27R Final

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION]
TC – 27R
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024
BEFORE THE GREATER AVENGERS COURT OF
JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(CASE CONCERNING THE REFUGEE STATUS OF KAROL DENVERS, NATASHA ROMANOFF,

AND PETER QUILL IN THE STATE OF WAKANDA)
IN THE MATTER OF:
KAROL DENVERS, NATASHA ROMANOFF, AND PETER QUILL.............................

APPLICANTS
VERSUS
THE STATE OF WAKANDA....,,,,.............................................................................

RESPONDENT
(FILED UNDER THE ARTICLE 2 OF THE ACIJ)
MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT
16TH NALSAR JUSTICE B.R. SAWHNEY MCC, 2023 PAGE | I

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [TABLE OF CONTENTS]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................... IV
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES.......................................................................................................... VI
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...............................................................................................XII
STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................... XIII
ISSUES RAISED.........................................................................................................................15
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS...................................................................................................XVI
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED...........................................................................................................1
I. KAROL DENVERS MAY BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE STATUS ASSESSED BY
WAKANDAN AUTHORITY AND WHETHER SHE MAY BE LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM
DEADPOOL ISLAND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.......................................................................1
A. KAROL DENVERS MAY BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE STATUS ASSESSED BY

WAKANDAN AUTHORITY..................................................................................................1
B. SHE MAY LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM DEADPOOL ISLAND...............................3
II. THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF BE

EXCLUDED AND SHE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT......................................................................................................................7
A. THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF SHOULD

BE EXCLUDED...................................................................................................................7
B. ROMANOFF SHOULDN’T ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF

NONREFOULMENT....................................................................................................19
III. PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS LAWFUL IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HE SHOULD NOT ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT....................................................................................................................22
A. WAKANDA CAN RIGHTFULLY DENY GRANTING ASYLUM UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW......................................................................................................22
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MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [TABLE OF CONTENTS]
B. WAKANDA HAS TAKEN EVERY MEASURE TO INITIATE THE GRANTING OF

ASYLUM...........................................................................................................................22
C. WAKANDA HAS THE RIGHT TO RIGHTFULLY DENY ASYLUM UNDER

INTERNATIONAL LAW......................................................................................................23
D. CLIMATE CHANGE IS NOT A VALID GROUND TO CLAIM REFUGEE STATUS.. .24
E. THE CONDITION OF PETER QUILL WAS NOT DUE TO HIS “MEMBERSHIP IN A

PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP”.......................................................................................25
F. THE REFUGEE CONVENTION REQUIRES AN IDENTIFIABLE, HUMAN ACTOR TO

CAUSE THE HARM..........................................................................................................26
PRAYER..............................................................................................................................XXVIII
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | III
MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS]
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS
SR. NO. ABBREVIATION EXPANSION
1. ¶ Paragraph
2. & and
3. % percent
4. Applicant Pemola
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

5. ARSIWA
Wrongful Acts
6. Art. Article
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,

7. CAT
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
Convention on the Elimination of All

8. CEDAW
Forms of Discrimination against Women
9. CIL Customary International Law
10. CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989
11. Ed. Edition
12. HRC Human Rights Commission
13. ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
14. ICJ International Court of Justice
15. ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia
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MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS]
16. IHL International Humanitarian Law
17. ILC International Law Commission
18. MoU Memorandum of Understanding
19. p. Page number
20. para. Paragraph
21. Respondents Boliria and Makonda
22. UN Charter United Nations Charter
23. UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
24. UNGAR United Nations General Assembly Resolution
25. v. Versus
26. VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | V

MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [STATEMENT OF
JURISDICTION]
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AND RULES
Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 SCR 39

593
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered passim
into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention)
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered 40
into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) art 1
into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) art 1(A).
into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) art. 33(1)
into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention).
Hague Convention IV, (adopted 18 December 1907, entered into force 26 28
January 1910) art 23
Huicochea Gomez v. INS, 237 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2001). 39
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 39
1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (‘ICCPR’), art 7; UN
Human Rights Committee (HRC)
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (entered into 18
force on 3 January 1976) art 1
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985) 39
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (adopted December. 19
26, 1933) 165 L.N.T.S. 19
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 26
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 609
(Protocol I) art 48
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JURISDICTION]
(adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 609
(Protocol I).
(Protocol I) (8 June 1977
UNHCR, 'Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 16
Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol'(February 2019) UN
Doc HCR/1P/4/ENG/RE
Vahe Salibian v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Canada, (1990), 39
113 N.R. 123 (FCA).
X v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [1981] F.C.J. No. 1013, 59 C.P.R. 39
(2d) 7
CASES
Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689 22

Chan v. Canada [1995] 3 SCR 593 39
Huicochea Gomez v. INS, [2001] 237 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2001) 39
Ioane Teitiota v Chief Ex ec. of the Ministn of Bus., Innovation & Emp 't 40
[2013] NZHC 3125
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 17
United States of America) (Merits) < https://www.icj-cij.org/case/70 >
accessed 28 November 2023
Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2005] 2 SCR 28
100
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 32
SCR 982
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47 34
T v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 2 All ER 865 30
United States v. Geiser, [2008] 527 F.3d 288, 294-95 38
Vahe Salibian v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Canada [1990] 39
113 N.R. 123
X v. Canada [1981] F.C.J. No. 1013, 59 39
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | VII
JURISDICTION]
OTHER AUTHORITIES
ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 37

(2nd ed. Chatham House 1972)
Ian Martin, Foreword to DANIELE JOLY ET AL., REFUGEES: ASYLUM IN 37
EUROPE? (Minority Rights Publications 1992).
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE ‘S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 37
502 (8th ed. Oxford University Press)
Persecution, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) 38
UNHCR ‘ RLD2 - Determination of Refugee Status, RLD2’ (Jan. 1, 1989) 36
UNHCR ‘Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and 36
Stateless Persons, Draft Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Report
of the Style Committee’ A/CONF.2/102/Add.2
UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 5: Application of the 26
Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees’ (September 2003) UN Doc HCR/GIP/03/05.
UNHCR, ‘HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR 38
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES’
UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non- 24

Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol
<https://www.unhcr.org/fr-fr/en/media/advisory-opinion-extraterritorial-
application-non-refoulement-obligations-under-1951-0> accessed 27
November 2023
UNHCR, Guidance Note on Extradition and International Refugee Protection, 23
(April 2008)
UNHCR, 'Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion 31
Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugee'
(HCR/GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003)
UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee 23, 24
Status and Guidelines on International Protection under the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Reissued, Geneva,
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | VIII
JURISDICTION]
February 2019) [hereinafter UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria

for Determining Refugee Status ]
UNHCR,’ Guidelines on International Protection No. 7: The Application of 38
Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons At Risk of Being
Trafficked, p. 6, HCR/GIP/06/07(Apr. 7, 2006)’
UNHCR‘UNHCR Intervention before the Supreme Court of Canada in the 34
case of Manickavasagam Suresh (Appellant) and the Minister of Citizenship
and Immigration, the Attorney General of Canada (Respondents)’, (8 March
2001),<: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3e71bbe24.html> accessed 2
December 2023
United Nations, 'Chapter I: Purposes and Principles' < 31
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1> (accessed 2 December
2023)
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA 36
Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 5
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA 37
Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art. 14(1)
BOOKS
Article 1 of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law at its 36

Bath Session, 50 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Supplement
(1951).
Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) 38
Cathryn Costello, Michelle Foster, and Jane, The Oxford Handbook of 23
International Refugee Law, (03 August 2021)
Christian Tomuschat, A Right to Asylum in Europe, 13 HUM. RTS. L. J. 257, 37
258 (1992).
David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of 37
Bohemia, 138 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1247 (1990).
David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of 37
Bohemia, 138 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1247 (1990).;
Christian Tomuschat, A Right to Asylum in Europe, 13 HUM. RTS. L. J. 257,
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | IX

JURISDICTION]
258 (1992)
Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, (first published 2014) 37
Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum,26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 327 (1949). 37
Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951, ( first 34
published 1963; re-published by the Department of International Protection in
October 1997) 235–6
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL 36
LAW (3rd ed. Oxford University Press 2007)
Hambro, Edvard. ‘New Trends in the Law of Extradition and Asylum. The 36
Western Political Quarterly’ (1952), <https://doi.org/10.2307/442548>.
Accessed 2 December 2023
Ian Martin, Foreword to DANIELE JOLY ET AL., REFUGEES: ASYLUM IN 37
EUROPE? (Minority Rights Publications 1992)
James A Green, “Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the 17
Use of Force” (2011) < https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol32/iss2/>
accessed 1 December 2023
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE ‘S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 37
502 (8th ed. Oxford University Press); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2nd ed. Chatham House 1972)
Roman Boed, The State Of The Right Of Asylum In International (first 37
published 1994) < https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol5/iss1 > accessed
3 December 2023
Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Art. 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary 17
Law and Practice (2010) 3-4
S. Prakash Sinha, An Anthropocentric View of Asylum in International Law, 10 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 78 (1971)
S. Prakash Sinha, An Anthropocentric View of Asylum in International Law, 10 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 78 (1971).
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, 'The Scope and Content of the 35
Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion'
UN RESOLUTION
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | X

