RISE - RTOs in the service economy

Workpackage synthesis report, wp4

On policy learning and the interaction

between policy makers and researchers
Per M. Koch, Johan Hauknes
STEP - Studier i teknologi, innovasjon og ekonomisk politikk
Storgaten 1, N-0155, Oslo, Norway
Direct line: +47 22 47 73 16
Email: per.koch@step.no

A final report of RISE: RTOs in the

service economy - Knowledge
infrastructures, innovation
intermediaries and institutional change
RISE reports may be downloaded from:
http://centrim.bus.brighton.ac.uk/go/rise

s
/

RISE coordinator: Dr Mike Hales

CENTRIM - The Centre for Research in
Innovation Management
Direct line: +44 1273 642190
Email: M.Hales@brighton.ac.uk

This report constitutes a deliverable specified in

the RISE work programme
Contract number: SOE1-CT98-1115
Funded under the TSER programme by the
European Commission, DG Research

Date: November 2000

RISE Work Package 4

On policy learning and the interaction between policy

makers and researchers
Summary report

Per M. Koch and Johan Hauknes

STEP
Oslo, December 2000

This report is based on material provided by:

Ulrich Wurtzel, DIW, Berlin

Mike Hales, CENTRIM, Brighton, UK
Nils Markusson, NUTEK, Stockholm
Lennart Norgren, NUTEK, Stockholm
Brigitte Preissl, DIW, Berlin
Margarida Fontes, INETI, Lisbon
Johan Hauknes, STEP, Oslo
Per M. Koch, STEP, Oslo
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Table of contents

SUMMARY................................................................................................................... 4
The RISE programme .............................................................................................. 4
The systemic approach ............................................................................................ 4
Research and technology services ........................................................................... 5
The public role ........................................................................................................ 6
POLICY MEMORANDUM ......................................................................................... 8
THE ANNUAL CABINET BUDGET CONFERENCE: ON THE ROLE OF RESEARCH AND
TECHNOLOGY SERVICES IN THE INNOVATION SYSTEM ..................................................... 8
Proposals of the Ministry of Finance....................................................................... 8
Market Failure ........................................................................................................ 8
The systemic view of innovation .............................................................................. 9
Competence and learning...................................................................................... 11
Institutional failure................................................................................................ 12
Systemic policy measures ...................................................................................... 13
Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 17
APPENDIX: RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY SERVICES AND POLICY
DEVELOPMENT ....................................................................................................... 19
The rise of systemic innovation theory................................................................... 19
Theory and reality ................................................................................................. 19
Research and policy making, another ’linear model’............................................. 20
Mentalities ............................................................................................................ 20
Research vs. policy making ................................................................................... 23
Policy learning...................................................................................................... 24
The learning processes of policy makers ............................................................... 28
Researcher/policy maker interaction ..................................................................... 29
Interaction vs. independence ................................................................................. 31
Systemic failures in the policy apparatus............................................................... 34
The ministerial memo, a didactic experiment......................................................... 35
RISE and beyond................................................................................................... 38
LITTERATURE ......................................................................................................... 38
Selected RISE Material ......................................................................................... 40

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Summary
The RISE programme
The main goal of the RISE programme is to gain new insight into the role of research
and technology organisations (RTOs) and knowledge intensive business services
(KIBS) in the innovation system.1 The programme is an attempt to map in which way
these institutions function as research and technology services for companies, i.e.
units that can help companies build up the competences needed to innovate.

The systemic approach

RISE is grounded in modern innovation theory, a view of economic activity that sees
innovation as a result of interaction and competence flows in the innovation system.2
The innovation system consists of companies, public organisations, R&D institutions
and others. The ability to innovate is considered a function of the ability to build
competences, while the ability to develop relevant competences is seen as a result of
the companies' ability to take actively part in the innovation system. They must
connect to the system in order to gain access to the knowledge and technology present
in this network.

Firms cannot passively start using new technologies just by reading about them.
Although companies may gain access to manuals or machinery, the ability to use this
knowledge rests on the ability to understand, use and integrate this technology into its
own learning and innovation processes. This ability depends on the employees'
education, work experience, organisational, social and technological expertise as well
as their ability to fetch relevant competences from firms and institutions outside the
company.

If firms for some reason fail in finding, absorbing and utilising relevant competences,
their ability to innovate is weakened. If this is a problem common for many firms in a
given industry, region or network of related firms (clusters), we are facing a so-called
systemic failure, where the flow of knowledge and technologies in the system is
blocked or hindered in a significant way.

It should be noted that there can be no such thing as an optimal or ‘perfect’ flow of
competences in social structures like these. In the real world it will always be possible
to develop new networks or to improve the existing ones. Moreover, the system
constantly generates new competences that can be combined in new and innovative
ways to create new forms of behaviour and – as a result of this – new products,
processes and services. This alone makes a state of a perfect flow of information
impossible.

Ultimately it is the firm that must decide when it has developed learning practices that
will make it able to absorb new knowledge and new technologies in a sufficiently
efficient way. In order to make this decision, however, it must have a relatively clear
view of the competences available in the innovation system. Given the large amount
of knowledge and expertise present in any part of society, this is not an easy task.
1
For a discussion of the term ‘innovation system’, see Lundvall (1995).
2
See for instance Metcalfe 1952, Dosi et. al. 1988.

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Hence, the company not only needs help in order to develop its own competences, for
instance by co-operating with a research institution. It normally also needs assistance
in order to map the sources of competence that can potentially be used in the
development of the firm, i.e. it needs ‘pathfinders’ as well as ‘co-workers and
teachers’.

Research and technology services

In order to improve the functioning of the whole system, one might argue that there is
a need for expertise that can develop vectors that can help strengthening the firms'
ability to learn and collaborate with other firms and institutions. From the company
perspective these vectors – which can include various R&D programmes and
institutions, advisory boards, consultancies, technology attachés, financial measures
and more – can be viewed as research and technology services, i.e. units that serve
companies the competences needed to succeed and that help them find relevant
sources of competences. They are helpers, assistants and partners.3

The relationship between a company and its service provider will not be based on a
passive reception of knowledge and technologies. Very often competence building is
a result of a form for co-operation and collaboration where both firms are experts in
their own field. Hence they both learn from this competence building innovation
process. Moreover, a firm that provide research and technology services to one
company may in its own right ask for competences from another – i.e. it will be a
service provider in one arena and a competence seeker in another. These relationships
reflect the systemic nature of competence building and innovation.

It can be argued that the market will and should provide the research and technology
services needed for company competence building and innovation, and – indeed – the
RISE data shows that there has grown up a rather large sector of so-called knowledge
intensive business services (KIBS) – i.e. various forms of private consultancies that
together with the research institutions provide technology and advice. Hence there
should be no need for government intervention in this arena. Several of the policy
makers contacted by RISE are of this opinion.

Others, however, argue that especially small and medium sized companies lack the
competences needed to find, develop and make us of contacts in the innovation
system. They are in effect unable to find the competences needed to succeed in the
market. These policy makers argue that it might be in the public interest to help these
companies. The companies may, for instance, contribute to much needed economic
growth or employment or their competences and technologies may give important
input to the development of other sectors of society. If this is the case, one can argue
that someone should implement, encourage and support policy vectors that can help
these companies learn where to find competence sources and how to interact with
them.

3
It should be stressed, however, that although these policy vectors, measures and institutions may
function as services vis-à-vis the companies, this is not necessarily their only purpose. An R&D
institution will often have public tasks that go beyond the needs of industry.

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The public role

Firms seldom have the ability to consider the welfare of the whole innovation system.
The individual company is mainly responsible for its own survival and success. Their
managers neither have the resources or the competences needed to improve the
overall flow of competences in a particular industrial cluster or the national
innovation system as a whole.

If the individual companies cannot be expected to take responsibility for the

’gardening’ of the whole system, then who can? In some fields large multinational
companies can do their part in developing a certain sector. Then there are the
industrial associations, which attempt to improve the working conditions of their
members. The fact remains, however, that the only institutions that have the resources
needed to look after the whole system, is the national governments, or – on the
European level – the European Union.

Policy development and learning

Although several European governments have developed policy vectors aimed at
improving the competence flows in the system, this is a task that goes beyond the
normal market failure rationale used to legitimise public intervention in the field of
innovation and technology development.4 In order to develop and gain support for
new measures in this field, policy makers need a coherent argumentation that can be
used to develop and explain such policy vectors.

Unfortunately there have not been many relevant studies of learning in policy-making
institutions or the political system. Hence it is hard to fine-tune a set of tools that can
be used in order to develop the policy system's competences in the field of innovation
systems theory and research and technology services. However, the RISE team have
done some preliminary studies of competence building in ministries, directorates,
research councils and other relevant institutions in order to gain insight into the
learning processes that take place there.

The RISE interviews and innovation policy workshops reveal a complex system of
policymaking and policy development institutions, which defies simple explanations
of policy formulation. The policy makers operate within a diverse organisational
culture, where he or she has to take a lot of factors into consideration, including the
ideology of the political leadership, the role of the media and public opinion, the
ruling ‘mentality’ within the ministry, organisation or unit, power struggles and the
need for financing and more.

Research is only one of many forms of input into these processes, which means that
the policy maker will take the other factors into consideration when commissioning,
interpreting and using research that is to contribute to the competence base of policy
development. Most of the policy makers involved in this part of the RISE study,
express a need for policy-oriented research, i.e. research that may be easily used in
policy development. Many criticise innovation research for being too theoretical and
academic, and not targeted towards the practical problems facing the policy agencies.
Some ask for concrete policy advice, while others would like the researcher to map

4
For a general introduction to innovation policies based on systemic approaches, see the forthcoming
OECD reports on the national innovation systems (OECD 2000).

