Plotinus and the "Daimonion" of Socrates

Author(s): John M. Rist

Source: Phoenix, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring, 1963), pp. 13-24
Published by: Classical Association of Canada
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1085843 .
Accessed: 26/11/2013 10:18

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Classical Association of Canada is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to
Phoenix.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PLOTINUS AND THE DAIMONION OF SOCRATES

JOHN M. RIST

IN THE tenthchapterof his Life of PlotinusPorphyryrecountsthe story

of a seance held in the Isaeum at Rome. An Egyptian priest,he tells us,
offeredto evoke Plotinus' daimon,but when he had deliveredhis sum-
monsit was not a daimonthat appeared,but a god. As a resultofmeditat-
ing on this experience,Porphyrycontinues,Plotinus wrote a treatiseon
spirit-guides(3.4) in whichhe attemptedto explainwhy the guides of all
men are not alike. Despite the assurances of the learned that Plotinus
had no timeformagic,even thoughhe recognizedit as a real power,1this
tale of the seance makes us wonderabout the preciseimportancePlotinus
attached to spirit-guidesand the originsof his beliefin theirsignificance.
In this paper, therefore,I wish to investigatethe historicalbackground
of Ennead 3.4 and of Porphyry'saccount of the seance.
ProfessorDodds has remindedus that both the incidentin the Isaeum
and the compositionof Ennead 3.4 took place beforePorphyry'sarrival
in Rome and that the accountof theseance is hearsayin whichwe cannot
put much confidence.2 Nevertheless,the treatise3.4 is certainlya genuine
work of Plotinus and its conclusionsmust be considered.In that treatise
we findthat a fewpeople have a god (OE6s) as their daimon and that
these are the sages (3.4.6). Since it is certain that Plotinus' pupils con-
sideredtheirmastera sage, we can understandhow theycame to believe
that his daimonwas a god.
Professor Armstrong3has clearly explained why Plotinus himself
could neverhave called the "god" conjuredup in the Isaeum a god at all.
The God who is the philosopher'sdaimon in 3.4.6 is the One, and the
One and NoDsare farbeyond the realmwheremagic can have any effect.
This realm is definedin Ennead 4.4.43. All we can say of the story in
Porphyryis that it probablygrewup partiallyunderthe influenceof the
doctrineof Ennead 3.4 wherethe sage's daimon is said to be a god. The
storyrecountsthe sort of practical demonstrationthat Plotinus' view is
true which might have appealed to certain of his more superstitious
followers.
We are thereforeleft with the text of Ennead 3.4 itself to help us
understand the Plotinian doctrine of spirit-guides,but if we can see
clearlythe historicaloriginsof some of the ideas in this treatise,we may
incidentallythrowmore lighton the passage in Porphyry'sLife. Let us
consider the latter part of 3.4.5. Here Plotinus offersan account of
'A. H. Armstrong,"Was Plotinus a Magician?" Phronesis 1 (1955) 73-79.
2E. R. Dodds, The Greeksand theIrrational (Berkeley 1951) 289.
3A. H. Armstrong,op. cit. (see n.1) 77.
13

PHOENIX, Vol. 17 (1963) 1.

