., 257, 266
Allaire, S. G., 229 Bearinger, L. H., 271,288
Allmon, D., 257, 267 Beers, M., 40, 46, 53
American Pain Society, 226, 226 Begg, D., 200
American Psychiatric Association, 83, 97, Belanger, I., 64, 71
107, 118 Belcher, L., 198, 203
Anbar, R. D., 278, 288 Belsky, J., 97
Anderson, C. L., 97 Benjamin, L. S., 244, 246
Andrews, B., 247 Bennett, L. A., 271, 277, 279, 284, 287, 290
Apfel, R.J., 40,51 Bentafridda, V., 207, 226
Armstrong, H. E., 257, 267 Berant, E., 82, 87, 97, 98
Arnett, J. ]., 183, 199 Berenbaum, H., 49, 51
Arora.N. K., 219, 226 Berkowitz, L, 54
Arseneault, L., 190, 203 Berndt, T.J., 162
Arsenio, W., 103, 104, 105, 106, 109, 112, Bernzweig, ]., 160
115, 116,117, 118, 119, 121 Berry, P. E., 219, 226
Asher, S. R., 143, 162 BijlsmaJ.W.J., 209, 227
Aspinwall, L. G., 125, 139 Birnbaum, G., 63, 72
Asselin, L. A., 223, 228 Blechman, E., 162,266,267
Blehar, M., 59, 70, 95, 97
Bagnini, C., 238, 248 Bliesener, T., 188, 202
Baider, L., 227 Block,]., 126, 139
Bailey, K. G., 246 Block,]. H., 126, 139
Baker, T,, 288 Bloom, R R, 158, 161
Baldwin, M. W., 78, 88, 97 Blum, R. W., 183, 203
Ball, F.L.J., 168, 179 Bodenhausen, G. V., 38, 51
Bandura, A., 173, 179 Bodin, S., 120
Barden, C., 103, 119 Bolger, R, 238, 247
Bargh, J. A., 294, 305 Bonica, ]. ]., 207, 226
Barkley, R. A., 190,199 Bonnano, G., 40, 42, 51
Barnctt, D., 125, 139 Bor, W., 305
Baron, R. M., 195, 199 Bornstein, M. H., 140, 161
307
Bosco, ], 47, 52 Campbell, L., 94, 99, 208, 227
Bost, K., 111,121 Campbell, S. B., 164, 180, 270, 287
Bouthillier, D., 64 71 Campbell, T. L., 257, 265
Bowlby, J., 57, 58, 59, 61, 71, 77, 78, 80, 81, Campos, ]. J., 5, 10, 102, 119, 125, 139
96, 97, 234, 246 Campos, R. G., 125, 139
Boyce.W.T., 271,279, 287 Camras, L, 5, 10, 102, 119
Boyle, M. H., 256, 266 Cantanzaro, S. J., 43, 52
Boys, A., 187, 199 Carlson, E. A., 274, 287
Boyum, LA., 148, 159, 161 Carlson,]., 225,226
Brackett, M. A., 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 51, Carnelley.K. B.,62,63, 71,72
52, 53, 54 Carson,]. L., 148, 149, 159, 161
Bradley, B., 245, 246 Carstensen, L. L., 31, 33, 34, 305
Bradley, L, 229 Caruso, D. R., 39, 43, 44, 53, 54
Bradley, M., 21,35 Carver, C. S., 188, 189, 200
Bradley, S., 106,119 Caspi, A., 191, 197, 200, 202, 305
Brand, B., 97 Cassidy, ]., 59, 60, 71, 78, 80, 97, 98, 111,
Brasfield, T. L., 198, 203 119, 120, 121, 148, 159, 161
Brasher, P. M., 220, 226 Castellani, A. M., 299, 305
Braungart, J. M., 148, 159 Castro, L, 229
Braverman, D. L., 39, 54 Catalano, R. F., 50, 52
Breakwell, G. M., 190, 199 Caudill-Slosberg, M., 229
Brennan, K. A., 60, 71, 72, 87, 92, 97, 224, Cavell, T. A., 295, 301,305
226 Cella, D. F., 226
Brewin, C., 247 Champion, C., 130, 139
Bridges, L.]., 5, 10 Chapman, A, L., 198, 202
Briner, R. B., 15, 35 Chapman, C. R., 208, 229
Brody, G. H., 132, 139 Charles, G., 98
Brown,]. L, 49, 50, 51,52 Chaudry, N., 49, 51
Brown, S. A., 187, 200 Chentsova-Dutton, Y., 28, 35
Bryk, A. S., 194,199 Chesney, M. A., 188, 201
Buck.R., 130, 139 Christensen, A. R., 238, 246, 301, 305
Buddin, N., 104, 120 Christensen, D. N., 219, 226
Buffington, A. L. H., 228 Chung, T., 188, 200
Bultz, B. D., 219-220, 226 Cicchetti, D., 49,52,125,139,177,181,233,
Buriel, R., 127, 141 246
Burks, C. M., 148, 161 Clark, C. L., 60, 71, 87, 97, 224, 226
Burleson, M. H., 222, 229 Clark, L. A, 191,200
Burrowes, B. D., 132, 139 Clark, M. S., 55, 71
Burrows, L, 222, 229 Classen, C., 34
Bush, E. G., 277, 287 Clipp, E., 228
Bushman, B.J., 187, 199 Clore, G. C., 13, 33
Butkovsky, L., 148, 159 Clore, G. L.,185, 202
Butler, E. A., 19, 33 Clothier, P., 243, 248
Butler, L. D., 34 Cohen, L. M., 187, 188, 200
Cohen, S., 219, 227
Caffray,C. M., 187, 199 Coie,]., 102, 106, 114, 119
Caldwell, D. S., 227, 228 Colder, C. R., 190, 200
Gale, E. M., 190, 199 Cole, D. A., 133, 139
Calhoun, L. G., 95, 99 Cole, J. R., 34
Calkins, S. D., 42, 52 Cole, P.M., 5, 10, 101, 108, 119, 125, 130,
Camerer, C. F., 184, 201 139, 149, 158, 159, 165, 175, 179
Campbell, D., 256, 266 Collins, N.L., 62, 63, 71,72
308 AUTHOR INDEX

Collins, W. A., 139, 162 Dennis, T. A., 5,10,101,119, 149,159,165,
Contreras, ]. M., 161 179
Cook, E. T., 138, 141 Demon, W. H., 243, 246
Cooper, C. L., 227 DePaulo, B. M., 17, 33
Cooper, ]. T., 55, 201 Derevensky, J. L, 188,202
Cooper, M. L, 186, 187,188,190,191,193, de Ridder, M. A. ]., 267
200, 202 Derrvberrv, D., 127, 139
Cooperman, S., 105, 119 Dessaulles, A., 243, 246
Cordova, ]. V., 299, 305 Dettling, A. C, 177, 181
Cordova, M., 34 Diamond, C. R., 248
Cornelius, J. R., 203 Diamond, L. M., 68, 69, 71
Costa, P. T., Jr., 189, 200 Dibble, S., 207, 228
Cote, S., 40, 46, 53 Dickson, N., 200
Cotte, ]., 187, 201 Dickstein, S. S., 275, 288
Couchoud, E. A., 148, 160 DiClemente, R. ]., 203
Cowan, C. P., 168, 179 Dieperink, M., 85, 98
Cowan, P., 168, 179 Dimidjian, S., 238, 246
Coyne J. C., 257, 266 DiPaolo, M. T., 39, 53
Cozzarelli, C., 82, 97 Dix, T., 129, 140
Creasey, G., 64, 71 Dodge, K. A., 102, 106, 110, 114, 116, 117,
Crick, N. R., 145, 159 119, 139,144,145,159, 160
Crockenberg, S., 168, 179 Donnelly, ]. M., 220, 227
Cronbach, L., 293, 304 Dornheim, L., 55
Crosby, R. A., 198, 203 Douglas, M., 288
Crowell, A., 120 DuRocherSchudlich,T., 166-167,170,175,
Crowley, M., 251, 267 181, 182
Cumberland, A., 127, 128, 130, 140, 142, Dube, M., 64, 71
251,265,300,304 Dukewich, T. L., 166, 180
Cumberland-Li, A., 130, 139 Duncan, S., 103, 119
Cummings, E. M., 137, 139, 147, 160, 163, Dunsmore, J. C, 148, 160
164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170,
172, 175, 176, 177, 180, 181, 182, Easterbrook, J. A., 40, 52
231,246,270,287 Edwards, W., 184, 201
Egeland, B., 274, 287
Dalton, J. A., 209, 225, 226, 227 Egert, ]. R., 228
Damasio, A. R., 38, 52 Egloff, B., 33
D'Amico, E., 186, 189, 201, 202 Eisenberg, M. E., 271,288
Damon, W., 55, 119, 141 Eisenberg, N., 31, 33, 55, 68, 71, 119, 125,
Dane, K, 120 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133,
Darling, M., 273, 287 135, 139, 140, 141, 142, 151, 153,
Daubman, K. A., 38, 40, 53 156, 160, 191, 201, 251, 265, 270,
Davidson, R. ]., 201 300, 304
Davies, P. T., 147, 160, 163, 164, 165, 166, Ekman, P., 14, 19, 34
167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, Elias, M. J., 50, 52
175, 177, 180, 181, 182, 231, 246, Elliott, R., 232, 246
270, 287 Ellis, L. K., 191,202
Davis, D., 80, 97 El Sheikh, M., 169, 175, 181
Davis, K. E., 61, 72 Emde, R., 115, 120,289
Dearing, K. F., 148, 160 Emilien, G., 92, 93, 98
Deffenbacher, J., 198, 201 Emmons, R. A., 40, 53
Denham, S. A., 5, 10, 148, 158, 160 Engdahl, B., 85, 98
Dennis,]., 162, 289 Enns, V., 78, 97
AUTHOR INDEX 309

Epstein, J. A., 17,33 Fruzzetti, A. E., 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254,
Epstein, N. B., 70, 71, 217, 226, 238, 246 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261,
Erickson, E. A., 33 262, 264, 265, 266, 267
Ettinger, D., 248 Fruzzetti, A. R., 252, 256, 258, 259, 260, 261,
Evans, D. E., 68-69, 73 266
Evans, T., 39, 54 Fung, H., 31, 33
Evers, A. W. M, 209, 227 Furrow,]. L, 245, 246
Fabes, R. A., 68, 71,129,130,135,139,140, Gall, M., 47, 54

