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1. CALTEX INC. V. PALOMAR

18 SCRA 247, September 29, 1966

Construction is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and
intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case,
where that intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the fact that the given case is
not explicitly provided for in the law. The case at bar involves the question of
whether or not the scheme proposed by the appellee is within the coverage of the
prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law which requires an inquiry into the intended
meaning of the words used.

Facts:
Caltex laid a groundwork for a promotional scheme, the “Caltex Hooded Pump
Contest”, which calls for participants to estimate the actual number of liters a
hooded gas pump at each station will dispense during a specific period. In order to
participate, no fee or consideration is required. Foreseeing the extensive use of the
mails, representations were made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the
contest to be cleared in advance for mailing in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code (specifically 1954 9a), 1982 and 1983) which provides
the non-mailable prohibitions on matters of advertising or conveying information
concerning any lottery, gift enterprise or of any similar scheme, the issuance of
fraud orders and the authority of the Director of Posts for that matter.
Caltex then thru their counsel, enclosed a copy of the contest rules and endeavored
to justify its position that the contest does not violate the anti-lottery provisions of
the Postal Law. However, the Acting Postmaster General opine that the scheme falls
within the purview of the provisions and decline to grant the requested clearance.
Caltex sought reconsideration but the Postmaster General Palomar maintained his
view that contest involves consideration and that it is a gift enterprise which is
banned by the Postal Law. He denied the use of mails and said that if the contest was
conducted, a fraud order will be issued against Caltex. Caltex then invoked judicial
intervention by filing a petition for declaratory relief against the Palomar praying
that the contest is not violative of the Postal Law and to order respondent to allow
petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the public.

Decision of the trial court: the court holds that the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest to
be conducted and that it does not violate the Postal Law. That the respondent has no
right to bar the public distribution of said rules by the mails.

The respondent appealed.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause for the declaratory relief
2. Whether or not the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest violates the Postal
Law

Held:
1. YES, the petitioner states a sufficient cause for the declaratory relief. In order that
a declaratory relief may be available, the following conditions must be present:
a. There must a be a justiciable controversy
b. The controversy must be between persons whose interest are adverse
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c. The party seeking relief must have legal interest in the controversy;
interest to continue the contest and the respondent’s interest that it is
under his authority to ban activities in accordance with the Postal Law
d. Issue involved must be ripe for judicial determination

The element of justiciable controversy is proven on the contrasting assertion of

the petitioner’s legal right and the denial on the part of the respondent concerning
a real question or issue. So, it is about the claim to use the mails for its proposed
contest and the challenger and denial of the respondent of the privileged
demanded which spawned a live controversy. With the authority of the
respondent to issue a fraud order if the contest is carried out, there is an inevitable
reason for a litigation to settle their differences. It ripened into a justiciable
controversy when their conflict was translated into a positive claim of right.
Hence, the petitioner is entitled to a declaratory relief

2. NO, the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest does not violate the Postal Law. Provisions
of the Postal Law defines lottery as schemes that are for the distribution of prizes by
chance like policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles and other forms of
gambling. Although not a lottery, respondent insists that the contest is a gift
enterprise because of the existence of the element of consideration. However, the
court says that the contest rules does not require any fee to be paid, merchandise to
be bought, any service to be rendered, or any value to be given for the privilege to
participate. The contest fails to exhibit any apparent consideration which would
brand it as a lottery or gift enterprise but instead a gratuitous distribution of property
by chance. Hence, the court affirms the ruling of the trial court that the contest is not
a lottery that may be administratively dealt with under the Postal Law.

Notes:
o Elements of lottery: definition is that lottery extends to all schemes for the
distribution of prizes by chance, like gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles
at fairs and various forms of gambling.
 Consideration
 Prize
 Chance
o Gift enterprise is commonly applied to a sporting artifice under which goods
are sold for their market value, but by way of inducement each purchaser is
given a chance to win a prize (used in association with lottery; hence, if
lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, also the term gift
enterprise will be prohibited only if it involves the same.
o The law does not condemn the gratuitous distribution of property by chance,
if no consideration is derived directly ot indirectly from the party receiving
the chance. What is condemned are criminal schemes that involve valuable
consideration of some kind for the chance to draw a prize.
o Test to determine consideration: does not derive from the benefit of the
proponent of the contest but to whether the participant pays a valuable
consideration for the chance. The standpoint to determine it would be on the
part of the contestant and not the sponsor.
o Purpose of the mail fraud orders is to prevent the use of the mails as a
medium for disseminating printed matters on which by ground of public
policy are declared non-mailable. Such prohibition is applied to lotteries, gift
enterprises and other similar schemes for the necessity to suppress the
tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public morals. Since
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in gambling it is inherent that something of value must be hazarded for a

chance to gain a larger amount.

2. PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION INC. v. NATIONAL

TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION AND PLDT
131 SCRA 200, August 18, 1984

Facts:
PCFI filed a petition praying that the decision of respondent NTC should be
annulled. Respondent NTC approved the application of PLDT for the revised
schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan and issued a decision that the SIP
schedule is within the 50% cost limit. Petitioner filed a motion for consideration but
was denied by the NTC. PCFI contends that the SIP is pre-mature and illegal
because NTC has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations
implementing Sec. 2 of PD. No. 217. NTC invoked its authority pursuant to Sec. 3
of the Rule 15 of the Rules of Practice, however, PCFI claims that implementing
rules and regulations are mandatory pre-requisite for the approval of SIP rates.

NTC admits the absence of the implementing rules and regulation but says that
nowhere in said decree is there any legal provision making it mandatory since NTC
is enjoined to implement the declared policies of the decree for its immediate
implementation, as all existing SIP plans were approved by them and that it may
rely on existing Rules of Practice.

Ruling of the court: The court then issued a ruling that the decision of the NTC be
annulled.

