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Anxiety and sport performance

Article  in  Exercise and Sport Sciences Reviews · February 1992

DOI: 10.1249/00003677-199200200-00009 · Source: PubMed

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 In (J.O. Holloszy, Ed.). EXERCISE AND SPORTS SCIENCES REVIEWS.
Vol. 20. Baltimore: Williams &Wilkins, 1992.

9
Anxiety and Sport Performance
JOHN S. RAGLIN, Ph.D.

INTRODUCTION
Psychological variables have long been thought to playa role in various
domains of performance, including sport [38]. Research has demon­
strated that personality factors [78]. mood states [79], and cognitive fac­
tors [82] are each related to athletic performance. Variables such as
motivation [21] and attentional processes [60] have also received consid­
erable investigation. However. the bulk of research and interest in the
pS~'chological aspects of sport has centered upon the effects of anxiety.
, In general. there appears to be a common assumption in the field of
sport psychology that anxiety influences sport performance in a pre­
dictable manner, and it is generally assumed that ele\'ated anxiety is a
cause of poor performance in many athletes (62). Consequently, a vari­
ety of intervention strategies have been employed in attempts to im­
prove performance by reducing anxiety. Despite the widespread use of
anxiety reduction techniques [16] as an ergogenic aid, a recent revie\\' of
the literature found little support for the putative beneficial effects of
such techniques [86]. Furthermore, previous reviews of the anxiety and
sport performance literature have failed to support a single theoretical
orientation unequivocally [57, 67, 68, 99].
The present chapter will attempt to address a number of unresolved
issues that appear to have limited advances in this area. Key issues con­
cerning the terminology, measurement, data analysis, and theory will be
discussed and selected research findings will be reviewed. The present
article will be limited to the discussion of athlete performance wherever
possible. However, other lines of research will be included where they
have direct relevance to the issues being discussed.

Terminology
A number of terms have been used imprecisely in the anxiety and sport
performance literature and this has been a major limitation to progress.
In particular, the terms stress, anxiety. and arousal are commonly used as
synonyms in sport psychology research in the mistaken belief that they
refer to the same construct. Furthermore, it has been proposed that the
construct of "global arousal" is overly simplistic and misleading [27, 30,
55, 84. 85]. and this viewpoint has direct consequences on theories of
performance based on arousal, such as the inverted-U hypothesis. Con­
243
 244 I Raglin

sequently, it is important that these and other complex constructs dis­

cussed in this paper be defined as unambiguously as possible.

PERFORMANCE
Because anxiety may affect motor skill differently as proficiency in- ;
creases, it is important to distinguish performance from learning.
Learning has been described by Schmidt [93J as: "A set of internal pro­
cesses associated with practice or experience leading to relatively per­
manent changes in the capability for skill" [po 375J. In a typical learning
paradigm, the rate of improvement is usually rapid at the initial phases
of task acquisition, but as trials progress, improvement begins to slow
and further increases in skill occur more slowly. Eventually, there is an
asymptote in improvement where little or no additional gain occurs with
additional trials. It is often considered that, when the rate of improve­
ment has reached an endkraft, the subject has reached the stage of per­
formance. Hence, most motor behavior experiments with nonathletes
study factors related to learning, but not to performance. This is in con­
trast to the example of the skilled athlete who has practiced her/his ac­
tivity a far greater number of trials than occurs in most motor behavior
experiments, and has progressed beyond the learning stages of skill
acquisition.
This distinction is particularly important when studying the effects of
arousal or anxiety on athletic performance, but it is seldom made in the
sport literature. For example, Schmidt [93J cited the research of Mar­
tens and Landers [71] and \Veinberg and Hunt [ 116] as evidence for the
inverted-V hypothesis, and speculated on the implications of these find­
ings for sport performance. However, the subjects in each of these stud­
ies were nonathletes. and the novel motor tasks employed were of mini­
mal ecological validity to real sport tasks. More importantly, these
studies assessed the influence of anxiety on motor learning, not per­
formance. Yet, authors of textbooks such as Schmidt have used thCi pro­
ceeding studies as support for the inverted-V relationship between
arousal and performance in athletes. As Morgan and Ellickson [80] have
noted, research findings generated from nonathletes who are learning
novel motor tasks have little relevance to the realm of sport because of
constraints in external and ecological validity. It is proposed that ad­
vancements or applications in this area will continue to be constrained
by such indiscriminate generalizations of findings to athletes.

Assessment of Performance
Another issue in anxiety and performance research involves the quanti­
fication of sport performance. It is often assumed that the determina­
tion of performance in sporting activities is a straightforward matter
compared with other domains because the outcome is easily quantifiable
 Anxiety and Sport Performance I 245

as a time, distance, height, or score [84]. However, the assessment of

performance in sport is actually problematic and entails difficulties not
encountered in the investigation of learning. A myriad of factors may
influence performance and the effectS of these factors is transient [93,
97]. Absolute or "raw" performance scores can be misleading because
transitory factors, such as general health status, training or nutritional
state, setting and environmental conditions, may each affect the out­
come in varying degrees [97]. The use of absolute values also limits
comparisons to athletes competing in a single event because meaningful
contrasts across athletic events (e.g., 800- and 1500-m races) cannot eas­
ily be achieved.
Because of these complications, a number of different strategies have
been developed to assess athletic performance more reliably. Probably
the most common method is to use subjective ratings provided by the
coach [34, 52, 89, 97]. It is thought that the coach can provide a valid
rating of performance by accounting for variables (e.g., training status)
that may bias an absolute measure of performance. Subjective ratings
are also preferable to objective measures in cases where otherwise out­
standing performances are marred by a single factor, such as a poor
start. However, direct comparisons across investigations are constrained
because of the use of different weighting factors and rating categories
to determine performance. Despite this, subjective ratings may be the
only practical alternative in the case of team sports where easily quanti­
fiable performance criteria often are not available.
Another strategy is to quantify each athlete's attained performance in
relative, rather than absolute terms. In this case, the absolute perform­
ance value is converted to an attained percentage of one's own personal
best [11] or average capability [91] to yield an intraindividually based
measure. It is proposed that the use of a recent average or current sea­
son average as a performance criterion is more ecologically valid than
absolute criteria, such as personal best. Recent averages reflect the in­
fluence of transitory factors, such as training or health status, and may
provide a more realistic indication of an athlete's potential than a best
performance, which may have occurred a number of months or even
years earlier. However, the use of personal best may be a more valid
indicator of capability in the case of the young athlete where maturation
and growth can result in continual improvements. Composites of sev­
eral aspects of sport performance have also been utilized [100]. Another
approach is to use a criterion-referenced method. An exam pie of this
would be to divide each athlete's attained performance by a standard­
ized reference, such as a regional or national qualifying standard for
the given sporting event [11IJ. Because performance is referenced in
terms of a single criterion across all athletes, direct comparisons of per­
formance across different sporting events are possible using this
approach.
 246 I Raglin

Each of the previously described methods for assessing performance

has its advantages and disadvantages, and investigators may not wish to
limit themselves to a single criterion [91, 100]. Although no single
method is without problems, it should be recognized that, in the case of
sport, untransformed measures of performance are often misleading
because of the potential influence of a multitude of factors. This brings
up another point: because sport performance is influenced by many
factors, the percent of variance explained by anyone variable will often
be modest or perhaps even negligible. Hence, the affect of anxiety
alone on sport performance will usually be small when contrasted with
other variables. Future research should include sample sizes that ensure
sufficient power as well as establishing controls for additional factors
that may affect sport performance.

GLOBAL AROUSAL
.-\rousal. as it was originallv defined b\' Duff~' [22] and others [42,65],
is a diffuse, unidimensional state of physiological activaTion ..-\rousal,
which has also been referred to as activation. was regarded to exist on
a single continuum ranging from deep sleep to extreme excitement.
The magnitude of arousal was indicated by "the extent of release of
the stored energy of the organism through metabolic activity in the
tissues" [23. p. 32]. Increases in activity of the reticular activation sys­
tem were thought to be linked \\'ith a wide range of physiological
changes. such as elevations in heart rate, blood pressure. and catecho­
lamine production, and emotional reactions, such as anxiety and fear
[22]. Because arousal has been operationalized as a broad and non­
specific response, theoretically, it could be determined by the activity
of any relevant physiological or behavioral variable. Consequently,
the assessment of a single measure (e.g., heart rate) or limited
number of physiological variables has been commonly used to indi­
cate the degree of general arousal [12].
In spite of the previously described conceptualization of global
arousal, there is substantial work indicating that it does not exist as a
simple global state of uniform activation. Lacey [55] has criticized the
concept of global arousal based on compelling evidence that physiologi­
cal variables commonly used to assess arousal are poorly intercorre­
lated. Lacey [55] and others [31] have proposed more complex models
of arousal consisting of several independent systems. This lack of con­
cordance among physiological markers of arousal also has been ob­
served in studies of motor performance [43] and sport [9].
In addition to problems presented by the lack of intercorrelation
among putative measures of arousal, it has been observed that individu­
als often exhibit distinct patterns of physiological responses to a given
stressor. This phenomenon has been referred to as individual-response
 Anxiety and Sport Peiformance I 247

stereotypy [55]. Research has demonstrated that such intraindividual

differences are relatively stable [49]. Thus, while correlations among
arousal measures are low between subjects, intraindividual correlations
often yield significant correlations. Individual response-stereotypy indi­
cates some stability in the pattern of arousal can be observed for a given
subject. but the response profile mav be quite different across a group
of subjects.
The pattern of physiological response also has been found to depend
on the features of the stressor itself. Different stressors have been
found to result in a distinct physiological response pattern for a given
individual; a phenomenon referred to as situational response stereotypy
[56] or stimulus-specific response stereotypy. Thus, both the variability
among individuals and the particular features of the Stressor can influ­
ence the pattern of physiological response [2]. These phenomena indi­
cate that the use of either single of multiple physiological variables often
may not provide reliable or valid indices of global arousal.
As an alternative to determining arousal by phvsiological measure­
ment. Th,l\'er (109] has contended that it is better determined through
self-report than bv physiological means, Thayer (109. IIOJ has pro­
posed that the perception of arousal is a more accurate means to mea­
sure acti\'ation because it represents the organismic integration of phys­
iological acti\'ity. However, research has shown that individuals often
fail to perceive physiological activity associated with arousal [46. 120], or
are only sensitive to high levels of physiological activity [12]. Individuals
also ha\'e been found to differ in the sensations they use to determine
general bodily state (35], as well as the sensitivity with which physiologi­
cal activity is perceived (66]. Based on these and on other concerns, it
has been concluded [12] that most individuals are poor perceivers of
arousal, and self-reports of perceived arousal do not accurately indicate
physiological activity.
In summary, the preceding lines of evidence indicate that the concept
of arousal as a broad and undifferentiated state of general physiological
activation has not been supported [30, 55. 84, 85, 113]. It has been dem­
onstrated that there is wide variability in the physiological pattern of
response due to either individual differences or to the particular fea­
tures of the stressor itself. A best measure or set of best measures that
can provide an overall index of arousal has not been identified, nor
have arousal patterns specific to anxiety been conclusively demon­
strated [106]. In addition, the putative advantages of assessing arousal
through self-report have not been supported. Individuals are often
poor or idiosyncratic perceivers of their own physiological state. For
these reasons, a strong case can be made that future research will be
advanced by abandoning the concept of global arousal, and utilizing
more complex multidimensional models of arousal or psychobiological
approaches.
 248 I Raglin

ANXIETY

Although there is some disagreement over the exact definition of

anxiety, the model proposed by Charles Spielberger has been widely
accepted. Spielberger [102] describes anxiety states as: "... emotional
reactions that consist of a unique combination of: (1) feelings of ten­
sion, apprehension. and nervousness; (2) unpleasant thoughts (wor­
ries); and (3) physiological changes" [po 5]. Spielberger has also pro­
posed that anxiety involves a dynamic biopsychosocial process
involving three components: stressors; perceptions and appraisals of
the stressor; and emotional reactions. A stressor is a situation that in­
volves some physical or psychological danger [1 02J. It is important to
note that if a stressor is appraised as being threatening, even in the
absence of objective danger or threat, an increase in anxiety will likely
occur. Hence, the subjective experience and appraisal of objectively
neutral stimuli can create anxiety responses as easily as objective or
"real" threats. This subjective aspect of the appraisal process may, in
parr. explain why athletes of comparable skill and experience often
displa\' widely varying anxiety responses to the same competition [81,
9 I, 92J. As Spielberger states: ". , . the same stimulus may be seen as a
threat by one person, a challenge by another, and as largely irrelevant
by a third" [102. p. 5].

/vIeasurement
Early psychometric instruments de\'eloped to assess anxiety. such as the
Taylor :\Ianifest Anxiety Scale (TMAS) [107], defined anxiety as a stable
and unchanging construct. A major theoretical advance beyond this
conceptualization involved the delineation of anxiety into two related
but distinct factors, state anxiety and trait anxiety [13. 14, 103]. State
anxiety refers to the transitory aspect of anxiety that can vary in inten­
sity and change across time. The degree of state anxiety is considered to
be proportional to the degree of threat perceived by the individual.
Anxiety will remain elevated until either the stressor is removed, or the
appraisal of the stressor is altered by a coping mechanism or other de­
fensive strategy [102]. Hence, state anxiety is a dynamic variable that is
mediated by changes in the environment (I.e., stressors) or factors
within the individual.
Trait anxiety represents the degree of anxiety proneness of an indi­
vidual and is regarded as relatively stable and unchanging. Trait anxiety
indicates the predisposition of perceiving situations as threatening. In
comparison to those with low trait anxiety, individuals with high trait
anxiety are more likely to: (a) perceive stressful situations as threaten­
ing; and (b) respond with increases in state anxiety. Hence, those with
high trait anxiety are apt to experience state anxiety reactions at a
greater frequency and intensity than individuals with low trair anxiety.
 Anxiety and SPOTt Peiformance I 249

Research has shown that high trait anxious athletes generally display
greater increases in state anxiety prior to competition than do low trait
anxious athletes [52, 100] but past experience can playa large role in
mediating this process [102]. This implies that situations exist where
changes in state anxiety will not necessarily correspond to an individ­
ual's level of trait anxiety.
The most widelr used measure of state and trait anxiety is
Spielberger's State-Trait Anxiety Scales (STAI) [104, 105]. The STAI is
a Likert format scale with two, 20-item scales that measure state anxiety
and trait anxiety. The STAI has been shown to possess distinct state and
trait components [7] and has been demonstrated to possess construct
validity [105].
SPORT-SPECIFIC MEASURES. Despite the established construct validity
of the STAI and its demonstrated sensitivity in a variety of settings, in­
cluding sport [102], several alternative anxiety scales have been devel­
oped that are sport specific [69, 70, 72, 98]. For example, Martens and
colleagues [72) have recently de\'e1oped the Cognitive-Somatic Anxiety
Questionnaire (CS.-\I-2), \\'hich assesses cognitive and somatic sport
state anxiety. as well as self-confidence. Theoretically, specific scales
should be better predictors of behavior than more general scales that
are regarded as too broad to evaluate behavior accurately in particular
situations such as test taking [63]. In support of this position, research
has been cited that general psychological measures have not proven to
be effective predictors of behavior in sport settings [69). However, Mor­
gan [77] has noted that much of this research was based on flawed
methodology and that the misuse of the theories underlying the scales,
rather than limitations inherent to the scales was reflected. Further­
more, general measures of psychological states and traits have proven to
be useful in predicting performance [40] and success [78] in a variety of
sports. Present limitations in knowledge in this area may actually indi­
cate a failure of theory or methodology rather than the lack of adequate
instrumentation. But despite the efficacy of general psychological mea­
sures in sport settings, the trend of developing sport-specific scales has
continued.
MULTIDI~{ENSIONAL ANXIETY. Another criticism of more general
anxiety scales concerns the view that anxiety is more accurate as a mul­
tidimensional construct rather than a global one. This has led to the
development of multidimensional anxiety scales consisting of separate
somatic and cognitive components for use in general situations [94] or
in sport [72, 98]. The underlying rationale for scales based on mul­
tidimensional conceptualizations of anxiety comes from research indi­
cating that anxiety consists of distinct cognitive and somatic components
[17, 25]. Excessive rumination and worry associated with cognitive anxi­
ety have been shown to interfere with attentional and cognitive pro­
cesses necessary for adequate cognitive performance [117], such as test
 250 I Raglin

taking. but the consequences of such interference on motor-based tasks.

such as sport. are less clear.
Somatic anxiety has been hypothesized to exert effects on sport per~
formance unrelated to cognitive anxiety. Martens et al. [72] have pro­
posed that the relationship between somatic anxiety and sport perform­
ance forms an inverted-C' function based on the findings of studies
considered to have involved "physiological indices" [po 161]. The basis
for this \"iewpoint is unclear. :\one of the studies cited [52. 58, 100] in
support of the inverted-U relationship actually employed physiological
measures. Moreover. contrary to theoretical assumptions. somatic anxi­
ety measure of the CSAI-2 has not been found to be related to selected
physiological indicators of arousal [50]. Empirical support for the
CSAI-2 is also lacking. A review of studies involving the relationship
between sport performance and the CSAI-2 subscales is presented in
Table 9.1. Investigations involving interventions were excluded. as were
studies involving motor tasks other than sport. Of the eight investiga­
tions listed, four provide no suppOrt for the hypothesized relationship
between performance for any of the CSAI-2 components," whereas
three studies provide partial support. One investigation hat positive
findings for each of the CSAI-2 subscales. 1\
It should be noted that other multidimensional anxiety scales have
corne under criticism. For example, Schwartz et al. [94] have created a
widely used Cognitive-Somatic Anxiety Questionnaire (CSAQ), which
Martens et at. [i2] employed in the validation process of their own
CSAI-2. Howe\"er. others have questioned the validity of the CSAQ [20,
33]. The issue of how many discrete anxiety dimensions exist is also not
clear. For example, models of anxiety that involve three [61], four [53],
or even five [25] anxiety factors have been proposed.
Multidimensional models of anxiety may eventually add to our
knowledge of the anxiety~performance relationship, but basirpsycho­
metric research is necessary before these instruments should be em­
ployed. It is proposed that the validation process of multidimensional
instruments incorporate comparisons with general anxiety scales with
demonstrated construct validity (e.g., STAI). The direct comparison of
the utility of multidimensional anxiety models with general measures
would be preferable to assuming simply that a multidimensional ap­
proach would be more efficacious.

GLOBAL AROUSAL, PERCEIVED AROUSAL, AND ANXIETY

It should be emphasized that the questionable validity of arousal is a
separate issue from the validity of measures of anxiety. Although most
theories of anxiety include aspects of physiological change, self-report
measures of arousal are implied to be directly related to the actual phys­
iological state of the organism [110]. This is fundamentally different
TABLE 9,1
Sport Performance and CSA/-2 Subscaies*
SelF
AItlJIOr($) S/JOrl(s) SIIII,/,/r(,) Somtdic Ct!K"iliIJf (;onJitlt!ll(t!
Gould etlil. 137) WresdillK I) :i7 wrl'sllns

McAuley (76) Golf 7 fl.'male universil y golfers

Hames et al. III) Swimming H mall' mllegiale SWillllll('l'S +

Gould et al. 136) Pistol target shooting 39 polke officers +
Krane and Williams [54) Gymnastics Salllple I: 36 fCllIale high sdloul
gymnasts
Golf 2: 44 fCIII"le

Maynard ami Howe (75) Rugby 22 lilait' university rughy 1)laycrs ~

i:i
Taylor (108) Ski racing. tennis. basketball. track 21 felll.lle and li:1 wllt-giale varsity Stllte Anxiety ~.
alld field. cross counlry alhleles Females
Males ~
Tmit anxiety ~
Felllaies + ~
Males + +I-t

l\urlOn [II) Swillllnillg Sample I: 13 felliale "lid 15 malc

l:ollcgi;lte swimlllers
+ + + '"
~
Smllpll' 2: :19 female ami :11 male
high sriwul Swilllllll'rs
1- + ~
;::I
~
*Key: + indicates a signilicant (p<O.05) relationship between anxiety allli performancc in the l~xpected direction; indicates either a lIollsignificant
(p>O,05) relationship between anxiety and performance or findings whidl wntradict theoretic'll expectations. Nl
tPerlormance was reported 10 worsen as self-confidence increased beyund IIlUdl'rale levels. (.J'
.­
 252 I Raglin

from the construct of anxiety in which physiological activity is only one

part of the construct. Inconsistent or contradictory relationships be­
tween anxiety and measures of arousal have been found for Sport [9]
and cognitive tasks [45, 46], and this lack of concordance has been
found even in extreme cases of anxiety, including panic attacks [6].
Research has also shown that perceived arousal is often not related to
actual physiological activity. Studies of residual arousal indicate that in­
dividuals consistently fail to perceive elevations in physiological activity
that occur following exercise or other excitatory stimuli [12, 120]. Self­
reports of anxious arousal prior to stressful testing also have been
found to be unrelated to physiological activity [46]. Similarly, studies
where arousal has been increased by the administration of ephedrine
[26] or reduced by J3-blockade [32] have failed to find concomitant
changes in anxiety. Arousal is often not clearly related to anxiety in a
predictable fashion and, in some cases, low anxious subjects may exhibit
higher levels of physiological activity than those with high anxiety [46].
Hence, equating high anxiety with the presence of elevations in com­
mon measures of arousal seems unwarranted. Furthermore. despite the
contention bv some [4] that global arousal remains a heuristic concept,
the sum of evidence indicates that the concept is overly simplistic and
unjustified on the basis of research indicating that it is a complex, mul­
tidimensional phenomenon [31, 55, 84, 85, 113]. The use of arousal
and anxiety as synonyms in sport psychology research, as well as the
cOlltinued use of the concept of global arousal, ma~' be major reasons
for the equivocal findings and confusion in the anxiety and sport per­
formance literature. It is proposed that advances in performance re­
search and theory will continue to be impeded until these constructs are
more carefully defined and distinguished.
The following section will overview major theories of arousal and
sport performance. It should be noted that these theories were origi­
nally conceptualized as a relationship between arousal and performance
but have also been tested within the context of anxiety. The preceding
evidence indicates that the use of the concepts of anxiety and arousal
interchangeably is problematic. Nevertheless, the nature of the extant
research dictates that this review includes tests of theories using concep­
tualizations based on anxiety or commonly used indicators of arousal.

DRIVE THEORY
The first major hypothesis put forward to explain the relationship be­
tween arousal and performance was the drive theory. Drive theory was
first outlined by Hull [47] and later modified [101] to account for per­
formance in com plex tasks. Drive theory proposes that performance (P)
is a function of drive (D) and habit strength (H) yielding the equation
P =D x H. Drive is a global energizer of behavior and is generally con­
 Anxiety and Sport Performance I 253

sidered to be synonymous with global arousal. Habit strength refers to

the relative dominance hierarchy of correct and incorrect behaviors. At
the early stages of skill acquisition of complex tasks, the habit strength
of correct responses is low. Conversely, habit strength is high for incor­
rect responses, and this leads to the predominance of incorrect re­
sponses. When a complex task becomes well learned and habit strength
is high, correct responses should dominate under high levels of arousal;
hence, a linear relationship between arousal and performance is
described.
Drive theory has also been restated and tested within the context of
emotional responsiveness [101J or anxiety [67, 68]. Trait measures of
anxiety have been used to identify individuals differing in drive level on
the basis of emotional responsiveness. Under this assumption, those
with high trait anxiety should also possess chronically elevated drive or
arousal levels. However, as noted earlier, problems with the construct of
global arousal and lack of distinction between arousal and anxiety indi­
cate that this assumption is often false.

Previous Revieu's of Drive Theory and Sport Performance

Ranier Martens [67, 68] has conducted the most extensive reviews of
drive theory. In an initial review (67], a number of investigations classi­
fied subjects according to emotionality with assessments of trait anxiety,
and inferred concomitant differences in drive level. Those with high
levels of trait anxiety would presumably have corresponding elevations
in both emotional responses and drive; hence, they would perform bet­
ter than subjects with low trait anxiety. However, in a review of 37 stud­
ies that utilized this approach, Martens [67] found only equivocal evi­
dence for drive theory. Others (101] have proposed that drive theory is
more appropriately tested in situations where different levels of drive
are created in high and low anxious individuals by means of exposure to
a threatening external stressor. In a review of 18 studies that incorpo­
rated external stressors, Martens [67] found that only three clearly sup­
ported drive theory. Measurements of physiological change (Le.,
arousal) would be needed to confirm the effectiveness of the stressor in
provoking a response directly, but many of the studies Martens cited
[67, 68J did not do so.
On the basis of his reviews of the literature, Martens [67, 68] called
for the abandonment of drive theory. Furthermore. Martens [67] ar­
gued that drive theory could not be directly tested because it was not
possible to determine the habit hierarchies of performance tasks ade­
quately. In a subsequent review of the arousal-performance relationship
by Landers [57], evidence of specific cases where habit strength could
be adequately defined was cited. It was contended that Martens' [68]
rejection of drive theory was premature and based on flawed evidence.
Landers [57] also emphasized the need for a manipulation check to en­
 254 I Raglin

sure that threatening stressors intended to achieve differences in drive

actually do so. Specific guidelines by Burkun [10] were provided and
included: "(1) the performance of subjects assumed to be stressed must
be different from a non-stressed group; (2) the participants must sub­
jectively report feeling distress in the situation of interest, and (3) there
must be an indication of disruption of normal physiological processes"
[po SO]. Although the previous guidelines appear to be reasonable, it is
proposed they are likely to result in erroneous assumptions. Concern­
ing the first guideline, the expectation that the performance of stressed
subjects should differ from that of nonstressed subjects only holds if the
stressor actually influences performance in a consistent fashion among
the majority of subjects. Stressors can result in heterogeneous physio­
logical changes across individuals that may have little impact on the per­
formance of some, and may either worsen or improve performance in
others [S4J. The rejection of a study because of a lack of performance
differences between stressed and nonstressed subjects may simply re­
\'eal that drive or other similar theories of performance are themselves
invalid, rather than the stressor itself being insufficient. The second
guideline is inappropriate because e\:idence indicates that arousal can
be present without the occurrence of anxiety [26]. The general lack of a
conceptual distinction between the constructs has impeded progress in
this area of research. Furthermore, physiological activation alone, with­
out a change in emotionality, should be sufficient to test a theory of
performance based on arousal without emotion. Guideline three is
problematic because it has been shown that experimental stressors may
produce disruptive effects that are nonspecific to arousal per se [44J or
are influenced by personality factors [73]. It has also been found that
experimental stressors, such as noise [IS] and caffeine [51], have differ­
ent performance consequences for introverts and extroverts, suggesting
that personality traits other than trait anxiety may contribute to both
individual response stereotypy and performance outcomes under stress.
Because of the lack of empirical support for drive theory and meth­
odological problems including the use of experimental stressors, drive
theory has fallen into disfavor [67, 6S, 99]. It has been proposed [67,68,
99] that the inverted-U hypothesis represents and more accurately ex­
plains the relationship between arousal and performance.

IN"VERTED-U HYPOTHESIS
The inverted-U hypothesis, or Yerkes-Dodson law, has become the
dominant explanation of the arousal-performance relationship in sport
psychology [5, 15, 58, 62, 93]. The basic tenet of the hypothesis is that.
as arousal increases from very low levels to moderate levels, there will be
a concomitant improvement in performance. Performance reaches its
peak when the level of arousal falls within a moderate range. When

'.
 Anxiety and Sport Performance I 255

arousal increases above this moderate range, performance rapidly wors­

ens. Thus, the relation between arousal and performance takes on the
inverted-U shape.
The inverted-U hypothesis stems from the study by Yerkes and Dod­
son (119]. These investigators examined the effects of varying levels of
shock on avoidance learning of a discrimination task in mice. It was
found that the easiest level of the discrimination task was acquired most
quickly with the strongest intensity of shock, whereas strong shocks dis­
rupted learning when the task was more difficult. The authors inter­
preted these findings as suggesting that there is a particular level of
stimulus intensity necessary for optimal learning and, as the task be­
came more difficult, the optimal level of stimulus decreased. Winton
(18] has noted that the original work of Yerkes and Dodson [119J has
been commonly misinterpreted in introductory psychology textbooks as
indicating the effect of arousal. rather than strength of stimulus, on task
acquisition. This has also been the case with sport psychology texts. For
example, Cox [15] described the findings of Yerkes' and Dodson's origi­
nal work as follows: ". , , the optimal level of electrical shock (arousal)
for a difficult task was much lo\\'er than for an easy task. Additionally,
an optimal level of arousal (electrical shock) is indicated for each task.
Before and after the optimal point, performance drops off. This is the
inverted-C" [po 9iJ. In this example, arousal is inappropriately assumed
to equal the degree of shock, and learning and performance are con­
founded, ,.l,. notable exception to this generalization in the exercise sci­
ence literature has been presented by Harmon and Johnson [41] who
stated: "Notice that nowhere has there been any mention of emotion or
arousal in the discussion of the Yerkes-Dodson study" [p, 121].
Hence, although the work of Yerkes and Dodson [119] has served as
the basis of current interpretations of the inverted-U hypothesis, their
investigation actually involved tests of the relationship between task ac­
quisition and stimulus intensity rather than arousal. Given the problems
commonly noted in the construct of global arousal, Winton [118] sug­
gests that the findings of Yerkes and Dodson [119] indicate a relation­
ship between aversive stimulation and performance. Unfortunately, in
pointing out this misinterpretation, Winton [118] fails to distinguish
performance from task acquisition (i.e., rate of learning),

Previous Re-views of the Inverted-V Hypothesis

Despite the broad acceptance of the inverted-U hypothesis in the field
of Sport psychology, several recent overviews have questioned its valid­
ity [27, 80, 84,86]. The most compelling arguments against the hypoth­
esis come from Neiss [84] who reviewed the extant literature and con­
clUded that: "The inverted-U hypothesis has not received clear support
from a single study" [po 355]. Neiss [84] has proposed that the hypothe­
sis should be abandoned because of: (a) the general absence of empiri­
 256 I Raglin

cal support; (b) flaws in the constructs underlying the hypothesis (Le.,
global arousal) and; (c) the inability to conduct tests of falsification be­
cause of the lack of an acceptable index of arousal. Neiss's [84] review
has been rebutted by Anderson [4] who cited evidence in support of the
inverted-U hypothesis and contended that the concept of global arousal
was a "pragmatically useful abstraction" [po 98]. Anderson did, how­
ever, admit that the evidence she cited in support of the inverted-U hy­
pothesis came from research involving cognitive performance rather
than motor performance, and stated: "It is important to note that the
form of the arousal-performance relationship may differ between these
two domains of functioning" [po 99].
Others have also contended that the inverted-U hypothesis is seri­
ously flawed [27, 80,83]. Morgan and Ellickson (80] conclude that there
is some evidence in support of the inverted-U hypothesis for motor
learning tasks, but these findings should not be generalized to sport
performance. They note that much of the research that su pports the
inverted-U hypothesis has utilized samples of nonathletes or novice per­
formers. These subjects often were not conversant in the motor tasks
used, and learning effects rather than performance were assessed. In
addition, the ecological validity of research has often been constrained
by the general reliance on the use of simple motor tasks rather than
sport skills, as well as the lack of field experimentation in sport settings.
Hence, many of the findings that support the inverted-U hypothesis
have limited or no relevance to sport performance.
The general conclusions based on recent reviews indicate that there is
a dearth of evidence to support the inverted-U relationship between
arousal and sport performance; it has been proposed that the hypothe­
sis be abandoned (27, 80, 83-85]. However, others have proposed that
modifications of the inverted-U relationship based on task characteris­
tics or individual factors can overcome prior limitations in the literature
[11, 99, 100]. Consequently, investigations testing the inverted-U hy­
pothesis from these alternative perspectives will be reviewed in the fol­
lowing section. It should be pointed out that most of the work to be
summarized has conceptualized arousal in terms of anxiety measures.
This is important because Neiss [84] submitted that the inverted-U hy­
pothesis has received more somewhat more support when framed as a
relationship between anxiety and performance.

Task Characteristics and Inverted-U

Fiske and Maddi [29] were among the first to postulate that the range of
optimal arousal varies as a function of the characteristics of the task.
These authors proposed that as the energy needed to perform the task
or the difficulty of the task (i.e., task complexity) increases, the optimal
range of arousal decreases and the function begins to take the shape of
an inverted "V" rather than a "U." Oxendine [87] extended this line of
 Anxiety and Sport Peiformance I 257

reasoning and presented a hierarchial classification of sPOrts activities

based on the estimated complexity of the motor task, degree of fine
motor control, and the degree of physical effort (strength, speed, en­
durance) necessary. The optimal arousal of various activities was classi­
fied along a general arousal continuum ranging from slight arousal to
extreme excitement. It was proposed that optimal performance in activ­
ities such as football blocking and running distances between 220 and
-l-l0 yards was associated with extremely high levels of arousal that bor­
dered on "blind rage," whereas tasks such as basketball free throwing
and archery were performed best at the lowest level of arousal above
the normal state. Thus, the inverted-U curve shifts from low to high
levels of arousal as tasks take more physical effort and involve less fine
motor control. Each activity is associated with an inverted-U~'Wrve
where optimal performance occurs at a midrange of arousal, buI'abso- _
lute degree of arousal, which is optimal for a given task, beco~es a
function of the characteristics of the task. More recently, Landers and
Boutchers [58] have created a similar hierarchial arrangement of sport­
ing activities and have listed optimal anxiety ranges for each activity.
Oxendine's [87] hypothesis was not based directly on the findings of
research, but it has exerted significant impact on the conceptualization
of the inverted-U hypothesis in sport psychology research and has been
incorporated into a number of textbooks [5, 15, 58, 62]. But despite its
acceptance, there has been surprisingly little research that has directly
tested Oxendine's [87] hypothesis. Weinberg and Genuchi [115] found
that low levels of state anxiety were associated with better scores during
a 3-day golf tournament. The authors suggested that optimal perform­
ance in golf was associated with low levels of arousal because of the pre­
cise degree of motor control needed, in accordance with the supposi­
tions of Oxendine [87]. However, this hypothesis was not directly tested
by assessing the performance of golfers possessing anxiety levels that
would be considered to be below the minimum optimum level. Neiss
[84] cautioned that poorer golfers may be more prone to becoming anx­
ious because of their anticipated lack of success. That is, in this case,
anxiety did not lead to poorer performance, rather it was a consequence
of being a poor performer. Evidence in support of this contention has
been found in another study of anxiety and golf performance [72]. For
sport tasks that extend over a relatively long period, poor performance
may induce an increase in anxiety, and better performance may reduce
it. Consequently, researchers may incorrectly conclude that elevated
anxiety leads to a drop in performance, where, in fact, the opposite
chain of events actually occurred.
In another investigation where task complexity effects were ad­
dressed, Furst and Tenenbaum [34] studied the relationship between
state anxiety and performance in national caliber athletes in five sports.
When mean anxiety levels prior to performance were calculated sepa­
 258 , Raglin

rately for each sport activity, the results were found to contradict Ox­
endine's hypothesis. Boxers performed optimally with the lowest mean
anxiety level of all sports assessed. In contrast, athletes in the sports of
table tennis and swimming, which required finer motor skills, possessed
the highest optimal levels of anxiety.
Both of the previolls investigations employed assessments of anxiety
rather than indicators of arousal; thus, they did not constitute a direct
test of Oxendine's hypothesis. However, to the extent theorists genera­
lize the hypothesis of Oxendine to anxiety, the findings indicate that the
hypothesis is not supported. Furthermore. Oxendine [87] has described
his hypothesis in terms of "emotional arousal," implying that a concep­
tual distinction was not made between anxiety and arousal. In addition,
work that has incorporated measures of physiological arousal and anxi­
ety [9] has failed to find effects for arousal or anxiety that support Ox­
endine's propositions.
The findings from the previous investigations do not support the hy­
pothesis that the optimal level of arousal or anxiety is dependent on the
task characteristics of the sporting event, This lack of evidence. how­
e\'er. does not rule out the possibility that specific physiological changes
may be linked to success in sporting tasks. Some evidence exists that
success in shooting sports is linked to changes in heart rate or hemi­
spheric EEG dominance that are specific to attentional and cognitive
factors [60].

sport Experience and the lnverted-U

Another factor that may affect the inverted-U hypothesis involves the
influence of experience on the optimal level of arousal or anxiety for a
given task. Specifically, it has been hypothesized that, within a given
sporting task, a more skilled athlete will be able to tolerate a higher de­
gree of arousal than would an athlete of lesser skill [15, 62]. In a
description of the Yerkes-Dodson law, Cox [15] states: "The optimal
level of arousal for a beginner should be considerably lower than the
optimal level for an expert performing the same task" [po 98]. Cox [15]
goes on to add: "... this concept explains why highly skilled athletes
perform better in competitive situations than do novices .. ," [po 98].
Keeping in mind the limitations in equating anxiety with arousal. sub­
stantial evidence exists that fails to support the contention that the more
experienced perform better at higher levels of anxiety than those with
less experience or skill. For example, Furst and Tenenbaum [34] found
that the performance of more skilled athletes was best at lower levels of
state anxiety and worst at high levels. In other words, the more skilled
athletes were adversely affected by high levels of anxiety but the less
skilled were not. Mahoney and Avener [64] did not observe differences
in anxiety levels experienced immediately before performance by ath­
letes who differed in skill level. Basler et al. [9] found that the anxiety or
 Anxiety and Sport Performance I 259

arousal exerted inconsistent or nonsignificant effects on the perform­

ance of female gymnasts. Landers et al. [59] studied the effects of the
presence or absence of a time-constraint stressor on the performance of
experienced and inexperienced rifle shooters. A significant (p>0.05)
gain effect was not observed for performance level across the stress con­
ditions, indicating the high stress did not adversely affect the perform­
ance of the less experienced shooters more than those with more expe­
rience and skill. 6't
The previous findings demonstrate that experience i~consistently re­
lated to optimal precompetition arousal or anxiety. Athletes with
greater levels of experience or skill are not necessarily inoculated
against the effects of stressors present in competition compared with
their less skilled counterparts.

Individual Differences and the Inverted-U

Previous reviews of the anxiety-performance relationship have empha­
sized the importance of individual differences [58, 68, 99]. Several re­
cent investigations have purported to provide support for the inverted­
L" hypothesis based on analytic techniques that control for between-sub­
ject differences in precompetition anxiety. An initial study, which ap­
pears to have influenced subsequent investigations, was performed by
Klavora (52] who assessed precompetition state anxiety with the STAI in
high school basketball players. Following each game, the coach classified
the performance of each player as below average, average, or outstand­
ing. It was revealed that outstanding performances were associated with
a particular level of precompetition anxiety for each athlete, but these
levels varied considerably across players. When performance was plot­
ted against anxiety, an inverted-U function was derived, indicating that
deviations either above or below the empirically defined optimal level of
precompetition anxiety were linked to less than outstanding perform­
ance. This finding has been cited as evidence that directly supports the
inverted-U hypothesis [62, 72, 100}. However, the function described
by Klavora (52] does not conform to the supposition of the inverted-U
hypothesis where the optimal level of anxiety is presumed to be uni­
formly moderate among those of similar skill. Klavora (52} found that
some of the players performed best at anxiety levels two or more stan­
dard deviations above age-group norms, whereas others performed best
with anxiety levels below the norms. These observations not only fail to
support the inverted-U hypothesis, but the heterogeneity in optimal
anxiety values also contradicts suppositions regarding task complexity
and experience. What Klavora's (52] findings do appear to demonstrate
is that outstanding performance is associated with a particular level of
precompetition anxiety for individual athletes. Rather than supporting
the inverted-U hypothesis, these results indicate that the optimal level
of anxiety can vary dramatically for individual athletes in a given sport
 260 I Raglin

even when age and experience are similar. This finding will be ex­
panded upon in the subsequent section addressing Hanin's [40] Zone of
Optimal Function theory.
In a later study, Furst and Tenenbaum [34] assessed the relationship
between anxiety and performance in national caliber athletes in six
sports following the method used by Klavora [52]. Thirty minutes prior
to a series of competitions, athletes completed the state version of the
ST.-\!. The results revealed that an inverted-U curve occurred between
anxiety and performance for basketball and soccer. Deviations from the
mean optimal tended to be associated with average or poor perform­
ance for the other spons assessed, but somewhat less consistent effects
were observed for the other sports assessed. The authors proposed that
the findings provided some support for the inverted-U hypothesis.
However, by treating intraindividual trends as between-subject effects.
any variability among athletes in the optimal level of precompetition
anxiety is obscured. In other words. it should not be assumed that be­
cause the mean anxiety level of a group of athletes was moderate. the
optimal level of anxiety for each athlete will be moderate. Other investi­
gators [40, 81] have found that the mean level of optimal precompeti­
tion anxiety for many sports is often moderate, but substantial variabil­
ity exists in the anxiety optimal anxiety values of individual athletes.
The use of an average optimal anxiety value based on all scores acts to
create a false impression that there is a single, moderate anxiety value
that is best for athletes.
Sonstroem and Bernardo [100] found an inverted-U function anxiety
and basketball performance using a different approach to control for
individual differences. Precompetition anxiety of female college basket­
ball players was assessed with the CSAI [70] 20-30 min prior to three
tournament games. Two measures of performance were used: total
points and an overall composite based on several aspects of offensive
and defensive play. The three precompetition anxiety scores of each
athlete were ranked from lowest to highest independently of the order
of games. and the median score of each athlete was defined as the opti­
mal anxiety value in every case. This technique was used to control for
interindividual differences in degree of anxiety responsiveness and the
authors cite the findings of Klavora [52] as the basis for their in­
traindividual approach.
In fact, however, these two techniques are quite different. Unlike
Sonstroem and Bernardo [IOO}, Klavora [52] did not define optimal
anxiety a priori. Rather, outstanding performances were first identi­
fied and then the optimal level of anxiety was empirically determined
by averaging precompetition anxiety for these performances. In con- .
trast, Sonstroem and Bernardo [100] defined optimal anxiety as each .
athlete's median value for the three games regardless of how the indi- '
vidual actually performed. Sonstroem and Bernardo [100] also cate­
 Anxiety and Sport Performance I 261

gorized the median value of anxiety as moderate. Although a median

anxiety score may well be moderate when contrasted with higher and
lower values. it is likely that there were a number of cases where the
median anxiety level was not moderate when compared with the pub­
lished norms for the inventory. Such variability has been found in
other investigations of athletes. For example, Morgan et al. (81)
found that the overall optimal precompetition anxiety value was mod­
erate in a group of elite female distance runners. But further analysis
revealed that 48% of the athletes reported performing best at low
levels of anxiety, and another 30% at high levels. Thus, the assump­
tion that the median level of anxiety as moderate in all athletes is con­
trary to the findings of research, and effectively obscures potentially
meaningful individual differences in precompetition anxiety levels
among athletes.
Another potential concern with the technique used by Sonstroem and
Bernardo [100] is that the median value anxiety score is always assumed
to be the optimal value. However, it is possible that there would be cases
where the athlete's optimal value would be either the lowest or highest
of all of the observed scores. Although the authors concluded that their
findings supported the inverted-U hypothesis. the results do not di­
rectly support the hypothesis because median anxiety may often not be
moderate in level. Rather, they suggest that deviations from the median
level-which mayor may not be moderate-tend to be associated with
decrements in performance.
Despite the constraints inherent in the intraindividual classification
system used in this study [100], it should be noted that this approach
does have advantages over previous designs. Ecological validity is en­
hanced in field research of this type, and the longitudinal design pro­
vided for the measurement of discrete levels of precompetition anxiety.
Moreover. these levels of anxiety were a consequence of the naturalistic
stressors associated with the competition per se, rather than experimen­
tal stressors that often exert nonspecific effects.
In an experiment that used the previously described in­
traindividual standardization technique, Gould and colleagues [36)
assessed the effect of anxiety on pistol-shooting performance in
policer officers. Anxiety was assessed with the CSAI-2 immediately
prior to several competitions. The lowest. median, and highest anxi­
ety scores of each officer were used for analysis and were standard­
ized across individuals to Z-scores. It was found that cognitive anxi­
ety was not related (p>0.05) to shooting performance. The self­
confidence portion of the CSAI-2 was negatively related (p<0.0005),
indicating that higher self-confidence scores were associated with
poorer performance. Somatic anxiety was significantly related to
performance and it was reported that an inverted-U function best
explained this relationship. Statistical support for this contention was
 262 I Raglin

not provided because the degree of improvement of the quadratic

explanation over a linear model was not presented, nor was the mul­
tiple-R indicated . .More importantly, as with Sonstroem and Ber­
nardo [I OOJ, median anxiety scores were equated with moderate
anxiety. Because it is not known if the median level of anxiety was,
in fact, moderate in every case, these findings cannot be taken to
support the inverted-U hypothesis.
Burton [11] studied the relationship between anxiety and perform­
ance using the CSAI-2 in female and male swimmers in several meets.
Differences in precompetition anxiety scores were controlled for us­
ing the previously described method [100J. The meet performances
of each athlete were standardized by using the personal best times of
each athlete as a criterion. The events were classified according to
task complexity following Oxendine's [87] hypothesis. although the
rationalization behind these derived categories was not made clear.
For example. the 200- and -100-m events were classified as moderately
complex. yet both the shorter (50- and 100-m) and longer freestyle
distances (800- and 1500-m) were classified in the low complexity cat­
egory. Regression analyses for the standardized somatic anxiety and
performance data revealed a significant trend describing an inverted­
V function, although the percentage of variance explained by the
analysis was not given. As in previous cases, the findings were taken
to support the inverted-U hypothesis although a distinction between
median and moderate precompetition anxiety was not made. In addi­
tion, the findings regarding the relationship between task complexity
and performance were inconsistent and often did not conform to the
anticipated relationship.
In summary, the findings from research using standardization tech­
niques that control for interindividual differences in anxiety have
inappropriately been taken to support the inverted-U hypothesis. In
contrast to the assumptions that underlie such techniques, research
indicates that precompetition anxiety responses may vary considera­
bly among athletes [52. 81, 91]. In many cases, these responses do not
conform to the assumption that a median value is equal to a moderate
anxiety score. Also, the presumption that the median anxiety value
observed for a given athlete is always associated with optimal per­
formance had not been demonstrated. Finally, the use of techniques
that standardize anxiety values across individuals provides a false in­
dication that athletes are more alike than they actually are. Instead of
leading to a greater understanding of the range of individual differ­
ences that are found among athletes and determining the reasons for
such differences, a false impression that athletes uniformly respond
to the anxiety associated with competition is created. Because of these
problems, the use of such standardization techniques has constrained
progress in this area.
 Anxiety and Sport Perfonnance I 263

ZONE OF OPTIMAL FUNCTION THEORY

An novel alternative to the inverted-U hypotheses and its modifications,

which is explicitly based on individual differences in anxiety responses,
has been recently developed. A Soviet psychologist, Yuri Hanin, has
proposed a Zone of Optimal Function (ZOF) theory-sometimes re­
ferred to as Individual Zones of Optimal Functioning (IZOF) theory­
of anxiety and sport performance [39, 40]. Hanin [39, 40] has pre­
sented findings indicating that individual athletes tend to perform best
when their own precompetition anxiety level is within a relatively nar­
row range or zone. When precompetition anxiety is either higher or
lower than this zone, performance deteriorates. This relationship ap­
pears to be described by an inverted-U curve and this may lead to the
mistaken belief that ZOF theory is simply a derivative of the inverted-V
hypothesis. In fact, however, ZOF theory differs in several crucial re­
gards from the inverted-U hypothesis First, Hanin [40] has observed
that there are considerable interindividual variability in the optimal
anxiety level of athletes. Contrary to the inverted-U hypothesis, ZOF
theory indicates that a substantial percentage of athletes perform best
when anxiety is low or high rather than moderate. This implies that any
intervention that acts to create a moderate level of anxiety among all
members of a team would harm the performance of many. A second
distinction between ZOF and the inverted-U hypothesis is that Hanin
[40] has found that interindividual variability in the optimal zone of
anxiety exists for every Sport and at different levels of expertise. This
stands in contrast to modifications of inverted-U theory based on task
complexity (87] where it is proposed that each sport is associated with a
single optimal range of anxiety. ZOF theory implies that task character­
istics or experience does not predictably influence where the athlete's
optimal range of anxiety will lie.
Hanin [40] has described two methods of determining ZOE In both
cases, the Russian language version of the STAI was used. The direct
method involves assessment of anxiety immediately prior to competition
until an outstanding or personal best performance is achieved. Subse­
quently the precompetition anxiety score for this performance serves as
the basis for determining ZOE Four anxiety units of the STAI are then
added and subtracted from this optimal anxiety value to yield the ZOE
Hence, the ZOF is equal to an athlete's optimal precompetition anxiety
value plus or minus approximately one-half standard deviation. In cir­
cumstances where this method is impractical. an alternative retrospec­
tive recall method can be performed. This involves using an athlete's
recollection of her/his own level of precompetition anxiety prior to best
performance. In this case, the athletes complete an anxiety question­
naire where they are asked to respond to, "How did you feel just prior
to your best performance?" Again, four anxiety units are added and
 264 I Raglin

subtracted to this recalled optimal value to determine ZOF. Hanin has

found that the recalled and actual values are highly correlated with co­
efficients ranging from 0.60-0.80 [40], indicating the retrospective re­
call method is a reasonable means to determine ZOF in cases where ac­
tual values are not available. However, it is not known if athletes differ
in the ability to recall anxiety associated with past competitions accu­
rately, nor is it known if the recency of recalled performance influences
the accuracy with which it can be recalled.
Hanin [40J has also found that athletes can accurately anticipate or
predict their own level of precompetition anxiety up to several days in
advance of a competition. Correlations between predicted and actual
values generally range from 0.60-0.80 with higher coefficients found
for more difficult or challenging competitions (40]. The ability to pre­
dict precom petition anxiety is of practical relevance because it indicates
which athletes are likely to have anxiety levels that fall outside of their
zone of optimal function well before the actual meet.
Despite the theoretical implications and practical uses of the ZOF the­
ory, little has been written about it in the west. Recently, however, sev­
eral studies conducted with North American athletes have supported
particular aspects of ZOF theory; these studies will be reviewed subse­
quently. In an initial study, Morgan et al. [81] assessed the ZOF of elite
and nonelite female long distance runners using the retrospective recall
method. Each athlete completed an experimental anxiety scale with in­
structions to respond on the basis of how they recalled feeling immedi­
ately prior to their best, worst, and usual competition. It was found that
48% of the subjects reported experiencing low levels of anxiety prior to
their best performance, 22% had moderate levels, and 30% reported
high levels of precompetition anxiety. The authors concluded that the
findings did not support drive theory because 48% of the athletes re­
ported experiencing low levels of anxiety prior to their best perform­
ance. Similarly, inverted-U theory was rejected because 78% of the ath­
letes reported either low or high anxiety levels prior to best
performance. Although these findings only indirectly refute inverted-U
and drive theory, and are valid only to the degree that the retrospective
results are accurate, they do support Hanin's findings that the optimal
level of precompetition anxiety varies widely among athletes of compar­
able ability engaged in a single sport.
Raglin and Morgan (89] assessed the ability of male college swimmers
to predict precompetition anxiety of upcoming meets. Each athlete
completed the state version of the STAI 24 hr before an easy meet and
48 hr before a difficult meet on the basis of how they anticipated they
would actually feel 1 hr before each meet. Actual precompetition anxi­
ety was assessed 1 hr before each meet. Each athlete's performance was
rated by the coach and these ratings were used to create groups of
above-average or below-average performers. Significant (p<0.05) corre­
 Anxiety and Sport Performance I 265

lations were found between the predicted and actual precompetition

anxiety scores for both meets. In accordance with Hanin's (40) findings.
the coefficient was higher in the difficult meet (r=0.71) than the easy
meet (r=0.60). It was also revealed that the above-average performers
were more accurate (p<0.05) in their predictions of precompetition
anxiety than the below-average performers. Mean precompetition anxi­
ety level did not differ (p>0.05) between the groups. Hence, North
American athletes were found to be able to predict precompetition anx­
iety with accuracies similar to those reported by Hanin [40]. Above-av­
erage performance was related to the ability to anticipate precompeti­
tion anxiety accurately but, as a group, the above-average performers
were not less anxious than the poorer performers.
Female high school swimmers served as subjects in another investiga­
tion of ZOF (91). Following a protocol similar to the previously de­
scribed investigation, 15 swimmers completed the state version of the
STAI 2 days before an easy meet and a difficult meet on the basis of
how they anticipated they would feel I hr before each meet. In addi­
tion, each swimmer completed another version of the STAI on the basis
of how she felt immediately before her best competition. This retro­
spective anxiety score was used to determine the ZOF of each swimmer.
Actual precompetition anxiety was assessed 1 hr before each competi­
tion. The correlation between predicted and actual precompetition anx­
iety was found to be significant (p<O.OI) for the difficult meet (r=0.95).
However, the coefficient (r=0.27) did not reach significance (p>0.05)
for the easy meet; this is consistent with other research involving adoles­
cent female athletes (90).
Successful and unsuccessful groups were independently formed us­
ing ratings made by the coach or by swimming times. For the difficult
meet, it was revealed that the successful performers. as classified by the
coach, were more accurate (p<0.05) in predicting precompetition anxi­
ety than the unsuccessful swimmers. In addition, it was found that ac­
tual precompetition anxiety tended (p<0.16) to be closer to the esti­
mated optimal level in the case of the successful swimmers in
accordance with the predictions of ZOF theory. However, the mean
level of precompetition anxiety was not significantly (p>0.05) different
between the successful and the unsuccessful performers; these previous
findings imply that anxiety is related to performance at the individual
but not group level. Differences found between successful and unsuc­
cessful swimmers were not observed for the easy meet. The authors in­
terpreted this to indicate that, for easy or unchallenging competitions,
successful performance may be less dependent on achieving one's ZOE
Although the previously described investigations tend to support
ZOF theory. alternative explanations, such as inverted-U. are not ex­
plicitly ruled out. However, recent pilot research has been completed in
which ZOF theory and the inverted-U hypothesis were directly com­
 266 I Raglin

pared. Turner and Raglin [Ill] found that track and field athletes who
competed within their estimated ZOF performed significantly (p<O.Ol)
better than athletes who competed with precompetition anxiety levels
outside their ZOF. These athletes were then grouped according to pub.­
lished optimal anxiety ranges based on the inverted-U hypothesis for
different events [58J. In contrast, athletes who possessed precompeti­
tion anxiety levels within the optimal range based on inverted-U did not
perform significantly (p>O.05) better than athletes with values falling
outside the optimal range.
The previous investigations provide some support for several aspects
of Hanin's ZOF theory of anxiety and performance. However, addi­
tional research is needed to examine the efficacy of ZOF theory across
different sporting activities, ages, and performance levels. Much of the
research in support of ZOF theory is based on individual sports. It is
possible that ZOF and other anxiety and performance theories are less
applicable in the case of team sports where a given individual's per­
formance can be dependent on the performance of her/his teammates.
The duration of the event may also play a role. It is possible that
precom petition anxiety becomes less im portant in sport tasks of longer
duration where changes in anxiety during competition may occur.
Nonetheless, individual-based theories of anxiety and performance,
such as Hanin's ZOF theory, provide a more attractive theoretical alter­
native to the derivations of the inverted-U hypothesis, which has been
criticized for minimizing the contribution of individual differences [84J.
Furthermore, the inverted-U hypothesis does not account for the signif­
icant percentage of individuals who perform well under high anxiety.
As P;eiss [84] stated: "At the most extreme level of life-threatening situ­
ations, when the majority of people are bewildered and psychologically
incapacitated, 12% to 25% show efficient, organized responses to the
situation" [112, p. 355J.

PUTATIVE MECHANISMS
It should be noted that theories of arousal and performance. such as the
inverted-U hypothesis. are merely descriptions of the relationship be­
tween arousal and performance, and do not themselves explain how
arousal acts to influence performance [57]. The most commonly in­
voked explanation of the effect of arousal comes from the work of Eas­
terbrook [24J. Specifically, it has been proposed that, as arousal in­
creases. there is a corresponding perceptual narrowing that restricts the
field of vision from peripheral to foveal. At low levels of arousal, per­
formance may suffer because an overly broad perceptual field will allow
both task-relevant and -irrelevant cues to be processed. As arousal in­
creases to a more moderate or "optimal" level, performance should im­
prove because perceptual restriction will eliminate task-irrelevant cues.
 Anxiety and Sport Peiformance I 267

When arousal increases above the optimal level occur, both task-irrele­
vant and -relevant cues become eliminated and performance should
worsen. Thus, an inverted-U function can be derived as a result of re­
strictions in the visual field that initially improve and then worsen per­
formance. A somewhat related explanation involves distractibility [114],
where increasing arousal is hypothesized to shift attention to different
cues. including those that are irrelevant for performance.
Although attentional narrowing provides a putative mechanism for
the inverted-U hypothesis, only a limited number of exercise or sport
studies have directly tested Easterbrook's hypothesis [24] and some have
failed to support it. For example, Allard and colleagues [3] found that
arousal produced by high-intensity exercise did not narrow the atten­
tional field in a visual detection task, and performance effects consistent
with the inverted-U hypothesis were not found. On the other hand,
Landers et al. [59] found some support for Easterbrook's hypothesis in
a study of experienced and inexperienced shooters. Under high-stress
conditions of time constraim, shooters exhibited significantly slower re­
action time to a secondary auditory task, suggesting perceptual narrow­
ing was taking place. However, performance in identifying the fre­
quency of the auditory signal was unaffected by the stress condition.
Some research involving I1onsport performance tasks has found that
subjects under high arousal or high anxiety conditions show a shift to­
ward peripheral rather than foveal vision, a trend that directly contra­
dicts Easterbrook's hypothesis [95, 96]. Shapiro and Lim [96] found
that. under some conditions, high anxious subjects undergoing a visual
attention task attended primarily to peripheral stimuli. The authors hy­
pothesized that a bias toward peripheral vision would be useful in
stressful situations for locating threatening stimuli.
The preceding investigations indicate that evidence for the percep­
tual narrowing hypothesis is inconsistent. However, even if attentional
narrowing consistently occurs with increased anxiety or physiological
activity, it is conceivable that skilled athletes could develop visual search
strategies that exploit these changes. Conversely, interventions that de­
crease anxiety and result in changes in the width of the visual field may
hypothetically worsen the performance of athletes accustomed to a par­
ticular attemional range. Research has shown that expert athletes are
particularly skilled in visual information processing [1]. Compared with
novice performers, expert athletes have been found to be more effec­
tive at picking up pertinent visual information [1]; they also possess do­
main-specific coding skills related to superior memory [19]. These skills
may help mediate any potentially detrimental effects of attentional
narrowing.
Recent theoretical models present a more complex view of the effects
of arousal on attention. For example, Humphreys and Revelle [48] have
proposed a multiple resource theory of attention involving sustained sit­
 268 I Raglin

uational-transfer resources and short-term memory. Elevations in

arousal are hypothesized to increase sustained information transfer but
reduce short-term memory resources. Thus, in complex tasks involving
both resources, an inverted-U function between arousal and perform­
ance should be present. However, some research [74] has failed to find
any evidence for the inverted-U relationship predicted by the model.
In summary, it has been proposed that anxiety or arousal may act to
influence performance through changes in attentional processes. Some
evidence [59J does support this hypothesis; however, other research
presents contradictory [95, 96J or indeterminate [3] findings. Further
research in this area is dearly indicated and other potential mechanisms
should be addressed. Although tests of the putative affects of anxiety or
physiological activity on attentional processes may be limited primarily
to laboratory paradigms because of technical constraints, findings based
on experimental stressors should not be freely generalized to sport
situations.

SUM:\IARY
From the findings summarized in this review, it appears that there is
little evidence in support of the inverted-U hypothesis. Available re­
search indicates that there is considerable variability in the optimal
precompetition anxiety responses among athletes, which does not con­
form to the inverted-U hypothesis. Many athletes appear to perform
best when experiencing high levels of anxiety and interventions that act
to produce quiescence may actually worsen the performance of this
group. These findings indicate that there is a need to shift the research
paradigm away from theories of anxiety and performance based on task
characteristics or group effects and, instead, employ theoretical models
that account for individual differences. Hanin's [39, 40] ZOF theory ap­
pears to be a good candidate for furthering our knowledge in this area.
It was developed on the basis of research with athletes and it explicitly
incorporates the concept of individual differences in the anxiety-per­
formance relationship. Most important, because an individual's optimal
range of anxiety is precisely defined, the validity of ZOF theory can be
directly examined through hypothesis testing, whereas it has been ar­
gued that the inverted-U hypothesis is effectively shielded against falsi­
fication [84J.
Although the findings of ZOF theory indicate that a significant per­
centage of athletes perform best at high levels of anxiety, Hanin's trans­
lated writings do not provide an explanation of why this is so. Further
research is clearly indicated, but one explanation for this finding may
involve how the athlete interprets or conceptualizes anxiety. For exam­
ple, Mahoney and Avener [64] found that, although the absolute level
of precompetition anxiety was similar between successful and unsuc­
 Anxiety and Sport Performance I 269

cessful Olympic gymnasts, there were differences in the way the athletes
conceptualized the anxiety they were experiencing. The better per­
formers viewed their anxiety as desirable, whereas anxiety was associ­
ated with self-doubts and catastrophizing in the unsuccessful gymnasts.
Similar differences have been observed in the test anxiety literature
where it has been found that poorer test takers perceive their anxiety to
be more threatening and debilitating than do better performers [45].
Furthermore, temporal differences in the patterning of anxiety [64],
fear responses, or cardiorespiratory measures [28] have been found be­
tween successful and unsuccessful performers; this may reflect a differ­
ence in the ability to regulate anxiety. It may also be the case that
performance is not so much affected by the absolute level of precompe­
tition anxiety as the consistency in the anxiety level across competitions.
Athletes may also develop coping strategies that exploit consistent
changes in attentional focus that result from elevated anxiety.
finally, available evidence suggests that anxiety may be distinct from
other psychological or physiological factors that influence athletic per­
formance [112]. That is, in the case of athletics, as with other endeavors,
the process of selection acts to favor particular biological [88] and psy­
chological [78] characteristics. Hence, there is an increase in homogene­
ity as one moves from samples of preelite to elite athletes in a given
sport. However, it appears that anxiety is an exception to this; that there
is no clear adaptive advantage to possessing a particular level of anxiety
prior to performance. The reasons behind this unique situation remain
to be uncovered by future research.

ACKr-;OWLEDGMENT
The author would like to thank Tammy Mckee for her expert editorial
assistance in the preparation of this manuscript.

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