JURISDICTION]
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), RLD2 - Determination of 36

Refugee Status, RLD2 (Jan. 1, 1989).
UNGA Res 2625 (1970) 19
ARTICLES
Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of 19

independence in respect of Kosovo (Overview)
<https://www.icj-cij.org/case/141 > accessed 25 November 2023
Sir John Beddington ‘Gov't Office for Sci., London, Final Project Report, tn 41
FORESIGHT: MIGRATION AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT’
(2011),<https://www.gov.uk/government/ uploads/system/uploads/attachment
data/file/287717/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmentalchange.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/K35A-HTRQ> accessed 3 December 2023
Persecution, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 38
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International 38
Protection No. 7: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention
and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of
Trafficking and Persons At Risk of Being Trafficked, p. 6,
HCR/GIP/06/07(Apr. 7, 2006).
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES [UNHCR], 38
HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE
1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, p. 21 ¶51 (Dec.
2011).
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | XI

JURISDICTION]
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
It is hereinafter most respectfully submitted that the Parties have submitted the questions
contained in the Special Agreement that is Avengers’ Convention on International Justice and
Human Rights 2010 (ACIJ) .
Therefore, pursuant to Art. 2 of the ACIJ1 this Hon’ble Court has jurisdiction over the
present case.
1
Fact Pattern (51)
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MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [STATEMENT OF FACTS]
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND OF AVENGER ARCHIPELAGO
1. The Avengers Archipelago, comprising the Federal Republic of Wakanda, the Socialist
State of Talokan, and the Principality of Sokovia, faces a complex geopolitical landscape
shaped by historical conflicts and colonial influences. Wakanda, the largest state, boasts a
powerful economy and military but faces criticism for its human rights policies. Talokan,
with its nuclear capabilities, is known for providing refuge to persecuted people.
Sokovia, ruled by the Kang dynasty, excels in technology and weapons trade but faces
scrutiny for its human rights record. The archipelago's history involves Chitauri and Kree
colonization, with ongoing tensions and alliances shaping its current state of affairs.
PLIGHT OF KAROL DENVERS
2. Karol Denvers, a Wakandan Kree activist, faced persecution in Wakanda for protesting
the de-Kreefication policy. Her brother, Kris Denvers, was imprisoned, and her younger
brother, Kevin, was lynched in 2018. Despite arrests and harassment, Karol was released
through presidential clemency. Seeking asylum, she escaped to Deadpool Island in 2019.
Facing extradition demands from Wakanda, Talokan granted her asylum, sparking
tensions. Wakanda threatened invasion, leading to Karol's arrest in 2022. Legal
challenges ensued, with Deadpool Island and Wakandan courts rejecting her claims.
Before the Wakandan Supreme Court, Karol argued against the annexation of Deadpool
Island, demanded humane treatment as a refugee, and contested improper asylum
evaluation. The court rejected her appeal, intensifying the complex legal and geopolitical
situation surrounding Karol Denvers. And therefore the Karol Denvers filed complain in
GACJ (Greater Avengers Court of Justice).
PLIGHT OF COMMANDER ROMANOFF
3. In the tumultuous aftermath of the Ravengers incident, tensions escalate between

Wakanda and Talokan, with Deadpool Island at the center of a brewing conflict. The
Talokan authority reinforces its military presence on Deadpool Island, seeking naval
support from Prince Kang XIV. A fierce battle unfolds as Talokan and Sokovian naval
forces, led by Commander Natasha Romanoff, liberate Ravengers Island. However, the
destruction of a Wakandan nuclear-powered ship by Commander Romanoff sparks
international outrage, leading to an arrest warrant for ecocide issued by Chitauria. Facing
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | XIII
MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [STATEMENT OF FACTS]
extradition threats from both Chitauria and Sokovia, Commander Romanoff seeks
asylum, only to be arrested by Wakanda. The Wakandan Supreme Court rejects her
asylum plea, setting the stage for a complex legal and geopolitical entanglement.
4. As the situation unfolds, Commander Romanoff challenges the decision before the
Wakandan Supreme Court, raising issues of the recognition of ecocide, justifiability of
SS T'Challa's destruction, and the validity of Sokovian charges. Despite her pleas, the
court rejects her application, emphasizing the need for Wakanda to address the
allegations of war crimes first. This decision intensifies the complexity surrounding
Commander Romanoff's fate, as she faces the prospect of extradition to Chitauria and
Sokovia while grappling with the intricacies of international law.
PLIGHT OF PETER QUILL
5. The aftermath of the Ravengers Island incident unfolds as Peter Quill, a last inhabitant of
Ravagers Island, seeks asylum, highlighting the environmental devastation caused by the
destruction of SS T’Challa, which caused the Nuclear disaster and which even caused the
Nuclear Radiation which lead to the death of Peter Quill’s son. Despite facing rejection
from Wolverine Island authorities, Peter contends that climate change should be
recognized as a valid refugee admission ground.
6. The Wakandan Supreme Court, however, dismisses his claims, emphasizing the absence
of such recognition in Wakandan refugee laws and excluding eco-piracy as grounds for
asylum. Dissatisfied, Peter, along with two other defendants, turns to the Greater
Avengers Court of Justice and Human Rights, invoking the regional jurisdiction
established by the Avengers' Convention on International Justice and Human Rights. The
case reflects the intersection of environmental concerns, refugee status, and piracy
accusations in the evolving legal landscape of the Avengers Archipelago.
7. Dissatisfied with the Wakandan Supreme Court rulings, Karol Denvers, Natasha
Romanoff and Peter Quill, collectively filed complaints before the Greater Avengers
Court of Justice and Human Rights (GACJ). Established in 2015 through the Avengers'
Convention on International Justice and Human Rights, the GACJ holds jurisdiction over
the grievances, involving the ratified states of Wakanda, Sokovia, and Talokan.
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | XIV
MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [ISSUES RAISED]
ISSUES RAISED
ISSUE I
WHETHER KAROL DENVERS MAY BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE STATUS ASSESSED BY

DEADPOOL ISLAND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.
ISSUE II
WHETHER THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF BE

EXCLUDED AND WHETHER SHE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT.
ISSUE III
WHETHER PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS LAWFUL IN INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND WHETHER HE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT.
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MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [ISSUES RAISED]
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | XVI
MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

WAKANDAN AUTHORITY AND WHETHER SHE MAY BE LAWFULLY REMOVED
FROM DEADPOOL ISLAND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The respondent submits that Karol Denver should be stripped of refugee status because the
applicant is a fugitive from justice. It is respectfully submitted that according to the travaux
préparatoires, serious transgressions before entry should bar an applicant from refugee status
and further the exception of Article 1F(b) of the 1951 convention will be applied in this case.
Furthermore, she should be lawfully removed from Deadpool Island as the use of force
against Deadpool Island was a lawful act of self-defense under the UN Charter. The
annexation of Deadpool Island was lawful as was done by the inherent right of self-
determination, and because of that Deadpool Island has achieved statehood.
II. THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF BE

EXCLUDED AND SHE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT.
It is submitted that the refugee application of Commander Natasha Romanoff be excluded as

Romanoff is not a refugee as per the 1951 convention. This was so as firstly no persecution,
secondly, fear of persecution does not amount to persecution, thirdly applicant is a fugitive
from justice
Additionally, even if she satisfies the criterion of being a refugee, she falls under the
exceptions under 1(f), as she committed a serious non-political crime, and the act she
committed was against the object and purpose of the United Nations
And lastly, Romanoff shouldn’t enjoy the protection of non-refoulment as she is Not a
refugee within the meaning of the 1951 convention read with additional protocol. And even if
applicant is considered a refugee the non-refoulment does not apply in her case.
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MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS]
III. PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS LAWFUL IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HE SHOULD NOT ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF
NON-REFOULEMENT
Peter Quill’s deprivation of refugee status is not unlawful in international law as that Climate
Change is not a recognized refugee status admission ground in international law. Firstly, as
Wakanda as confined with all the obligations, secondly there is no well-found fear of
Persecution, thirdly he does not have membership in a particular social group and lastly the
refugee convention requires an identifiable human actor to cause harm
And lastly there are five protected grounds under which the refugee status could be granted
and Peter Quill does not fulfil even one ground.
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MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [ARGUMENTS ADVANCED]
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

