Nternational Ourt OF Ustice: Nalsar Unhcr P I L M C C, 2021

22R
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

THE PEACE PALACE,
THE HAGUE, THE NETHERLANDS
NALSAR UNHCR PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021
CASE CONCERNING
The Differences between the Three States
Concerning the Okuzan Refugees from Mayzan
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF PEMOLA

(APPLICANT)
v.
THE STATE OF BOLIRIA & REPUBLIC OF MAKONDA

(RESPONDENTS)
M E MOR I AL FO R R E SPO N D E N T S [A R GUME NT S A DVANC E D ]
MEMORIAL FOR RESPONDENTS
[ II ]
NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS...........................................................................................IV
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.................................................................................................VI
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION................................................................................XIII
STATEMENT OF FACTS.................................................................................................XIV
ISSUES RAISED...............................................................................................................XVII
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS....................................................................................XVIII
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED..................................................................................................1
ISSUE I: BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE CONFORMED WITH ALL

OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO
OKUZAN REFUGEES WHO FALL UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION..........................1
A. BOTH THE COUNTRIES HAVE CONFORMED WITH ALL THE OBLIGATIONS

UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW..........................................................................................1
1. BOLIRIA HAS CONFORMED WITH ALL THE OBLIGATIONS.......................................1
2. MAKONDA HAS CONFORMED WITH ALL THE OBLIGATIONS................................2
B. RIGHT OF ASYLUM IS A RIGHT OF A STATE, RATHER THAN RIGHT OF AN

INDIVIDUAL........................................................................................................................3
ISSUE II: BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS &

MAKONDA’S MEASURES INTERDICTING THE OKUZAN PEOPLE DO NOT
VIOLATE THEIR OBLIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW..................................4
A. BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS DOES NOT VIOLATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW.......................................................................................................4
1. THE REQUIRED CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CEASED TO EXIST....................................4
B. MAKONDA’S MEASURES ARE NOT IN VIOLATION OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW.......................................................................................................5
1. THE SECURITY MEASURES OF MAKONDA CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS
‘INTERDICTION’..............................................................................................................6
a. Responding to Persons in Distress at Sea does not amount to Interdiction....7
[ III ]

b. Assuming arguendo that Makonda’s measures amount to Interdiction, they

are within their obligations under International Law...............................................7
2. THE MEASURES UNDERTAKEN BY MAKONDA DO NOT AMOUNT TO REFOULEMENT

8
3. THE ‘FIRST COUNTRY OF ASYLUM’ APPLIES.........................................................9
ISSUE III: BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA DO NOT HAVE AN ERGA OMNES

PARTES OBLIGATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON- REFOULEMENT.............10
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT DOES NOT FULFIL THE CRITERIA......11
1. LACK OF COMMON INTEREST...............................................................................11
2. LACK OF LEGAL INTEREST...................................................................................12
B. ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT SETTLE THE QUESTION.........13
C. EVEN IF THERE EXISTS AN OBLIGATION, IT CANNOT BE INVOKED......................13
ISSUE IV: THERE IS NO SITUATION OF STATELESSNESS THAT ARISES AND

BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS IT..................14
A. OKUZAN PEOPLE ARE NOT STATELESS................................................................14
1. MAYZAN HAS JUS SOLI CITIZENSHIP LAW.............................................................14
2. MAYZAN HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE CITIZENSHIP DOCUMENTATION TO THE
OKUZAN PEOPLE............................................................................................................15
B. COUNTRIES ARE NOT A PARTY TO THE RELEVANT TREATY AND PREVENTION

OF STATELESSNESS IS NOT A PART OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW............16
PRAYER...............................................................................................................................XX
[ IV ]

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
SR. NO. ABBREVIATION EXPANSION
1. ¶ Paragraph
2. & and
3. % percent
4. Applicant Pemola
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

5. ARSIWA
Wrongful Acts
6. Art. Article
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,

7. CAT
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Convention on the Elimination of All

8. CEDAW
Forms of Discrimination against Women
9. CIL Customary International Law
10. CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989
11. Ed. Edition
12. HRC Human Rights Commission
13. ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
14. ICJ International Court of Justice
15. ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former
[V]

Yugoslavia
16. IHL International Humanitarian Law
17. ILC International Law Commission
18. MoU Memorandum of Understanding
19. p. Page number
20. para. Paragraph
21. Respondents Boliria and Makonda
22. UN Charter United Nations Charter
23. UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
24. UNGAR United Nations General Assembly Resolution
25. v. Versus
26. VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969
[ VI ]

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
SR. PG.
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND RULES
NO. NO.
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Dec. 13 1975, 989 U.N.T.S.

1. 16
175.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights preamble, 16 December

2. 2
1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171.
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
3. 1
Protocol, preamble, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, art. 1(1), 28
4. 14
September 1954, U.N.T.S., vol. 360.
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Conclusions on

International Protection Adopted by the Executive Committee of the
5. 8
UNHCR Programme 1975 – 2017 (Conclusion No. 1 – 114), “Non-
Refoulement” at para. (a), HCR/IP/3/Eng/REV. 2017 (Oct. 2017).
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, art. 26, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
6. 16
331.
SR. PG.
CASES
NO. NO.
1. A. v. Australia, (1997) 5 IHRR 78. 16
2. Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, App no. 30471/08 (ECHR 2009). 15
Ali Aqsar Bakhtiyari and Roqaiha Bakhtiyari v. Australia, (2003) 11 IHRR

3. 16
315.
[ VII ]

Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the

4. Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 13
Montenegro), [2007] ICJ 2.
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the

Congo v. Uganda), Judgement, Merits, ICJ GL No 116 [2005] ICJ Rep 168,
5. 13
ICGJ 31 (ICJ 2005), 19th December 2005, International Court of Justice
[ICJ].
Buffo Carballal v. Uruguay, Comm. 33/1978, U.N. Doc. A/36/40, at 125

6. 2
(HRC 1981).
Civilian Claims (Ethiopia v. Eriteria) Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 and 27-32,
7. 16
Partial Award (Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Comm’n Dec. 17, 2004).
8. Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13. 16
9. Gaweda v. Poland, [2004] 39 EHRR 4. 16
10. Jalloh v. Netherlands, (2002) 9 IHRR 940. 16
Jesús Tranquilino Vélez Loor v. Panama, Case 92-04, Report No. 95/06,
11. 15
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127 Doc. 4 rev. 1 (2007).
12. John K. Modise v. Botswana, Comm. No. 97/93 (1997). 14
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece

13. 17
intervening), Judgment, ICGJ 434 (ICJ 2012).
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) Great

14. 17
Britain v. France, (1923) PCIJ Ser B No 4, 24.
15. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14. 17
North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v.

