PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY Vol. 16, No.

3
1979 by The Society for PsydtoiAiyskrfogical Reaevch. Inc. Printed in U.S.A.

Orienting Reflexes and Significance: A Reply to

O'Gorman

IRVING MALTZMAN
University of California. Los Angeles

ABSTRACT
A psychophysiologkal theory of ORs is presented within the framework of methodolo^cal
behaviorisan. Contrary to O'Gorman there is extensive evidence supporting the distinctmn
between voluntary and involuntary ORs. There is also good evidence indicating that the operation
of %ts predetermine the occurrence of ORs. A theoretical physiological ba^s is available to account
for the phenomena of set: dominant foci. The latter conception also provides a physiological basis
for stimulus significance and permits an integration of diverse phenomena involving ORs,
including classical and verbal conditioning.
DESCRIPTORS: Orienting response, Stimulus significance. Classical conditioning, Methodo-
logical behaviorism.

O'Gorman's (1979) paper is a welcome addition Maltzman, 1955,1960, 1966, 1971, 1975, Note 1).
to the literature on orienting refiexes (ORs) because In order to avoid further misunderstandings I shall
it raises some important issues with respect to the briefly characterize this position. The basic tenet of
OR and psychophysiological theory in general. It behavioristic psychology is that it is possible to have
also affords me an opportunity to correct a number a psychology based solely upon physical laws (Wat-
of misconceptions conceming my position and to son, 1913). Methodological behaviorism tends to
expand somewhat upon that position. If an astute differ from radical behaviorism in its freer use of
observer such as O'Gorman has misconstmed what behavioral dispositions and physiological states in
I have attempted to say on the question of stimulus tte formulation of its theories. However, methodo-
significance, the OR, and related issues, there must logical behaviorism and radical behaviorism may be
certainly be other readers who have also been mis- distinguished primarily in terms of their respective
led by my statements. philosophies of mind. Radical behaviorism adopts
a behavioristic or materialistic philosophy as well
Philosophy of Psychology as a behavioristic psychology. Methodological be-
Most conspicuous and embarrassing from my haviorism, on the other hand, is open with respect to
point of view is O 'Gonnan 's misinterpretation of its philosophy of mind but is likely to adopt as most
my basic philosophical position. He ascribes to me a congenial a psychophysical parallelism. The latter
dualistic psychology and philosophy of mind that is in keeping with cunent philosophical analyses of
leads to insumiountable difficulties in psychophysi- "^"d (e.g., Bergmann, 1960,1967; Dennett, 1969;
ology, difliculties which O'Gorman delineates. I Q^ine, 1960). Their basic difference hinges upon
agree with his analysis of the deficiencies in Carte- the question of the reducibility of intentional terms,
sian dualism—which is why I have never adopted Brentano emphasized (Brentano, 1973; Rancurello,
such a view 1968), that certain terms cannot be reduced to oth-
AU of my intellectual life I have adhered to the ers, cannot be replaced or translated into equivalent
position of methodological behaviorism (e.g., behavioral or physical temis. They are intentional m
nature and are the unique subject matter of psychol-
ogy. Such terms as "awareness," "thinking,"
Addressrequestsforreprintsto: Irving Maltzman. Department "remembering," etc., always imply an object,
of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, Caiifor- When I am aware, I am aware of Something. These
nia 90024. intentional terms are irreducible in that phrases
274
0048-5772/79/030274-09$0.90/0
© 1979 The Society for Psychophysiological Research, Inc.
May, 1979 ORS AND SIGNIHCANCE 275

containing suchtermscannot bereplacedby equiva- An altemative behavioristic ^proach is to

lent phrases containingtermsreferringonly to phys- theorize about the physiological changes that are
ical objects, their properties, and relationships responsible for conditioning and the factors that
among them. "There is a high tone" is not equiv- give rise to the verbal report that is taken as the
alent to "I am aware of a high tone." I have measure of awareness. The latter approach is the
discussed this question of intentional terms in onethatIhaveadopted(e.g.,Maltzman, 1977). But
somewhat more detail elsewhere in relation to O'Gorman views my position as inconsistent.