DEADPOOL ISLAND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. KAROL DENVERS MAY BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE STATUS ASSESSED BY

WAKANDAN AUTHORITY.
i. The Applicant is a fugitive from Justice.
[¶1.] It is most respectfully submitted that as per the UNHCR Guidance Note On
Extradition And International Refugee Protection, in examining whether an asylum-seeker
whose extradition has been requested by the authorities of his or her country of origin
qualifies for refugee status, the asylum authorities need to assess whether the individual
concerned is seeking to escape legitimate prosecution or punishment for criminal acts, rather
than persecution, in that country2.
[¶2.] If it is found that an applicant is a fugitive from justice rather than fleeing persecution,
he or she would not meet the refugee definition set out in Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention3 and his or her claim should be rejected.
[¶3.] It is further submitted that persecution must be differentiated from punishment for a
common law offence. Persons fleeing from prosecution or punishment for such an offence are
not normally refugees. It is established that a refugee is a victim or potential victim of
injustice, not a fugitive from justice as per the UNHCR handbook4.
[¶4.] It is most humbly submitted that in the instant case, the applicant is a fugitive from
justice rather than a legitimate asylum seeker. This is due to the fact that as established above,
2
UNHCR, Guidance Note on Extradition and International Refugee Protection, (April 2008
3
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention)
4
UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status and Guidelines on
International Protection under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Reissued, Geneva, February 2019) [hereinafter UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status ]
4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | 1

the applicant had no fear of persecution at the hands of his state of origin. The pardon given
by the president is in the hand of the state and the state did allow the parson. It can be said for
that reason that she was rather trying to escape legitimate prosecution and punishment for her
criminal acts.
[¶5.] Therefore, the applicant by the reason of being a fugitive from justice, doesn’t meet
the refugee definition set out in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and her claim should
be rejected.
ii. Against the travaux préparatoires
[¶6.] It is respectfully submitted that according to the travaux préparatoires, serious

transgressions prior to entry should bar an applicant from refugee status, and that no one who
had committed crimes should escape prosecution through obtaining refugee status5.
[¶7.] Therefore, if the applicant is granted refugee status, it would go against the legislative
intent of the convention and the travaux préparatoires which bar an applicant from seeking
refugee status on account of serious transgressions before entry. In the instant case as well,
the applicant engaged in the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ecocide
which preclude him from seeking the benefit of being granted a refugee status.
iii. (II) 1F(b) of the 1951 convention will be applied in this case
[¶8.] If the threat of persecution is less severe, consideration of the type of crime or crimes
assumed to have been committed will be required to determine whether the applicant is truly
a runaway from the law or whether his criminal record does not outweigh his status as a
legitimate refugee. It also matters if the petitioner was found guilty of a major non-political
crime and has already completed his term, received a pardon, or been given amnesty. In the
second instance, unless it can be demonstrated that the applicant's criminal character still
predominates despite the pardon or amnesty, there is an assumption that the exclusion clause
is no longer applicable.6
[¶9.] In this case, the Applicant’s Criminal character predominates her fear of getting
persecuted. It is to submit before the honorable court that the petitioner was arrested twice
after protesting the inaction of law enforcement and she was given presidential clemency
which is entirely a state’s discretion. She was kept under surveillance and she was asked to
5
Cathryn Costello, Michelle Foster, and Jane, The Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law, (03 August
2021)
6
UNHCR, 'Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention
and the 1967 Protocol'(February 2019) UN Doc HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV

come to the police station only twice a month from which she ran away. From this fact, it can
be said that she was a fugitive from justice rather than persecution as there was no fear of
persecution but rather it is established how there was fear of punishment
B. SHE MAY LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM DEADPOOL ISLAND.
[¶10.] Karol Denvers can be arrested and removed from Deadpool Island as no one can be a
refugee in one’s own country. The annexation done by Wakanda of Deadpool Island was
valid because firstly, the use of force against Deadpool Island is justified in pursuance of the
exercise of self-defence. Secondly, Deadpool Island is now a sovereign of Wakanda as
Deadpool Island’s representative exercised its inherent right to self-determination. Thirdly,
Deadpool Island has achieved the status of statehood so it can enter into international
relations with Wakanda.
i. The use of force against Deadpool island were lawful act of self-defense
under the UN Charter.
[¶11.] The prohibition against the use of force is not absolute 7. International law permits
States to use force through the exercise of their right of self-defence under Art.51 of the UN
Charter8.
[¶12.] Use of force on the Deadpool island are justified in pursuance of exercise of self-
defence, being a necessary and proportionate response to the attack of of Talokan on the
military of Wakanda9. Furthermore, the Respondent submits that Wakanda's failure to report
its action to the Security Council does not estop it from asserting self-defence. Reporting is
merely a procedural mechanism for monitoring compliance with Charter commitments. 10

Article 51 preserves the right to use force in self-defence “if an armed attack occurs”, until
the Council has taken the necessary measures. On one view, the right is confined to
circumstances in which an actual armed attack has commenced.
7
James A Green, “Questioning the Peremptory Status of the Prohibition of the Use of Force” (2011) <
https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol32/iss2/> accessed 1 December 2023
8
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America)
(Merits) < https://www.icj-cij.org/case/70 > accessed 28 November 2023
9
ibid
10
Ruys, ‘Armed Attack’ and Art. 51 of the UN Charter: Evolutions in Customary Law and Practice (2010) 3-4

ii. Use of force by Talokan on the Miltary of Wakanda Constitute An Armed

Attack.
[¶13.] Destruction of property and loss of life has been recognized as constituting an armed
attack in international law11. In determining the existence of an armed attack, the following
are to be considered; first the scale of attacks and second its effects in terms of damage or
casualties as relevant variables12. Wakanda had established a temporary military base in

Ravengers Island with the permission of Ravengers Island which is an island which was
controlled by the Ravengers pirate. (
[¶14.] During the attack on Revengers Island, Talokan destroyed all Wakandan vessels and
took 100 Wakandan personnel as prisoners of war. According to Article 51, an armed attack
not only includes an attack on the territory of a state but also on its armed forces or embassies
abroad. Therefore, an 'armed attack' refers to an intentional intervention or attack on another
state without that state's consent or subsequent acquiescence, which is not legally justified.
Since Talokan attacked Wakanda's military force and destroyed its property, it falls under
Article 51, which preserves the right to use force in self-defence "if an armed attack occurs."
In this case, Talokan attacked Wakanda's military forces out of fear of an immediate
Wakandan attack. Talokan not only attacked the armed forces of Wakanda but has also
intervened into the territory of Ravengers island.
iii. The Annexation is lawful as was done by the Inherent Right of Self
Determination.
[¶15.] The purposes of the UN are set out in Article 1 of the Charter which states the
principles of equal rights and self-determination of people. In 1966, the right of all peoples to
self-determination was also enshrined in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR). Article 1, common to both covenants, reads: ‘All peoples have the right to self-
determination. By that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development’13.
11
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Iran v. United States of America) [1980 ] I.C.J.
12
Ruys (n 6) 41
13
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (entered into force on 3 January 1976) art 1

[¶16.] Self-determination ‘should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the
territory’s peoples acting with the full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes
having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted
and based on universal adult suffrage’.14In this particular case, General Thomas clearly stated
his thoughts of making Deadpool Island a part of Wakanda after which the people of
Deadpool Island through its elections elected a government. A government elected by the
votes of the people are regarded as the representative of the people and has the right of
involving the country on behalf of its population in foreign relations.
[¶17.] Human Rights Committee takes the view, as Professor Higgins. noted that ‘external
self-determination requires a state to take action in its foreign policy consistent with the
attainment of self-determination in the remaining areas of colonial or racist occupation 15.
[¶18.] The Deadpool island was annexed by Talokan by use of force in the 1980s. The local
rulers of Deadpool Island, despite the dissatisfaction of the majority population of Wakandan
origin, showed allegiance to the Talokan authority. Deadpool Island was subsequently
annexed to Talokan. Here, there was dissatisfaction from the majority of the population which
were Wakandan in origin .The occupation done by Talokan force in the year 1835 was
colonial. The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations referred to the colonial situation and noted that subjection of peoples to alien
subjugation, domination and exploitation constituted a violation of the principle.16
[¶19.] A peaceful referendum, held as a last resort, is a lawful way for a people to realize its
right to external self-determination. The Kosovo Advisory Opinion demonstrates that
declarations of independence are not per se prohibited under international law and such
declarations have been recognized in instances including the breakup of the former
Yugoslavia.17
[¶20.] Here, the people of Deadpool Island pursued their right to external self-determination
through peaceful secession.
14
UNGA Res 1541 (1960)
15
Higgins, Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in Brölmann et al., Peoples and Minorities in
International Law (first published August 2009) 31
16
UNGA Res 2625 (1970)
17
Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo
(Overview) <https://www.icj-cij.org/case/141 > accessed 25 November 2023

