Professional Documents
Culture Documents
ASSIGNMENT
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TABLE OF CONTENT
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SADHANA UPADHYAYA V.S STATE OF U.P.
CITATION- 2009 (4) ADJ434
ISSUES
The problem is that vegetable vendors are occupying Bank Road illegally. The expulsion of
these unauthorized occupants is the subject of the court's appeal.
ANALYSIS
The case is for Allahabad's Nagar Nigam to remove the unauthorised occupants of Bank
Road. The petitioner's experienced counsel has drawn the court's attention to the Division
Bench of an earlier case, Sanjay Agarwal v Nagar Patlka, Allahabad, in which the court
directed the illegal occupiers on the Katra Road. Following the above-mentioned ruling, it
appears that the same individuals are now occupying Bank Road unlawfully. This, according
to the court, is not permissible; one can only occupy public land with the permission/license
of the relevant authority.
According to information supplied by Sri Q.H. Siddiqui, learned counsel for the Nagar
Nigam, Allahabad, such persons who are occupying/squatting on the Bank Road are not
permitted to do so. It was also reported that Nagar Nigam officials tried to evict the unlawful
occupiers one morning but received no police assistance, and that the Nagar Nigam officials
and the petitioner were attacked on Bank Road by the illegal occupiers. As a result, the court
ordered the S.S.P. Allahabad, respondent No. 5, to provide police assistance to the Nagar
Nigam officials in removing the people who are occupying Bank Road illegally. The
petitioner further said that the illegal squatters had been removed four times previously, but
that each time they returned and squatted on Bank Road.
The court makes it plain that anyone who want to sell vegetables, grain, or other
commodities, whether wholesale or retail, cannot do so on public land without the authority's
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consent or licence. They may apply to the Nagar Nigam or another relevant authority for this
purpose, and the Nagar Nigam or other relevant authority may, at its discretion, grant
permission at a suitable location for such persons, considering various factors such as free
flow of traffic, local needs, and the payment of tehbazari charges as determined by the said
authority.
Conclusion
In the instance, the court proceeded to grant relief by ordering the Nagar Nigam to remove
out the illegal occupants, and the court also directed the S.S.P. of Allahabad to provide police
assistance to the Nagar Nigam authorities in light of the earlier assault.
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IN RE: ARUNDHATI ROY
CITATION- [AIR 2002 SC 1375: (2002) 3 SCC 343]
ANALYSIS
The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India ruled that the facts of the episodes
are unreliable as acts of omission and conduct on the part of the respondents, and that the
appellant's submission of a complaint petition did not result in the initiation of criminal
proceedings. The police had also filed no charge sheet regarding the incident on October 26,
1993, for which a FIR had been filed. The fact that the first respondent had not appeared in
the rent control proceedings was also acknowledged. As a party in person, not as an advocate.
The decision to refuse recusal appears to be erroneous since it contradicts the law set forth in
Section 14 of the Act. Due process and the principle of natural justice following the
judgement in Maneka Gandhi v. UOI, and common-sense notions of
Justice urged that the judge decline to hear the case and withdraw himself from the bench. In
contempt proceedings begun by the court suo motu, there is a propensity to inherit bias,
resulting in a risk of unfairness and a violation of the contemnor's treasured freedoms.
The court stated that freedom of speech and expression guaranteed by the constitution were
subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the law, one of these being the contempt of
courts act which, amongst other objectives, was directed at maintaining the dignity and the
integrity of the courts and the judiciary. The Respondent's claim that the issue of whether the
truth might be asserted as a defence in contempt proceedings required to be decided was
disregarded as irrelevant. On the basis of the offensive and contemptuous part of the reply
affidavit, which made outrageous charges against the court, scandalising its authority,
contempt proceedings were begun. In those procedures, there was no point or fact that needed
to be defended by pleading the truth.
