Socrates and the Divine Signal

according to Plato's Testimony:

Philosophical Practice as Rooted in
Religious Tradition
Luc Brisson

In the Platonic corpus, we find some passages in which the divine signal
manifested to Socrates is mentioned: Apology 31c-e, 40a, 40c, 41d; Euthy-
phro 3b; Euthydemus 272e; Republic VI 496c; Phaedrus 242b-c; Theaetetus
151a. This phenomenon is also mentioned in the first Alcibiades 103a-b,
105d-e, 124c-d, whose authenticity I consider doubtful, and in the Theages
128d-31a, which I consider apocryphal. I will not take these last testimo-
nies into consideration, and I will limit myself here to a description of
the phenomenon in which this divine signal consists, to raise a more
general problem: that of the compatibility, in Socrates, between this
divine signal and 'moral autonomy'.1

1 The Signal

What reaches Socrates is a semeion: Ap 40bl, 40c3,41d6; Euthd 272e4; Phdr

242b9; R VI 496c4. Formed from sema, 'sign, distinctive character, or
mark', the word semeion designates both a sign by which one recognizes
something or someone (a trident for Poseidon, for example), and a signal,

1 This term is not found as such in ancient Greece: the terms autonomia and autonomes
are applied to cities and not to human beings. Following Kant, I understand moral
autonomy as the ability to determine one's actions by means of reason alone.

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2 Luc Brisson

that is, a sign that serves as a warning and triggers specific behavior —
the response — once conditioning has been activated. In principle, this
sign may involve all five senses. Sometimes, however, the nature of the
signal perceived by Socrates is specified: It is a phone: Ap 31d3; Phdr
242c2. A phone involves hearing, for the term phone designates a sound
produced by a living being. Unlike logos, however, this sound is not
necessarily articulated.2 Only the acoustic aspect of the phenomenon is
taken into consideration. The divinity manifests itself to Socrates not
directly or in person, but indirectly, by a phonic signal that manifests a
prohibition. What is more, in view of all that has just been said, such a
signal should be equivalent to something like 'nie', 'do not'. There can
therefore be no question of a revelation, in this context. In a revelation
we find, among other things, descriptions, arguments, and injunctions,
and this implies the use of articulated language.

2 The Sender

The signal addressed to Socrates is qualified either as theion (Ap 31c8), or

as daimonion (Ap 31dl; Euthd 272e4; Euthphr 3b5; Phdr 242b9; R VI 496c4).
The adjective theion indicates that the signal is sent by a theos. This is
confirmed by Ap 40bl, where ίο tou theou semeion is mentioned. As far as
the adjective daimonion is concerned, we must, I believe, refrain from
making it into a substantivized adjective, even when daimonion is pre-
ceded by to as in Euthyphro 3b5, in Theaetetus 151a4,3 and in Apology 40a4.
In all these cases, to daimonion seems to me to be an ellipse for to daimonion
semeion.4

2 We read at the beginning of Aristotle's Politics: 'As we say, indeed, nature does
nothing in vain; yet man is the only living being (zoiori) to have speech (logon). To
be sure, the sound of the voice (phone) expresses pain and pleasure; thus we find it
in living beings generally (Ms allois zoiois): their nature only allows them to feel pain
and pleasure and to manifest them among themselves. But speech (logos), for its
part, is made to express what is useful and harmful, and consequently also what is
just and unjust' (Pol 11,1253a9-15).
3 For an objection, see MacNaghten 1914,188.
4 An inventory of the various positions on that point may be found in Dorion 2003,
171 η 7, who refers to note 5; Dorion adopts the position that the expression to
daimonion is equivalent to ho theos, or to to theion. As far as Plato is concerned, my

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 Socrates and the Divine Signal 3