16. Denmark and the Netherlands, [1969] ICJ 1.; Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), 17
1950 I.C.J. 266.
[ VIII ]

17. Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] ICJ Rep 4. 14
18. Nystrom v. Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007 (18 July 2011). 16
19. Oppenhiemer v. Cattermole, 1973 Ch 264. 15
Prosecutor v. Blaskic (Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia

20. for Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997) ICTY-95- 12
14.
21. Qatar v. Bahrain, (1995) I.C.J. 6. 3
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa)
22. 12
(Second Phase) (Judgment) [1966] ICJ Rep 6, 22 [49-50].
23. Stoeck v. Public Trustee, (1921) 2 Ch 67. 15
24. The Gambia v. Myanmar, (2020) PL (HR) May 70. 16
SR. PG.
BOOKS, HANDBOOKS, AND YEARBOOKS
NO. NO.
Anne Gallagher & Fiona David, Migrant Smuggling by Sea: Interdiction and
1. Rescue, in THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING, 403-489 7
(Cambridge University Press, 2014).
ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

2. 3
3 (2nd ed. Chatham House 1972).
CJ TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

3. (Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law No 44, CUP, 11
Cambridge 2005) p 308.
4. Documents of the fourth session including the report of the Commission to 16

the General Assembly [1952] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm'n, Sales No.: 58.V.5,Vol.
[ IX ]

II, 3, 7.
DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA , 4

5. 6
(Cambridge University Press 2009).
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN

6. 2
INTERNATIONAL LAW 358 (3rd ed. Oxford University Press 2007).
HENKIN LOUIS, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 266 (2nd ed. Columbia University

7. 2
Press 1979).
Ian Martin, Foreword to DANIELE JOLY ET AL., REFUGEES: ASYLUM IN

8. 3
EUROPE? (Minority Rights Publications 1992).
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE ‘S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

9. 3
LAW 502 (8th ed. Oxford University Press).
10. Jus soli, Black’s Law Dictionary 775 (10th Ed. 2014). 14
PAUL WEIS ET AL., THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAVAUX

11. PRÉPARATOIRES ANALYSED WITH A COMMENTARY BY THE LATE DR. PAUL 8
WEIS, 341 (Cambridge University Press 1995).
Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-
12. 12
third session [2001], Y.B. Int’l L.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-First

13. 1
Session, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (1979).
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, The scope and content of the
principle of non-refoulement: Opinion, in J. FITZPATRICK AND R. BONOAN,
14. REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S GLOBAL 12
CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (E. Feller, et al. eds.,
Cambridge University Press, 2003).
[X]

SR. PG.
ARTICLES AND JOURNALS
NO. NO.
Article 1 of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law at

1. its Bath Session, 50 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1
Supplement (1951).
Barbara Miltner, Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in

2. Rescue and Interception, 30(1) FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 75 6
(2006).
Christian Dominicé, The International Responsibility of States for Breach of

3. 10
Multilateral Obligations, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 353, 354 (1999).
Christian Tomuschat, A Right to Asylum in Europe, 13 HUM. RTS. L. J. 257,

4. 4
258 (1992).
David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast

5. 4
of Bohemia, 138 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1247 (1990).
6. Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 327 (1949). 3
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the

Status of Refugees: Non-penalization, Detention and Protection,
7. 8
DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE UNHCR GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS (2001).
Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the

8. Multilateral Dimension of the Relations of International Responsibility, 13 11
EUR. J. INT’L L. 1127, 1135 (2002).
Rainer Hofmann, Denaturalization and Forced Exile, 2 OXFORD PUB. INT’L

9. 16
L. 6 (2020).
[ XI ]

Roman Boed, The State of the Right of Asylum in International Law, 5 DUKE
10. 8
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-34 (1994).
S. Prakash Sinha, An Anthropocentric View of Asylum in International Law,

11. 3
10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 78 (1971).
Sandra Mantu, Terrorist’ citizens and the human right to nationality, 26 J.

12. 16
CONTEMPORARY EUR. STUD. 1, 30 (2018).
SR. PG.
OTHER AUTHORITIES
NO. NO.
James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc

1. 11
A/CN.4/507/Add. 4, 2000, 386 et seq [92].
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Department of

International Protection (DIP), Guidelines on International Protection No. 3:
2. Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 5
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Ceased Circumstances"
Clauses), HCR/GIP/03/03 (Feb. 10 2003).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Executive Committee of

3. the High Commissioner’s Programme, Conclusion No. 69 (XLIII), UN doc. 4
A/AC.96/804, (1992).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Legal considerations on

the return of asylum-seekers and refugees from Greece to Turkey as part of
4. 9
the EU-Turkey Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under the safe
third country and first country of asylum concept, (March 23, 2016).
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), RLD2 - Determination of

5. 2
Refugee Status, RLD2 (Jan. 1, 1989).
6. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Note on the 10

Principle of Non-Refoulement, (Nov. 1997),
[ XII ]

https://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Executive

Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Conclusion on
7. 6
Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures No. 97 (LIV) – 2003, No. 97
(LIV) (Oct. 10, 2003).
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The ‘Note on

8. the Cessation Clauses Clauses: Guidelines on Their Application, ¶ 20 (April 4
26, 1999).
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Executive

Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme; Standing Committee,
9. Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees: The International Framework 7
and Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach, ¶ 3, 14,
EC/50/SC/CRP.17 (June 9, 2000).
United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), General comment

10. No. 35, Article 9 (Liberty and security of person), CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 15
2014).
SR. PG.
GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS
NO. NO.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble para. 1 G.A. Res. 217A

1. (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., UN Doc A/RES/3/217 A (Dec. 10, 1948) 1
[hereinafter UDHR].
[ XIII ]

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is hereinafter most respectfully submitted that the Parties have submitted the questions
contained in the Special Agreement (together with Corrections and Clarifications to follow)
(“the Case”) to the Court pursuant to Article 40(1) of the Court’s Statute.1
Therefore, pursuant to Art. 36(1)2 of the ICJ statute read with Article 40(1)3, this
Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction over the present case.
1
Art. 1, Special Agreement submitted to the International Court of Justice by the Federal Republic of Pemola,
the State of Boliria and Republic of Makonda on the differences between them concerning the Okuzan refugees
from Mayzan.
2
“The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.”
3
“Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special agreement or
by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject of the dispute and the parties shall
be indicated.”
[ XIV ]

STATEMENT OF FACTS
[BACKGROUND OF DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF MAYZAN]

The Democratic Republic of Mayzan, is a sovereign coastal country that shares its
border with three other countries. These countries are part of the continent of Kuwei. The
Republic of Mayzan is a secular, democratic, and republic country and the President is
responsible for deciding and supervising its general policies. Mayzan has diverse
demography having 67% people as ethnic Mayzanos and Okuzans make up 28% of the
population.
[PLIGHT OF OKUZANS]
The ethnic characteristics of the Okuzans are very similar to those of the Bolirians,
and their settlements are very close to the Bolirian frontier. There is general misconception
among Mayzan people that Okuzans are illegal immigrants from Boliria and hence, they have
been a marginalised group in Mayzan. They have very limited opportunities and do not even
have access to basic requirements. However, National Democratic Party (NDP) government
brought affirmative action for the welfare of Okuzans and enacted the Okuzan Protection
Against Violence Act, 2006 to curb the cases of ethnic violence against the Okuzans.
[RISE OF THE MAYZAN NATIONALIST FRONT]

The MNF was formed in 1984 by Doler Raz having political manifesto for a
homogenous Mayzano state – “for the Mayzano People by the Mayzano people, one Nation
under one religion”. Over the decades, the MNF steadily gained popularity among the
majority Mayzano ethnic group and won 2008 elections and got re-elected in 2013.
[MNF’S APPROACH TOWARDS OKUZANS]

The MNF government gradually abolished minority rights and eliminated affirmative
action programmes and initiatives placed by previous governments, the Okuzan Protection
Against Violence Act, 2006 was also repealed. The Okuzan people protested against the
MNF government however, there was not any considerable change in their favour. The
Okuzan People Front (OPF) with Okuzan people peacefully demonstrated against the MNF
government and they quickly grew a strong social media presence. In late 2017, Mr. Baden
Haler gave numerous speeches in which he incited anti-Okuzan sentiment among the
[ XV ]

audience. As a result of this, violence against Okuzan people increased sharply in 2017-18. In
2018, the MNF government was re-elected and made an announcement to review the
citizenship of the people of Mayzan.
[OUTRAGE AGAINST CITIZENSHIP SCRUTINY PROCESS]

The announcement of reviewing of citizenship was met by outrage among rights
groups. Organisations and intellectuals from all over the world raised their voices against this
announcement. On 01 July 2018, 3 bombs exploded at parking garages at the 3 busiest
market centres of Mayzan. Freedom Fighters of Okuzan (FFO) claimed responsibility for the
attacks and warned the government to stop the citizenship scrutiny process.
[RESPONSE OF MNF GOVERNMENT]