The goal of the contempt proceedings, according to the Court, was to maintain public faith in
the legal system. The statement "must be made in good faith and in the public interest, which
is to be gauged by the surrounding circumstances, including the person responsible for the
comments, his knowledge in the field regarding which the comments are made, and the
intended purpose sought to be achieved," according to the Court. Given that neither the
appellant nor the respondent had submitted any document establishing any follow-up action
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on his behalf regarding a complaint filed by him with the police authority, nor had he filed
any private complaint as of the date of the impugned judgement. Based on the foregoing
grounds, the Committee found that there was no prima facie evidence to charge the
respondent of misconduct. The Appellant's Counsel contended that under section 35 of the
Advocates Act, 1961, actions can be brought for any misbehavior, not just professional
misconduct, and cited many precedents, including one involving an Advocate of the Supreme
Court.
The Court considered that the Respondent’s statement was not based on any understanding of
the law or the judicial system. Her statements alleging the judiciary’s willingness to issue
notice on “an absurd, despicable, entirely unsubstantiated petition” whilst exhibiting a lack of
willingness to entertain a case concerning “national security and corruption in the highest
places” and its intention to silence criticism along with her lack of remorse, made it difficult
“to shrug off or to hold the accusations made as comments of outspoken ordinary man”
The Court's decision highlights the fact that exercising fundamental rights requires formal
education and might be limited to a few elites who are well-versed in legal complexities,
rendering the right illusory. Furthermore, the court's comment that the law "punishes the
arches as soon as the arrow is launched, regardless of whether it misses the target," illustrates
another peculiarity in the law (as read) regarding the necessity of mens rea in a case of
contempt.
CONCLUSION
Decision- The Court eventually found the Respondent guilty of criminal contempt and
sentenced her to one day of "symbolic" incarceration and a fine of Rs. 2000, with the
provision that she would be imprisoned for three months if she did not pay the fine.
The power of the higher judiciary to penalise for contempt is a shaky jurisdiction that is
frequently applied indifferently and indiscriminately. Criminal contempt is defined in the
Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 as conduct that "scandalises the court" or "prejudices
judicial procedures" without any clarification of these crucial concepts. There are minimal
restrictions on the use of this authority, and it is likely to be used arbitrarily most of the time.
The Court has often failed to recognise that the court's authority, which is enforced through
contempt fines, might elicit submission but not respect. A more flexible approach will reflect
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the judiciary's increased confidence, and may be inspired by Chief Justice Marshall's famous
comment, "The power of the judiciary resides not in determining cases, enforcing sentences,
or punishing for contempt, but in the trust, confidence, and faith in the ordinary man."
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SANJAY KUMAR V.S STATE OF BIHAR
CITATION- (2014) 9 SCC 203
The learned Magistrate, Danapur, summons the private respondent for appearance on
12.6.2008, prima facie believing that the petitioner had brought out a case under Section 406,
420 IPC, and Section 138 of the NI Act. The private respondent challenged the said order by
filing a petition with the High Court, which was granted by the impugned judgement and
order on various grounds, including that the parties had agreed to serve for one year, and one
of the terms of the agreement was that the petitioner would not resign from the institute until
the three years had passed.
Furthermore, the petitioner did not provide the accused enough time to react to the legal
notice because he filed the complaint close to the date of the notice. The high court further
determined that there was no evidence on record that the notice was ever served on the
private respondent, and eventually granted the petition on the grounds that it was a civil issue
involving salary recovery.
Angry, the petitioner came to this court, averring in the petitioner on specific terms and
despite working there. He was not compensated for his work.
ANALYSIS
The petitioner alleged that the private respondent no.2 had appointed him as a Senior
Lecturer in a fictitious dental college for a year and had provided 12 post-dated cheques for
payment of his salary, nine of which had bounced.
The private respondent challenged the said order by filing a petition with the High Court,
which was granted by the impugned judgement and order on various grounds, including that
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the parties had agreed to serve for one year, and one of the terms of the agreement was that
the petitioner would not resign from the institute until the three years had passed.
The Advocate-on-Record (or 'AOR' for short) showed no respect by failing to submit, at the
very least, a paper stating the name of the lawyer who must present in court. In this matter,
the petitioner's attorney in court has designated himself as a proxy counsel.