I base this hypothesis on the following two arguments. (1) In most

cases, to daimonion is constructed with the verb gignesthai followed by a
first-person personal pronoun in the dative. But such a construction
quite naturally implies that the subject of the verb is a phenomenon and
not a person.5 In Euthyphw 3b5 and in Theaetetus 151a4, we must under-
stand that it is not the divinity that manifests itself in person, but instead
that it reveals a prohibition through the intermediary of a sign. (2) Above
all, only this hypothesis enables us to understand Apology 40a4 without
modifying the text transmitted by the manuscripts.6 The manuscripts
read he gar eiothuia moi mantike he tou daimoniou. Since mantike is an
adjective and eiothuia is a perfect passive participle, we must suppose
that a noun is understood. With mantike, what is understood is usually
tekhne, which gives the translation: 'the divinatory art (or simply divina-
tion), that is familiar to me'. This way of construing things immediately
raises two problems. The following clause, he tou daimoniou becomes
quite problematic, for we must understand 'the divinatory art (or divi-
nation) that comes from the daimonion' or 'the divinatory art (or divina-
tion) that pertains to the daimonion'; which makes no sense in either case.7
This, moreover, is why Schleiermacher wanted to athetize he tou daimo-
niou. In fact, if we understand phone after mantike and semeiou after
daimoniou, the meaning becomes clear without any need for eliminating
anything, for, we can then translate while considering tou daimoniou as
an objective genitive: 'the divinatory voice that is familiar to me, the one
in which the divine signal consists'.8
In none of the texts mentioned, it seems to me, is a clear distinction
made between the notion of theos and that of daimon, although the

position is akin to that of Vlastos 1991, add note 6.1,280-7, who relies on Burnet. I
am willing to admit, with Dorion, that when in Xenophon we find the expression
to daimonion semainein, this expression would be redundant if to daimonion were an
ellipse for to daimonion semeion (as Dorion explains at note 11 of page 173). Things
are different in Plato, whose strategy is quite distinct when it comes to defending
Socrates' memory (see Dorion 2003,158 n 57).
5 As is noted by Dorion 2003,182 n 39.
6 For a review of the positions, see Dorion 2003,183 n 43.
7 On the difference between Plato and Xenophon on the question of divination, see
Dorion 2003,186-7.
8 This position is very close to that of McPherran 1996,185 and 195.

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4 Luc Brisson

distinction is clear in other passages of the Platonic corpus.9 This confu-

sion gives a good reflection of the ambiguity we observe at the time in
the Greek religious tradition between theos and daimon.10 This raised no
problems in the context of a civic religion without clergy and without a
reference text to serve as the vehicle of precise dogmas. As a result, there
is nothing to oppose translating both theion and daimonion by 'divine'.
What is more, no information is given on the identity of the theos or the
daimon who intervenes in the case of Socrates. We can therefore not
associate with Socrates a theos or a daimon, who would play the role of
a guardian angel or tutelary divinity.11 The signal could have been sent
to Socrates by Apollo or by any other divinity of the traditional pan-
theon. If we limit ourselves to the texts considered here, we cannot say
anything more.

3 The Addressee

The most usual construction for speaking of the transmission of this

signal is moi gignetai, which could be translated as 'it happens to me', 'it
reaches me', or 'X manifests itself to me': Ap 31c8-dl, 31d3; Euthd 272e3;

9 For instance, in the Apology and the Symposium. For a critical inventory, see A. Motte
1989,205-21; 208 n 7 (220-1).
10 Motte is quite right to write: 'As a matter of fact, the Greeks never had a very firm
conception on the subject of the nature and origin of demons' (Motte 1989,208).
11 The interpretation of the daimonion as a guardian angel is still frequent today (cf.
Gottlieb 2000,20 and 28). It was upheld in particular by Motte 1989, in the following
terms: "This conception [sci'i. that of the demon-phylax], which is akin to that of the
guardian angel, is also attested in several passages of the Laws, and it is to it, of
course, that it is fitting to attach the famous theme of the of Socrates' demoniacal
sign' (213). My disagreement with this position bears on two points: (1) the demon-
phylax of the Phaedo and the Republic bears no resemblance to a guardian angel: it is
not there to watch over us, protect us, and help us avoid making mistakes, but
essentially to ensure that the cup will be drunk to the dregs; that is, that the destiny
we have chosen will be accomplished entirely; (2) Motte already assimilates Socra-
tes' divine sign to a form of demon, or again of guardian angel. But the divine sign
has nothing in common with the demon of the Phaedo and the Republic; on the other
hand, it is true that it is the manifestation of a certain divine benevolence (like the
guardian angel), but it does not have the independence of a demon.

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 Socrates and the Divine Signal 5

Euthphr 3b6; Phdr 242b9, 242c2.12 The impersonal construction empha-

sizes the objective, and as it were automatic nature of the intervention.13
Socrates never takes the initiative, and never solicits the signal. The
signal somehow 'falls upon him', without his expecting it This signal
concerns a particular individual, Socrates, as is indicated by the construc-
tion with the dative of a personal pronoun (moi), indicating the benefici-
ary of the action.
In Book VI of the Republic, Socrates' exceptional character in this
regard is insisted upon:
As far as I am concerned, the divine signal (to daimonion semeion) is not
worth talking about; it's not certain that we could find another individ-
ual to whom it has manifested itself (e tini allöi e oudeni gegonen") among
people of the past (tö« emprosthen). (R VI 496c3-5).