iv. Deadpool Island has achieved statehood.
[¶21.] The Montevideo Convention, codifies the declaratory theory of statehood.Under this
theory, the four criteria for statehood are: (1) a permanent population, (2) a defined territory,
(3) government, and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states.18
[¶22.] Notably, Article 3 of the Montevideo Convention specifies that the fact of statehood is
independent of recognition by other states. Deadpool island satisfied these four requirements.
a. The people of Deadpool island has a permanent population
[¶23.] The people of Deadpool island have long been the population of the island. The island
consist of a majority of wakandan people and the rest is the talokan population.
b. Deadpool island has a defined territory.
[¶24.] There is no dispute that Deadpool island forms a distinct and definitive territory.
There is a definitive separate territory of the Deadpool island which satisfies the second
condition.
c. The government established was an effective government.
[¶25.] The government established by the people of Deadpool island through its election. An
effective government consists of a centralized legislative and administrative organ that (1)
has the power to enforce commands over its territory and (2) does not share this power with
anybody else. Both the criteria are fulfilled by the government of Deadpool island. The
government was unrivalled in its authority. It faced no resistance from the local population.
d. Deadpool Island had the capacity to enter into relations with other states.
[¶26.] Lastly, a state must have the capacity to enter into relations with other states. The
Deadpool island demonstrated its ability to enter into relations with other states, namely with
Wakanda.
[¶27.] This is to respectfully submit before this honourable court that by the above-stated
arguments, it is thus clear that Deadpool Island is now a Part of the Wakanda territory. The
Annexation of Deadpool Island is hence valid. According to international law, no person can
be a refugee in one’s own country so by this principle Karol Denver (I) cannot be a refugee in
Deadpool island (ii) She can be arrested from Deadpool island on the grounds of sedition that
she committed in 2019.
18
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States (adopted December. 26, 1933) 165 L.N.T.S. 19

II. ISSUE II- THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF

BE EXCLUDED AND SHE SHOULD AT LEAST ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT.
A. THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF

SHOULD BE EXCLUDED.
[¶28.] The Refugee Application should be excluded because, firstly, Romanoff is not a
refugee as per the 1951 Convention [A]; Secondly, even if she satisfies the criterion of being
a refugee, she falls under the exceptions under 1(F).
i. Romanoff is not a refugee as per the 1951 Convention
[¶29.] The 1951 Refugee Convention, supplemented by its 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee
as a person who, "owing to a well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country”19.
[¶30.] It is most respectfully submitted that the applicant falls short of satisfying the
requisite conditions to be recognised as a refugee in light of the above mentioned definition
because: Firstly, the applicant doesn’t have any danger of being persecuted and Secondly, the
applicant doesn’t have a well-grounded fear which shall be explained as follows:
ii. The applicant doesn’t have any danger of being persecuted
[¶31.] It is most humbly submitted that in the present matter, the applicant is not in fear of
persecution as she merely escaping the legitimate prosecution under law and not persecution.
This renders him a fugitive from justice rather than a legitimate refugee. Therefore, granting
19
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) art 1(A).

him the protection of the refugee law would be against the objectives, principles and
legislative intent of the 1951 refugee convention and its additional protocol.
iii. Mere fear of prosecution doesn’t amount to prosecution
[¶32.] The respondent humbly submits that as per the UNHCR training module on
determination of refugee status, if the prosecution concerns a punishable act committed out of
political motives, and if the anticipated punishment is in conformity with the general law of
the country concerned, fear of prosecution will not in itself make the applicant a refugee.
[¶33.] It is further submitted that holding political opinions different from those of the
Government is not in itself a ground for claiming refugee status, and an applicant must show
that he has a fear of persecution for holding such opinions as per the UNHCR handbook
[¶34.] It is possible for an individual, having no well-founded fear of being persecuted, to
deliberately and cynically set about creating circumstances exclusively for the purpose of
subsequently justifying a claim to refugee status. To protect the system from those who would
seek, in a sur place situation, to manipulate circumstances merely to achieve the advantages
which recognition as a refugee confers, the Authority has interpreted the Refugee Convention
as requiring, implicitly, good faith on the part of the refugee claimant.
[¶35.] The claimant must provide clear and convincing confirmation of a state’s inability to
protect absent an admission by the national’s state of its inability to protect that national.
Except in situations of complete breakdown of the state apparatus, it should be assumed that
the state is capable of protecting a claimant. The persecution must be real and the
presumption cannot be built on fictional events20.
[¶36.] It is most respectfully put forth that the applicant held political opinion different than
that of his country of origin, i.e., Sokovia. This ipso facto doesn’t give him the status of a
refugee. He should further prove that on account of his political views, she had the fear of
being persecuted. However, in the instant case, the applicant had committed a political
offence by expressing political opinion against the King and she merely feared prosecution in
line with the general law of the country.
[¶37.] It is further submitted that as against Chitaura as well, the applicant committed the
offence of Ecocide for which she feared prosecution under the universal criminal jurisdiction
adopted by Chitaura. There was no fear of persecution but merely of prosecution under the
legitimate law.
20
Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689

[¶38.] It is further submitted that the actions of the applicant lacked good faith. She
represented her country of origin in an armed conflict, enjoyed a superior position in the
armed forces and thus was under no fear of persecution from it. But she deliberately and
maliciously created circumstances exclusively to avail the benefits available to a refugee.
Thus, her acts lacked good faith, an essential to claim refugee status.
[¶39.] Finally, the applicant’s case falls short of the refugee status as she has not put forth
any convincing and conclusive evidence that the protective bond between her and her state of
origin has broken. In absence of that, it is to be presumed that her state of origin is capable of
protecting her interests and that the case of the applicant is based on mere surmises and
conjectures and fictional thoughts.
iv. The applicant is a fugitive from justice
[¶40.] It is most respectfully submitted that as per the UNHCR Guidance Note On
Extradition And International Refugee Protection, in examining whether an asylum-seeker
whose extradition has been requested by the authorities of his or her country of origin
qualifies for refugee status, the asylum authorities need to assess whether the individual
concerned is seeking to escape legitimate prosecution or punishment for criminal acts, rather
than persecution, in that country21.
[¶41.] Ifit is found that an applicant is a fugitive from justice rather than fleeing persecution,
he or she would not meet the refugee definition set out in Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and his or her claim should be rejected.
[¶42.] It isfurther submitted that persecution must be differentiated from punishment for a
common law offence. Persons fleeing from prosecution or punishment for such an offence are
not normally refugees. It is established that a refugee is a victimor potential victim of
injustice, not a fugitive from justice as per the UNHCR handbook22.
[¶43.] It is most humbly submitted that in the instant case, the applicant is a fugitive from
justice rather than a legitimate asylum seeker. This is due to the fact that as established above,
the applicant had no fear of persecution at the hands of his state of origin. Rather she is trying
to escape legitimate prosecution and punishment for her criminal acts.
21
UNHCR, Guidance Note on Extradition and International Refugee Protection, (April 2008)
22

[¶44.] Therefore, the applicant by the reason of being a fugitive from justice, doesn’t meet
the refugee definition set out in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and her claim should
be rejected.
v. Against the travaux préparatoires
[¶45.] It is respectfully submitted that according to the travaux préparatoires, serious

transgressions prior to entry should bar an applicant from refugee status, and that no one who
had committed crimes should escape prosecution through obtaining refugee status23
[¶46.] Therefore, if the applicant is granted refugee status, it would go against the legislative
intent of the convention and the travaux préparatoires which bar an applicant from seeking
refugee status on account of serious transgressions prior to entry. In the instant case as well,
the applicant engaged in the commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity, ecocide
which preclude him from seeking the benefit of being granted a refugee status.
vi. No-well-grounded fear.
[¶47.] The term “well-founded fear” therefore contains a subjective and an objective
element, and in determining whether well-founded fear exists, both elements must be taken
into consideration. An alien satisfies the subjective component by credibly testifying that she
genuinely fears persecution and that his continued stay in his
country of origin has become intolerable to him for the reasons stated in the definition, or
would for the same reasons be intolerable if he returned there. The objective component
requires a showing by credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record, of facts that would
support a reasonable fear of persecution24.
[¶48.] It is humbly submitted that the burden of proof lies on the person who makes the
assertion, in the case of refugee claims, on the asylum-seeker. This burden is discharged by
providing a truthful account of his/her background and personal experiences which have
given rise to the fear of persecution25.
23
Cathryn Costello, Michelle Foster, and Jane, The Oxford Handbook of International Refugee Law, (03 August
2021)
24
25
UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol

[¶49.] It is most respectfully submitted that in the instant case the applicant couldn’t satisfy
the subjective element of fear as can be assessed from her state of mind, her statements which
indicate that her sole concern was to save herself from the legitimate prosecution for the
crimes she committed rather than any fear of persecution. Further, the objective criterion of
the fear being “well founded” is also not fulfilled in light of the conditions prevailing in the
countries in which he alleges fear of persecution as neither in Chitauria nor in Sokovia, are
there conditions which raise a fear of persecution, deprivation of inherent human rights,
denial of life and liberty based on the grounds set out in the 1951 convention26.
[¶50.] It is further submitted that the applicant has failed to discharge his burden of proof as
neither did she satisfy the subjective criterion nor the objective criterion for determining fear.
She failed to satisfy the authorities as to the circumstances that could cause a legitimate fear
of persecution in her mind and also failed to bring about the situations prevailing on ground
which could have qualified her fear as “well founded”.
[¶51.] Therefore, in light of the arguments presented above, it can be concluded that the
applicant did not have any well-founded fear of persecution, in the absence of which she
cannot be granted the status of a Refugee under the 1951 convention read with the additional
protocol.
vii. Even if she satisfies the criterion of being a refugee, she falls under the
exception under the exceptions I(F).
[¶52.] It is most humbly submitted that under the Article 1(F)(a) of the refugee convention, a
person who has committed a crime against peace, a war crime, or a crime against humanity,
as defined in the international instruments drawn up to make provision in respect of such
crimes is precluded and he cannot avail the benefit of this convention read with the additional
protocol27.
[¶53.] The Rome Statute of ICC under Article 8 defines War crime as grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or
property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention: Wilfully
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health; Extensive destruction and
<https://www.unhcr.org/fr-fr/en/media/advisory-opinion-extraterritorial-application-non-refoulement-
obligations-under-1951-0> accessed 27 November 2023
26
27

appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly
[¶54.] It also includes other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely,
any of the following acts: intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as
such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities; intentionally directing
attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives;
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss
of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
[¶55.] It is further submitted that War crimes cover such acts as wilful killing and torture
of civilians, launching indiscriminate attacks on civilians, and wilfully depriving a civilian
or a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial as per UNHCR guidelines.28
[¶56.] It is submitted that as far as the civilian population is concerned during hostilities, the
basic rule sometimes termed the principle of distinction, formulated in article 48 of Protocol I
is that the parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between such population and
combatants and between civilian and military objectives and must direct their operations only
against military objectives. Military objectives are limited in article 52(2) to ‘those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances
ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage’29.
[¶57.] There is thus a principle of proportionality to be considered. Judge Higgins, for
example, in referring to this principle, noted that ‘even a legitimate target may not be attacked
if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportionate to the specific military gain
from the attack. while ensuring that, on the other, such objects or facilities are not used by
opposing military forces in an attempt to secure immunity from attack, with the inevitable
result that civilians may be endangered. Article 51 provides that the civilian population as
such, as well as individual civilians shall not be the object of attack. Article 57 provides that
28
UNHCR, ‘Guidelines on International Protection No. 5: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of
the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees’ (September 2003) UN Doc HCR/GIP/03/05.
29
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 609
(Protocol I).

in the conduct of military operations, ‘constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian
population, civilians and civilian objects’
[¶58.] Parties to the conflict are to distinguish between civilian objects and military
objectives30 .Military objectives are “those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or
use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction
offers a definite military advantage.”() Such advantage demands a concrete and perceptible
military advantage rather than a speculative one. Making civilians the objects of attack has
been specifically prohibited under AP I.
[¶59.] It is most respectfully submitted that as a former Director of Sokovian Naval
Intelligence, the applicant had conclusive knowledge of the nuclear-powered engine of SS
T’Challa and her objective was to destroy the Ravagers Island, not the SS T.Challa.
Therefore, it can be said that she could forsee the enormous damage to the civilian life that
could be posed by the destruction of SS T’Challa.
[¶60.] The deployment of SS T’Challa did not contribute to the military action, neither did it
offer a definite military advantage. Therefore, the attack on SS T’Challa, a nuclear powered
ship after having already destroyed all the Wakandan ships and establishing a military
advantage with the intention of causing killings of civilians had no military objective and
failed to meet the principle of distinction.
[¶61.] International Humanitarian Law mandates that the use of force must be proportional
with respect to the expected military advantage. It is most humbly submitted that the
destruction of SS T’Challacould not be justified on the grounds of neccessity and they were
in excess of direct and concrete military advantange. Further, no neccessary precautionary
measures were taken by the applicant during the air bombings and the same was in complete
violation of the precautionary principle.
[¶62.] Under the principle of military necessity, use of force by states is impermissible
unless “imperatively demanded by the necessities of war,” for which there is no equivalent
alternative. First, the destruction of SS T’Challa was not imperatively demanded by the
necessities of war as the applicant had already destroyed all the Wakandan ships and
established a clear military advantage by even taking in 100 prisoners of war . Therefore,
following the military advantage already established, the circumstances did not necessitate
the use of such force. Second, the reckless and indiscriminate manner in which the ship was
30
of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1979) 1125 UNTS 609
(Protocol I) art 48.

destroyed clearly indicate that no attempt was made on the part of the applicant to use less
destructive means even in the presence of civilian localities and the potential hazardous risk
posed by the destruction to the civilian population. This evidences that applicant did not abide
by the principle of proportionality.
[¶63.] It is respectfully submitted that Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulation stipulates that it
is especially prohibited to ‘employ arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause
unnecessary suffering’. It mandates that the use of force must be proportional with respect to
the expected military advantage31.
[¶64.] It is most humbly submitted that the destruction of SS T’Challa could not be justified
on the grounds of necessity and they were in excess of direct and concrete military advantage.
Further, no necessary precautionary measures were taken by Commander the applicant during
the air bombings and the same was in complete violation of the precautionary principle.
Therefore, the destruction of SS T’Challa was highly disproportionate and unnecessary to her
military objective.
[¶65.] The Court emphasised that the fundamental rules flowing from these principles bound
all states, whether or not they had ratified the Hague and Geneva Conventions, since they
constituted intransgressible principles of international customary law. At the heart of such
rules and principles lies the overriding consideration of humanity.
viii. Exception of 1(F)(b).
[¶66.] It is most respectfully submitted that under Article 1(F)(b) of the 1951 Convention, a
person is precluded from the protection of being a refugee if there are serious reasons for
considering that he has committed a serious non-political crime outside the country of refuge
prior to his admission to that country as a refugee32.
[¶67.]
It is further submitted that “reasonable grounds to believe” standard requires
something more than mere suspicion, but less than the standard applicable in civil matters of
proof on the balance of probabilities. Reasonable grounds will exist where there is an
objective basis for the belief which is based on compelling and credible information. They
require that the proscribed act take place in a particular context: a widespread or systematic
attack, usually violent, directed against any civilian population. The widespread or systematic
31
Hague Convention IV, (adopted 18 December 1907, entered into force 26 January 1910) art 23
32

nature of the attack will ultimately be determined by examining the means, methods,
resources and results of the attack upon a civilian population33
[¶68.] It is most humbly submitted that Chitauria has adopted the universal criminal
jurisdiction legislation to prosecute and punish international crimes, including ecocide. Its
definition of ecocide is a verbatim adoption of the proposition of the Stop Ecocide
International. According to Stop Ecocide International, ecocide means “unlawful or wanton
acts committed with knowledge that there is a substantial likelihood of severe and either
widespread or long-term damage to the environment being caused by those acts.”
[¶69.] It is further submitted that a parallel can be drawn between the definition of Stop
Ecocide International and the Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Convention which
under Article 35(3) provides that it is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare
which are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage
to the natural environment34. Further, Article 55 states that care is to be taken in warfare to
protect the natural environment against such damage, which may prejudice the health or
survival of the population, while noting also that attacks against the natural environment by
way of reprisals are prohibited. Under Article 56,attacks are also prohibited against works or
installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear generating
stations.
[¶70.] It is humbly submitted that the Rome Statute of ICC under Article 8, regards
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss
of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated as serious violations of the laws
and customs applicable in international armed conflict and thus, a war crime. It further
renders the acts violating the Geneva Convention as a “War crime”.
[¶71.] As per the International Committee for Red Cross, state practice establishes this rule
as a norm of customary international law applicable in international, and arguably also in
non-international, armed conflicts.significant practice has emerged to the effect that this
prohibition has become customary. This prohibition is set forth in many military manuals.
Causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the environment is an offence under the
33
Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2005] 2 SCR 100
34
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (8 June 1977)