This Court had previously given a notice to the petitioner to show cause why, if the
institution was a forgery, he joined it and continued to serve there for a year. Furthermore,
whether such a pleading is relevant or not is a matter for the court to decide, and under
Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the court has the authority to ask the party any
question, relevant or irrelevant, and the parties or their counsel have no right to object.
Pleas must be true to the best of the parties' knowledge, and anyone who makes false
pleadings can be denied not just any type of relief from the court, but also be convicted for
perjury. We don't see why a party should be allowed to file a pleading in the petition and then
ask the court to dismiss it because the issue has no influence on the case's merits and is
completely irrelevant. In response to the show cause notice, the petitioner requested that such
pleadings be dismissed and that they not be included in the decision of the instant petition.
In such a chaotic situation, any “Arzi”, “Farzi”, half- baked lawyer under the label of “proxy
counsel”, a phrase not traceable under the Advocates Act, 1961 or under the Supreme Court
Rules, 1966 etc., cannot be allowed to abuse and misuse the process of the court under a false
impression that he has a right to waste public time without any authority to appear in the
court, either from the litigant or from the AOR, as in the instant case.
We take this AOR's actions extremely seriously, especially in light of this Court's decision in
Re: Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, (2014) 1 SCC 572, in which this Court expressly said that if
the AOR fails to appear in court, his conduct may be considered criminal contempt of court.
The Court is concerned about the conduct of the AOR, Shri Manu Shanker Mishra, and warns
him that unless he behaves in a manner proper for an attorney and an AOR, this Court would
not hesitate to act against him.
Regardless, during the first round of hearings in this case, this Court insisted that the AOR,
Shri Manu Shanker Mishra, be present in the Court during the arguments and also passed
over the subject for his appearance.
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The petition is dismissed as a result of the foregoing observations.
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R.K. ANAND V REGISTRAR, DELHI HIGH COURT
CITATION- (2009) 8 SCC 106
The Delhi High Court, shocked by the programme, took action on its own (Writ Petition
(Criminal) No.796 of 2007). It demanded all of the materials used in the telecast from the
news channel, and after reviewing them, it issued show cause notices to RK Anand, IU Khan,
and Bhagwan Sharma, an associate advocate with RK Anand, asking them to explain why
they should not be convicted and punished for criminal contempt of court, as defined by
section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
RK Anand's and IU Khan's actions fell fully within the definition of contempt under clauses
(ii) and (iii) of section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, according to the High Court. As a
result, it found them guilty of contempt of court in a judgement and order dated August 21,
2008, and in exercising its power under Article 215 of the Indian Constitution, it barred them
from appearing in the Delhi High Court and its subordinate courts for a period of four months
from the date of the judgement. It was also held that RK Anand and IU Khan had forfeited
their right to be designated as Senior Advocates and recommended to the Full Court to divest
them of the honor. In addition to this the High Court also sentenced them to fine of rupees
two thousand each.
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2. Whether the High Court's procedure in the contempt proceedings was fair and reasonable,
and whether it prejudiced the two appellants?
3. Could the High Court, as one of the remedies for criminal contempt of court, bar the
appellants from appearing before the High Court and the courts subordinate to it for a certain
amount of time?
4. Whether the sentences meted out to the appellants were adequate and proportionate to their
wrongdoings considering the facts and circumstances of the case.
RK Anand argued that the recordings on the CDs had been tampered with, and he offered the
Supreme Court the opportunity to send these recordings as evidence to the Central Forensic
Science Laboratory to determine whether they had been tampered with. Although RK
Anand's effort to bribe the witness must be denounced, claiming partiality is seen as akin to
casting doubt on the judges' integrity and putting the judiciary's impartiality and
independence into question. According to the Supreme Court, RK Anand has exhibited no
remorse for his horrible conduct, and the petition reveals that he is disobeying the High
Court's verdict. The truth is that the judges may not have first paid attention to the words
made by the persons during the televised interviews. This looks to have backfired on him,
especially as IU Khan had contended in the judgement that the recordings had been altered
with from the start. RK Anand first accepted the video, which was shown on the news
channel NDTV, according to the judgement.