Socrates has experienced this signal since childhood (Ap 31d3).

Throughout his life, until the day of the trial he had to face, these
interventions have never ceased (aei) (Ap 40a5); they occurred very close
to one another (pukrie15) (Ap 40a5), on every occasion (ekastote), and they
concerned even little things (Ap 40a6). We can therefore understand why
Socrates calls this signal 'familiar' (ewthos) (Ap 40c2; Euthd 272e3; Phdr
242b9).

4 Nature and Context of the Manifestation

The divine signal always manifests itself in a concrete situation, and it

informs Socrates about the opportunity to undertake a particular action
that is in itself banal. It therefore has no theoretical dimension, nor does
it, by itself, permit any considerations of a general nature. To be sure, the
context of the prohibition may make the simplest of divine prohibitions
of the simplest of actions extremely significant. For instance, just as the

12 On this expression, see Dorion 2003,182 n 30.

13 For a different position, see Dorion 2003,182 n 39.
14 Note the recurrence in this phrase of the habitual construction with gegonen in the
dative.
15 In Greek, pukrie, which in the proper sense means 'compact', 'thick', 'dense'.

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6 Luc Brisson

divine signal did not prevent Socrates from going to Court on the day of
his trial, when he was to be condemned to death, this sign could have
prevented Socrates from going to the Assembly at a given crucial mo-
ment, which could have opened the doors for him to a political career.
In both cases, however, it is the interpretation Socrates gives after the
fact that gives meaning to the signal's manifestation or absence.

4 1 Either the signal manifests itself

When it manifests itself, the signal limits itself in every case (aei) to a
prohibition: it diverts (apotrepei) Socrates from pursuing an action, in the
order of speech and activity, that he is about to undertake (Ap 31d3-4);
it holds him back (episkhei) from acting (Phdr 242cl); it prevents him
(apoköluei) (Tht 151a4); it does not allow him to act (ouk eai) (Phdr 242c2);
it opposes him (enantioutai) (Ap 40a-c, iris). From what action does the
divine signal divert Socrates? Sometimes, it makes him remain silent (Ap
40b4). In the Euthydemus (272e) and in the Phaedrus (242d), it stops him
from getting up and leaving. It prevents him from seeing again some of
his disciples who left him some time ago (Tht 151a). It keeps him from
doing politics (R VI 496c; Ap 40a-b). In all these cases, the signal diverts
Socrates from occupations to which no moral value is attached: instead,
the moral value of these occupations depends on the interpretation
Socrates gives to it after the fact. It is Socrates who, later on, will consider
that it was better for him not to undertake the prohibited action. We
therefore cannot consider that the signal perceived by Socrates might be
equivalent to a form of moral conscience.16

4 2 Or else the signal does not manifest itself

At the end of the Apology, Socrates gives the following interpretation of
the god's silence. Commenting to his friends on the result of the trial,
Socrates says:

16 Hadot 2002,34, writes with regard to the daimonion: 'Mystic experience or mythical
image, it is hard to say; but in any case we can see in it a kind of figure of what would
later be called the moral conscience'. This is highly debatable, for the divine sign
intervenes very often, as Socrates himself admits, on insignificant occasions that
have no moral dimension. The sign would be a moral conscience if it intervened to
prevent Socrates from doing evil; but such is not the case.

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 Socrates and the Divine Signal 7

Yes, judges — and when I call you "judges", I am using the proper
formula17 — something amazing happened to me. In fact, whereas the
divinatory voice that is familiar to me (he gar eiothuia moi manlike), that
in which the divine signal consists (he tou daimoniou), has never ceased
manifesting itself to me until today (en men toi prosthen khronoi panti
panu pukne aei en) to prevent me (enantioumene), even in matters of little
importance (kai panu epi smikrois),™ from doing what I shouldn't do,
today, as you can observe yourselves, there occurred to me what could
be considered the greatest evil (oietheie eskhata kakon einaf) and which is
thought to be so (kai nomizetai). And yet, the divine signal (to tou theou
semeion) did not hold me back (enantwthe) either this morning, when I
was leaving my home, nor in the moment when here, before the
tribunal, I was going up to the tribune, nor during my plea, to prevent
me from saying anything. Quite often, in other circumstances, it has
silenced me right in the middle of my speech (kaitoi en allots logois
pollakhou de me epeskhe legonta metaxu). Today, on the contrary, in the
course of this affair, it never prevented me from doing or saying
anything. What reason must I suppose to explain this phenomenon? I
will tell you. What is happening to me might well be a piece of good
fortune for me, and we all — all of us who are present — are mistaken
when we imagine that to die is an evil. A decisive proof of this for me
(mega moi tekmerion) is the following: indeed, it would not have been
possible that the signal that is familiar to me (to eiothos semeion) did not
oppose me (ouk enantwthe an moi), if what I was going to do was not a
good thing (agathon)." (Ap 40a2-c2).