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
14 PHOENIX

spirit-guideswhich, he says, is supported by the Timaeus (90A) and

which also contains a quotation fromthe tenth book of the Republic
(620E).
Timaeus 90A tellsus in factthat we should conceiveof the most lordly
kind of soul that we possess as a daimonwhich God has given each one
of us. There seems little doubt that this daimon is equivalent to vovsor
to theXoryLrtK6v of theRepublic.It is whollywithinus as a giftfromGod.
It is the directingelement in our soul. Two passages fromthe Laws
relatingto the daimon,however,give perhaps a slightlydifferent impres-
sion. Both 732C and 877A leave the nature of the daimonin doubt, but
both seem to imply-more than does Timaeus90A-the meaning"spirit-
guide" or "guardian-angel."One mightsuppose that such a spirit-guide,
thoughcalled a daimon,would not be the simple equivalent of vo3s.
The notionof thedaimonas theguardianof the fateof the individual-
and as a guardian chosen by the individualsoul-is clear in the mythof
Er, especiallyat 620DE. Plotinus,as we have seen, alludes to thispassage
in Ennead 3.4.5, and triesto reconcileit withthe Timaeus.The two,how-
ever, are not easily to be reconciled.Whereasin the TimaeusPlato thinks
of the daimonas vois,in the mythof Er the daimonis a principlechosen
by the soul, yet still in some respectsapparentlyoutside the soul, which
watches over the soul's life. What is inside the soul should be different
fromwhat is outside; yet the word daimonis used forboth.
Plotinus is partiallyaware of the difficulty of reconcilingthe passages.
He is probablyalso aware that the Platonistsdid not always amalgamate
them, for he suggests that other interpretationsthan his own lead to
contradictionswhereas his own does not. We shall look brieflyat other
Platonist theoriesabout such daimoneslater; forthe momentwe should
observe how Plotinus strugglesto avoid making the passages contra-
dictory.The daimonis not whollyoutside,he says in line nineteen.This
is a concessionto the doctrineof the Timaeus, which would be denied
outrightifthedaimonwerethoughtto be outsidevois. Yet on the ground
that as individual humans we live a lifeto which it is superiorPlotinus
has to add that it is not boundup withus. This additionis almostopposed
to the Timaeus, but fitsthe Republic better.Again, the daimon is said
to be ours,if "we" are our souls, thoughit is not the agent of our actions
(obb' It is, of course, hard to see how the daimon of the
~~Epycwr,).
Timaeus, if it is not the agent of at least our noblest actions,can be the
same as vois, as Plato says it is. Plotinus' interpretation of the Timaeus
again seems veryodd.
In Ennead 3.4 Plotinus devotes a good deal of space to the reconcilia-
tion of the Timaeus doctrineof the daimonwith that of the Republic.It
is a strangefact,however,that he says nothingof the aL~bvLov, or divine
sign,ofSocrates,that arousedsuch interestamongmanyofthePlatonists.

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PLOTINUS AND THE DAIMONION 15

I shall suggest in this paper, however,that those pupils who supposed

that the seance in the Isaeum gave a demonstrationthat Plotinus' own
daimon was a god, were thinkingin termsof Socrates' daimonion.It is
beyond doubt, as Armstronghas shown,that Plotinus supposed his own
spirit-guideto be beyond mere conjuration,to be in fact the One itself.
Yet formen withoutmuch grasp of the elevated Plotinian metaphysic,
the phrase "spirit-guide" would suggest ideas of somethinglike the
daimonionof Socrates, or ratherlike theirimpressionof the daimonion
of Socrates. As we shall see, Plotinus himselfmay have felt that his
spirit-guidewas akin to the daimonion of Socrates, but the popular
conceptionof that daimonionmay well have been much inferiorto his.
We musttherefore now look at the historyof the accountsof the Socratic
divine sign itself.
The least extreme, and thereforeprobably truest accounts of the
daimonion are to be found in the Platonic dialogues. Apart fromthe
Theages,of which we shall postpone consideration,mentionis made of
the sign in the Apology (31D, 40AB), Euthyphro(3B), Alcibiades I
(103A, 105A), Euthydemus (272E), Republic(496C), Phaedrus(242B) and
Theaetetus(151A). The information we can derive fromthese sources is
not great, but it is consistent.We sometimes findthe daimonioncalled
it
OCrov(Apol. 31D). We learn that is a voice (Apol. 31D, Phaedrus
242C). We learn that this voice is frequentlyheard by Socrates; it is
r6 dWc~bsanrezov(Euthydemus272E, Phaedrus242B). Yet again and again,
Plato insists that it never exhorts Socrates to a positive action, but
continuallyrestrainshimfromdoingwhat is wrong.This viewis expressed
most clearly in Apology31D, but occurs again in the same dialogue
(40B, 41D) as well as in the Eulhydemus(272E) and the Theaetetus
(151A). The most interesting passage of all, however,is Phaedrus242BC,
because although Socrates here points out that the sign "always holds
me back fromsomethingI am about to do" he adds that "I thoughtI
heard a voice fromthere,which forbademy going away until I should
purifymyself."The addition of the phrase irply &vv &oartcroLa seems to
attributeto the voice some kind of hortatorypowerof the kind that the
Platonic Socrates normallydisclaims. I do not thinkit likely that this
passage fromthe Phaedrus should be taken to imply an account of the
daimonionat variance with the other Platonic evidence, but I am not
the firstto believe that it may well have been a source fromwhich the
idea that the voice gave positivecommandswas derived.
In Phaedrus 242C Socrates tells us that the voice forbadehis going
away tillhe had purifiedhimself,since he had offendedagainstthe divine.
He continuesas follows:"I am a prophet,not a verygood one, but ...
good enoughformyself."There seems to be no directconnectionbetween
the daimonionand Socrates' being a prophet.Indeed he later speaks of