The Ministry for Interior Affairs stated that the government would take all necessary
measures to maintain law and order in Mayzan. The President declared a state of emergency
and cut access to internet in the Eastern Province. Police forces started arresting Okuzan people
under the Mayzan Terrorism Law, 2015. Curfews were imposed, and residents were not
permitted to leave their homes after 6 p.m. on any given night. Exacerbating the situation,
military forces were deployed to track movement between villages and towns. Okuzans who
were living in other parts of Mayzan were also being arrested without an option to seek bail.
Fearing for their future, the Okuzan people began to flee across the border to Boliria, seeking
asylum.
[OKUZAN PEOPLE IN BOLIRIA]

Facing persecution in Mayzan, thousands of Okuzans fled to Boliria. UNHCR
assisted the Bolirian Government by providing food supplies, tents and sanitation facilities to
the incoming refugees. However, the condition of the camps was reported to be deplorable.
The Bolirian Times reported the paucity of food supply and sanitary amenities. Meanwhile,
the Bolirian government started the process of RSD for the Okuzan people. Despite their best
efforts, Boliria, as a developing nation, could not keep up with influx of Okuzan people.
There was also a growing feeling of resentment among the Bolirian people for Okuzans who
had received basic amenities at the taxpayers’ expense and now giving them competition in
the job market.
[AGREEMENT BETWEEN MAYZAN AND BOLIRIA]
[ XVI ]

Seeing a potential crisis, the Bolirian Prime Minister visited Mayzan and they reached
a Memorandum of Understanding regarding the Okuzan refugees. The MoU stated that
Mayzan agreed to welcome back all Mayzan citizens who were currently living in Boliria and
would provide citizenship documentation after detaining them for two weeks. After the
announcement of MoU, rights groups in both countries expressed their concerns regarding
the detention. The Government of Mayzan clarified that this was part of the procedure
established by law under the Mayzan Immigration Control Act, 1988. Meanwhile, the
Government of Boliria announced that it would begin the process of cessation of refugee
status of Okuzan refugees.
[OKUZAN FLEEING TO REPUBLIC OF MAKONDA]

Once again fearing for their lives, Okuzan refugees started fleeing to Makonda. They
were assisted by smugglers and in September 2020, the Makonda government stated that it
had received more than 3000 Okuzans at its ports. Over the next month, Makonda’s
neighbouring countries, Joran and Ligos also reported receiving Okuzan people at their ports.
All three countries signed an MoU which states that countries would take every measure to
prevent illegal migration and would also comply with its obligations under international law
for the protection of Okuzan refugees. As a part of marine surveillance, countries interdicted
more than 10,000 Okuzan people in a period of two months. At the same time, in Boliria, the
Jinoras, an Okuzan family were the first to be sent back to Mayzan.
[THE DISPUTE]
On 15 January 2021, the Makonda Daily newspaper broke the story that more than
200 Okuzan people, who were attempting to reach Makonda, drowned in the Calasian Sea.
This incident drew the attention of the international community. On 20 January 2021 the
international NGO Human Rights Alert (HRA) released a report named ‘The Innocent, The
Imprisoned, and The Impunity: The Situation of Okuzans in Mayzan’. This report shows the
pathetic condition of Okuzans in Mayzan, the report also highlighted the maritime security
measures taken by Makonda as well as the cessation of refugee status by Boliria. According
to the report, all these measures were in clear violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
On 25 January 2021, the Federal Republic of Pemola initiated a trilateral dialogue
between Boliria and Makonda. However, the negotiation between the countries ended
inconclusively. Pemola has now brought the matter before International Court of Justice (ICJ)
invoking Article 40(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
[ XVII ]

[ XVIII ]

ISSUES RAISED
-I-
WHETHER BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE CONFORMED WITH ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO OKUZAN REFUGEES WHO FALL UNDER
THEIR JURISDICTION?
- II -
WHETHER BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS AND MAKONDA’S
MEASURES INTERDICTING THE OKUZAN PEOPLE ON THE CALASIAN SEA ARE IN VIOLATION OF
THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW?
- III -
WHETHER BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE AN ERGA OMNES PARTES OBLIGATION TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF ‘NON- REFOULEMENT’?
- IV -
WHETHER THERE IS A SITUATION OF STATELESSNESS FOR THE OKUZAN PEOPLE THAT ARISES
IN THIS CASE AND DO BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE ANY OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS IT?
[ XIX ]

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
-I-
The respondents submit that they have conformed with all the obligations under
international law to provide protection to Okuzan refugees who fall under their jurisdiction.
Boliria undertook every measure to ensure the enjoyment of all basic rights by the refugees as
set forth in the various treaties and conventions. It had provided make-shift camps, food
supply and sanitary amenities to the refugees. It had also initiated Refugee Status
Determination Process of the asylum seekers.
Furthermore, upon receiving more than 3000 Okuzan refugees at its port, the
Makonda government had stated that it would comply with its obligations under international
law. It had also signed an MoU with other two countries to be bound by its international
obligations. It has conformed with its obligation by providing asylum to 3000 refugee who
fall under its jurisdiction. Moreover, it has upheld 1951 Refugee Convention by refraining
from imposing penalties on refugees by virtue of their presence within its territory.
Lastly, it is an established principle that every sovereign state is presumed to have
exclusive jurisdiction over its territory. Hence, right of asylum is a right of state, rather than
right of an individual and therefore, all the acts of Boliria and Makonda are in addition to
their international obligations.
- II -
It is submitted that Boliria’s measures regarding cessation of refugee status are not in
violation of their obligations under International Law. This is so, as firstly, the circumstances
under which the refugee status was granted have ceased to exist, as there have occurred
fundamental changes, and the particular cause of fear or persecution has been eliminated.
Additionally, Makonda’s measures interdicting the Okuzan people are also
accordance of their obligations under International Law; firstly, the security measures
undertaken by Makonda cannot be regarded as interdiction; secondly, Makonda’s measures
do not amount to non-refoulement; and thirdly, the ‘first country of asylum’ principle shall
apply.
[ XX ]

- III -
Boliria and Makonda do not have an erga omnes partes obligation to the principle of
non-refoulement. This is because the principle itself is uncertain and does not fulfils the
criteria of belonging to such a class of obligation. Further, the court cannot make use of the
Articles on State Responsibility as they cannot settle the question in this case. And finally,
even if there does exists an obligation erga omnes partes to the principle of non-refoulement,
it cannot be invoked by the Applicant.
- IV -
The respondents submit that there is no situation of statelessness that arises and they
have no obligation to address it. The Okuzan refugees are not stateless as their country of
origin, i.e., Mayzan has jus soli citizenship law and there exists a genuine connection (link)
between them and their country of origin. Moreover, it is clear that citizenship of a person is
determined by the municipal law of the state to which the person is claimed to belong.
Mayzan has also signed an MoU, agreeing to welcome back all the Okuzan people and
providing them citizenship documentation.
Further, as the respondents are not signatories to relevant treaty, they could not be
bound to declare the nationality of Okuzan refugees. There is also no authority demonstrating
that deprivation of nationality constitutes a violation of jus cogens norms. Hence, prevention
of statelessness is not a part of customary international law.
[ XXI ]