142, 151, 153, 160, 191,201, 288 Ganiban, J. M., 5, 10, 125, 139
Fals-Stewart, W., 257, 266 Garber, J., 139
Fearnow, W. K., 132, 141 Gardner, H, 38, 52
Feeney, B. C, 63, 64, 71, 72, 224, 227 Gamer, P. W., 132, 140, 152, 160
Fehr, B., 78, 97 Gaschke, Y., 39, 53
Feinman, S., 289 Ge, X., 132,139
Fejfar, M. C., 188, 201 Gee, C. B., 299, 305
Feldman Barrett, L, 57, 58, 59n, 61, 62, 63, Geenen, R., 209, 227
64, 69, 70, 73 Geggie, P. H., 220, 226
Feuerstein, M., 209, 226 Gendlin, E. T., 244, 248
Field, T. M., 177, 181 Genest, M., 208, 229
Bering, C., 271,288 George, T., 219, 228
Fiese, B. H., 271, 272, 274, 276, 277, 278, Gershoff.E.T., 129,130,131,132,133,135,
279, 280, 284, 288, 289 139, 140
Fincham, F. D., 154, 160, 163, 164, 174, Getz, L, 38, 52
181 Gibson, J., 228
Fisher, J. E., 266 Giese-Davis, J., 33, 34
Fisher, L., 284, 288 Gil, K. M., 228
Fiske, S. T., 55 Gilbert, P., 246, 247
Fitzsimmons, G. M., 294, 305 Gill, L. H., 229
Flanagan, E., 175, 18) Gillath, O., 63, 72, 87, 98
Fleeson,]., 144, 162 Ginzburg, K., 85-86, 92, 99
Fleishman, S., 227 Giordano, L., 208, 228
Florian, V, 63, 72, 82, 85, 94, 97, 98, 224, Glaser, R., 168, 181
228, 245, 248 Glassman, S. L, 257, 267
Fobair, P., 34 Gleason, J. B., 275, 276, 289
Folkman, S., 14, 35, 188, 201 Goeke-Morey, M. C., 137, 139, 164, 166,
Follette, V. M., 266 167, 169, 172, 177, 180, 181, 182
Fonagy, P., I l l , 112, 120 Goering, P. N., 256, 266
Ford, L., 245, 247 Gold,]., 103, 106, 119
Fordyce, W. E., 214, 217, 227 Golden, C. J., 55
Forgas, J. P., 189, 201 Goldman, A., 243, 247
Forman, E. M., 165, 171, 172, 180 Goldman, R. N., 232, 246, 242, 248
Fox, N. A., 42, 52, 55,142, 177, 181 Goldman, S. L., 43, 54
Fraley, R. C., 59, 60, 61, 72 Goldsmith, H. H., 201
Frankel, C. B., 5, 10, 102,119 Gomez,].]., 49, 51
Fravel, D., 288 Good, A. B., 209, 227
Frederickson, B. L., 81, 98 Goodnow, J. ]., 129, 141
Freire-Bebeau, L., 28, 35 Gotlib, I. H., 82, 99
Frick, P., 113, 114, 118, 120, 121 Gottestam, K., 34, 305
Frijda, N. H., 13, 14, 34, 233, 247 Gottman, J. M., 32, 33, 34, 130, 132, 140,
Fromme, K., 186, 189, 201, 202 145, 151, 153, 155, 156, 160, 162,
Frone, M. R., 187, 200, 202 177, 181, 245,247
310 AUTHOR INDEX

Gray, J. A., 127, 141, 186, 189,201 Harter, S., 104, 120
Green, C., 98 Hartrup, W. W., 162
Greenberg, L. S., 70, 72, 232, 234, 235, 237, Hawkins, ]. D., 50, 52
238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, Hawkins, R. P., 226
246, 247, 248, 253, 266 Hayes, S. C., 266, 266
Greenberg, M., 110, 120 Haythornthwaite, J., 229
Greenberg, M. T., 50, 52, 138, 141 Hazan, C., 57, 59, 59n, 60, 62, 72, 80, 81,
Greenwald, M., 21, 35 82, 99, 224, 227
Greenwood, D., 63, 64, 73 Heard, H., 257, 267
Greenwood, G., 43, 52 Heffner, K. L, 168, 181
Greif, E. B., 275, 289 Heidgerken, A. D., 295, 305
Grelling, B. Z., 97 Heindel, S., 169, 181
Heinrich, R. L., 220, 227
Grewal, D., 44, 47, 52, 53
Helgeson, V. S., 219, 227
Grich, J., 63, 73
Helson, R., 31,34
Gross, J. ]., 13,14,15,16,17, 18, 22, 25, 29,
Henrich, C. C., 49, 51
30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 41, 42, 43,
Henry, B., 191, 200
49,52,125,126,141,150,159,160,
Hesse, E., 86, 98
181, 211, 212, 227, 251,266, 296, Hetherington, E. M., 162
305 Heyman, R. E., 253, 267
Grossman, 106 Hibbs, E. D., 201
Grorevant, H. D., 288 Higgins, E. T., 55, 73, 200
Grusec,]. E., 129, 141 Hill, C, 201
Grych,J. H., 163, 164, 174, 181 Hinde, R. A., 289
Gunderson, V., 271,289 Hinshaw, S. P., 198, 201
Gunlicks, M., 64, 66, 73 Hirschberger, G., 94, 98
Gunnar, M. R., 177, 181 Ho, K., 3, 185, 202
Gupta, M., 257, 266 Hoffman, J. M., 129, 141,229
Gupta, R., 188, 202 Hoffman, M., 104, 109, 110, 111, 120
Gurman, A. S., 246, 248 Hoffman, P. D., 252, 256, 259
Gustafson, D. H., 226 Hoffman, R., 115,119
Guthrie, I. V., 129, 140 Holmes, B., 64, 73
Holt, R., 148, 160
Haddad, P., 219, 227 Hooven, C., 32, 34,130,140, 151,160, 245,
Haggerty, D. ]., 55 247
Halberstadt, A. G., 132, 139, 148, 160 Horesh, N., 87, 98
Hall, L. E., 55 Horowitz, L. M., 60, 62, 71, 83, 84, 98
Hallberg, I. R., 207, 227 Horvath, P., 190, 201
Hamelin, M., 64, 71 Howell, K. J., 276, 288
Hamm, A., 21,35, 248 Hoyle, R. H., 188, 190,201
Mannish, L., 160 Hsee, C. K., 38, 53, 185, 202
Hansen, W. B., 203 Hsu, A. Y. C., 34, 305
Hardy, D. F., 132, 141 Hubbard, J. A., 148, 160
Harlan, E. T., 129, 141 Hudis, C. A., 227
Harless, D. W., 184, 201 Huffman, L. C., 124,138, 141
Harnish, J., 106, 119 Hughes,]. N., 295, 301,305
Harold, G. T., 164, 167, 180, 181 Hunsley, ]., 242, 248
Harrington, H., 200 Huppert, J. D., 257,267
Harris, P. L, 120, 162 Hurwitz, H., 228
Harrist, A. W., 144, 145, 160 Hussong, A. M., 188, 190, 201
Hart, C. H., 162
Hart,]., 177, 181 lavnieli, D., 63, 72
AUTHOR INDEX 311

Imber-Black, E., 287, 289, 290 Kendall, P. C, 251,267
Isen, A. M., 38, 40, 53, 185, 201 Kennedy-Moore, E., 270, 289
Isley, S., 149, 151, J60, 161 Kenny, D. A., 195, 199
Ivcevic, Z., 44, 52 Kerivan, A. S., 124, 141
Iverson, K. M., 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 256, Kermoian, R., 125, 139
258, 264, 266 Kerns, K. A., 161
hard, C. E., 49, 52, 233, 246 Kiecolt-Glaser, J., 168, 181, 232, 248
Kiesler, D. J., 244, 248
Jaccard,]., 271,289 Killen, M., 119
Jackson, B., 186, 201 Killian, C, 162,289
Jacobs, J. S., 279, 290 Kim, M., 150, 154, 155, 160, 161, 162, 289
Jacobs, J. W. G., 209, 227 Kinchen, S., 201
Jacobson, N. S., 246, 248, 253, 266,301, 305 King, L. A., 40, 53
Jacobvitz, D., 110, 120 Kirisci, L., 203
Jaedicke, S., 132, 141 Kirkendol, S. E., 17,33
Jaffe, K., 63, 71 Kirkpatrick, L. A., 64, 72, 224, 227
Jakobsson, U. L. R, 207, 227 Kirsch, L, 250, 266
James, P., 243, 247 Klein, M. H., 244, 248
James, S. A., 271,287 Kliewer, W. K., 132, 141
Jensen, E. W., 271,287 Kline, C. A, 279, 288
Jensen, M. P., 209, 227 Kline, R. B., 132, 141
Jensen, P. S., 201 Klohnen, E.G., 31,34
John, O. P., 15, 18, 25, 30, 31, 32, 34, 42, Kobak, R. R., 80, 97
43,52,141,200,296,305 Kochanska,G., Ill, 113,114,115,120,129,
Johnson, S. M., 70,72,96,98,232,234, 242, 137, 141
243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 301- Koenig, A., 115, 120
302, 305 Koeter, M. W., 267
Jones, H. E., 17, 35, 99 Koh Rangarajoo, E., 78, 97
Jones, S. M., 49, 51 Koopman, C., 34
Josephs, K., 288 Kornblith, A. B., 227
Julien, D., 64, 71 Kraaimaat, F. W., 209, 227
Junghofer, M., 248 Kragness, L., 207, 228
Kramer, G. P., 38, 51
Kadis, J., 47, 53 Kramer, R., 103, 119
Kahneman, D., 184, 203 Kretz, L., 97
Kann, L., 201 Kriegel, W., 209, 229
Kanninen, K., 86, 98 Krueger, R. R, 188, 191,202,305
Kaplan De-Nour, A., 227 Kruglanski, A. W., 73
Karbon, M., 160 Kubicek, L. F., 279, 289
Kashy, D. A., 17,33 Kuczynski, L., 180
Kassel, J. D., 82, 99 Kuhlman, D. M., 189, 203
Katz, E. C, 186, 189,201,202 Kupersmidt, J. B., 160
Katz, L. R, 32, 34, 130, 140, 151, 160, 177, Kusche, C. A., 50, 52, 138, 141
181,245,247
Keefe, R J., 208, 209, 210, 214, 215, 217, Labouvie, E., 188, 200
218, 220, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, Ladd, G. W., 143, 161,162,162
228, 229 Landesman, S., 271,289
Keelan, J. P. R., 78, 97 Lane.S., 177, 181
Keller, M., 104, 120 Lang, P., 21, 35
Keller, P. S., 172, 180 Langenbucher, J., 188, 200
Kelley, J. C., 223, 228 Langley, J., 200
Kelly, M. L., 257, 266 Langrock, A, 168, 179
312 AUTHOR INDEX