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
16 PHOENIX

the soul, not the daimonion,as prophetic.But the juxtaposition of the

daimonion and the idea of prophecy was too significantfor certain
Platonists to pass over. Furthermoreit is a fact that in Apology40A the
divine sign itselfis called prophetic.For those who wished to put the
Apology and Phaedrus together,the materials for a more elaborate
theoryof Socrates the prophet,whose power of prophecyderived from
a divine sign,were ready to hand.
We can see that, even if the evidence is stretchedas far as possible,
the knowledgeto be derived fromPlato about the Socratic divine sign
is scanty. This scantiness may well reflectthe fact that Plato, who
almost certainlyregarded his master as especially gifted,felt awed in
speaking of the daimonion.In Republic496C the divine sign is said to
have been granted to few if any beforeSocrates himself.This makes it
certainthat a daimonionof the Socratic typecannot be identicalwiththe
daimon in the Timaeus, for this is apparentlythat higherpart of the
human soul which everyonepossesses to a greateror lesser extent. Nor
can it be the daimon of the tenthbook of the Republicwhich each man
is said to choose forhimself.It may howeverbe a superiorversionof this,
possessed by a very fewspecially fortunatemortals.In otherwords,the
Socratic daimonion may have some kinship with the highest kind of
daimonthat can guide a human life,perhapswith the only kind that can
give a firstimpulse to philosophy.If such is Plato's view of it, Socrates'
daimonionwas a manifestationthat Socrates was guided by something
superiorto the daimonesof other men, that he was under the especial
protectionof God and that his life fulfilleda specificpurpose in the
divine scheme. This is in fact the view which the Apologysuggests. In
33C Socrates explains how the course of his life was laid down forhim
by God's commandssent by oracles, dreams, and any othermeans God
chose. In 41D he tells the judges that the gods do not neglectthe good
man and that he believes that since his divine sign has remainedsilent
duringhis trialit is best forhim to die. His death does not mean that the
gods have abandoned him, but ratherthe reverse.
This much and this much only does Plato tell us about the daimonion.
Perhaps the most significantfact forlater Platonism is that if the dai-
monionbears some resemblanceto the daimonof the mythof Er, it is a
superiorversionof it.
We must now turn to the evidence of Xenophon. His chiefreferences
to the divine sign are Apology 12-13 and Memorabilia 1.1.2-9, 4.3.12,
4.8.1, and 4.8.5. The accountgiven in thesepassages differsconsiderably
fromthat retailed by Plato. One of the most strikingdifferences is that
according to Xenophon the sign did not restrictitselfto prohibitions.
In 4.8.1 we read that it told Socrates both what he should do and what
he should not do. 4.3.12 repeats this. Furthermore,accordingto Xeno-

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PLOTINUS AND THE DAIMONION 17