Private respondent and the Solicitor General for NTC filed their comments and
memoranda challenging the decision of the court because said decision was not
unanimous (bears only the concurrence of only 9 members, while 3 members took
no part and 1 member reserved his vote). PLDT as well filed for a motion for
reconsideration joining NTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the promulgation of implementing rules and regulations should be
mandatory?

Held:
NO, the promulgation of implementing rules and regulations is not mandatory. It is
not stated in the provisions of P.D. No. 217 that the phrase “may be promulgates”
should be construed as “shall be promulgated”. The NTC can function without
additional rules aside from the existing Public Service Law and the rules issued by
the Public Service Commission. What is mandatory on the part of NTC is the
immediate implementation of the polices and that formulation of rules and
regulations is purely discretionary on their part. With that, the decision of the court
is reconsidered and set aside and the petition is dismissed.

3. NFL v. EISMA
127 SCARA 419, January 31, 1984

Facts:
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Petitioner National Federation of Labor (NFL) filed with the Ministry of Labor of
Employment a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective
bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of the respondent
Zamboanga Wood Products. Employees charged the respondent firm before the
same office for underpayment of monthly living allowances. After some time, a
notice of strike against the private respondent happened which was followed by the
union submitting minutes of the declaration of strike. Zambowood filed a complaint
with the respondent Judge against the officers and members of the union for
damages for obstruction of private property. It was alleged that petitioner blockaded
the road preventing customers and suppliers to enter the premises. Petitioners
contended that acts complained of were incidents of a strike against private
respondents and that exclusive jurisdiction belongs to the Labor Arbiter and not to a
court of first instance.

The motion was dismissed, hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the court has jurisdiction

Held:
NO, the RTC has no jurisdiction. It is expressly provided in Art. 217 that labor
arbiters has the exclusive jurisdiction on claims arising from employer-employee
relations. Hence, the petition id granted and the order issued by the respondent
Judge is nullified.
The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction and
interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them. The exclusive jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter is provided for explicitly in Art. 217 of the Labor Code.

4. PAAT v. CA
266 SCRA 167, January 10, 1997

5. PEOPLE V. MAPA
20 SCRA 1164

Facts:
Mario M. Mapa was charged for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in
violation of Section 878 of the Revise Administrative Code Accused admits to
possession of firearm on ground of being a secret agent of Governor Feliciano
Leviste of Batangas. Counsel for the accused presented 4 exhibits; one is the appoint
of the accused as a secret agent of the governor, a document issued by the governor
addressed to the accused directing him to go to Manila on a confidential mission;
oath of the accused as a secret agent and a certificate that the accused is a secret
agent of Governor Leviste.

Ruling of the lower court: The lower court rendered a decision convicting the
accused of the crime and sentenced him to imprisonment for one year and one day to
two years. As the appeal involves a question of law, it was elevated to the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
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Whether or not a secret agent duly appointed as such of a governor is exempt from
the requirement. It is clear that it is only when firearms in possession of officials
enumerated in Sec. 878 and public servants for use in the performance of their
official duties can they be covered by the provision. The law cannot be cleared and
that no provision made for a secret agent is provided. Hence, the judgement
appealed from is affirmed.

Held:
NO, a secret agent of a governor is not exempt from the requirement

Note:
o People v. Macarandang; where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the
assumption that his appointment was to assist in the maintenance of peace and order
sufficiently puts him in the category of a peace officer equivalent to a member of the
municipal police covered by the Sec. 878.

6. LEVERIZA V. IAC
157 SCRA 282

7. DAOANG V. MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF SAN NICOLAS, ILOCOS NORTE

159 SCRA 369, 1988
Facts:

Spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of
San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their
father and guardian, the petitioners filed an opposition to the said adoption. They
contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter
named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died and therefore said spouses
were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that
those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children
by legal fiction cannot adopt.

Issue:

Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are disqualified to adopt
under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held:

NO, the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos. The words used in Article
335 of the Civil Code enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear. The
children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law and do not include
grandchildren. The SC denied the petition and affirmed

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with
an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction.

Notes:
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o Respondent judge held that to add grandchild or grandchildren in this article where
no grandchild is included would violate the legal maxim that what is expressly
included would naturally exclude what is not included.
o Petitioners contended that adoption would introduce a foreign element in the family
unit but also a reduction of their legitimes or their inheritance.

8. PARAS V. COMELEC
264 SCRA 49, November 4, 1996

Facts:

A Petition for recall was filed against petitioner Danilo Paras who was the
incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City. Respondent COMELEC
resolved the recall election November 1995 since 29.30% of the registered voters
signed the petition which is above the 25% required by law. However, the recall
election was deferred because of the petitioner’s opposition. Respondent then set a
new schedule for the recall election which was December of the same year but was
deferred again due to the petitioner filing a case before the RTC for a petition for
injunction. RTC then issued a temporary restraining order. After a summer of
hearing, the TRO was lifted, dismissed the petition and required the petitioner and
his counsel to explain why they should not be contempt for misrepresenting that the
recall election is not approved by COMELEC. On its third attempt, respondent again
set a new schedule for the recall election dated January 1996. Petitioner filed a reply,
that under Sec. 74 of RA 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the
date of the official’s assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a
regular election. Petitioner claims that since the Sangguniang Kabataan was set on
the first Monday of May 1996, no recall election must be set because it is only a
matter of 4 months before the SK election.

Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation of the provisions of Sec.
74 of the LGC

Held:
NO, the recall election in the case is not a violation of the LGC. Petitioner’s
interpretation of the provision is too literal and that it is not in accordance with the
intention of the authors of the law. Regular local election refers to an election where
the office is held by a local elective official sought to be recalled. Petitioner’s
interpretation that Sangguniang Kabataan election is considered to be a regular
election is incorrect and that under Sec. 74 of RA 7160, prohibits the conduct of
recall election one year immediately preceding the regular election.

Notes:
 It must be construed that a regular local election refers to an election where
the office is held by the local elective and not a youth organization
 Recall was possible because of the limitation under Sec. 74 considering that
the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is 7 months
away.
 Petition was dismissed because the issue is already moot and academic
 TRO enjoining the recall election is made permanent
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9. FLORESCA v. PHILEX MINING CORP.