legislation of numerous States. This practice includes that of States not, or not at the time,
party to Additional Protocol I35.
[¶72.] Other relevant practice includes condemnations of States not, or not at the time, party
to Additional Protocol I for their alleged “ecocide” or “massive destruction of the
environment” or for having violated Articles 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol I.The
prohibition on inflicting widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment
is also repeated in the Guidelines on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed
Conflict and the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin on observance by United Nations forces of
international humanitarian law.
[¶73.] It is submitted that by reading the Ecocide definition as provided by Stop Ecocide
International in consonance and in line with the aforementioned provisions of Geneva
Conventions, Additional Protocols to Geneva Conventions and the Rome Statute, it can be
concluded that Ecocide is a war crime under international law.
[¶74.] It is most respectfully submitted that a crime is a political crime for the purposes of
Article 1F of the 1951 Convention if it was committed for a political purpose and there was a
sufficiently close and direct link between the crime and the alleged political purpose. In
determining whether such a link existed, the court would consider the means used to achieve
the political end and, in particular, whether the crime was aimed at a military or governmental
target, or a civilian target, and in either event whether it was likely to involve the
indiscriminate killing or injuring of members of the public.36
[¶75.] Acts of violence which were likely to cause indiscriminate injury to innocent persons
who had no connection with the government of the state did not constitute political crimes for
the purposes of the 1951 Convention. Where no clear link exists between the crime and
its alleged political objective or when the act in question is disproportionate to the
alleged political objective, non-political motives are predominant.
[¶76.] It is most humbly submitted that the applicant had definite knowledge of the nuclear
powered engine of SS T’Challa. In spite of the potential enormous and hazardous risk posed
by the destruction of the ship, Commander destroyed it which caused long term and severe
damage to the natural environment. Many indigenous Ravengers lost their lives, and many
were exposed to nuclear radiation, the water became very contaminated, even the destruction
of SS T’Challa exposed children to nuclear radiation and they eventually died and most of the
35
International Humanitarian Law Databases, Rule 45.Causing Serious Damage to the Natural Environment <
https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule45 > accessed on 2 December 2023
36
T v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1996] 2 All ER 865

persons had to relocate themselves to other places because the life on Ravagers island had
become unbearable due to the severe environmental damage done by the criminal acts of the
applicant.
[¶77.] It is further submitted that the crime committed by the applicant was non-political in
nature because there was no direct nexus between the crime and any political objective
sought to be achieved, it was directed against a civilian object, it resulted in indiscriminate
killing of the innocent civilians and was also disproportionate to the objective sought to be
achieved.
[¶78.] Therefore, in light of the facts of the case, it can be concluded that there is a serious
reason to believe that the applicant has committed a serious non-political crime outside the
country in which she seeks asylum. Therefore, she is excluded from the protection of the
Refugee Convention 1951.
ix. Exception of 1(f)(c).
[¶79.] It is most respectfully submitted that under Article 1F(c) of the 1951 of the
convention, a person against whom there are serious reasons for believing that he has been
guilty of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations, he is not eligible
for protection of this convention37.
[¶80.] It is most humbly submitted that as per Article 1 of the UN charter, the purposes of
the UN are: To maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law,
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach
of the peace38.
[¶81.] It is further submitted that relevant principles of the UN are: All Members shall
refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.
[¶82.] As per the UNHCR guidelines: In general, individual responsibility flows from the
person having committed, or made a substantial contribution to the commission of the
37
38
United Nations, 'Chapter I: Purposes and Principles' < https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-1>
(accessed 2 December 2023)

criminal act, in the knowledge that his or her act or omission would facilitate the
criminal conduct. The individual need not physically have committed the criminal act in
question. Instigating, aiding and abetting and participating in a joint criminal enterprise
can suffice39.
[¶83.] The court must assess the status of the rule which has been violated. Where the rule
which has been violated is very near the core of the most valued principles of human rights
and is recognized as immediately subject to international condemnation and punishment, then
even an isolated violation could lead to an exclusion under Article 1F(c)40.
[¶84.] It is most humbly submitted that the acts of the applicant satisfy the ingredients of
subjecting her to the exclusion under Article 1(F)(c). As the commander of the Sokovian
Navy, she substantially contributed and aided the act which violated the purpose of UN
namely the maintenance of international peace and security by carrying out operation to
illegally occupy the lawful territory of Wakanda.
[¶85.] It is further submitted that the acts of the applicant also go against the principles of the
UN as she intentionally used force against the territorial independence and integrity of
Wakanda by invading Ravagers island. Further, the applicant has done committed war crimes
as established above which violated the very core and most valued human rights namely right
to life by causing indiscriminate suffering to civilians and causing irreparable damage to the
natural environment.
[¶86.] Therefore, the case of applicant falls under the exclusion criteria of Article 1(F)(c) of
the 1951 convention.
B. ROMANOFF SHOULDN’T ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF

NONREFOULMENT
i. Not a refugee within the meaning of 1951 convention read with additional
protocol.
[¶87.] It is most humbly submitted that the Article 33 of the 1951 convention provides that:
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever
to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his
39
UNHCR, 'Guidelines on International Protection: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugee' (HCR/GIP/03/05, 4 September 2003)
40
Pushpanathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982

race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” 41 It is

pertinent to note that for claiming the benefit of this provision, the person, firstly, a person
should be a “refugee” and secondly, there should be a threat to that person’s life on the
grounds mentioned above.
[¶88.] It is further submitted that the applicant cannot claim the benefit of non-refoulment
because firstly, he is not a refugee and secondly, doesn’t face any threat on the grounds
enumerated in the Article.
ii. The applicant is not a refugee
[¶89.] The 1951 Refugee Convention, supplemented by its 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee
as a person who, "owing to a well- founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such a fear, is unwilling to avail
himself of the protection of that country.” 42 It has already been established above that the
applicant couldn’t satisfy the essential ingredients for being a “refugee” within the meaning
of the 1951 convention read with its additional protocol.
[¶90.] Therefore, it can be concluded that the applicant had no threat to her life or freedom
on the grounds enumerated in the said article but merely feared legitimate prosecution for the
crimes she had committed and legitimate prosecution cannot be a ground for seeking refugee
status.
iii. Even if the applicant is considered a refugee, non- refoulement doesn’t
apply
[¶91.] It is most respectfully submitted even if the applicant is considered a refugee within
the meaning of the 1951 Convention, she cannot claim the benefit of non-refoulement
because there are serious grounds for considering that she is a threat to the security of the
country, i.e., Wakanda.
[¶92.] It is further submitted that Article 33 of the 1951 Convention provides that the benefit
of the provision of non-refoulment may not, however, be claimed by “a refugee whom there
are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is,
41
42

or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes
a danger to the community of that country.”43
[¶93.] In Rehman case, the House of Lords stated in effect that there was no specific
standard of proof which must be met when deciding whether a person is a danger to national
security: “There must be material on which proportionately and reasonably [the Secretary of
State] can conclude that there is a real possibility of activities harmful to national security but
he does not have to be satisfied, nor on appeal show, that all the material before him is
proved, and his conclusion is justified, to a “high civil degree of probability”44.”
[¶94.] It is most humbly submitted that UNHCR intervention before the Supreme Court of
Canada in the case of Manickavasagam Suresh and the Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration, the Attorney General of Canada, the UNHCR emphasized Article 31(1) of the
Vienna Convention provides that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of
its objects and purposes.”45Therefore, on a plain reading, article 33(2) requires that the
refugee must be “a danger to the security of the country in which he is”. Article 33(2) makes
no reference to the security of other countries or international security concerns generally.
[¶95.] It is further submitted that the UNHCR opined in order to trigger the article 33(2)
exception, the danger must be established to be very serious. AtleGrahl-Madsen, a leading
refugee law scholar, has stated with respect to article 33(2) that: “ ... the security of the
country is invoked against acts of a rather serious nature endangering directly or indirectly
the constitution, government, the territorial integrity, the independence, orthe external peace
of the country concerned.”
[¶96.] The travaux préparatoires make clear that the drafters were concerned only with
significant threats to national security. The nature of the concerns that led to the inclusion of
the threat to security provision are captured in a statement by the United Kingdom
representative that it is reasonable for the country of asylum to protect itself against an
asylum seeker who poses threat to its security at the behest of some foreign power.46
43
44
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47
45
UNHCR‘UNHCR Intervention before the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of Manickavasagam Suresh
(Appellant) and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, the Attorney General of Canada (Respondents)’,
(8 March 2001),<: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3e71bbe24.html> accessed 2 December 2023
46
Grahl-Madsen, Commentary on the Refugee Convention 1951, ( first published 1963; re-published by the
Department of International Protection in October 1997) 235–6