phon, the sign enabled Socrates to give advice to his friends.Those who
followedthis advice prospered,those who did not repentedof it (1.1.4).
Socrates is depicted as the wise counsellorwhose advice is inspiredby
God. This leads to what we can only regard as a vulgarizationof the
whole concept of the sign in Xenophon's account. We saw in Plato's
version how Socrates spoke of the sign as prophetic and how in the
Phaedrus he calls himself,thoughnot because of the sign, a prophet.In
the Memorabilia (1.1.3-4) Xenophon compares the ability to prophesy
given to Socrates by his sign with propheciesmade by seers fromthe
flightof birds and other such things. The only differenceXenophon
seems to have seen between Socrates and the ordinary"prophet" is in
the manner in which Socrates spoke about the source of his prophetic
ability. Ordinaryprophets,says Xenophon, say that they are exhorted
and discouraged by birds, but Socrates said what he meant, namely
that the daimoniongave him a sign.Xenophon is, perhapsunconsciously,
playingdown the unique quality of the Socratic experience,whichPlato
had particularlyemphasized in the Republic. Socrates the prophet is a
more commonplaceSocrates, but he proved extremelypopular.
Again in the ApologyXenophonportrayshis heroin ther61le ofprophet,
when in chapter twelvehe makes him say: "How could I be introducing
new divinitiesby saying that a voice of God indicatesto me what I must
do? For surely those who take the cries of birds and the utterancesof
menbase theirjudgementson voices." An elaborationofthe themefollows
on lines similar to those in the Memorabilia,and Socrates says he can
demonstratethe truthof his words by the fact that he has revealed the
counsels he has received fromthe gods to his friends,and that his fore-
casts have always proved correct.It is hard not to conclude that Xeno-
phon's concept of the daimonionis much more materialistthan Plato's.
In some respects he has tended to merge into the daimoniona daimon
conceived entirelyas a guardian in the mannerof Plato's myth of Er,
thus emphasizingthe motifof prophecy.And Socrates was certainlynot
the only man who claimed the abilityto prophesy!
The next stage in our investigationmust be the pseudo-Platonic
Theages.I am in agreementwith the great majorityof recentwritersin
regardingthisdialogue as spurious.The evidence that it is a composition
based on passages fromgenuinePlatonic works,in particularthe Apology,
Theaetetus,and the firstAlcibiades, is well marshalled by Pavlu4 and
Souilhe6.Against such proofthe doubts of Friedlanderare of littlesigni-
ficance.6The extraordinarycorrespondencesbetween Apology19E and
Theages128A, and betweenApology31D and Theages128D by themselves
'J. Pavlu, "Der pseudoplatonische Dialog Theages," WienerStudien 31 (1909) 13-37.
5J. Souilh6, Platon, OeuvresCompltes (Bud6) 132 (Paris 1930) 137-142.
IP. Friedlinder, Platon 2 (Berlin 1957) 135-142, 299-302.

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
18 PHOENIX

are very strongevidence that one of these worksis a copy of the other,
and fewwould suggestthat the Apologyis not by Plato's hand. Souilh6
has furtherpointed,in my opinion rightly,to the actual circumstances
which led the author of the Theages to make Theages an important
characterin a dialogue devoted largelyto a discussionof the divinesign.7
There is a passage in the sixthbook of theRepublicwhereSocratesspeaks
firstof Theages and then of the divine sign. In 496B he tells us that
Theages-who is only introducedin this passage-did not enterpolitics
because of his weaknessof constitutionand chronicillness.He then adds
that in his own case it was the daimonionwhich preventedhim. The
juxtapositionof these two ideas proved fertilein the mind of the author
of the Theages.Althoughthereis no connectionbetweenTheages and the
divine sign in theRepublic,such a connectionwas easily imaginedby the
scholarlyimitator.
Assumingthen that the dialogue is spurious,our next problemis its
date. Since Souilh6 has shown beyonddoubt that it is influencedby the
Theaetetus,we cannot date it before369. Alleged considerationof style
cannot affectthis point.8Indeed, if the author is imitatingmainlyearly
Platonic works,one would suppose that, if his imitationis at all good,
the productwould have some stylisticresemblancesto the earliestworks
of Plato. That it has such resemblancescannot be used as evidence for
dating it before369.
Souilhe, however,wishesto date it to the end of the fourthcenturyon
the groundthat in 125E-126A Theages says he would like to be a tyrant
and would pray to be a god.' Souilh6 supposes that he is thinkingof the
divine honoursvoted to Alexanderthe Great, but this need not be the
case. Even if the passage is taken absolutely seriously,Alexander was
not, after all, the firstGreek to receive divine honours. He had been
anticipatedin thisby Lysander.Furthermore, Theages says that he does
not desire(brievLu tv) to be a god, but ratherthat he would pray to be one
The contrast between the two words is stressed.Theages
(Eb4atE1vtv).
presumablythinksthat only by transcendingthe limitsof nature could
he be a god, and that thereforethereis no point in desiringthis.There is,
we recall, a Greek phrase for wishfulthinking.The object of wishful
thinkingis said to be 6~goov bxats. Probably in this passage of the
Theages,Theages means that it mightbe a pleasant day-dreamto be a
god, but it is a possibleobject ofdesireto be a tyrant.If thisis so,whether
the author of the Theagesis thinkingwith Souilh6 of Alexanderor with
me of Lysander becomesirrelevant,as he cannot be thinkingof anyone's
7J.Souilh6, Platon 132. 138.
8P. Friedlinder (Platon 2. 142) attempts to use stylistic arguments without con-
sidering what the style of a good imitator would be like.
9J.Souilh6, Platon 132. 142.