136 SCRA 142, April 30, 1985

Facts:
Petitioners are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation,
who, while working at its mines died as a result of the cave-in that buried them. The
complaint alleges that Philex was negligent and deliberately failed to take the
required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men. A motion to dismiss
was filed by Philex alleging that the causes of action of petitioners are based on an
industrial accident which is covered by the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the
Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners on the other
hand contend that the cause of action is not based on the WCA but on the provisions
of the Civil Code allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages. CFI
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and ruled that WCA has exclusive
jurisdiction over damage or compensation claims for work-connected deaths,
irrespective of whether or not the employer was negligent.

Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance have jurisdiction over the complaint?

Held:

10. AISPRONA V. CA & PEOPLE

113 SCRA 459, April 12, 1982

Facts:
Rodolfo Aisporna is a duly licensed agent to Perla Compania de Seguros. In his
absence, his wife, Mapalad Aisporna, effected a renewal of an accident insurance
policy to a certain Eugenio Isidro. An information was then filed charging the
Mapalad of violation of Sec. 189 of the Insurance Act for having acted as agent in
behalf of Perla Compania de Segurus without having first secured a certificate of
authority to act as such. The trial court ruled that Mapalad Aisporna, the petitioner,
is guilty as charged. Petitioner contends that being the wife of a licensed agent, she
naturally helped him in his work. Upon appeal, the trial court’s decision was
affirmed by the respondent court ruling that Aisporna is guilty of violating the first
paragraph of Sec. 189.

Issue:
Whether or not a person can be convicted of having violated the first paragraph of
Sec. 189 of the Insurance Act without reference to the second paragraph of the same
section

Held:
NO, the second paragraph of the same section is intended to define the word agent
mentioned in the first paragraph. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the
second paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first would give harmony to the
intent of the provision. Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration
of the statute as a whole.

Considering that the definition in the second paragraph provides that it is an

essential element to receive compensation for the violation of the first paragraph
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which merely prohibits the act of a person from acting as an agent in the
procurement of application for insurance without certificate of authority. In the case
at bar, the information does not allege that the insurance contracted by the petitioner
to Isidro was one for compensation. Thus, Mapalad Aisporna did not violate Sec.
189 of the Insurance act. Judgement appealed from is then reversed and Aisporna is
acquitted of the charged.

Note: Doctrine of Associated Words (Noscitur a Sociis)- where a particular word or

phrase is ambiguous or is equally susceptible to various meanings, its true meaning
may be made clear and specific by considering the company with which it is
associated.

11. CHINA BANK V. ORTEGA

49 SCRA 355, January 31, 1973

Facts:
Vicente Acban filed a complaint against Bautista Logging, B&B Forest
Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the collection of a sum of money.
Trial court then declared defendants in default and rendered a judgement by default
against them. To satisfy the judgement, plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank
deposit of the defendant with the China Banking Corporation. After a notice of
garnishment was served, the bank, through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong, alleged that
the provisions of RA 1405 prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to
bank deposits. Tan was ordered to inform the Court whether or not there is a deposit
in the China Banking corporation of defendant B&B Forest Development
Corporation, and if there is any deposit, to hold the same intact and not allow any
withdrawal under further orders. China Banking Corporation and Tan then instituted
the instant petition. The petitioners argue that the disclosure of the information
ordered by the court does not fall within any of the exceptions of RA 1405 and that
Tan may be held criminally liable for it. Moreover, petitioners claim that the bank
deposit of judgement debtor B&B cannot be subject to garnishment to satisfy a final
judgement against it.

Issue:
Whether or not China Bank may validly refuse to comply with a court process
garnishing the bank deposit of the debtor by invoking the provisions of RA 1405

Held:
NO, China Bank may not refuse to comply with the court regarding the garnishment
of a bank deposit. It is sufficiently clear that the prohibition against examination or
inquiry of a bank deposit under RA 1405 does not preclude it being garnished to
insure satisfaction of a judgement. It is not the intention of the Congress to enable
debtors to evade payment of their debt, even if ordered by the court, through the
convenience of converting their assets into cash and depositing it in a bank.

Notes:
RA 1405 provides that all deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions are considered absolutely confidential in nature and may not be
examine or inquired by any person, government official or office, except
upon written permission of the depositor, in cases of impeachment, or upon
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order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty, here the

money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation
 Prohibited to the extent that the inquiry is limited, the inquiry made only for
the purpose of satisfying a liability already declared. The law prohibits mere
investigation or inquiry into the existence and the amount of the deposit. It is
allowed if it is to determine only the amount of such money to satisfy the
obligation and not to determine whether a deposit has been made.
 The lower court did not order an examination of or inquiry into the deposit of
B&B Forest Development Corporation. It merely required Tan to inform the
court whether the defendant had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation
so that the bank will hold the same and not allow withdrawal until further
order.

12. BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS OF THE P.V.A. V. BAUTISTA

112 SCRA 59, February 22, 1982

Facts:
Calixto Gasilao was a veteran in good standing during the World War II. He filed a
claim for disability pension under Sec. 9 RA No. 65 alleging that he was suffering
from PTB which he incurred in line of duty. Due to Gasilao’s failure to complete his
supporting papers and submit evidence to establish his service connected illness, his
claim was disapproved by the Board of Administrators of Philippine Veterans
Affairs Office in December of 1955. When he was able to complete his supporting
papers in 1968, the Board of Administrators awarded him the benefits of RA 65.
However, Gasilao now claims that he was deprived of his right to the pension from
1955-1957. The lower court then rendered judgement against the Board of
Administrators, that they be ordered to make Gasilao’s pension effective as of 1955.