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various alternatives as regards policies and policy vectors and to analyse the possible
consequences following various lines of action.

In any case there seems to be a need for improved forms of communication between
policy makers and researchers, so that the researchers may better understand the
competence needs of the policy makers, and give the policy maker a better
understanding of the potential and the limitation of research in this field. Moreover,
from a competence perspective, the passive reading of research reports is an
inefficient form of policy learning. In order to fully grasp the implications of
innovation theory and research, the policy maker need to interact with researchers in
different fora and in various stages of the research process.

There is also an important dividing line inside the policy apparatus, between those
who are familiar with systemic innovation theory and those that are not. It turns out
that many policy makers find it difficult to make this way of thinking understandable
for the ‘outsiders’. This makes it difficult to promote and defend policy vectors based
on these premises. The fact that so many of them find research reports ‘academic’ and
hard to read does not make their task any easier.

Hence there is a need for more accessible presentations of theory and results,
presentations that can lay the ground for more effective learning processes within the
ministries and policy agencies. This is a challenge that may benefit the researchers, as
they will be forced to understand the ‘lifeworld’ or cultural context of the policy
maker in a better way. By doing so, they will learn more about the environment in
which the research shall be used.

As an experiment we have written a fictional memo to an unnamed minister of

innovation, explaining the basis of the RISE programme and discussing the need for a
research and technology services policy. The memo follows this summary. This
document also includes a wider discussion of the memo, policy learning and the role
of research and technology services.

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Policy Memorandum

Ministry of Innovation
Department of Innovation Services

MEMO
The Annual Cabinet Budget Conference: On the role of
research and technology services in the innovation system
To the Minister,

We refer to Cabinet meeting document No. 2001-27, containing the

Ministry of Finance’s budget proposals in the area of knowledge
production and dissemination. This Memo contains arguments that might
be used in the Cabinet discussions.

Proposals of the Ministry of Finance

Budget cuts As expected the Ministry is proposing substantial cuts in the public
proposed by
the Ministry of funding of R&D and innovation support, arguing that the economy is
Finance overheating and that there is a need to curb public spending. The Minister
of Finance maintains that a further increase in the inflation rate will harm
the competitiveness of our industry, which in the long run may lead to
higher unemployment and social unrest.

The Minister also claims that the beneficial effects of the Government’s
innovation policies have not been documented, and that competence
building and knowledge acquisition and dissemination for competitiveness
is a task for industry itself.

The Department of Innovation Services has reason to believe that the

Ministry of Finance assumes that a further increase in public spending on
health, pensions and social services is unavoidable of political reasons. The
Minister of Finance will therefore fight hard to reduce expenses in other
parts of the budget.

The Department suggests that the Minister co-operate with the Minister of
Education on the topic of funding of basic university and college science
(see separate Memo on the overall R&D budget).

This Memo will concentrate on the issue of producing, distributing

and upgrading competences in the innovation system.

Market Failure
The Minister of Finance will accept that there is a need for public support
for research and development. She will do so on the basis of the traditional

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market failure rationale. The argument goes like this:

The Market R&D that leads to new or improved products, processes or services will
failure
argument not only benefit the company that perform or finance this activity. The
companies and people that use this new product will also profit from
increased efficiency. A new drug will not only benefit the pharmaceutical
company, it may benefit the whole society.

According to the market failure argument, firms are prone to invest too
little in R&D, as they are unable to harvest the profits following from this
spin off effect. This is a problem if the competitors benefit as much from
the innovation as themselves. Moreover, R&D is always a risky adventure,
which may stop some firms from investing.

Although this department is sceptical towards some of the premises behind

the concept of market failure (especially the idea that the chaotic nature of
everyday business is but a deviation from ’perfect’ or ’balanced’ market
conditions), there is no need to argue against it. It is certainly true that
society at large may benefit much more from an innovation than the
company doing or financing the research. This is a strong argument for
public support for R&D.

The systemic view of innovation

Traditionally economists have tended to view innovation – i.e. the
learning-based process of developing new, and improving existent,
products, processes and services – as something that is introduced into the
economy from the outside (’an externality’). Although most – if not all –
economists now agree that technological development is a major
contributor to economic growth, innovation policies are normally not
considered a part of economic and financial policies.

Modern innovation theory argues that:5

Innovation is
Technological change cannot be seen as something delivered from the

an integrated
part of the outside into the economy. Innovation is rather seen as an integrated
economy part of economic development. Managers, workers, engineers and
researchers all take part in a process aimed at producing and
developing products that someone asks for or might need in the future.
The most successful firms are most likely those that manage to advance
new or improved commodities or services.

Companies
No company is an island in itself. All firms take part in complex

take part in
clusters networks of suppliers, customers, partners, consultants and research
institutions, as well as various forms of public governance and
regulations.

Studies show that companies are more likely to interact with some

5
For a general introduction to modern innovation theory, see the RISE literature review or Innovation
policy in a knowledge-based economy, European Commission, Luxembourg 2000.

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companies and institutions than others, i.e. with those they share a
common interest. It turns out that most companies have the closest
relationships with customers and suppliers within the same branch of
industry or the same field of trade.

If you map the flow of trade, people and knowledge between

companies, you will find clusters of companies that are strongly inter-
connected, often being suppliers and buyers in the same chain of
production. These companies frequently interact with the same parts of
the public apparatus, including research institutions, offices and
programmes that are established to help these companies with advice,
information, facilitation and money. You will also find privately owned
consultancies (knowledge-intensive business services) that aim at
supporting these firms in their innovation effort.

These groups of firms and institutions may be anchored regionally or

locally, in which case we talk of regional or local clusters. However,
these patterns of interaction might also cross regional or national
borders, forming national or international clusters.

Industrial
It follows from this that the economic success of an industry to a large
success rests
on an efficient extent rests on the distributions and flows of competence-building
flow of resources in the relevant clusters, i.e. on whether the individual
competences companies are able to get hold of, understand and use the resources
available in the cluster. These resources may be found in various
institutions, and includes formalised, research-based knowledge.

In a similar vein one could argue that in the long term the main key to
the economic health of a nation is found in the production and
reproduction of relevant competences and knowledge in the innovation
system, not primarily in interest rates, inflation rates or a balanced
budget.

The RISE project indicates that as long as clusters have built in

mechanisms to renew and re-invent themselves their competences and
experience are very precious assets, regardless of their R&D-intensity
(i.e. whether they are classified as ‘high-tech’ or ‘low-tech’). However,
most successful clusters are the results of long and complex social
processes. To artificially create new cluster may be a too costly
strategy from both a policy and industry point of view. It is much
easier and cost-effective to build on existing strengths.

• When developing their competences and innovative capability firms

may interact with various forms of competence providers, including
other firms, public institutions, universities and colleges. From the
firm’s point of view these all provide competence services.

Some companies and institutions specialize in providing research and

technology services for firms. These have traditionally been called
RTOs (Public or semi-public Research and technology organisations –

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including laboratories and research institutes) and KIBS (Knowledge

intensive business services – predominantly private consultancies).

The EC RISE study shows that in quite a number of clusters RTOs and
increasingly KIBS provide all sorts of knowledge-related service
functions that help actors in this cluster to innovate and to adapt. The
mix of service functions and the balance between what services are
provided by RTOs vs. KIBS’ vary from cluster to cluster. However, the
general trend is that RTOs tend to move more downstream providing
more hands on and implementation like services, whereas KIBS
increasingly perform services that used to be associated with RTOs and
institutions of higher education only.

Competence and learning

Innovation Modern innovation theory argues that the companies’ ability to innovate
depends on
the ability to rests on their ability to learn. By this is meant not only learning through
learn trial and error within the companies’ own walls, but by learning from
others in the system of innovation.

Learning is not the passive absorption of information. Information is in

itself worth nothing unless you know where to find it, and how to mobilise
it in a relevant context – hence the need for close interaction with other
people and institutions.

In order to learn and stay up to date the companies and their employees
must stay in touch with related companies, institutions, and other sources
of knowledge and competence building (including everything from
research laboratories to trade fairs, conferences and professional
associations).

Knowledge is The Minister of Finance may argue that knowledge is a common good –
not a ’free’ or
common good freely available to anyone who knows how to read. In practice, however, it
is not. In firms knowledge is but an aspect of competence, meaning the
ability to perform significant tasks and to solve problems that enable firms
to compete effectively and sustainably in markets. Abstract theoretical
knowledge is of small value unless it is utilised in innovation practice.
Another company cannot just download a competitor's organisation or
work and life experience from the Internet.

This is why companies invest in R&D in spite of the market failure, and
this is why companies adopt innovative practices and organisational
structures. For a period of time they will have competitive advantage based
on improved competence that may be hard to imitate, even if they are
unable to patent the innovation.

Tacit Knowledge includes so-called ’tacit knowledge’, including the contacts of

knowledge
individuals, intuition and creativity, social intelligence, background
knowledge, a sense of context and appropriateness, and more.

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Culture and At the collective level, knowing ’what to do’ in a firm involves company
social skills
and business culture, shared ’genres’ of practice, and the local languages
and stories that are ’part of the furniture’ of a workplace. Competences – a
firm's abilities to do significant things in markets – include such tacit as
well as explicit and formal elements.