the psychophysiology of classical conditioning While I appear to be a behaviorist in my treatment of
(Maltzman, Note 1). It need only be noted here that awareness in conditioning, I am a mentalist with
methodological behaviorism may accept the special respect to the processes determining the occurrence
status of intentional terms in its philosophy of mind of an OR. He apparently reached this latter conclu-
whereas radical behaviorism does not. Within psy- sion because I have stated that the voluntary OR
chology, both kinds of behaviorism are in agree- may be a consequence of thinking or a problem-
ment that intentional concepts do not possess any solving discovery process (Maltzman, 1971, 1977;
special status. Their meaning stems from their ref- Pendery & Maltzman, 1977). Occurrence of an OR
erence to the physical world, including behavior, is a consequence of the discovered significance of
and their interrelationships with other theoretical the CS as a signal from the UCS. Confusion over my
terms. The burden of proof remains upon the position was probably compounded by my state-
consciousness-centered psychologist to demon- ment that as a result of my research on semantic
strate that what is not reducible in philosophical conditioning and generalization my thinking about
analysis is of some import in psychological science, thinking changed over the years (Maltzman, 1971,
A related issue that deserves comment but which 1977). O'Gorman apparently took this assertion to
cannot be treated here in the detail its importance mean that my philosophy of mind as well as my
deserves is the relationship between behaviorism psychology of thinking (Maltzman, 1955) had
and cognitive psychology. From almost the outset changed. I can assure him that while the psychology
of the history of behaviorism there has been a has, the philosophy has not.
cognitive branch as exemplified by the work of First, I will indicate what is not implied by my
Tohnan (e.g., 1922, 1923, 1927). But "cognitive brief accounts of the predeterminers of the volun-
psychology" also refers to a consciousness- tary OR in classical conditioning. I will then expand
centered psychology having its modem origins in upon the physiological hypotheses underlying my
the work of Lewin (e. g., 1935). What characterizes conception of voluntary ORs in relation to classical
cognitive psychology is its concem with and exten- conditioning and indicate that the same principles
sive use of intentional concepts. But a cognitive are involved in the development of significance as a
psychology can just as well be behavioristic as determiner of the OR.
consciousness-centered or mentalistic. It all de- When I say that a problem-solving discovery
pends upon the status of intentional terms within process leads to the occurrence of a voluntary OR, I
their psychology: are they translated into behavioral do not mean that a mental process induces a
and physical terms, or not. If the former is the case, physiological change that is manifested as a GSR
It is a cognitive behaviorism. If the latter is the case, which is taken as an index of the OR. I do mean that
It is a consciousness-centered cognitive psychology. there is a gross empirical relationship between mea-
Some investigators who label themselves as cog- sures of an OR and the verbalreportsof the partici-
nitive psychologists theorize that awareness causes pants in the experiment describing what they were
the physiological change taken as a measure of doing and thinking about in the experiment. At one
conditioning (e.g.. Brewer, 1974). But they do not level of analysis such statements explain the
delineate how this happens, and ignore a considera- phenomena of interest since the occurrence of dif-
ble body of evidence embarrassing to the position ferential classical conditioning of the GSR often
that awareness is a determiner of classical condi- appears in the individual participant as a large
tioning. Nor can they specify the conditions under all-or-none response related to the trial they report
which awareness should and should not berelatedto as having discovered the CS-UCS contingency
conditioning. Thereasonfor the poverty of a cogni- (Pendery & Maltzman, 1977).
tive theory, whether behavioristic or not, that em- Given the above account of classical conditioning
Phasizes the role of awareness in classical condi- of the GSR, I would attempt to explain the verbal
tioning is that there is no extant theory or model of reports of thinking and awareness and the occur-
awareness. Such a theory would be needed if a rence of the GSR manifestation of an OR intermsof
cognitive psychology were to account for classical more general principles. They are more general in
conditioning in terms of determination by aware- that they lead to the explanation of a greater variety
"^^^ of phenomena than the ones at hand, characteristics
276 IRVING MALTZMAN
of a differential classically conditioned GSR. An
outline of such an account has b ^ n given elsewl^re
(Maltzman, Note 1).