The Board of Administrators of the PVA, then filed its petition challenging the
decision of the court. Petitioner maintains that RA 65 does not provide for the
effectivity of pension awards but to remedy its deficiency, they cited Sec. 15 of the
law providing the need to file an application with them to be able to be awarded the
benefits under the law. That since the provision requires that claimant should first be
awarded by board before he could receive his pension, thus an award of pension
benefits should commence from the date of the approval of his application.

Issue:
Whether or not Gasilao is entitled to his pension from 1955-1957

Held:
YES, Gasilao is entitled to his pension from 1955-1957. The interpretation of the
petitioner that the award of pension should commence from the date of the approval
of the application is not in consonance with the spirit and intent of the law. The
purpose of Congress in granting pensions is to compensate veterans for their service
and those that sustained injuries and sickness while in line of duty. It is a
governmental expression of gratitude, that pension statues must be given liberal
construction in favor of those entitled to pension.

Notes:
 Provision clearly provides that it is incumbent upon the board to carry out
the provisions of the statute in the most expeditious way possible and
without unnecessary delay. In the Begosa case, it took 9 years and in the
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instant case it took 12 years. It would be more in consonance with the spirit
and intendment of the law that the benefits granted should be enjoyed at the
earliest time possible.
 If pension awards are made effective only upon approval of the application,
it would then be dependent on the discretion of the board which is
susceptible to abuse through inaction which can take several years to be
granted. If it’ll be dependent on the board, the purpose of which RA 65 could
easily be defeated.

13. SALVATIERRA V. CA and SPS. LINO LONGALONG & PACIENCIA

MARIANO
261 SCRA 45, August 26, 1996

Facts:
Enrique Salvatierra left 3 parcels of land to his legitimate brothers and sister.
Macario, one of the brothers, sold Lot. 26 to his son, Anselmo Salvatierra.
Venancio, on the other hand who owner 2/5 of the estate, sold a portion of the Lot
26 and the whole Lot 27 to private respondents Lino Lingalong and Paciencia
Mariano, who after the sale took possession of the lots. After some time, the spouses
discovered that a portion of Lot 26 was outside their fence and that Anselmo was
able to obtain an Original Certificate of Title under his name covering the whole of
Lot 26. Settlements in the barangay were done, however, the widow of Anselmo,
Purita Salvatierra, refuse to return the 149 square meter portion of Lot No. 26.
Private respondents then filed a case for the reconveyance of the portion of the lot
with the RTC but it was dismissed on the grounds that Longalong failed to establish
ownership of the portion and that the prescriptive period of four years from
discovery of fraud had already lapsed. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision and
ruled that the lower court failed to examine carefully the deed of extrajudicial
partition and the deed of sale between Macario and his son Anselmo. That a vendor
can sell only what he owns or what he is authorized to sell. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:
Whether or not the private respondents are entitled to the reconveyance of the
portion of Lot No. 26

Held:
YES, the private respondents are entitled to the reconveyance of the portion of the
lot. It was clear in the deed of extrajudicial partition that Anselmo obtained only 405
square meters out of Lot No. 26. Since there was no ambiguity in the terms and
stipulations of the extrajudicial partition, that terms are clear and unequivocal.
Hence, the literal and plain meaning of it should be observed. The SC then denied
the petition.

14. KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA MANILA RAILROAD

COMPANY CREDIT UNION V. MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY
88 SCRA 616, February 28, 1979

Facts:
The petitioner credit union cites Par. 1 and 2 of RA No. 2023 and claims that loans
granted by credit unions to its members enjoy first priority in the payroll collection
from the respondent’s employees’ wages and salaries. The petition was dismissed by
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the lower court and held that there is nothing in the provision that provides an
obligation of laborers and employees payable to credit union shall enjoy first priority
in the deduction from employees’ wages and salaries. Petitioner then filed an appeal
to this court.

Issue:
Whether or not lower court erred in its appreciation of RA 2023

Held:
NO, the lower court did not err in the application of RA 2023. It was clear in RA
No. 2023 that the its only effect is to compel the employer to deduct from the
salaries or wages payable to members of the employees’ cooperative credit unions
the employees’ debt to the union and to pay the same to the credit union. It merely
gives the employer an obligation to make the deduction of the employees’ debt from
the latter’s salary and turn it over to the credit union but the provision does not
converts the credit union’s credit into a first priority credit. If the legislative intent is
to give first priority credit then it would have been expressly declared. RA 2023
speaks for itself and is unequivocal, hence, there is nothing for the courts to do but
to apply it. The appealed decision is affirmed.

15. ABELLANA V. MARAVE

57 SCRA 106, May 29, 1974

Facts:
Petitioner Francisco Abellana was charged with the crime of physical injuries
through reckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a pedicab resulting in
injuries to its passengers, who are the private respondents in this case. The criminal
case was filed with the city court which found the accused Abellana guilty as
charged and damages are awarded in favor of the offended parties. The accused,
now petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of First Instance, Private
respondents filed with another branch of the Court of First Instance a separate and
independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered by them from the negligence
of Abellana. Francisco and Crispin Abellana who was also included as defendant in
the criminal case, sought the dismissal of the civil action on the ground that there
was no reservation and that it was not allowed at a stage where the criminal case was
already on appeal. Respondent Judge Geronimo Marave denied their petition. A
motion for reconsideration was also filed but was denied by the respondent judge as
well. Hence this petition. The basis of the petitioners is that there was grave abuse of
discretion.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondents could properly institute a separate civil action
not withstanding their failure to reserve the right to file the same in the criminal
proceeding

Held:
YES, the private respondent are entitled to file a separate civil action. The
petitioners reading of the Rules of Court that, “the civil action for recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charge is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately” should
not be favored. Petitioners took comfort from such interpretation thinking that
without a reservation, an independent civil action is already barred. Their restrictive
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interpretation of the rule gives rise to a serious constitutional question as it impairs

with the substantive right of the offended parties to seek recovery for damages in the
civil suit. Moreover, it is a well settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a
statue or legal norm is such a manner that would give rise to constitutional doubt.
Hence, the petition was dismissed.