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE CONFORMED WITH ALL

OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO
OKUZAN REFUGEES WHO FALL UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION.
[¶1.] Fearing of their future, the Okuzan people left Mayzan and fled to Boliria and
afterwards to Makonda. International law puts an obligation on both the states to protect
Okuzan Refugees. Both the countries have conformed with all the obligations under
international law [A.]; further, the right of asylum is the right of a state, rather than right of
an individual. [B.]
2. BOTH THE COUNTRIES HAVE CONFORMED WITH ALL THE OBLIGATIONS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
[¶2.] When a person escaping persecution enters a country other than his or her own, the
first thing he needs is asylum. “Asylum is the protection which a State grants on its territory
or in some other place under the control of certain of its organs, to a person who comes to
seek it”.4
3. BOLIRIA HAS CONFORMED WITH ALL THE OBLIGATIONS
[¶3.] “Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” 5
The Preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention itself recognizes the duty that each State has
towards protection of refugees. It states thus:
“Expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian
nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to
prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States.” 6
[¶4.] State responsibility is applicable only if the state can reasonably be expected to take
action to stop the wrongful act, or to provide whatever remedy might be appropriate. 7 Boliria
4
Article 1 of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law at its Bath Session, 50 AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Supplement (1951).
5
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble para. 1 G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., UN
Doc A/RES/3/217 A (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
6
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, preamble, 189 U.N.T.S. 137.
[hereinafter the 1951 Refugee Convention].
7
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-First Session, 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N
at 129, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1979/Add.1 (1979).
[1]

undertook every measure to ensure the enjoyment of all basic rights as set forth in the various
treaties and conventions. Despite their developing economy, they have provided make-shift
camps, food supply and sanitary amenities to the refugees.8
[¶5.] Further, if a country is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the government is
responsible for granting refugee status.9 States must provide access to fair and effective
refugee status proceedings.10 Boliria has also initiated Refugee Status Determination Process
of the asylum seekers, which was also lauded by the UNHCR. Hence, Boliria has conformed
with all the international obligations to provide protection to Okuzan refugees.
[¶6.] Moreover, there was a growing sentiment of resentment among the Bolirian people as
Okuzan refugees were getting their necessities at the cost of taxpayers, 11 which might lead to
disruption of peace in Boliria, and as a norm the first priority of the UN charter is peace and
then comes human rights.12 Thus, any restrictions on Okuzan people would be reasonable and
can be attributed as a precautionary measure.
4. MAKONDA HAS CONFORMED WITH ALL THE OBLIGATIONS
[¶7.] Every state has some general obligations in respect of human rights, and the majority
of states have particular obligations in respect of refugees.13 Almost all the countries follow
nearly all International Law principles and commitments most of the time.14 Article 2 of
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [ICCPR] also requires States Parties to
respect the rights of those “within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction.”15
[¶8.] Upon receiving more than 3000 Okuzan refugees at its port, the Makonda government
had stated that it would uphold its obligations under International Law. 16 Further, the MoU
signed between the countries also states that they would comply with all the obligations to
protect refugees.17 In this case, the intent of the parties and the wordings and language used,
make this MoU enforceable and binding between the parties.18
8
Compromis, ¶18.
9
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), RLD2 - Determination of Refugee Status, RLD2 (Jan. 1,
1989).
10
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 358 (3rd ed. Oxford
University Press 2007).
11
Compromis, ¶22.
12
UDHR, supra note 5, preamble para. 2.
13
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights preamble, 16 December 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171.
[hereinafter ICCPR].; Buffo Carballal v. Uruguay, Comm. 33/1978, U.N. Doc. A/36/40, at 125 (HRC 1981)
14
HENKIN LOUIS, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE 266 (2nd ed. Columbia University Press 1979).
15
ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 2(1).
16
Compromis, ¶ 25.
17
Compromis, ¶ 26.
18
Qatar v. Bahrain, (1995) I.C.J. 6.
[2]

[¶9.] Further, the 1951 Refugee Convention is the most significant international agreement
governing refugee status and rights; and Makonda is bound by its provisions. It has upheld
this convention by refraining from imposing penalties on refugees by virtue of their presence
within its territory, as specified in Article 31 of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 19 Moreover,
Makonda has provided asylum to more than 3000 Okuzan refugees who fall under its
jurisdiction, conforming with Article 14 of UDHR.20
[¶10.] Hence, Makonda has complied with all obligations to provide protection to Okuzan
refugees who fall under their jurisdiction.
5. RIGHT OF ASYLUM IS A RIGHT OF A STATE, RATHER THAN RIGHT OF AN

INDIVIDUAL
[¶11.] Every sovereign state is presumed to have exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and,
as a result, over the people present there. 21 One of the ramifications of this widely accepted
rule is that any sovereign state has the authority to grant or deny asylum to people who are
physically present within its borders.22 Thus, under International Law, asylum has
traditionally been regarded as a state’s right rather than an individual’s right.23
[¶12.] Admission of aliens into a state's territory has historically been treated as a matter of
state sovereignty, and this is still the case under International Law.24 Felice Morgenstern’s
views that, “there can be no doubt that the individual has no general ‘right’ of asylum against
the state,”25 is generally accepted to represent the status of an individual's right of asylum vis-
a-vis the state of refuge.
[¶13.] Article 14(1) of the UDHR proclaims the right of an individual “to seek and to enjoy
in other countries asylum from persecution.” 26 However, scholars agrees that this clause only
gives a person the right to seek asylum, not the right to receive it. 27 As a result, the
19
The 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 6, art. 31.
20
UDHR, supra note 5, art. 14.
21
Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 327 (1949).
22
S. Prakash Sinha, An Anthropocentric View of Asylum in International Law, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 78
(1971).
23
Supra note 10.
24
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE ‘S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 502 (8th ed. Oxford
University Press); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2nd ed.
Chatham House 1972).
25
Supra note 21.
26
UDHR, supra note 5, art. 14(1).
27
Ian Martin, Foreword to DANIELE JOLY ET AL., REFUGEES: ASYLUM IN EUROPE? (Minority Rights
Publications 1992).
[3]

Declaration did not add to the existing International Law about an individual's right to seek
asylum in a particular country.
[¶14.] Further, other treaties and conventions like ICCPR and the 1951 Refugee Convention
and its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, also do not provide a right to be
granted asylum.28
[¶15.] Thus, it is established that states are under no International legal obligation to
mandatorily accept refugees who seek asylum at their borders.29 All the acts of Boliria and
Makonda are in addition to their International obligations. Hence, both the countries have
conformed with all the obligations.
6. BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS &

MAKONDA’S MEASURES INTERDICTING THE OKUZAN PEOPLE DO NOT
VIOLATE THEIR OBLIGATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS DOES NOT VIOLATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW
[¶16.] Article 1C(5) of the 1951 Refugee Convention states that the refugee status under
Article 1A30 shall cease to apply to an individual if the circumstances under which the
individual had been recognized as a refugee have themselves ceased to exist. However, this
article shall not apply to refugees who can invoke compelling reasons to not avail the
protection of the refugee’s country of nationality, out of previous persecution.31
1. THE REQUIRED CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CEASED TO EXIST
[¶17.] To ensure that an objective and verifiable situation exists which warrants the cessation
of the refugee status, the states must assess the fundamental character of the changes that
have took place in the country of nationality or origin, as well as the particular cause of fear
of persecution.32 Such fundamental change can also be said to be evidenced by ‘significant
reforms altering the basic legal or social structure of the State’.33
28
David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1247 (1990).; Christian Tomuschat, A Right to Asylum in Europe, 13 HUM. RTS.
L. J. 257, 258 (1992).
29
Supra note 13.
30
31
Id.
32
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s
Programme, Conclusion No. 69 (XLIII), UN doc. A/AC.96/804, (1992).
33
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), The ‘Note on the Cessation Clauses: Guidelines
on Their Application, ¶ 20 (April 26, 1999).
[4]