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There's no compelling reason why a contempt of court charge should be treated differently
than a criminal matter in terms of evidence. It was further argued that if the court had
observed the Indian Evidence Act and Criminal Procedure Code, there would have been no
errors like the ones described above.
CONCLUSION
It might be stated that R.K. Anand gave the Supreme Court a chance to clarify the law
regulating sting operations in sub judice cases and subsequent contempt proceedings under
the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. I U Khan, who had been convicted by the Delhi High
Court, was exonerated by the Supreme Court. Finally, the Supreme Court confirmed Anand's
conviction by the Delhi High Court on the same charge.
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A.S. MOHAMMED RAFI V. SATE OF TAMIL NADU
CITATION- AIR 2004 11 SC 2440
ANALYSIS
The constitutionality of the Bar Association's resolution that none of its members will appear
for an accused was challenged in this case. In the past, some bar associations have passed
resolutions that were like the following:
• When police officers and lawyers clash, no one will represent the police officer in a
criminal case;
• They will not defend a terrorist, a person accused of a cruel or terrible act, or a person
charged with rape.
There is ample evidence to show that Indian lawyers have never shied away from their
responsibilities on the basis that doing so would make them unpopular or put their lives in
peril.
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Attorneys are required by the Indian Constitution and the Bar Council of India Rules to
defend cases and not to refuse briefs. According to the Constitution, no one who is detained
will be held in jail without first being informed of the grounds for his detention as soon as
possible, and he will not be denied the right to speak with and be represented by a counsel of
his choice. The Bar Council of India's regulations provide that an advocate must accept any
brief in Courts or tribunals before any other authorities in or before which he intends to
practise for a fee commensurate with his status at the Bar and the nature of the matter.
CONCLUSION
As a result, the Court found that if a client is ready to pay his fee and the lawyer is not
otherwise occupied, a lawyer cannot refuse a brief. As a result, any Bar Association that
passes a resolution stating that none of its members will appear for a certain accused, whether
he is a police officer or a suspected terrorist, rapist, mass killer, or other, is breaking all
constitutional, legislative, and professional ethics rules.
It goes against the Bar's long-standing tradition of representing criminal defendants. This
resolution is an embarrassment to the legal profession. According to the Court, all such
resolutions of Indian Bar Associations are null and void, and right-thinking lawyers should
reject and disobey them if they want democracy and the rule of law to be safeguarded in our
country. As a result, a Bar resolution saying that no member of the Bar shall speak on behalf
of a specific defendant is in violation of all constitutional, statutory, and professional ethics
principles. It also goes against the bar's long-standing policy of taking treason and other
serious crimes cases.
Only through providing access to justice through the legal profession can democracy and the
rule of law be maintained, and no one shall be denied the right to be represented by a lawyer.
The Supreme Court's ruling affirming a person's right to be represented by a lawyer and the
lawyer's duty to defend that person enhances not just the legal profession, but also the rule of
law and democracy in the country.
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RAMON SERVICE LTD. V.S. SUBHASH KAPOOR
CITATION- AIR 20001 SC 207
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CONCLUSION
The learned judge stated that members of the legal profession are unquestionable among
society’s elite. Strikes between industrial worker and professionals such as lawyers cannot be
compared in compliance with the law. Absence of lawyers during a legal proceeding has a
negative impact on not just the members of the legal profession, but also hinders the process
of getting justice especially for defenseless plaintiffs.
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MAHIPAL SINGH RANA V. STATE OF U.P.
CITATION- AIR 2016 SC 3302
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court held in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India that while
exercising contempt jurisdiction, this Court cannot take over the disciplinary committee's
jurisdiction, and that it is up to the Bar Council to punish the advocate by prohibiting him
from practicing or suspending his license to practice. This court or the High Court can also
prevent the contempt or advocate from appearing before it or other courts until he clears
himself of the contempt, which is not the same as suspending or revoking his license or
forbidding him from practicing. Debarring a person from appearing in court falls under the
Court's jurisdiction, as opposed to the Bar Council's authority to suspend, or revoke a license.
