Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1
2. Historical Background .......................................................................................................... 1
2.1 Early History ....................................................................................................................... 1
2.2 19th Century: The Formation of Today’s Yemen ............................................................ 1
2.3 The Threat of Terrorism ............................................................................................... 2
2.3 Fragmentation and Catastrophe ........................................................................................ 2
3. Causes of Yemen Crisis ......................................................................................................... 3
4.Actors involved and their interest) ........................................................................................... 3
4.1 Actors involved ............................................................................................................... 3
4.1.1 The Houthi–Saleh alliance ........................................................................................... 3
4.1.2 Pro-Houthi external actors..................................................................................... 4
4.1.3 The anti-Houthi bloc ............................................................................................... 4
4.1.4 Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.............................................................................. 4
4.1.5 External Actors ....................................................................................................... 5
4.2 The Interest of Actors .................................................................................................... 5
5. Consequences (socioeconomic and political implications to the world) ........................... 6
6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 7
References ...................................................................................................................................... 8

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 1. Introduction

Foreign actors have a long history in Yemen. From the first Zaidi imam who arrived in the country
in the ninth century to the regional military intervention led by Saudi Arabia in 2015, outsiders
have often altered the trajectory of domestic politics in Yemen. This has been particularly
pronounced throughout the 20th century, when modern communication technology, speed of travel
and air power allowed outside powers, such as the British empire in south Yemen, to more directly
influence and impact change on the ground in Yemen. But perhaps never have foreign actors had
as large and influential a role in Yemen as they do in the midst of the ongoing war (Elayah et al.,
2020).

The civil war in Yemen is a multipolar conflict (with regional and local components) rather than
a clear cut fight between two sides. Above all, it is the result of an increasingly corrupt central
state that became incapable of enforcing the rule of law and unwilling to incorporate various actors.
The conflict has been portrayed as a proxy war, pitting an Iran-backed side against Saudi-backed
adversaries. But in reality, the Houthi–Saleh bloc which is the strongest military component inside
the country – and the anti-Houthi bloc are both internally diverse and harbor competing interests
and priorities. Participants agreed that in practice, there is little loyalty to President Abed Rabbo
Mansour Hadi among the anti-Houthi bloc. Many on the pro-Houthi side are more anti-Saudi than
pro-Houthi (Sharp et al., 2015).

2. Historical Background

2.1 Early History

Yemen has played a small by significant role in world history. The Queen of Sheba in the Hebrew
Bible and the Three Wise Men of the New Testament are traditionally linked to Yemen. While
coffee perhaps originated in Ethiopia, Yemen for centuries was the primary producer, exported
through the legendary (and now flavorful) port of Mocha. For a while Yemen was doing so well
that the Romans called the area “Arabia Felix,” flourishing (or happy) Arabia (Brandt, 2017).

2.2 19th Century: The Formation of Today’s Yemen

When the political contours of today’s Yemen really started to emerge, with distinct northern and
southern regions, whose tribal, religious, and geographic divisions still complicate Yemeni politics

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today. In 1839, as part of their Empire, the British set up a protectorate around the port city of
Aden and rule southeastern Yemen (Day, 2012). In 1918, Shia imams declare a kingdom in North
Yemen and gain independence from the Ottoman Empire (Aboul-Ela, 2019). In 1960s, a military
rebellion and six-year civil war in the 1960s, in which Saudi Arabia and Egypt backed opposite
sides, overthrows the kingdom and establishes the Yemen Arab Republic ((Day, 2012). In 1967,
the British leave southern Yemen, and the People’s Republic of Southern Yemen is created. In
1970, The People’s Republic becomes the Marxist People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen,
known as South Yemen, a client state of Moscow. In 1990, The end of the Cold War a year earlier
brings profound change in Yemen. Communist subsidies to south Yemen evaporate, and the two
Yemens merge into one. In 1994, Simmering north-south tensions once more erupted, with
President Saleh sending armed forces to crush a southern independence civil war ((Aboul-Ela, 2019).