[¶97.] It is further submitted that the danger must outweigh risks of refoulement. If article
33(2) were considered applicable, it could only be applied with due regard to the notion of
proportionality. It is common ground between the parties that a balancing of interests is
required under article 33(2). The requirement for a balancing of interests is fully consistent
with the travaux préparatoires of the Refugee Convention and the views of international
refugee scholars47.
[¶98.] It is further submitted that the applicant had acted in violation of the1949 Geneva
Conventions by directing indiscriminate attack against the civilians, wilfully caused great
suffering, serious injury to body and health, extensively destroyed property, not justified by
military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly, intentionally launched an attack
in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment.
[¶99.] Further, As the commander of the Sokovian Navy, she substantially contributed and
aided the act which violated the purpose of UN namely the maintenance of international
peace and security by carrying out operation to illegally occupy the lawful territory of
Wakanda. It is further submitted that the acts of the applicant also go against the principles of
the UN as she intentionally used force against the territorial independence and integrity of
Wakanda by invading Ravagers island.
[¶100.]It is most humbly submitted that given the illegal acts of the applicant, there is “high
civil degree of probability” that there is a danger to the territorial integrity, independence,
external peace of Wakanda. Therefore, Wakanda would be justified in extraditing him and it
would not be unreasonable on its part to protect itself against such a contingency. It is also
submitted that the danger posed to the Wakanda is far more serious than the potential risk, if
any, faced by the applicant because as established above there was no risk of persecution to
the applicant on any ground and she was just liable to be prosecuted on legitimate grounds for
the illegal acts she had committed. Therefore, it can be concluded that the applicant should be
precluded under Article 33(2) of the 1951 convention.
47
Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, 'The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement:
Opinion'

III. ISSUE III - PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS LAWFUL IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HE SHOULD NOT ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-
REFOULEMENT
[¶101.]Fearing for his future, Peter Quill left Ravagers Island and fled to Wakanda Island. He
made an application for asylum application on the ground of Climate Change which was
subsequently rejected The Grounds for refusal of asylum are valid because, Wakanda can
rightfully deny granting asylum under International Law[I], Secondly, Climate Change is not
a valid ground to claim refugee status under international law [II] and Thirdly, the principle
of non-refoulment does not extend to high seas and even registered ships of a State [III].
A. WAKANDA CAN RIGHTFULLY DENY GRANTING ASYLUM UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
[¶102.]When a person escaping persecution enters a country other than his or her own, the
first thing he needs is asylum. “Asylum is the protection which a State grants on its territory
or in some other place under the control of certain of its organs, to a person who comes to
seek it”.48
B. WAKANDA HAS TAKEN EVERY MEASURE TO INITIATE THE GRANTING OF
ASYLUM
[¶103.]“Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” 49
The Preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention itself recognizes the duty that each State has
towards protection of refugees. It states thus:
[¶104.]“Expressing the wish that all States, recognizing the social and humanitarian nature
of the problem of refugees, will do everything within their power to prevent this problem from
becoming a cause of tension between States.”50
[¶105.]Further, if a country is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, the government is
responsible for granting refugee status.51 States must provide access to fair and effective
48
Hambro, Edvard. ‘New Trends in the Law of Extradition and Asylum. The Western Political Quarterly’ (1952),
<https://doi.org/10.2307/442548>. Accessed 2 December 2023
49
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art 5
50
UNHCR ‘Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless Persons, Draft Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. Report of the Style Committee’ A/CONF.2/102/Add.2
51
UNHCR ‘ RLD2 - Determination of Refugee Status, RLD2’ (Jan. 1, 1989)

refugee status proceedings52. Wakanda has also initiated Refugee Status Determination
Process of the asylum seekers.
[¶106.]Hence, Wakanda has conformed with all the international obligations to provide
protection to Peter Quill
C. WAKANDA HAS THE RIGHT TO RIGHTFULLY DENY ASYLUM UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
[¶107.]Every sovereign state is presumed to have exclusive jurisdiction over its territory and,
as a result, over the people present there. 53 One of the ramifications of this widely accepted
rule is that any sovereign state has the authority to grant or deny asylum to people who are
physically present within its borders.54 Thus, under International Law, asylum has
traditionally been regarded as a state’s right rather than an individual’s right.55
[¶108.]Admission of aliens into a state's territory has historically been treated as a matter of
state sovereignty, and this is still the case under International Law. Felice Morgenstern’s
views that, “there can be no doubt that the individual has no general ‘right’ of asylum against
the state,”56 is generally accepted to represent the status of an individual's right of asylum vis-
a-vis the state of refuge.
[¶109.]Article 14(1) of the UDHR proclaims the right of an individual “to seek and to enjoy
in other countries asylum from persecution.” 57 However, scholars agrees that this clause only
gives a person the right to seek asylum, not the right to receive it. 58 As a result, the
Declaration did not add to the existing International Law about an individual's right to seek
asylum in a particular country.
52
GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3rd ed. Oxford University
Press 2007)
53
Felice Morgenstern, The Right of Asylum, (first published 2014)
54
S. Prakash Sinha, An Anthropocentric View of Asylum in International Law, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 78
(1971)
55
JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE ‘S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 502 (8th ed. Oxford University
Press); ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (2nd ed. Chatham House
1972)
56
Roman Boed, The State Of The Right Of Asylum In International (first published 1994) <
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/djcil/vol5/iss1 > accessed 3 December 2023
57
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948 UNGA Res 217 A(III) (UDHR) art.
14(1)
58
Ian Martin, Foreword to DANIELE JOLY ET AL., REFUGEES: ASYLUM IN EUROPE? (Minority Rights
Publications 1992)

[¶110.]Further, other treaties and conventions like ICCPR and the 1951 Refugee Convention
and its 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, also do not provide a right to be
granted asylum.59
[¶111.] Thus, it is established that states are under no International legal obligation to
mandatorily accept refugees who seek asylum at their borders. 60 All the acts of Wakanda are
in addition to their International obligations
[¶112.]Hence, Wakanda has the right to rightfully deny granting Asylum under International
Law
D. CLIMATE CHANGE IS NOT A VALID GROUND TO CLAIM REFUGEE STATUS.
[¶113.]Pursuant to the definition given in 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual must have
a well-founded fear of persecution and the persecution must be based on his or her race,
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. 61. It is
submitted that none of the above-mentioned grounds are present in the instant case.
i. There is no “Well-Founded Fear of Persecution”
[¶114.]The 1951 Refugee Convention requires asylum seekers to show that there is a
reasonable possibility that they will suffer persecution if returned to their country of
nationality or habitual residence.62 What constitutes a well-founded fear of being persecuted
rests on the circumstances of the case, including the person’s background, profile and
experiences, considered in light of the up-to-date information about the country of origin.
Persecution includes threats to life or liberty, as well as other serious human rights abuses, for
the purpose of the 1951 Refugee Convention.63
[¶115.]In United States v. Geiser64, the Court noted that Black’s Law Dictionary defines
‘persecution’ as “violent, cruel, oppressive treatment directed towards a person or a group of
persons because of their race, religion, sexual orientation, politics or other
59
David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 UNIVERSITY OF
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1247 (1990).; Christian Tomuschat, A Right to Asylum in Europe, 13 HUM. RTS. L.
J. 257, 258 (1992)
60
Boed, (n 58)
61
62
63
UNHCR, ‘HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES’
64
United States v. Geiser, [2008] 527 F.3d 288, 294-95

beliefs.”65Persecution is established when a person faces a threat to his or her life or

freedom,66 as well as other serious human rights abuses or harm.67
[¶116.]Further the Peter Quill neither encountered the situation of armed conflict and
violence frequently involving exposure to serious human rights violations or other serious
harm amounts to persecution.68
[¶117.]Thus, it is humbly submitted that, there was a no well-founded fear of persecution in

the Peter Quillin Ravagers Island.
E. THE CONDITION OF PETER QUILL WAS NOT DUE TO HIS “MEMBERSHIP IN
A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP”.
[¶118.]Individuals who believe in or are perceived to believe in values and standards at odds
with the social mores of the society in which they live may, in principle, constitute a
“particular social group” within the meaning of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention.69 A social group is made up of people who share some basic traits that
distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor or public in general.70
[¶119.]Persecution on account of membership in a particular social group refers to

“persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons, all
of whom share a common, immutable characteristic, i.e., a characteristic that either is beyond
the power of the individual members of the group to change.” 71 People can be perceived by
society as a social group by reason of their origin or social background.72
[¶120.]The applicant has to show that their apprehension was caused by heinous acts
committed or likely to be committed against members of a community to which they
belonged.73
65
Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)
66
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) art. 33(1)
67
UNHCR,’ Guidelines on International Protection No. 7: The Application of Article 1A(2) of the 1951
Convention and/or 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to Victims of Trafficking and Persons At
Risk of Being Trafficked, p. 6, HCR/GIP/06/07(Apr. 7, 2006)’
68
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March
1976) 999 UNTS 171 (‘ICCPR’), art 7; UN Human Rights Committee (HRC)
69
70
Huicochea Gomez v. INS, [2001] 237 F.3d 696 (6th Cir. 2001)
71
Chan v. Canada [1995] 3 SCR 593
72
X v. Canada [1981] F.C.J. No. 1013, 59
73
Vahe Salibian v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, Canada [1990] 113 N.R. 123