With reference to Section 34 of the Advocates Act, it was held in R.K. Anand v. Registrar,
Delhi High Court, that the court has the right to restrict the advocate in question from
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appearing before the courts for an appropriate period of time. The courts have jurisdiction
over the regulation of the right of attendance in court.
The Bar Council took no action in this instance, despite a directive from the High Court
dating back more than 10 years. Considering the Bar Council of the State of Uttar Pradesh's
and the Bar Council of India's inability to fulfil their statutory obligations, this Court must
exercise appellate jurisdiction under the Advocates Act considering proven misbehavior
warranting disciplinary action.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court denied the lawyer's appeal, affirming his conviction and the Allahabad
High Court's ruling barring him from appearing in District Etah courts until he clears himself
of contempt. The Court also ruled that an advocate is covered by Section 24A of the
Advocates Act, and that his enrolment will be stopped for two years as a result. The
contemnor's license will also be suspended for another five years as a disciplinary
punishment for his demonstrated misbehavior, according to the Court. The Advocate's jail
term, on the other hand, was reversed by the Court.
The Supreme Court also noted that the parts of the Advocates Act dealing with the legal
profession's regulatory framework need to be revised right now. It has requested that the
Indian Law Commission and the Indian government take appropriate measures in this
respect. The Law Commission of India conducted a study and sought input from the Bar
Council of India, all State Bar Councils, the Supreme Court Bar Association and Advocates
on Records Association of the Supreme Court, Advocates Associations in the High Courts,
and their respective Benches considering the foregoing.
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RE RAMESHWAR PRASAD GOYAL
CITATION- AIR 2014 SC 850
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Thus, it is clear that this Court has the authority to act against an AOR on its own initiative,
without the need for a complaint from anybody, if it believes prima facie that the AOR has
engaged in misconduct or behaviour unworthy of an AOR.
Such an agreement is both sad and in violation of a lawyer's responsibility and commitment
to his or her clients as well as the court. The AOR's conduct in this matter is disgusting and
unforgivable; yet, given the facts and circumstances, the Supreme Court censured his actions
and advised him not to behave in this manner in the future and to attend in court in all
instances where he has entered presence.
CONCLUSION
In this scenario, the AoR has turned this noble profession into a deceitful profession. An
AoR, whom the litigant has never briefed or employed, has given his signature for a little fee
on the condition that he would not be held liable for any act in any of the Registry or court
proceedings in the issue. The advocate who has been compelled by such an AoR must enter
the Registry in an unauthorised manner, present in court without the knowledge or authority
of the AoR, or engage a senior advocate without the knowledge or authorization of the AoR.
Because an AoR is the source of lawful recognition through which the litigant is represented,
he is unable to diverge from the rules' norms.
Lawyers must remember that they are equal partners with judges in the administration of
justice. If lawyers do not perform their function properly, it would be destructive of
democracy and the rule of law.
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TUSHAR BHATT V STATE OF GUJARAT AND ANR.
AIR 2009 11 SCC 678
The Assistant Commissioner, Bhuj called upon the appellant to immediately join the duty,
but the appellant did not comply with his direction. The appellant on 17.01.2000 filed a reply
to the show cause notice and bluntly refused to join duty at Bhuj. Ultimately, the appellant
was suspended from the service. On 05.05.2000, the appellant was served with a charge-sheet
containing seven charges, including remaining unauthorizedly absent, deciding on his own
the place of discharging his duty without permission of the competent officer, exerting mental
pressure and making threats, acting beyond his official under the Gujarat Civil Services
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, flouting and disobeying the orders of the Head of the
department as well as the Head of the office, and acting beyond his official under the
provisions of the Gujarat Civil
ANALYSIS
According to the Court, absenteeism and the use of intemperate language, both of which are
acts of extreme indiscipline, are not minor offences, and being tolerant about them would be
unjust in the institution's best interests. The Appellant did not object to the Inquiry Officer's
guilt being confirmed in the Report, and so a proven guilt cannot be exceeded as a minor
infraction. The Court reasoned that if the Appellant can get away with a modest punishment,
it will set a negative precedent, and in the future, some unscrupulous government employee
may resort to arm-twisting his superior in order to extract a favourable result.