2.3 The Threat of Terrorism

In 2000, 17 U.S. personnel are killed in the October bombing of the USS Cole in Aden, focusing
international attention on a rapidly expanding terrorist threat inside ungoverned areas in Yemen in
the form of an offshoot of Al Qaida known as Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) (Rogers,
2019). In 2004, As the United States and others push President Saleh to concentrate on fighting
AQAP, Saleh launches a series of brutal battles, backed by Saudi Arabia, against northern Yemeni
Zayidi Shia fighters known as Houthis, whom he accuses of separatism and of trying to impose
their religious orthodoxy on the state. In 2008, Eighteen Yemenis are killed in a September 2008
terrorist attack against the U.S. Embassy in the capital Sana’a. In 2011, One such drone strike kills
AQAP leader (and U.S. citizen) Anwar al-Awlaki. The policy of drone strikes draws criticism for
resulting in civilian deaths (Rogers, 2019).

2.3 Fragmentation and Catastrophe

In 2011, In Yemen’s version of the Arab uprisings, protests in Sana’a initially concentrate on
corruption and economic hardships. In 2012, As part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
initiative, Saleh receives immunity from local prosecution and Hadi runs unopposed for a two-
year term as transitional president (Kendal, 2021). In 2012, As part of the GCC initiative, Saleh
receives immunity from local prosecution and Hadi runs unopposed for a two-year term as
transitional president. In 2015, Hadi and his cabinet, after briefly being held hostage by the
Houthis, flee to Saudi Arabia, leaving the Houthis in practical, if not legal, control of the

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institutions of the state. According to Kendal (2021), Today, More than two and a half years later,
Yemen’s war consists of several distinct but overlapping parts – Houthis vs. the Saudi-led
coalition, Houthis against Yemeni Sunnis in places such as Ta’izz, a southern independence
insurgency against both Houthi-controlled Sana’s and the Hadi government, an anti-terrorism
campaign, and a Saudi-Iranian proxy war. With victory in any of these wars elusive, the losers are
the Yemeni people enduring the world’s worst humanitarian crisis (Kendal, 2021).

3. Causes of Yemen Crisis

According to Day & Brehony (2020) the causes for Yemen crisis were listed below

1. Fuel price hikes. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which had
extended to Yemen a $550 million loan premised on promises of economic reforms, Hadi’s
government lifted fuel subsidies in 2014.
2. Houthi takeover. The Houthis captured much of Sanaa by late 2014. Reneging on a UN
peace deal, they consolidated control of the capital and continued their southward advance.
3. Military division. Military units loyal to Saleh aligned themselves with the Houthis,
contributing to their battlefield success. Other militias mobilized against the Houthi-Saleh
forces, aligning with those in the military who had remained loyal to the Hadi government
4. Saudi intervention. In 2015, with Hadi in exile, Riyadh launched a military campaign—
primarily fought from the air—to roll back the Houthis and restore the Hadi administration
to Sanaa

4.Actors involved and their interest)

4.1 Actors involved

4.1.1 The Houthi–Saleh alliance

According to Keshishyan Siraki & Soheiy Najafabadi (2019), the Houthi–Saleh alliance is a
military–tribal marriage of convenience between former foes, with its origins in a shared
interpretation of the 2012–14 transition as inimical to their interests. Cooperation began in 2011,
when the military and tribes felt that they were losing power and Islah, Yemen's main Sunni
Islamist party, emerged as the main winner. The Houthis are naturally suspicious of Ali Abdullah
Saleh, the former president deposed in 2011, and his political party, the General People’s Congress

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(GPC), with which they fought six wars between 2004 and 2010. In Sana’a the narrative of the
war is one of ‘defending the nation against an external threat’.

4.1.2 Pro-Houthi external actors

Iran has historically had a small amount of influence in Yemen in both the south and the north of
the country. Ideologically, the Houthis’ founder, Hussain al-Houthi, was inspired by the Iranian
Revolution but envisioned having his own Islamic revolution based on Zaydi principles. Some
Houthis do follow Twelver Shi’ism but do not form a monolithic movement. Russia, for its part,
has aligned itself – at least as far as diplomacy is concerned with the Houthi–Saleh side in a
continuation of regional dynamics that pit Russia and Iran against Saudi Arabia.