In this passage, we encounter the usual description of the signal's

manifestation. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that Socrates pro-
poses an evaluation of what has just happened to him. Whereas most
people consider that the death to which he has just been condemned is
the worst of evils, he, for his part, considers that, in view of the fact that

17 In fact, Socrates is no longer speaking to those who voted to acquit him, and thus
expressed a proper judgment, in accordance with the judgment that must charac-
terize a judge; cf. the beginning.
18 For examples, cf. Euthydemus 272e; Phaedrus 242b.
19 For the interpretation of this passage, see Dorion (2003), 183, nn 43 to 46; see also
the passage from Phaedo 85b.

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8 Luc Brisson

the signal has not held him back from going to the trial at the end of
which he was condemned to death, death must be something good for
him.
The reading of this passage has led some interpreters to conclude that
Socrates was contradicting himself. Whereas above (Apology 29a4-b2 and
37b5-7), he affirmed that he did not know whether death was a good
thing, Socrates declares here that what is happening to him because of
the absence of a divine signal — that is, death — is a good thing. T. C.
Brickhouse and N. D. Smith20 admit in any case that Socrates is mistaken
when he concludes that, for him, what is not an evil is necessarily good.
If he interprets the lack of manifestation of the divine signal in this way,
that means that Socrates considers that what is not an evil is good,
according to the following reasoning. If what I was going to do was a
bad thing, the signal would have prevented me from doing it. It did not
prevent me from doing it. Therefore, what I did was a good thing. Such
a conclusion is not essential, for nothing indicates that that which is not
a bad thing is a good thing; it can be a ridiculous thing, an insignificant
thing, or an indifferent thing, that is, something neutral.21 For his part,
Mark A. Joyal22 considers that the difficulty can be explained by a literary
stratagem on the part of Plato, who wanted to assimilate the divine signal
to conventional religious phenomena, which would, in a way, have
justified the accusers.

5 The Religious Background

For my part, I think Socrates does not contradict himself in the Apology,
and Plato never described Socrates as bogged down in this contradiction,
even for requirements of a literary nature. Against this view, I would
adduce the following two reasons.

• Even if he is not in a position to say whether death in general is or

is not a good thing, Socrates can consider that in the particular

20 Brickhouse and Smith 1989, section 5.5

21 For an example, see Gorgias 467el-8a6.
22 Joyal 1997,43-58

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 Socrates and the Divine Signal 9

circumstances in which he finds himself, the result of a trial that

condemns him to death is for him (hie et nunc) a good thing.

• Socrates is immediately situated in a religious context which, con-

sciously or unconsciously, contemporary commentators do not take
into consideration. Let us read the following passage once again,
which we find at the very end of the Apology, and which reflects the
one we have just cited like a mirror.

You too, judges, must be full of confidence in the face of death,23 and
put one single truth in your minds to the exclusion of all others, that is,
that no evil can touch a good man24, either during his life or after his
death,25 and that the gods do not lack interest in his fate (oude ameleitai
hupo theon ta toutou pragmata). Nor is the fate that is mine today a result
of chance (oude ta emu nun apo tou automatou gegonen); on the contrary,
I consider it obvious that it was better for me to die now and be freed
from all problems. This indeed is why (dia touto kai) the signal (to
semeion) did not hold me back at any time (erne oudamou apetrepsen),26
and as a result I am absolutely not upset with those who have con-
demned me by their vote. (Ap 41c8-d7).

This is the general context that enables Socrates to interpret in a

positive sense the fact that the signal does not manifest itself at his trial.
What does this mean? Socrates bases the belief that 'no evil can touch a
good man, either during his life or after his death' on the following
principle: 'the gods do not lack interest in the fate of human beings'.27
Consequently, Socrates can claim not to know anything about death or
anything else, and he can interpret the result of the trial, which implies
death, as a good thing. In fact, the only minimal knowledge he admits
to possessing is the following:

23 For the same expression, cf. Phaedo 63c.

24 Socrates knows that he is a good man, because he has never committed an injustice
by disobeying the gods (see the following citation from Ap 29b6-7).
25 We find an echo of the same doctrine in Book X of the Republic (613a).
26 This certainty is expressed and demonstrated in Book X of the Laws.
27 Cf. Apology 40d2.