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After that, the Disciplinary Authority's judgement is restricted. There can be unlimited
judicial review only when a punishment order is found to be so irrational that no reasonable
person could make it, or the punishment imposed is shockingly disproportionate to the guilt
established, or there is a violation of any fundamental rights or natural justice principles.
However, no such facts have been established in this instance, and hence the Court's judicial
review is restricted. Also, according to the Court, “...transfer is an incidence of service and
transfers are made according to administrative exigencies.” The Court observed in the present
case that the Transfer of the Appellant has only been made twice in his 18 years tenure and
this cannot be termed as mala fide. Thus, the allegations made by the appellant was devoid of
any merit and was dismissed.
CONCLUSION
In this case, the appellant failed to show reason why he should not be subjected to one of the
punishments listed in Rule 6 of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules. The
appellant has been providing insufficient and unaccepted excuses for failing to respect the
Head's instruction and for failing to perform his obligations.
It is clear from the analysis that all of the tribunals to which the appellant has turned were
correct in ruling against him due to his negligence and indiscipline. As a result, the court in
hearing the present case correctly dismissed the appeal against the appellant because the
appellant failed to provide answers for his unjustified and clearly seeming deliberate absence
from duty, making him liable under the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules.
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RADHA MOHAN LAL V RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
CITATION- AIR 2003 SC 1467
ANALYSIS
The order of the High Court was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the Criminal Appeal. The
appellant, on the other hand, issued an unqualified apologies for the charges he made against
the Rajasthan High Court Justice. The counsel who represented the appellant in the complaint
and contempt proceedings, on the other hand, had a different storey to tell. The Court stated
that counsel who sign applications or pleadings containing matter scandalising the Court
without reasonably satisfying themselves about the prima facie existence of adequate grounds
therefor, with the intent to prevent or delay the course of justice, are guilty of contempt of
Court, and that a counsel's duty to his client is to advise his client to refrain from signing such
applications.
CONCLUSION
DECISION: The right to free speech cannot be equated or confused with the right to make
baseless and reckless accusations against the court. On the grounds that he did so in his
professional role, an attorney cannot absolve himself of guilt for drafting a scandalous
notification to a Magistrate. An advocate is more than a client's representative or servant. He
is a member of the Court's staff. He has a responsibility to the Court. Nothing could be more
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severe than an advocate's act if it impedes, obstructs, or prevents the administration of law, or
if it undermines the public's trust in such administration.
Free speech is at the heart of democracy. When it comes to contempt of court, the freedom to
free expression might be restrained under Article 19(2). The people should be able to criticise
the judiciary without fear of retaliation. However, the judiciary's dignity must be safeguarded
at the same time. The objective of a deliberative democracy is not served by blanket bans on
expressing disagreement with the court. As a result, there is a need to strike a balance
between the right to free expression on the one hand and the dignity of the court on the other.
Such sweeping restrictions, as found in this instance, do not achieve the goal of balancing
individual rights with the dignity of the judiciary.
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JOURNAL ENTRIES
A1.
A2.
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To Capital A/c 90,000
2. Prepaid Insurance A/c Dr. 1500
To Cash A/c 3,000
3. Client A/c Dr. 10,000
To Sales A/c 10,000
4. Office Supplies A/c Dr. 1400
To Cash A/c 400
To Sales 1000
5. Cash A/c Dr. 2,000
To Client A/c 2,000
6. Cash A/c Dr. 15,000
To Client (Debtor) 15,000
7. Photography Equipment A/c Dr. 1,00,000
To Cash A/c 25,000
To B/P 75,000
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