4.1.3 The anti-Houthi bloc

The various groups fighting the Houthis have often competing visions of Yemen’s political future.
This hugely diverse bloc has a common enemy today, but once the Houthi threat has been
eliminated, there is unlikely to be a clear and united view of how the country can move forward.
The bloc has three main pillars:

 Southern separatists, also known as Herak or the Southern resistance: Its priority is
eventual independence for South Yemen, which was a separate country until 1990.
 Sunni Islamists: The most important member of this group is Islah, is a political party with
ambitions to govern Yemen.
 Fighters with tribal or regional motivations: Primarily in Mareb and, to a lesser extent, in
Al Jawf, Taiz and some southern governorates, these fighters see themselves as defending
their territory.
4.1.4 Al Qaeda and the Islamic State

Al Qaeda and the emergent Yemeni branch of ISIS have both positioned themselves as 'anti-
Houthi' but are not part of the semiformal apparatus of the anti-Houthi bloc. AQAP, the virulent
local Al Qaeda branch, is widely seen as being one of the big winners from the war, having seized
the southeastern port town of Mukalla days into the Saudi-led bombing campaign. The group has
since cemented its control over the port and has begun to expand westward towards Aden. AQAP
sees the war as an opportunity to brand itself as the only group capable of defending Yemen's
Sunnis, and of providing - as it has been doing in Mukalla - security and basic governance

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including the provision of water, electricity and jurispudence. ISIS has thus far limited itself to
attacks on Houthi-affiliated buildings including mosques in Sana'a, and on government officials
in Aden

4.1.5 External Actors

 When the Houthis signed the Peace and National Partnership Agreement on 21 September
2014 after seizing Sana’a, Saudi Arabia was willing to accept an imposed power-sharing
agreement. But as the Houthis pushed south, many Arab countries and Saudi Arabia, in
particular came to view their expansion as an Iran-led ‘attack on Arab identity’, linked
to a broader regional struggle for power, and decided to intervene.
 Yemen’s anti-Houthi bloc is highly dependent on external military backing Saudi Arabia
being the most important of the external actors in the war, followed by the United Arab
Emirates (UAE). The stated aim of the Saudi-led coalition is to roll back Houthi–Saleh
advances. But many (though not all) the workshop participants agreed that intervention by
the coalition has less to do with internal Yemeni politics than with regional competition.
 The United States of America and United Kingdome position is one of support for a
regional ally, Saudi Arabia, but there is increasing discomfort over the course of the war,
especially the gains made by ISIS and AQAP as a result of the conflict.
4.2 The Interest of Actors
 Saudi Arabia, which has revealed aspirations to build an oil-exporting pipeline to the
Arabian Sea through Mahara governorate, thus bypassing the Strait of Hormuz. The
Kingdom’s apparent keenness to prevent a military victory by any of the conflict’s
parties even the IRG, which it claims to be helping points to its long-term policy of
promoting Yemen’s instability to facilitate its own ambitions.
 The United States of America and the other Western countries allied with it also have
their own geopolitics behind the war in Yemen. The Western alliance, especially
America, believe that the security of Israel and Saudi Arabia is part of their national
security and thus the prejudice of these two countries is a serious threat to global peace
and security.
 The USA is also playing a critical role with its ally of Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has
remained supportive of the Hadi government and hence conducted military operations
against the Houthis in Yemen.

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  The United States is committed to Yemen's stability, security and economic recovery,
including supporting its ability to counter the malign influence of Iran and defeat
terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda.
 Iran supports the struggle of Houthis in Yemen partly because, the conflict has
allowed it to add Sana’a to the group of Arab capitals within its sphere of influence
along with Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut, something recently made explicit by the
Iranian Ambassador in Houthi-controlled Sanaa.
 A weak and fragmented Yemen mired in violence facilitates the main GCC powers’
expansionary ambitions, helps them maintain control of important seaports and
islands, and enables access to the Arabian Sea to export their oil.
5. Consequences (socioeconomic and political implications to the world)

Iran's control of Bab al-Mandab via the Houthis means giving Iran's allies, Russia and China, a
position in this important chokepoint for the whole world. Hence the global competition and the
proxy war is occurring again in Yemen. Accordingly, there has been a convergence of interests
among many countries in the importance of destroying the power of Yemen, especially after
Houthi militias’ control of Sana'a, and to prevent the occurrence of security hurdles in Bab
alMandab, which could threaten international shipping traffic. Yemen is forgotten in the
international media, but the country is not forgotten in the strategic calculations and the national
security patterns of most of the Western countries and some of the Arab countries (Leijon, 2020).

Impact on Economic Development

 Inequitable economic development, poverty and rising prices: Declines in economic

growth and rising consumer prices following the uprising have contributed to increased
.poverty across the country.
 The concentration of wealth, oil revenues and government resources within a small group
of political elites is in stark contrast to the lives of average Yemenis and a considerable
source of grievance against the State. Chronic malnutrition prevents children from
succeeding at, or even attending, school.

Impact on Social Issues

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 Youth alienation and vulnerability to recruitment into violence: Almost half of Yemen’s
population is under age 15.
 Poor-quality education: The poor quality of education contributes to high rates of
unemployment, with highly skilled jobs in the oil and gas sector going to foreigners.
 Sexual and gender-based violence: Women lack civic and political rights, and sexual and
gender-based violence, female genital mutilation and early marriage rates are increasing as
the economy declines.

Political Implication

 The lack of economic assistance and failure of the political process leads the GPC-
Houthi alliance to establish a parallel governing structure that will erode chances of
future peace. Hadi loyalists will also begin to agitate for their own objectives, seeking
support for a federalist state.
 Insecurity caused by warlordism and the necessity of local groups to ensure the security
of their communities. This economic and security relationship will remain an incentive
for young men who need a source of income; and will provide cover for the growing
influence of AQAP and IS.
 The North will remain relatively secure as the Houthis consolidate their control over
the black market. Food scarcity will lead to higher recruitment particularly in the north.
The risk of attacks inside Saudi Arabia and along the Bab al-Mandeb will increase.
6. Conclusion

By analyzing the conflict in Yemen, it seems that the prospects, hopes and solutions of the
Saudi war in Yemen are not clear, as a result of the complexity of global interests and link of
the war with global geostrategic issues and conflicts, in the sense that there is interdependence
in global political conflicts. Yemen cannot be taken in isolation from the global accounts of
the international superpowers. It can be said that the solution is not in the hands of the Yemenis,
but there is a great need for a serious direct regional dialogue in which Iran and its allies, Russia
and China, as well as Saudi Arabia and its allies from the USA and other Western countries,
are directly involved. Dialogue must be in accordance with convictions by all parties to solve
the problems of Yemen and motivate the conflicting parties to engage in a direct and serious
dialogue at local levels, and to come up with a clear vision and peace road map.

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References
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103.

Brandt, M. (2017). Tribes and politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi conflict. Oxford
University Press.

Day, S. W. (2012). Regionalism and rebellion in Yemen: A troubled national union (No. 37).
Cambridge University Press.

Day, S. W., & Brehony, N. (Eds.). (2020). Global, regional, and local dynamics in the Yemen
crisis. London: Palgrave Macmillan

Elayah, M., Schulpen, L., van Kempen, L., Almaweri, A., AbuOsba, B., & Alzandani, B. (2020).
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Kendall, E. (2021). Jihadi militancy and Houthi insurgency in Yemen. In Routledge Handbook of
US Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare Operations (pp. 83-94). Routledge.

Keshishyan Siraki, G., & Soheiy Najafabadi, S. (2019). A Survey of the Yemeni Crisis:
Developments, Roots, Actors and Strategies for the End of the Crisis. Political Science
Quarterly, 15(46), 187-214.

Leijon, J. (2020). The Crime of Hunger: Yemen’s Humanitarian Crisis.

Rogers, J. (2019). Violence and the (trans) formation of the state in the Yemen Arab Republic
1962-1970 (Doctoral dissertation, SOAS University of London).

Sharp, J. M., & Brudnick, I. A. (2015). Yemen: civil war and regional intervention.

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