Machinery Competences also include the material apparatus of the firm – concrete
configurations of capital assets such as machinery or computers, materials,
documents, the communications infrastructure, the physical and practical
organisation of space, etc. In practice, the competences of a company take
the form of the entire organisation of resources available to actors in the
firm.

Tradeable Consequently learning is related to the acquisition of assets, including

assets
tradable knowledge assets, the ’public goods’ of basic science and ’hard’
technology and machinery. But tradable assets and public goods are not, in
themselves, competences. Further investment is required to ’configure ’
them into significant competences – to make them useful.

Whether a firm succeeds in developing the much-needed competences,

depends to a large degree on its ability to build linkages to relevant firms,
organisations and research and technology services. Although a firm can
be said to belong to a certain ‘industrial cluster’ (which is a theoretical
concept), that does not necessarily mean it is good at ‘networking’.

Institutional failure
The Minister of Finance would like to cut the budget of several
programmes targeting competence building in firms and knowledge
dissemination, claiming that this is the responsibility of industry. She
claims that the public’s responsibility should be limited to funding
university and college science.

Lack of However, recent research from the EU research project RISE and others
networking
and the ability confirm the need for such programmes. A lot of companies lack the
to find, competences needed to make use of university science in specific
understand competitive settings. The staff may not have the education that is needed,
and use new
knowledge they may lack the necessary contacts in the university sector or they may
lack the experience of transforming academic knowledge into industrial
competences.

As it happens, most innovation is done without direct use of university

research.6 For most companies it is more important to build learning
relationships with other firms, suppliers as well as customers.

6
Meaning that they are not using results from basic research directly and that they are not in contact
with universities and other institutions doing basic research. However, they may use knowledge and
technologies, which have components that have been developed through basic research. For instance:
All companies use computers, and although modern computers are not developed in science labs, they
contain materials developed through basic science and software based on logical systems developed in
universities.

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Moreover, they may also lack the experience to evaluate how relationships
with external sources of knowledge, skill, assets and insights might
contribute in a practical way to new, improved, relevant competences.

Systemic Companies thus often face what researchers have called systemic failure,
failure: Plugs
in the i.e. they are unable to mobilise resources needed to perform certain
knowledge innovation activities. They cannot get access to a relevant competence
flows (from an external specialist) or the means of building a relevant
competence within the firm. One could say that flows of knowledge and
other competence resources in the innovation system are restricted in such
a way that it hinders much needed innovation. This is especially true for
small and medium-sized firms that often lack the personnel and
competences needed to access the relevant networks and institutions.

Issues of perception are involved, together with interpretation (’making

sense’ of unfamiliar arrangements), communication, practical abilities to
get certain things done, finding the right institutions etc., which make them
invisible to potential beneficiaries.

In a sense these are all ’market failures’. A perfect market would have
none of these problems because all information would be perfectly
meaningful and all resources perfectly available. But in real-time and real
space, real humans and real firms have these problems of institutional
failure. ’Hard’ institutional failures are in formal organisations (e.g.
universities, government departments, firms), ’soft’ failures are in culture:
good practice, norms, language, expectations, stereotypes, etc.

Some policy makers argue that the impressive growth of the KIBS market,
shows that the private technology services do meet the demand of industry
and that there for this reason is no need for public measures. However, the
RISE programme has documented that research and technology services
may be marginal in particular clusters of innovating firms, while
simultaneously being viable as revenue-generating companies. In other
words, the market in research and technology services does not guarantee
that the companies that need them most use these services.

Systemic policy measures

Public support This is why the Ministry of Innovation has decided to support the
to the
development development of so-called research and technology services. These are
of a network services provided by firms, institutions, organisations or programmes that
of research help firms get access to much needed competences in these external
and
technology organisations, or to factors that enable them to build and upgrade
services sustainable competences in-house, as well as exploiting the existing assets,
resources and competences of the firm.

The Ministry of Finance will probably argue that the public contribution to
research and technology services should be the responsibility of public
universities, colleges, R&D institutes and laboratories only. These do
indeed play important roles as suchservice providers.

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However, the Minister could argue that institutions like the universities and
colleges have tasks that go far beyond the needs of industry. Their role of
providers of basic, long-term science often demands a culture that is not
always compatible with the short-term horizon of small and medium-sized
businesses. A too strong focus on industry needs may undermine the long-
term aspect of university research. Furthermore, what the firms need is
often not new basic science, but more practical technological or
organisational solutions based on already existing knowledge.

RTOs and The main business oriented competence services today are the research and
KIBS
technology organisations (RTOs, mainly industry-oriented, public-funded
technology institutes or research laboratories) and knowledge intensive
business services firms (KIBS, including various forms of private
consultants and professional services firms). Under pressure of reduced
public funding many RTOs increasingly operate as KIBS, perhaps on a
private non-profit basis.

The recent RISE study shows that RTOs are so diverse in their institutional
form and service activities that it is impossible to give a clear definition,
and misleading even to offer a typology. From an innovation policy and
functional point of view it is probably better to talk about research
institutes, laboratories, consultancies as research and technology services.
To these services one should also add units performing routine operations
associated with the productive use of technological apparatus – for
example, testing and certification, maintenance, health and safety audits –
and providers of machinery and new technology. These may not all be
targeting innovation directly, but by improving the competences of the
firm they strengthen the firm’s ability to innovate.

It should be added that from an institutional and administrative point of

view, it may still make sense to speak about R&D institutes, RTO, KIBS
etc.

Some research and technology services do an excellent job connecting

firms with firms, firms with R&D institutions, and firms with relevant
public measures, but the effect of their work varies from region to region,
industry to industry. This variation is partly due to individual, cultural and
historical differences in the institutions, but mainly due to the differing
dynamics and requirements of the clusters that the RTOs and KIBS serve.

Of course, innovation systems and clusters are dynamic, i.e. they change
over time, and the relevance or effectiveness of public-funded RTOs, for
example, may change (especially if RTOs or universities themselves do not
change).

The This variation means that one cannot base innovation policy on a
innovation
system is theoretical basis that treats all firms, industries, regions and research and
varied and technology services in the same way. This is why the Ministry of Finance
constantly is mistaken when they claim that there is no need for public measures in
changing,
hence the this field. The individual business owner cannot – and probably should not

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need for – concern herself with the overall functioning of the innovation system. It
dynamic
innovation is her job to develop a successful firm where she is. The same applies to
policies managers of RTOs; they have a difficult job maintaining the excellence of
their services, balancing the budget and identifying appropriate, competent
clients for their services.

The public On the other hand, the public policy makers, the industrial corporations
institutions
have the and relevant researchers should be able to develop an overall view of the
overall national and regional innovation systems, including the public and private
responsibility research and technology services provided within them.
for developing
the innovation
system The public sector may contribute to the development of a comprehensive
system of knowledge institutions and innovation programmes that can
improve the flow and distribution of relevant competences and competence
factors in various industries and clusters.

Private KIBS will always play an important role as competence suppliers

for firms, but they are not able to fulfil the needs of the whole system.
There will also be a need for publicly organised and funded policy vectors.

The RISE programme identify several core elements for policy related to
research and technology services (RTOs as well as KIBS):

• Build firms’ competences to use external research and technology

services (In most advanced countries, articulating demand is more
important than increasing the supply of research and technology
services).
• Facilitate a sound division of labour between various kinds of suppliers
and different kinds of service content.
• Match services to cluster requirements in strategically important cluster
(‘high-tech’ as well as ‘low tech’, new as well as traditional industries).
• Integrate actions across policy areas and government functions.
• Assess research and technology services’ contribution in specific
clusters, and give priority to existing clusters when developing public-
funded or sponsored vectors/measures.
• The various institutions contain mixes of economic and social tasks or
functions, which vary from cluster to cluster and from country to
country. When developing policies it is important to identify the actual
innovation functions of these units.
• Safeguard multiple roles of RTOs under other aspects of policy
(including employment, labour relations, the environment, health,
public welfare, culture and social affairs).

The innovation White Paper

Change and The Minister could remind the Cabinet of the recent proposals forwarded
Opportunity
in the white paper on innovation policy Change and Opportunity – on
Industrial Innovation and Creativity. This clearly states that the
Government wants to go beyond the traditional research policy, where the
State focuses on supporting R&D institutions only. The paper states that:

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To establish a • ’It is the goal of the Government to establish a well functioning

structure of
competence institutional structure of R&D institutions, knowledge-intensive
institutions business services, public measures for high risk financial support,
and programmes aimed at improving the competences of firms to
learn.’ (p. 17)

Dynamic • ’ One should increase the dynamic capability of firms, thus

capabilities of
firms strengthening their absorptive capacity and generating and updating
their strategic technological competences.’ (p. 18)

Uphold • ’It is the goal of the Government to uphold a modern, adaptive

modern
education sector of education of high quality that may bring out skilled and
creative people that can fulfil the needs of our society, our culture
and our economic life.’ (p. 35)

However, this is not enough. When focusing on the needs of business, the
paper also focuses on the systemic nature of innovation and knowledge-
creation:

Develop • ’The Government will continue to develop public services aimed at

public
research and improving the interaction between the participants in the innovation
technology system. These will include publicly funded, chartered or franchised
services for research and technology services in areas of the economy where
interaction
and co- there are few or no relevant private companies. Where the
operation opportunity offers, these will be 'prototypes' of potentially viable
commercial services. (...)

’The main effort, however, will be targeted towards programmes

for co-operation and interaction within and sometimes across
various industrial clusters: ‘collaborating for competition’. These
measures will counteract institutional failure of both an
organisational and a cultural kind within the system, failure that
prevents resources and competences outside the firm from being
identified or used in innovation. (...)