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PLOTINUS AND THE DAIMONION 19

divine honours at all. But if he is not thinkingof divine honours,the

evidence fora late fourth-century date disappears.
I have little constructiveto offeron the problemof dating. That the
Theagesis later than 369 seems certain. That it was writtenvery long
afterwardsI finddifficultto believe both because of the style-for the
author manages to weave his snippets from Plato togetherwithout
intrudingtransitionalpassages too suggestiveof a much later age-and
because, as we shall see, the later Platonistsregardedit as genuine.These
argumentsare not strong,but I should be prepared to risk dating the
workto veryshortlyafterPlato's death in 347. We know that Plato left
theLaws unfinished;therehas been a great disputeover the authenticity
of the Epinomis. AfterPlato's death all check on the authenticityof
workspurportingto be his had vanished.The timewas ripe forpublishing
spuriousmaterialas genuine.The Theagesmay thenbe dated tentatively
to 345 B.c.
Assumingthat the Theagesis later than the accounts of the daimonion
given both by Plato and by Xenophon,we can now look at the develop-
ments in the account of the daimonionwhich it contains. The firstis in
128D, immediatelyfollowinga passage taken over fromthe Apology.
Socrates repeats that the voice always preventshim fromactingwrongly,
but never gives a positive command-the doctrineof Plato and not of
Xenophon. This is followed,however, by the remark that if one of
Socrates' friendsconsults him, the voice may well occur and utter a
prohibition.This extensionof the activityof the "oracle" to replyingto
the demands of Socrates' friendsis Xenophontic rather than Platonic.
Unplatonic too is the list of personswho regrettedthe factthat theyhad
not taken Socrates' advice. The transformationof Socrates into the
traditional wise man is evident in the stories of Cleitomachus and
Sannio.
Strangerstill,however,is the suggestion,made by Socrates,about the
effectsof his physical presence. It is of course true that the personality
of Socrates drew men to hear his words; this is evident fromboth Plato
and Xenophon. But the crude renderingof this theme in the Theages
is a development-or degradation-introduced by the later writer.It is
said that the nearer one comes to Socrates, the more powerfulis his
effect,and that the best effectcan be obtained by physicalcontact with
him. Doubtless the physical presenceof Socrates was commandingand
magnetic-the Symposiumis a witnessof the fact-but Plato emphasizes
the effectof his words farmore than that of his body. It is his words,for
example, that have the numbing effectdescribed by Meno, and that
make the philosopherlike a "torpedo-fish"(Meno 80A). Gomperz has
completelymissedthe point in remarkingof the Theagesthat "it is hardly
possible to depict in a simplerand more convincingmannerwhat to-day