Note: It is not within the power of the Court increase or modify a substantive right.
One should ignore the main purpose of litigation which is to assure justice according
to the law. Such purpose will fail if too literal construction of the law would be used
to vindicate an alleged right given by the constitution.

16. PARAS V. COMELEC

Petitioner Danilo Paras who was the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City, won the barangay election in 1994. A petition for recall was filed
against him. Respondent COMELEC approved the said petition and set the recall
election in November 1995. However, the recall election was deferred because of
the petitioner’s opposition. Respondent then set a new schedule for the recall
election which was December of the same year but was deferred again due to the
petitioner filing a case before the RTC for a petition for injunction. RTC then issued
a temporary restraining order. After a summary hearing, the TRO was lifted,
dismissed the petition and required the petitioner and his counsel to explain why
they should not be contempt for misrepresenting that the recall election was without
COMELEC approval. On its third attempt, respondent again set a new schedule for
the recall election dated January 1996. Petitioner filed a reply, citing Sec. 74 of RA
7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official’s
assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular election. Petitioner
claims that since the Sangguniang Kabataan Election was set on the first Monday of
May 1996, no recall election must be set because it is only a matter of 4 months
before the SK election. Petitioner claims that since SK election is a regular election,
he cannot be subjected to the recall election.

Issue:
Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation of the provisions of Sec.
74 of the LGC

Held:
NO, the recall election in the case is not a violation of the LGC. Petitioner’s
interpretation of the provision is too literal and that it is not in accordance with the
intention of the authors of the law. It was clear that the intent of Sec. 74 is to subject
an elective local official to recall election during the second year of his term. His
interpretation to the phrase “regular local election” to include the SK election is
incorrect as SK is nothing more than a youth organization as its elective officials
have not yet attained the status of local elective officials.
Notes:
 It must be construed that a regular local election refers to an election where
the office is held by the local elective and not a youth organization.
 Regular local election refers to an election where the office is held by a local
elective official sought to be recalled. Petitioner’s interpretation that
Sangguniang Kabataan election is considered to be a regular election is
incorrect
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 Recall was not possible because of the limitation under Sec. 74 considering
that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is 7
months away.
 Petition was dismissed because the issue is already moot and academic
 TRO enjoining the recall election is made permanent

17. PAFLU V. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS

72 SCRA 396, August 21, 1976

Facts:
A certification was issued by the director of Labor Relations, Carmelo Noriel, that
National Federation of Free Labor Relations Union won against the petitioner
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, by 429 votes and the latter with only
414 votes. The petitioner filed a complaint against the director of BLR on the
ground that he committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not count 17 spoiled
ballots. Petitioner cites the ruling in the case of Allied Workers Association of the
Philippine v. Court of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots should be counted.
The respondent director contends that the case of Allied Workers cannot be applied
in the present case because said case was decided when it was the Industrial Peace
Act that was in effect and not the present law. Thus, it no long possess relevance as
it was superseded by the present Labor Code.

Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
Director

Held:
NO, there was no grave abuse of discretion. The principle of contemporaneous
construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whose duty is
to execute it, is entitled to great respect and should ordinarily control the
construction of the statute by the courts. Such contemporaneous construction should
be respected by the courts unless such interpretation is clearly erroneous. Hence, the
petition was dismissed.

18. PHILIPPINE APPAREL WORKERS’ UNION V. NLRC and PHILIPPINE

APPAREL
106 SCRA 444, July 31, 1981

Facts:
Petitioner union and private respondent Philippine Apparel signed a collective
bargaining agreement which provides a 3-stage wage increases for all rank and file
employees in April 1977, Meanwhile, P.D. 1132 was enacted the same year
providing for an increase y 60 in the living allowance ordained by P.D. 525. The
controversy arose when the petitioner sought the implementation of the negotiated
wage increase in the collective bargaining agreement. The respondent company
however, alleges that the negotiated wage increase in their CBA is in partial
compliance with the decree so that it is obliged to pay only 38P. Petitioner maintains
that the living allowance under P.D. 1123 is distinct and separate from the
negotiated wage increase in the CBA. Petitioner then filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice and violation of the CBA against the respondent company.
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Labor Arbiter Maglaya dismissed the complaint. Petitioner filed an appeal assailing
that the order of the labor arbiter constitutes grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, respondent company filed a partial appeal
claiming that it has not committed an unfair labor practice nor violated the CBA.
NLRC then dismissed the case for lack of merit. The dismissal is based on the
opinion of the Undersecretary of Labor saying that the CBA was already perfected,
and that respondent company is exempted from payment prior to the CBA plus the
additional 60 for emergency cost of living allowance. That the respondent has to pay
a total of 60P monthly for it to satisfy payment of both the wage increase and the
allowance. Since respondent has agreed to pay said increase, there can be no unfair
labor practice. Secretary of Labor also said that the petitioner’s claim for wage
increase under CBA and the 60P allowance under P.D. 1123 is untenable citing par.
K of Sec. 1 of the rules implementing P.D. 1123, that said increase shall not apply to
those who have been granted increase. He claims that respondent company shall
only pay the difference of the negotiated increased wage and the 60P allowance.
Petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration but the NLRC dismissed the same.
Hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not par. K Sec. 1 of the Rules Implementing P.D. 1123 is valid

Held:

NO, par. K Sec. 1 of the rules implementing P.D. 1123 is invalid and should be
declared null and void. In line with this, Secretary of Labor exceeded his authority in
enacting it which exempts not only distressed employers but also those that were
granted allowance under P.D. 525. Moreover, said opinion is based on the wrong
premise that there was already a grant. There was no grant in the wage increase as
employees were not yet paid, to enable the company to avail the exemption under
P.D. 1123. It is not only incorrect based on a misapprehension of facts but also
unlawful because it goes beyond the scope of the law excluding those who have
been granted said increase. Clearly, the inclusion of par. K contravenes the statutory
authority granted to the Secretary of Labor, the same is therefore void.