’Sometimes market failures of a straightforward kind are involved

and appropriate financial measures (e.g. public venture capital) will
be integrated with 'institutional failure' measures.’ (p. 45)

Regulatory • ’The Government will continue to improve structural elements in

reform.
the system, including regulatory frameworks, taxation, technical
standards, risk-management rules, health and safety regulations.’
(p. 46)

Programme The white paper also announces (pp. 54-60):

aimed at
strengthening
the learning
The creation of a new programme aimed at supporting the building of
capacities of systematic competences of firms to evaluate and use external sources
firms.
of knowledge and capability,
A system

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based on a
The development of a service system based on a sound mix of private

mix of private
and public and public institutions, including hybrids based on public as well as
institutions. private finance and participation,
Programme
for
A new programme aimed at building in the strategic and administrative
strengthening competences of policy makers involved in innovation policy and the
the design of research and technology services. The Government shall
competences
of policy identify the actual innovation functions performed by public-funded
makers. suppliers and R&D services in the various industries, clusters and
regions, and get a better insight into their various roles and tasks.

Some RTOs have functions going beyond the role of research and
technology services, including scientific advice to the public, inputs to
political debate and decision making, inputs to judicial processes,
operational services to firms and government departments, or – even –
basic research. The Government has been criticised for trying to sacrifice
these long-term public tasks on the altar of ’short-sighted’ innovation
processes in industry. Some of the ministers may repeat these concerns on
the conference, especially the Minister of Culture and the Minster of
Health and Social Affairs.

The Minister can refer to the White Paper's discussion of these matters. It
states that these functions should not be weakened, as the interaction
between the various functions will strengthen their long-term ability to
perform research and technology services, as well as their capability of
accomplishing other tasks.

Conclusion
University There now seem to be broad agreement on the need for strong support to
science and
industry our R&D institutions, and especially for university science and 'bridging'
mechanisms between university R&D and industry such as the Foresight
programme and various regional networking initiatives.

Clearly university research has cultural and social goals that go far beyond
the needs of industry. From an economical point of view, however, the
Government has a responsibility for making certain that relevant
competences and resources developed in these institutions are utilised by
industry in the most efficient way possible.

Exploiting the It is also important to ensure that the competences of our industry are
competences
of industry exploited effectively, since these constitute a far larger national resource
base than the whole of the university sector. This can only be done by a
two-pronged strategy.

Establishing a • Establishing a framework that improves the companies’ ability to

learning
framework learn, mobilising, generating and using new competences.

Improving • Improving the linkages between firms and between firms and
innovation
institutions (including firms) that provide research and technology

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linkages services in the form of either ’ready to use’ competences for

innovation, or various factors for competence-building (including
data, information, staff, physical technology and intangible assets).

An innovative Our economy and our welfare rest on an industry that is able to innovate
industry gives
a strong and adapt to constantly changing environments. Hence it is in the interest
economy of both society and the Ministry of Finance to support measures that
improve the competitive edge of industry.

Need for In order to develop such instruments and policies, there must be room for
strong public
institution for strong public institutions and offices that have the financial resources
innovation necessary to learn the nature of the various clusters and industries, and the
and co- research and technology services that are available or relevant for these
operation
purposes. There must also be institutions that can evaluate these measures
and suggest improvements.

The Ministry of Innovation must therefore oppose the proposed cuts in the
research and innovation budgets, and asks that the proposals forwarded in
the white paper on innovation is carried out according to plan.

END OF MEMO

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Appendix: Research and technology services and policy

development
The rise of systemic innovation theory
Rise is part of a longer series of studies of the innovation systems in Europe, which
gained ground with the OECD TEP-programme and the publication Technology in a
Changing World.7

In this document one finds a policy statement on technology and the economy
adopted by the OECD Council at ministerial level dated June 4 and 5 1991. In the
statement the Ministers ’...reaffirm the importance of fostering diffusion and wide
acceptance of technology within their economies and societies,’ and ’underscore the
critical importance of human resource development and mobility for the
competitiveness of firms and countries’ (p. 9).

Since the late 1980s the systemic view of innovation and technological development
has come to the forefront. More and more often policy makers and politicians use
arguments based on modern innovation theory, i.e. a view where innovation is seen as
the fruit of an efficient flow of competences, knowledge and ideas in a larger network
of firms, organisations, public institutions and regulations.

Theory and reality

However, when discussing these matters with researchers and policy makers, one
soon get the impression that this way of thinking is in no way taken for granted. In a
ritualistic manner both policy documents and research reports often opens their
analysis by declaring ’the death of the linear model’, meaning the end of the view that
new ideas and concepts normally are born in university science laboratories and
offices.

’We all say that the linear model is dead,’ one interviewee told one of the Norwegian
RISE researchers, ’still a lot of policy makers act as this is not the case. Maybe they
have not grasped the true implications of the new way of thinking, or maybe they find
it opportune to use more old fashioned arguments.’8

The RISE Work Package 4 studies show that there is no simple explanation for this
phenomenon. No country has a monolithic policy apparatus characterised by total
ideological consensus and common goals. Instead one will find large variations as
regards ways of thinking, policy strategies, educational backgrounds, historical
traditions and institutional frameworks. We have found ministries where the
worldview in one department differs significantly from the basic concepts used in
another.9 In this way policy-making milieus are no different from academic circles
where one school of thought may compete with another.

7
Technology in a Changing World, OECD Paris 1991.
8
From an interview with a Norwegian ministerial policy maker June 2000.
9
This used to be the case in the Ministry of Industry and Trade in Norway, where the Department of
Research used innovation theory actively, while the Department of Industry tended to use base its
thinking on traditional macro economic theories. The two departments have now been merged.

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For instance, within innovation studies one continue to differ between ’neoclassical
economics’, ’new growth theory’ and ’evolutionary innovation theory’.10 Although
there are no absolutely clear boundary lines between the various schools, the terms do
point to significant differences in the way one picture the reality at the root of modern
economic development. One will find some of the same dividing lines within the
political apparatus of European countries, although in these environments the
differences are not always formulated in academic terms.

Research and policy making, another ’linear model’

However, there is no one to one relationship between social and economic studies and
policy development. Strangely enough, researchers studying innovation and the
systemic nature of competence building, often fall back to a quite linear
understanding on how research on innovation and knowledge creation influence
policy development, i.e. policy makers ’transform’ the objective analysis of
researchers into relevant policy measures.

The RISE study shows, however, that the day-to-day reality of policy makers is much
more complex. Research results are only one of many factors influencing policy
development. Policy makers and politicians must also bear in mind the importance of
overall policy goals beyond the sphere of innovation and industrial development.
Then there is the press and public opinion to consider, cultural and ideological
differences, as well as the constant struggle between the various parts of the political
apparatus for funding and power (Edwards 1999).

Moreover, it would normally be wrong to picture policy makers as ’clients’ asking

’experts’ (i.e. the researchers) for help. Policy makers are experts in their own field.
Not only do they know much more about the nature of the political and administrative
system than the average social researcher; many of them are experts on the interaction
between industry on the one hand and public institutions and measures on the other.
One could therefore argue that it is essential that the contact between researchers and
policy makers go beyond the posting of a research report. There a should be a
dialogue between them, so that the researcher may gain a better insight into the life
and needs of the policy maker, while the policy maker can get a better understanding
of the theoretical and factual basis of the research done.

Mentalities
Periods with dominating mentalities
In 'Innovation polices in the post-war period' Hauknes and Wicken (1999) outlines
some aspects of recent innovation policies in Norway and points to some possible
trends of these policies for the upcoming years. The main concern is to elicit what the
underlying presumptions about industrial production and ‘value creation’ is and what
the ultimate aim of ‘modern’ competitive industry was.

A core assumption in the paper is that industrial innovation policies in any period
basically find their political aim in the perception of a gap between what is regarded
as the 'idealised modern' industry and characteristics of the present industries. This
ideal may vary over time, and an identification of key ideal models in various phases

10
See for instance Smith 1994.

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would thus contribute to explaining shifts in policy maker’s perceptions of challenges

to be met or problems to be solved by industrial policies. The same applies to shifts in
policy objectives and in the measures and instruments developed and used to attain
these objectives.

Though there are various other mechanisms that may cause shifts in these policy
mentalities, such as enhanced scientific understanding of economic growth and
development, it seems that the contribution of these to explain wider mentality shifts
of the public communities generally are minor. The guiding role of these inputs lies
probably more in shaping and advising policy formulation at the detailed level, within
the framework of any governing mentality.

The importance of industrial policy and its descendant innovation policy11 stems
generally from the role of the industrial enterprise as a generator of welfare. The
industrial enterprise, and the economic system, is a ‘value creator’ in these
terminologies, generating national income both on the private and the public hand, the
size of which determines the allowable levels of collective and individual
consumption and hence of general welfare.

Thus ultimately industrial policy is a central part of overall welfare policies. As well
as pointing to why industrial policies have been given strong attention in the period
we consider here from political parties and the policy system, it also throws light on
why the indicated mentalities are important; they are ultimately ideals about the ‘best’
generation of social economic welfare.

The mentality concept

The mentalities of policy practice have emerged at specific periods in history, in the
form of relatively coherent and explicit clusters of policy positions and practical
measures. They may be interpreted as ‘genres’, ‘paradigms’ or as ideal models of
industry.12

Mentalities persist, or have inertia. They continue to operate after the period during
which they originated and are embedded in institutional structures and arrangements

11
In the European Commission report Innovation policy in a knowledge-based economy (June 2000),
the term ‘innovation policy’ is defined as ‘a set of policy actions to raise the quantity and efficiency of
innovation activities, whereby “innovation activities” refers to the creation, adaptation and adoption of
new or improved products, processes, or services.’ Innovation policy is normally a part of a country’s
industry and R&D policies, but may also be integrated into economic, regional and educational
policies.
12
The term ’mentality’ will have to be an ambiguous one, given that a lot of the attitudes and opinions
that follow are not necessarily the result of systematic reflection. In this respect it has a lot in common
with Thomas Kuhn’s ‘paradigm’ (Kuhn 1970, Masterman 1972), Michel Foucalt’s ‘mentality’ and
Hans Blumenberg’s ‘epochs’ (Blumenberg 1983), although our ‘mentality’ must be understood as a
matrix of ideas that encompass a specific group of people, not a whole society or epoch.

One can also interpret the term hermeneutically. In this case the basis of the lifeworld (i.e. the total life
experience and competences) of the individual is shaped by ideas, competences and attitudes that are
common in his or her cultural and social context. Hence policy makers and researchers in a particular
environment and period of time will have their lifeworlds shaped by the same influences – they will
take part in the same ‘mentality’.

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as well as in policy practices and instruments. They constitute a framework for policy
discourse among policy makers and between these and the relevant policy
environment.

Mentalities and ideologies

Mentalities are often considered ‘self-evident’ and are not necessarily explicitly
formulated by policy makers. Researchers and scholars may, however, try to give a
clearer description of such worldviews, developing what one can call ‘ideologies’, i.e.
systematically developed models based on a given mentality or view of ‘reality’.13
Studies of innovation may for instance be linked to one or more of the dominating
schools of economics, including traditional neo-classical economics, new growth
theory and evolutionary innovation theories. These may be considered the ideologies
of innovation research and policy making.

There is, however, no one to one relationship between these ideologies and the
mentalities of policy makers. The RISE studies show clearly that any idea of policy
development as being solely a product of ideologies or practical research is
misconceived. There is no linear process starting in the universities or research
institutes leading to new and improved policies in the ministries and policy
institutions.

This should come as no surprise to people involved in innovation policies and

innovation theory, given the strong slant towards systemic thinking in these circles.
Nevertheless, the fact that there have been so few studies of policy learning has often
led to an oversimplified understanding of the relationship between research and policy
making.

Decisions of development and implementation of innovation policy programmes,

funding schemes and other policy instruments are made in a complex environment of
heterogeneous power distribution and responsibilities. This implies that simple
models of rational policy choices and implementation does not resemble ‘policy
making in action’. It also implies that simple models or analytical alternatives cannot
address concrete policy issues and choices in a sufficiently rich way, relevant to the
incentives structures, necessary trade-offs and negotiation processes of the policy
makers’ working context.

In analysing the interaction of research and analysis with innovation policy

development, it is necessary to approach the two environments as different cognitive
systems or fields of expertise, with different incentives structures.

13
An ’ideology’, theory or philosophy may, of course, also give birth to a new mentality. However,
one should be very careful picturing any linear process form mentality to ideology or visa versa.
Researchers, philosophers and policy makers all take part in a complex social and cultural systems,
where competences, ideas and cognitive structures may influence and inspire various individuals and
groups in a wide variety of ways. One way of interpreting the development of new ideologies would be
to model a feed-back loop where the ruling mentality of a social group or school inspires researchers to
develop new theories that ultimately challenges the basis of this mentality, thereby changing it.

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Research vs. policy making

The culture of Academia
Social researchers are raised in academic environments that reward new models and
new insight into social processes, regardless of any practical implementation of this
knowledge. This gives their publications a strong theoretical slant, which is reflected
in terminology and forms of publication. The scholar or academic is normally writing
for fellow researchers and scientists, not policy makers or the general public, which
can make the text inaccessible for persons that are not familiar with the present
discourse within these disciplines.

Researchers employed in institutions oriented towards applied social science and

economics are more likely to know the policy makers’ frame of reference, which
should make it easier for them to communicate. In other words, researchers familiar
with the needs and competences of the policymaker should be able to transfer their
own competences to the policy makers’ in a more efficient way.
Practical use of research
However, many of the policy makers taking part in RISE interviews and workshops
complain that it often is hard to read the main message of reports and that the material
is too ‘academic’ or not relevant to policy and policy vector development. This seems
also to be the case for research produced by institutions of applied research. This
could mean that the researcher has failed to understand the needs of the party
commissioning the research, or that he or she is unable to communicate the new
insight in an efficient way. In any case, one is facing a sub optimal learning process.

In general the policy makers taking part in WP4 have degrees from institutions of
higher education – very often a masters degree or an equivalent. Hence one should
expect that they are familiar with basic scientific methodology and terminology. This
is probably the case in most instances, and the discussions taking place in the
workshops and in the interviews, clearly shows that many of them are familiar with
various forms of social and economic theories, including modern innovation theory.
This means that at least some of these policy makers should have the competences
needed to read and understand research in general. If they find the research
inaccessible or not useful, one will have to look for other causes.

Given the description of mentalities above, one possible explanation may be a conflict
of mentalities or worldviews. Modern innovation theory is a fairly new discipline,
and policy makers with a more traditional educational background may fail to grasp
the essence of systemic thinking. The terminology used may also be unfamiliar.

The deficient learning process may also be caused by an ideological conflict. The
policy maker may perfectly well be aware of the message given in the report, but he
or she disagrees with the theoretical basis or find it uninteresting. Some of the RISE
interviewees reflected on different intellectual traditions existing side by side in
various departments, organisations or ministries.

These traditions may be rooted in different mentalities or ideologies (or both). In the
Norwegian Ministry of Industry and Trade one will find groups adhering closely to
traditional neoclassical economics, while others use modern innovation theory
actively in policy development. In Sweden a green paper recently presented a

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traditional linear university-oriented approach to research and innovation.14 That there

is a general interest in systemic innovation theory on the policy level is nevertheless
reflected in the name of one of the heirs to NUTEK: Verket för innovationssystem
(The Organisation for the Innovation System).15 The reception RISE-relevant research
gets will to a certain extent be dependent on the frame of mind of the recipient: his or
her mentality and ideological convictions.

There may, however, also be more pragmatic reasons for a lack of communication
between researchers and policy makers, some of them caused by the work
environment and the organisational structure of the policy agency or ministry at hand.

As there has been little research on the learning processes in policy-making

institutions, and RISE only has been able to make some preliminary studies, RISE
cannot venture solutions as regards how to improve the learning conditions in units
like these. It is, however, possible to map some of the most important aspects of
learning and innovation in such institutions and give a presentation of how some of
the policy makers themselves experience their situation.

Policy learning
Definition of policy learning
We define policy learning as the process underlying any changes in the political
‘behaviour’ of an agency, its portfolio of policy vectors (institutions, programmes,
funding schemes, regulatory frameworks etc.), objectives and management for or of
these, their constitution and the relative weight of vectors in the portfolio.

We broadly regard policy learning as having taken place within a policy agency when
the agency alters its policy behaviour, i.e when it

alters specifications and orientations for subsidiary institutions, programmes, or

the policy legitimisation of these, etc.

introduces new or altered policy vectors or

new internal and external monitoring or management systems,

expands or contracts its main constituencies.

The process underlying these changes is a complex process including various forms of
learning, types of competences and sources of knowledge.
Models of learning
An organisations ability to develop relevant knowledge-based policies is to a large
extent based on its ability to develop relevant competences, i.e. it is based on learning.
Four generic models of learning has been used as part of the analytical basis for case-
analysis in WP4:

Explicit conceptual delivery and acquisition

An explicit and direct interaction between the policy making agency and an

14
SOU 1998:128 Forskningspolitik -Forskning 2000 (Research 2000). Stockholm.
15
See Forskningsfinansiering i samverkan, Delrapport från organisationskommittén för Ny
myndighetsorganisation för forskningsfinansiering, 2000. http://www.nutek.se/information/forskfin.pdf

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external institution, furnishing new analytical perspectives, presenting and

performing research to policy makers, contract work to commissions, agencies on
specific issues or suggestions in new or altered policy initiatives or objectives etc.

Learning networks
Policy agencies are often involved in permanent or long-term networks where a
primary objective is the sharing of information or other conceptual resources
among its members. Such networks may include individual experts’ formal and
informal professional networks, long term institutional networks, dialogue with
the members of the constituency the relevant policies address, intra- or inter-
ministerial networks, and international networks (e.g. EU and OECD-based
working groups).

Benchmarking and other indicator-based or best-practice approaches

At one end of the spectrum are formalised indicator based reporting systems, at
the other ’one shot’ or sporadic assessments, evaluations and analytical studies.

Continuous improvement
Of informal processes, most notable is learning-by doing, which generates
capabilities and competences that are operational and experience-based. These
processes and capabilities are shaped by the impact of an evolving policy
‘culture’, including the ministerial or departmental perception of the organisation's
policy agenda; the governing, more general, political objectives and how they are
operationalised, and divisions of labour between ministries and departments.

Individual and organisational learning

Several of the RISE interviewees and respondents have pointed to the discrepancy
between individual learning and the learning processes of the whole organisation. For
instance: Although the Research Council of Norway employs a lot of highly
competent policy makers with experience from research as well as industry, the
organisation seem to lack an overall strategy competence building. In some respects
the competences of the organisation are not much more than the sum of the
competences of its employees.

Respondents from the Norwegian ministries give the same impression: There is a lot
of individual ‘learning by doing’, but the ministries as a whole seem to lack long term
plans for strategic competence building. The Ministry of Education, Research and
Church Affairs has its own ‘KUF School’, offering various courses to its employees
through various colleges and institutions for adult education. It is, however, up to the
individual to take the initiative, selecting courses.

The commissioning of research and evaluations often take place on an ‘ad hoc’ basis,
although the Research Council and SND have implemented policies of systematic
evaluation of institutions and programmes.

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Individual learning
A policy maker in a ministry or policy organisation is normally set to administer and
monitor excising policy vectors and to develop new ones. In doing so she or he will
have to take a lot of factors into consideration. Among these are:16

• the wishes, ideas, worldview and ideology of the political leadership of the
ministry, or − in the case of subordinate policy organisations − the political signals
and demands coming from the relevant ministry or ministries
• the wishes, ideas, worldview and ideology of the non-political superiors (civil
servants)17
• public opinion, including social movements and organisations
• the media
• regulatory restraints
• financial restraints
• scientific expertise

One must also take her or his personal background and interests into consideration
(the 'lifeworld' of this individual, to use the hermeneutic expression18):

• personal experience
• education
• worldview and ideological background
• networks and contacts

And finally, there are sources of information. These are of limited value if the
individual does not now how to find, understand and use this information. On the
other hand, the process of learning becomes much more difficult if relevant
information is not readily obtainable.

Policy makers tend to use a wide array of information sources:

• newspapers and magazines

• newsletters
• World Wide Web
• specialist databases, including relevant statistics
• books and periodicals acquired by the policy maker or her department
• books and periodicals from the library of the institution (if it has one)
• books and periodicals from public libraries
• government reports (including white papers and budget documents)
• reports commissioned by the government (green papers)
• reports from research institutes and consultants, including evaluations of
institutions, programmes and other policy vectors
• in-house memorandums and reports
• conferences, seminars, national and international organisations and working
groups

16
Cp. Arthur Edwards: 'Scientific expertise and policy-making: the intermediary role of the public
sphere', Science and Public Policy, June 1999.
17
This does not apply to ministries in countries were large parts of the staff is politically appointed, as
in the USA.
18
As used by Jürgen Habermas..

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Although scientific knowledge does play an important role in policy development,

any ‘linear’ model depicting the policy maker as a person who designs new policy
vectors purely on the basis of expert advice must be false. Not only is the policy
maker forced to take other factors into consideration − in a democracy he or she is
expected to do so.

However, many of the Norwegian respondents underlined the need for contacts in
policy agencies, industrial organisations and research institutes that can assist the
policy maker in gaining access to relevant competences. Hence researchers often play
an important role as competence providers also outside the traditional relationship of
commissioner/report producer.
The competence need of the policy makers
The policy makers look for various competences when hiring new employees or
asking researchers for help. In the Swedish round of interviews policy makers
expressed a need for:

• An understanding of the different cultures of industry, universities/university

colleges and industrial institutes. Work experience from the respective
organisation types was mentioned as a major contributor to such competences,
• Knowledge about relevant science and technology,
• Factual knowledge about the relevant industrial sector (structure, organisation
etc.),
• Awareness of what is currently going on in research, industry and policy
development,
• Knowledge about what it is possible to do and how to do it (available instruments
and the limitations inherent in the policy area, system or technologies),
• Experience from large development projects,
• An inclination to act, even if one have a partial and imperfect understanding of all
the dimensions of the topic at hand,
• An insight into the policy development in other countries,
• An insight into the present interests of managers on various levels in the relevant
industries or parts of the system.19

As one can see the policy maker has to develop a theoretical and factual insight into
the nature of the industrial innovation system. This they have in common with
researchers studying industrial innovation. However, the policy maker must also
know a lot about the workings of the political system and the relevant policy vectors.
Moreover, this knowledge must go far beyond an understanding of organisational
charts and formal procedure. They must develop an intimate knowledge of the
cultural aspects of the political and administrative environment, and learn what is
possible within the present administrative structure and political context.

Researchers have the duty to give their advice on a more independent basis, regardless
of whether this advice is ‘politically correct’ or politically feasible at the present time.
If they do not, research will very easily be reduced to a ‘legitimiser’ of the status quo.
The researchers still need to gain a better insight into the political and administrative
processes in the public sector, however, and into the everyday life of the policy

19
RISE: Swedish results of interviews on policy learning.

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maker. They need this knowledge in order to understand the competence needs of the
policy maker and in order to produce a realistic analysis of the consequences of the
various findings and suggested policy vectors.

The learning processes of policy makers

The RISE studies of policy learning cover only a few countries and a few institutions.
Hence it is hard make generalisations that cover all countries, cultures and policy-
making institutions. Nevertheless, innovation policy makers in the European area all
face some of the same challenges, which are to design, fund, implement, administer,
control and evaluate public policies, institutions, programmes and regulations.

As we have seen from the RISE exercise the competences of the individual policy
maker and the policy institutions depend on a combination of various factors,
including recruitment, information sources, networks and education.

Recruitment
The background of the policy makers come from is important. Some policy
institutions tend to hire highly experienced people with a background from
universities, colleges, RTOs, firms and other policy institutions. The ability to do so
depends, to a certain extent, on the cultural status of these positions, as well as
salaries.

In a country like Norway the salaries of ministerial officials tend to be much lower
than salaries in industry. Hence one very seldom sees movement of expertise from
industry to ministry bureaucracies. In institutions where there is a closer collaboration
with industry, the salaries tend to be higher, and the dissemination of experienced
people from industry to the public sector is normally more extensive. 20

Several of the interviewees underline the need for people with practical administrative
competence, especially from local administration of publicly funded policy vectors,
including programmes and institutions on the borderline between the public sector
and industry.

The same laws of learning apply to the policy maker as the company employee.
Information needs to be transformed into concrete competences. The policy makers’
ability to find, use and understand the information given by various sources is to a
large extent anchored in their network of colleagues and contacts.

Networks
The major source of competence building is day-to-day practice and collaboration
with colleagues and other people involved in the processes of policy development.
Hence interviewees mention networks and personal contacts as the most important
sources of information and knowledge.

20
Nås (1998). See also DSTI/STP/TIP(2000)16 Focus groups on national innovation systems, draft
final version of forthcoming OECD report on knowledge markets and innovation systems: Nurturing
the institutions of innovation (cf. OECD 2000).

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From the interviewees we gather that this contact building primarily is an individual
activity with little managerial input, although programme steering committees and
budget reference groups may be perceived as institutionalised instruments for
networking.

Educational background
The educational background of policy makers is of importance. Most of them have a
university or college background, normally at a graduate level.

Many of them consider themselves generalists, and claim that the particular
disciplines taken are not as important as the fact that higher education gives them the
ability to take part in the political culture and find, understand and utilise relevant
literature and research.

In other institutions and departments, the management tends to prefer recruits with a
specific type of education. There is, for instance, reason to believe that Ministries of
Industry, Economics or Finance tend to have a larger proportion of economists than
many other ministries and public institutions.

Researcher/policy maker interaction

The RISE studies have shown that one of the most important impediments for an
effective utilisation of innovation research in policy organisations is time – or, rather,
the lack of it.

The hectic pace of modern ministries and directorates leaves often little time to
reading and reflection. This does not mean that there is not room for learning. Policy
makers develop their competences through their day-to-day practice, but they often
lack the time needed to read through long reports or follow theoretical debates in the
research community.

Moreover, many policy makers say that they need information and advice of direct
relevance to the development of concrete policy vectors. Their patience often runs out
when researchers start deliberating the purely theoretical aspects of a certain
hypothesis.

In order to make certain that research is used and understood it is therefore important
to find other avenues for communication of research results. Several of the policy
makers interviewed reported that they found an active dialogue with researchers very
useful. Discussions in workshops and seminars seem to be efficient, more so than
large conferences where participants passively listen to selected speakers.
Commissioning research – phases
The most important meeting place for researchers and policy makers seem to be the
process of commissioning research and evaluations. Such processes are divided into
several phases:

The preliminary phase, where policy makers try to determine the nature of the
question that is to be asked. Informally, policy makers may get in touch with
researchers that are part of their network of contacts. Moreover, the issue at hand

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may be caused by questions raised by other reports or evaluations made by

researchers. In general, however, researchers are not much involved in this phase.

The commissioning phase, where policy makers get in touch with one or more
research institutions in order to get suggestions on how this research can be
carried out. This can be an important learning phase for policy makers as well as
researchers. The researchers must try to understand the needs of the public
institution in order to target the research or evaluation process as accurately as
possible. The policy maker need the expertise of the researcher to map the status
of research in this area, to decide what can be done, within a certain period of
time, to a given price. By discussing these matters with researchers the policy
maker may learn more about research in this field.

The research phase, when the research is carried out. The policymakers may
follow this part of the process through follow up meetings, preliminary reports,
workshops, seminars, participation in reference groups etc. The feedback they
give may teach the researchers more about the needs of the policy makers.
Furthermore, as the policy makers often are experts in the field of active
innovation policies, they may give the researchers useful feedback on the content
of the preliminary material, and input on how to proceed.

The finalising phase, where the research results are delivered, normally in the
form of printed material, seminars and conferences. Several policy makers told the
RISE researchers about reports and evaluations that have ended up i a drawer,
never to be used in policy development. Others felt that the dissemination of
results through seminars and conferences is more important than the final reports
in themselves. One reason for this is the lack of time for reading. Some policy
makers admitted that they often read executive summaries only. However, if the
reports are to be used in the development of new policies and new policy vectors
the results will often be included in policy documents written by the policy
makers. If this is the case, the chances are that the reports will be thoroughly read
by these policy makers.

The post-publishing phase, where policy makers may contact researchers in

order to clarify information given in the reports, where researchers may be asked
to present the results in meetings with the policy institutions, and where
researchers may be asked to carry out new research based on the previous mission.
Often policy organisations have agreements with R&D institutions, where the
policy makers are allowed to discuss relevant issues with researchers, without
making a new payment or signing a new contract. This service is often part of
agreements made in connection with basic funding or long-term contracts for
competence building.

The fact that an interaction between policy makers and researchers may take place
during these various phases does not mean that it necessarily does take place. The
process does show, however, that there are potentially many stages where researchers
and policy makers may interact and learn from each other.

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Strategic learning
It turns out that few of the institutions contacted by RISE have strategic approach to
learning through policy vector development. Policy learning is rather a useful side
effect.

However, there are departments that use workshops and seminars consciously in order
to improve the competences of policy vector administrators. The Norwegian
BRIDGE-programme, which aims at improving the innovative capability of firms,
continuously evaluates the various sub-programmes and projects belonging to the
programme. The central administrators in the Research Council of Norway travel
extensively to the local representatives in regions and take part in project leader
meeting and in term evaluation seminars.21 Moreover, the Research Council of
Norway often recruits private consultants as project managers as well as programme
co-ordinators. These consultants often have a background from industry or industry-
related services. The idea is to stimulate to competence flows between the advisers
and civil servants of the Research Council, regional administrators and the companies
themselves.

Interaction vs. independence

The role of scientific advice
Arthur Edwards points out (Edwards 1999) that although the sciences have lost their
authority based on knowledge and unanimous expertise, this has not led policy-
makers to reduce their appeal to scientific advice-giving.22 Edwards points to Jürgen
Habermas, who gives science a role in the communication between citizens and
policy makers in the ‘public sphere’. Edwards argues, however, that both the appeal
of the policy-makers to science and their uses of scientific expertise are often
tactically motivated and dependent on a variety of factors that bear on the ‘political
attention’ an issue receives. Hence the potential impact of scientific insights on the
public sphere is anticipated or used instrumentally by policy makers. On the other
hand scientists participate in public agenda-setting and make use of media attention in
furthering their normative stands on issues as well as their own strategic aims.
The use of policy oriented research
‘Deconstructivist’ research within the sociology of knowledge, philosophy and the
history of ideas have increasingly interpreted the use of science, research or any form
of communication as tools in struggles for power and influence (Aarnes 1987).
However, one should be careful reducing all uses of research input into tools of
opportunism.

The RISE interviews and workshops do indicate that policy makers may commission,
select or use results that strengthen their own position and arguments. We have
witnessed policy makers (and scientists from the universities!) focusing on indicators
that seem to support an analysis of reality that strengthens their position in the
struggle for R&D funding. Indicators that point in another direction are not discussed
with the same enthusiasm. There is reason to believe that policy makers commissions
21
Cf. http://program.forskningsradet.no/bro (includes English presentation); Programkatalog 2000
Området for industri og energi, The Research Council of Norway; Country report from Norway in the
EC Trend Chart exercise (http://ed230.eurodyn.com/Trendchart/).
22
Cf. Weingart 1999.

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evaluations, not solely to gain insight into the present state of affairs, but to be able to
legitimise reorganisation or political reform. Hence one can clearly argue that policy
makers do not always use research results in a balanced, fair and ‘objective’ way.

On the other hand, there is no reason not to believe policy makers when they say that
they commission research in order to gain insight into the workings of the innovation
system or the effectiveness of various policy vectors. Not only are many of these
policy experts genuinely interested in the ‘academic’ aspect of innovation and
learning, they also need this knowledge in order to develop new, effective policy
vectors. Their legitimacy as civil servants rests to a certain degree on their ability to
produce effective policy actions that can strengthen the political credibility of the
politicians.

Politicians may also be genuinely concerned about finding solutions that might help
industry, and even if this is not always the case, their success as politicians rests on
their ability to be perceived as competent and pro-active. This does not guarantee a
realistic utilisation of relevant research – like most human beings, politicians may find
it useful to suppress information that does not strengthen their own cause – but it may
also stimulate their interest in the topic at hand, making them more receptive to new
research.

Several of the policy makers contacted in this study are very aware of ethical
problems related to the use of research in policy development. Their interest is partly
grounded in pragmatic concerns. They argue that the credibility of the research and
the use of it depend on trust. If any party can raise doubt about the validity of a report
or an evaluation, it might easily become useless from a policy perspective.

This line of reasoning often brings up the role of public opinion or the public sphere
mentioned by Edwards. These policy makers argue that the best defence against abuse
of research or a lack of impartiality on the side of the researcher is an open public
debate where alternative research bodies may criticise the findings.

Others perceive a possible conflict with more classical ideas of what science and
research should be. This is often based on the ideal of the disinterested natural
scientists. Many researchers hesitate when asked to give concrete policy advice, often
on the grounds that it is the task of policy makers to do so – researchers shall only
supply the factual base for this decision-making.

The neutrality of the researcher

There is also the idea that researchers should stay neutral in political matters, and that
their objectivity may be threatened if they engage in the development of policy
vectors. This understanding is based on traditional views of the ideal university
researcher as a person that stands on the outside of society, looking in, giving the
necessary corrections to ‘manoeuvring politicians’ and ‘predisposed policy makers’.23

The policy makers are presumed to be too immersed in the complexities of social
leadership to get the overview needed to make unbiased judgements. And
interestingly enough, when policy makers commission research from researchers, it is

23
Often called the ‘Weberian ideal’ after the German sociologist Max Weber.

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often to get an independent view and a more refined understanding of the problem at
hand. An independent review may also give a political legitimacy.

There may indeed be a possible conflict between the need for dialogue and
understanding between policy makers and researchers on the one hand and academic
independence on the other. This conflict must be taken seriously and should be
discussed thoroughly.

The results from the RISE project indicate, however, that it is very hard – if not
impossible – to uphold the ideal of the isolated observer. Not only are researchers –
like all human beings – influenced by ideological trends and personal preferences,
ambitions and prejudices, they also need a close dialogue with the users in order to
understand the commission, and to produce relevant and useful research. As we have
seen, this dialogue is also needed to strengthen the learning processes in the political
apparatus.

There is, on the other hand, a danger that researchers may be ‘held hostage’ by policy
makers that deliberately or unconsciously try to influence results in a way they find
useful, for instance in order to legitimise a certain policy. Policy makers may also
interpret results in a certain way in order to achieve political goals.

There may also be instances when the researchers have their own political agenda or
when they consciously or unconsciously try to please the commissioners in order to
get more funding. Hence it is essential that applied research of this kind uphold the
same methodological and ethical standards as other forms of science and research.
One must make certain that there exists several alternative research institutions or
environments studying related fields, so that there might be fruitful discussions and
scholarly criticism.

Several of the policy makers contacted by RISE argue that researchers should be
careful suggesting one – and only one – policy solution. The complexity of both
innovation systems and political systems gives reason to believe that there are no
optimal solutions to specific policy problems. There is rather a wide array of various
combinations of possible policy vectors and organisational structures. When asked for
concrete policy advice, it is probably better that researchers map possible avenues of
action and give an analysis of potential consequences following the various
alternatives. It can be useful to give examples from other countries, these policy
makers argue, although one should always discuss the main similarities and
differences between the relevant national innovation systems.

As there is no single solution that can be objectively characterised as ‘the best’, it

must eventually be up to the policy advisers and policy makers to use their
experience, expertise and faculty of judgement to suggest concrete policy vectors. The
researcher has the luxury of withholding his or her final judgement arguing that there
is need for more research. It is the task of the policy maker to make decisions, in spite
of a lack of knowledge.

Systemic failures in the policy apparatus

Even if researchers and policy makers in the field of innovation policy have
succeeded in developing a common frame of reference and are able to discuss these

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matters in a constructive and useful manner, there remains another stumbling block
for the development of a modern and flexible innovation policy. This is the struggle
that takes place within the policy apparatus.

The political system consists of a large number of institutions, organisations and

ministries. Each institution is divided into various departments, and each of them may
have their own culture, ideology and policy. Several of the interviewees pointed to
the importance of the leaders of the relevant departments; their interests, opinions,
contacts and psychology. In a small organisation one person may to a certain extent
shape the development of policies within its own field of interest. The researchers
often communicate with lower or medium level civil servants and policy advisers.
Whether the managers of these units absorb and make active use of the competences
in the organisation depends on their ability to communicate with the rest of the staff.

These managers must also be able to explain the policies suggested by this unit to
managers and politician higher up in the system. If there is a struggle for influence
and funding going on inside the organisation, the fate of a policy vector may rest on
the manager’s ability to convince the upper echelons of its usefulness.

Policy vectors based on systemic innovation theory often conflict with traditional
economic thinking and research policies. The manager cannot take a common frame
of reference for granted. The struggle for influence will therefore often become a
struggle to establish a new worldview and a new vocabulary. From a didactic point of
view this is a very difficult task, especially as the senior managers and political
leaders often are older, experienced men and women. Through a long life they have
developed their own perspective and their own ways of doing things, and they can
find it hard to abandon these in favour of new and seemingly radical ideas. Even if
they do accept the new way of thinking, they may avoid using arguments based on
these theories in fear of loosing the struggle for money and influence.

There may also be a conflict with other departments and organisations that are not
involved in innovation policy formulation. This is particularly the case in the central
government. In the annual budget cabinet meetings, the ministers will have to
convince his or her colleagues about the wisdom in funding their particular policy
vectors.

Although it seems that the success of a certain policy to large degree rests on the
competences of individual managers, their competences are interconnected with the
competence flows in the policy system. The preliminary studies made by RISE may
indicate that there are large differences between organisations as well as countries in
this respect. It seems, for instance, that the culture of Norwegian and Swedish
ministries are characterised by a rather ‘flat’ command structure, meaning that junior
civil servants and policy advisers can communicate with the managerial level in a
fairly efficient way. This means that the competences developed in co-operation with
researchers more easily will reach the political level of the system.

Moreover, innovation policy is not that politically or ideologically charged in these

countries. There seems to be a broad consensus as regards the overall policy goals.
This leaves more room for civil servants to suggest and implement new policy
measures. Both Norwegian and Swedish R&D and industry policies are increasingly

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based on innovation systems theory, and this development is to a large degree based
on bottom up initiatives, i.e. the new policy vectors are often based on suggestions
made by the bureaucracy, not by the parties or the politicians.

In other countries, like Germany, policy development seems to be characterised by a

top down culture, meaning that the political level to a greater extent influence the
limits of policy formulation. This may restrict the flow of new ideas from research
and lower level civil servants.

The ministerial memo, a didactic experiment

Having met several policy makers involved in innovation, industry and R&D polices
in Britain, Sweden, Germany, Portugal, the Netherlands and Norway, the RISE team
has decided to make a didactic experiment, trying to make the RISE results more
accessible and relevant for policy makers in the European area. We have established a
fictional Department of Innovation Services in an imagined Ministry of Innovation in
an unnamed European country. This department is given the task of briefing the
Minister of Innovation before an important budget meeting in the Cabinet.

The Minister is to defend the Governments funding of certain RISE-relevant policy

vectors against a more traditional Minister of Finance that wants to curb public
spending and keep a balanced budget. By doing so the Minister will have to articulate
the basic concepts used by RISE for an audience of Ministers that are not necessarily
familiar with this kind of thinking.

This is by no means an unlikely scenario. Although no European countries have a

separate Ministry of Innovation, there are always one or more ministers that are
responsible for innovation polices, normally ministers of research, industry, the
economy or – even – education. These ministers have to legitimise funding of policy
vectors aimed at knowledge development and competence building. Traditionally
these ministers have focused on the importance investments in R&D and higher
education when doing this, and they have often used arguments based on a linear
understanding of innovation in addition to theories of market failure.

Although there have for a long time existed programmes for technology diffusion in
many European countries, these have often been based on the idea of transferring
knowledge and new ideas from universities, colleges and RTOs to industry. They
have not been that concerned about the interaction between the various actors, nor the
learning processes in firms.

The increasing popularity of systemic models of innovation, however, has led to the
development of policy vectors aimed at improving the competence flows in the
system, e.g. between companies and RTOs/KIBS24, firms and firms and companies
and universities. Although university and RTO science and research are considered
equally important for industry today (although partly for different reasons), the focus
of policy interest has therefore shifted somewhat to the companies themselves. 25
24
Research and technology organisations and knowledge-intensive business services, including
research institutions, government laboratories and private consultancies
25
For a discussion of recent innovation policy developments see Innovation Policy in Euorpe 2000, a
report from the European Trend Chart of Innovation programme (EC 2000). More reports can be found
at http://ed230.eurodyn.com/Trendchart/.

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From an innovation policy standpoint, universities, RTOs, KIBS and various public
institutions, programmes and schemes are viewed as service providers that can
provide firms with much needed competences, contacts and collaboration.26
Moreover, there is a new interest for institutions and measures designed to foster
interaction in the system.

These policy vectors often go beyond the traditional sphere of public support and
intervention. In order to defend and explain these measures, the policy makers and
politicians cannot take RISE’s common frame of reference for granted. He or she
cannot expect the listeners to know the nuances of modern systemic innovation
theory, and must therefore try to make this worldview understandable and acceptable
before defending the funding of concrete policy vectors.

If the listeners are entrenched in an older mentality or a conflicting ideology, it is hard

to make this way of thinking understandable in a short period of time. Cabinet budget
meetings do not normally leave room for long speeches, and our minister will have to
be very brief indeed. We have to admit that our memo will not help him or her in that
respect. Still, it will hopefully give the Minister some ideas on how to approach the
subject.

Our discussions with policy makers and our own experience indicate that the
acceptance of these kinds of systems approaches may rest on several factors.

It is normally easier to non-economists to accept the systemic integrated view of

innovation, as it seems more "common sense" and "true to life" than neo classical
theories. Economists steeped in traditional economics might find it harder to
break loose from the standard models of economic growth. We suggest that the
Minister appeal to the listener's own experience with learning and networking.

Some policy makers are unfamiliar with RISE's use of the cluster concept. This is
especially true in Britain, where policy makers tend to think of clusters as a
regional phenomenon. Hence we suggest that the Minister explain the various
forms of clusters, naming regional clusters as one of them.

The idea of a hybrid economy of research and technology services is problematic.

Many may find the inclusion of government funded programmes within the
category of ‘research and technology services’ confusing, even if they provide
financial services and facilitation components (e.g. consortium-building) that are
unavailable in commercial forms of innovation-services provision. Many policy
makers focus on the institutional structure, not on the services these institutions
supply. This is why we feel that the Minister must stress the functional role the
institutions have in the innovation system. What counts is what the institutions
are doing, not their historical role or what they are called.

On the other hand, policy makers that do focus on the services these institutions
supply, tend to find the distinction between RTOs and KIBS disturbing. From the
26
That is not the same as saying that these institutions are seen solely as instruments for industrial
development. There seem to be broad agreement that science and research have cultural and social
goals that go far beyond the sphere of economics.

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firms perspective it is not important whether an institution is called a research

institute or a consultancy. The firm is looking for competences, and it does not
matter much whether these competences are based on research or work
experience. Policy makers, however, are obliged to look beyond these
institutions' roles as research and technology services. There may, for instance, be
a need for government laboratories and publicly funded research for cultural,
social or welfare reasons. Governments must also consider the need for a stable,
long-term development of competences; research that is not directly relevant for
companies today. The Minister must therefor remind his colleagues of the broader
perspective.

We suggest that the policy maker normally use the word ‘competences’, as this
includes the idea of learning processes. European policy makers often use words
like ‘knowledge’ and ‘information’ instead, in spite of the fact that these terms
lack the dynamic aspect of ‘competences'. Our use of ‘competences’ reflect a
similar drift in educational policies, away from a word like ‘teaching’ –
signifying diffusion of knowledge – towards ‘learning’ – pointing to the
interactive aspect of competence building. The minister should not spend too
much time on this point, however, as the message is more important than the
terms used. He or she may, however, use the distinction to make a point. By
explaining the use of terms, the minister may draw the listeners’ attention to an
important aspect of new innovation theory.

There is no absolute division between innovation services and operational services

(production services) involving the deployment of technology, or between
research and technology services and manufacturing supply (e.g. of capital
equipment or intermediate products within a supply chain). Acquiring new
‘things’, machinery included, implies the acquisition of new competences, partly
as the employees must learn how to operate the technology and integrate it into
the innovation process and partly because the functionality of the ‘thing’ is based
on competences. However, the minister must choose his points with care and not
make his exposition too complicated. We therefore suggest that he or she does
elaborate on this. We have, however, decided to use the term ‘research and
technology services’ in order to encompass RTOs and KIBS as well as regular
suppliers of machinery and technology.

International and inter-sectoral comparisons and benchmarking for R&T services

may be viable. But because of historical differences in institutions, cultures and
industrial structures and trajectories there can be no generic, abstract model of a
successful research and technology services operating strategy. Unless the
minister feels that his audience has grasped the gist of systemic thinking, he or she
should not complicate matters by going into concrete examples from other
countries. However, in another context concrete examples may be a useful
didactic instrument.

We suggest that the Minister introduces the term systemic failure. Some of his
listeners may already know this term; to others it will represent a new way of
thinking. RISE researchers have discussed the use of an alternative terminology,
for instance by classifying the concept of systemic failure at as another type of
market failure (‘market failure mark II’). This might make it easier to get the term

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accepted by traditional economists. On the other hand it may also strengthen the
traditional understanding of market failure, giving the listeners the impression that
there may exist a social state of affairs where this failure is totally absent (‘perfect
market conditions’). In order to draw the listeners’ attention to the systemic nature
of systemic failure, we therefore suggest that the minister uses the term, while at
the same time explaining that it also can be explained as a sort of market failure.

RISE and beyond

Our studies of the national systems for innovation policy development have shown us
that sound innovation policy advice not only depends on a proper understanding of
the industrial innovation system. The researchers must also gain insight into the
nature of the system of policymaking, its institutional structure, its culture and social
framework. Like companies and clusters, this is also an arena for learning and
innovation, although the policy makers are operating under different ‘market
conditions’ than company managers and employees.

It should also be said that in one respect this system of policy making is actually part
of the overall national system of innovation. This does not only apply to public
institutions for R&D, financial support and research and technology services. It also
applies to the political and administrative apparatus that design these policy vectors.
Their understanding and their decisions may have a profound impact on the working
conditions of firms.

We therefore believe that innovation research should increasingly focus on

‘innovation policy innovation’. Hopefully, RISE can function as a starting point for
such studies.

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