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
20 PHOENIX

we might style the charm and the spell of a great and inspiringper-
sonality."10This is the hagiographicalapproach of which the Theages
itselfis redolent."This dialogue is in fact an early stage in the debasing
both of Socrates and of the conceptof his daimonion.
This retrogrademovementis advanced a furtherstage by the closing
speech of Theages. We have alreadyseen Socrates as the traditionalwise
man and prophet whose propheticpowers derive fromhis daimonion.
Now we see the nextstage in a processwhichwill help to usherin an age
in whichthe conjuringup of daimonesis an accepted part of the Platonic
tradition. Neither Xenophon nor Plato says anythingabout offering
sacrificesto the daimonion.It is too personal a thing to be treated in
that way. Theages, however,has no such inhibitions.He will make trial
of the daimonionby associatingwith Socrates, and if it does not speak
he will be delightedand maintainthe association. If, on the otherhand,
it objects to his presence,he will considerthe possibilityof placating it
with prayers and sacrificesand any other means the prophets may
indicate.
The Theages was quickly assimilated into the Platonic tradition.
Thrasyllusincludedit in the fifthof his tetralogies,12and when Diogenes
Laertius (3.62) lists the spurious dialogues which were generallyrecog-
nized as such by the critics,the Theagesis not among them.One of these
authoritieson Plato is said by Diogenes to have been the grammarian
Aristophanes.PresumablyAristophanesregardedthe Theagesas genuine.
Hisfloruitis the middleof the thirdcenturyB.c.
Later writerstoo were equally convinced of its authenticity-a fact
whichpartly accounts forthe spread of its unauthenticdoctrines.In his
Life ofNicias (13.6) Plutarchcites theprophecyofdoom which,according
to the Theages(129D), Socrates utteredbeforethe sailing of the Sicilian
Expedition. Albinus,an aristotelianizingPlatonist of the second century
A.D., tells us that there are lecturerson Plato who start their courses
with the Theages 5).
(Elacyoyr,
Legends about the daimonionbegan to accumulate. Cicero tellsus that
Antipaterthe Stoic made a large and interestingcollectionof them,and
himselfrecountsa storyabout Crito of which thereis no knownsource
and whichpresumablyderivedfromthe Stoic's collection.'3It is Socrates
the prophetthat interestsCicero.
The revival of Platonism in the Imperial period saw a furthergrowth
of interestin the daimonion.Plutarch, Maximus of Tyre, and Apuleius
all wrotedown theirviews on it. We must thereforelook brieflyat this
10H. Gomperz, "Plato on Personality," The Personalist 22 (1941) 30.
'1H. Gauss, Handkommentarzu den Dialogen Platos 12 (Bern 1954) 209.
12Diog. Laert. 3. 59.
13De div. 1. 54.

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PLOTINUS AND THE DAIMONION 21

evidence in orderto arrivefinallyat the pictureof the daimonionwhich

would have been current among the associates of Plotinus. We may
then compare this picturewith that drawn by Plato.
In Plutarch's treatiseDe Genio Socratisthe sign is firstintroducedat
580C. The speaker, Theocritus,emphasizes its mantic nature and says
that it was a guide in life which the gods gave to Socrates fromhis
earliest years. This passage is cited by Friedlinder as derived from
Theages 128D, and if this is so-which is probable-we should notice
how the trendsaway fromthe Platonic account, already observable in
the Theages,are accentuated by Plutarch. The Theages says that the
sign accompanies Socrates (7raperbYevov); Plutarch says that it is his
Is he thinkingof the guardiandaimonof the myth
guide (Orpoirob~rybv).
of Er? Both the Theagesand Plutarch,however,emphasizethe genuinely
Platonic view that the signshows that Socrates enjoyedheaven's especial
favour.
In De Genio581B we hear that the signwas both positiveand negative
-this versionpresumablydrove out the simplerPlatonic account-and
there is talk about its being identifiedwith a sneeze, an identification
said to originatewith Terpsion of Megara but unacceptable to some of
the company. Yet in view of such talk it is refreshingto read in 588C
that Socrates had been heard to say that people who claimedto have had
visual communicationswith heaven were imposters,but that he himself
was most interestedin anyone who claimed to have heard voices. The
speaker at this point of the dialogue is Simmias-representingPlutarch
himself.Simmias adds that when he and his friendsdiscussed the divine
sign they supposed it was not a vision but the perceptionof a voice, a
voice analogous to those we thinkwe hear in sleep. The view that the
sign was visible-which could clearlybe the basis forsupposingit might
be made visible by conjuration-is here rejected. It is certain fromthe
discussionof it, however,that such a view was currentin Plutarch's day.
The less material view given by Simmias is that Socrates' mind, being
pure,unaffectedby the passions,and havingonly the minimumof bodily
contamination,was refinedenough to enable him to hear the divine
commands in his waking hours. Such commands in other men are
drowned by the chorus of theirpassions.'4
In his account of the Socratic divinesign,Plutarch does not assimilate
this sign to the daimon that is vovsin Plato's Timaeus. That he does not
make such an assimilationwas arguedsome years ago by W. Hamilton,'5

'4A similar account is given by Chalcidius (ch. 253). For the idea that in sleep men
can learn the divine commands since they are then freedfromthe tyrannyof the body
and its passions, cf. Cic. de div. 1.49, 53, 57.
'6W. Hamilton, "The Myth in Plutarch's De Genio (589F-592E)," CQ 28 (1934)
180, n.1.