19. IBAA EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION V. OPLE

132 SCRA 663, August 28, 1985

Facts:
The petitioner Union filed a complaint against the respondent bank for the payment
of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor. National Labor Relations
Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila. Conciliation having failed, and upon the
request of both parties, the case was certified for arbitration. Arbiter Ricarte T.
Soriano rendered a decision granting petitioner's complaint for payment of holiday
pay. Respondent bank did not appeal from the said decision and complied with the
order of the Labor Arbiter by paying their holiday pay up to and including January
1976. On 16 December 1975, Presidential Decree 850 was promulgated amending,
among others, the provisions of the Labor Code on the right to holiday pay.
Accordingly, by authority of Article 5 of the same Code the Department of Labor
(now Ministry of Labor) promulgated the rules and regulations for the
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implementation of holidays with pay which now provides that employees who are
uniformly paid by the month, irrespective of the number of working days and with a
salary of not less than the statutory or established minimum wage shall be presumed
to be paid for all days in the month whether worked or not."

Because of the implementation of Policy Instruction 9, respondent bank stopped

the payment of holiday pay to all its employees. With that, the Union filed a motion
for a writ of execution to enforce the arbiter's decision of 25 August 1975, which the
bank opposed. The Labor Arbiter, instead of issuing a writ of execution, issued an
order enjoining the bank to continue paying its employees their regular holiday pay.
Respondent bank appealed but the same was dismissed. Hence, this petition

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 2 of the implementing rules is valid

Held:
NO, Sec. 2 of the implementing rules is invalid. It is clear in the Labor Code that
monthly paid employees are not excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
However, the implementing rules on holiday pay promulgated by the Secretary of
Labor excluded monthly paid employees from said benefits which is a violation of
the rule on statutory construction regarding verba legis (words in the constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except when technical terms are employed). In
the case, it was clear in the Labor Code that it does not exclude monthly paid
employees. So, although administrative interpretation of statues are generally given
with, they should not be applied if such interpretation is amending or enlarging the
scope of exclusion found in the law itself, as in the case. Petition is then granted, the
order of public respondent is set aside reinstating the decision of the labor arbiter.

20. CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES’ ASSOCIATION V. OPLE

Facts:
The petitioner, Chartered Bank Employees Association instituted a complaint with
the Regional Office of the Department of Labor against private respondent Charted
Bank for the payment of 10 unworked legal holidays, premium and overtime
differentials for worked holidays. The NLRC and the arbitrator ruled in favor of the
petitioners ordering the respondent bank to pay its monthly paid employees holiday
pay for 10 legal holidays and to pay premium or overtime pay differentials to all
employees who rendered work during said legal holidays. On appeal, the Minister of
Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC dismissing the petitioner’s claim for lack
of merit basing its decision on Sec. 2 Rule IV Book II of the Integrated Rules and
Policy Instruction No. 9 which excludes monthly paid employees from the benefits
of holiday pays. Petitioner contends that respondent gravely abused his discretion in
promulgating Sec. 2 of the implementing rules and that it contravened and violated
the Labor Code by excluding the benefits of the petitioners, when the Code itself did
not provide for their exclusion.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 2 of the implementing rules valid

Held:
NO, Sec. 2 of the Policy Instruction No. 9 issued by the respondent Minister is
invalid. As a rule, then the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law
must be taken to mean exactly what it says. The Labor Code is clear and concise
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defining those employees who are covered and those who are secluded from the
benefits of the holiday pay. The respondent implementing the Policy Instruction No.
9 exceeded his statutory authority. Although contemporaneous construction is given
great weight, unless such construction is so erroneous, it must be declared as null
and void. Hence, the order of the respondent is reversed and the court affirms the
decision of the NLRC.

21. SARMIENTO V. MISON

G.R. No. 79974, December 17, 1987

Facts:

Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of
Constitutional law, seeks to enjoin respondent Salvador Mison from performing the
functions of the Office of Commission of the Bureau of Customs on the ground that
Mison’s appointment as Commissioner is unconstitutional by reason that it was not
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. Sec. 16 Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that there are 4 groups of officers whom the President shall
appoint from time to time:

First- the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, and other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces
Second- all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not provided
by law
Third- those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint
Fourth- officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone.

The provision provides clearly that the first group of officers should be appointed
with the consent of the Commission on Appointments which are initiated by
nomination. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th groups of officers are the present bone of contention
in the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the appointment of Mison is valid

Held:

YES, the appointment of Mison is valid. It is clear in Sec. 16 Art. VII of the 1987
Constitution that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be
made by the President without the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
Clearly, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except
appointments to officers expressly mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16. The
position of Commission of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of
those within the first group where such consent is required. The court then ruled that
the President acted within her constitutional authority in appointing respondent
Salvador Mison without submitting his nomination to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation. Hence, the Court dismissed the petition.

Note:
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- 1935 Constitution almost all presidential appointments

required the consent of the Commission on Appointments
- 1973 Constitution placed the absolute power of appointment
in the President with hardly any check on the part of the
legislature (subject to political influence)
- 1987 Constitution struck a middle ground by requiring the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments for the first
group of appointments and leaving to the President the
appointment of other officers without such confirmation
- Rule in statutory construction that an express enumeration of
the subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow
that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in
the first group requires the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments
22. PERFECTO V. MEER
85 Phil. 552, February 27, 1950

Facts:

Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax
upon his salary as member of this Court in 1946. After paying the amount, he
instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the
assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of
taxes would reduce it in violation of the Constitution. The court upheld his
contention and required the refund of the amount collected. After some time, Justice
Perfecto died, however since the question in this case affects all the members of the
judiciary and the issue involves the right of other constitutional officers whose
compensation is equally protected by the Constitution, the court pushed through
with the case. Hence, this appeal by the defendant.

Issue:
Whether or not the salary of judges is subject to the payment of income tax

Held:
NO, it is not subject to the payment of income tax. The Sec. 9 Art. VIII of the 1935
Constitution provides that the members of the SC and all judges of inferior court
shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office. The Consititution of the United
States, like ours, forbids the diminution of the compensation of Judges of the SC and
inferior courts. Hence, the petition was affirmed.