Lantieri, L., 50, 52 Major, B., 82, 97
Larsen, R. ]., 41, 53 Malarkey.W. B., 168, 181
Lasseaux, L., 98 Malcolm, W, 245, 247
LaTaillade, J. ]., 238, 246 Malouff, J. M., 55
Laursen, B., 162 Maki, T., 104,120
Lawton, M. P., 33 Mandler, G., 40, 53
Lazarus, R. S., 14, 17, 35 Manne, S. L, 214, 228
Le, H., 49, 51 Margolin, G., 305
LeDoux, J. E., 235, 248 Marjinsky, K. A. T., 274, 288
Lefebvre, J. C., 209, 228 Markson, S., 277, 289
Leidy, M. S., 150, 154, 155, 161 Marsden, ]., 187, 199
Leisen, J. C., 223 228 Martell, C. R., 238, 246
Leith, K. P., 186, 202 Martin, D., 98
Lemerise, E., 106, 109, 112, 117, 118, 119 Martin, M., 229
Lemieux, K. E., 85, 99 Martin, S. E., 5,10,101,119, 149,159,165,
Lenhart, L., 117, 120 179
Leonard, K. E., 64, 73 Martini, M., 271,289
Lerner, N., 46, 48, 53, 141 Masion, L, 243, 248
Leskela, ]., 85, 98 Masters,]., 103, 119
Levenson, R. W., 17, 29, 34 Maszk, P., 160
Lewis, M., 120, 271, 288, 289 Mathieu, P. L., 244, 248
Liddle, H. A., 245, 248 Matt, K. S., 222, 229
Lietaer, G., 248 Maurer, M., 50, 53
Liew, ]., 133, 140 Maxwell, S.E., 133, 139
Lin, P., 256, 266 Mayer, J. D., 38, 39, 39n, 43, 44, 45, 51, 53,
Linehan, M. M., 198, 202, 251, 252, 253, 54
257, 259, 266, 267 McBurnett, K., 113, 120
Linton, S. ]., 209, 222, 229 McCarthy, D. M., 187, 200
Lipkus, I., 228 McClain, T. M., 42, 55, 188, 203
Lipman, A. G., 229 McCrae, R. R., 189, 200
Lochman,]., 106, 117, 119, 120 McCubbin, A., 279, 289
Lockwood, C. M., 129, 141 McCubbin, H., 279, 289
Loesel, F., 188, 202 McDowell, D. J., 150, 152, 153, 154, 160,
Loewenstein, G. F., 38, 53, 185, 202 162, 289
Loney, B., 120 McGarvey, A. L., 82, 99
Lopes, P. N., 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 52, 53 McGee, R. O., 191,200
Lopez, S. ]., 54 McGuire, M., 234, 247
Losoya, S. H., 131, 133, 140, 142, 288 McKinley, M., 148, 160
Lourenco, O., 104, 120 McNally, R. ]., 92, 93, 98
Lover, A., 105, 119 McTavish, F., 226
Loving, T. J., 168, 181 Meagher, R., 98
Lowr y > K.,251,266 Meehan, B. T., 301, 305
Lowry, R., 201,251,266 Meehl, P., 293, 304
Lubart, T. L, 38, 52 Mehlinger, S. L, 124, 141
Lumley, M. A., 223, 228 Meichenbaum, D., 208, 229
Lynam, D., 190, 202 Meisels, S. J., 289
Lyons-Ruth, K., 110, 120, 177, 181 Mellers, B. A., 38, 54, 185, 202
Mellon, S., 219, 228
MacDonald, K., 144, 161 Melzack, R., 213, 218, 228
MacKinnon, D. P., 129, 141 Messick, S., 297, 305
Magdol, L., 305 Mezzich, A., 203
Maguire, P., 219, 227 Miaskowski, C., 207, 228
AUTHOR INDEX 313

Michel, M. K., 108, 119, 125, 139 Nowicki, G. P., 38, 53
Mikulincer, M., 58, 59, 59n, 60, 61, 63, 64, Nunner-Winkler, G., 103, 121
72, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 85, 85-
86, 87, 88, 90, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, O'Brien, B., 113, 120
99, 171, 18;, 224, 228, 245, 248, O'Callaghan, M., 305
270, 289 O'Connor, R., 190, 200
Miller, A. L., 105, 121, 257,267 O'Connor, S., 280, 290
Miller,]. D., 188, 190,201,202 O'Donohue, W. T., 266
Miller, P. A., 132, 141 Getting, E. R., 198, 201
Milbn, T., 98 Offord, D. R., 256, 266
Mintz, L, 186, 201 Ognibene, T. C., 63, 72
Minuchin, P., 273, 289 Ohman, A., 248
Mischel, W., 17,35 Ohry, A., 85-86, 92, 99
Mitchell, D., 228 Olson, R.E., 271,288
Miterany, D., 91,92, 98 Olson, S., 105, 121
Moffitt, T. E., 188, 191, 200, 202, 298, 305 O'Neil.R., 144,149,150,151,153,156,160,
Mood, D., 219, 228 161, 162
Moore, B., 17, 35 Oppenheim, D., 115, 120
Moore, T. ]., 250, 266 Orbach, I, 63, 72
Moos, R. H., 188, 200 Orcutt, H. K., 193, 200
Morris, A. S., 31,33, 140 Orina, M. M., 63, 73
Mosco, E., 251, 257, 264, 266
Mudar, P., 187, 200 Padavich, D., 115, 120
Muller, R. T., 85, 99 Page, S. A., 220, 226
Mumme, D. L., 125, 139 Pajer, K., 203
Munoz, R. F., 32, 34, 41, 49, 52 Palfai, T. P., 40, 43, 54
Murphy, B.C., 140, 153, 160,191,201,288 Pandina, R., 188, 200
Murray, K. T., 129, 141 Papp, L. M., 137, 139, 166, 167, 180, 182
Myers, M. G., 187,200 Pargament, K. 1,277,287
Myers, R. L, 169, 181 Parke, R. D., 127, 141, 143, 144, 145, 146,
148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154,
Nachmias, O., 63, 72 155, 156, 159, 160, 161, 162, 270,
NajmanJ.M., 298, 305 289
Neal-Barnett, A. M., 161 Parker, J. G., 143, 145, 162
Nelligan, ]. S., 63, 73 Parker, S. W., 177, 181
Nelson, C. A., 158, 161 Parkinson, B., 15,35,41,54
Neria, Y., 85-86, 92, 99 Parrott, W. G., 14, 19, 21, 35, 40, 54
Neumark-Sztainer, D., 271, 288 Pascual-Leone, J., 240, 247
Newman, J. R., 42, 55, 188, 203 Pasupathi, M., 34, 305
Newton, T. L, 232, 248 Patrick, B. C., 58, 73
Nezlek, ]., 53 Patterson, T., 265
Neiworski, T., 97 Peacock,]. L, 271,287
Nicassio, P. M., 208, 229 Peirce, R. S., 187, 202
NICHD Child Care Research Network, 157, Penasse, C., 98
161 Pennebaker, J. W., 42, 54, 223, 228
Nicholls, S. S., 250, 266 Pereg, D., 171, 181,270,289
Nikles, J., 305 Perlman, D., 73, 99
Noien-Hoeksema, S., 42, 54 Perlmann, R. Y., 275,289
Noonan, D. L, 277, 290 Perri, L. M., 208, 228
Norman, S., 223, 228 Pervin.L. A., 141,200
Northouse, L. L., 219, 228 Pettit, G., 102, 110, 119, 144, 160
Nower, L, 188, 202 Pettit, S., 106, 119
314 AUTHOR INDEX

Pfafflin, F., 120 Rholes, W. S., 57,61, 63, 71, 72, 73,94,97,
Phillips, C., 188, 201 98, 99, 296, 305
Phillips, C. M., 187, 199 Rice, C. L., 47, 54
Phillips, D., 63, 73 Rice, L. N., 242, 248
Phillips, D. A., 124, HI Richards,]. M., 18, 35
Picavet, H. S., 222, 229 Riggs, N., 50, 52
Pick, A. D., 159 Ritov, L, 38, 54, 185, 202
Pickering, A. D., 127, HI Rivers, S., 44, 47, 50,51,54
Pidada, S. U, 133, HO Roberts, J., 281,289,290
Pietromonaco, P. R., 57, 58, 59n, 61, 62, 63, Roberts, J. E., 82, 99
64,65,66,68,71,72,73 Robertson, C., 228
Pingree, S., 226 Robins, C. ]., 198, 202
Pitceathly, C., 219, 227 Robinson, E., 227, 228
Plain, F., 50, 53 Roderick, T., 50, 52
Plutchik, R., 251,267 Rogers, C.R., 81,99, 242, 248
Pollack, L, 188, 201 Rogers, G. M., 82, 99
Pokrock, S., 288 Rom, E., 94, 99
Ponton, L. E., 203 Romano, ]. M., 209, 227
Pope, M. S., 227 Rosensteil, A. K., 222, 229
Popenoe, D., 271, 289 Ross, ]., 201
Posner, M. L, 191, 202 Roth, S., 222, 229
Potter, P., 229 Rothbart, M. K., 68-69, 69, 73, 126, 127,
Poulin.R., 160 129, 139, 141, 155, 158, 162, 191,
Power, M., 247 202, 295, 305
Power, T. G., 115, 121, 130, 132, 139, Rottenberg, ]., 32, 35
HI Rowe, C., 248
Powers, A. M., 186, 200 Rubin, Z, 162
Powers, S., 64, 66, 68, 73 Rumble, M. E., 208, 228
Przymus, D. E., 28, 35 Russ, S. W., 52
Punamaki, R. L., 86, 98 Russell, M., 187, 200, 202
Putnam, R. D., 271,289 Ryff, C. D., 30, 31,35
Qouta, S., 86, 98 Saalbach, H., 104, 120