[¶121.] Thus, It is humbly submitted that, the condition that Peter Quill experienced were not
in relation to him belonging to any particular social group but were common to all people of
Ravagers Island, thus this did not make him a refugee under international law.
F. THE REFUGEE CONVENTION REQUIRES AN IDENTIFIABLE, HUMAN ACTOR
TO CAUSE THE HARM.
[¶122.]The respondent humbly submits that as per the Refugee Convention 1951, the grant of
refugee status requires an identifiable, human actor to cause the harm.74
[¶123.]It is further submitted that climate change is not in itself a ground for claiming
refugee status, and an applicant must show that he has a fear of persecution as per the
UNHCR handbook.
[¶124.]It is plausible for an individual, without a genuinely founded apprehension of
persecution, to intentionally and strategically orchestrate situations with the sole intent of
subsequently substantiating a claim for refugee status. In order to safeguard the integrity of
the system against those who might attempt, through a changed circumstance scenario, to
manipulate situations solely for the purpose of gaining the benefits associated with being
recognized as a refugee, the Authority has construed the Refugee Convention as implicitly
mandating good faith on the part of the asylum seeker.
[¶125.]It is most respectfully put forth that the applicant was in fact displaced from his island
due to climate change. This ipso facto doesn’t give him the status of a refugee. He should
further prove that this displacement was cause due to an identifiable, human actor.
[¶126.]Thus, it is humbly submitted that, the applicant has not, in any way whatsoever
proved that his displacement was caused due to a human actor.
i. The Five Protected Ground
[¶127.]It is respectfully submitted that the eligibility for refugee status is typically confined
to individuals facing persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion 75. Peter Quill encountered a significant challenge
due to the fact that the environmental repercussions of climate change affect populations at
large and do not discriminate based on the grounds specified in the Refugee Convention76.
74
UNTS 137 (Refugee Convention) art 1
75
ibid
76
Ioane Teitiota v Chief Ex ec. of the Ministn of Bus., Innovation & Emp 't [2013] NZHC 3125

[¶128.]The adverse impacts of environmental degradation are experienced collectively by the

entire population of Ravagers Island, rather than being individualized to Peter Quill. Despite
the acknowledgment in the New Zealand v Terretoria, Tribunal that the environmental
degradation resulting from natural disasters in Kiribati is a "sad reality," this did not extend
Teitiota's experience into the purview of the Refugee Convention.
[¶129.]While the High Court did recognize the intricate link between natural disasters,
environmental degradation, and human vulnerability, it was noted that climate change, in a
different case, could potentially establish a valid pathway to protection under the Refugee
Convention. It is essential to highlight that the Tribunal explicitly dismissed any presumption
against the applicability of the Refugee Convention to individuals displaced by climate
change.
[¶130.]Refugee protection could potentially be accessible when environmental concerns lead
to armed conflict directed at a specific population segment or result in politicized
humanitarian relief that discriminates against a particular social group. It is crucial to note
that for refugee status to be considered, a convention ground must coexist concurrently with
environmental degradation. “The Refugee Convention does not mandate that persecution be
the exclusive or primary cause of displacement; it merely necessitates the presence of
persecution.”
[¶131.]Further, if the court would rule in the favors of Peter Quill than millions of people
facing this plight would apply for getting refugee status. Moreover, it is the legislature, not
the court, that is tasked with determining the scope of the Refugee Convention. Moreover the
state contends that the Peter Quill is nota climate change refugee but a “sociological refugee”
who just wants to get better standard of life.
[¶132.]It is most respectfully submitted that Despite years of discourse, there is still no
formal legal definition of who constitutes a climate-induced migrant.
[¶133.]Moreover this phenomena of Climate Change is difficult to quantify. 77 As Teitiota
illustrates, under current law persons displaced from their home country due to climate
change have no right to remain permanently in another country.
[¶134.]It is submitted that the, root cause of migration flows often lies in human rights
violations, leading individuals to become refugees, asylum-seekers, or displaced persons.
Regardless of the reasons for their departure, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
77
Sir John Beddington ‘Gov't Office for Sci., London, Final Project Report, tn FORESIGHT: MIGRATION
AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT’ (2011),<https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment data/file/287717/11-1116-migration-and-global-environmentalchange.pdf,
archived at https://perma.cc/K35A-HTRQ> accessed 3 December 2023

(UDHR) emphasizes the right of everyone to leave any country, including their own, and to
return to their country (Article 13(2)) . Additionally, it asserts the right of everyone to seek
and enjoy asylum in other countries to escape persecution (Article 14(1)). Although
individuals are entitled to flee harmful situations, there is no automatic right to enter another
country once outside their own border.
[¶135.]Therefore it is humbly submitted that Peter Quill should NOT enjoy the protection of
non-refoulement.
PRAYER
For reasons stated above, the Applicant hereby requests the Court to adjudge and declare
that:
-I-
KAROL DENVERS SHOULD BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE STATUS ASSESSED BY WAKANDAN

AUTHORITY AND WHETHER SHE BE LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM DEADPOOL ISLAND UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
- II -
REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF BE EXCLUDED AND SHE

SHOULD NOT ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULMENT.
- III -
PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS LAWFUL IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HE

SHOULD NOT ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF NON-REFOULMENT.
ANY OTHER RELIEF WHICH THIS HON’BLE COURT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE.

Respectfully submitted,
AGENTS FOR THE RESPONDENTS

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MEMORIAL FOR THE RESPONDENT [STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION]

BEFORE THE GREATER AVENGERS COURT OF

JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

(CASE CONCERNING THE REFUGEE STATUS OF KAROL DENVERS, NATASHA ROMANOFF,

IN THE MATTER OF:

KAROL DENVERS, NATASHA ROMANOFF, AND PETER QUILL.............................

THE STATE OF WAKANDA....,,,,.............................................................................

(FILED UNDER THE ARTICLE 2 OF THE ACIJ)

MEMORIAL ON THE BEHALF OF RESPONDENT

16TH NALSAR JUSTICE B.R. SAWHNEY MCC, 2023 PAGE | I

STATEMENT OF FACTS.......................................................................................................... XIII

I. KAROL DENVERS MAY BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE STATUS ASSESSED BY

WAKANDAN AUTHORITY AND WHETHER SHE MAY BE LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM

DEADPOOL ISLAND IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.......................................................................1

A. KAROL DENVERS MAY BE STRIPPED OF THE REFUGEE STATUS ASSESSED BY

B. SHE MAY LAWFULLY REMOVED FROM DEADPOOL ISLAND...............................3

II. THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF BE

A. THE REFUGEE APPLICATION OF COMMANDER NATASHA ROMANOFF SHOULD

B. ROMANOFF SHOULDN’T ENJOY THE PROTECTION OF

III. PETER QUILL’S DEPRIVATION OF REFUGEE STATUS IS LAWFUL IN

A. WAKANDA CAN RIGHTFULLY DENY GRANTING ASYLUM UNDER

4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | II

B. WAKANDA HAS TAKEN EVERY MEASURE TO INITIATE THE GRANTING OF

C. WAKANDA HAS THE RIGHT TO RIGHTFULLY DENY ASYLUM UNDER

D. CLIMATE CHANGE IS NOT A VALID GROUND TO CLAIM REFUGEE STATUS.. .24

E. THE CONDITION OF PETER QUILL WAS NOT DUE TO HIS “MEMBERSHIP IN A

F. THE REFUGEE CONVENTION REQUIRES AN IDENTIFIABLE, HUMAN ACTOR TO

SR. NO. ABBREVIATION EXPANSION

Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally

Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,

Convention on the Elimination of All

9. CIL Customary International Law

10. CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989

11. Ed. Edition

12. HRC Human Rights Commission

13. ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

14. ICJ International Court of Justice

15. ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former

4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | IV

16. IHL International Humanitarian Law

17. ILC International Law Commission

18. MoU Memorandum of Understanding

19. p. Page number

20. para. Paragraph

21. Respondents Boliria and Makonda

22. UN Charter United Nations Charter

23. UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

24. UNGAR United Nations General Assembly Resolution

26. VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969

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INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION AND RULES

Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1995] 3 SCR 39

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Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689 22

ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 37

UNHCR, Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non- 24

February 2019) [hereinafter UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria

Article 1 of the Resolution adopted by the Institute of International Law at its 36

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4TH NALSAR UNHCR PIL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2024 PAGE | X

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), RLD2 - Determination of 36

Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of 19

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BACKGROUND OF AVENGER ARCHIPELAGO