A Physiological Basis for Classical
Conditioning
Briefly, the more general account of classical
conditioning involves the following. When a nor-
mal adult engages in problem solving there is an
increase in synchronous biopotential activity re-
corded from the cerebral cortex, particularly the
prefrontal cortex (Livanov, 1977). Solution of a
problem is assumed to be accompanied by an in-
crease in synchronous activity between spatially
disparate functional constellations of activity. Oc-
currence of such synchronous activity reflects
communication, the transmission of information,
between these disparate constellations or foci of
activity (Livanov, 1977). I hypothesize that this
occurrence of synchronous activity between
spatially disparate centers is the psychophysiologi-
cal basis of what Maier (1930) described as insight:
the integration of previously isolated areas of
experience. An additional testable hypothesis
is necessary in order to complete the psycho-
physiological account of a problem-solving dis-
covery process as the precursor of the appearance
of a voluntary OR-CR: Onset of synchronous activ-
ity between previously independent functional con-
stellations of activity is accompanied by an OR.
While there is no direct evidence in support of this
relationship between ORs and the development of
synchronous activity, Livanov's description of the
sequence of electrocortical events obtained in con-
ditioning suggests that such an effect is a reasonable
one to expect. Using an arrangement such as the
encephaloscope and measures of the OR, the
hypothesis is readily testable.
Thus, what may be described phenomenologi-
cally and also given an account in terms of be-
havioral dispositions, can be explained in terms of
presumed physiological changes occurring within
tlte central nervous system. Modem EEG tech-
niques using multiple leads as represented by the
encephaloscopic studies of Livanov (1977) and his
group permit the empirical investigation of the
hypotheses presented above. Such a physiological
account would provide an explanation of the be-
havioral and phenomenological changes occurring
in classical conditioning. It does not deny the reality
of the phenomenological experience nor does it
completely replace the intentional terms by phys-
icalistic ones. No matter. The contribution of
methodological behaviorism is that it can offer in
principle a systematic physical explanation of the
phenomena of interest without doing violence to the
raw data. i already is available an obvious interpretation of
Vol. 16, No. 3
Inteii»retations of Stimulus Sigpiilkance and the
OR
O'Gorman believes that currently available con-
cepts are adequate to account for augmented ORs
following the addition of signal value or signifi-
cance to a stimulus. I agree with this view. I
disagree with O'Gorman, however, in that he does
not utilize a sufficient number of such available
concepts and some of those that he does use are
inadequate to the task at hand. Arousal, itself a
highly ambiguous notion, cannot explain certain of
these effects, as we shall see. I do not believe that
the occurrence of an OR is dependent solely upon
the presence of a neuronal model and stimulus
mismatch. Of course, neither do Sokolov and other
Soviet investigators (Voronin, Leontiev, Luria,
Sokolov, & Vinogradova, 1965). They all accept
the notion of an OR occurring to significant stimuli
in the absence of stimulus change. This is most
obvious in two kinds of experimental situations: 1)
during the course of classical conditioning when the
CS becomes a signal for the UCS following prior
habituation of the OR to the CS, and 2) when
subjects are instmcted to perform a task on signal.
O'Gorman offers an interpretation of how the
addition of stimulus significance augments ORs in
terms of Germana's (1968) analysis. According to
the latter interpretation the neuronal model includes
the motor characteristics or kinesthetic cues of the
response performed as well as a model of the
stimulus. Thus when subjects are instmcted to re-
spond to a stimulus the neuronal model is different
from the one not requiring a response. There now is
a greater discrepancy between the new neuronal
model and the physical stimulus than the old model
and the stimulus. Invoking Germana's interpreta-
tion in the context of stimulus significance is
gratuitous for two reasons. First, it is inadequate to
the task of accounting for the changes in the usual
measures ofthe OR, GSR and alpha desynchroniza-
tion, in classical conditioning. Germana's account
is designed to account for instmmental response
situations or leaming situations where subjects per-
form an overt response. It does not account for the
changes occurring in classical conditioning where
previously habituated indices of the OR induced hy
the CS reappear during the course of conditioning
and usually precede the appearance of the overt
response (Morrell, 1961). Likewise, it does not
^count for the results in habituation situations with
induced significance where the task is to engage in
implicit activity such as counting or implicit judg-
ments (Luria, 1973; Maltzman, Note 2; Maltzman
& Raskin, 1965, Note 3). Use of Germana's
analysis is gratuitous for a second reason. There
 , 1979 ORS AND SIGNIHCANCE 277

significance which does not require interpretations respectively. Evidence that we have to date pro-
of neuronal models incorporating nonexistent vides little support for the distinction between vol-
Idnesthetic cues. A stimulus that is significant as the untary and involuntary ORs intermsof hemispheric
resultoftask instructions acquires its significance as specialization. There is, however, a great cteal of
a consequence of verbal conditioning (Pendery & other kinds of evidence, morphological, physiolog-
Maltzman, 1977). A previously habituated or an ical, and ontogenetic, to support the conception of
innocuous stimulus transformed into a signal for a voluntary ORs as distinguished from involuntary
task evokes a large OR (e.g., Luria, 1973; Luria & ORs (e.g., Luria, 1973; Luria & Homskaya, 1970;
Vinogradova, 1959; Maltzman & Raskin, 1965) Maltzman, Note 1).
because the task instructions are a form of verbal Luria and his colleagues make a distinction simi-
conditioning. Such instructions enable the signal to lar to the present one and provide considerable
evoke a verbally conditioned OR, one that we experimental and clinical evidence to demonstrate
would call a voluntary OR. No new concepts or that the two kinds of OR have different kinds of
assumptions are necessary to account for the effects cerebral organization (Artemieva & Homskaya,
of significant or signal stimuli in these situations. 1973; Baranovskaya & Homskaya, 1973;Demina&
Even the notion of a voluntary OR is not essential in Khomskaya, 1976; Homskaya, 1964, 1973; Luria,
tte above situations. The physiological basis for 1973; Luria & Homskaya, 1970). Pribram, Luria,
suchverbalconditioningisbasically the same as.in and their colleagues provide evidence from in-
more conventional classical conditioning. Since in frahuman and human subjects using electrocortical
both verbal conditioning and conventional classical as well as autonomic measures demonstrating that
conditioning the CS acquires significance, the tte prefrontal cortex is essential for the normal
physiological basis for the acquisition of signifi- occurrence of a voluntary OR, but that posterior
cance in these situations may be one and the same. regions of the cerebral cortex are not (Pribram &
T K" H f n o Luria, 1973). Differences in cerebral organization
1 wo Kinds of UK Q^ jjjg ^^ y^^^^ QJ Qj^ ^ related to their different
O'Gormaniscriticalof our notion of a voluntary roles in adaptive behavior. An intact prefrontal
OR and questions whether there is empirical support cortex necessary for the occurrence of normal vol-
for the conception. There is extensive evidence untary ORs is essential for the appearance of goal
indicating that measures of the OR initially elicited directed behavior, problem solving, planning, what
and those elicited later in a stimulus series are not is ordinarily meant by voluntary behavior.
the refiection of precisely the same kind of OR. , J ^ ^ TA A •*• r c- •£ J ¥*
p,,-^ * u • _j *u u A- Independent Definitron of Significance and Its
0 Gorman cites results m accord with such a dis- "^ ¥x * •
. *• uu u u J * * *u • Determiners
tmction although he does not comment upon their
implications in this regard. We were originally led O'Gorman is concemed with the apparent ab-
to the distinction between ORs by the observation sence of an independent criterion of significance,
that task instructions have a profound influence Others have expressed this same concem (Grings,
upon the course of habituation of the GSR induced 1977). Independent specification of significance is
by a series of stimuli, but such instructions do not not an insurmountable problem, especially with
influence the magnitude of the response to the first normal ^ults as subjects. The problem is similar to
stimulus in the ^ries (Maltzman, 1971,1977, Note the one that Thomdike faced: how to define
2; Maltzman & Raskin, 1965). We interpreted the satisfiers and annoyers, positive and negative rein-
differential effect of task instructions as suggesting forcers, independently of the leamed behavior that
that the initial response to arelativelyunpredictable they presumably wereresponsiblefor inducing. His
stimulus is less affected by individual differences in solution was to define reinforcers in terms of ap-
sets, pattems of thinking, etc. It is relatively in- proach and avoidance behavior, nonleaming
voluntary as distinguished fr^om the responses later criteria. Situations inducing approach behavior
induced which are relatively voluntary. Since the were defined as satisfiers whereas those inducing
initial response is to a sudden change in the envi- avoidance were specified armoyers (Thomdike,
ronment whereas subsequent ORs appear to be 1931). Both kinds of situations are significant. Any
influenced by speech and thinking, it seemed rea- reinforcer—positive or negative—is significant be-
sonable to assume that, to use Pavlov's terminol- cause it evokes approach or avoidance behavior.
ogy, the involuntary OR was primarily in the first This is why ORs are intimately related to the rein-
signal system whereas the voluntary OR was in the forcement process. It is why I believe measures of
second signal system. Bogen (1969) noted that tht OR such as tl» GSR and alpha desynchroniza-
Pavlov's distinction between the first and second tion always reflect an OR—even when a noxious
signal
Unctionssystems corresponds
of the right to the hemispheres
and left cerebral specialized stimulus is presented.
latter assumption, I willelse
if nothing continue
tl»n ontothe
make
basisthe
of
278 IRVING MALTZMAN
parsimony, until there is some good evictence to the
contrary. In my judgment there is no evictence at
present tojustify the hypothesis that a GSR reflects a
DR when a noxious UCS is presented (Maltzman,
Weissbluth, & Wolff, 1978). Evidence, on the con-
trary, indicates that the GSR reflects an OR wl^n
noxious as well as innocuous stimuli are used (e.g.,
Sokolov, 1963, pp. 59-60). To return to the im-
mediate issue, Solarz (1960) found that the extreme
ratings on evaluative scales were related to ap-
proach and avoidance behavior. One way, there-
fore, ofdefining significance in an objective manner
independently of measures of the OR, is in terms of
semantic differential ratings obtained on evaluative
scales. Thus, we have found that significance de-
fined in terms of evaluative ratings of a CS was
reliably related to differential semantic conditioning
of the GSR among students all of whom could
verbalize the CS-UCS contingency (Maltzman,
Raskin, & Wolff, Note 4). Students who rated the
CS as highly unpleasant, for whatever their reasons,
yielded significantly better differential semantic
conditioning than those who rated the CS as rela-
tively neutral. Since all of these students verbalized
the CS-UCS contingency, these results further indi-
cate that tte presence of' 'awareness'' by itself does
not ensure classical conditioning or automatically
trigger a physiological mechanism (Brewer, 1974).
Presence of verbalizations of the CS-UCS con-
tingency is not a sufficient condition for the appear-
ance of conditioned responses.
Set, Significance and the OR
Perfiaps my most basic disagreement with
O 'Gorman is a consequence of my apparently ex-
treme position that the OR is never a consequence
solely of stimulus change. I would make this asser-
tion even more general, a response is never a
function of solely tte parameters of the physical
stimulus. Upon a little reflection such an assertion
would appear to be obvious. But if it is obvious for
responses in general, it should be obvious as well
for that special class due to neuronal mismatches,
Responses are always a function of the history of the
organism, tte state ofthe organism at tlte moment as
a consequence of its past history. This does not
mean that I see no need for a conception of a
neuronal model as a detector of stimulus change,
My view is that the neuronal model may be taken as
a detector of stimulus change provided certain
standing conditions are present. Occurrence of an
OR as a consequence of novel stimuli presupposes a
particular state of tte organism, a particular state of
the CNS that is a consequence of ontogeny,
phytogeny, past learning experiences, sets estab-
lished by the immediate stimulus context, as well as
previous stimulations. Given a particular state of the
Vol. 16, No. 3
organism, a stimulus change may evoke an OR. In a
different state that same stimulus change would not,
or would do so to a much smaller degree. Fur-
ttermore, th& states in question are not simply levels
of arousal or changes in different arousal systems as
ordinarily conceived.
Our notion that the OR is never a function solely
of the neuronal model and stimulus change stem-
med in part from informal observation of people in
our experimental situation, by similar observations
reported by Luria, and by the important but unduly
neglected conceptions concerning higli^r nervous
system activity proposed by Wedensky and
Ukhtomsky (e.g., Bykov, 1958). Conceptions for-
mulated by the latter theorists make sense out of the
above informal observations as well as experimen-
tal data on tte effects of task instructions on the OR.
What is more, these notions permit an integration
of the conceptions of voluntary ORs, classical
conditioning, and a host of other experimental
phenon^ena. The conceptions in question are related
to Ukhtomsky's formulation of the dominant focus
or simply the dominant (Anokhin, 1974; Bykov,
1958; John, 1967; Maltzman, Note 1; Razran, 1971;
Rusinov, 1973).
Before turning to theoretical interpretations, we
shall indicate an empirical basis for tlw assertion
limiting the role of the neuronal model and for
proposing that dominant foci play a profound role in
modulating the occurrence of ORs to stimulus
change. First, our informal observation has been
^^^^ ^ '"^^®° ^^'"^ " ° ^ ^ **^' "°* necessarily evoke
a manifestation of an OR in an experimental sub-
ject. It does not do so when it comes from outside
the laboratory, when it clearly is not some part of the
experimental arrangement. Most stimulus changes
above a certain level of intensity evoke ORs in most
observers because the observers are all under the
same set. They are participating in a laboratory
experiment and the change is part of the experiment,
The experimenter does not realize that tte obtained
effects are specific to a particular set since the
subjects are always run under the same general
laboratory conditions. In principle, a test of the
notion that the effectiveness of a neuronal model
presupposes certain standing conditions, certain
conditions of set or dominant foci, would be one
where subjects are telemetered and stimuli are pre-
sented in tl» laboratory and under non-laboratory
ostensibly nonexperimental conditions, where the
subjects do not believe they are part of an experi-
ment at the moment. I would predict reliable dif-
ferences in indices of the ORs obtained to stimulus
changes under these two kinds of conditions and
these differences would not be a function of dif-
ferences in arousal level,
There is, of course, experimental data bearing
f4ay. 1979 ORS AND SIGNIFICANCE 279

Upon this critical issue that does not involve tlie word iiK^reased itsresponsivityas a consequence of
telemetering of unsuspecting subjects. A number of attributing significance to it, making it a signal for a
studies have produced results that cannot be ac- task. Selective orienting occurred rather than an
counted for by the conceptions proposed for this im^rease in arousal, a nonspecific effect, as indi-
purpose by O'Gorman, neuronal mo(tels and cated by the fact that the magnitudes of tlK GSRs to
arousal. He conce(ks that thereversalin habituation thefillerwords were not significantly greater in tl^
as students come to anticipate the approaching con- experimental as compared to the control group,
ditioning task reported by Pendery and Maltzman Furthermore, there was no significant groups effect
(1977) is not in accord with the neuronal model for conductance level. Experimental groups did not
conception, but dismisses this result along with m^fest significantly higher conductance levels
reported personality effects as failing to meet the than the control group and did not show larger
test of replicability. This sort of "refutation" is phasic responses to control filler words. As pre-
resorting to a bit of sophistry since the personality viously indicated, this selective effect, larger GSRs
effects or attitudes toward experiments were the only to the critical stimulus, can be explained in
ones not reproduced in other experiments in the terms of existing notions. It needs neither poorly
series in question. There was no attempt to repro- specified neuronal models with kinesthetic cues nor
duce the habituation effect in those studies. The two significance detectors. It is a consequence of a
kinds of effect, personality or attitude differences, verbally conditioned OR where the verbal condi-
and the effects of set, need not necessarily suffer the tioning was induced by the task instmctions (Pen-
same fate of lack ofreplicability.That ttey do not is dery & Maltzman, 1977).
indicated by the results on habituation reported in a More interesting, theoretically, were the results
more recent experiment (Maltzman et al., 1978), obtained in tte above study in the habituation ses-
and an earlier experiment where an impending oral sion preceding the presentations of the critical
examination was found to markedly influence word. Experimental groups receiving task instmc-
habituation of the GSR index of the OR (Maltzman, tions showed significantly greaterresponsivitythan
Smith, Kantor, & Mandell, 1971). In the former thecontrolgroup, with one exception. There was no
experiment an habituation session preceded seman- difference in the magnitude of the GSR induced by
tic conditioning with a noxious UCS on each of 5 thefirstword presented to the students. Differences
successive days. A significant increase in responsiv- in the magnitudes of the GSRs evoked by the
ity on the second day of habituation suggests that the different words developed as trials progressed. That
students were anticipating or set for the approaching these results cannot be reasonably attributed to a
onset of conditioning. Magnitude of the GSR index greater level of arousal in the experimental groups
of the OR was presumably influenced by self- than the control group is indicated by the absence of
induced sets or self-instmctions and not by stimulus a significant difference in conductance levels among
change and neuronal models alone. the groups (Maltzman & Raskin, Note 3). I attribute
Some of our most consistent effects of task in- this significant difference in responsivity prior to
structions have been obtained in our attempts to the appearance of tte significant stimulus to a corti-
replicate and extend the results on stimulus signifi- cal set or dominant focus induced toward words by
cancereportedby Luria and Vinogradova (1959). In the task instmctions. In order to respond to th&
our first experiment different groups of college critical word students in the experimental groups
students were instmcted as follows: 1) press a foot must orient more vigorously to all words. An obvi-
pedal whenever they heard the word LIGHT, ous problem is to determine the degree of specificity
2) covertly free associate whenever they heard or nonspecificity of the effect attributed to set.