23. ENDENCIA V. DAVID

93 Phil. 696, 1953

Facts:

The case is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance which
ruled that Sec. 13 of RA No. 590 is unconstitutional and ordered the appellant
Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to refund to Justice Endencia and
Justice Jugo the income tax collected on their salary. The judge of the lower court
held that under the doctrine in Perfecto v. Meer, the collection of income taxes from
the salaries of judges was a diminution of their compensation and therefore a
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violation of the Constitution. Appellant was the ordered to refund said taxes. The
ruling in the said case was not favored by the Congress who after its promulgation
enacted RA. No. 590 providing that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a
decrease of compensation.

Issue:
Whether or not RA. No. 590 Sec. 13 can justify and legalize the collection of
income tax on the salary of judicial officers

Held:
NO, RA 590 cannot justify the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial
officers. The court cited Sec. 9 Art. VIII of the Constitution which clearly provides
that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries
because the collection thereof by the government was a decrease or diminution of
their salaries and thus, expressly prohibited by the constitution. Wherefore, the
decision appealed from is affirmed.

Note:
- Congress cant do this because the interpretation and
application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial
department. And this authority to interpret and apply extends
to the Constitution. The legislature is assigned the task and
the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. If
the legislature may declare what a law means, even after the
courts have already ascertained and applied it in a decision, it
would cause confusion and instability in judicial process and
court decisions.
- One of the main reasons behind the enactment of RA 590 is
the feeling among certain legislators that members of the SC
should not enjoy an exemption and that as citizens, and out of
patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income
tax on their salaries.

24. NITAFAN V. COMM. OF INTERNAL REVENUE

152 SCRA 284, 1987

Facts:

Petitioners are duly qualified and appointed judges of the RTC in the NCR seek to
prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding
taxes from their salaries. They submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments
or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their
salaries, contrary to the provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased. Petitioner then filed this instant petition for prohibition.

Issue:

Whether or not judges are exempted from payment of tax

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Held:

NO, judges are not exempted from the payment of tax. The deliberations in the 1986
Constitutional Commission reveals that the clear intent of the framers was to delete
the proposed express grant of exemption from payment of income tax to members of
the judiciary, so as to give substance of equality among the three branches of the
government. It was made clear in the deliberations that the salaries of the members
of the Judiciary would be subject to income tax applied to all taxpayers. Wherefore,
the court dismissed instant petition for prohibition.

Note: tax exemption violates the principle of uniformity of taxation and the principle
of equal protection of the law (they alleged independence of the judiciary)

25. AGLIPAY V. RUIZ

64 Phil. 201, March 13, 1937

Facts:

The Director of Posts ordered the issuance of postage stamps in commemorating the
celebration in Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress which is
organized by the Catholic Church. Petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, the Supreme
Head of the Philippine Independent Church seeks the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner
then, requested Vicente Sotto, a member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President. Despite this, respondent publicly announced the sending of
said stamps to the US for printing.

Petitioner alleged that there was a violation of the Constitution when respondent
issued the selling of the said stamps. He claims that the action of the respondent is
violative of Sec. 13, subsection 3 Art. VI which provides the prohibition of the use
of funds for the benefit or support of a particular sector as in this case, the Church.

Respondent issued the postage stamps under the provision of Act. 4052,
appropriating the sum of 60k for the cost of plates and printing of the said stamps.
Said act authorizes the Director of posts to dispose of the amount appropriated as
often as may be deemed advantageous to the government. Respondent now claims
that the Government would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. Moreover,
it was inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination since it was not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church.
Nor were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to the church.

Issue:

Whether or not there has been a constitutional infraction pursuant to Act. No 4052

Held:
NO, there has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar. Although the
issuance of the stamps were inseparable linked with an event of a religious
character, it was the aim and purpose of the government to use it to benefit or
support the Church. The only purpose of selling the stamps was to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourists in the country. The officials concerned merely
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took advantage of the even for publicity to the Philippines and to its people. It does
not necessary benefit a particular sector. And even if in a way, religious sector was
benefitted, it is only incidental to the primary purpose of the Act which is purposely
to benefit the government. Hence, the writ of prohibition is denied.

26. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V. GSIS

G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

Facts:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the Constitution is a grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, that the State shall
give preference to qualified Filipinos. The controversy in this arose when respondent
GSDID, pursuant to the privatization program of the government under
Proclamation No. 50, decided to sell through public bidding 30-51% of the shares of
Manila Hotel Corporation, which owns the Manila Hotel. In the bidding, 2 bidders
participated, Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm and Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, which is a Filipino corporation. Renong Berhad offered to buy the
shares for P44 per share and Manila Prince offered P41.58. Pursuant to the bidding
rules, the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Pending the declaration
of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder and the execution of necessary documents,
Petitioner sent a letter to respondent matching the bid price of P44 per share
tendered by Renong Berhad. Another letter was again sent together with a manger’s
check as bid security. However, respondent GSIS disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and sale of the shares was consummated with Renong Berhad.
Petitioner then filed a prohibition as to the sale. The court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining respondent from perfecting and consummating the sale to
the Malaysian firm.

Petitioner invokes Sec. 10 of Art. XII claiming that Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony and that petitioner should be preferred after it matched the bid
offer of the Malaysian firm. Respondents maintain that Sec. 10 of Art. XII is not a
self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation.

Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 10 Art. XII is self-executing

Held:
YES, Sec. 10 Art. XII is self-executing. The court said that a provision that is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary and
enabling legislation is self-executing. The court even cited several cases involving
provisions that are mere guidelines for legislation and are not judicially enforceable.
On the other hand, Sec. 10 of Art. XII is enforceable as it is a mandatory and
positive command which is complete in itself and needs no further guidelines or
implements rules for its enforcement. Hence, it is per se judicially enforceable.

Wherefore, GSIS is directed to cease and desist from selling 51% of the shares of
the Manila Hotel Corporation to Renong Berhad and to accept the matching bid of
the petitioner and thereafter execute the necessary agreements and documents to
effect the sale, necessary clearances and other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for the purpose.

27. -
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28. -
29. PEOPLE V. ECHAVEZ
G.R. No. L-47757-61, January 28, 1980

Facts:
Fiscal Abundio Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against 16
persons charging them with squatting as penalized in PD No. 772. Five of the
informations were raffled to Judge Vicente Echaves Jr. before the accused could be
arraigned, Judge Echaves dimissed the 5 informations on the ground that the
accused entered the land through stealth and strategy, whereas under the decree the
entry should be effected with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking
advantage of the absence or tolerance of the owner, and that under the rule of
ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of grazing lands.

The fiscal asked that the dismissed order be reconsidered. The lower court denied
the motion and insisted that the decree does not include agricultural purposes
because the preamble does not mention the Secretary of Agriculture and makes
reference to the affluent class. Fiscal then appealed to this court.

Issue:
Whether or not P.D. No. 772 applies to agricultural lands

Held:
NO, it does not apply to agricultural lands. The decree does not apply to pasture
lands because the preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban
communities, more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas. The
squatting complained of in this case involves pasture lands in rural areas. The
decision of the trial court is then affirmed.

30. PRIMICIAS V. MUNICIPALITY OF URDANETA, PANGASINAN

Facts:
Juan Augusto Primicias was driving his car in Urdaneta when a police officer asked
him to stop. He was told that he violated Municipal Ordinance No. 3 for overtaking
a truck. A criminal complaint was filed against Primicias for violation of Ordinance
No. 3. Plaintiff Primicias then initiated an action for annulment of said ordinance.
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of the plaintiff and rendered that the
ordinance was null and void. The reason of the CFI is that ordinance has already
been repealed by RA No. 4136 or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Defendants now allege that the lower court erred in declaring the ordinance null and
void. They alleged that the Ordinance is valid as it is based on the Revised Motor
Vehicle Law or Act No. 3992 and that a later enactment of the law relating to the
same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not sufficient to cause an implied
repeal of the original law.

Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 3 is valid

Held:
NO, the ordinance is valid. Ordinance No. 3 is said to be based on Sec. 53 of Act
No. 3992. However, Sec. 63 of RA No. 4136 provides the express repeal of Act No.
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3992. As a rule, a later law prevails over an earlier law. Moreover, an ordinance on
order to be valid must not contravene the statute enforcing it.

31. BAGATSING V. RAMIREZ

Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522 which regulates the
operation of public markets and prescribes fees for the rentals of stalls. The
petitioner City Mayor Ramon Bagatsing approved the said ordinance. Respondent
Federation of Manila Market Vendors, filed a civil case in the Court of First
Instance of Manila praying for the declaration of nullity of said ordinance on the
grounds that it did not comply with the publication requirement under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila.

Respondent judge issued an order denying the plea for failure of Federation of
Manila Market vendors Inc to exhaust the administrative remedies in the Local Tax
Code. After the hearing, respondent Judge held that the said ordinance is null on the
primary ground of non-compliance with the publication requirement under the
Revised City Charter. Petitioners now move for the reconsideration of the adverse
decision stressing that only a post-publication is required by the Local Tax Code.
However, respondent judge denied their motion. Hence this petition.

Whether or not the Revised City Charter should govern the publication of a tax
ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila.

NO, it is the Local Tax Code that should govern. Revised Charter of the City of
Manila is a special act since it relates only to the City of Manila whereas the Local
Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all local governments.
The fact that one is special and the other is a general law creates a presumption that
the special is to be considered as an exception of the general. However, the rule
readily yields to a situation or case where the special statute refers to a subject in
general, which the general statute treats in particular. In the case at bar, the Revised
Charter of the City prescribes a rule for the publication of ordinance in general while
the Local Tax Code establishes a rule for the publication of ordinances levying or
imposing taxes, fees or other charges in particular. Hence, the ordinance is valid in
compliance with the Local Tax Code. Accordingly, the decision of the lower court is
reversed and Ordinance No. 7522 is held to have been validly enacted.

32. PEOPLE V. MANANTAN

An information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First
Instance. Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Sec. 54 of the
Revised Election Code. The trial started upon defendant’s plea of not guilty and
moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the
defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Sec. 54 of the Revised Election
Code.

The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and held that a justice of the peace is
within the purview of Sec. 54. A Second motion was filed by the defense counsel
who cited the case of the CA in People v. Macaraeg where it was held that a justice
of peace is excluded from the prohibition of Sec. 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The lower court then dismissed the information against the accused.
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Whether or not a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Sec. 54 of the
Revised Election Code

YES, a justice of peace is included in the prohibition. Sec. 54 provides that no

justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor shall aid any candidate or exert any
influence in any manner in any election. Although a justice of peace is not listed on
the officers enumerated in said provision, it does not mean that the omission reflects
the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace from its operation.
What was intended is to include all kinds of judges and there was no necessity
anymore to include justices of peace in the enumeration because the legislature had
adopted a generic term which is “judge”.

33. CIR V. CA
34. MCIAA V. MARCOS
35. SERFINO V. COURT OF TAX APPEALS

36. COSICO JR. V. NLRC

37. BUSTAMANTE V. NLRC
38. MANAHAN V. ECC
39. VILLAVERT V. ECC
40. DEL ROSARIO & SONS V. NLRC
41. TY V. FIRST NATIONAL CO. INC V. CAPITAL INSURANCE AND
SURETY CO.
42. DE LA CRUZ V. CAPITAL INS. & SURETY CO.
43. QUA CHEE GAN V. LAW UNION AND ROCK INS. AND SURETY CO.,
INC
44. PANATON V. MALAYAN INSURANCE
45. AIRSPORNA V. CA & PEOPLE
46. HOME INSURANCE CO. V. EASTERN SHIPPING