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10 Luc Brisson

What I do know, on the other hand (oida), is that committing injustice

(to adikein), that is, disobeying (kai apeitheiri) what is worth more than
oneself (beltioni), whether god (kai theöi) or human being (kai anthropoi),
is something bad, and shameful. It follows that before the fear of evils
that I know are evils, I will never range fear of things of which I do not
know whether they are good, and I will not try to avoid them, either.
(Ap 29b6-cl)

We can thus understand that Socrates considers himself a good man,

to whom nothing bad can happen. The knowledge in question refers not
to an item of information, but to a belief. This belief in turn takes its place
within a wider context, which implies a hierarchy. Gods and demons are
more powerful than the human beings for whom they care, and among
human beings an expert is superior, by reason of his positive knowl-
edge.28 Even if he cannot find genuine experts, Socrates is warned by a
divinity not to do such-and-such a thing; consequently, he can interpret
a non-prohibition not as permission, but as proof that that action he
proposes will not entail bad consequences for him. Hence, three conse-
quences follow:
(1) Rational exegesis of the divine signal, which is always proposed
at Socrates' initiative, admits as an axiom the well-foundedness
of divine action.
(2) The gods never send inexplicable signals.
(3) In this context, Socrates can, without any hesitation, consider
that the death to which he is condemned at the end of his trial is
a good thing for him, without knowing how he should react to
the general question of whether death is the greatest of evils. The
divine signal always manifests itself as a replacement for defec-
tive knowledge; but philosophy according to Socrates is nothing
other than ignorance that is not ignorant of itself.

28 This belief is also expressed by Xenophon in his Memorabilia (14,14-15 and IV 3,12).
Both passages are cited by Dorion 2003,175-6.

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 Socrates and the Divine Signal 11

6 The Question of 'Moral Autonomy'

I conclude with a few remarks intended to set forth on what conditions

the divine signal's manifestation to Socrates can, in my view, be compat-
ible with the use of reason in moral matters.
(1) The gods exist, and are more powerful than human beings.

(2) They are concerned with the fate of all human beings; they
reward the good and punish the wicked.

(3) Socrates is the object of exceptional attention on the part of the

gods, as is indicated by the manifestation of the divine signal.
Moreover, this explains the accusation concerning kaina daimo-
nia brought against him.

(4) The signal does not come within the domain of articulated
discourse; there can therefore be no question of a revelation, or
even an explanation.

(5) Socrates never solicits the manifestation of this signal, but it

imposes itself upon him. We therefore cannot speak of a per-
sonal relation between Socrates and the sender of the signal,
which never manifests itself directly.
(6) When it manifests itself, the signal indicates only one thing to
Socrates: the prohibition to begin or to pursue such-and-such a
concrete action. Conversely, the signal's failure to manifest itself
can be interpreted by Socrates as proof that such-and-such a
concrete action will not entail anything bad for him.

(7) The concrete action in question has no moral value in itself. This
moral significance is given to it after the fact by Socrates.

(8) The divinity does not say whether such-and-such an action,

abandoned or undertaken, is good or bad. It restricts itself to
sending or failing to send a signal. The divinity thus does not
teach Socrates anything, and he can thus lay claim to complete
ignorance.

(9) It is Socrates who, in some cases, attributes a value to the action

abandoned or undertaken. The very possibility of this exegesis
explains why Socrates seeks to know what virtue is.

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12 Luc Brisson

No one can deny that Socrates uses his reason in the area of morals.
In him, however, rational activity is framed by divine intervention,
which fixes its limits and orients it. The divine signal enables Socrates to
determine in every particular case if he can do or say something, and as
a function of these injunctions he tries, by applying the usual rules of
deduction, to produce general propositions that give a rational account
of adequate behaviors. In Socrates, religious tradition gives its frame-
work to the practice of philosophy, without, however, being substituted
for it. Socrates does not enjoy complete 'moral autonomy', but neither is
he a blind follower of the religious tradition in which he is immersed29.
The trial that had him condemned to death testifies to the validity of the
second proposition, whereas the divine signal testifies to the validity of
the first one.

29 This conclusion is not that far from the position of Brickhouse and Smith 2000b.

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