[¶18.] In the present circumstance, as a response to the Okuzan people fleeing to other
countries, Mayzan had agreed to welcome back all of its citizens of Okuzan descent, with
documentation to be arranged for them in case they did not possess it. 34 They also had to
undergo a two-week detention which is a part of the procedure established by law.35
[¶19.] In circumstances wherein a particular cause can be attributed to the fear of

persecution of an individual,36 and has been identified, the elimination of that specific cause
carries more weight than a change in other related factors.37
[¶20.] The Okuzan people had to flee from Mayzan because of the events that were triggered
by the measures of the Mayzan Government to review the citizenship of the people residing
in their country.38 It is this event which then led to the subsequent bomb blast by the Freedom
Fighters of Okuzan (FFO),39 leading to the imposition of emergency in certain parts of
Mayzan,40 and then the eventual fleeing of the Okuzan people to Boilria.41
[¶21.] Now that Mayzan has agreed to welcome all its citizens, regardless of descent or
documentation,42 the particular cause that could be attributed to the fear of persecution has
been lifted, and hence can call for cessation of the refugee status.
2. MAKONDA’S MEASURES ARE NOT IN VIOLATION OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW
[¶22.] Makonda’s measure undertaken in the Calasian Sea are not violative of their
obligations under International Law, as the security measures of Makonda cannot be
classified as ‘Interdiction’ [1.], the measures adopted by Makonda do not amount to non-
refoulenent [2.], and that the principle of ‘First Country of Asylum’ applies in the given
circumstances [3.].
1. THE SECURITY MEASURES OF MAKONDA CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS ‘INTERDICTION’
[¶23.] The UNHCR in 2003, redefined the term ‘interception’ as:
“One of the measures employed by States to:

34
Compromis, ¶ 23.
35
Compromis, ¶ 24.
36
Supra note 32, para. a.
37
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Department of International Protection (DIP), Guidelines on
International Protection No. 3: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Ceased Circumstances" Clauses), HCR/GIP/03/03 (Feb. 10 2003).
38
Compromis, ¶ 13.
39
Compromis, ¶ 15.
40
Compromis, ¶ 16.
41
Compromis, ¶ 17.
42
Compromis, ¶ 23.
[5]

(i) prevent embarkation of persons on an international journey;

(ii) prevent further onward international travel by persons who have
commenced their journey;
(iii) assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe
the vessel is transporting persons contrary to international or national
maritime law; where, in relation to the above, the person or persons do not
have the required documentation or valid permission to enter; and that such
measures also serve to protect the lives and security of the traveling public as
well as persons being manner. in an irregular or transported smuggled or
transported in an irregular manner.”43
[¶24.] Guilfoyle further defines the term in a two-step process with the first step involving
the boarding, inspection, and search of a ship that is suspected of partaking in prohibited
conduct; and the second step, taking measures which include arresting the vessel, arresting
persons aboard, seizing cargo or the combination of all of these, once the suspicions are
proved to be justified.44
[¶25.] Contrary to the earlier definition of interception proposed by the UNHCR itself, this
redefined definition does not contain any explicit extraterritorial element with regards to
interdiction,45 hence making its application to the High Seas ambiguous, and unjustified. In
the present case, the Okuzan people were travelling from Boliria and Mayzan to Makonda in
smuggler boats across the High Seas of the Calasian Sea, where Makonda was practicing
security measures and maritime surveillance which were in accordance with their
international legal obligations to prevent illegal migration. 46 Therefore, Makonda’s practice
involving coordinated security measures cannot be regarded as interdiction.
2. Responding to Persons in Distress at Sea does not amount to Interdiction
[¶26.] It is established that when a State responds to vessels or persons in distress at sea,
they are not engaged in interception. 47 To qualify as a vessel being in a state of distress there
needs to be reasonable certainty that a person or vessel is threatened by grave and imminent
43
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner’s Programme, Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in Interception Measures No. 97 (LIV) –
2003, No. 97 (LIV) (Oct. 10, 2003).
44
DOUGLAS GUILFOYLE, SHIPPING INTERDICTION AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, 4 (Cambridge University Press
2009).
45
Barbara Miltner, Irregular Maritime Migration: Refugee Protection Issues in Rescue and Interception, 30(1)
FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 75 (2006).
46
Compromis, ¶ 27.
47
Supra, note 43, Preamble.
[6]

danger and needs immediate assistance,48 that may or may not be life threatening. The distress
or danger must be urgent, and must indicate towards a well-grounded apprehension of loss of
vessel and cargo, or of the lives of the crew and the other members on board.49
[¶27.] In the present circumstance, the Okuzan people were travelling on smuggler boats that
were filled beyond their capacity.50 Such boats clearly posed an obvious danger to the lives of
such people, and had also resulted in a tragedy on the night of 13th January 2021 wherein
more than 200 people died due to drowning in the Calasian Sea.51
[¶28.] Hence, Makonda was simply responding to the danger that such migration possessed
to the lives of the Okuzan people, which could not be regarded as interdiction.
3. Assuming arguendo that Makonda’s measures amount to Interdiction, they are within
their obligations under International Law
[¶29.] Interdiction is one of the most common law enforcement measure employed by states
to combat illegal immigration, smuggling, trafficking activity, 52 or as a method to prevent the
abuse of the asylum system.53 Interception may also deter the irregular movement of refugees
who have already secured protection in another country. 54 It is further justified as a national
security measure, or even as an exercise of a State's humanitarian obligations.55
[¶30.] Further, consistent with State sovereignty and the prerogative of border control,
coastal States are entitled to interdict vessels engaged in migrant smuggling at sea in order to
prevent unauthorized migrants from entering their territory, as long as such measure take
place in accordance with the principles of International Law, and within the bounds of any
multilateral or bilateral agreement that may exist on the subject.56
[¶31.] If for Argument’s sake, it is assumed that Makonda’s security and maritime
surveillance measures on the Calasian Sea did amount to interdiction of the Okuzan people, it
is consistent with their obligations under International Law to prevent unauthorized migrants
48
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, Annex, ¶ 1.3.13, Aug. 27 1985, 1405 U.N.T.S.;
Ships in Distress, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, (Oct. 2007).
49
Id.
50
Compromis, ¶ 28.
51
Compromis, ¶ 28.
52
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], Executive Committee of the High
Commissioner's Programme; Standing Committee, Interception of Asylum Seekers and Refugees: The
International Framework and Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach, ¶ 3, 14, EC/50/SC/CRP.17
(June 9, 2000).
53
Supra, note 45.
54
Id, ¶ 15.
55
Id, ¶ 16.
56
Anne Gallagher & Fiona David, Migrant Smuggling by Sea: Interdiction and Rescue, in THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING, 403-489 (Cambridge University Press, 2014).
[7]

from entering their territory, and to prevent migrant smuggling. This is evidenced by the fact
that in a month alone, Makonda had received more than 3000 Okuzans at its ports, 57 and more
than 10,000 people had been interdicted between November to December 2020.58
4. THE MEASURES UNDERTAKEN BY MAKONDA DO NOT AMOUNT TO REFOULEMENT
[¶32.] Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides that “no contracting state shall
expel or return a refugee to a territory or country where their life or freedom is threatened on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion”,59 and is an established fundamental humanitarian principle.60
[¶33.] It is established that the 1951 Refugee Convention and the principle of non-
refoulement as enshrined in International Law do not contain the right to asylum to be
granted to an individual.61 Hence, the above principle does not prevent a state to send an
asylum seeker to a country where that individual shall not be persecuted on account of race,
nationality, membership to a particular social group, or political opinion, 62 in the event that
the State is not prepared to grant asylum to the people seeking it. The States must adopt a
course that does not amount to non-refoulement, which could include removal to a safe third
country, temporary protection, or refuge.63
[¶34.] In the present circumstances, Makonda had already received more than 10,000
refugees over the course of two months, and had conformed with all international obligations
when dealing with the Okuzan people.64 Hence, the interdiction of the Okuzan people does
not amount to refoulement.
5. THE ‘FIRST COUNTRY OF ASYLUM’ APPLIES
[¶35.] The concept of ‘First Country of Asylum’ can be derived from Article 31 of the 1951
Refugee Convention, as that article was intended to apply, and has been interpreted so as to
57
Compromis, ¶ 25.
58
Compromis, ¶ 27.
59
60
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Conclusions on International Protection Adopted by the
Executive Committee of the UNHCR Programme 1975 – 2017 (Conclusion No. 1 – 114), “Non-Refoulement”
at para. (a), HCR/IP/3/Eng/REV. 2017 (Oct. 2017).
61
PAUL WEIS ET AL., THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES ANALYSED WITH A
COMMENTARY BY THE LATE DR. PAUL WEIS, 341 (Cambridge University Press 1995).
62
Roman Boed, The State of the Right of Asylum in International Law, 5 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE &
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-34 (1994).
63
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, The scope and content of the principle of non-refoulement:
Opinion, in J. FITZPATRICK AND R. BONOAN, REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (E. Feller, et al. eds., Cambridge University Press,
2003).
64
Compromis, ¶ 25, 27.
[8]

apply to those persons who have briefly transited other countries, or those who are unable to
find protection from persecution in the first country to which they fled, or who have ‘good
cause’ for not applying in such country.65
[¶36.] According to UNHCR, the ‘first country of asylum’ principle can be applied in cases
where a person has already found international protection in a previous State, which is also
accessible and effective for that individual. The application of the concept is based on an
individual assessment, which would further ascertain whether the individual would be
accorded treatment commensurate with the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol,
including protection from refoulement.66
[¶37.] In the present circumstance, the Okuzan people had already gained refuge in Boliria,
where they were provided with haven in the form of temporary camps. 67 They were also
accorded with a refugee status, which had not ended when they began to flee to Makonda. 68
Boliria had also taken measures to start the RSD of the Okuzan people, so as to provide them
with documentation that would give them the chance to gain access to livelihoods and better
resources outside of the temporary camps.69
[¶38.] Since the Okuzan people had gained asylum in Boliria, by the ‘first country of
asylum’ principle, they cannot claim the same from Makonda.
6. BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA DO NOT HAVE AN ERGA OMNES PARTES

OBLIGATION TO THE PRINCIPLE OF NON- REFOULEMENT.
[¶39.] This Court has found the concept of ‘obligations erga omnes partes’ as treaty
obligations owed towards a group of states, parties to the same treaty, where all have a legal
interest in respecting the rules embodied therein. They are obligations in the compliance of
which states have a common interest.70
[¶40.] However, this jurisprudence is inconclusive. Having proclaimed the concept, this
Court has subsequently taken a rather cautious approach, and has said very little on how to
65
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: Non-penalization,
Detention and Protection, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION FOR THE UNHCR GLOBAL
CONSULTATIONS (2001).
66
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Legal considerations on the return of asylum-seekers and
refugees from Greece to Turkey as part of the EU-Turkey Cooperation in Tackling the Migration Crisis under
the safe third country and first country of asylum concept, (March 23, 2016).
67
Compromis, ¶ 18.
68
Compromis, ¶ 17, 18.
69
Compromis, ¶ 19.
70
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Case No. 2012/24,
International Court of Justice Press Release, (July 20, 2012) [hereinafter Belgium v. Senegal Case].
[9]

identify the new category of obligations. The idea of the obligation contradicts the widely
held view that multilateral treaties are made up of a set of bilateral and mutual rights and
obligations.71 As a result, it has been argued that the principle of erga omnes partes extends
the understanding of treaties and thus, the concept of state consent.72
[¶41.] Since all states are independent and have equal sovereign rights, one state cannot be
held responsible by another state, but this is the basic concept of obligations under erga
omnes partes. States would be obliged to allow refugees to seek asylum – in order to respect
the principle of non-refoulement – but its granting would be a discretionary act of the State
(in accordance with their domestic legislation) rather than a right of the individual to receive
it (in accordance with international law).73
[¶42.] This uncertainty is reflected through the point that the principle of non-refoulement
does not even fulfil the criteria of being an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ [A]. Further, the
Articles on State Responsibility cannot settle the question [B]. In arguendo, even if there
does exist an erga omnes partes obligation, the Applicant cannot invoke it [C].
A. THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT DOES NOT FULFIL THE CRITERIA
[¶43.] The principle of Non-Refoulement is reflected in different bodies of International

Law and protects any person from being transferred from one state to another when there are
substantial grounds for believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to
violations of certain fundamental rights.
[¶44.] There is still no obligation to grant asylum and the restriction on sovereignty entailed
by non-refoulement is very limited, and only about not sending the individual to a country in
which their life or liberty would be endangered. The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, speaking at the invitation of the Chair, stressed the importance of the principle
being stated unambiguously74, which can be evinced from the principle lacking certain basic
traits.
71
Christian Dominicé, The International Responsibility of States for Breach of Multilateral Obligations, 10
EUR. J. INT’L L. 353, 354 (1999).
72
Belgium v. Senegal Case, supra note 70, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Xue, ¶ 12; Dissenting Opinion of Judge
ad hoc Sur, ¶ 38.
73
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNHCR Note on the Principle of Non-Refoulement, (Nov.
1997), https://www.refworld.org/docid/438c6d972.html.
74
Supra, note 10, 344.
[ 10 ]

1. LACK OF COMMON INTEREST
[¶45.] These set of obligations have always been seen as having a common interest in their
fulfilment and is limited to treaties that are intended to protect a collective interest. 75 Firstly,
this court has failed to explain the implication of the parties ‘common interest’. 76 Secondly,
the point that states can prove general interest just because the treaties confer them with
similar powers is a unique myth.77 This is because there can always be ‘an interest’ of ‘each
State party’ to the treaty in the performance of the obligation, which arises, in particular,
when the obligation is owed to that state party and which is also the nature of any obligation.
[¶46.] For reference, a sense of global reciprocity can be found in breach of agreements
related to disarmament, as each state may disarm because the others did the same.78 Although,
no such interest can be identified in human rights tmsreaties like the ones being discussed in
the present case. This is because the fact that one state violates its human rights obligations
has no bearing on the ability of other party States to meet their respective obligation.79
[¶47.] Furthermore, even if there exists a common interest, this court has never stated that
the mere presence of a shared interest would entitle a State to file a claim in court. 80 It is one
thing for each state party to have an interest in the responsibilities being met, and quite
another for each state to have standing to file a claim against another.81
[¶48.] Comparatively, the broad human rights treaties, that the Respondent States are party
to, focus on States’ relationship with individuals. 82 The status of the obligation only attaches
itself to a narrow category of obligations.83
[¶49.] Thus, the principle of non-refoulement only interests the states concerned individually
and hence there is a lack of common interest among them.
75
Belgium v. Senegal Case, supra note 70; James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc
A/CN.4/507/Add. 4, 2000, 386 et seq [92].
76
Id, Belgium v. Senegal Case, Separate opinion, Judge Skotnikov, ¶18.
77
CJ TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Cambridge Studies in
International and Comparative Law No 44, CUP, Cambridge 2005) p 308. [hereinafter Tams].
78
Linos-Alexander Sicilianos, The Classification of Obligations and the Multilateral Dimension of the Relations
of International Responsibility, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1127, 1135 (2002).
79
Id.
80
Supra 72, Judge Xue ¶16.
81
Id.
82
Belgium v. Senegal Case, supra note 70.
83
Tams, Supra note 77, p 117.
[ 11 ]

2. LACK OF LEGAL INTEREST
[¶50.] A general legal interest has always helped courts and tribunals to determine the nature
of obligations.84 Pemola [The Applicant] too, requires a legal interest in the subject matter to
invoke responsibility.85
[¶51.] Although this court has decided that some acts are essential in fulfilling the aim of the
treaty and therefore all State parties ought to have a legal interest in others’ compliance with
the obligation.86 However, this also suggests that not all obligations pertaining to the
Convention are obligation erga omnes partes.87 It is unthinkable that third-party States would
have standing in an International Court to sue a State Party for allegedly failing to comply
with provisions.
[¶52.] As a result, the idea that states have a legal interest in maintaining compliance with
human rights commitments forces us to take a different approach. This abandons the
conventional view of states being a self-interested sovereign actor, and see them as
individuals with a common responsibility to protect humanity's wellbeing as a whole.
[¶53.] Hence, the Applicant being a mere party to the Conventions does not have a legal
interest in the fulfilment of the provisions mentioned therein.
3. ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT SETTLE THE QUESTION
[¶54.] The “Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”
[ARSIWA] by the International Law Commission [ILC] has developed the theory of State
responsibility through the codification of such a law. It primarily governs the matter of the
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. The Articles have been referred by
this Court in various cases.88 Yet the rules proposed in the ARSIWA do not definitively settle
the question of standing for all treaties.
84
Prosecutor v Blaskic (Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the Decision of Trial
Chamber II of 18 July 1997) ICTY-95-14.
85
South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v South Africa; Liberia v South Africa) (Second Phase) (Judgment)
[1966] ICJ Rep 6, 22 [49-50].
86
Belgium v. Senegal Case, supra note 70, para 68.
87
Belgium v. Senegal Case, supra note 70, Declaration by Judge Donoghue, para 12.
88
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), [2007] ICJ 2; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgement, Merits, ICJ GL No 116 [2005] ICJ Rep 168, ICGJ
31 (ICJ 2005), 19th December 2005, International Court of Justice [ICJ].; Certain Activities Carried Out by
Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), ICGJ 490 (ICJ 2013).
[ 12 ]

[¶55.] Art. 48 (1) (a) of the same provides the non-injured states to take action and invoke
the responsibility. However, the entitlement to invoke responsibility granted to ‘any state
party’ to a treaty is only predicated of treaties expressly allowing for it, “without in any way
implying that such an entitlement is allowed in treaties which do not contain a specific
provision to that effect”.
[¶56.] Establishing a treaty obligation as an ‘obligation erga omnes partes’ and to intend a
universal standing for all the contracting parties before an international court is a matter of
treaty interpretation. Further, to invoke the responsibility on its own account, the state should
have a specific right to do so.89
[¶57.] However, in the present case, the applicant is in the absence of any specific right that
would enable it to establish its standing and then invoke the responsibility through the
concerned set of Articles. Hence, ARSIWA cannot be considered as a means to settle this
question raised in the present case.
4. EVEN IF THERE EXISTS AN OBLIGATION, IT CANNOT BE INVOKED
[¶58.] As the obligation in discussion, has mostly been used where the issues to be addressed
were that of jurisdiction and admissibility, it is only fair to deduce the point that the
Applicant has no right to invoke the responsibility of the Respondent States to the principle
of non-refoulement.
[¶59.] Invoking the responsibility for an alleged breach of obligation has neither been
properly explained nor justified.90 It is strange for all States to have standing over any
violation of human rights treaty obligations, regardless of the significance of the treaty
provision and the gravity of the alleged breach. 91 Furthermore, whether and by which means
States can respond against treaty breaches largely depends on the interpretation of the
relevant treaty. 92
[¶60.] However, there exists no discussions regarding the standing in respect of the
obligations erga omnes partes thus making the “entitlement to monitor the implementation of
89
Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the work of its fifty-third session [2001], Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm'n 42 ¶ 2, A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2).
90
Supra note 72, Declaration of Judge Skotnikov ¶10.
91
Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 304 (Feb. 5)
[hereinafter Barcelona Traction Case].
92
Tams, supra note 77, p. 310.
[ 13 ]

any State party on the basis of erga omnes partes to certainly go beyond the legal framework
of the Convention.”93
[¶61.] This renders the applicant incapable of invoking the responsibility, if at all some is
due on part of the Respondent States.
5. THERE IS NO SITUATION OF STATELESSNESS THAT ARISES AND

BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS IT
[¶62.] No situation of statelessness arises in this case and further, the Respondent States do
not have any obligation to address it [A.]; Okuzan people are not stateless, [B.]; Prevention
of statelessness is not a part of customary international law.
A. OKUZAN PEOPLE ARE NOT STATELESS
[¶63.] “Statelessness arises when a person who is not recognized as a national by any State
under the operation of its law.” 94 However, in the present case [1.] Mayzan has jus soli
citizenship law and [2.] Mayzan has agreed to provide citizenship documentation to the
Okuzan people.
1. MAYZAN HAS JUS SOLI CITIZENSHIP LAW
[¶64.] The theory of jus soli states that a person acquires citizenship in a country by virtue of
being born in that country or its territorial possessions. 95 In Nottebohm case,96 this Court
pointed out that the existence of genuine connection (link) of an individual with the state is an
evidence of nationality under International Law.
[¶65.] In Stoeck v Public Trustee97, it was observed that the state to which a person claims or
is alleged to belong must eventually be determined by the municipal law of the state to which
he claims or is alleged to belong. This rule has also been followed in Oppenhiemer v
Cattermole.98
[¶66.] In John K. Modise v. Botswana99, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights held that the applicant is a citizen of Botswana by birth, as he had been born in South
Africa and was therefore considered a citizen of Botswana following its independence.
93
Tams, supra note 77, ¶ 39.
94
The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, art. 1(1), 28 September 1954, U.N.T.S., vol.
360.
95
Jus soli, Black’s Law Dictionary 775 (10th Ed. 2014).
96
Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), [1955] ICJ Rep 4.
97
Stoeck v. Public Trustee, (1921) 2 Ch 67.
98
Oppenhiemer v. Cattermole, 1973 Ch 264.
99
John K. Modise v. Botswana, Comm. No. 97/93 (1997).
[ 14 ]

Mayzan has jus soli citizenship law100 and there is also a genuine link of Okuzan people with
Mayzan as expert ethnographers have stated that the Okuzans are a distinct ethnic group
indigenous to the country of Mayzan.101
[¶67.] Thus, the Okuzan people could be regarded as citizens of Mayzan. Hence, no situation
of statelessness arises in this case.
2. MAYZAN HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE CITIZENSHIP DOCUMENTATION TO THE OKUZAN

PEOPLE
[¶68.] In the MoU signed between Boliria and Mayzan, Mayzan agreed to welcome back all
Mayzan citizens and provide them with documentation after a detention of two weeks. 102 This
was in accordance with the Mayzan Immigration Control Act, 1988.103
[¶69.] The right to personal liberty is not absolute. Article 9 of ICCPR acknowledges that
deprivation of liberty can be justified in certain circumstances.104 Detention time limits along
with specific processes for enforcing, updating, and extending detention must be included in
the municipal code.105 The detention was authorized by domestic law and thus was not
arbitrary.106
[¶70.] Detention in the course of immigration control proceedings is not inherently arbitrary,
but it must be justified as fair, appropriate, and proportionate in light of the circumstances,
and it must be reassessed as time passes.107 Asylum seekers who enter a State Party's
jurisdiction illegally may be detained for a limited period of time to track their entry, record
their claims, and, if necessary, determine their identity.108
[¶71.] Upon detention the documentation to prove their citizenship shall be provided to the
Okuzan people once they enter Mayzan. The interference was prescribed by law. 109 Hence,
the procedure for providing citizenship documentation is not arbitrary and thus, Okuzan
people are not stateless.
100
Compromis ¶ 14.
101
Compromis ¶ 5.
102
Compromis ¶ 23.
103
Compromis ¶ 24.
104
ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 9.
105
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, App no. 30471/08 (ECHR 2009); Jesús Tranquilino Vélez Loor v.
Panama, Case 92-04, Report No. 95/06, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127 Doc. 4 rev. 1 (2007).
106
United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), General comment No. 35, Article 9 (Liberty and
security of person), CCPR/C/GC/35 (Dec. 16, 2014).
107
A. v. Australia, (1997) 5 IHRR 78; Jalloh v. Netherlands, (2002) 9 IHRR 940; Nystrom v. Australia, UN Doc
CCPR/C/102/D/1557/2007 (18 July 2011).
108
Ali Aqsar Bakhtiyari and Roqaiha Bakhtiyari v. Australia, (2003) 11 IHRR 315.
109
Gaweda v. Poland, [2004] 39 EHRR 4.
[ 15 ]

3. COUNTRIES ARE NOT A PARTY TO THE RELEVANT TREATY AND PREVENTION OF

STATELESSNESS IS NOT A PART OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
[¶72.] “An international convention or treaty is an agreement between countries that binds
the contracting countries legally. When a state ratifies a convention, it becomes legally
binding on that state.”110 It is important to note that Makonda and Boliria are not a party to
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961 and 1954 Convention Relating to the
Status of Stateless Persons, which obligates a state to prevent statelessness.
[¶73.] In the Rohingya case,111 it was held that since Myanmar is not a party to the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness,112 it could not be bound by this obligation to
declare the nationality of the Rohingya. Further, it was declared that Myanmar could only be
bound by this obligation if the rule reflected jus cogens norms or Customary International
Law, and there is no authority demonstrating that deprivation of nationality constitutes a
violation of jus cogens norms.113
[¶74.] It is a “little difficult to argue” a right exists not to be subjectively “deprived of one’s
nationality under current Customary International Law.”114 For a customary rule to emerge,
there should be constant State practice 115 and opinio juris.116 In particular, where the practice
is fraught with “uncertainty and contradiction fluctuation and discrepancy”, the formation of
a customary rule is obstructed. In view of the fact that the elements for the existence of
custom are not met, states are not obliged to address the issue of statelessness of Okuzan
people, if any.
[¶75.] Moreover, the question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the
jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question in the present state of international
110
Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, art. 26, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VCLT]
111
The Gambia v. Myanmar, (2020) PL (HR) May 70 [hereinafter Rohingya Genocide Case].
112
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Dec. 13 1975, 989 U.N.T.S. 175.
113
Civilian Claims (Ethiopia v. Eriteria) Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 and 27-32, Partial Award (Eritrea Ethiopia
Claims Comm’n Dec. 17, 2004).; Sandra Mantu, Terrorist’ citizens and the human right to nationality, 26 J.
CONTEMPORARY EUR. STUD. 1, 30 (2018).
114
Rainer Hofmann, Denaturalization and Forced Exile, 2 OXFORD PUB. INT’L L. 6 (2020).
115
North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark and the Netherlands, [1969]
ICJ 1.; Asylum (Colombia v. Peru), 1950 I.C.J. 266.
116
Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J. 13.; Nicaragua v. United States,
1986 I.C.J. 14.; Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment, ICGJ
434 (ICJ 2012).
[ 16 ]

law. Questions of nationality are in principle within this reserved domain, 117 and nationality
issues are, in practice, within each state’s domestic jurisdiction.118
[¶76.] Thus, in the light of above arguments it is established that Boliria and Makonda are
not obliged to address the issue of statelessness of Okuzan people, if any.
117
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) Great Britain v. France, (1923) PCIJ Ser B
No 4, 24.
118
Documents of the fourth session including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly [1952] Y.B.
Int’l L. Comm'n, Sales No.: 58.V.5,Vol. II, 3, 7.
[ 17 ]

PRAYER
For reasons stated above, the Applicant hereby requests the Court to adjudge and declare
that:
-I-
BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE CONFORMED WITH ALL OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW TO PROVIDE PROTECTION TO OKUZAN REFUGEES WHO FALL UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION.
- II -
BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS AND MAKONDA’S MEASURES

INTERDICTING THE OKUZAN PEOPLE ON THE CALASIAN SEA ARE NOT IN VIOLATION OF THEIR
OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.
- III -
BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA DO NOT HAVE AN ERGA OMNES PARTES OBLIGATION TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF NON- REFOULEMENT.
- IV -
THERE IS NO SITUATION OF STATELESSNESS FOR THE OKUZAN PEOPLE THAT ARISES IN THIS
CASE AND BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE NO OBLIGATION TO ADDRESS IT.
-V-
ANY OTHER RELIEF WHICH THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE.
[ XX ]

Respectfully submitted,
AGENTS FOR THE RESPONDENTS
[ XXI ]

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22R

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

NALSAR UNHCR PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF PEMOLA

THE STATE OF BOLIRIA & REPUBLIC OF MAKONDA

MEMORIAL FOR RESPONDENTS

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

ISSUE I: BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA HAVE CONFORMED WITH ALL

A. BOTH THE COUNTRIES HAVE CONFORMED WITH ALL THE OBLIGATIONS

1. BOLIRIA HAS CONFORMED WITH ALL THE OBLIGATIONS.......................................1

2. MAKONDA HAS CONFORMED WITH ALL THE OBLIGATIONS................................2

B. RIGHT OF ASYLUM IS A RIGHT OF A STATE, RATHER THAN RIGHT OF AN

ISSUE II: BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS &

A. BOLIRIA’S MEASURES OF CESSATION OF REFUGEE STATUS DOES NOT VIOLATE

1. THE REQUIRED CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE CEASED TO EXIST....................................4

B. MAKONDA’S MEASURES ARE NOT IN VIOLATION OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER

1. THE SECURITY MEASURES OF MAKONDA CANNOT BE CLASSIFIED AS

a. Responding to Persons in Distress at Sea does not amount to Interdiction....7

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

b. Assuming arguendo that Makonda’s measures amount to Interdiction, they

2. THE MEASURES UNDERTAKEN BY MAKONDA DO NOT AMOUNT TO REFOULEMENT

3. THE ‘FIRST COUNTRY OF ASYLUM’ APPLIES.........................................................9

ISSUE III: BOLIRIA AND MAKONDA DO NOT HAVE AN ERGA OMNES

A. THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-REFOULEMENT DOES NOT FULFIL THE CRITERIA......11

1. LACK OF COMMON INTEREST...............................................................................11

2. LACK OF LEGAL INTEREST...................................................................................12

B. ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY CANNOT SETTLE THE QUESTION.........13

C. EVEN IF THERE EXISTS AN OBLIGATION, IT CANNOT BE INVOKED......................13

ISSUE IV: THERE IS NO SITUATION OF STATELESSNESS THAT ARISES AND

A. OKUZAN PEOPLE ARE NOT STATELESS................................................................14

1. MAYZAN HAS JUS SOLI CITIZENSHIP LAW.............................................................14

2. MAYZAN HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE CITIZENSHIP DOCUMENTATION TO THE

B. COUNTRIES ARE NOT A PARTY TO THE RELEVANT TREATY AND PREVENTION

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

SR. NO. ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,

Convention on the Elimination of All

9. CIL Customary International Law

10. CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989

11. Ed. Edition

12. HRC Human Rights Commission

13. ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

14. ICJ International Court of Justice

15. ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

16. IHL International Humanitarian Law

17. ILC International Law Commission

18. MoU Memorandum of Understanding

19. p. Page number

20. para. Paragraph

21. Respondents Boliria and Makonda

22. UN Charter United Nations Charter

23. UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

24. UNGAR United Nations General Assembly Resolution

26. VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969

NALSAR UNHCR P UBLIC INTERNATIONAL L AW MOOT COURT COMPETITION , 2021

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Dec. 13 1975, 989 U.N.T.S.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights preamble, 16 December

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Conclusions on

1. A. v. Australia, (1997) 5 IHRR 78. 16

2. Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, App no. 30471/08 (ECHR 2009). 15

Ali Aqsar Bakhtiyari and Roqaiha Bakhtiyari v. Australia, (2003) 11 IHRR