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
22 PHOENIX

and I need notexpatiateon it. Such an amalgamationofPlato's thought-

probably presupposedin Porphyry'saccount in the tenthchapterof his
Life of Plotinus-would be strictlyunplatonic,unless Plato's thoughtis
regardedas monolithic.Platonic too is Plutarch's associationof a theory
of daimoneswith the care of the gods formen that is specificallydis-
cussed in 593A-594A. Yet, as in the case of Xenophon, in what way
would Plutarch distinguishthe daimonionfromthe daimon of the myth
of Er, save by the admissionthat the daimonionof Socrates is superior
to that of ordinarymortals?
There is little freshinformationto be derived fromthe fourteenth
and fifteenth discoursesof Maximus of Tyre which purportto give an
account of the daimonion.We hear in 14.8 and 15.1 of the care ofgods for
mankind.The only featureworthyof emphasis,perhaps,is the attempt
that Maximus makes to show that it is not at all unreasonableto suppose
that Socrates had a daimonion.No one, he suggests,is amazed at the
powers of the priestessof Apollo at Delphi, or of the priestsat Dodona
and Ammon or elsewhere.All we can say of this comparisonis that the
uniqueness of the voice of Socrates, so emphasized in the Platonic
account, is forgotten.Socrates is just one among many who have pro-
phetic powers. Why indeed should he not have them, since they are
bestowed on so many inferiormortals?The problemof the existenceof
daimonesdoes not arise only in the case of Socrates; we must consider
the nature and activitiesof daimonesin general (14.6).
Finally we may look at the treatiseofApuleiusentitledDe Deo Socratis.
In chapter seventeenwe findthe words si Socrates... hunc deum [the
divine sign]suum cognovit et coluit.Colerepresumablymeans at the least
"to tend" and at the most "to worship."Deum coluitpresumablyimplies
that Socrates worshipped his daimonion. We recall the suggestionof
Theages that he mightconsiderplacatingthedaimonionwithprayersand
sacrifices.Here the notionthat the daimonionis a kindof "spiritwithin,"
rather than a voice from God, is predominant. I suspect that the
daimonionof Apuleius owes almost as much to the account of guardian
spiritsthat occurs in the mythof Er (misunderstood)as it does to des-
criptions of Socrates' own life. Again, as in Maximus, we find that
accounts of the daimonion have become merged with more general
theoriesof daimones.
The notion of the daimonionas a "spirit within,"like the "guardian
spirit" that we found in the Laws, is furtherbuttressed in chapter
twenty,where, after explainingthat the voice heard by Socrates and
describedby Plato in the Phaedrus was no mere human voice, Apuleius
tells us that he thinksthat Socrates not only heard his daimonion,but
that he also saw it-an entirelynew and significantvariation.He bases
this conclusionon the fact that Socrates not only claimed to have heard

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 PLOTINUS AND THE DAIMONION 23