Quamma, J. P., 138, HI Saarni.C, 120, 152, 153, 154,162, 251,267
Quigley, K. S., 63, 69, 70, 73 Safran, ]. D., 253, 266
Salley, A., 227, 228
Radojevic, V., 208, 214, 215, 217, 229 Salovey, P., 38, 39, 39n, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46,
Raezer, L. B., 228 47,49,50,51,52,53,54
Raghavan, C.,49, 51 Sameroff, A. J., 271, 275, 284, 288, 289
Ramos-Marcuse, F., 115, 116, 119, 121 Samoluk, S. B., 203
Raptis, G., 227 Samples, F., 49, 51
Radius, J. H., 257, 267 Sampson, J. A., 57
Raudenbush, S. W., 194, 199 Sandy, J. M., 187-188, 203
Read, S. J., 62, 71 Sayer, A., 64, 66, 73
Reilly, P. M., 198, 202 Sayrs, J. H. R, 257, 267
Reinecke, M. A., 82, 99 Schachncr, D. A., 186, 202
Reis, H. T., 58, 64, 73, 74 Schaeffer, C. M., 97
Reiser, M., 129, 135, HO, 142 Schag, C. C., 220, 227
Reiss, D., 271, 277, 284, 287, 289, 290 Schaie, K. W., 33
Reiter, S., 169, 181 Schaps, E,, 50, 55
Revclle, W., 190, 202 Scharff, J. S., 238, 248
Reynolds, S., 15, 35 Scheier, M. F., 188, 189, 200
AUTHOR INDEX 315

Scher, S., 184, 199 Skinner, J. B., 187,200
Scherer, K. R., 22, 35, 201 Sloman, L., 246
Schermerhorn, A. C, 175, ISO Sluyter, D. J., 39n, 54
Schiller, M., 275, 288 Smetana, ]., 119
Schindler, D., 242, 248 Smith, B. H., 50, 52
Schmidt, S., 248 Smith, B. W., 209, 229
Schneider, S. L, 187, 199, 248 Smith, C. L, 142
Schneider, W. J., 238 Smith, D. K., 175, 179
Schore, A. K, 233, 248 Smith, J., 228
Schouten, J. S., 222, 229 Smith, M., 160
Schupp, H., 233, 248 Smith, N. C., 33
Schutte, N. S., 44, 55 Smith, P. K., 112, 121, 162,289
Schutz, A., 53 Smith, S., 228
Schwartz, A., 38, 54 Smyth, J. M., 278, 290
Schwartz, N., 185, 202 Snow, R. E., 305
Schwarz,N., 40, 55, 202 Snyder, C. R., 54
Scipio, C. D., 208, 228 Snyder, D. K., 238, 248, 249, 256, 257, 266,
Scoboria, A., 250, 266 267, 302, 305
Scott, R. L, 299, 305 Sodian, B., 103, 121
Sebanc, A., 177, 181 Solomon, D., 50, 55
Seifer, R., 275, 288 Solomon, Z., 85-86, 86, 92, 99
Sellin, L, 53 Sorrentino, E. M., 55, 200
Sells, C. W, 183, 203 Sosa, R., 151, 161
Senchak, M., 64, 73 Southam-Gerow, M. A., 251, 267
Sessa, F. M., 248 Spagnola, M., 276, 288
Shaffer, L. F., 38, 55 Speca, M., 220, 226
Shamir, H., 170, 177, 180, 182 Spence, S., 305
Shapiro, C. M., 186, 200 Spinrad, T. L., 125,127,128,130,140, 251,
Shaver, P. R., 57, 58, 59, 59n, 60, 61, 62, 265, 300, 304
63, 64, 71, 72, 74, 78, 79, 80, 81, Sroufe, L. A., 57, 74, 78, 99, 111, 112, 121,
82, 83, 87, 88, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 144,162,234,234,248,274,287
120, 121, 171, 181, 186, 202, 224, St. Andre, M., 275, 288
226, 227, 270, 289 St. Lawrence, J. S., 198, 203
Sheets, V., 129, 141 Starr, K., 228
Sheldon, M. S., 187, 200 Steinberg, L., 273, 287
Shelton, K., 113, 121 Steinglass, P., 284, 290
Shelton, K. H., 164, 181 Sternberg, R. ]., 38, 55
Shenk, C., 251, 252, 256, 266 Stevenson-Hinde, J., 289
Shepard, S. A., 140, 142, 288 Stewart, S. H., 186, 203
Shields, S. A., 48, 55 Stijen, T., 267
Shinar, O., 187-188, 188, 203 Stockburger, ]., 248
Shonkoff, ]. P., 124, 141,289 Stone, A. A., 278, 290
Shopshire, M. S., 198, 202 Story, M., 271, 288
Sicoli, L. A., 85, 99 Strang,]., 187,199
Sifneos, P. E., 40,51,223, 229 Straus, R., 44, 45, 53
Silva, P. A., 191, 200, 305 Studts, J. I., 228
Silverthorn, P., 113, 121 Suarez, A., 257, 267
Simon, H. A., 40, 55 Sullivan, M. J. L, 211-213, 222, 228, 229
Simon, L, 214,229 Sumer, N., 82, 97
Simpkins, S. D., 162, 289 Summerfield, A. B., 22, 35
Simpson,]. A., 61,63,66, 71,72, 73,94,97, Siisser, K., 38, 51
98, 99, 296, 305 Sutton,]., 112, 117, 121
316 AUTHOR INDEX

Sutton, L, 227 Walberg, H. ]., 52, 54
Swann, W., 254, 257, 264, 267 Wald, L. H, 209, 227
Swettenham, ]., 112, 121 Walker, J., 243, 248
Sydney, R., 305 Wall, P. D., 213, 218, 228
Wall, S., 59, 70, 95, 97
Tarter, R. E., 190, 203 Wallbort, H. G., 22, 35
Taylor, S.E., 125, 139 Waller, N. G., 60, 72
Tedeschi, R. O., 95, 99 Wallhagen, M., 207, 228
Teitlebaum, M. A., 277, 290 Waltregny, A., 98
Templin, T., 219, 228 Waltz, M., 209, 229
Teti, L. O., 108, 119, 125, 139 Wamboldt, F. S., 276, 278, 280, 284, 288,
Thayer, R. E., 42, 55, 188, 203 290
Thompson, A., 279, 289 Wang, M. C., 52, 54
Thompson, R. A., 13, 35, 42, 55, 124, 125, Wang, Y., 135, 142
142, 149, J62, 165, 182,251,267 Ward, S. F., 219, 226
Thorn, B., 229 Warner, R.M., 44, 47, 51,52
Thorp, S. R., 257, 267 Warwar, S., 245, 247
Thuras, P., 85, 98 Waters, E., 57, 59, 70, 74, 78, 95, 97, 99,
Tidwell, M. O., 64, 74 111, 121
Timmons, K., 227, 228 Watson, D, 191, 200, 232, 246
Tomcho, T., 288 Watson, J. C., 242, 248, 270, 289
Totterdell, P., 15,35,41,54 Waysman, M., 92, 99
Tran, S., 94, 99 Weber, E. U, 38, 53, 185, 202
Tremblay, R. E., 190, 203 Wegner, D. M., 54
Troy, M., 112, 121 Weihs, K. L., 284, 288
Tsai, J., 28, 31, 34, 35, 135, 142, 305 Weike, A., 248
Turk, D. C., 208, 229 Weisman, M. H., 208, 229
Turner, ]. A., 208, 209, 227, 229 Weisner, T. S., 279, 290
Turvey, C., 43, 54 Weiss, R. L., 253, 267
Tversky, A., 184, 203 Weissberg, R. P., 52, 54
Twycross, R. G., 207, 226 Welch, N., 38, 53, 185, 202
Weller, A., 63, 72, 85, 98, 224, 228, 245,
Uebelacker, L. A., 256, 267 248
West, S. G., 129, 141
Valiente, C, 125, 129, 131, 136, 137, 140, Wexler, D., 248
142 Whiffen, V. E., 234, 248, 301-302, 305
Vanaerschot, G., 242, 248 Whisman, M. A., 82, 99, 231, 248, 249, 256,
van den Bosch, L. M. C., 267 257, 266, 267, 302, 305
van den Brink, W., 267 Whiting, R. A., 289, 290
van der Hart, O., 271,290 Wiley, D. E., 305
van't Pad Bosch, P., 209, 229 Wilhelm, F. H., 33
Vanyukov, M., 203 Williams, B., 201
Vaughn, B., Ill, 121 Williams, G. M., 305
Verheul, R., 257, 267 Wills, T. A., 187-188, 188, 203, 228
Vernon.L. L, 49, 51 Willson, V. L., 295, 305
Vernon, M. L, 80, 97 Wilson, B.)., 155, 156, 162
Vitaro, F., 190, 203 Wilson, C. L., 94, 99
Vlaeyen, J. W., 222, 229 Wilson,]., 177, 180
Vlaeyen, J. W. S., 209, 222, 229 Winter, M. A., 172, 180
Vohs, K. D., 202, 305 Woddis, D., 63, 72
Wolcott,]., 271,290
Wachs, T. F., 203 Wolf, D., 115, 120
AUTHOR INDEX 317

Wolin, S. J., 271, 277, 279, 284, 287, 290 Zahn-Wexler, C, 175, 179
Wood, P. K., 193, 200 Zautra, A. J., 209, 214, 221, 222, 228, 229
Wootton, J., 113, 114, 120, 121 Zeitlin, S. B., 186, 203
Wyer, M. M., 17, 33 Zelko, F., 103, 119
Wyman, S. E., 257, 267 Zhou, Q., 132, 133, 135, 140, 142, 288
Zins, J. E., 52, 54
Yaeger, A., 187-188, 203 Zuckerman, E., 227
Yazdani, N., 198, 203 Zuckerman, M., 189, 190, 197, 201, 203
Yocum, D., 229
Young, K., 38, 55
Youngblood, R., 225, 226
318 AUTHOR INDEX

SUBJECT INDEX
Accurate expression, 263-264 and pain, 223

and inaccurate labeling, 254 Amusement, extent of control of, 26, 27
Achenbach Child Behavior Checklist, 130 Amygdala, 233, 235
Action urges, identifying and managing of, Anger
261 as adaptive or maladaptive, 235
Activity pacing, as coping skill, 216 and aggression, 105-106
Adjustment, and adult attachment, 81-82 in attachment cycle, 237
Adolescents and attention regulatory processes, 156
and conceptions of happy victimization, in couples' conflict, 239
115 extent of control of, 26, 27
developmental differences in emotion in frustration-anger-aggression model,
regulation of, 296 106, 108, 116
emotion attributions of, 106-108 in interview episode, 20-21
risky behavior of, 183 (see also Risk tak- as protective response, 234-235
ing during adolescence) reflecting on, 241
self-disclosure and intimacy manage- as regulation target, 19
ment as task of, 146 revelation of (EFCT approach), 232
Affective reactivity, 58 Anger management therapy, 117, 198
and anxious-ambivalence, 64 Antecedent-focused emotion regulation, 5,
and attachment, 61, 63, 65-66 9, 15, 16, 125
and cognitive interventions, 70 Antecedent-focused skills, 211
Affective tasks, in course of development, Antecedent-focused strategies for emotion
146 regulation, 15, 16, 125, 294
Affect regulation, 14-15, 58 Anticipated emotions, 185
and attachment, 59, 61, 63, 65-66, 68 Anxiety
and cognitive interventions, 70 and attachment, 78, 224, 234
at dinner table, 274-278 and changes in coping strategies, 95
and PTSD, 84 extent of control of, 26, 27
and secondary attachment strategies, 78 in negative interactional cycle, 237
strategies of, 58, 79-80 Anxious-ambivalent (preoccupied) proto-
Aggression type, 60, 62, 171, 172, 176-177
and attachment, 112 and affective reactivity, 64
and happiness, 105 (see also "Happy vic- and emotional distress, 62-63
timization") and physiological response to stress,
positive emotions in, 102 67
reactive vs. proactive, 102, 105-106, and threat sensitivity, 68
116, 117, 118 Arthritis pain, 214
and adolescents' emotion attribu- emotional disclosure for, 223
tion, 107-108 partner-assisted coping with, 214-219
developmental origins of, 114 Asian Americans, emotional control among,
and emotional responsiveness, 112, 25-29
113,114 Asthma, family response to, 280
Alcohol use. See Risk taking during adoles- Asthma Impact Interview, 280
cence Attachment, 59n
Alexithymia affective bases of, 58, 62-66
and deficit in emotion perception, 40 and clinical intervention, 70
319
and interdisciplinary collaboration, biological correlates of, 158
69 and emotion regulation, 158-159
research on, 68-69 family pathways to, 158
and affect regulation, 63 and social competence, 155-158
in children Authoritarian parenting style, 135
affective bases of, 58-59 Authoritative parenting style, 116, 135
and competence, 270 Autonomy, as relationship need, 234
and empathy/happy victimization, Avoidance
110-112, 118 and attachment, 78, 224, 234
and marital relationship, 171 in model, 60, 61, 62, 53, 64, 66 (see
and moral socialization, 114 also Dismissing-avoidant proto-
and peer group adaptation, 144 type)
and romantic relationships, 60 and changes in coping strategies, 95
and couples' negative interactional in children's management of negative
cycles, 237 affect, 156
and emotion, 57, 58 emotional awareness and expression as
individual differences in, 59-61 overcoming, 238
and mental health, 81 in pain adjustment, 222-223
need for, 234, 235 and physiological response to stress, 67
and physiological response, 64, 66—68 in PTSD, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92-94,
and prosocial behavior, 81, 96-97 95
research needed on, 245 and threat sensitivity, 68
and romantic relationships, 57, 59, 60, Avoidance coping, 194, 195, 196-197, 198
63-64, 65 Awareness of emotion, lack of, 253
clinical interventions for, 70
and temperament, 68-69 Behavioral activation system (BAS), 186,
three-phase model of, 78-79 189
and trauma, 82-83 Behavioral inhibition system (BIS), 186,187
implications of and future directions Behavioral rehearsal, as coping skill, 216
for, 94-97 Big five model, 189
and PTSD, 83-94, 95-96 Biological correlates of emotional and
Attachment anxiety attentional regulation, 158
buffering for detrimental effects of, 94 Biological factors
and hyperactivation, 80 in emotion regulation, 295
and negative affectivity, 82 in psychopathology, 250
and PTSD, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90-91, 92- Biopsychosocial model of pain, 208-210
93 and early intervention, 225
Attachment behavioral system, 77 intervention studies on, 219
Attachment figures, 77, 79, 80 and nurses role, 225
Attachment injuries, 96 Biopsychosocial perspectives, 297
Attachment style, 78 Borderline personality disorder (BDP), 257,259
and partner-assisted pain coping, 224
Attachment theory, 57, 58-59, 69, 77-78 Callous-unemotional traits, 113-114, 118
and effect of previous traumas, 96 Cancer pain, 219
and emotion regulation, 8 interventions for management of, 225
research on, 296-297 partner-assisted coping with, 219-221
and marital discord, 165 Caregivers. See Infant-caregiver relationships
Attentional deployment, 16, 17, 159 Caregiving, intimate, 234
frequency of use of, 22 Caretaking Routines Interview, 279
Attentional deployment skills, 211 Catastrophizing, 222
Attention control, ineffective, 254 Change, and emotive regulation in everyday
Attention regulation, 155 life, 31-32
320 SUBJECT INDEX

"Change-oriented" skills, 255 two-process model of, 114
Chaotic routine/ritual type, 281-282 See also at Moral
Child abuse, and attachment-PTSD associa- Contempt, extent of control of, 26, 27
tion, 85 Contexts, social
Child agency, and marital discord, 176 in emotion management, 42
Child Behavior Checklist, 115, 151 of emotion regulation, 255
Chilean children, and marital conflict, 177 as emotional responding, 22
China, People's Republic of, study on in study, 298
children's effortful control in, 135 in survey, 23
Classification schemes, based on purpose, 41 variability of, 24
Clinical intervention, and affective bases of at end of life, 221
attachment, 69-70 Continuity, in routines and rituals, 273
Clinical psychology, and emotional intelli- Continuous Performance Task (CPT), 156-
gence research, 49 157
Closeness gradient, 22, 24 Control, vs. regulation, 5, 125-126
Cognitive change, 16, 17 Coping and coping strategies or styles, 14
frequency of use of, 22 and attachment avoidance (romantic
Cognitive change skills, 211 relationships), 65-66
Cognitive contextual framework, 174 and emotion experience, 195
Cognitive reappraisal, 17, 18, 30, 176-177, vs. managing emotions, 41
301 and partner-based intervention for pain,
and healthy functioning, 31 225
and pain, 209 proactive, 125
and positive vs. negative emotions, 30 security-based changes in, 95
stability of, 31, 32 Coping skills
in survey, 23, 25 in pain training for patients, 209
teaching increased use of, 33 in partner-assisted pain coping, 210-
Cognitive responses, dysfunctional, 254 214,216
Cognitive restructuring, 213 for arthritis, 214-219
as attention regulatory process, 156 and attachment style, 224
as coping skill, 216 for cancer, 220-221
Collect!vist cultures, and marital discord, 178 Core emotions, partners' expression of, 242
Color-naming task, Stroop, 91-92, 93, 94 Core feelings, awareness of, 239
Commitment, in routines and rituals, 273 Cortisol, 66, 67n, 177
Communication, in routines and rituals, 273 Couples
Communication skills training, 216 and attachment theory, 69
Concurrent emotion regulation, 125 effects of interactions of, 249
Conflict emotional connections in, 232
within couples, 236-237, 239 emotional intimacy within, 234-235
and EFCT approach, 232 and emotion dysregulation (research
and research on less damage to chil- agenda on), 265
dren, 245 lack of acceptance and validation skills
as marital discord, 164 (see also Marital in, 255
discord) lack of change or problem management
See also Negative interactional cycles skills in, 255
Conflict within family. See Marital discord and psychopathology or emotional
Conflict tactics dysregulation, 255-256
constructive and destructive, 166, 168- empirical foundations of, 256-258
169, 170-171 and relationship mindfulness, 263
and marital discord, 166-169 unrepresentative samples of, 299
teaching parents about, 179 See also Emotion-focused couples
Conscience development therapy (EFCT) approach; Partner-
SUBJECT INDEX 321

assisted pain management; Roman- validation skills in, 264
tic relationships Directionality, in relation of ERSBs and
Couples therapy. See also Marital therapy children's regulation, 132-133, 134
complex of relationships in, 256 Direction of regulation, and emotion re-
emotional awareness and expression in, sponse systems, 21
238-239 "Disappointing gift paradigm," 153,154, 175
therapeutic relationship in, 238 Disease. See Illness, chronic
CPT (Continuous Performance Task), 156- Disease management, and routines, 277-278
157 Disease-related pain. See Pain from disease
Criterion contamination, 298 Disgust, extent of regulation of, 25, 26, 27
Cross-cultural variation Dismissing-avoidant prototype, 61, 62, 171,
Asian Americans vs. European Ameri- 172, 176-177
cans in emotional regulation, 25-29 Disordered behaviors
in conflict tactics, 166-167, 168-169 and quality of relationships, 249
in relation of emotion regulation and See also at Risk taking
marital discord, 177-178 Display rules, 19, 149
in relation of ERSB and effortful con- parental correlates of knowledge and
trol, 133, 135 utilization of, 153-154
in self-regulation, 158 and peer social competence, 152-153
Cross-disciplinary collaboration. See Interdis- Distraction, as strategy, 42
ciplinary collaboration Distraction techniques, as coping skill, 216
Cultural issues, 8 Distress tolerance, 257-258
in relation of ERSBs and children's regu- Diverse paradigms, 298
lation, 133, 135 Divorce, 231, 285, 303
and relation between marital discord Drug use. See Risk taking during adolescence
and children's emotion regulation, Dysfunction
178 and emotion regulation in everyday life,
research needed on, 300 30-31
See also Emotion dysregulation
Data-analytic strategies, 298 Dysfunctional cognitive responses, 254
Deactivating strategies, 80-81, 91
and avoidant ex-POWs, 86 Ecocultural Family Interview, 279
in PTSD, 84 Education, in emotion, 33
and security-enhancing stimuli, 95 Education and prevention programs, 301
Decision process, emotions in, 185-186 EFCT. See Emotion-focused couples therapy
Decoding, emotion, 145, 147-148 approach
Defense, psychological, 14, 15 Effortful control (children), 6, 126
"Demand and withdraw" cycles, 253 and developmental outcomes, 129
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental and ERSBs, 129-130
Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV), 83,107 cultural issues in, 133, 135
Dialectic behavior therapy (DBT), 198,257- and directionality issues, 132-133,
258, 258-259 134
accurate expression in, 263-264 and mediating role of effortful con-
identifying and labeling emotions in, trol, 130-132, 135
260-261, 262 tests for needed, 137
identifying and managing action urges Embarrassment, extent of control of, 26, 27
in, 261 Emotion(s), 13, 232
mindfulness in, 257, 259-260 adolescents' attribution of, 106-108
of relationships, 263 in attachment processes, 57, 58
sorting of primary and secondary re- "harder" vs. "softer," 232, 301
sponses in, 261-262 identification and labeling of, 260-261,
tolerating painful emotions in, 262-263 262
322 SUBJECT INDEX

as infant's signaling system, 234 as skill, 50
vs. moods, 42 and social interaction, 45-47
motivational consequences of (negative value of, 3
vs. positive emotions), 189 Emotional intimacy within couples, 234-235
negative, 25, 26, 27, 29-30, 152, 156, Emotional Literacy in the Middle School
252-253, 303 program, 50
and pain, 221-223 Emotionally focused therapy, 70
need for education on, 226 Emotional perception and expression (per-
painful (tolerating of), 262-263 ceiving emotions), 39, 40, 147
reflection on, 240-241 Emotional Quotient Inventory, 44
in risk taking, 184-186 Emotional regulation. See Emotion regula-
by adolescents, 185 tion
in rituals, 276 Emotional responses
and routines, 277-278 primary and secondary, 261-262
socialization of (ERSBs), 127-129 social context of, 22
and children's effortful control, 129- Emotional security
135 clusters of, 171
transforming of, 241-242 and family experiences, 179
types of, 235-238 and marital discord, 164-165,168-169,
and victimization, 103-104 171-173
Emotional arousal or reactivity, 6, 252-253, and family configurations, 173
294 as organizational construct, 164
and emotion dysregulation, 258 Emotional security hypothesis (ESH), 6,163,
Emotional awareness 164, 166-169, 170, 171, 173-174,
in couples therapy, 238-239 176
lack of, 253 and sensitization hypothesis, 169-170
Emotional baseline, slow return to, 253 Emotional skills, 145
Emotional change in therapy, principles of, Emotional understanding (understanding
238-242 emotions), 39, 40, 148-149
Emotional competence, and linkages be- Emotion-coaching, 32, 245, 301
tween parenting and social compe- Emotion control, vs. emotion regulation, 5
tence, 146 Emotion dysregulation, 108, 251
Emotional control, importance of, 37 components of, 251-255
Emotional disclosure, in pain adjustment, and couple or family interventions
223 research agenda on, 265
Emotional display rules. See Display rules, 152 and dialectical behavior therapy, 258-
Emotional expressiveness, 148-149 259
in couples therapy, 238-239 and emotional arousal (basic science
and family, 231 needed on), 258
family rules on, 274 and family interactions, 255-256, 257
Emotional facilitation of thought (using and happy victimization, 108-110
emotions), 39, 40 and attachment-empathy relation,
Emotional intelligence, 37, 38-41 110-112
and emotionally insecure children, 166 and parental contribution, 114-116
emotional management in, 39, 40-43, and parenting-empathy-aggression
294 relation, 112-114
four-branch model of, 39, 45 Emotion encoding and decoding, 147-
future directions and policy implications 148
for, 47-51 Emotion-focused couples therapy (EFCT)
importance of, 231 approach, 232
measurement of, 43—45 conceptual and theoretical underpin-
and managing emotions, 48 nings of
SUBJECT INDEX 323

and emotional arousal disorders, 303 as mediator, 155, 300
and emotional intimacy within and mindfulness skills, 259
couples, 234-235 need for, 13,233
and emotion theory, 233-234 new approaches to, 3
and principles of emotional change opposing types of, 125-127
in therapy, 238 and overregulation vs. underregulation,
and types of emotion, 235-238 239-240
empirical foundations of, 242-245 in partner-assisted pain coping, 210—
future directions for research on, 245- 214
246 for arthritis, 217-218
and relationship trauma, 302 in end-of-life context, 221
Emotion-generative process, 14 physiology in, 176
Emotion knowledge, assessments of, 105 process model of, 15-17
Emotion(al) management (managing emo- questions on, 6, 19
tions), 32,39,40-43,45,47,48,294 research on, 13-14, 48, 293, 304
Emotion regulation, 3—4, 14, 233-234 application issues in, 300-304
and accurate self-expression, 264 conceptual and theoretical issues in,
antecedent- vs. response-focused (con- 293-297
current), 5, 9, 15, 16, 125 and incomplete knowledge on, 258
and attachment theory, 77 (see also At- methodological issues in, 297-300
tachment) on parental and marital correlates in
and attentional deployment, 159 different cultures, 158
and attentional regulation, 158-159 and treatment, 302
biological correlates of, 158 and risk taking during adolescence, 187-
clinical implications of, 8-9 191
conceptual and theoretical issues on, 5- intervention implications in, 198-
7, 158 199
constructs to be operationalized for, 6-7 issues unresolved in, 191-196
and couples or family distress (research research implications in, 196—198
needed on), 265 social context of, 22, 23, 24, 255-256,
in couples therapy, 239-240 298
definitions of, 5, 124-125, 165 strategies for, 22, 294
in dialectical behavior therapy, 257 antecedent-focused vs. response-
and emotional intelligence, 37 (see also focused, 15, 16
Emotional intelligence) cognitive reappraisal, 17, 18, 30
vs. emotion control, 5, 125-126 consequences of, 176-177
and empathy, 243 and distress-prone individuals, 69
essential components of, 250-251 expressive suppression, 17—19, 30
and family, 270 individual differences in, 296
differences among families, 269 positive and negative, 150
research needed on, 158, 250 question of effectiveness of, 41-42
routines and rituals of, 270-287 (see researchers' divergence on, 303
also Family routines and rituals) rituals and routines as, 287
as transactional process, 273, 274 security-based, 297
frequency of (survey), 24 taxonomy of, 41
identification and labeling of emotions Texas A&M University Conference on
in, 260-261 (February 2004), 4
importance of, 4, 231, 304 See also Emotion dysregulation
individual and situational moderators Emotion regulation in children, 101
of, 296 and emotional security, 173
intra- and interpersonal forms of, 8,42- and ERSBs, 136 (see also Emotion-re-
43, 45, 149, 294, 295-296 lated socializing behaviors)
324 SUBJECT INDEX

clinical, social and public policy im- and attachment, 108, 110-112
plications of, 138-139 of emotion-focused therapist, 242
future research directions for, 136- as emotion regulator, 243
138 therapist's modeling of, 243
interdisciplinary collaboration on, and victimization, 104
138 happy victimization, 7, 109, 118
and ESH, 163, 174 (see also Emotional Encoding, emotion, 145, 147
security hypothesis) End-of-life context, for emotion regulation
and marital discord (emotional security in partner-assisted pain coping, 221
hypothesis), 154-155, 163, 165- Enriched routine/ritual type, 283-284
166, 169, 171 ERSBs. See Emotion-related socializing be-
future directions for, 174-179 haviors
as mediator, 178 Escalation, negative, 253, 262, 264, 302
and middle school program, 50 ESH (emotional security hypothesis), 6,163,
parenting as factor in, 7-8, 151-152, 164, 166-169, 170, 171, 173-174,
295 176
future research on, 137 and sensitization hypothesis, 169-170
and parents'emotionality, 132, 135 Ethnicity, and emotion regulation, 25—28
and peer social competence, 149-151 Exit behavior, 46
and social competence, 157-158 Experiences in Close Relationships Scale, 87,
social development of, 123 92
Emotion regulation in everyday life Exploration behavioral system, 81
questions on, 19 Expression of feelings, 254, 263
research on Expressive behavior
future directions and policy implica- and display rules, 19
tions of, 29-33 in interview episode, 21
laboratory experiment, 28-29 Expressive suppression, 17-19, 30
semistructured interview approach vs. cognitive reappraisal, 301
to, 19-23 and positive vs. negative emotions, 30-
survey approach to, 22-28 31
Emotion-related socializing behaviors stability of, 31, 32
(ERSBs), 8, 127-129 in survey, 23-24, 25
and children's effortful control, 129- teaching decreased use of, 33
130
cultural issues in, 133, 135 Family(ies), 269
and directionality issues, 132—133, broad configurations of, 172-173
134 effects of interactions of, 249, 300
and mediating role of effortful con- ways of socialization, 300-301
trol, 130-132, 135 emotional connections in, 232
and children's emotion regulation, 136 and emotional expression, 231
clinical, social and public policy im- and emotion dysregulation
plications of, 138-139 research agenda on, 265
future research directions for, 136- lack of acceptance and validation skills
138 in, 255
interdisciplinary collaboration on, lack of change or problem-management
138 skills in, 255
Emotion-relevant skills, deficiencies in, 253- organizational model for emotion func-
255 tioning of, 302
Emotion response systems, and direction of practicing vs. representational, 273
regulation, 21 and psychopathology or emotion
Emotion theory, 233-234 dysregulation, 255-256
Empathy (empathic tendencies) empirical foundations of, 256-258
SUBJECT INDEX 325

and public policy, 303-304 Gulf War (1991), reactions to Scud attacks
and relationship mindfulness, 263 in, 85
therapeutic relationship with, 238
unrepresentative samples of, 299 "Happy victimization," 7, 102-104
whole process of, 270 and adolescents' emotion attributions,
See also Parenting 106-108
"Familycentric" affect cues, 148 and emotion dysregulation, 108-110
Family correlates, of emotional regulation, and attachment-empathy-relation,
151-152 110-112
Family Ritual Interview, 279 and parental contribution, 114-116,
Family Ritual Questionnaire, 279, 282 118
Family routines and rituals, 270-271 and parenting-empathy-aggression
and affect regulation at dinner table, relation, 112-114
274-278 future research on and policy implica-
benefits of, 271,301,302 tions of, 116-118
and clinical decision making, 284-285, observational studies on, 104-105
286 questions on, 102
clinical implications of, 278-279 and reactive vs. proactive aggression,
assessment, 279-281 105-106
family ritual typologies, 281-284 Health, and emotion regulation in everyday
conceptual challenges to, 273-274 life, 30-31
defining of, 271-273 Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), 88-90
and emotion regulation, 274, 278, 287 HOME Scale, 156
and chronic illness, 284 Hostile attributional bias, 106, 113
policy implications of, 285, 287 Hostility
Family therapy, complex of relationships in, and risk-taking behavior, 197
256 See also Anger
Fear Hyperactivating strategies, 79, 80
in attachment cycle, 237 of anxious or anxious-ambivalent, 60,
in couples' conflict, 239 94
extent of control of, 26, 27 and emotional or adjustment problems,
in pain adjustment, 222-223 81-82
Fearful-avoidant prototype, 60-61, 62 in PTSD, 84
Felt security, 57, 59, 78, 94, 111 Hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis,
Flexible and variable routine/ritual type, and physiological responses to stress,
283 66,67
Friendship, and managing emotions, 46
Frustration-aggression-anger theories and Identity, as relationship need, 234, 235, 237
model, 106, 108, 116 Illness, chronic
and family functioning, 277-278, 284
Gate control theory, 213 in asthma cases, 280
Genetic contributions to emotional regula- See also Pain from disease
tion, 158 Imagery, as coping skill, 216
research needed on, 295, 300 Imagination, of therapist, 242
Gleeful taunting, 105 Irnpulsivity, 190-191, 192, 194, 197
Goal setting, as coping skill, 216 Inaccurate expression and labeling, 254
Group interactions, repetitive, in family iden- Individual differences
tity, 270 in adult attachment style, 59-61
Guilt and mental health, 81
in couples therapy, 245 in emotion regulation
extent of control of, 26, 27 research on, 297
and shame, 243 and strategies, 296
326 SUBJECT INDEX

in risk taking by adolescents Joy, extent of control of, 26, 27
and impulsivity, 190-191, 192
and negative emotions, 187-188 Labeling of emotional responses, 254
and positive emotions, 188-190 Laboratory experiments, 28-29
Indonesia, study on children's effortful con- vs. "everyday events," 298
trol in, 135 Longitudinal studies, 7, 139, 144, 147, 190,
Infant-caregiver relationships 193, 299
behavioral patterns in, 59-60 Love, extent of control of, 26, 27
and PTSD in avoidant people, 95
Insecurity, attachment, 80 (see also Attach- MacArthur Story Stem Battery (MSSB), 115
ment) Maintenance training, as coping skill, 216
Intelligence, and emotions, 38 (see also Emo- Maladaptive primary emotions, 236-237
tional intelligence) Managing of emotions, 32, 39, 40-43, 45,
Interdisciplinary (cross-disciplinary) collabo- 47, 48, 294
ration Marital discord, 164
and affective bases of attachment, 69 and children's emotion regulation, 154-
on EFCT, 245 155
in emotion-regulation research, 297 on emotional security hypothesis,
on marital discord and emotion regula- 163, 165-166, 169, 171
tion, 176-178 future directions for, 174-179
on relation of attachment and PTSD, 96 and children's emotional security, 164—
and relation of ERSBs to emotion con- 165, 168-169, 171-173
trol, 138 and emotion regulation, 173
Interest, extent of control of, 26, 27 and family configurations, 173
Interparental conflict. See Marital discord and cognitive contextual framework,
Interpersonal effectiveness, 257 174
Interpretations and conflicting routines, 285
vs. facts, 261 and conflict tactics, 166-169
in family identity 270 EFCT for, 242-245
of family practices, 273 effects of, 231-232
Interventions, 32—33 harm to children 164, 231
church- or school-based, 301 and sensitization hypothesis, 169-170
comparing alternative strategies for (re- See also Romantic relationships
search needed on), 302 Marital therapy. See also Couples therapy
four forms of, 284-285, 286 and attachment (clinical interven-
for risk taking in adolescence, 198-199 tions), 70
sequencing and pacing of, 302 attachment injuries in, 96
and threat perception, 70 Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Intelli-
Interview, semistructured, 19-22 gence Test (MSCEIT), 44-46, 47,
limitations of, 23 49
Intimate caregiving, 234 Managing Emotions subscale of, 47, 48
Intracultural variation, in self-regulation, 158 Meaning, in family rituals, 272
Intrusion, in PTSD, 84 Measurement
Invalidation, 256. See also Validation of emotional intelligence, 43-45
Iraq war (2003), Israeli PTSD study during, and managing emotions, 48
87-91 of emotion regulation, 6
Israel Mediator
attachment-PTSD studies in 85, 87-91 between attachment anxiety and nega-
and children's reaction to marital con- tive affectivity, 82
flict, 177 children's effortful control as, 130-132,
133, 134
Joint practice sessions, as coping skill, 216 emotion regulation as, 155, 300
SUBJECT INDEX 327

of peer liking, 105 NICHD study of child care and youth devel-
between skills and outcomes, 48 opment, 156
between validating responses and di- Nonconscious regulatory responses, 294
minished emotional arousal, 258
MEIS (Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Object relations tradition, 58
Test), 44, 46-47 Older adults, research needed on, 299-300
Mental health Order, perceptions of, 277
and adult attachment, 81-82
and managing of emotions, 41 PACES questionnaire, 153
and routines or rituals, 277 Pain from disease, 207
Mental illness, parental, 175 biopsychosocial model of, 208-210
Meta-emotion philosophies, 32 and catastrophizing, 222
Mindfulness, 257, 259-260 and emotion, 221-223
and accurate expression, 263-264 need for education on, 226
of relationships, 263 intra- and interpersonal interventions
Modeling, parental, 158 for, 295
Mood regulation, 14-15 partner-assisted coping with, 210-214
Moods, vs. emotions, 42 for arthritis, 214-219
Moral development research, and emotions, for cancer, 219-221
103, 104 clinical, social and policy implica-
Moral reasoning, and child's behavior prob- tions of, 225-226
lems, 116 future research directions for, 221-
Moral reciprocity, 111 225
Moral socialization and routines or rituals, 277
and attachment, 114 and social environment, 226
See also Empathy Painful emotions, tolerating of, 262-263
Motivation Paradigms, diverse, 298
positive vs. negative emotions as, 189 Parental modeling, 158
to use skills, 255 Parental philosophies, 32-33
MSCEIT (Mayer Salovey Caruso Emotional Parenting
Intelligence Test), 44-46, 47, 49 authoritarian (nonsupportive control-
Managing Emotions subscale of, 47, 48 ling) style of, 135
Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Test authoritative ("loving but firm") style
(MEIS), 44, 46-47 of, 116, 135
and children's attention regulation, 156
National Academy of Science, report of and children's display rules knowledge
(From Neurons to Neighborhoods), and utilization, 153—154
124 and children's emotional competencies,
Negative emotions 7-8, 151, 270
extent of regulation of, 25, 26, 27, 29- and children's emotional socialization,
30 300-301
fathers' reactions to, 152 and children's emotion regulation, 7-
and problem behaviors, 156 8, 132, 135, 151-152, 295
question of response to, 303 future research on, 137
vulnerability to, 252-253 and children's empathic tendencies,
Negative escalation, 253, 262, 264, 302 111, 113-114
Negative interactional cycles, 236-237 vs. happy victimization, 114-116,
and EFCT approach, 232 118
in partner-assisted pain coping, 218-219 and children's peer competence, 144—145
role of, 239 assumptions in study of, 145-147
transforming of, 241 and emotional expressiveness, 148-
New Zealand, impulsivity study in, 190-191 149
328 SUBJECT INDEX

and emotional understanding, 148 and emotion encoding or decoding,
and emotion encoding or decoding, 147-148
147-148 See also Social competence
and children's social functioning, 127 Perceiving of emotions, 39, 40, 147
and effortful vs. reactive control, 127 Perspectives
emotion-coaching philosophy in, 32, biopsychosocial, 297
245, 301 proximal vs. distal, 299
ERSBs in, 127-129 Physiological reactivity and regulation, and
and children's effortful control, 129- attachment (adult), 66-68
135 Physiological soothing, 240
and children's social functioning, Planning, around routines for illness, 280
136 Pleasant activity scheduling, as coping skill,
fathers as well as mothers in, 146-147, 216
151-152, 159 Positive emotions, extent of regulation of,
See also Family 25, 26, 27
Parenting Dimensions Inventory (PDI), 115, Posttraumatic growth, 95
116 Posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 83
Partner-assisted pain management and attachment, 83-85
for arthritis, 214-218 empirical findings on, 85-94
on biopsychosocial model, 210 implications of and future directions
for cancer, 219-221 for, 94-97
clinical, social and policy implications and PTSD Inventory, 92
of, 225-226 and relationship distress, 231
coping skills in, 209-214, 216 Preoccupied prototype, 60, 62, 171, 172,
emotion regulation in, 210-214 176-177. See also Anxious-ambiva-
for arthritis, 217-218 lent prototype
in end-of-life context, 221 Prevention programs, 33, 301, 303
and family rituals, 277 Pride, extent of regulation of, 25, 26, 27, 28
future research directions for, 221-225 Primary adaptive emotions, 235
increased number of providers needed Primary emotional responses, 261-262
for, 225, 304 Primary emotions, difficulty in tolerating,
and negative interactional cycles, 218- 253-254
219 Primary maladaptive emotions, 236-237
Partners. See Couples Prisoners of war, and attachment-PTSD as-
Pathogenic beliefs, EFCT as addressing, 241- sociation, 85-86
242 Proactive aggression happiness, 107-108
PATHS (Promoting Alternative THinking Problematic responses of others, 255
Strategies), 49-50 Problem solving, as coping skill, 216
PDI (Parenting Dimensions Inventory), 115, Process model of emotion regulation, 15-17
116 Prosocial tendencies, and attachment, 81,
Peer competence of children, 143 96-97
and display rules, 152-153 Psychological defenses, 14, 15
and emotional regulation, 154-155 Psychopathology
and managing emotions, 46 and children's emotion regulation, 101
and marital conflict, 154-155 and couples or families, 255-256
and parental relationship qualities, 144- and empirical foundations, 256-258
145 and relationship dysfunction, 249-250
assumptions in study of, 145-147 PTSD. See Posttraumatic stress disorder
and emotional expressiveness, 148- PTSD Inventory, 92
149
and emotional understanding, Reactive control, 6, 126
148 Realignment, as intervention, 284, 285, 286
SUBJECT INDEX 329

Reappraisal, cognitive. See Cognitive reap- Resolving Conflict Creatively Program, 50
praisal Response-focused skills, 211
Recontextualizing, 262 Response-focused strategies for emotion regu-
Redefinition, as intervention, 284, 286 lation, 5, 9, 15, 16, 125
Reeducation, as intervention, 284, 284-285, Response modulation, 17
286 frequency of use of, 22
Reflection, on emotion, 240-241 in partner-assisted pain coping, 213
Regulation, vs. control, 5, 125-126 Responses, discrete vs. patterned, 6
Reinforcement skills, in partner-assisted pain Responses of others, problematic, 255
coping, 213 Restructuring, cognitive, 213
"Relationship activation," 260 as attention regulatory process, 156
Relationship mindfulness, 263 Reward (or arousal) seeking, 189
Relationship skills, lack of, 255 Rigid and hollow routine/ritual type, 282—
Relationship stimuli, sensitivity to, 252 283
Relaxation training, as coping skill, 216 Risk taking, 184
Remediation, as intervention, 284, 286 dual pathways to (positive and nega-
Research tive), 185, 186-187, 192, 196, 197
on affective bases of attachment, 68- emotions in, 184-186
69 multiple risk behaviors in studies of,
on aggression (proactive and reactive), 192-193
106 Risk taking during adolescence, 183
on couple and family interventions for emotions in, 185, 187-191
emotion dysregulation, 265 individual differences in
on EFCT, 245-246 and impulsivity, 190-191, 192
on emotional intelligence, 47-49 and negative emotions, 187—188
on emotion and attention regulatory and positive emotions, 188—190
processes, 157-159 intervention implications in, 198-199
on emotion regulation, 13-14, 48, 293, unresolved issues on, 191—193
304 empirical evidence on, 193-196
application issues in, 300-304 future research implications in, 196-
conceptual and theoretical issues in, 198
293-297 Rituals, 272, 287
in everyday life, 30 characteristics of, 273
methodological issues in, 297-300 disruption of, 273
on parental and marital correlates in emotion in, 276
different cultures, 158 and routines, 276
parents' role in, 136-138 See also Family routines and rituals
and treatment, 302 Rituals in Families and Family Therapy (Imber-
on family routines-and-rituals typologies, Black), 287
283-284 Romantic relationships
on happy victimization, 102 and attachment, 57, 59, 60, 63-64, 65
and proactive aggression, 117-118 clinical interventions for, 70
on partner-assisted pain coping, 221- and managing emotions, 47
225 and physiological responses to stress,
on relation between avoidance and 66-67
trauma, 95-97 and social adaptation, 166
on relation between family practices and See also Couples; Marital discord
affect, 275, 278 Roommates, and management of emotions,
on relation between marital conflict and 46
children's emotional regulation, Routines, 272
174-176, 178 characteristics of, 273
on risk taking, 197-198 and emotions, 277—278
330 SUBJECT INDEX

and rituals, 276 Situation modification skills, 211
See also Family routines and rituals Situation selection, 15-17, 211
Rumination, as strategy, 42 Social cognitive skills, 145
Social competence
Sadness, extent of control of, 26, 27 and attention regulation, 155-157
Schools and children's emotion regulation, 101
and emotional intelligence, 49-50 research on, 157-158
See also Education and prevention pro- See also Peer competence of children
grams Social context. See Contexts, social
Seattle Social Development Project, 50 Social Decision Making and Social Problem
Secondary attachment strategies, 78 Solving program, 50
Secondary emotional responses, 261-262 Social Development Project, University of
Secondary emotions, 235—236, 253 California, Riverside (UCR), 144,
couples' conflict from, 239, 240 151, 152, 154, 156
Secure prototype, 60, 62, 171, 171-172, 176 Social information processing (SIP) model
Security, as relationship need, 237 of children's adjustment and compe-
Security-based strategies of affect regulation, tence, 106, 118
79-80 Social interaction, and emotional intelli-
Self-blame, and marital discord, 174 gence, 45-47
Self-control, lack of (impulsivity), 190-191, Socialization, of emotion (ERSBs), 127-129
192, 194, 197 and children's effortful control, 129-
Self-disclosure, 263, 265 135
in couples therapy, 244-245 Social learning theory, and harmfulness of
Self-disclosure skills, 254 marital discord, 173
Self-regulation, of children Social reasoning, and reactive aggression,
importance of, 124 117
See also Emotion regulation in children Social reinforcement, as coping skill, 216
Self-reported measures of affect, 67 Social skills in childhood, 143
Self-reported patterns of affective reactivity Socioeconomic status (SES), and behavior
and regulation, 65 problems, 110
Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test, 44 "Softening," 244, 245
Self-report methods, 43, 45, 297 "Softer" emotions, 232
Self-validation, 262-263 Soothing, physiological, 240
in accurate labeling of emotions, 254 Stability, and emotive regulation in every-
SEM (structural equation modeling), 131, day life, 31-32
194 Status, as relationship need, 234, 237
Semistructured interview, 19-22 Stimulus-emotion relation, lack of awareness
limitations of, 23 of, 254
Sensitivity to relationship stimuli, 252, 259 Stoic philosophers, 38
Sensitization hypothesis, 169-170 Story Stem Battery, MacArthur (MSSB), 115
Sex (male/female), and emotion regulation, Strange Situation, 60
25-28 Stress
Shame, 234 and disease/related pain, 221-222
in couples' conflict, 237, 239, 243-244, and parents' influence on children, 130
245 physiological responses to, 66
extent of control of, 26, 27 Stroop color-naming task, 91-92, 93, 94
SIP (social information processing) model of Structural equation modeling (SEM), 131,
children's adjustment and compe- 194
tence, 106, 118 Suppression, expressive. See Expressive sup-
Situation awareness, selection, and manage- pression
ment, 253 Surgency, 191
Situation modification, 16, 17 Surprise, extent of control of, 26, 27
SUBJECT INDEX 331

Temperament and PTSD, 83-94, 95-96
and attachment, 68-69, 111 Triggers, emotional, recognition of, 262
culturally linked differences in, 158
effortful and reactive control as aspects Undercontrol, 190-191,198. See also Impul-
of, 127 sivity
and emotion regulation, 136 Understanding emotions, 39, 40
and happy victimization, 118 Using emotions, 39, 40
Therapeutic relationship or alliance, 238, U.S.-Iraq war (2003), Israeli PTSD study
242 during, 87-91
Therapist, emotion-focused, 242. See also
Emotion-focused couples therapy Vagal tone, 176, 177
Therapy, principles of emotional change in, Valence, of emotion regulated, 25
238-242 Validation (validating responses), 240, 252,
"Third-party" observing perspective, 261 257, 258, 265
Thought, emotional facilitation of (using Validation skills, 264
emotions), 39, 40 lack of, 255
Threat Victimization, positive emotions from, 102.
and affective reactivity, 58 See also "Happy victimization"
and affect regulation, 63 Voluntary control, 5-6,126. See also Effortful
and attachment, 61, 62-63, 68, 78 control
and hyperactivating strategies, 80
and emotional distress, 62 Whole-family approach, 10, 270. See also
and marital discord, 174, 175, 179 Family routines and rituals
parents' conflict as, 169 Working models of attachment, 58, 59, 61,
Thrill and adventure seeking (TAS), 194, 78,96, 112
195, 195-196, 197 negative, 82
Transactional (reciprocal) model, 256 and PTSD, 86
Trauma, and attachment, 82-83 Workplace training programs, in emotional
implications of and future directions for, intelligence, 50—51
94-97
332 SUBJECT INDEX

Emotion Regulation in Couples and Families Pathways To Dysfunction and Health

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Emotion Regulation in

Couples and Families

Douglas K. Snyder, Jeffry A. Simpson, and Jan N. Hughes

AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

Typeset in Goudy by Stephen McDougal, Mechanicsville, MD

Printer: United Book Press, Inc., Baltimore, MD

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

Printed in the United States of America

To Cindy, Chris, and Natalie, for your support and

To Mrs. Harding, my kindergarten teacher, for a good start.

About the Editors xi

I. Emotion Regulation: Theoretical Perspectives 11

II. Linking Emotion Regulation to Dysfunction and

Chapter 6. Parenting and Children's Adjustment: The Role

Chapter 7. Family and Peer Relationships: The Role of

Chapter 8. Marital Discord and Children's Emotional

Chapter 9. Individual Differences in Emotion Regulation

III. Clinical Interventions in Emotion Regulation Processes . . . 205

Chapter 10. Emotion Regulation Processes in Disease-

Chapter 11. Promoting Emotional Expression and Emotion

Chapter 12. Intervening With Couples and Families to

Chapter 13. Who Took My Hot Sauce? Regulating

Chapter 14. Family Emotion Regulation Processes:

Author Index 307

Subject Index 319

Douglas K. Snyder, PhD, is a professor and the director of clinical psychol-

Jeffry A. Simpson, PhD, is a professor of psychology at the University of

xii ABOUT THE EDITORS

William F. Arsenic, PhD, Ferkauf Graduate School of Psychology,

In recent years, there has been growing interest in emotion regulation

4 SIMPSON, HUGHES, AND SNYDER

Because intense research interest in emotion regulation is a recent phe-

6 SIMPSON, HUGHES, AND SNYDER

EMOTION REGULATION IN THE CONTEXT

Attention to the role of parenting in the socialization of children's

Because poor emotion regulation is linked with impaired social, emo-

8 SIMPSON, HUGHES, AND SNYDER

PLAN OF THE BOOK

10 SIMPSON, HUGHES, AND SNYDER

Sometimes, our emotions lead us to do the oddest things. Grown men

Our starting point is a conception of emotion that is shared with a

]4 GROSS, RICHARDS, AND JOHN

A PROCESS MODEL OF EMOTION REGULATION

If emotions are seen as involving a coordinated set of responses that

EMOTION REG L/LATJON IN EVERYDAY LIFE J5

16 GROSS, RICHARDS, AND JOHN

TWO SPECIFIC STRATEGIES:

EMOTION REG ULATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE J7

AFFECTIVE, COGNITIVE, AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

Because reappraisal occurs early in the emotion-generative process, we

18 GROSS, RICHARDS, AND JOHN

These studies demonstrate the divergent impact of differing forms of

Approach 1: The Semistructured Interview

One approach to studying emotion regulation is to ask people about

EMOTION REGULATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 19

To answer these questions, we interviewed 91 participants (70 women),

Regulation Episodes and Target Emotions

20 GROSS, RICHARDS, AND JOHN

Emotion Response Systems and the Direction of Regulation

EMOTION REG ULATION IN EVERYDAY LIFE 21

Approach 2: The Survey

22 GROSS, RICHARDS, AND JOHN