UGHT, 3) covertly count the number of times Pertiaps it is only a consequence of arousal, and
UGHT occurred, 4) sit quietly and listen to a series conductance level simply is not always as effective a
of words. All students heard the same list of words, n^asure of arousal as it should be.
An habituation series of 20 different words preceded Subsequent experiments (Maltzman, Note 2)
the first presentation of OGHT which occurred 14 have attempted to examine some of the effects of
times interspersed among unrelated neutral filler varying task instmctions, the effects of different
words. Results showed that each of the experimen- kinds of cortical sets or dominant foci. Instmcting
tal groups provided disproportionately larger GSRs students to respond to a tone interspersed among
to LIGHT than to the filler wonis immediately different words resulted in heightened responsivity
preceding and following each presentation of the to the words prior to the first appearance of the tone,
critical word as compared to tte control group Instmcting students torespondto a tone that would
which did not show differential responsivity to the always follow a particular word without stating
critical word (Maltzman & Raskin, 1965, Note 3). which word it is resulted in larger GSRs to preced-
Covert as well as overt responding to a particular ing words than only instructing tt^m torespondto a
 280 IRVING MALTZMAN
tone. InstnK^ting students to respond to a particular
word resulted in larger GSRs to preceding words
than instructing students to respond to a tone in-
terspersed among words. In the latter two experi-
ments comparisons of GSR responsivity were be-
tween groups receiving task instructions to perform
an overt response. Groups were equated in this
respect. Nonspecific arousal and motor prepared-
ness should therefore be the same in these groups.
Specificity of task instruction effects was therefore
indicated by the results obtained in these experi-
ments.
Dominant Foci in Relation to ORs and Stimulus
Significance
According to Ukhtomsky (Bykov, 1958) a domi-
nant focus refers to a focus of excitation in the CNS
that modifies current activity by attracting to itself
impulses which would evoke a different response in
the absence of the prior existing dominant. Rusinov
(1973)refersto it as a temporarily prevailing system
that directs tl^ activity of neural centers at any given
moment. Anokhin (1974) considers dominant foci
as playing a fundamental role in adaptive behavior.
Bechterev (1933), in addition to claiming priority
over Ukhtomsky for the formulation of the concept,
noted that in terms of its experimental effects it
serves as the physiological basis for the Wurzburg
school's formulation of set, determining tendency,
or Aufgabe. We concur with the above assertions
and have utilized their implications in our own
tteorizing about the determiners of the OR and
attention in relation to complex processes (e.g.,
Maltzman, Note 1).
It is the basis for our assumption that the occur-
rence of an OR is not dependent upon novelty alone
but is predetermined by the set or dominant focus
present at the moment. Sokoiov (1963, p. 184)
describes an experiment in which the hypothesized
dominant focus may determine the presence or
absence of an OR to subsequent stimulation. He first
established that a particular auditory stimulus, a ^
dB sound, evoked cephalic vasodilation, an indica-
tion of the presence of an OR. Its rating on a five
point scale of intensity was 4, categorizing it as a
strong sensation, slightly painful. Repeated applica-
tion of a more intense sound was used for the
establishment of a dominant focus. A100 dB sound
was repeatedly applied, one which evoked cephalic
vasoconstriction indicative of a defensive reflex
(DR). It was rated as very strong, an unpleasant
sensation, severely painful. When the 90 dB sound
followed the applications of the 100 dB sound,
instead of tte former evoking an OR, it evoked the
response of the latter. Cephalic vasoconstriction
now occurred to the 90 dB sound along with a rating
of 5. Sokolov reports similar results with electric
Vol. 16, No. 3
shock. A weak electric shock when pre^nted by
itself may evoke evidence of an OR, cephalic vas-
odilation. If it is presented following a stronger
^ock which induces cephalic vasoconstriction,
then it too induces vasoconstriction. Whetter or not
an OR occurs is a function of the dominant focus or
state of the organism present at tl^ moment. Given a
certain state—or set—a. neuronal model may deter-
mine the occurrence of an OR to a novel stimulus. I
am simply generalizing that the above demonstra-
tion by Sokolov is not an isolated result obtained
under special experimental conditions. It is a gen-
eral effect, and even more so than in the illustration,
is not a consequence of a state of nonspecific
arousal. The neuronal model and novelty as deter-
miners of an OR are always dependent upon an
appropriate dominant focus or cortical set. We as
investigators ordinarily are not aware of these pre-
determiners because we always conduct our exper-
iments in experimental situations in a standard
manner.
It is important to note that a conception of a
dominant focus was basic to Pavlov's interpretation
of conditioning (Asratyan, 1953), how a temporary
connection was formed in the brain. Livanov's
(1977) toposcopic studies of synchronous cortical
^tivity during conditioning provide considerable
support for Pavlov's hypothesis. In terms of
Livanov's (1977) toposcopic analyses of EEG activ-
ity, classical conditioning occurs when the domi-
nant foci or constellations of cortical excitability
induced by the CS and the UCS become synchron-
ous. Such systematic changes in synchronization of
spatially disparate cortical potentials occur in
human as well as animal studies.
We hypothesized (Maltzman, Note 1) that the
establislunent of dominant foci by instructions or by
cortical activity accompanying thinking is a pre-
(kterminer of the occurrence of voluntary ORs. fc
normal adults dominant foci are also the physiologi-
cal bases for attitudes and interests (Wingard &
Maltzman, Note 5). Utilizing the conception of
dominant foci it is possible to integrate classical and
verbal conditioning of the OR as reflected by such
measures as the GSR despite their radically different
appearance (Maltzman, Note 1; Pendery &
Maltzman, 1977). Utilization of this concept per-
mits the integration of phenomena of conditioning,
which certainly involves the acquisition of stimulus
significance, with experimental studies in which
significance is established by instructions. Accord-
ing to our view task instructions induce a dominant
focus which selectively determines which stimuli
will evoke an OR and which will not. It selectively
influences the transmission of information within
the central nervous system.
Sokolov's conception of a neuronal model has
May. 1979 ORS AND SIGNMCANCE
made an enormous contribution to psychology and
the neurosciences generally. This contribution,
however, does not mean that the tteoretical concep-
tion is witlKJUt limitations. In order to account for
complex phenomena of orienting and related be-
havior, theoretical conceptions in addition to the
neuronal model, arousal, and a unitary OR must be
added. The conception of an OR was originally
formulated by Pavlov as the result of observing the
behavior of infrahuman organisms in relatively
simple experimental situations. As long as the OR is
studied in research with human subjects by manip-
ulating the same kinds of parameters as those used
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REFERENCE NOTES
1. Maltzman, I. Orienting reflexes and classical conditioning in
humans. Paper presented to NATO Conference on the Orient-
ing Reflex in Humans, Leeuwenhorst Congress Center, The
Netherlands, 1978.
2. Maltzman, I. Task instructions as a determiner of the GSR
index ofthe orienting reflex. Manuscript in preparation, 1979.
3. Maltzman, I., & Raskin, D. C. Selective orienting and
habituation of the GSR as a consequence of overt and covert
activity. Manuscript submitted for publication, 1978.
Maltzman, I., Raskin, D. C , & WoW, C. Lateru inhibition
of the GSR conditioned to words. Manuscript submitted for
publication, 1978.
Wingard, J., & Maltzman, I. Interests as a predeterminer of
the GSR index of the orienting reflex. Manuscript in prepara-
tion, 1979.

(Manuscript received October 23, 1978; accepted for publication October 31, 1978)

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