a voice but also spoke of a sign. This sign is supposed by Apuleius-who

thoughtof it as a vision-to have been speciesipsius daemonis.
After this long and saddening account of the vulgarization of the
concept of the Socratic daimonion,we must return to Porphyryand
Plotinus. It should now be clear that the spirit-guideconjuredup in the
Isaeum bears a certain similarityto the daimonion as envisaged by
Apuleius, but has littlein commonwith the daimoniondescribedby the
Platonic dialogues. Plato's account of the daimonionis very restrained;
Apuleius' is less so. In particularthe divinitydescribedby Apuleius can
be seen with the eyes. It could probably thereforebe revealed to others
by magic-as could the "spirit-guide"of Plotinus in the story of the
Isaeum.
It is of course irrelevanthere that the "spirit-guide"of Plotinus turns
out to be a god; Apuleius himselfis writingDe Deo Socratis.Presumably
bothApuleiusand thoseresponsiblefortheseance in theIsaeum supposed
that the sage had a higherkind of spirit-guidethan ordinarymortals.
Such spirit-guides,possessed in theiropinion by Socrates and Plotinus,
were gods.
All this is very far fromPlotinus' own account of his spirit-guide
which,as we have seen, is the One itself.Plotinustellsus littleabout how
such guidance is transmitted.Presumablyhe felthimselfboth exhorted
and restrainedby his guide-and in this respect was differentfrom
Socrates. Yet in the immaterialityof his conceptionhe is returningto the
originalmaster of the Platonists. In the superiorityof the spirit-guide,
as understoodby Plotinus, to mere conjuration,we see the tremendous
superiorityof Plotinus to his contemporaries.Even as far back as the
Theageswe hear of attemptsto influencethe daimonionby other ways
than by livingthegood life.The suggestionofTheages would have seemed
to Plotinus as worthlessas that of Amelius,who on one occasion wished
to embroilhis master in a meaninglessreligiosity.
I have already remarked that Plotinus has nothing to say of the
Socratic daimonion.Perhaps he was aware of the superstitionin which
it had become involved. His own account of spirit-guidesderives
principallyfromthe mythof Er in the Republic.Yet he must have been
aware that thedaimonionofSocrateshad by thistimebecomeinextricably
mixed with more general theoriesof daimones,and, I believe, with the
daimon of the myth of Er in particular.He probably also knew that,
although Plutarch still distinguishedbetween the daimon that is vo^s
(derived fromthe Timaeus) and the particulardivine sign or daimonion
of Socrates, other Platonists were more confused.And even Plutarch,
in the myth of the De Genio, supposes that the vois is able to wander
apart fromthe body,and that in thisrespectit is akin to thedaimonion-
a daimonentirelyfreeof bodily ties.

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
24 PHOENIX

Yet we may ask, since Plotinus does not mentionthe daimonion,how

do we know that Porphyryis thinkingof it at all in his remarksabout
spirit-guides.It should be clear by now that Porphyry'sunderstanding
of a spirit-guidediffersradically fromPlotinus'. Porphyry'sis probably
that of many contemporaryPlatonists. He is sure that certainkinds of
spirit-guidescan be conjured up. The spirit-guideof the Isaeum is
certainly not Plotinus' vovs;it seems more like Porphyry's idea of a
"guardian-angel."Such a guardian-angel-whichcan be made to appear
in bodily form-resemblesApuleius' versionof the daimonion.This in its
turn looks like a debased versionof the daimon of the mythof Er.
Throughout the later tradition, the opinion had been growingthat
the daimonionof Socrates was akin in some ways to the propheticpowers
presentin seers.Maximus in particularlooks at it in thisway. This would
tally well with the fact that in the seance Plotinus is expectedto have a
daimon (as the seers would have had), but in facthas a god, as guide. In
this he is like Socrates, whose daimoniontoo is often called Oebs.All in
all we cannot but draw the conclusion that Porphyry'sview of spirit-
guides, made manifestin his account of the seance, is deeply influenced
by the new accounts of the daimonion,while Plotinus, if he thinksof
the daimonionin 3.4, does so ratherin the earlierand less materialistic
manner of Plato. Porphyryknows that spirit-guidesdifferin rank. This
in itselfmakes it unlikely that he is thinkingin termsof the daimon
as vois. Plotinus, on the other hand, though he bases his theories of
spirit-guideson the Republicand Timaeus, is far fromthese dialogues in
his beliefthat the guide of the sage is the One, but perhaps less farfrom
Plato's attitude towardsthe daimonionitself.At least Plato mighthave
agreed that the daimonionrepresentsthe providenceof the highestGod
and his care forman.
Plotinus must at the least have been convincedthat, if the daimonion
was really as his contemporariessupposed, it was not importantto his
philosophy.A second, and more attractivepossibilityis that, since he
valued the Socratic daimonion but put little value on such spirits as
could be conjured up, he believed that the account of the daimonion
currentin his day must be rejected.How his own treatiseon spirit-guides
was supposed by Porphyryto have arisenfromthe seance I have already
discussed.The unlikelihoodof Porphyry'saccount being accurate should
now be recognized.

This content downloaded from 128.206.9.138 on Tue, 26 Nov 2013 10:18:11 AM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions