A New Look at Creative Giftedness

Gifted and Talented International
Volume 25, Number 1, August, 2010.
Gifted and Talented International – 25 (1), August, 2010. 1

The World Council for Gifted and Talented Children
Executive Committee and Officers (2009-2011)

President
Taisir Subhi Yamin;
General Director, The International Centre for Innovation in Education (ICIE);
Université Paris Descartes, France.
Vice President
Edna McMillan;
Stoney Creek, Ontario, Canada.
Secretary
Leslie S. Graves;
Educational consultant, Dublin, Ireland.
Treasurer
Julia Link Roberts;
Executive Director of the Carol Martin Gatton Academy of Mathematics and
Science; Western Kentucky University;
Bowling Green, Kentucky, USA.
Members
Ngarmmars Kasemset;
Director, Thailand–The Gifted and Talented Foundation (TGT);
Bangkok, Thailand.
Leonie Kronborg;
University Lecturer in Gifted Education, Monash University;
Clayton, Victoria, Australia.
Klaus K. Urban;
Leibniz University, Hannover, Faculty of Humanities;
Stadthagen, Germany.
Executive Administrator
Cathrine Froese Klassen;
University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada.
2 Gifted and Talented International – 25 (1), August, 2010.

Gifted and Talented International
Volume 25, Number 1, August, 2010.
Editor-in-Chief: World Council for Gifted and Talented

Taisir Subhi Yamin Children (WCGTC)
International Centre for Innovation in
Education (ICIE), WCGTC Headquarters,
Institut de Psychologie, C/O University of Winnipeg, 515 Portage Avenue,
Université Paris Descartes, France.
Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3B 2E9, Canada
Associate Editors: Phone: (204) 789-1421 Fax: (204) 783-1188
e-Mail: headquarters@world-gifted.org
Todd Lubart
Laboratoire Cognition et Développement,
www.world-gifted.org
Institut de Psychologie,
Universite Paris Descartes, France. International Editorial Review Board
e-Mail: todd.lubart@univ-paris5.fr
(2009-2013)
Ken McCluskey
Eunice Alencar, Brazil Don Ambrose, USA
Faculty of Education,
University of Winnipeg, Canada. Alessandro Antonietti, Italy Jean-Jacques Bertschi, Switzerland
e-Mail: k.mccluskey@uwinnipeg.ca Jim Campbell, England Hanna David, Israel
Joan Freeman, England Marcia Gentry, USA
Peter Merrotsy Miraca Gross, Australia Mary-Anne Heng, Singapore
School of Education, Katherine Hoekman, Australia Astrid Kaiser, Germany
University of New England, Australia. Lannie Kanevsky, Canada Sandra N. Kaplan, USA
e-Mail: pmerrots@une.edu.au
Katerina M. Kassotaki, Greece Leonie Kronborg, Australia
Trevor J. Tebbs Roza Leikin, Israel Lee Martin, England
Psychology Department, Bronė Narkevičienė, Lithuania Lynn D. Newton, England
Castleton State College, Roland S. Persson, Sweden Louesa Polyzoi, Canada
Castleton, Vermont, U.S.A. Joseph S. Renzulli, USA Karen Rogers, USA
e-Mail: aquate11@hotmail.com Larisa Shavinina, Canada Bruce M. Shore, Canada
Rena Subotnik, USA Kornelia Tischler, Austria
Dorothy A. Sisk
Sylvie Tordjman, France Javier Tourón, España
Director, The Gifted Child Center, Lamar
Donald J. Treffinger, USA Klaus K. Urban, Germany
University, P.O. Box: 10034, Beaumont,
Texas 777l0, U.S.A. Dmitry Ushakov, Russia Wilma Vialle, Australia
e-Mail: dorothy.sisk@lamar.edu Wu-Tien Wu, Taiwan Dimitris Zbainos, Greece
Copyright 2010 – World Council for Gifted and Talented Children, all rights reserved.
The Gifted and Talented International (GTI) is a refereed journal published twice a year by the World Council for
Gifted and Talented Children (WCGTC).
Membership includes this journal. Additional copies may be purchased by contacting the WC GTC:
worldgt@uwinnipeg.ca
Submit all manuscripts in quadruplicate, double spaced, accompanied by a short abstract (approximately 100
to 150 words), and with citations and references, following the guidelines set forth in the Publication Manual of
the American Psychological Association, 6 th Edition.
Include author’s full mailing address, phone and fax numbers, as well as an e-Mail address.
Send manuscripts to:
Taisir Subhi Yamin, Editor-in-Chief, Gifted and Talented International,
Heilmeyersteige 93, D-89075, Ulm, Germany, mobile telephone: (0049) 172-929-7632.


Table of Contents
From the Editor’s Desk
Scientific Creativity and Knowledge Production: Theses, Critique and Implications.
Taisir Subhi Yamin …………..….……………………………………...………………...……...... 07
Articles
Where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of knowledge production?
Hisham B. Ghassib …………………………………………...…………………..………................ 13
Limits on Science: A Comment on Where Does Creativity Fit into a Productivist Industrial
Model of Knowledge production?
Robert J. Sternberg …………..……………………………………………...………………..…..…. 21
Comments on Ghassib’s “Where Does Creativity Fit into a Productivist Industrial Model of
Knowledge Production?”
Ken W. McCluskey …………………………………….……………………………...……….……... 23
Little Science to Big Science: Big Scientists to Little Scientists.

Dean Keith Simonton …………..………………………………………………………….……...… 27
The Importance and Weaknesses of the Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge
Production.
Roland S. Persson ……………………………………………………………………….…….......…. 31
Expanding Views of Creative Science: A Response to Ghassib’s Productivist Industrial

Model.
Don Ambrose ………………………………………………………………..………………….….…. 35
Review of Hisham Ghassib: Where Does Creativity Fit into the Productivist Industrial
Model of Knowledge Production?
Heinz Neber ……………………………………………………….………………...………………... 41
A Short Commentary on “Where Does Creativity Fit into a Productivist Industrial Model of
Knowledge Production?
Marcia Gentry ……………………….…………………………………...……...…...…………...….. 45
A Chaos of Delight: A Response to Hisham Ghassib.

Peter Merrotsy ……………………………………………………………………………...…....…. 49
A New Look at Creative Giftedness.

Todd Lubart; and Franck Zenasni ……..……………………………………………….……...…. 53
Scientific Creativity: Idealism versus Pragmatism.
Michael D. Mumford; Kimberly S. Hester; and Issac C. Robledo …….……...…………...…. 59
Creativity, Scientific Practice, and Knowledge Production.

Marilyn Fryer ………………………………………………………………………………...…....…. 65
Science and Creativity: The Importance of Ontology for Scientific Understanding.

Lee Martin …………………………………………………………………………………...…....…. 69

Can Creativity be Systematized?: A Response to Ghassib.

Joyce VanTassel-Baska ………………...………………………………………………...…....…. 75
Products Depend on Creative Potential: A Comment on the Productivist Industrial Model
of Knowledge Production.
Mark A. Runco ……………………………………………………………………………...…....…. 81
Knowledge is Where You Make it: A Response to Ghassib.

Jonathan Alan Plucker; and Anne T. Ottenbreit-Leftwich ..………………………...…....…. 89
Creativity and the Science Enterprise.

Rena F. Subotnik …………………………………………………………………………...…....…. 93
A Brief Comment on the Surge of Modern Scientific Knowledge.

Joan Freeman …………………………………………………….………………………...…....…. 95
Creativity, Knowledge Production, and Innovation Studies: A Response to Ghassib’s
“Where Does Creativity Fit into a Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge Production?”
Tudor Rickards …………………………...………………………………………………...…....…. 97
Critique of “Where Does Creativity Fit into a Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge
Production?”
Carole Ruth Harris ………………………………………..……………………………...…....…. 101
Creativity in Science and Science Education: A Response to Ghassib.
Lynn D. Newton ………………………….………………………………………………...…....…. 105
Creativity an Ultimate Goal and Challenge for Education: A Response to Ghassib’s Article.
Dorothy A. Sisk ………………………………………………….……………….………...…....…. 109
Knowledge Production in Small and Medium Sized Enterprises.
Han Van der Meer …………….…………………………………………………………...….....…. 115
A Response to a Plethora of Responses.

Hisham B. Ghassib ……………………………………………………………………….…....…. 117
Book Reviews
(1) Light Up Your Child’s Mind.
Joseph Renzulli; and Sally Reis; with Andrea Thompson ……………………....……….…. 127
(2) Being Smart about Gifted Education.

Dona J. Matthews; and Joanne F. Foster ……………….…………………...……...……..…. 129
Submission Guidelines

From the Editor’s Desk:
Scientific Creativity and Knowledge

Production: Theses, Critique, and
Implications
Taisir Subhi Yamin
Welcome to this issue [Volume 25, Number 1 (August, 2010)] of Gifted and Talented
International. It is a special issue on scientific creativity and knowledge production. The target
paper, the twenty-two critiques and response article, and the concluding article are significant
in their depth and are thought-provoking contributions that will highlight and expand areas for
future research on the conception of creativity and the models of the creative process and
knowledge production. It offers insight into the nature of scientific creativity, the creative
process and the dynamics of knowledge production. Ghassib (2010) proposed a well-grounded
model for knowledge production.
The purpose of this special issue is to shed light on a new model of knowledge
production. In his target paper, “Where Does Creativity Fit into a Productivist Industrial Model of
Knowledge Production?”, Hisham B. Ghassib (2010) focused on science as industry, and has
grounded it in certain socio-historic peculiarities of modernity. He has also constructed a
comprehensive mode of knowledge industry coupled to an epistemological model of scientific
rationality. According to this model, Ghassib (2010) has placed creativity at the heart of
scientific practice and considered scientific creativity as the basis of knowledge production.
The object of Ghassib’s (2010) paper In the first response article, “Limits on
is not creativity per se. Rather; it is the Science: A Comment on Where Does
production of scientific knowledge and the Creativity Fit into a Productivist Industrial
role of both individual- and collective- Model of Knowledge Production?”, Robert J.
creativity in the process. Ghassib (2010b) Sternberg (2010) agreed with Ghassib (2010)
emphasizes science as “a socio-historic that scientific knowledge is playing a key role
process, and presupposes the notion of in the forward development of society.
collective creativity” (p. 113).
Sternberg (2010) suggested directions
Ghassib (2010) has addressed that might need to be further developed. In
different processes, including: logical, addition, he listed the limitations of the
deductive, and thought experimentation. In scientific knowledge, and the advantages to
addition, he has identified four global scientific knowledge, including: self-
commons of scientific practice, including: correcting; its truth does not depend on
Scientific reason; scientific intellectual tools; ideology; and correspondent to some reality.
the ontology of natural being; and the
qualifications of a scientist. Uncertainty seems to be the essence
of creativity. This phenomenon is the most
Ghassib’s (2010) model has six important quality in knowledge production.
components: The productive sites; the
producer; raw materials; means of knowledge In the second response article,
production; methods of production; and the “Comments on Ghassib’s Where Does
product. Creativity Fit into a Productivist Industrial
Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 7

Model of Knowledge Production?” Ken W. Bearing in mind what we know about

McCluskey (2010) stressed the importance of the conception of creativity and the
Ghassib’s model. He extends this paper and components of the creative process in the
emphasized the importance of programmes context of psychology and education, Roland
and special provisions aimed at developing S. Persson (2010) addressed strengths,
potential creativity [e.g., Creative Problem weaknesses, and the negative consequences
Solving (CPS)]. of Ghassib’s model.
According to McCluskey (2010), In the next response article,

creativity may be taught or enhanced. But, “Expanding Views of Creative Science: A
what about the role of abilities, interests, Response to Ghassib’s Productivist Industrial
styles of learning and expression, emotional Model”, Don Ambrose (2010) provided
commitment, and motivation? insightful responses to Ghassib’s (2010)
model, and invaluable recommendations for
McCluskey (2010) believes that its extension and refinement.
inventions happen when the scientist is ready
and able to seize opportunities when they According to Ambrose (2010), “the
come along. This implies that educational scientific enterprise could be helped on the
systems are responsible about knowledge large scale if scholars paid more attention to
dissemination, taking into account the most interdisciplinary initiatives” (p. 36).
effective/ innovative teaching methods.
In the next response article, “Review
McCluskey (2010) asserted the of Hisham Ghassib: Where Does Creativity Fit
importance of competencies-based capacity into the Productivist Industrial Model of
building in nurturing the gifted and talented, Knowledge Production?”, Heinz Neber (2010)
and to maximize the potential of the average addressed a number of issues pertinent to the
learner. He also reported that various nature of the scientific method, and discussed
instruments, such as the Torrance Tests of the production process in natural sciences.
Creative Thinking (TTCT), were developed to He also highlighted the general characteristics
rate the creativity of responses. More of knowledge production in science.
recently, another battery to measure potential
creativity was developed in France. Evaluation Reading Ghassib’s (2010) target
of Potential Creativity (EPoC) was published article has caused me to ponder a number of
in 2009, and can also be used to measure the interesting questions, which may also be the
impact of training programmes aimed at focus of future research papers and articles
developing thinking skills. for this journal: Why is investigating this
phenomenon important, and how could we
In his critique, “Little Science to Big strengthen our definitions and models
Science: Big Scientists to Little Scientists?”, representing the creative process? How can
Dean Keith Simonton (2010) reviewed in we promote inter-cultural dialogue to
depth Ghassib’s (2010) paper, and asserted stimulate creativity and innovation in
his points of view concerning the proposed education in order to understand the world
model. Simonton (2010) provided a strong better and to improve standards of life?
comprehensive analysis, and pointed out that
different models may be needed to account Similarly, in her response paper, “A
for different aspects of this complex Short Commentary on “Where Does Creativity
phenomenon. Fit into a Productivist Industrial Model of
Knowledge Production?”, Marcia Gentry
In his critique, “The Importance and (2010) asked Ghassib (2010) a large number
Weaknesses of the Productivist Industrial of important questions to answer, or to
Model of Knowledge Production”, Persson encourage scholars and researchers to find
(2010) raised a number of questions. the right answers.
8 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

Gentry (2010) concluded her response knowledge; and (4) the importance of the
article with a table summarizing the outcomes organizational setting in which this work
of her survey. She asked nine doctoral occurs.
students to respond to Ghassib’s (2010)
paper by considering what about the theory In the 11th response article, “Creativity,
they found interesting, profound, or Scientific Practice, and Knowledge
appealing. Then she asked them to consider Production”, Marilyn Fryer (2010) welcomed
what questions, gaps, or issues they would Ghassib’s target paper and considered it as a
like to see the author address. “window into pre-modern science and under-
reported history” (p. 66). Fryer (2010) pointed
In the 8th response article, “A Chaos of out that “motivation is absolutely crucial to
Delight: A Response to Hisham Ghassib”, the production of creative work” (p. 65).
Peter Merrotsy (2010) sheds light on the value
of science and discussed the components of Rather than offering an alternative
Ghassib’s model. Merrotsy (2010) concluded position to Ghassib’s theory, in his response
that this model fits very well within the article, “Science and Creativity: The
conceptual framework of Creative Knowledge Importance of Ontology for Scientific
Environments (CKE). In addition, it fits with Understanding”, Lee Martin (2010) offered
other models to locate and understand some reflection on the role of creativity in
scientific creativity. industry, explored the role of recognition in
science and creativity; and highlighted the
In the next response article, “A New importance of ontology when considering the
Look at Creative Giftedness”, Todd Lubart; philosophy of science.
and Franck Zenasni (2010) analysed
Ghassib’s target paper, and concluded that In the next critique, “Can Creativity be
the business of science is the creation of new Systematized?: A Response to Ghassib”,
knowledge. Lubart and Zenasni (2010) remind Joyce VanTassel-Baska (2010) concluded
us that the characteristics listed in Ghassib’s that countries that allow the industry of
paper are relevant to creative work in science, science to flourish may become leaders in the
and they considered them as a subset of the next millennium. According to VanTassel-
cognitive and conative factors that were Baska (2010), the researchers should focus
identified in the multivariate approach to on the environmental contexts that are
creativity. This response article also brought conducive to creativity. In her article,
the investment approach into focus. VanTassel-Baska addressed the definition of
creativity and discussed the relationship of
According to Lubart and Zenasni creativity and intelligence. In addition, she has
(2010), the target paper can be taken as a call reported the characteristics of creative
to recognize the importance of creative people.
giftedness in science. Thus, we can examine
empirically if the abilities highlighted by In agreement with VanTassel-Baska
Ghassib (2010) are the most important ones (2010), creativity and innovation are important
for scientific creativity. to the success of economy. So, why do
educational systems spend so little time and
There is a need for creativity and resources on developing creativity and
innovation in all fields of knowledge in general innovation skills?
and in science in particular. Along these lines,
the next response article, “Scientific Trilling and Fadel (2009) concluded
Creativity: Idealism versus Pragmatism”, that “the new world of work is demanding
Michael D. Mumford; Kimberly S. Hester; and ever higher levels of expert thinking and
Issac C. Robledo (2010) discussed scientific complex communicating” (p. 49).
creativity, and addressed four key problems:
(1) the assumptions made about who does According to Trilling and Fadel (2009,
creative work; (2) the kinds of knowledge p. 49), the first set of the 21st century skills
involved in creative work; (3) the processing focuses on critical learning skills and
operations people apply in working with this innovation: Critical thinking; problem solving;

future problem solving; communication and as the largest economic sector, Subotnik
collaboration; and applied imagination and (2010) asserted that this is not true unless he
invention. includes the defense industry; the service
industry; manufacturing; and health.
In the next response article, “Products
Depend on Creative Potential: A Comment on Freeman (2010) wrote a brief
the Productivist Industrial Model of commentary and said “Ghassib presents
Knowledge Production”, Mark A. Runco intriguing and novel ideas”. In her critique, “A
(2010) believes that Ghassib’s (2010) theory is Brief Comment on the Surge of Modern
useful and logical. The primary objectives of Scientific Knowledge”, Joan Freeman (2010)
Runco’s (2010) commentary are to examine concluded that “this is an interesting essay on
the relationship between creativity and the origins of scientific thinking and
knowledge and the relationship between knowledge production. But where are the
creativity and productivity. In addition, he references to gifts and talents.
attempts to identify and evaluate those
assumptions in the target paper. Challenging traditional models of
creative thinking, leadership, problem solving
In the next critique, “Knowledge is and team building, Tudor Rickards’ research
Where You Make it: A Response to Ghassib”, is non-traditional. In his response article,
Jonathan Alan Plucker; and Anne T. “Creativity, Knowledge Production, and
Ottenbreit-Leftwich (2010) focused on one Innovation Studies: A Response to Ghassib’s
aspect of Ghassib’s target paper, and “Where Does Creativity Fit into a Productivist
addressed the influence of technology on Industrial Model of Knowledge Production?””,
changing where knowledge is generated and Tudor Rickards (2010) analyzed Ghassib’s
how it is used. article and examined its conceptualization
alongside recent contributions to creativity
Plucker and Ottenbreit-Leftwich theory and practice at the levels of individual,
(2010) concluded that “technology has team, and organization.
already facilitated fast transformations to
collective knowledge, as well as facilitated Rickards (2010) made an interesting
change to democratize knowledge production point that “a new form of institutionalisation
and research” (p. 91). may be underway which may be heralding the
rise of the creative manager” (p. 98).
Reading Plucker and Ottenbreit-
Leftwich (2010) stimulated some enlightening In the next response article, “Critique
discussions, and raises two questions: What of “Where Does Creativity Fit into a
is the role of technology in the creative- Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge
learning environments and innovative Production?””, Carole Ruth Harris (2010)
teaching methods? What is the nature of the raised a number of questions, and concluded
most effective curricula in promoting creativity that Ghassib’s (2010) will benefit by defining
and innovation in education? terms, expanding definitions, and providing
an historical time line to assist the reader to
In the digital world, “knowledge and understand his theses.
thinking skills are greatly enhanced when a
child applies her efforts to a real and present In the 20th response article, “Creativity
problem, a ‘something’ that is personally in Science and Science Education: A
meaningful and important” (Renzulli, Reis, & Response to Ghassib”, Lynn D. Newton
Thompson, 2009, p. 228). (2010) is concerned about the implications of
Ghassib’s (2010) model on gifted education
In the next brief commentary, and talent development programmes.
“Creativity and the Science Enterprise”, Rena
F. Subotnik (2010) focused her critique on the Newton (2010) offered a number of
logic of Ghassib’s article. In disagreement definitions, and highlighted the importance of
with Ghassib’s (2010) description of science gifted education, and scientific creativity.

According to Lynn D. Newton (2010), In agreement with Runco (2010),
“scientific processes can involve creative Ghassib’s (2010) paper is “one of the many
thought and action” (p. 105). Scientists are divergent and diverse perspectives which are
being creative when “they construct scientific necessary for the evolution of scientific
arguments, models, explanations and theories thoughts” (p. 86).
and when they test them” (p. 105) with
experimentation. In science education, In his concluding article, “A Response
instead of using the term ‘creativity’, it might to a Plethora of Responses”, Hisham B.
be more useful to refer to ‘productive thought Ghassib (2010b) summarized the main theses
(Newton, 2010). of his target paper, clarified the major issues
and his views on knowledge production. He
In the next response article, “Creativity also showed unusual foresight in
an Ultimate Goal and Challenge for Education: conceptualizing scientific creativity and
A Response to Ghassib’s Article”, Dorothy A. modeling knowledge production.
Sisk (2010) raised the important question;
“Why doesn’t education invest more time and Last, yet not least, he was hinting at
funds in creativity development, and if they the implications of his theory and its impact
did invest, what could educators do to on other disciplines (e.g., gifted education,
promote creativity?” (Sisk, 2010, p. 109). excellence in education, talent development).
The concluding article (Ghassib,

Sisk (2010) addressed the first 2010b) will offer further comment on these
component, that of the productive sites of critiques and response papers, and will
universities and research institutes which are answer a number of important, fundamental
crucial to the realization of Ghassib’s (2010) questions raised by the authors of this special
model. In addition, she has reported the issue.
outcomes of her research in this field
knowledge. For example, she surveyed Nobel The authors of this special issue have
Prize winners in science, math, and contributed substantially to the debate
concerning the nature of scientific creativity
chemistry. “Nobel Prize winners surveyed
and knowledge production. They deserve
were emotionally and intellectually committed
recognition for their contributions, as well as
to their work” (Sisk, 2010, p. 112). their patience throughout the production,
review, and editorial process.
In the last critique, “Knowledge
Production in Small and Medium Sized Apparently, this special issue has
Enterprises”, Han Van der Meer (2010) allowed us to develop a more comprehensive
pointed out that “when we see an enterprise understanding of scientific creativity, the
as an organisation with an inbuilt drive to creative process, and knowledge production.
survive and strive for continuity, it is common Hopefully, this special issue will serve as a
stimulus forum for sharing creative thoughts.
to make the distinction in two equally
important processes. One process
I hope you will find the contents of
concentrates on doing the right things (also Gifted and Talented International (2010, 25(1))
called effectivity), the other on doing the interesting, fascinating, useful and
things right (also called efficiency)” (p. 115). informative.
I hope that Ghassib’s ideas regarding As always, should you have any
the definition of the conception of scientific comments or suggestions, please feel free to
creativity and what models should be forward them to me. Additional intriguing
constructed for the creative process are works are already on the horizon, so stay
useful to GTI readers. tuned to Gifted and Talented International.

References
Ambrose, D. (2010). Expanding views of creative science: A response to Ghassib’s productivist industrial model.
Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 35-40.
Freeman, J. (2010). A brief comment on the surge of modern scientific knowledge. Gifted and Talented
International, 25(1), 95-97.
Fryer, M. (2010). Creativity, scientific practice, and knowledge production. Gifted and Talented International,
25(1), 65-68.
Gentry, M. (2010). A short commentary on “where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of
knowledge production? Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 45-48.
Ghassib, H. B. (2010a). Where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of knowledge production?
Ghassib, H. B. (2010b). A response to a plethora of responses. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 117-
124.
Harris, C. R. (2010). Critique of “where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of knowledge
production?” Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 101-104.
Lubart, T.; and Zenasni, F. (2010). A new look at creative giftedness. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 53-
58.
Martin, L. (2010). Science and creativity: The importance of ontology for scientific understanding. Gifted and
Talented International, 25(1), 69-74.
McCluskey, K. W. (2010). Comments on Ghassib’s “where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model
of knowledge production?”. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 23-26.
Merrotsy, P. (2010). A chaos of delight: A response to Hisham Ghassib. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1),
49-52.
Mumford, M. D.; Hester, K. S.; and Robledo, I. C. (2010). Scientific creativity: Idealism versus pragmatism.
Neber, H. (2010). Review of Hisham Ghassib: Where does creativity fit into the productivist industrial model of
Newton, L. D. (2010). Creativity in science and science education: A response to Ghassib. Gifted and Talented
Persson, R. S. (2010). The importance and weaknesses of the productivist industrial model of knowledge
production. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 31-34.
Plucker, J. A.; and Ottenbreit-Leftwich, A. T. (2010). Knowledge is where you make it: A response to Ghassib.
Renzulli, J. S.; Reis, S. M.; and Thompson, A. (2009). Light up your child’s mind. New York: Little, Brown and
Company.
Rickards, T. (2010). Creativity, knowledge production, and innovation studies: A response to Ghassib’s “where
does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of knowledge production?”. Gifted and Talented
Runco, M. A. (2010). Products depend on creative potential: A comment on the productivist industrial model of
knowledge production. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 81-88.
Simonton, D. K. (2010). Little science to big science: Big scientists to little scientists. Gifted and Talented
Sisk, D. A. (2010). Creativity an ultimate goal and challenge for education: A response to Ghassib’s article.
Sternberg, R. J. (2010). Limits on science: A comment on where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial
model of knowledge production?. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 21-22.
Subotnik, R. S. (2010). Creativity and the science enterprise. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 93-94.
Trilling, B.; and Fadel, C. (2009). 21st century skills: Learning for life in our times. San Francisco, CA: John Wiley
and Sons.
Van der Meer, H. (2010). Knowledge production in small and medium sized enterprises. Gifted and Talented
VanTassel-Baska, J. (2010). Can creativity be systematized?: A response to Ghassib. Gifted and Talented

Where Does Creativity Fit into a
Productivist Industrial Model
of Knowledge Production?
Hisham B. Ghassib
Abstract
The basic premise of this paper is the fact that science has become a major industry: the knowledge industry.
The paper throws some light on the reasons for the transformation of science from a limited, constrained and
marginal craft into a major industry. It, then, presents a productivist industrial model of knowledge production,
which shows its components, mechanisms, bases, rules and specificities. Accordingly, it locates the place and
role of creativity and innovation in its processes. This leads to constructing a new model for the scientific
method and scientific practice.
Keywords: Scientific creativity, knowledge production, productivist industrial model, innovation,

epistemic heritage, evaluation process, scientific method.
Introduction
Exact science, whereby mathematized expense of exact scientific methods. The socio-
theorization is closely wedded to mathematized historical conditions in pre-modern cultures
observation and experimentation, is a millennial were not ripe for the rapid expansion of such
affair. It started well before the advent of pockets at the expense of their pre-modern
Modernity; in 5th century BC Babylon, in the context (Amin, 1989).They awaited the advent of
form of Babylonian astronomy, with its peculiar capitalistic, modernistic Europe, which created
blend of numerical methods with accurate the required conditions for the so-called
naked-eye observation (Aaboe, 2001). Scientific Revolution, whereby exact science
Another pocket of exact science was broke the mythico-metaphysical shell asunder,
soon to flourish in Hellenism-namely, theoretical disposing of ancient gnostic, apriorist methods
geometry and Greek astronomy, with its once and for all (Ghassib, 2004).
peculiar geometrical, as opposed to Babylonian
numerical, methods (Neugebauer, 1969). The pocket became the norm, and the
context was reduced to a marginal curiousity.
A third pocket was to form in Arabic This tremendous revolution was soon to
Islamic culture-namely, objective optics revolutionize the very process of scientific
(Rashed, 2003) and the Shukuk school of practice and organization and the role of
Ptolemaic astronomy (Saliba, 1994). science in modern culture and the modern
economy.
These great beginnings of exact science
are associated with such ancient names as the Pre-modern science was a marginal
Babylonian Kidinnu, the Greeks Euclid, sector and activity in more than one sense. Its
Hipparchus and Ptolemy, and the Arabs Al- practitioners were very few in number compared
Hazen, the Maragha school luminaries and the to the mass of peasants, craftsmen, soldiers
Damascene Ibn Al-Shatir. and tradesmen. Its economic impact was
almost non-existent, and its economic size was
However, these were mere, relatively infinitesimal compared to the agricultural sector.
isolated, pockets in a mythico-metaphysical Its organization was guild-like, and it lacked
context. That context was characterized by self-autonomy in the sense that it was
gnostic, apriorist, syllologist and idealist subordinated to religious and theological
metaphysical methods, which prevailed at the institutions and policies.

On the other hand, modern science, It has also become a truly self-autonomous
which erupted volcanically during the 17th enterprise, which is almost unconditionally
century, has come to play a pivotal role in the supported by government and the private
modern economy, and has rapidly expanded to sector.
become the largest economic sector in modern
society, both in terms of the number of In the following sections, I shall attempt
scientists, engineers, technicians and an explanation of this transformation in the
administrators working in it, and in terms of status of science, and present a productivist
governmental and non-governmental industrial model of the knowledge industry,
investments in it. which accords creativity and innovation a
central place in this process. I shall end the
In fact, it has become a major industry- paper with an account of the global commons of
probably the largest industry-in modern society. scientific practice.
__________________________________________________________________________________________
The Peculiarity of the Modern Economy
Very few scholars would contest the idea that the Renaissance witnessed epochal
transformations, both cultural and economic. The emergence of modern science- what may be
termed the Galilean Newtonian project- was intimately tied to these transformations. If we locate the
essence of that transformational process in the emergence of a new revolutionary mode of
production, we could say that modern science was the necessary offspring of this new mode of
production. In other words, we locate the transformation of science from a constrained, dependent,
marginal craft into a self-autonomous gigantic industry into the peculiarities of the modern economy.
Of course, one could speculate on the relationships between pre-modern science and pre-
modern modes of production, such as the vast variety of feudalist and slave modes of production
that prevailed in antiquity (Ghassib, 1993). However, this need not detain us here. Instead, let us
focus on those peculiarities of the modern economy that necessitated turning scientific knowledge
into a major industry.
I relate the knowledge industry to two essential peculiarities of the modern economy. The
first is that the modern economy withers away and dies out unless the means of production,
transport, communication and exchange are constantly revolutionized- i.e., unless its activities are
based on a rapidly developing technology (Marx, 1982).
Thus, whereas the pre-modern economy could afford to rely on a static technology based on
crude empirical craft-like knowledge, the knowledge associated with the direct practice of the
peasant, sailor, tradesman, blacksmith and carpenter, the modern economy i s necessarily based on
a rapidly developing scientifically based technology –i.e, a technology that embodies scientific
knowledge, the precise mathematized knowledge of causes and productive mechanisms. A
constantly revolutionized technology is of necessity scientific, and requires a rapidly developing
institutionalized scientific enterprise, a knowledge industry. Thus, the modern economy requires a
knowledge industry, a gigantic knowledge industry, if it wants to survive, persist and reproduce
itself. Science as industry seems to be a necessary condition of reproduction in modern society. The
type of technology required necessitates that.
The second peculiarity of the modern economy in this context is that, unlike premodern
economies that were geared towards satisfying basic existing needs, the modern economy is geared
towards creating new needs, including illusory needs. In fact, it withers away and dies out without
constantly creating new needs (Marx, 1973). However, the largest generator of new needs is
knowledge, being also the prime creator of new modes of consciousness. Thus, a large knowledge
industry is a necessary condition of survival of the modern economy, as it is a constant generator of
new needs that drive the modern economy forward, albeit alo ng a tortuous, crisis-ridden march.
These peculiarities have turned science into the largest industry in terms of capital investment and
the number of employees.

A Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge
In what sense is the knowledge enterprise an industry? And, in what sense does it differ from
other conventional industries?
If we view it as an industry, then we shall have to define its productive sites, the nature of its
producers, the nature of its raw material, the nature of the means of prod uction, the methods of
production employed in its productive sites, and the peculiarity of its products. Once we define
these components and mechanisms, we can locate the specificity of the knowledge industry as a
creative enterprise within its structure as a specific industry.
Let us define the components named above.
1. The productive sites: Needless to say that the principal sites of knowledge production are
universities, research institutes and research units in various enterprises. In modern times ,
universities have been steadily transformed from teaching and knowledge -preserving
institutes into knowledge-producing factories. Their number and sizes have rapidly
mushroomed, and it would be an interesting research exercise to draw curves showing the
expansion rates. Similarly, research institutes devoted to pure and applied research started,
at the beginning of the 20th century, as a few scattered trickles here and there in Germany,
but soon spread and expanded exponentially worldwide (Kragh, 2002). The knowledge
factories of today are universities and research institutes.
2. The producers: The knowledge producers are known by the name "scientists" and
researchers- a breed of specially trained creative minds that are bred and nurtured at a very
high cost. Of course, the knowledge factories reproduce themselves by breeding and
nurturing such a network of highly qualified creative minds. They constitute the core of the
knowledge working force. Of course, they are supported at all levels by an army of
engineers, technicians and administrators, but they are the real, direct producers of
knowledge.
3. The raw material: To define the raw material of knowledge production, let us take a few
examples from the history of science. Let us start with Kepler. What was the material Kepler
worked with and on? Certainly not with actual material objects or experimental instruments.
Rather, he worked on (and with) Ptolemaic geometrical methods and concepts, Aristotelian
physics, Copernican ideas, Pythagorean notions, and Brahian naked-eye observations.
Theories, ideas, notions, data, mathematical objects- these were his raw material. In brief,
his raw material was a specific epistemological heritage-the Aristotelian Ptolemaic
Copernican Pythagorian heritage (Stephenson, 1987).
Let us take another example-namely, Max Planck. In his scientific practice, Planck was
totally oblivious to the type of heritage Kepler had worked on and with. All pre-Newtonian science
was alien to his thought and practice. Rather, his point of reference was classical physics, a
theoretical edifice consisting of four principal components—namely, classical mechanics,
electromagnetic theory, thermodynamics and the then newly founded statistical mechanics.
Together with experimental data concerning black-body radiation, that theoretical edifice constituted
his raw material (Kuhn, 1978). Thus, once again we find a specific epistemological heritage
constituting the raw material of a specific scientific practice (Alhusser, 1977).
We can generalize by saying that the raw material of any scientific practice is a specific
epistemological (or, more precisely, epistemic) heritage, or past knowledge. Generally speaking, an
epistemic heritage is a logically and conceptually inhomogeneous edifice ridden with defects,
absences, inner contradictions and areas and halos of uncertainty. Scientists work on it, and with it,
to fill in gaps, resolve contradictions, solve problems, test its ideas, contract areas of uncertainty,
ground notions, provide explanations, construct new ideas, and predict results. Textbooks tend to
present it as though it were a logically coherent axiomatic system. However, research reveals it to be
highly inhomogeneous and partially incoherent. That is why it develops and unfolds dialectically. The
pressure of incoherence is its principal motor of development.

4. The means of knowledge production: Knowledge is produced by means of knowledge.

The epistemic heritage is the main repository of the means of production of knowledge. That
is why a scientist works on, and with, his epistemic heritage. A creative scientist constantly
takes ideas and mathematical techniques out of their original contexts, and employs them
elsewhere, embedding them into new contexts. Ptolemy constructed the whole of ancient
astronomy with a marvelous mathematical tool called Euclidean geometry (Ptolemy, 1978).
Galileo constructed a wholly new astronomy with a wonderful instrument called the
telescope. Newton followed by constructing a wholly new mechanics with a sharp new
mathematical tool called the calculus (Cohen, 1980). Einstein turned to a mathematical tool
perfected by Riemann, Levi Civita and Ricci, called differential geometry, to construct his
monumental theory of gravity (Eisenstaedt, 2006).
Mathematical methods, physical ideas, measuring instruments and labs are all means of the
production of knowledge, and they are a part of the epistemic heritage.
5. Methods of production: The history of science reveals a variety of methods of scientific

practice and research. Every major scientist seems to have had his/ her own method of
research. No two major scientists seem to be alike in this respect. Einstein's way of thinking
and constructing theories was peculiarly his own. Likewise with Boltzmann, Planck, Bohr,
Heisenberg, Schrodinger, Dirac and Feynman. Does this mean that there is no scientific
method—that it is a philosophical myth? We shall discuss this issue in detail in the next
section.
6. The peculiarity of the product: In scientific production, the product differs fundamentally
from other industrial products in two basic respects. In the first place, the evaluation process
of the product is an essential moment of its production. This means that the product does
not acquire its definite character as a scientific product until it successfully passes through
the evaluation process set forth by the scientific community. The work done by a researcher
or a research group can be raised to the status of a scientific product only via this evaluation
process. When it is thus recognized by the scientific community, it gains admittance into the
epistemic heritage. In no other industrial process does quality control or evaluation play such
a crucial role in the very process of defining the product.
In the second place, in all industrial processes, the product is imaginatively and operationally
specified beforehand, prior to the production process, with the exception of the scientific product.
The latter is by definition unspecified, and unspecifiable, beforehand. Otherwise, it would not be new
knowledge. The fact that the product is specified beforehand in all other industries makes the
production process a routine mechanical process. That is, it reduces it to an a priori well-defined
order of well-defined steps. Production in these cases is reduced to drudgery. In science, on the
other hand, the product cannot be specified a priori. Thus, the knowledge production process
cannot be reduced to an a priori order of well –defined steps. It cannot be reduced to a routine
assembly line, to mere drudgery. It is in essence a creative process. Without creativity and
innovation there is no knowledge production. One can never arrive at a genuine scientific product by
faithfully following a fully ordered and specified set of steps, rules and operations. The creative leap
is a must, just as in music (contrast Mozart to Salieri) (Schaffer, 1981). The scientific product is
intrinsically and necessarily (almost logically) unenvisaged and unenvisageable a priori, which means
that its process of production is intrinsically unspecified and unspecifiable, and this is the essence of
creativity and the creative process.
These two fundamental traits make science an essentially communal creative process .
The Myth of Scientific Method and the Global Commons of Scientific Practice
Following the preceding discussion, we method as such, but there is a scientific

aver that the scientific method is an rationality, or global commons of scientific
epistemological myth. There is no scientific practice, which make it scientific, and, thus,

distinguish it from other practices. Every major physical laws – it turned the laws of nature into
scientist follows his or her specific method and a set of very powerful differential equations.
way, his or her own vision and research project,
but within the broad context of a universal These equations have an amazing
common rationality, or a structure of global explanatory and predictive power – almost
commons of scientific practice. magical. They define an ever expanding space
I identify the following four global of possible concrete situations. They generate
commons of scientific rationality and practice: structured knowledge out of a limited number of
local bits of information. They lie at the basis of
1. Scientific reason: This is the only scientific explanation and prediction. Needless
authority and point of reference recognized to stay that modern science is still dominated
by scientific practice. No other authority, and defined by the Galilean – Newtonian
whether sacred or profane, is recognized project, despite the enormous revolutionary
by it. Scientific reason consists in a developments that have occurred in the past
dialectical system with two basic hundred years (relativity, quantum mechanics,
components–namely, mathematized quantum field theory, superstring theory,
theorization and mathmatized cosmology).
experimentation. These two moments are
related to each other dialectically. By 2. Scientific intellectual tools: Scientific
"dialectical" I mean "necessary, practice employs a variety of intellectual
transformative and contradictory". That is, tools that are common to all its diverse
each of the two moments presupposes the forms. The most conspicuous are those
other necessarily, such that each ceases which transform theory into practice and
to exist without the other. The dialectical vice versa. These are induction, deduction
relationship between them is a necessary and thought experimentation. An equally
ontological or existential, relationship. It is important intellectual tool is dialectical
also transformative, in the sense that one synthesis, which is the principal tool of
moment is constantly transformed and theory construction. This entails resolution
translated into the other; it passes into the of conceptual contradictions and
other. This process is basically dialectical fusion of opposites and
contradictory, in the sense that the ideal is contradictory elements into higher, more
constantly transformed into the concrete comprehensive categories. It is the most
and vice versa. This dialectical relationship effective and pervasive tool in the history
constitutes the essence of scientific of physical theory. None of the great
practice. theories of physics can be comprehended
without a clear conception of this tool
This model of scientific practice had its (Ghassib, 1988).
beginnings in antiquity (Babylonian, Greek and
Arab). However, as a universal and fully defined The central tool of scientific verity and
project, it started with Galileo. The Galilean efficacy is, of course, logical and experimental
project envisions nature as a global physical testing. What ultimately makes an idea scientific
system constituted by an infinite number of is its testability. And what makes an action
physical systems. These systems are described, scientific is being endowed with a theoretical
defined and related via a hierarchy of physical purpose and being an embodiment of a testable
quantities. Each physical quantity is defined by idea. Thus, the spirit of science resides in
mathematics and measurement. The Galilean experimentation and testing, both logical and
project aims at discovering and introducing practical.
more and more physical quantities and
mathematical relations between them. That Coupled to these essential tools is
accounts for both the nature of scientific reason critique ‫ ـــ‬i.e., deconstructing an idea to reveal
and the fact that all physical laws are basically its limits, grounds and contradictions, both
mathematical equations. internal and external. This tool or process is a
prelude to all other tools.
The Galilean project was further
extended and made more potent and concrete Finally, we have intelligent reading of
by the Newtonian project. The latter introduced phenomena ‫ ـــ‬i.e., the ability to intuit great
the calculus into the heart of physics and qualitative truths via very delicate quantitative

nuances. This ability to read universal principles scientific reason can penetrate its thick
into minor quantitative differences is a creative veils via scientific practice.
ability, a mark of scientific genius. Eratosthenes
read the sphericity of Earth and a method for This view prevailed since Galileo until
measuring its circumference in a small variation the advent of quantum mechanics. The latter
in the shadow of a gnomon (Sarton, 1987). has questioned the notion of an objective reality
Newton read universal gravitation and its laws prior to, and independent of, the observer
into the possibility of viewing circular motion as (Heisenberg, 1979; Bohm, 1979). The question
a case of free fall (Barbour, 2001). Einstein read naturally arises: Has science entered a self-
the geometrical essence of gravity in the long contradictory, self – destructive phase with
previously noticed equality between inertial quantum mechanics? Or, does science cry out
mass and gravitational mass. Schrödinger read for an altogether new ontology? (Ghassib,
the basic law of atomic events in an analogy 1999).
between geometrical optics and classical
Hamilton Jacobi mechanics (Ghassib, 1983). 4. The qualification of a scientist: Since
Dirac read a wholly new realm of matter (anti – scientific practice entails working at, and
matter) in a mere mathematical transposition of working with, an epistemic heritage, a
his fundamental relativistic quantum equation necessary condition for scientific
(Kvasnica, 1964). production and practice is for the scientist
to be well- versed with his epistemic
heritage and in full command of his means
3. The ontology of natural being: Scientific of intellectual production. Generally
reason seems to presuppose an ontology speaking, a scientist should be emotionally
of nature (Bhaskar, 1978). It seems to and intellectually committed and devoted
presuppose that nature is a self- to his work, and should be in contact with
contained, independent physical system the latest developments in his epistemic
governed by a set of integro – differential heritage. Thus, he should pass through an
physical equations. Nature is basically a arduous path of intellectual, emotional and
hierarchy of active interconnected ethical preparation. The more versed with
mechanisms that produce events and his epistemic heritage in its totality and
phenomena according to specific living movement, the more he stands a
tendential laws. These events and chance of creatively contributing to its
phenomena are, generally speaking, development. Scientific creativity is not a
incongruent with the mechanisms that mere flight of the unbridled imagination,
produce them ‫ ـــ‬i.e., nature is not but is firmly and solidly rooted in the thick
transparent to the human senses. Only mesh I have termed the epistemic heritage.
Conclusion
In this paper, the author has focused on science as industry, and has grounded it in certain
socio- historical peculiarities of Modernity. I have also constructed a detailed and comprehensive
model of the knowledge industry, coupled to an epistemological model of scientific rationality. These
models have placed creativity at the heart of scientific practice and production.

References
Aaboe, A. (2001). Episodes from the early history of astronomy. Springer.
Alhusser, L. (1977). For Marx. (Translator: Ben Brewster). London.
Amin, S. (1989). Eurocentrism. Monthly Review Press. New York.
Barbour, J. (2001). The discovery of dynamics. Oxford.
Bhaskar, R. (1978). A realist theory of science. England: Harvester.
Bohm, D. (1979). Quantum theory. Dover.
Cohen, B. I. (1980). The Newtonian revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Eisenstaedt, J. (2006). The curious history of relativity. (Translator: Sangalli, A.). Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Ghassib, H. (1983). The origins of wave mechanics (in Arabic). Amman-Jordan.
Ghassib, H. (1988). The road to relativity: From Copernicus to Einstein. (In Arabic), Amman.
Ghassib, H. (1993). Studies in the historicity of science. (In Arabic). Amman-Jordan.
Ghassib, H. (1999). Is physics sick? In praise of classical physics, Dirasat, 26(2). Amman: University of Jordan.
Ghassib, H. (2004). Critique of dialectical reason. (In Arabic). Amman-Jordan.
Heisenberg, W. (1979). Philosophical problems of quantum physics. Connecticut.
Kragh, H. (2002). Quantum generations: A history of physics in the 20th century. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Kuhn, T. (1978). Black–Body theory and the quantum discontinuity, 1894-1912. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Kvasnica, J. (1964). Physical fields. London.
Marx, K. (1973). Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy. (Translator: Martin Nicolaus,
Penguin.
Marx, K. (1982). The Communist manifesto, in: Marx, K. and Engels, F., Selected works. Moscow.
Neugebauer, O. (1969). The exact sciences in antiquity. Dover.
Ptolemy, C. (1978). The Almajest. (Translator: Taliaferro, R.). Great books of the Western world, Vol.16, Chicago.
Rashed, R. (2003). Optics and the science of optical reflection. (In Arabic). Beirut-Lebanon.
Saliba, G. (1994). A history of Arabic astronomy. New York.
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Schaffer, P. (1981). Amadeus. London: Penguin Books Ltd.
Stephenson, B. (1987). Kepler’s physical astronomy. Springer.
About the Author

Hisham B. Ghassib obtained his B.Sc. (Hon.) in physics from Leeds University (UK) in 1972. In the
year 1976, he has obtained his Ph.D. in theoretical physics from the same university. He worked at
the Royal Scientific Society as the head of the Science Popularization Department (1976 – 1991). In
the year 1991, he was appointed as the head of the Sciences and Humanities Department and
associate professor in physics for about ten years. In 1999, he was a ppointed full Professor in
Physics and dean of the college. In February 2003, he was appointed President of Princess Sumaya
University for Technology (PSUT). This appointment was renewed in February 2007 for four more
years. He has written a large number of books and papers in physics and philosophy. Hisham
Ghassib has established and edited a large number of scientific and cultural magazines. He has won
two national cultural prizes.
Address
Prof. Dr. Hisham B. Ghassib,
President,
Princess Sumaya University for Technology (PSUT),
Amman-Jordan.
e-Mail: ghassib@psut.edu.jo


Limits on Science:
A Comment on “Where Does Creativity
Fit into a Productivist Industrial
Model of Knowledge Production?”
Robert J. Sternberg
In his essay on the role of creativity in science and of science in society, Ghassib (2010)
points out that science is much more a series of common attitudes and practices rather than a
clearly delineated set of methods. I agree. Moreover, I also agree that scientific knowledge is
playing a key role in the forward development of society. So my commentary is not for the purpose
of arguing with what Ghassib (2010) has said, but rather, to reflect upon it and suggest directions
that might need to be further developed.
There are three great advantages to scientific knowledge.
The first is that scientific knowledge, unlike any other form of knowledge, is self -correcting.
False ideologies—whether political, religious, economic, or otherwise—have no clear self-correcting
mechanism. They can remain in place indefinitely. Consider the policies of any political
administration. As I am American, I will consider the policies of the Bush administration. For me and
75% of the American population, they have been a disaster. But 25% are fine with them and given
(what I would view as) the spectacular failures of the Bush administration in every conceivable
domain, it is unclear what kind of evidence would persuade that 25% that they are wrong. After all,
things could be worse! And they may not even see them as bad! Similarly, how does one know if a
religion is true or false? What does it even mean for a religion to be true or false? It depe nds on
whom you ask. Clergy of different religions may criticize each other’s religions, but there is no
mechanism other than their authority to choose among them. Science, through experimentation,
can help falsify ideas that are, in a word, wrong.
A second advantage of scientific knowledge is that its truth does not depend on ideology.
High-level political officials in the Bush administration did all they could to distort results of scientific
research in order to conform to their political ideology and agenda. They did so with no scruples or
concern for the integrity of the scientific process. But what they did was, indeed, distortion. The
facts of science remained the same, regardless of how the Bush administration tried to distort them.
In contrast, political facts very much depend on who is in power. The war in Iraq became a fact
under Bush, but might well not have under Gore.
A third advantage of scientific knowledge is that it is, ultimately, internally coherent and
externally correspondent to some reality. We may not understand how it coheres internally or
corresponds externally, but those lapses in understanding reflect our ignorance, not a problem with
science itself. If quantum mechanics and Einsteinian relativity don’t fit together, tha t is not the fault
of nature, but of our incomprehension.
The main thesis of this essay, though, is that scientific knowledge, for all its advantages over
other forms of knowledge, also has limitations that are not always immediately obvious.
A first limitation is that what appears to be scientific knowledge often isn’t as it appears.
Before Einstein, Newtonian physics appeared comprise scientific facts. They were facts, but more

limited than they appeared to be. Sometimes, what appear to be facts are not merely incomplete
but wrong, for example, in our changing understandings of cancer cells or of DNA. What once was
called “junk DNA” is now realized to be anything but. So what we think we know we may not, in
fact, know.
A second limitation of scientific knowledge—again, one of use—is that there are some
questions it simply is incapable of answering. Is there a God? What form does God take? What is it
that makes me feel that I am me and not you? What happens to us after we die, if anything —is there
an afterlife of any kind, or none at all? In fairness, science is not supposed to answer these
questions. But for those who think that science has all the answers, they are mistaken.
A third limitation respecting scientific knowledge is that it can be used for good or for ill. Of
course, this limitation is not in the knowledge itself, but rather of how humans choose to employ it.
But scientific knowledge has been used to create bombs, missiles, gas chambers, poison gases,
and any number of things that have caused death and destruction on increasingly larger scales.
Science is tremendously important to the modern world. Ultimately, however, the largest
questions facing the world today may be ones related not to scientific creativity, but rather to
scientific wisdom—how do we best use the knowledge we have? Even in the beginning of the
twenty-first century, we face, as a world, wars, famine, disease, poverty, terrorism, and global
warming, among other problems. Sadly, most of these problems are man -made. Science did not
create them—although sometimes, as in the case of bombs, it has been a facilitator --and it will not
solve them. The world needs scientific creativity, as Ghassib (2010) rightly points out. But unless
we get wiser, there will be no world on or about which to be creative.
Reference
Ghassib, H. B. (2010). Where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of knowledge production?
About the Author

Robert J. Sternberg is the Provost and Senior Vice President of Oklahoma State University. He was
the Dean of the School of Arts and Sciences, Professor of Psychology, and Adjunct Professor of
Education at Tufts University, where he directed the Center for the Enhancement of Teaching and
Learning. He is also Honorary Professor of Psychology at the University of Heidelberg, Germany.
Prior to coming to Tufts, he was IBM Professor of Psychology and Education and Professor of
Management at Yale. Sternberg is President of the Eastern Psychological Association, President-
Elect of the International Association for Cognitive Education and Psychology, and Past -President of
the American Psychological Association. Sternberg has written roughly 1200 articles and books and
has won over $20 million in grants and contracts. He has won roughly two dozen awards. His Ph.D.
is from Stanford and he has 9 honorary doctorates.
Address
Prof. Dr. Robert J. Sternberg,
Provost and Senior Vice President,
Oklahoma State University,
Whitehurst 101,
Stillwater, OK 74078, U.S.A.
e-Mail: robert.sternberg@okstate.edu

Comments on Ghassib’s
“Where Does Creativity Fit into a
Productivist Industrial Model of
Ken W. McCluskey
I enjoyed the piece by Ghassib (2010), a “persist and reproduce itself” if it and modern
renowned scientist in his own right, for it societal structures hope to survive. Further,
represented quite a departure from the articles rather than servicing basic existing needs as in
on creativity that typically cross my desk. While the past, science and the modern economy are
not an easy read, it certainly was a rewarding now “geared towards creating new needs,
one: Ghassib (2010) has a knack for saying including illusory needs.” It seems as if we are
important things in an interesting manner. on a treadmill or bullet train rapidly picking up
speed, and that we can’t get off.
Essentially, the article focuses on the
transformation of science from pre-modern In conceptualizing “the knowledge
times (where it existed in small, relatively enterprise” as an industry, Ghassib (2010)
isolated parochial pockets) to the present identifies and defines its components. Much of
(where – awakened by the Renaissance and what he says connects quite nicely with
nurtured by conditions in capitalist, modernistic elements of the more than five-decade-old
Europe – it has “morphed” into the ubiquitous tradition of the theory and practice of Creative
force which permeates and drives industry, the Problem Solving (Isaksen, 2000; Isaksen,
economy, and the production of knowledge). Dorval, & Treffinger, 2000; McCluskey, Baker, &
Ghassib (2010) notes that, unlike in an earlier McCluskey, 2005; Osborn, 1953; Parnes, 1967;
era when the economy depended on static Torrance, 1972; Treffinger, Isaksen, & Stead-
knowledge reflected in basic trades and Dorval, 2006).
apprenticeships, today’s reality has positioned Here are Ghassib’s (2010) six
science as a knowledge industry that must components:
(1) The productive sites

The productive sites, which relates to the notion of “context” or “press” in the Creative
Problem Solving (CPS) literature. From the perspective of creativity researchers, problem solving
occurs not in isolation or in designated areas, but in a complex environment. Some argue that
education and productivity do not just take place in schools or labs, but rather in “an ‘ecosystem of
learning’ ... education is influenced by what happens in homes; at computers on the Internet; in
community workplaces; in churches, museums, and theaters; on athletic fields; and in correctional
facilities, youth homes, and health-care centers” (McCluskey & Treffinger, 1998, p. 218). By way of
example, back in the ’60s, the Faculty of Medicine at McMaster University introduced the notion of
problem-based learning (Kaufman, 1985). Basically, the emphasis for students of medicine moved
from the traditional approach of memorizing facts to gathering and using information for problem
solving. Other medical schools followed this lead, shifting the focus of teaching and learning away
from artificial “show and tell” classrooms to actual real-life involvement and experience in the
hospital and laboratory. This approach, in a sense, redefined best practice and good education. The
“teaching as telling” and “learning as listening” methodology gave way to more participatory,
interactive engagement (Goodland, 2004).

Be that as it may, Ghassib (2010) makes it clear that, in his opinion, the productive sites of
the knowledge industry reside mainly in universities and research units/institutes. And it is difficult to
quarrel with his assertion, for there is no denying that scientific research has become a major part of
university life – to the point where the tenure and promotion of faculty, and indeed the ranking of the
institution itself, often depend upon it.
(2) The producers

The producers, which ties to the emphasis on “person” in CPS. Each individual problem
solver brings something unique to the party. In this case, it is the highly trained scientists and
researchers who generate the knowledge in question. Ghassib (2010) describes them as “a breed of
specially trained creative minds, that are bred and nurtured at a very high cost.” The implicit
assumption here, that some individuals solve problems more effectively than others, fits with the
“novice/ expert” literature (Anderson, 1985; Larkin, 1980). Also implicit in Ghassib’s (2010) remarks is
the possibility that creativity, at least in part, may be taught or enhanced: More about that in a bit.
(3) Raw material

The raw material, or the theories, ideas, and data of science, which would be used in the
“exploring data” stage of CPS. Because scientific knowledge unfolds and evolves dialec tically, it is,
by definition, amorphous, “inhomogeneous and partially incoherent.” Many educators who feel that
“tolerance for ambiguity” is an essential part of creativity might be on the right track. Actually, this
understanding may come easier to people from Indigenous cultures, who tend to hold more
process-oriented world views, than to those from the more linear Western scientific tradition.
(4) Means of knowledge production

Means of knowledge production, which – in both the scientific method and CPS – involves
seeking new combinations through analysis and synthesis. As well, “hitchhiking” or “piggybacking”
on previous ideas is central to science and CPS.
(5) Methods of production

Methods of production, which is akin to “process” – how we do what we do – in Creative
Problem Solving. As Ghassib (2010) puts it, “Every major scientist seems to have had his/ her own
method of research.” This comment is interesting, in that it suggests that individuals tackle problems
differently. Quite likely, Gardner (1983), from his multiple intelligences vantage point, would concur.
The authors of VIEW (Selby, Treffinger, Isaksen, & Lauer, 2002) have echoed this thought in their
work by showing convincingly that there are distinct creative styles, and that different pe ople absorb,
interpret, and employ knowledge differently. For example, “explorers” revel in thinking outside the
box, while “developers” take pride in thinking better within it.
(6) Peculiarity of the product

Peculiarity of the product, which links to “originality” – and the fact one must have a
“product” to gauge accomplishment – in the problem solving literature. Ghassib (2010) contrasts
regular industry (where production often takes place in unexciting, assembly-line fashion) with
science (where there is a real need to seek novelty to drive the knowledge industry and the
economy). In science, things ought not to go the way they have always gone – a creative, innovative
leap is usually needed to move forward. As such, the product is “unenvisageable” in advance. To
Ghassib (2010), this leap from uncertainty seems to be the essence of creativity.
Evaluation lies at the core of the scientific method. In fact, according to Ghassib (2010), “The
work done by a researcher or a research group can be raised to th e status of a scientific product
only via this evaluation process.” Researchers and educators have also emphasized the need for
objective evaluation, and various instruments such as the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking

(Torrance, 1966) rate the creativity of responses by assessing fluency (number of ideas generated),
flexibility (number of different types of ideas produced), originality, and elaboration. And, of course,
in CPS, evaluation comes in with a vengeance in the “developing solutions” and “build ing
acceptance” stages of the “action” component.
In any case, Ghassib (2010) moves on with his thesis in his cogent, reasoned style. He
speaks of “the myth of scientific method,” again emphasizing how each major scientist follows his
own path within “a structure of global commons of scientific practice.” He considers the
transformative power of scientific reasoning, experimental testing, the importance of scientific tools
and critique, and the ontology of nature (where “Only scientific reason can penetrat e its thick veils
via scientific practice.”).
A final thought. Ghassib (2010) stresses that scientists must be qualified and “pass through
an arduous path of intellectual, emotional and ethical preparation.” He also, in effect, places
creativity “at the heart of scientific practice and production.”
These statements beg the question, if creativity is a central ingredient in science, might we
not broaden the path of preparation for scientists by actually giving them a greater opportunity to
learn more about Creative Problem Solving? CPS training introduces a “toolbox” of skills, and also
discusses “myths” about creativity, including that it is too mysterious to be taught. Rather than
assume that problems are solved and great inventions happen only when, in Treffinger’s words, “a
miracle occurs,” might it not be more productive to prepare the ground so that more scientists are
ready and able to seize opportunities when they come along by making creative leaps at the
appropriate time, or that individual scientists are able to experience more “Aha moments” because
of thinking and learning about creativity? If we truly must generate new ideas and needs to drive the
economy, all of us – especially scientists – ought to think more about how to accomplish this
mission. I realize that some science programs do inject elements of problem solving into the
curriculum, but perhaps by encouraging more active reflection concerning the process of creativity,
we might actually be able to “grow” scientific genius.
Anyway, that’s enough rambling from me – I’m becoming concerned that this review is
approaching the length of the article. The reason is, however, that this piece truly was thought-
provoking in the extreme. In an entertaining, intuitive way, Ghassib (2010) has made an important
contribution by showing how creativity fits into and anchors the scientific method. It was a pleasure
to hear about such matters from the viewpoint of a scientist. More dialogue of this sort should be
encouraged.
__________________________________________________________________________________________
References
Anderson, J. R. (1985). Cognitive psychology and its implications (2nd ed.). New York: Freeman.
Gardner, H. (1983). Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Ghassib, H. B. (2010). Where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of knowledge
production? Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 13-20.
Goodland, J. (2004). A place called school. San Francisco, CA: Jossey Bass.
Isaksen, S. G. (Ed.). (2000). Facilitative leadership: Making a difference with creative problem solving. Dubuque,
IA: Kendall/Hunt.
Isaksen, S. G., Dorval, K. B., & Treffinger, D. J. (2000). Creative approaches to problem solving: A framework for
change (2nd ed.). Dubuque, IA: Kendall/Hunt.
Kaufman, A. (1985). Implementing problem-based medical education. New York: Springer.
Larkin, J. H. (1980). Teaching problem solving in physics: The psychological lab and the practical classroom. In
D. T. Tuma & F. Reif (Eds.), Problem solving and education: Issues in teaching and research. Hillsdale, NJ:
Erlbaum.
McCluskey, K. W., & Treffinger, D. J. (1998). Nurturing talented but troubled children and youth. Reclaiming
Children and Youth, 6 (4), 215-219, 226).

McCluskey, K. W., Baker, P. A., & McCluskey, A. L. A. (2005). Creative problem solving with marginalized
populations: Reclaiming lost prizes through in-the-trenches interventions. Gifted Child Quarterly, 49 (4),
330-341.
Osborn, A. F. (1953). Applied imagination. New York: Scribners.
Parnes, S. J. (1967). Creative behavior guidebook. New York: Scribners.
Selby, E. C., Treffinger, D. J., Isaksen, S. G., & Lauer, K. J. (2002). VIEW. An assessment of problem solving
style: Technical manual and user’s guide. Sarasota, FL: Center for Creative Learning.
Torrance, E. P. (1966). Torrance tests of creative thinking. Princeton, NJ: Personnel Press.
Torrance, E. P. (1972). Can we teach children to think creatively? Journal of Creative Behavior, 6, 114-143.
Treffinger, D. J., Isaksen, S. G., & Stead-Dorval, K. B. (2006). Creative problem solving: An introduction (4th ed.).
Waco, TX: Prufrock Press.
About the Author

Ken McCluskey, Dean and Professor of Education at the University of Winnipeg, has had 25 years
experience as a school psychologist, special educator, and administrator in the public school
system. A recipient of major program development, creativity, and publication awards from the
Canadian Council for Exceptional Children, the International Centre for Innovation in Education
(ICIE), the World Council for Gifted and Talented Children (WCGTC), and Reclaiming Youth
International (along with his institution's teaching, research, and community service awards), Ken – a
much sought after international speaker – has written well over 100 professional articles and
chapters, and is the author, co-author, or editor of 20 books, including The Doubtful Gift: Strategies
for Educating Gifted Children in the Regular Classroom, Lost Prizes: Talent Development and
Problem Solving with At-Risk Populations, and Enriching Teaching and Learning for Talent
Development.
Address
Prof. Dr. Ken McCluskey,
Faculty of Education,
University of Winnipeg, Canada.
e-Mail: k.mccluskey@uwinnipeg.ca

Little Science to Big Science:
Big Scientists to Little Scientists?
Dean Keith Simonton
Professor Ghassib’s (2010) essay This ordinal placement is founded on

presents a provocative portrait of how the little several significant contrasts. At one end are
science of the Babylonians, Greeks, and Arabs domains that are more logical, objective, and
became the Big Science of our modern formal and at the other end are domains that are
industrial world. This historical transformation more intuitive, subjective, and emotional
directly shaped the very nature of scientific (Simonton, in press). Stated differently, the
creativity. In reading this fascinating article, physical sciences are the most rational, precise,
however, I could not avoid noticing that the collective, and constrained by a strong
analysis concentrated on the physical sciences, disciplinary consensus, whereas the arts are the
and especially on physics. The biological, most expressive, ambiguous, individualistic, and
behavioral, and social sciences are completely free of external constraints. The other sciences
ignored. Given the exceptional status accorded and the humanities fall between these extremes,
physics and its most outstanding practitioners, in the order specified. But I can go one step
this emphasis would seem quite justified. Even further: A discipline’s position along this
so, if the aim is to understand the changes in dimension corresponds to the creativity of its
human creativity over the course of recent practitioners (Simonton, in press). That is, the
history, this particular focus may not be optimal. personality traits and developmental
Creativity is manifested in all of the sciences, as experiences most strongly associated with
well as in the arts and humanities. Even more exceptional creativity are most likely to be found
critically, different domains of creative at the artistic end than at the scientific end. And
achievement may feature variable amounts of this disciplinary differential makes perfect sense.
creativity. To see how this is so, I must turn to a Rationality, objectivity, precision, and
philosophical problem that is over a century old. consensus impose far more constraints on
creativity than do emotionality, subjectivity,
In the first half of the 19th century, ambiguity, and individualism. For this reason, it
Auguste Comte (1839-1842/1855), the French requires less creativity to make contributions to
philosopher, proposed that the sciences formed physics than it does to contribute to domains
a logical hierarchy. Physics was higher than lower in the hierarchy. The rationality that
chemistry, chemistry, higher than biology, etc. Ghassib (2010) identified as a crucial factor in
Other thinkers have provided a stronger modern science turns out to render that science
analytical basis for this hierarchical arrangement less creative. The “hard sciences” may not
(e.g., Bliss, 1935; Gnoli, 2008). In addition, share the same well-defined “scientific method,”
empirical studies have demonstrated that the but they do have in common this rationality,
principal domains of science can be ordered as along with its correlates – objectivity, precision,
follows: physics, chemistry, biology, and consensus.
psychology, and sociology (e.g., Simonton,
2004). Just as significant is the evidence, both Of course, as Ghassib (2010) points out,
analytical and empirical, that the disciplinary the “hard” or “exact” sciences like physics were
hierarchy can be extended into the humanities not always so. But they became more so,
and even the arts (Bliss, 1935; Gnoli, 2008; private and personal little science eventually
Hemlin, 1993; Simonton, in press). Thus, the becoming the public and collective Big Science,
hierarchical sequence consists of the physical and thereby leaving the other sciences behind,
sciences, the biological sciences, the behavioral as the “soft” sciences. The Spanish philosopher
sciences, the social sciences, the humanities, Ortega y Gasset (1932/1957) said “it is
and the arts. necessary to insist upon this extraordinary but

undeniable fact: experimental science has true democracy. The same may be said of those
progressed thanks in great part to the work of sciences that went from little to big. By
men astoundingly mediocre, and even less than progressively minimizing the role of creativity,
mediocre. That is to say, modern science, the the scientists who work in those sciences went
root and symbol of our actual civilization, finds a from big to little. Those scientists who chose to
place for the intellectually commonplace man rebel against the constraining conventions, such
allows him to work therein with success” (pp. as Albert Einstein, constitute the exceptions that
110-111). Even Kant (1790/1952), the great prove the rule. Indeed, there is empirical
German philosopher, claimed just a century evidence that revolutionary scientists who
after the Newtonian revolution that whereas the challenge the received paradigm have personal
arts required creative genius, the sciences did characteristics closer to the artistic end of the
not. Like Ghassib (2010), Kant used the physical continuum (e.g., Ko & Kim, 2008).
sciences as the reference point for his assertion.
In sum, Ghassib’s (2010) analysis may
It is sometimes said of Otto von indicate how creativity can become co-opted by
Bismarck, the chancellor who unified Germany, sociocultural status. If so, it is a narrative of
that he made his country great by making his creative decline rather than ascent.
countrymen small. Political unification was
acquired at the cost of personal freedom and
References
Bliss, H. E. (1935). The system of the sciences and the organization of knowledge. Philosophy of Science, 2, 86-
103.
Comte, A. (1855). The positive philosophy of Auguste Comte (H. Martineau, Trans.). New York: Blanchard.
(Original work published 1839-1842)
Gnoli, C. (2008). Categories and facets in integrative levels. Axiomathes, 18, 177-192.
Hemlin, S. (1993). Scientific quality in the eyes of the scientist: A questionnaire study. Scientometrics, 27, 3-18.
Kant, I. (1952). The critique of judgement. In R. M. Hutchins (Ed.), Great books of the Western world (Vol. 42, pp.
459-613). Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica. (Original work published 1790)
Ko, Y., & Kim, J. (2008). Scientific geniuses’ psychopathology as a moderator in the relation between creative
contribution types and eminence. Creativity Research Journal, 20, 251- 261.
Ortega y Gasset, J. (1957). The revolt of the masses (M. Adams, Trans.). New York: Norton. (Original work
published 1932)
Simonton, D. K. (2004). Psychology’s status as a scientific discipline: Its empirical placement within an implicit
hierarchy of the sciences. Review of General Psychology, 8, 59-67.
Simonton, D. K. (in press).Varieties of (scientific) creativity: A hierarchical model of disposition, development,
and achievement. Perspectives on Psychological Science.

About the Author
Dean Keith Simonton obtained his 1975 Ph.D. in Social Psychology from Harvard University, where
he was a Fellow of the National Science Foundation. In 1976 he joined the faculty of the University of
California, Davis, where he was named Distinguished Professor of Psychology. His re search program
concentrates on various aspects of genius, creativity, leadership, talent, and aesthetics. He has
studied eminent scientists and inventors, great philosophers, literary giants, illustrious artists,
classical composers, the Presidents of the United States, absolute monarchs of Europe, and other
distinguished achievers in almost every domain of accomplishment. In these studies he has
examined such factors as intelligence, precocity, personality, values, motivation, family environment,
education, political circumstances, and the broad sociocultural milieu. He has produced
approximately 400 publications, including articles in the technical journals of psychology, education,
sociology, anthropology, political science, statistics, the natural scienc es, and the humanities. He
also authored eleven books: Genius, Creativity, and Leadership (Harvard 1984), Why Presidents
Succeed: A Political Psychology of Leadership (Yale 1987), Scientific Genius: A Psychology of
Science (Cambridge 1988), Psychology, Science, and History (Yale 1990), Greatness: Who Makes
History and Why (Guilford 1994), Genius and Creativity: Selected Papers (Ablex 1996), Origins of
Genius: Darwinian Perspectives on Creativity (Oxford 1999), Great Psychologists and Their Times:
Scientific Insights into Psychology’s History (American Psychological Association 2002), Creativity in
Science: Chance, Logic, Genius, and Zeitgeist (Cambridge 2004), Genius 101 (Springer 2009), and
Great Flicks: Scientific Studies of Cinematic Creativity and Aesthetics (Oxford, in press). In addition,
he is co-editing a companion volume on The Social Science of Cinema (Oxford, in press).
Simonton has delivered invited addresses before numerous organizations, including the
Council of Scientific Society Presidents, Sociedad Interamericana de Psicología, International
Association of Empirical Aesthetics, International Society for the Psychology of Science and
Technology, International Leadership Association, International Society for Intelligence Research,
World Council for Gifted and Talented Children, Association for Psychological Science, American
Psychological Association, Gerontological Society of America, and the National Association for
Gifted Children. He has served as Editor of the Journal of Creative Behavior, Guest Editor for the
Leadership Quarterly and the Review of General Psychology, and currently serves on a dozen
editorial boards, such as the Creativity Research Journal, Empirical Studies of the Arts, the
Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, the International Journal of Creativity & Problem
Solving, the Review of General Psychology, and Perspectives on Psychological Science.
Simonton is Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the
American Psychological Association (in nine divisions), the American Psychological Society, the
American Association of Applied and Preventative Psychology, and the International Association of
Empirical Aesthetics. He is Past President of both the International Association for Empirical
Aesthetics and the Society for Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, and is President -Elect of the
Society for General Psychology (Division 1, American Psychological Association). Moreover, he has
been honored with the William James Book Award, the Rudolf Arnheim Award for Outstanding
Contributions to Psychology and the Arts, the Sir Francis Galton Award for Outstanding
Contributions to the Study of Creativity, the Theoretical Innovation Prize in Personality and Social
Psychology, the George A. Miller Outstanding Article Award, two Awards for Excellence of the
Mensa Education and Research Foundation, the President’s Award from the National Association for
Gifted Children, and the Robert S. Daniel Award for Four Year College/University Teaching.
Education and Research Foundation, the President’s Award from the National Association for Gifted
Children, and the Robert S. Daniel Award for Four Year College/University Teaching.
Address
Prof. Dr. Dean Keith Simonton,
Department of Psychology,
University of California, Davis,
One Shields Avenue,
Davis, CA 95616-8686, U.S.A.
e-Mail: dksimonton@ucdavis.edu


The Importance and Weaknesses of the
Knowledge Production
Roland S. Persson
To view contemporary Science as an industry is a very apt and timely stance. Ghassib’s
(2010) historical analysis of knowledge production, which he terms A Productivist Industrial Model of
Knowledge Production, is an interesting one. It is important, however, to observe that the outline of
this model is based entirely on the production of Natural Science, and that its epistemological basis
is a positivist one. Since the article argues to focus on the creative process and its developing
objectives through history, this raises a few concerns needing further discussion in order to
strengthen the legitimacy of the proposed model.
(1) The epistemology and ontology of the model need to be addressed if the objective is to
generalize The Productivist Knowledge Production Model. To view only the Natural Sciences as
“true science” (or exact science in Ghassib’s (2010) words) in a Kuhnian sense and its premise
that Science is absolutely objective, is becoming increasingly outdated worldwide. Above all
Feminist Science has awakened the interest in the relationship of subjectivity rather than
objectivity to knowledge generation (cf. Tuana, 1989). Others have also addressed the issue (eg.
Phillips, 1987). However, the argument against Natural Science as a standard for all k nowledge
generation in all academic disciplines is much older and can be traced back in time to Ancient
Greece, Aristotle and the notions of, for example, Episteme, Techne and Phronesis.
(2) The generation of new knowledge is the ultimate objective of all Science, irrespective of
epistemological stance. However, it appears that Ghassib (2010) views new knowledge as the
only objective of Science. This needs clarification. Not all researchers devote every research
project to basic research with an immediate aim to unveil new understandings. Perhaps even the
majority of all studies carried out globally are better seen as reproductive or descriptive and
exploratory rather than experimentally confirming. Establishing a new theory is laborious work
and it will take many a reproductive study to confirm initial findings before something new is
seen as inevitable and generally accepted. It is also worth noting that it does not take a creative
genius to replicate research, only a skilled craftsman not necessarily very creative. Asking the
original and answerable questions, and figuring out how to find the answers to them, on the
other hand, takes a creative mind indeed. Ghassib’s (2010) model is in my view slightly
paradoxical for this reason, in that many of the pioneers of Physics and Maths are used as
examples of the societal knowledge production model while, in fact, the majority of
representatives of this contemporary production system is actually unaccounted for. The
Productivist Knowledge Production Model cannot feasibly be based merely on the science
production of creative geniuses in the Natural Sciences!
(3) While I agree that knowledge production indeed, as Ghassib (2010) outlines it, has become a
major industry, and that global social welfare and affluence—current and future—are generally
dependent on this industry, there are more sides to this state of affairs that are crucial to include.
One must consider the possibility that this shift in the societal understanding and use of world of
Science is perhaps not an altogether positive and desired one. Market controlled research is
becoming increasingly more controversial.
Is really that focused in research of which we have a need in an objective sense? Or is that
being funded for research which is more likely to generate a financial profit and raise international

status? (Miller & Philo, 2002). This has become such a powerful motive in promoting Science that
opponents and critics of it, according to Philo and Miller (2001), tend to be silenced by the
universities and research institutes where these conscientious objectors reside and work. The threat
to Science as a “search for truth” becomes very real when Science is governed by markets where
money and status comprise the ultimate objective for Scientists. There are many scandals and
frauds reported in the wake of this unfortunate development, where scientists have crossed the line
by far and felt forced to produce results other than the correct ones (for further reading, see Martin,
1992; or listen to a very disturbing, but informative, radio programme by the BBC addressing the
American “The Black List” consisting of fraudulent scientists: BBC Radio 4, 2006).
Needless to say, given that Ghassib’s (2010) article aims at describing a creative process, it
would seem that the environment created by the model is at best conducive to some researchers
who may generate large incomes and research grants over time, whereas for other researchers and
thinkers who do not quite fit into the market-oriented production structures of ideas and
organization, the Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge Production, is very likely to be more or
less detrimental, as insightfully examplified by Shekerjian (1990).
(4) Finally, perhaps this is a difference in various cultures’ traditional understanding of higher
education, but I do not agree with Ghassib’s (2010) statement that, in modern times, universities
have been transformed from based on teaching and knowledge -preserving to being knowledge-
producing factories. While I can sympathise with viewing higher learning today as a kind of
factory for students; a supermarket of knowledge filled with quick and easy bargains, I do not
see—regardless how educational policies have changed—that tertiary education has ever been
knowledge-preserving. In my experience the opposite is true. Universities, at least in Europe, are
legally forced to keep up with the latest research and to share this with students. Tertiary
institutions can therefore not be preserving knowledge. They have a dynamic nature at least as
far as course contents go. The traditions surrounding how knowledge should be shared with
students, on the other hand, differ greatly. Some teaching methods may well be ancient and in
need of reform.
In conclusion, I find Hisham Ghassib’s (2010) Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge

Production enlightening and timely. However, in order to make it more useful to a wider audience, as
discussed above, I propose a widening of the epistemological worldview; a more updated
understanding of the nature of Science; the inclusion of other Sciences and last but not least: to
address the potentially negative consequences of the model. Irrespective of epistemology, the
ecological aspect of scientific creativity needs to be addressed, lest the model ac tually contradicts
itself by outlining the glories of economy-based knowledge production for scientific creativity, when
in fact such a basis, as shown, may well prove counterproductive.
References
BBC Radio 4 (2006, 3 January). The Science Black List. Available for downloading at:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/science/scienceblacklist.shtml
Martin, B. (1992). Scientific fraud and the power structure of Science. Prometheus, 10(1), 83-98.
Miller, D., & Philo, G. (2002). Silencing dissent in academia. The commercialisation of Science. The
Psychologist, 15(5), 244-246.
Phillips, D. C. (1987). Philosophy, Science, and Social Inquiry, Contemporary Methodological Controversies in
Social Science and Related Applied Fields of Research. Oxford, UK: Pergamon Press.
Philo, G. & Miller, D. (2001). Market killing. What the free market does and what social scientists can do about it.
London: Longman.
Shekerjian, D. (1990). Uncommon genius, How great ideas are born. New York: Viking.
Tuana, N. (Ed.). (1989). Feminism and Science. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

About the Author
Roland S. Persson, Ph.D., Professor of Educational Psychology and Associate Professor in General
Psychology, has a wide scope of research interests. Most interests lead to the various aspects of
giftedness, but how an individual experiences being gifted has especially attracted his attention in
recent time. Persson has authored a large number of books and scientific articles over the years in
music psychology, gender issues, research issues and the social aspects of giftedness and talent.
He serves on several review boards and is former Editor-in-Chief of High Ability Studies.
Address
Prof. Dr. Roland S. Persson,
School of Education and Communication,
Jönköping University,
P.O. Box 1026,
SE-55111 Jonkoping, Sweden.
Phone: +46(36)101360 (direct),
Fax: +46(36)162585
e-Mail: pero@hlk.hj.se


Expanding Views of Creative Science:
A Response to Ghassib’s Productivist
Industrial Model
Don Ambrose
It was refreshing to read Hisham Ghassib’s (2010) article outlining his model of scientific
knowledge production. Too few scholarly writings in creative studies and gifted education deal with
issues at the large-scale, panoramic level of analysis. Ghassib (2010) would not disappoint Albert
Einstein who lamented that "I have little patience with scientists who take a board of wood, look for
its thinnest part, and drill a great number of holes where drilling is easy" (cited in Gardner, 1993, p.
106). Instead of selecting an easily drilled micro-element of creativity, Ghassib (2010) drilled into a
very thick, knotty board, the philosophy and history of science itself, looking for creative dimensions
within.
Of course, given the thickness of this board, Ghassib (2010) cannot possibly address all
complexities and nuances of the scientific enterprise in a single article. While he does explore some
aspects of the historical evolution of science, cognitive and procedural dimensions of scientific work,
and science’s role in the economy, his analysis could benefit from treatment of several additional
elements, I think there are some other facets of scientific creativity that can augment what he has
done and I address some of them here. First, I provide some responses to his model, which include
some recommendations for its extension and refinement. These recommendati ons include a call for
more attention to alternative creative processes and paradigms, as well as deeper scrutiny of the
sociopolitical and economic contextual influences on scientific processes. In addition, I argue that
more interdisciplinary work can enrich both the model and the scientific enterprise somewhat.
Deeper Probing of Cognitive Processes in Creative Science

While admirable in its breadth of scope providing compelling accounts of aesthetic
and treatment of the historical dimensions of influence during the exploratory phases of the
science, one aspect of Ghassib’s (2010) model scientific process. In these exploratory phases,
seems to beg elaboration. As with most aesthetics seems to establish the initial nature
complex human endeavors, scientific creativity and scope of investigations. Unfortunately, the
is shaped and confined by diverse cognitive contributions of aesthetics and imagination are
processes and methodology, and Ghassib obscured because they are ignored in the later,
(2010) recognizes this. However, the commonly refining, public phases of skeptical critique and
lauded value of quantitative empiricism has publication.
been called into question as somewhat
overemphasized as a driver of scientific Appropriately, Ghassib (2010)
progress. For example, while recognizing the addressed logical, deductive, and thought
crucial importance of empirical testing, the experimentation processes in his model. More
eminent philosopher of science Karl Popper attention to thought experiments at the core of
(1959) went against the grain by arguing that “it scientific creativity might enhance the model
is always the theory and not the experiment, somewhat. Logic, deduction, and quantitative
always the idea and not the observation, which analyses are necessary but likely insufficient to
opens up the way to new knowledge (p. 268). account for creative progress in the scientific
Moreover, creative theorizing often relies on enterprise. Thought experimentation, however,
imagination, aesthetics, and conceptual pattern often capitalizes on the creative, imaginative
finding. Weschler (1988) and Holton (1996) power of metaphor, which is often but not
explored the aesthetic dimensions of science always visualizable. Metaphorical thought

experimentation can both catalyze and them initial creative inspiration. Metaphors have
suppress creativity in science. Examples of portrayed brain-mind systems as "wax writing
catalysis include the admirable tendency of tablets, as hydraulic systems of pipes and
great thinkers to distill the essence of complex valves, as telegraph and telephone systems,
scientific problems and to synthesize complex until we arrive at today's most seductive of
variables through the power of visual- metaphors, that of the brain as computer" (p. 5).
metaphorical insight, which has been at the core This latest metaphor of the mind as computer
of many creative scientific breakthroughs prevents many cognitive scientists from
(Gruber, 1978; Gruber & Wallace, 2001; Hallyn, appreciating the more nebulous aspects of mind
2000; Harmon, 1994; Harrington, 1996; Holton, (Descombes, 2001).
1996; Miller, 1978, 1986, 1996).
In the words of Holton, a prominent Interestingly, perception of metaphorical
philosopher of science, entrapment in science can illustrate something
The visual imagination has often been the particularly interesting about cognitive
crucial component in the mix that leads processes in the scientific enterprise. While
to new insights. . . . The physics literature most discussions of thought experimentation
is full of highly visual thought pertain to the creative insights of individuals,
experiments, from Newton's bucket analyses of metaphorical frameworks in the
experiment to Maxwell's Demon and sciences reveal ways in which entire fields can
Schrödinger's cat-in-a-box (p. 189). be trapped within the confines of particular,
large-scale thought experiments. For example,
Another prominent scientific metaphor the insistence of many cognitive scientists’ on
is the human body as a working, mechanical assuming that the mind is a hard-wired
motor (see Rabinbach, 1990). Yet another more computational device may be considered a
recent example comes from string theory, which large-scale collective thought experiment that
is a particularly strong representation of visual has dominated a field for several decades
thinking and metaphor applied to scientific (Ambrose, in press). Metaphor often is at the
insight (Feist, 2006). core of paradigmatic disputes in the natural
sciences as well as in other disciplines. The
The creative catalysis of metaphor in battle between two computational metaphors of
science is impressive, but what of suppression? mind, the connectionists and the symbolists
While metaphor can enliven creative thinking it (see Baumgartner & Payr, 1995) was a
also can confine it by locking researchers into prominent example. For more about
insular perspectives on the phenomena they metaphorical entrapment in academia see
study. For instance, Rose (1998) illustrated how Ambrose, (1996, 1998, 2003), Johnson (in
cognitive scientists have been misled by press), Lakoff (1993), Lakoff and Johnson (1980,
metaphors of mind after these metaphors gave 1999), and Sternberg (1990).
Attend more to interdisciplinary work

Creativity in the scientific enterprise could be helped on the large scale if scholars paid more
attention to interdisciplinary initiatives. Scientific creativity is hampered by a form of hierarchical
hubris in which some disciplines are lauded as exemplars for other, supposedly inferior disciplin es
(Schwartz, 1992). The following is an amusing depiction of hierarchical discipline envy based on an
astronomer’s response to the question “Which field of science has the smartest people?”
Politicians think they are Economists.
Economists think they are Social Scientists.
Social scientists think they are Psychologists.
Psychologists think they are Biologists.
Biologists think they are Organic Chemists.
Organic chemists think they are Physical Chemists.
Physical chemists think they are Physicists.
Physicists think they are Mathematicians.
Mathematicians think they are God.

God…ummm…so happens that God is an Astronomer. (Vinay Kashyap cited in Garber, 2001,
p. 65)
The hierachization occurs because the “lesser” disciplines cannot match the analytic
precision of physics. In actuality, the methods employed in a discipline should match its phenomena.
When these phenomena are highly complex and messy, analytic precision can be thwarted and les s-
precise pattern-type methodologies appropriately come to the fore (Ambrose, 2005).
Piaget argued that disciplinary hierarchization is counterproductive and recommended

instead a nonhierarchical circle of the sciences in which scholars from diverse disciplines could
share ideas for the purposes of conceptual cross-fertilization (see Gruber, 1996). The
interdisciplinary fields of cognitive science and complexity theory generate much creative connection
making, although the flattening of disciplinary hierarchies in these fields is not perfect. Another
example of interdisciplinary cross-fertilization appears in a forthcoming work that interconnects 87
theories and research findings from 28 academic fields for the purposes of creative associative
inspiration about conceptions of creativity and giftedness (see Ambrose, in press) . Ghassib’s (2010)
model could be strengthened by more attention to interdisciplinary dynamics because the most
difficult scientific problems (e.g., climate change; the ethical implications of new scientific
discoveries, understanding the mind) require contributions from multiple disciplines.
More recognition of sociopolitical, ideological, and economic contexts and

their influences on the scientific enterprise
Ghassib (2010) recognizes the revealing the extent and nature of environmental
interactions between science and the economy, devastation as well as potential solutions for
claiming that these connections perpetually these problems.
create and drive the growth of knowledge. This Hopefully, the model also would make
appears to be an accurate and strong aspect of room for treatment of the political pressures that
his model, an aspect representing the positive suppress or distort science in service of
side of a larger picture. It would be helpful if the ideological goals. For example, in the United
model paid more attention to the negative side States, the Bush administration misled the
where the science-economy nexus generates populace by distorting and suppressing
technological exploitation and destruction of scientific findings important to public health and
natural resources (Ferkiss, Bergmann, Agarwal, the environment and favored corporate interests
& Floro, 1993; Flannery, 2006). Such attention over the public good wherever the two were in
also could reveal the promise science holds for conflict (Shulman, 2007).
Final thoughts
Overall, Ghassib’s (2010) model represents a very promising step along an important
investigative path. I commend him for the courage and initiative he has exhibited in pursuing such a
broad-scope, panoramic vision of the long-term evolution of scientific work and its connection with
the economy. Due to the model’s breadth of scope, I couldn’t deal with more than a few of its
dimensions in this article; however, it provides much food for thought. I look forward to further
development of this model and its use as a springboard for insights about the science -high ability
nexus.

References
Ambrose, D. (1996). Unifying theories of creativity: Metaphorical thought and the unification process. New Ideas
in Psychology, 14, 257-267.
Ambrose, D. (1998). A model for clarification and expansion of conceptual foundations. Gifted Child Quarterly,
42, 77-86.
Ambrose, D. (2003). Paradigms, mind shifts, and the 21st-century zeitgeist: New contexts for creative
intelligence. In D. Ambrose, L. M. Cohen & A. J. Tannenbaum (Eds.), Creative Intelligence: Toward
theoretic integration (pp. 11-31). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press.
Ambrose, D. (2005). Interdisciplinary expansion of conceptual foundations: Insights from beyond our field.
Roeper Review, 27, 137-143.
Ambrose, D. (in press). Expanding visions of creative intelligence: Interdisciplinary perspectives. Cresskill, NJ:
Hampton Press.
Baumgartner, P., & Payr, S. (Eds.). (1995). Speaking minds: Interviews with twenty eminent cognitive scientists.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Descombes, V. (2001). The mind's provisions: A critique of cognitivism (S. A. Schwartz, Trans.). Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Feist, G. J. (2006). The psychology of science and the origins of the scientific mind. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
Ferkiss, V., Bergmann, B., Agarwal, B., & Floro, M. (Eds.). (1993). Nature, technology, and society: The cultural
roots of the current environmental crisis. New York: New York University Press.
Flannery, T. (2006). The weather makers: The history and future impact of climate change. New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press.
Garber, M. (2001). Academic instincts. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gardner, H. (1993). Creating minds. New York: HarperCollins.
Gruber, H. E. (1978). Darwin's "tree of nature" and other images of wide scope. In J. Wechsler (Ed.), On
aesthetics in science (pp. 121-140). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Gruber, H. E. (1996). The life space of a scientist: The visionary function and other aspects of Jean Piaget's
thinking. Creativity Research Journal, 9, 251-265.
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346-349.
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Communication Quarterly, 3, 179-194.
Harrington, A. (1996). Reenchanted science: Holism in German culture from Wilhelm II to Hitler. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Holton, G. (1996). On the art of scientific imagination. Daedalus, 125, 183-208.
Johnson, M. (in press). What cognitive science brings to ethics. In D. Ambrose & T. L. Cross (Eds.), Morality,
ethics, and gifted minds. New York: Springer Science.
Lakoff, G. (1993). The contemporary theory of metaphor. In A. Ortony (Ed.), Metaphor and thought (2nd ed., pp.
202-251). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1999). Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind and its challenge to Western
thought. New York: Basic Books.
Miller, A. I. (1978). Visualization lost and regained: The genesis of the quantum theory in the period 1913-1927.
In J. Wechsler (Ed.), Aesthetics in science (pp. 73-104). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Miller, A. I. (1986). Imagery in scientific thought: Creating 20th-century physics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Miller, A. I. (1989). Imagery and intuition in creative scientific thinking: Albert Einstein's invention of the special
theory of relativity. In D. B. Wallace & H. E. Gruber (Eds.), Creative people at work (pp. 171-188). New
York: Oxford University Press.
Miller, A. I. (1996). Insights of genius: Imagery and creativity in science and art. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Popper, K. R. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. New York: Basic Books.

Rabinbach, A. (1990). The human motor: Energy, fatigue, and the origins of modernity. Berkeley, CA: University
of California Press.
Rose, S. (1998). Brains, minds and the world. In S. Rose (Ed.), From brains to consciousness? (pp. 1-17).
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Schwartz, J. (1992). The creative moment: How science made itself alien to modern culture. New York:
HarperCollins.
Shulman, S. (2007). Undermining science: Suppression and distortion in the Bush Administration Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press.
Sternberg, R. J. (1990). Metaphors of mind: Conceptions of the nature of intelligence. New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Weschler, J. (Ed.). (1988). On aesthetics in science (2nd ed.). Boston: Birkhauser.
About the Author

Don Ambrose, Ph.D., is Acting Associate Dean in the College of Liberal Arts, Education, and
Sciences at Rider University, USA; Editor of the international, refereed journal Roeper Review ; and
past chair of the Conceptual Foundations Division of the National Association for Gifted Children. He
is an interdisciplinary scholar who investigates influences on high ability. Author of several books
and numerous other publications, most of his work entails theoretical syntheses and philosophical
analyses based on a wide-ranging, interdisciplinary search for theories, philosophical perspectives,
and research findings that challenge, refine, and expand thinking about the development of creative
intelligence.
Address
Prof. Dr. Don Ambrose,
Editor, Roeper Review,
Acting Associate Dean,
College of Liberal Arts, Education, and Sciences,
Rider University,
2083 Lawrenceville Road,
Lawrenceville, NJ, 08648-3099 USA
phone: (609) 895-5647
e-Mail: ambrose@rider.edu


Review of Hisham Ghassib:
Where Does Creativity Fit into the
Knowledge Production?
Heinz Neber
Ghassib (2010) describes historical transformations of science from a marginal and non -
autonomous activity which had been constrained by traditions to a self-autonomous, knowledge-
producing enterprise. Its products in form of scientific knowledge cannot be derived from traditions
and religious or philosophical doctrines. Autonomously generated scientific knowle dge is considered
by the author as the main influential factor in modern societies because it is shaping technological
and economical developments. This statement could even be further generalized. It seems that is
not only applicable to technological and economical aspects of societies but to all aspects of
organizational, social, and individual life. Some more examples from other domains may help to
illustrate this generalization: Scientific knowledge is available to communicate more effectively and
to resolve conflicts in social interactions, to provide new ways of how we might acquire language,
social, and mathematical skills or to identify and replace traditional beliefs and doctrines that are
obstacles for implementing more optimal ways to develop human individuals, organizations and
societies. Corresponding and available knowledge-bases are science-based, and they are generated
or produced by methods that originally have been developed in the natural science s, in particular in
physics. E.g., the examples just mentioned are all related to psychology which is considered a
science since Wundt transfered research methods from physics to this domain by establishing the
first laboratory for performing controlled experiments about psychological issues.
In other words, Ghassib’s (2010) productive developments in science and

statement about the importance of scientific society.
knowledge production could be supported and
generalized by further arguments: it represents a How is knowledge produced in
central common and defining feature of science? As an answer to this question, the
advanced societies. As a consequence, most of author describes general characteristics of the
what constitutes developed individuals and production process, and he defines a model of
organizations has or even should be the product required components in terms of four
of applications of scientific findings. “commons”.
Due to that, advanced societies may be Knowledge production in science is

considered as “designed” societies or “artifacts” characterized as a creative, dialectical, and
(Simon, 1969). Their establishment, communal process. These general
maintenance, defense and development characteristics undoubtedly constrain the range
presuppose a continuous interaction with all of processes and activities as well as the
kinds of domain-specific sciences. Such possible spectrum of products considered as
societies may vice-versa even stimulate and scientific to certain types. If only “creative”
require the advancement of science in form of knowledge generation processes are
new kinds of “sciences of the artificial” (e.g. acknowledged as being scientific, then much of
computer science). Without any doubt, by what common scientists are doing doesn’t
integrating diverse single aspects into an count as scientific activity. This relates to those
historical and system-oriented context, Ghassib many investigations that use already established
(2010) opens perspectives for new and frameworks, and which result in findings whose

“truth” is clearly decidable. In terms of problem- Heisenberg (1975) stated that for extended
solving models offered by cognitive psychology periods, scientists define their research
(e.g. Klahr & Simon, 1999), the very scientific questions, the solution methods, and the ways
activity is restricted by the author to define and to interpret and model the findings by using
solve only “ill-defined problems” (Simon, 1973). established traditions of the discipline. By
Some or all components of such problems are applying a historically oriented social science
under-specified, and there is no already existing perspective, Simonton (2010) has found that
knowledge available to clearly define them. This long years of lower level accumulation of
may apply to one or more of the three knowledge within existing frameworks
components that define a problem (Neber, characterizes scientific work after having
2008): To the “initial state” (how to define and generated deeply restructured, may be
represent the problem situation?), to the revolutionary products that mark the observed
“transformation method” (what transforms the discontinuities in the development of a scientist
initial state into a solution?), and to the “final and of science (Kuhn, 1987). Thus, integrating
state” (what counts as a solution?). processes on different levels and considering a
larger spectrum of problem types as legitimate
Accordingly, real scientists seem to be tasks for research in one model might contribute
only those who are able to define new to attain a more complete representation of the
problems, at least to reformulate already knowledge production process in science.
existing problems in new ways, and/or to
develop new solution methods, at least to apply Concerning “processes” of scientific
existing methods (e.g. from another domain) in practice, another issue may require further
analogical ways for unusual and new purposes clarification. Inferring from historical cases that
(Antonietti, 2001), and/ or those researchers scientific products have been created by a
who generate solutions that are disputable but broad spectrum of processes and procedures
which are finally acknowledged as domain- corresponds to findings of cognitive science
specific solutions by the community of peer studies. There, the formulation of models that
scientists – even if it may take decades. could simulate more than only single cases of
Ghassib (2010) thus exclusively focuses discoveries (e.g. those of biochemist Hans
on so called deep- or high-level processes as Krebs) was not very successful (Langley et al.,
scientific production activities. In terms of the 1987). For these reasons, Ghassib’s (2010)
classification of knowledge generation statement that “there is no scientific method as
processes that has already been provided by such” seems also to be supported by empirical
Rumelhart and Norman (1977), only studies. However, does that really mean that
“restructuring” processes are considered as the science has no method at all, and that creative
very scientific activities. products in science are merely due to chance?
Whereas so called lower-level Even that the author denies the

“knowledge-accumulation” processes are existence of a universal scientific method, in
neglected. These are processes that contribute exposing the first two commons of his model
in accumulating knowledge withing existing (scientific reason and scientific intellectual
frameworks (like a social scientist who tools), he assumes that dialectical reasoning is
investigates the same variables or uses the always involved in scientific practice. This
same model repeatedly e.g. by applying the seems to be quite contradictory to the
same model of motivation to further samples). statement above, and might indeed require a
Viewed from the perspective of problem-solving dialectical synthesis.
research thus may help to specifiy and locate
Ghassib’s (2010) contribution more precisely. Here too, a solution could be to
distinguish between different levels of
Related to that, an open question processes that control scientific practice. On a
remains: Should lower level activities like solving general level, a common method that is used to
well-defined instead of only ill-defined problems solve ill-defined problems by scientists seems
really be excluded or rather included into the to exist, whereas lower level procedures (e.g. for
spectrum of what counts as knowledge- defining the contradiction that specifies thesis
production in science? May be the answer and antithesis) might be case specific, even be
should be positive. Arguments for that are unique inventions of the scientist, and, at least,
provided from different aspects. As a physicist, are not definable as algorithms.

Besides being creative and dialectical, Ghassib (2010) characterizes knowledge production
in science as a communal process. Accordingly, communality is realized as evaluation of research
products by peer scientists. If a product will not be recognized by the scientific community, it may
be at least unimportant for the domain. However, acknowledging a determining role of the scientific
environment only for the product seems to be too much restricted. Studies in cognitive science have
shown that all phases in defining and solving ill-defined scientific problems may be partially
determined by the community. Beginning with the formulation of research questions, the
representation and re-representation of the problem to study, to the development of methods, the
interpretation of the results, and finally the evaluation of the solution (product) – all these processes
are, more or less, due to “distributed reasoning” (Dunbar, 1999). Longitudinal in-vivo investigations in
molecular biology and immunology labs revealed that the weekly meetings with colleagues in those
labs have already to be considered as a crucial factor in determining and locating anomalies that are
not predictable by existing theories (Dunbar & Fugelsang, 2003). It is just the detection of anomalies
that is decisive for formulating theory-changing research questions in particular for questions that
establish cognitive conflicts and contradictions that may be resolved by applying dialectical thinking.
Such kinds of epistemic questioning may even intentionally be supported with students by
communicating with peers in research planning teams (Neber & Anton, 2008). Recent findings thus
indicate that “communality” seems to be an even more general feature of scientific work than it is
assumed by the author.
Conclusion
A concluding comment refers to the and individuals claim a high morale for them,
relation of science and society, i.e., the general but just the opposite is true).
perspective that Ghassib (2010) has established It remains an open question if this issue
at the beginning of his article. Accordingly, the of application, use, and purpose should
importance of scientific products for society necessarily supplement the discussion about
results from the application and use of these science as a knowledge-producing enterprise or
knowledge products for attaining certain not.
purposes and functions. According to Attneave (1974), a former
representant of cognitive science, “... knowing
However, it should be considered that at least connotes some kind of utility, some kind
discoveries and developments in physics, of consequences for the behavior” (p. 494).
chemistry, psychology and other sciences may Including such functional relations into models
be used for positive as well as for negative of knowledge contributes to the “completeness”
purposes (irrespective of whoever defines what of knowledge (Neber, 1997).
is positive or negative). For example, energy- In agreement with these statements, it is
producing methods may be used to prolong or suggested to integrate the applicaton-and-use
to destroy life; new and experimentally issue into the discussion about science as
supported findings about leadership skills may knowledge-producing enterprise because it
be used to strengthen charity institutions or might offer perspectives for further analyses and
criminal and corrupt organizations and insights in explaining why the relation among
individuals (may be even that the same groups science and society is so important.
References
Antonietti, A. (2001). Analogical discoveries. Identifying similarities to solve problems. Rome: Carocci editore.
Attneave, F. (1974). How do you know? American Psychologist, 29, 493-499.
Dunbar, K. (1999). Scientific creativity. In M. Runco & S. Pritzker (Eds.), Encyclopedia of creativity. Volume 1 (pp.
1379-1384). San Diego: Academic Press.
Dunbar, K. N., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2005). Causal thinking in science: How scientists and students interpret the
unexpected. In M. E. Gorman, R. D. Tweney, D. L. Gooding & A. R. Kincannon (Eds.), Scientific and
technological thinking (pp. 57-79). Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum.

Heisenberg, W. (1975). Tradition in science. In O. Gingerich (Ed.), The nature of scientific discovery (pp. 219-
236). Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
Klahr, D., & Simon, H. A. (1999). Studies of scientific discovery: Complementary approaches and convergent
findings. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 524-543.
Kuhn, T. S. (1987). What are scientific revolutions? In L. Kruger, L.J. Daston, & M. Heidelberger (Eds.), The
probabilistic revolution (Vol 1, pp. 7-22). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Langley, P., Simon, H. A., Bradshaw, G. L., & Zytkow, J. M. (1987). Scientific discovery: Computational
explorations of the creative processes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Neber, H. (1997). Promoting the generation of usable knowledge. In J. H. M. Hamers & M. T. Overtoom (Eds.),
Teaching thinking in Europe (pp. 255-260). Utrecht, NL: Sardes.
Neber, H. (2008). Problemlösen (problem solving). In K. H. Arnold, U. Sandfuchs, & J. Wiechmann (Eds.) (2007).
Handbuch Unterricht (handbook of instruction). Bad Heilbrunn, D: Klinkhardt.
Neber, H. (2009). Entdeckendes Lernen (discovery learning). In D. H. Rost (Ed.), Handwörterbuch Pädagogische
Psychologie (concise dictionary of educational psychology), fourth revised edition (in press).
Weinheim/Germany: PVU.
Neber, H., & Anton, M. A. (2008). Promoting pre-experimental activities in high-school chemistry: Focusing on
the role of students’ epistemic questions. International Journal of Science Education, 30, 1801-1822.
Rumelhart, D. E., & Norman, D. A. (1978). Accretion, tuning, and restructuring: three kinds of learning. In J.W.
Cotton & R.L. Klatzky (Eds.). Semantic factors in cognition (pp. 55-67). Hillsdale, NJ: erlbaum.
Simon, H. A. (1969). The sciences of the artificial. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
Simon, H. A. (1973). The structure of ill-structured problems. Artificial Intelligence, 4, 181-201.
Simonton, D. K. (2010). Little science to big science: Big scientists to little scientists? Gifted and Talented
About the Author

Heinz Neber is a professor of psychology, and had different positions as a professor of educational
psychology (currently at the University of Ulm/ Germany). His research focuses on learning, in
particular on discovery learning, and inquiry (e.g. in chemistry education). He published on the
acquisition of usable knowledge, problem-solving, cooperative learning, and self-regulation most of
them in German). On questioning, he published several studies focusing on ways to promote
students’ epistemic questions in regular classroom contexts (history, chemistry). Together with Kurt
Heller, he extensively evaluated the German Students Academy (a summer school for highly gifted
students). Other contributions concerned competitions, the quality of teacher nominations for
programs, self-regulated, and cooperative learning with highly gifted secondary school students.
Address
Prof. Dr. Heinz Neber,
University of Munich; Germany.
e-Mail: heinz.neber@online.de

A Short Commentary on “Where Does
Creativity Fit into a Productivist
Industrial Model of Knowledge
Production?”
Marcia Gentry
Ghassib (2010) takes the reader through an interesting history of human innovation and
processes and situates his theory within a productivist model. The deliberate attention to creativity
as human capital that informs scientific processes provides a refreshing view to processes often
viewed by the lay-person as mysterious and for the few.
I would like Ghassib (2010) to operationally define “modern science.” The discussion of
economic impact and the number of scientists, engineers, technicians, and administrators needs a
situated context. Does Ghassib (2010) consider those of us working in the social sciences scientists,
or does he reserve the term scientist for those working in the STEM disciplines. What about
medicine? Is a practitioner in any field considered a technician or can some practitioners also be
scientists? Defining the scope and context that underpin this model of scientific process and
scientific practice would enhance readers’ understanding of the theory he posits.
Although I don’t disagree with the assertion that science is a large industry in terms of
capital investment and number of employees, some data to substantiate these claims would
enhance this discussion. Additionally, specific examples of how needs are created, the effects of
such creation on science and life-styles, and a description of how demands have increased have
evolved over a relatively short time could also provide a clearer picture of the context for the theory.
Is scientific knowledge a major industry or a component in many major industries? And how does
scientific knowledge differ from what Ghassib (2010) terms knowledge enterprise?
I wonder if scientists, or the producers, as Ghassib (2010) terms them, are actually bred.
How does one breed a mind, or how does a knowledge factory breed and nurture a network of hi gh
quality minds. Perhaps he means to say identifies, finds, and nurtures. True, universities compete for
top students and then faculty mentor and develop the next generation of scientists. I struggle trying
to picture the army of engineers to which he refers, aren’t engineers, at least some of the time,
scientists?
I would also like to see a discussion of the creative scientist to which Ghassib (2010) refers
on page 4 under item #4. Is there a difference between this creative scientist and a regular scien tist?
How much knowledge is needed for creativity, how much stifles creativity?
I find the idea of a variety of methods of scientific practice and research exciting and with
profound implications for how we approach teaching science to children. If childr en are constrained
by a lock-step “scientific method” as commonly taught in most schools, then might we be stifling
their own methods and creativity. This notion gives credence to constructivist approaches to
developing understanding (e.g., Bruner, Dewey, Vygotsky).

I would like more discussion on why Ghassib (2010) reduces scientific reason to only two
basic components and why must these components be mathemetized? Why not simply theorization
and experimentation, and why not include explanation and reflection as intermediate steps between
what he determines as dialectic? Can one experiment and return to theory without considering
findings in the context of the theory?
How does logical and practical testing square with creativity? Is there room for intuit ive
leaps, knowledge that is innate before testing? I would like to see more attention to creativity, its
definition, and its central role within the “science industry.” I believe taking the text to a level with a
figural model of how these components interact and interrelate would strengthen the written
argument.
After reading and responding to this manuscript, I gave it to 9 future social scientists —
known in some circles as doctoral students. I asked these students to read and respond to the
manuscript by considering what about the theory they found interesting, profound, or appealing.
Then I asked them to consider what questions, gaps, or issues they would like to see the author
address. Following are the results of the students’ perceptions of the stre ngths and weaknesses of
this theory as presented in the manuscript. Table 1 summarizes their comments on and reaction to
Ghassib’s (2010) theory.
Table 1: Future Scientists’ Comments on the Theory.

Interesting, Profound, or Appealing Questions, Gaps, or Issues
Use of historical framework is impressive, More citations and evidence for assertions
complete, and provides excellent underpinning presented in the historical framework would
for the theory. strengthen the manuscript.
A unique connection is posited between The creativity component of the model needs
creativity and science with a new framework for elaboration and description similar to that
understanding. provided for the history and industrial
components.
Well-made connection between theory and Explanation and examples of the communal
knowledge production. nature of science are warranted.
Profound idea of the creation of perceived Include definition, theoretical background, and a
needs. conceptual framework for creativity.
The industrial model is well described and Elaborate on the scientific method referenced in
provides a clear basis for the theory. the theory.
Reference

About the Author
Marcia Gentry is the Director of the Gifted Education Resource Institute (GERI). Marcia joined the
faculty at Purdue in 2004 after spending 8 years as a professor in Minnesota where she began her
research into student perceptions of school experiences and directed graduate programs in gifted
education. She accepted the role of GERI director in January of 2008. Her research has focused on
the use of cluster grouping and differentiation; the application of gifted education pedagogy to
improve teaching and learning; student perceptions school; and on non-traditional services and
underserved populations—areas in which she has over 50 publications. Marcia is chair-elect of the
American Educational Research Association Special Interest Group, Research on Giftedness and
Talent. She has also served on the National Association for Gifted Children’s Board of Directors and
is recipient of its Early Scholar Award. She frequently contributes to the literature, regularly
participates in international, state, and regional venues concerning gifted child education and
educational research, and she serves on the editorial review boards of 5 journals including Gifted
and Talented International. Prior to her work in higher education Marcia taught math and science to
middle school students, enriched curriculum to gifted elementary students, and she served as a
regional administrator for gifted programs.
Address
Dr. Marcia Gentry,
Purdue University,
BRNG 5116,
100 N. University St,
West Lafayette, IN 47906, U.S.A.
e-Mail: mgentry@purdue.edu


A Chaos of Delight:
A Response to Hisham Ghassib
Peter Merrotsy
“The mind is a chaos of delight, out of which a world of future and more quiet pleasure will arise.”
(Charles Darwin, 28 February 1832.)
Professor Ghassib is a (theoretical) physicist who is internationally acclaimed as a writer in

scientific thinking, philosophy, and Arabic culture. His publications reflect an academic career of
advocating for progress in science, and a long-term commitment to interpreting the development of
scientific thinking through a Marxist lens. In this paper (Where does creativity fit into a productivist
industrial model of knowledge production?) Ghassib (2010) explores the epistemological
ramifications of science becoming a major industry, which is generally called the knowledge
industry. In particular, he proposes a ‘productivist industrial model’ of scientific practice and
knowledge production, at the heart of which are placed the related processes of creativity and
innovation. The model is ‘productivist industrial’ in the sense that the productive sites, the
producers, the raw material, the means of knowledge, the methods of production and the
uniqueness of the product can all be defined, detailed and located. However, it does differ from
typical industrial processes in so far as the product is not pre-determined, for such is the nature of
creativity and innovation.
Even given Bertrand Russell’s issues with inductive reasoning, the scientific method of
enquiry is well established and well known: hypothesis, null-hypothesis, rigorous testing and
reproducibility of testing, and its theories are empirically refutable. This can be concisely and
succinctly described as ‘the coming to consciousness of uncertain inference’ (Franklin, 2001, p. x).
That is, as Ghassib (2010) points out, scientific practice comes with its own baggage or epistemic
heritage, ‘a logically and conceptually inhomogeneous edifice ridden with defects, absences, inner
contradictions and areas and halos of uncertainty.’
The defects, contradictions and uncertainty are apparent wherever we look. Science can be
a demanding master, and people who make enormous contributions can be soon forgotten: we
know neither the inventor of the plough nor the discoverer of hybrid vigour in seed crop plants, yet
their contributions to knowledge have had enormous economic and social impact. Some scientists
lead troubled lives, have their contributions to knowledge suppressed or subsumed by ot hers for
personal or material gain, and become embroiled in bitter disputes over recognition and
acknowledgement (see, for example, the story of Tesla, in Cheney, 2001). Particular fields of science,
such as so-called defence research, are favoured by government funding grant bodies, to the
detriment of other fields and to the detriment of society and of knowledge. For many women, the
scientific world is a deeply alienating world, and their underrepresentation in it, or exclusion from it,
is well documented. The current preoccupation of physicists, for example, with discovering the
Theory of Everything (TOE), and the billions of research dollars spent in its pursuit, could be
interpreted as irresponsible when the valuable research time and money could contri bute to solving
social problems that are plaguing people throughout the world. Wertheim (1997) argues that women

tend to reflect more on their role in the community, and ask different types of questions, so that if
significant numbers of women were to participate in a science, they would alter its intellectual
climate and creative environment.
This human face of science reinforces, perhaps in a cynical way, that science, as it is
currently practised, evidently does fit well with a ‘productivist industrial model’. As Ghassib (2010)
worries, scientific reason appears to construct an ontology, perhaps hypostasis, of nature and of
natural being, which raises deep questions concerning the nature of being itself. In the western
world, this is no more apparent than in a doctrine of analogia entis, reflected in a spate western
scientists claiming to seek The Mind of God (and Hawking’s best-selling book, A Brief History of
Time, opens with a reference to ‘the mind of God’). Quite correctly, this should be a concern for
anyone. The human face of science also raises questions about the purpose and meaning of
science, and whether the ‘productivist industrial model’ is a necessary or desirable model for
scientific practice. For example, does such a model have a place for people whose creativity is far
ahead of their times with perhaps no known application: would Apollonius of Perga and Srinivasa
Ramanujan find a comfortable place to express themselves in it?
In the abstract to his paper, Ghassib (2010) claims to construct a new model for the
scientific method and scientific practice. The final reflection in this response to his paper is to
consider the extent to which this claim is true. At first glance, Ghassib’s (2010) ‘productivist
industrial model’ is reminiscent of systems approaches that attempt to understand creativity and
intelligence through the interaction of cognition through context (Sternberg, 1994). For
Csikszentmihalyi (1999), for example, creativity is located in a virtual space, or system, where an
individual interacts with a cultural domain and with a social field. It is a historical process, analogous
to the theory of evolution, and it manifests itself only in the relation of these three separate entities.
The domain is a necessary component because creativity is not possible in the absence of a
symbolic system. Creativity occurs when a person makes a change to a domain that will be
transmitted through time. Changes are not adopted unless they are sanctioned by some group of
gatekeepers, or the field, entitled to make decisions as to what should or should not be included in
the domain.
On the other hand, Ghassib’s (2010) model fits very well within the conceptual framework of
Creative Knowledge Environments, or CKEs (Hemlin et al., 2004). Such a framework begins with the
premise that creativity is to a great extent influenced by the environment in which people work to
produce creative products. CKEs are then defined to be those environments, contexts and
surroundings, which have characteristics that exert a positive influence on human beings engaged in
creative work aiming to produce new knowledge or innovations. The people may work individually or
in teams, within a single organization or in collaboration with others. CKEs represent an obvious
focus to aid in understanding the process of knowledge generation: economies have become more
knowledge intensive; knowledge is socially negotiated or constructed and is established in a process
involving communication. Perhaps here it goes without saying that three types of CKEs are
acknowledged: academia, industry and government.
Hence Ghassib’s (2010) answer to the question ‘where does creativity fit into a productivist
industrial model of knowledge production?’ will not sit comfortably with everyone, especially those
for whom the Hegelian dialectic or a Marxist interpretation of history is not their cup of tea. Given the
recent exponential growth of the knowledge economy, it would seem fitting to point to other models
to locate and understand scientific creativity. However, given current events in the international
financial world, it would also be fitting to take Ghassib’s (2010) questions seriously. In either case, it

is worth keeping in mind, during this bi-centenary of the birth of Darwin, that from an evolutionary
point of view, the key characteristic that defines human diversity and achievement is the brain’s
ability to reflect, to create, and to solve problems.
References
Cheney, M. (2001) Tesla: Man out of time. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1999) Implications of a systems perspective for the study of creativity. In R. Sternberg
(Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 313–335). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Franklin, J. (2001). The science of conjecture: Evidence and probability before Pascal. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press.
Hemlin, S., Allwood, C. & Martin, B. (Eds.) (2004) Creative Knowledge Environments: The Influences on
Creativity in Research and Innovation. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Sternberg, R. (1994) Intelligence. In R. Sternberg (Ed.), Thinking and problem solving (pp. 263–288). San Diego:
Academic Press.
Wertheim, M. (1997) Pythagoras’ trousers: God, physics, and the gender wars. New York: W.W. Norton &
Company.

About the Author

Peter Merrotsy: After 18 years as a teacher and head teacher of mathematics in rural Australia,
Peter was appointed to the University of New England in 2004. He is Senior Lecturer in Gifted and
Talented Education, Associate Director, Student Diversity Education, at The National Centre of
Science, Information and Communication Technology, and Mathematics Education for Rural and
Regional Australia SiMERR, and Editor of the journal TalentEd. His research focuses on gifted
children from backgrounds of disadvantage (low socio-economic status, cultural minority status,
rural and isolated contexts, refugees, and youth in juvenile justice).
Address
Dr. Peter Merrotsy,
School of Education,
University of New England,
Armidale, NSW , Australia 2351.
e-Mail: pmerrots@une.edu.au

A New Look at Creative Giftedness
Todd Lubart; and Franck Zenasni
In the target article, “Where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of
knowledge production?”, Ghassib (2010) invites the reader to step back and consider some long
term historical and socio-cultural trends concerning the field of science and its relationships to
society. This perspective suggests that science has evolved to become an industry which is central
to economic growth, engaging large sectors of the workforce. According to Ghass ib (2010), science
has become the dominant mental paradigm of our times. Within this analysis, the concept of
creativity plays an important role. Science is by its nature a creative endeavour. The result of a
scientific process is new knowledge, new methods, and subsequently after application, new
inventions, new products, and advances for society. Thus, the business of science is the creation of
new knowledge, a creative endeavour just as much as artistic or literary work.
According to Ghasib’s (2010) target Sternberg and Lubart (1995) propose that
article, there are certain characteristics that are creativity involves more than a simple sum of an
particularly relevant to creative work in science. individual's level on each of the components for
These are (1) the importance of having creativity. First, there maybe a threshold for
background knowledge on a topic, (2) the some components (e.g., knowledge) below
capacity to transpose methods from one sector which creativity is not possible, regardless of an
to another, a sign of flexible thinking, (3) the individual's level on the other components.
ability to selectively encode small, “delicate Second, partial compensation may occur
quantitative differences” between observed and between the components in which strength on
expected results and to realize the significance one component (e.g., motivation) may
of these differences, (4) the ability to use counteract weakness on another component
analogies or metaphors, and to engage in (e.g., knowledge).Third, although each
dialectical thinking to construct new theoretical component contributes in its own way to
models, (5) the ability to combine information creativity, a component is always acting in the
from different fields in a new synthesis, and (6) presence of other components and this co-
the ability to evaluate the quality of new ideas action can lead to interactive effects. For
and transmit these ideas socially to the scientific example, high levels on both intelligence and
community. motivation could multiplicatively enhance
creativity.
These characteristics represent a
subset of the cognitive and conative factors A creative person is one who possesses
identified in the multivariate approach to the necessary resources and uses these
creativity (Lubart, 1999; Lubart, Mouchiroud, resources to "buy low" (pursue ideas that are
Tordjman & Zensani, 2003).. For example, new or out of favour but have potential) and,
Sternberg and Lubart (1995), in their investment after developing these ideas, to "sell high"
approach, proposed that creativity requires a (presenting the production publicly, at the right
confluence of cognitive, conative and moment for the production to be appreciated).
environmental resources. These resources for Of course, the contribution and interaction
creativity are specific aspects of intelligence, between each component may vary somewhat
knowledge, cognitive styles, personality, with the domain of creative endeavour. We
motivation, and environmental context. With hypothesize that there is a multivariate model
regard to the confluence of resources, specific to scientific creativity, according to

which the optimized set of psychological employing knowledge in expert ways, rather
resources will differ from those needed for other than contributing to the growth of new
forms of creativity, such as literary or artistic knowledge. This is consistent with the major
creativity. Thus, we can examine empirically if educational paradigm of the past century: follow
the abilities highlighted by Ghassib (2010) are in the footsteps of the teacher, achieve mastery,
the most important ones for scientific creativity. and show mastery by producing the expected
correct answer.
When we consider the field of However, there is another form of
giftedness and its’ focus during the past giftedness that has begun to receive attention:
century, we can only be struck by the creative giftedness. This kind of giftedness
implications of Ghassib’s (2010) analysis represents a potential for original thinking. It is
concerning the scientific field and its integration not well measured by standard intelligence
in the fabric of modern society. Indeed, the field tests, but it can be measured in other ways. This
of giftedness has historically focused on creative potential, if identified and nurtured,
traditional intellectual skills, those involved in leads to creative talent—defined here as the
traditional academic success. The use of IQ socially-recognized production of novel,
tests, designed originally by Binet and Simon to adaptive ideas in professional contexts.
predict academic success has led to the Ghassib’s (2010) target article can be taken as a
identification of a kind of gifted person, the call to recognize the importance of creative
intellectually or academically gifted individual. giftedness in science as a fundamental
This kind of person has potential to succeed in contributor to modern society. The logical
traditional academic tasks. These tasks involve conclusion would be a reorientation of the field
the acquisition of knowledge, and structured of giftedness to focus on those who have high
reasoning using this knowledge leading to an potential to contribute to the generation of new
expertise in an intellectual field, such knowledge rather than those who have high
engineering, law, medicine to cite only a few potential to use this knowledge.
examples. It is not surprising that longitudinal
studies of gifted individuals, identified in There are, certainly, some links between
childhood by IQ tests, tend to have successful academic giftedness and creative giftedness
academic careers and most often become (see Root-Bernstein, Bernstein & Garnier, 1993).
successful experts in various knowledge-driven There has been, over the years, a long debate
domains (Lubart, 2006). on the separation between intelligence and
creativity (see Lubart, 2003). Within the existing
Based on longitudinal studies, relatively IQ-focused literature on giftedness, some
few of these individuals, however, have studies, which are particularly relevant to
produced creative breakthroughs. It seems that scientific creative potential, can be highlighted
academically gifted individuals are trained to in the context of the multivariate approach to
focus more on using the results of science, creativity.
Cognitive resources
Divergent thinking, defined as the capacity to generate alternative ideas, has often been
advanced as a key part of the creative process. Runco (1986) showed in a series of studies that
gifted children tend to have relatively high levels of divergent thinking, showing fluency (generating
many ideas) and flexibility (switching from one to other kinds of ideas). This divergent thinking may
be associated with a competency in gifted children to access information from their long term
memory but also with their high ability to associate and combine remote information.
Neuropsychological studies have provided evidence for good interhemispheric coordination in gifted
children (O’Boyle et Singh, 2004; O’Boyle et al, 2005): this functioning may allow the gifted to

connect distinct kinds of information (for example verbal and visuo-spatial) at the same time and
combine them to create ideas or new solutions to problem.
The ability to activate disparate information and combine them may moreover be associated
with an ability to inhibit information that is not relevant in a situation. This selective mental-attentional
capacity (Baillargeon, Pascual-Leone, & Roncadin, 1998) is hypothesized to contribute specifically to
giftedness. It corresponds to the capacity to activate multiple ideas, and specifically refers to the
maximum absolute number of different schemata that can be activated in a single mental act. After
the activation of the schemata, individuals have to select relevant information/ solutions by inhibiting
irrelevant information. Johnson et al (2003) found that gifted children from 6 to 11 years were better
able to resist interference in tasks requiring effortful inhibition. This ability of gifted children to inhibit
information highly predicts the capacity to select and organise ideas, which are potentially important
resources for scientific investigation.
Conative resources
Concerning cognitive style, we may note that gifted children during learning prefer to be
involved actively in the acquisition of knowledge. They prefer to search for new information rather
than simply receiving it. Rayneri (2006) conducted a study to examine learning style of 80 gifted
children (aged from 11 to 14 years). Using Dunn and Dunn’s Questionnaire of learning style, Ray neri
observed that gifted children, compared to non-gifted pupils, tend to be more active in their learning
activities; they prefer to be mobile (involving tactile and kinaesthetic modes) and to be responsible
for their choice of activities.
In term of motivation, empirical studies showed that gifted children have interests that differ
from those of other children. Vocational interests of gifted adolescents indicate a preference for
activities oriented toward investigation, which favour a preference for sc ience. Schmidt, Lubinsky
and Benbow (1998) examined vocational interest of 695 highly gifted adolescents (mean age = 13
years) with the Strong-Campbell inventory. This tool evaluates six areas of interest : Realistic,
Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, and Conventional themes. Results indicate that gifted
boys tend to prefer investigative vocations, particularly science, and choose less entrepreneurial,
social and artistic vocations. Gifted girls show also a significant preference for science bu t also for
social activities. Sparfeldt (2007) replicated this study with a German population of 106 gifted
adolescents compared to 98 non-gifted adolescents. Results indicate that gifted adolescents
displayed higher investigative interests and lower social interests than non-gifted adolescents.
Differences between both groups regarding their realistic, artistic, enterprising, and conventional
interests were non significant.
Finally, within the conative sphere, personality traits may be defined as stable patterns of
preferred behaviors. Some data indicate that gifted children may present specific behavioural
characteristics (Lens & Rand, 2000 ; Zenasni & Mouchiroud, 2005) that support an interest in
science. Curiosity and perfectionism are two of these. Curiosity, which is related to openness to new
experiences, refers to the desire to know and understand the world. Curiosity, often noted as a
character of gifted children, may lead to frequent questioning of facts and phenomena as well as an
interest in novelty. Curiosity may contribute to intellectual risk-taking in pursuit of knowledge, which
is particularly relevant for scientific work. Perfectionism is another often observed characteristic of
children with high potential (Kline and Meckstroth, 1985; Parker and Stumpf, 1995; Neumeister,
2004). Perfectionism refers to a need for excellence that drives individuals to be critical of
themselves. Perfectionism can be expressed in different ways, such as a search for great accuracy
or a desire to be exceptionally effective (see Stumpf and Parker, 2002, concerning “healthy”
perfectionism). Perfectionism, considered as a personality trait, can thus contribute to certain

behaviours relevant to creative productivity, such as perseverance, tolerance of ambiguity, and

achievement motivation.
Conclusion
The financial crisis of the early 21 st oriented giftedness are not mutually exclusive.
century (2008-2009) has brought into focus the Indeed, some characteristics associated with
evolving nature of the global economy, and the intellectual giftedness, based on research
increasing need for creativity and innovation in highlighted in this paper, are potentially relevant
all sectors to stimulate growth by providing new to scientific potential.
opportunities, and opening new sectors of
activity. However, to hit the bulls-eye of
The role of science as a major industry scientific giftedness, which inherently involves
underpinning this growth is highlighted in original, creative thinking, we will need to re-
Ghassib’s (2010) think piece. A change in focus efforts to identify the specific multivariate
perspective on giftedness is needed, with more set of cognitive and conative characteristics
attention to creative giftedness. Creative involved and to develop new educational
giftedness and traditional, academic, expertise- programs to enhance them.
References
Baillargeon, R., Pascual-Leone, J., & Roncadin, C. (1998). Mental-attentional capacity: Does cognitive style
make a difference? Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 70, 143-166.
Johnson J., Im-Bolter N., Pascual-Leone, J (2003). Development of mental attention in gifted and mainstream
children: The role of mental capacity, inhibition, and speed of processing. Child Development, 74(6),
1594-1614.
Kline, B. E. & Meckstroth, E. A. (1985). Understanding and encouraging the exceptionally gifted. Roeper Review,
8(1), 24-30.
Lens, W., & Rand, P. (2000). Motivation and cognition: Their role in the development of giftedness. In K. A.
Heller, F. J. Mönks, R. J. Sternberg, & R. F. Subotnik (Eds.), International handbook of giftedness and
talent (2nd ed., pp. 193-202). New York: Elsevier.
Lubart, T. I. (1999). Componential models of creativity. In M. A. Runco & S. Pritzer (Eds.) Encyclopedia of
creativity (pp. 295-300). New York : Academic Press.
Lubart, T. I. (2003). In search of creative Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg, J. Lautrey, & T. I. Lubart (Eds.), Models
of intelligence : International perspectives (pp. 279-292). Washington, DC: American Psychological
Association.
Lubart, T. I. (Ed) (2006) Enfants exceptionnels: Précocité, haut potentiel et talent. (Exceptional children :
precocity, high potential and talent). Bréal.
Lubart, T., Mouchiroud, C., Tordjman, S. & Zenasni, F. (2003). Psychologie de la créativité (Psychology of
creativity). Paris : Armand Colin.
Neumeister, K. L. S. (2004). Understanding the relationship between perfectionism and achievement motivation
in gifted college students. Gifted Child Quarterly, 48, 219–231.
O’Boyle & Singh (2004). Interhemispheric interaction during global–local processing in mathematically gifted
adolescents, average-ability youth, and college students. Neuropsychology, 18(2), 371–377.
O'Boyle, M.W., Cunnington, R., Silk, T., Vaughan, D., Jackson, G., Syngeniotis, A., & Egan, G. (2005).
Mathematically gifted male adolescents activate a unique brain network during mental rotation. Cognitive
Brain Research, 25, 583-587.
Parker, W. D., & Stumpf, H. (1995). An examination of the Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale with a sample
of academically talented children. Journal of Psychoeducational Assessment, 13, 372-383

Rayneri, Letty J., Gerber, Brian L., Wiley, Larry P. (2006). The relationship between classroom environment and
the learning style preferences of gifted middle school students and the impact on levels of performance.
Gifted Child Quarterly 50, 104-118.
Root-Bernstein, R.S., Bernstein, M. & Garnier, H. (1993). Identification of scientists making long-term high-
impact contributions, with notes on their methods of working. Creativity Research Journal, 6, 329-343.
Runco, M. A. (1986). The discriminant validity of gifted children's divergent thinking test scores. Gifted Child
Quarterly, 30(2), 78-82.
Schmidt, D. B., Lubinski, D., & Benbow, C. P. (1998). Validity of assessing educational-vocational preference
dimensions among intellectually talented 13-year olds. Journal of Counseling Psychology, 45, 436-453
Sparfeldt (2007). Vocational interests of gifted adolescents. Personality and individual 42(6),1011-1021
Sternberg, R. J., & Lubart, T. I. (1995). Defying the crowd : Cultivating creativity in a culture of conformity. New
York: Free Press.
Stumpf and Parker, (2000). A hierarchical structural analysis of perfectionism and its relation to other personality
characteristics. Personality and Individual Differences, 28, 837–852.
Zenasni, F., et Mouchiroud C. (2005). Aspects socio-émotionnels du phénomène du haut potentiel. In T. Lubart
(Ed.). Enfants exceptionnels : Précocité intellectuelle, haut potentiel et talent (pp 142-156). Bréal : Paris
About the Authors

Todd Lubart is Professor of Psychology at the Université Paris Descartes, and Member of the
Institut Universiatire de France. He received his Ph.D. from Yale University and was an invited
professor at the Paris School of Management (ESCP). His research focuses on creativity, its
identification and development in children and adults, the role of emotions, the creative process and
intercultural issues. Todd Lubart is author or co-author of numerous books, research papers, and
scientific reports on creativity, including the books Defying the crowd: Cultivating creativity in a
culture of conformity (NY: Free Press, 1995), Psychologie de la créativité (The psychology of
creativity, Paris: Colin, 2003), and Enfants Exceptionnel (Exceptional Children, Bréal, 2006). He is the
co-founder of the International Centre for Innovation in Education (ICIE), and the associate editor of
Gifted and Talented International.
Franck Zenasni is assistant professor in Differential Psychology at the Université Paris Descartes.
His research focuses on (1) definition and description of emotional traits and aff ective style, (2) the
impact of these characteristics on cognitive activities, (3) the role of emotions in creativity and (4) the
evaluation of quality of life.
Addresses
Prof. Dr. Todd Lubart,
Laboratoire de Psychologie et Neurosciences Cognitives (LPNCog-CNRS),
Institut de Psychologie,
Université Paris Descartes,
71 avenue Edouard Vaillant, 92774 Boulogne-Billancourt Cedex–France.
e-Mail: todd.lubart@parisdescartes.fr
Dr. Franck Zenasni,

Laboratoire adaptation Travail Individu, Université Paris Descartes,
Université Paris Descartes,
71 avenue Edouard Vaillant,
92100 Boulogne-Billancourt,
Paris, France.
e-Mail: franck.zenasni@parisdescartes.fr


Scientific Creativity:
Idealism versus Pragmatism
Michael D. Mumford; Kimberly S. Hester; and Issac C. Robledo
Abstract
The need for creativity in the sciences has, from time to time, been questioned. Thus, Ghassib’s (2010)
argument that creativity is critical to performance in the sciences, and hence organizational effectiveness in a
knowledge production economy, is important. Moreover, the proposition that scientific creativity is based on
knowledge and conceptual combination is well founded. Nonetheless, the description of creativity in
organizational settings provided is, ultimately, an idealistic image. The idealism leads to problems with regard to
the assumptions made about (1) who does creative work; (2) the kinds of knowledge involved in creative work;
(3) the processing operations people apply in working with this knowledge; and (4) the importance of the
organizational setting in which this work occurs. The implications of these observations for preparing people for
creative work in organizations are discussed.
Keywords: Creativity, innovation, scientists, organizations.
Introduction
Few scholars, or for that matter few literature. For example, the available evidence
practitioners, would dispute the fact that indicates that expertise (Ericsson & Charness,
creativity, the production of original, high- 1994; Weisberg, 2006) and conceptual
quality, solutions to novel, complex, ill-defined combination skills (Baughman & Mumford,
problems (Mumford & Gustafson, 2007), is 1995; Finke, Ward, & Smith, 1992) are critical to
critical to organizational performance in the creative thought in many disciplines including
economy of the 21st century (Mumford, Scott, the sciences. By the same token, we found
Gaddis, & Strange, 2002; Shalley & Zhou, 2008). Ghassib’s (2010) argument that the creativity of
Ghassib (2010) seeks to explain knowledge an individual scientist can account for
creation and organizational performance with organizational creativity to be idealistic and
respect to the creativity of one key overly simplistic. In the present effort we will
constituency—scientists. In his view scientific address four key problems we found in
creativity is the basis for knowledge production. Ghassib’s (2010) arguments: (1) assumptions
The basis of scientific creativity is held to lie in about who does creative work; (2) the way
the epistemic knowledge, field-based expertise, knowledge is employed in creative work; (3) the
of the scientist and the scientists’ ability to processing operations involved in creative work;
create new combinations of knowledge and and (4) the organizational setting in which
explicitly evaluate, or test, these new creative work occurs. We will then consider the
combinations. implications of these differing views for the
The arguments presented by Ghassib development of creative talent and
(2010) are not necessarily inconsistent with the organizational innovation.

Domains
Ghassib (2010) argues that the Even if one recognizes that multiple
production of new knowledge is the basis for forms of knowledge creation are valuable in
organizational innovation. From this assumption organizations, one might still argue, as we
he goes on to argue that knowledge creation is suspect Ghassib (2010) would, that it is the
the provenance of scientists with engineers, creation of non-technical, scientific, knowledge
technicians, and administrators serving in that drives creative performance in
support roles. What Ghassib (2010) does not organizations. The problem here is that Ghassib
recognize is the fact that organizations are (2010) assumes new knowledge is per se of
complex systems, and, in complex systems, value and therefore creative. However, creative
many roles exist where the creation of new work requires the production not of knowledge,
knowledge would prove of value (Katz & Kahn, but rather original, useful, products (Mumford &
1978). Gustafson, 1988). Thus, knowledge must be
turned into something useful if creativity is to be
For example, leaders may create new observed. As a result, one would expect that the
strategies and this strategy may prove critical to work of engineers in crafting knowledge into
organizational performance. In fact, the viable new products would be critical to
marketing strategy pursued by General Motors organizational creativity (Drazin, Glynn,
in the 1920s and 1930s provides one, of many, Kazanjian, 1999; Hughes, 1989).
illustrations of the point (Halberstam, 1986).
Moreover, knowledge creation need not always Similarly, one would expect creating
be solely technical in nature. Instead, the products that prove of value in this marketplace
creation of new knowledge may also be based would contribute to organizational creativity
on the processes by which the organization (Osborn, 1963). Thus in our view creativity
completes its work (Damanpour, 1991). cannot, and should not, be viewed solely as the
prerogative of scientists. In fact, the multiple
The importance of knowledge creation forms of creative thought required to produce
with regard to work processes is nicely viable new products has led many organizations
illustrated in Kanigel’s (1996) analysis of the to stress the use of multi-functional teams in
impact of Taylor’s work on time-motion studies. product development efforts (Thamhain, 2003).
Knowledge
Although one might dispute Ghassib’s For example, Andersen, Barker, and
(2010) assumption that creativity is only the Chen (2006) examined the knowledge involved
provenance of the sciences, there can be little in a number of historically notable scientific
dispute about the importance of knowledge, or innovations (e.g., x-rays, planetary movements).
expertise, to creative thought (Ericsson & They found that the generation of new scientific
Charness, 1994; Weisberg, 2006). knowledge was not concept based per se but
The problem here, however, arises from rather involved both concept creation and the
how Ghassib (2010) defines knowledge. In his integration of multiple concepts into complex
view, knowledge is field, or epistemologically- mental models articulating cause-outcome
based, involving “universal principles”—a type linkages. Along related lines, Hunter, Bedell-
of knowledge referred to as schematic Avers, Ligon, Hunsicker, and Mumford (2008)
knowledge. examined the influence of three different types
of knowledge, associational, schematic, and
In fact, the available evidence indicates case-based or experiential, on idea generation
that schema, or principles, are critical to and the production of creative problem
creative thought in general (Baughman & solutions. They found that associational
Mumford, 1995) and scientific creativity in knowledge contributed to idea generation but
particular (Dunbar, 1995). The problem here, that both schematic and case-based knowledge
however, arises because schematic knowledge contributed to the generation of creative
may not be the only form of knowledge involved problem solutions. Thus, while schematic
in creative thought. knowledge may be important to creative

thought, it may not be the only form of indicate that creative people typically draw
knowledge that is needed. knowledge from two to four different fields
Although one might question Ghassib’s relevant to the problem at hand (Mumford &
(2010) emphasis on principle-based, schematic, Gustafson, 1988). A case in point may be found
knowledge on creative thinking in the sciences, in the Wright brothers’ development of powered
perhaps more problematic is his emphasis on flight. Their work depended not only on
knowledge drawn from a single field. Field understanding the principles involved in lift but
based expertise, while necessary for creative also the principles involved in control—control
thought, does not appear sufficient for knowledge emerging not from their work on
creativity. Instead, incidents of eminent flight but rather their work as bicycle mechanics
achievement in the sciences, and other fields, (Crouch, 1992).
Processes
Ghassib (2010), while stressing the identified that influence creative thought
importance of knowledge, also stresses the (Mumford, Mobley, Uhlman, Reiter-Palmon, &
need for scientists to work with this knowledge Doares, 1991) including: (1) problem definition;
in producing new understandings of a (2) information gathering; (3) concept solution;
phenomenon. Thus, Ghassib (2010), like many (4) conceptual combination; (5) idea generation;
earlier investigators (Merrifield, Guilford, (6) idea evaluation; (7) implementation planning;
Christensen, & Frick, 1962), argues for the and (8) monitoring. What should be recognized
importance of requisite processing activities. In here, however, is that other processing activities
Ghassib’s (2010) view three key processing aside from conceptual combination, idea
activities underlie creative thought: (1) generation, and idea evaluation, may prove
conceptual combination (transformation and critical to scientific creativity, or creativity in
transition); (2) idea generation; and (3) idea other fields, depending on the field’s status and
evaluation. In fact, this available evidence stage of development. Thus, Peterson (2006), in
indicates that all three of these processing her analysis of Jane Goodall’s contributions to
activities are critical to creative thought across a primatology, points to the importance of
number of fields (Basadur, Runco, & Vega, information gathering (e.g. observations of
2000; Lonergan, Scott, & Mumford, 2004; Scott, chimpanzee meat eating and tool use) as a
Lonergan, & Mumford, 2005). basis for Goodall’s creative contributions—
By the same token, a number of notably information gathering without reference
cognitive processing operations have been to an epistemological set of principles.
Setting
Although we would dispute some of the bearing on creative work in industry—attributes
assumptions Ghassib (2010) makes with regard of the group/team and attributes of the
to the domains of creative work, the nature of organization (Mumford & Hunter, 2005).
the knowledge involved, and the processes At the group level, it appears that two
employed in working with this knowledge, our variables are critical to promoting creativity. The
most serious reservation with regard to both his first variable is the climate of the interactional
discussion of organizational innovation, and environment surrounding the people engaged in
scientific creativity, lies in his discounting of collaborative, creative, work (Amabile, Conti,
context. In Ghassib’s (2010) analysis creativity is Coon, Lazenby, & Herron, 1996). In fact, in a
the property of an individual—an individual recent meta-analysis of studies of climatic
working alone. However, the best available influences on creativity, Hunter, Bedell-Avers,
evidence indicates that creative products, and Mumford (2007) found that perceptions of
including new knowledge, arise from people mission challenge, support, intellectual
working collaboratively (Abra, 1994; Sawyer, stimulation, and resources all exerted strong
2007). When it is recognized that collaborative effects on the production of creative products.
teams are established, and supported by, The second variable that has a marked impact
organizations it becomes apparent that Ghassib on creative production when people must work
(2010) has overlooked a critical set of influences collaboratively is leadership (Mumford, Scott,

Gaddis, & Strange, 2002). In fact, studies by for organizations to be able to absorb creative
Andrews and Farris (1967) indicate that effective work, along with the substantial investment of
leadership may be critical to the performance of resources that must be made in creative efforts
creative teams. led Mumford, Bedell-Avers, and Hunter (2007) to
argue that organizations must plan for
At an organizational level, it is clear that creativity—planning based on the exploration of
a focus on finances, as opposed to substantive themes derived from fundamentals applying in
production, inhibits creative work (Hitt, relevant fields (Hughes, 1989). Thus, unlike
Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996). This Ghassib (2010), who sees creative knowledge
evaluative framing is, in part, significant because as “unenvisageable” we would argue that it is
it influences the organizations capacity to be only through a process of envisioning creative
able to absorb, and respond to, the demands work, through planning, that creative products
imposed by new knowledge, products, or will emerge that can be successfully exploited
processes (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The need by organizations (O’Connor, 1998).
Conclusion
In our view, Ghassib (2010) has an idealized view of organizational creativity. It is a view that
stresses the scientists’ use of extant knowledge through a limited set of processing activities to
produce new knowledge. The idealism inherent in this model is evident in the fact that, at no point, is
the word product discussed—and, ultimately, creativity in organizations is expressed through
products.
What must be remembered is that multiple fields, multiple forms of knowledge, and multiple
processes are involved in producing products within an organizational setting. This inherent
complexity of creative work implies that a pragmatic, functional, orientation, in contrast to Ghassib’s
(2010) idealistic view, is required to enhance real-world creative performance.
The pragmatic, functional, orientation underlying our comments on Ghassib’s (2010) work is
not simply a matter of academic interest. Ghassib’s (2010) work has significant implications for how
organizations and societies should seek to develop creative capacity. Specifically, in Ghassib’s
(2010) view, creative potential can be enhanced by developing field specific expert ise and a limited
set of processing skills among those pursuing scientific careers.
In our view, however, although expertise must be acquired, a wider range of knowledge and
a wider set of processing skills must be acquired by people working in a number o f fields, not just
the sciences. Moreover, people must learn how to collaborate and plan creative work in an
organizational context. Hence, a broader more encompassing approach is, in our view, required for
the development of creative potential.
Hopefully, the present effort will serve as a stimulus for future work along these lines .
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Baughman, W. A., & Mumford, M. D. (1995). Process analytic models of creative capacities: Operations involved
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Crouch, T. D. (1992). Why Wilbur and Orville? Some thought on the Wright brothers and the process of
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Damanpour, F. (1991). Organizational innovation: A meta-analysis of effects of determinants and moderators.
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Dunbar, K. (1995). How scientists really reason: Scientific reasoning in real-world laboratories. In R. T. Sternberg
& J. E. Davidson (Eds.), The nature of insight (pp. 365-396). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Ericsson, K. A., & Charness, W. (1994). Expert performance: Its structure and acquisition. American
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Finke, R. A., Ward, T. B., & Smith, S. M. (1992). Creative cognition: Theory, research, and applications.
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Ghassib, H. B. (2010). Where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of knowledge production.
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Hitt, M. A., Hoskisson, R. E., Johnson, R.A., & Moesel, D. D. (1996). The market for corporate control and firm
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Hughes, T. P. (1989). American genesis: A history of the American genius for invention. New York: Penguin.
Hunter, S. T., Bedell-Avers, K. E., & Mumford, M. D. (2007). Climate for creativity: A quantitative review.
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Hunter, S. T., Bedell-Avers, K. E., Ligon, G. S., Hunsicker, C. M., Mumford, M. D. (2008). Applying multiple
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About the Authors

Michael D. Mumford is the George Lynn Cross Distinguished Research Professor of Psychology at
the University of Oklahoma where he directs the center for applied social research. He received his
doctoral degree from the University of Georgia in 1983 in the fields of industrial and organizational
psychology and psychometrics. Dr. Mumford is a fellow of the American Psychological Association
(Divisions 3, 5, 14), the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, and the American
Psychological Society. He has written more than 250 articles on creativity, innovation, planning,
leadership, and ethics. He serves as senior editor of the Leadership Quarterly and is on the editorial
boards of the Creativity Research Journal, the Journal of Creative Behavior, IEEE Transactions on
Engineering Management, and the Journal of Business Ethics. Dr. Mumford has served as principal
investigator on grants totaling more than 30 million from the National Science Foundation, the
National Institutes of Health, the Department of Defense, the Department of Labor, and the
Department of State. He is a recipient of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology's
M. Scott Myers Award for Applied Research in the Workplace.
Kimberly Hester is a doctoral student in the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Program at
the University of Oklahoma. Her research interests include leadership, affect, creativity, and
innovation.
Issac C. Robledo is a doctoral student in the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Program at
the University of Oklahoma. His research interests include creativity, innovation, and leadership.
Addresses
Prof. Dr. Michael D. Mumford,
The University of Oklahoma,
Norman, Oklahoma 73019, U.S.A.
e-Mail:
Kimberly Hester
Graduate Research Assistant,
University of Oklahoma,
Center for Applied Social Research,
2 Partners Place, 3100 Monitor, Suite 100,
Norman, OK 73072, U.S.A.
e-Mail: KHester@psychology.ou.edu
Issac C. Robledo,
The University of Oklahoma,
Norman, Oklahoma 73019, U.S.A.
e-Mail:

Creativity, Scientific Practice, and
Knowledge Production
Marilyn Fryer
In this interesting article, Hisham Ghassib (2010) describes the transformation of science
from its craft status in a pre-modern era to the major knowledge industry it is today. He then
compares the production of scientific knowledge with industrial production, but makes the important
distinction between the process of developing scientific knowledge and mechanistic industrial
production (cf. Fryer, B. 1996; 2004). Ghassib (2010) concludes by questioning the concept,
‘scientific method’ which he argues can be misleading since it could imply a single process which all
researchers follow, when in reality different scientists adopt different methodologies and do not
necessarily operate in the same logically-sequential way in which scientific research is conventionally
reported. Indeed competent scientists operate in a highly creative and innovative manner which is
anything but airy-fairy. However, his assertion that there is ‘no scientific metho d as such’ sounds a
shade strong since what he appears to be arguing, and quite rightly in my view, is that there are
many routes to creative outcomes and even if scientists adopt different methodologies they
nevertheless operate in scientific ways.
In the UK there is less literature on the achievements of Arabic/ Islamic

acknowledgement of the role of creativity in and Babylonian scientists. However, the
science than in the arts, such that the arts and situation has improved a little since the
creativity are often erroneously regarded as Creativity Centre’s 2002 international
synonymous. The way in which Ghassib (2010) conference on Creativity and Cultural Diversity
draws attention to the role of creativity in the which was held to draw attention to and begin
sciences helps to redress this imbalance. to address this anomaly (Fryer, M. 2004). Yet,
even though 2009 is designated the European
Ghassib (2010) argues, and I agree, that Year of Creativity & Innovation and Creativity
creativity ‘is not a mere flight of unbridled and Cultural Diversity is one of its key themes,
imagination’ but requires a good grounding in there is still a long way to go to raise public
the relevant body of knowledge as well as awareness.
willingness to seek links beyond one’s own field
of study. Citing Marx (1982), Ghassib (2010)
argues that, unlike the pre-modern economy,
I also agree that creativity is at the heart ‘the modern economy withers and dies out
of scientific discovery and technological unless the means of production, transport,
invention and that it is dependent on a whole communication and exchange are constantly
range of variables, but I would add that revolutionized - i.e. unless its activities are
motivation (which may manifest itself as based on a rapidly developing technology’.
persistence, determination or deep absorption Marx’s assertion, I suspect, will continue to be
in one’s work) is absolutely crucial to the the subject of much debate. Is it perhaps worth
production of creative work, since without it considering whether an economy could simply
there would be no striving for new knowledge. stagnate without ‘withering’, whether a happy
equilibrium could be reached or whether there
Of particular interest is his account of will always be scientific and technological
the emergence of pockets of exact science in revolutions as envisaged by Kuhn (1970) for
pre-modern times which laid the foundations of example?
modern science and which originated in
Hellenistic, Babylonian and Arabic Islamic Ghassib (2010) then observes that
cultures. Whilst Greek scientific achievements another key feature of the modern economy is
are well-documented in the English language, in the creation of new (and sometimes illusory)
the West there is still a paucity of accessible needs, generated by knowledge. Artificially-

created demand certainly seems to be evident infer that there will be rampant consumerism or
in the modern economy. The extent to which that, for example, increasing concern about
new needs are created by new knowledge or global warming or about the rate at which our
clever marketing also seems worth considering. planet’s resources are being depleted will drive
If we agree that ‘a large knowledge the modern economy at a different rate and in a
industry is the largest generator of new needs different direction? And how would that affect
that drive the modern economy forward’ (here the resourcing of scientific enquiry? Would the
supportive referencing would add weight to his biological and human sciences take priority over
argument), then this begs the questions, ‘In the physical and technological? Furthermore,
what manner?’, ‘Which research findings will be what lessons could be learned from science in
most influential?’ and ‘What other forces are at the pre-modern era? These are the kinds of
work which could have an effect?’ Should we questions this article provokes.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this article is to be welcomed on a number of counts:
 As a window into pre-modern science and under-reported history – something which is

especially important for British young people of ethnic minority origins many of whom have
little or no knowledge of the achievements of early scientists from their own cultural heritage,
and who often lack suitable role models, as evidenced in the Creativity Centre’s schools’
Science Alliance project (for instance Bolingbroke & Fryer, 2009).
 In its recognition of the difference between scientific research and traditional industrial
production.
 In its acknowledgement that creativity cannot arise from nothing, but instead requires
grounding in a relevant body of knowledge, as well as a willingness to look beyond and to
operate flexibly.
 In the way in which the author demonstrates that the development of new knowledge,
scientific discovery, reasoning, experimentation and the capacity to make valid inferences
from limited data all involve creativity, thus ‘[placing] creativity at the heart of scientific
practice and production’.
References
Bolingbroke C. S. & Fryer, M. (2009.) Benefiting from a Nation of Immigrants: Enabling culturally and
linguistically diverse students to realise their potential – a British Perspective. Journal of Urban Education:
Focus on enrichment. New Orleans: College of Education, Southern University.
Fryer, B. (1996; 2004). The practice of construction management. Oxford: Blackwell Science.
Fryer, M. (2004) [Ed.] Creativity & cultural diversity. Leeds: CCET Press.
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The Structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Marx, K. (1982). The Communist Manifesto, in K. Marx; and F. Engels. Selected works. Moscow: Progress
Publishers.

About the Author
Marilyn Fryer, Ph.D., is Managing Director of The Creativity Centre Ltd and Chief Executive of
registered charity, The Creativity Centre Educational Trust (a voluntary role). She is a chartered
psychologist and chartered scientist. She specialises in consultancy, research and the provision of
learning resources in creativity (in its widest sense), innovation and cultural diversity. Marilyn has a
special interest in the contribution of culturally diverse communities to our understanding of
creativity and innovation. She enjoys writing and is a member of the Society of Authors. Her work
has been published and presented in Asia, the United States, Eastern and Western Europe.
Address
Dr. Marilyn Fryer,
The Creativity Centre,
P. O. Box: 419,
Paignton, Devon,
TQ4 9AZ,
UK.
Tel: +44 (0) 845 643 1235
e-Mail: marilyn@creativitycentre.com


Science and Creativity:
The Importance of Ontology for
Scientific Understanding
Lee Martin
I recently held a seminar on developing creativity within higher education at a university in the United
Kingdom. Afterwards, I met a physicist and we discussed the importance of creativity for the field of
physics. He claimed his colleagues had a dim view of the importance of creativity for physics, they
felt it was something for the arts and had little to do with the ‘hard science’ they were doing.
Creativity researchers may have long claimed science is a creative process but this seemed to have
had little impact within his department. It seems then, at this university at the least, a paper
advocating the importance of creativity for science is still very necessary indeed.
The history of science presented by A Productivist Industrial Model of

Ghassib (2010) reveals the significance of Knowledge Production is developed. The model
knowledge generating action throughout human attempts to codify the form of science
history. Ghassib’s (2010) paper explores the conducted in the 21st Century. This includes a
embedded nature of scientific practise and in view of science as a ‘need fulfiller’ to the wheels
doing so offers some insight into the role of capitalism and notes that the emphasis in the
creativity plays in our attempts to understand modern academy may have shifted from one of
the world around us. Science is presented as a knowledge preserver to that of knowledge
knowledge generating industry. It is argued that generator. This knowledge generation is argued
science is a peculiar form of industry in that the to be achieved through our engagement with,
product of science, unlike other forms of and interpreting of, an epistemological heritage.
industry, is ‘intrinsically and necessarily un- Indeed, Ghassib (2010) argues that each
envisaged and un-envisageable a priori’. scientist will interpret that heritage uniquely and
therefore the term ‘scientific method’ may be a
Creativity and the creative process are form of myth. He replaces this myth with
therefore argued to be intrinsic to science, science as a global commons of scientific
which is described as an ‘essentially communal practise including four features: 1) Scientific
creative process’. A timely reminder of the reason; 2) Scientific intellectual tools; 3) The
importance of creativity to science is therefore ontology of natural being; 4) The qualifications
provided within this work. of a scientist.
Reflecting upon our action as scientists is a necessary part of the process of science.
Ghassib (2010) has offered a unique reflection on modern science which locates our practise within
wider cultural mechanisms. Importantly, creativity is argued to be central to this process and
therefore the encouragement of creative thought in the next generation of scientists can be argued
to be vital. Rather than offer an alternative position to Ghassib’s (2010) argument, I’d like to offer
some reflection on the role of creativity in industry, explore the role of recognition in science (and
creativity) and highlight the importance of ontology when considering the philosophy of science.

Creativity at work
Creativity at work has a troubled process. It is important to clarify this position as,
existence, some authors argue that too much it seems to me, creativity is as important tosome
creativity in the workplace can be bad for profit, forms of work, as it is in science. When
others have argued it is essential for innovation considering innovation in industry, this
and therefore our ability to compete in the distinction becomes clearer. Whilst some
modern economy (e.g. Dewitt 2003, Bommer innovation is the result of the commercial
and Jalaja`s 2002; Mumford, 2000; Williams & exploitation of scientific advances, this cannot
Yang, 1999; Amabile, 1997; Cummings and be said of all innovation. Sometimes re-packing
Oldham, 1997; Proctor 1991). Clearly both the and recombining existing technology into new
nature of work and the nature of creativity in formats can lead to significant advances,
work, is complex and require careful independent of scientific advancement; for
consideration. In Ghassib’s (2010) paper, it is example, the development of social-networking
argued that, unlike science, in all industrial sites on the internet. Whether these
processes the product is imaginatively and technologies fulfil ‘real’ need, a question
operationally specified before hand, prior to the Ghassib (2010) considers, requires a different
production process but this claim requires form of analysis.
careful scrutiny.
This does not distract from Ghassib’s
Whilst it is acceptable that in some (2010) core argument, it merely challenges the
industries, where the mass production of a implicit view that industry, and workers within it,
specific good takes place, the production might either lack creativity or not be required to
process may not require imagination. However, use their creative abilities in order to complete
this may not be true of all industries. Indeed, in their roles. This is important. If we do not
some, such as software design, the production conceive of these workers as having creative
process can be considered similar to that of abilities, we are less likely to consider policy that
science, in that it is essentially a creative might enable these abilities to be developed.
Recognition in science
When considering the nature of science Ghassib (2010) advocates that scientific production
differs from other forms of production in a second respect. He seems to argue that the evaluation
process of science is an essential moment of its production. This means the scientific product
doesn’t acquire its essential character until it has passed through the evaluation process, as defined
by the scientific community. It is the recognition of the product that gives it admission to the
epistemic heritage. In a practical sense this is accurate, scientific knowledge is subject to peer
review and as such, any claims to knowledge within science need to pass this peer review. However,
when considering philosophy of science, this view can effectively collapse science into such
recognition processes. This means that whilst we may be attempting to describe the ontology of
scientific output, what it actually is, we can mistakenly define it through epistemological means, by
how we come to know something is a scientific production.
The distinction is an important one in both science and definitions of creativity. If scientific
practise requires recognition for it to be defined as science, what is it we do prior to this recognition?
Is it the case that unless our work is recognised by the scientific community, we were not
conducting science? There are well known examples such as Mendel’s work on genetics being
largely ignored by peers until the discovery of DNA. The work he conducted prior to discovery of
DNA had not changed, yet the status of the product did. If one accepts recognition as the defining
feature of science then his work must be considered magically transformed from non -science to
proper science in the moment of recognition.
The same could be said to be true of definitions of creativity that assume recognition is a
fundamental feature. In my own work, I propose a definition of creativity not reliant on recognition,
one that places discovery at the heart of what it is to be creative, (Martin 2009) and clearly, creativity
researchers implicitly understand there is something prior to recognition as scientists understand

that there is something prior to peer review. Knowledge is not constructed at the moment of
recognition; rather knowledge gains credibility and can affect change, once recognition is afforded to
it.
The peer review process exists as a set of practises surrounding the process of science. We
can study these practises and theorise about them. However, this does not mean that the scientific
product is entirely created via this peer review. Peer review may be a necessary feature in the
dissemination of new knowledge but not also in the discovery of such knowledge. Something prior
to and separate from peer review needs to be present in order for knowledge generation to be
possible. It is therefore important for Ghassib (2010) to distinguish knowledge generating activity
from knowledge recognition in his definition of modern scientific practise. Without such distinction it
is difficult to defend scientific practise as a special type of knowledge generating activity capable of
more reliable and valid knowledge claims.
The Ontology of Science and Creativity

This leads to my final observation, the problem when we consider creative potential,
importance of ontology for understanding the something we all attempt to develop in our
scientific process; which Ghassib (2010) would students. Given potential is defined as ‘not yet
no doubt agree with, given his inclusion of actual’, therefore ‘not yet observable’; it is
Bhaskar’s (1978) ontology of natural being difficult to explain it and be consistent with the
within his argument. Bhaskar’s (1978) work epistemological rules of logical positivism.
contains significant insights for both the Runco (2003: 138) astutely observed the affect
philosophy of science and the understanding of this can have on conceptions of potential when
creativity. Whilst Ghassib’s (2010) paper he claimed:
concerns itself with the epistemology of modern I am fully aware that my position on
science, which is perfectly reasonable, potential does not lend itself to an
Bhaskar’s (1978) contribution has been to stress entirely objective science. However, it
the importance of ontology to such discussions. may be that we have to modify our
In particular, he noted that other forms of methods such that they aren’t
philosophy of science commit the epistemic maximally objective but are as objective
fallacy. That is, defining ontological phenomena as possible and still cover the topic at
through our methods of coming to know them, hand, namely, creativity.
our epistemology.
Rather than reflect upon the definition
Ghassib (2010) describes a form of and methods of science he engaged with,
empirical realism or logical positivism within his Runco (2003) drew the conclusion that these
historical account of science. This form of methods need to be temporarily modified to
science, in broad terms, suggests that we enable exploration of this phenomena. I would
should only consider observable phenomena as contend that no amount of modifying methods
objects of enquiry. The explanation of the would reconcile creative potential with the
existence of such phenomena, and how they are assumption that the natural world is exhausted
causally related, should then be tested via by that which is empirical. Ghassib (2010)
collecting empirical data and applying various seems to accept this, with his discussion of the
mathematical and statistical tests upon it to ontology of natural being, but it is important to
ascertain correlation and causation between remind ourselves that dealing with questions
events. Whilst this may be a perfectly about the nature of things through only
acceptable set of knowledge generating exploring epistemology can lead to inconsistent
practises, it inadvertently implies that if ontological assumptions about the nature of
something is not empirical, it does not exist. In things. This, in turn, can limit our understanding
other words, the ontology of the natural world is of the natural world. Ghassib’s (2010)
defined through the epistemological rules exploration of the epistemological heritage of
through which we come to know it. For the scientific method, whilst extremely valuable,
researchers of creativity, this can lead to a also requires this note of caution.

Conclusion
Ghassib (2010) has offered an intriguing However, whilst demonstrating the value of
insight into the nature of science and an creativity to scientific endeavour and
opportunity to reflect on our practise as a highlighting the importance of recognition to the
culturally embedded process. His Productivist dissemination of scientific knowledge we must
Industrial Model of Knowledge Production be careful not to reduced science to its
provides a unique account of the scientific recognition or assume that other industries in
method, one which challenges us to view our some way lack the need for creativity we find in
practise not just as a set of inherited research science. One route to achieving this is to take
techniques but as a deeper embedded process. ontology seriously.
References
Amabile, T, M. (1997). Motivating creativity in Organisations: On doing what you love and loving what you do.
California Management Review, 40, No 1, PP 40.
Bhaskar, R. (1978). A Realist Theory of Science. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Bommer, Michael & Jalajas, David. (2002). The innovation work environment of high-tech SME’s in the USA and
Canada. R & D Management 32 5 PP379-386
Cummings, A. & Oldham, G. R. (1997). Enhancing Creativity: Managing Work Contexts for the High Potential
Employee. California Management Review, 40, No 1, PP 22-38
Dewitt, Todd. (2003). Understanding the relationship between Information Technology and creativity in
organisations. Creativity Research Journal, Volume 15, No’s 2 & 3 PP 167-182
Martin, L,D. (2009). Critical realism and creativity: A challenge to the hegemony of psychological conceptions.
Journal of Critical Realism. 8(3), 294-315
Mumford, M. D. (2000). Managing Creative People: Strategies and Tactics for Innovation. Human Resource
Management Review. 10, 3, 313-351.
Proctor, R. A. (1991). The importance of creativity in the management field. British Journal of Management. Vol.
2 223-230
Runco, M. A. (2003). Commentary on personal and potentially ambiguous creativity: You can’t understand the
butterfly unless you (also) watch the caterpillar. Creativity Research Journal. 15, 2&3, 137-141
Williams, W. M. & Yang, L. T. (1999). Organisational creativity. In Sternberg, R. J. (1999) (Ed.). Handbook of
Creativity. Cambridge University Press.

About the Author
Lee Martin Lectures in creativity and entrepreneurship at Nottingham University Business School in
the United Kingdom. His research explores creativity at work, unrecognised and unrealised creativity
as well as the nature of reward for motivating creativity at work. A particular interest is
understanding how the potential or capacity for creativity can be realised into capabilities and
performance within organisational settings. He is currently exploring the relationship between
creativity, discovery and entrepeneurship and teaches modules on creativity and entrepreneurship
within the Institute for Enterprise and Innovation to both Masters and MBA students.
Address
Dr. Lee Martin,
Institute for Enterprise and Innovation,
Nottingham University Business School,
Jubilee Campus, Nottingham, NG8 1BB, U.K.
Telephone: 0115 846 6062
e-Mail: lee.martin@nottingham.ac.uk


Can Creativity be Systematized?:
A Response to Ghassib
Joyce VanTassel-Baska
The Ghassib (2010) article is a wonderful thought piece to cause us to stop and think more
about the creative enterprise, especially in science. It provides a strong argument for the importance
of preparing future scientists well in the historical traditions of the discipline. By so doing, it
challenges current societies to consider carefully how science makes progress on current problems
and new discoveries.
The premise of Ghassib’s (2010) article is that science is a unique knowledge industry that
produces predictable products, thus representing a system that can be controlled. Yet it is also a
system that requires a revolution to enable the constant upgrading needed to continue innovation
and creativity in the enterprise so that new needs can be created. He views universities and research
institutes as knowledge factories that hire producers (scientists) who work with raw material in
specific methods of production. He rightly sees, however, the peculiarity of the products of
science—they are not arrived at by formula; rather they are creative and not envisaged a priori.
Moreover, they are subject to an evaluation process that determines the value of the product before
it is released.
The author further maintains that there breakthroughs is unpredictable in many

is no scientific method, only rationality which he respects.
sees as the basis of the scientific intellectual
tools of the industry, involving testing for We also know that scientific agendas
verification, critiquing, and considering or are not totally forged by individuals or even
intuiting an intelligent reading of phenomena. He groups working in universities or other settings
argues that the qualifications of a scientist that but rather by governments who establish
matter the most depend on being well-versed in funding priorities for scientific work in any
epistemic heritage that allows him to see the society. In the absence of funding from
nature of his being as rational. governmental sources and the private sector
that often mimics the same priorities for funding,
While the article is fascinating in its the scientific enterprise would be stymied. So, it
history of the phenomenon of scientific inquiry is fair to say that doing science is less
over centuries, it falls short, in my opinion, of autonomous than we might assume and less
capturing the essence of scientific inquiry today. subject to regularity in its progression due to
Just as Kuhn (1980) opined 40 years ago, outside pressures.
science is dependent on external pressures to
make breakthroughs which are usually done by Moreover, the article calls into question
younger scientists who may be on the fringes of the very nature of creativity itself. If scientific
the discipline but who attract adherents to their creativity could be bottled, we would have done
ideas. He exploded the notion of scientists it long ago. It is also questionable that creativity
standing on each other’s shoulders over time to is always subject to critique in the way it is
make a new discovery. Rather he saw described in the paper. We have every reason to
discoveries as breaks with past traditions that believe that rationality is not the basis for how
created a whole new set of applications to be the world works, even the scientific world. Thus
worked out by the journeymen of science. As we have examples of random acts of discovery
such, the creative act of important scientific from Ben Franklin to Edison to Darwin. These

discoveries were carried out by individuals any of those breakthroughs would have
working alone in conditions where purpose, happened within the walls of a knowledge
affect, and organization drove the discovery factory, no matter how conducive to the creative
process (Gruber, 1979). It is hard to imagine that process.
What is creativity?
Creativity may be defined in many ways but two aspects of a definition fit most examples
within the world of science. What is creative could be 1) a breakthrough discovery that causes a
paradigm shift in a field or it could be 2) an important synthesis of existing thought and knowledge
by forming new associations (VanTassel-Baska, 1998). Moreover, the idea or product that is original
may not be considered as creative unless it has social value and appropriateness in a culture (Runco,
1993; Csiksenmihalyi, 2000)). Thus, creativity is the ability to produce work that is both original and
appropriate or useful as judged by the recipients, not by the originator (Simonton, 1999).
Conditions for creativity

What are conditions for creative productivity? According to Rhodes (1961), there are four P’s
to explain the multifaceted construct of creativity--Person, Process, Product, and Press. Person
includes cognitive abilities, biological traits, biographical traits, and personalogical traits; Process
describes the mental processes operative in creating ideas, which include preparation, incubation,
illumination, and verification; Product includes ideas expressed in the form of language or craft;
Press includes the relationship between a person and his or her environment. Creative products are
the outcome of creative processes engaged in by creative persons, which is supported by creative
press. Torrance (1988) started with research on the creative process and then asked what kind of
person one must be to engage in the creative process successfully; what kind of environments
(press) will facilitate it; and what kinds of creative products will result from successful operation of
the creative processes. More current creativity researchers have focused strongly on the
environmental contexts that are conducive to creativity (Amabile, 2003), the quality of the products
that are created (Simonton, 1999)), and the role of cultural acceptance of the innovation
(Csiksenmihalyi, 2000).
The relationship of creativity and intelligence

Many researchers in the field (e.g., Barron, 1961; Guilford, 1967; MacKinnon, 1961, 1967;
Simonton, 1994) agree with the “threshold theory”, which assumes that above an IQ score of 120
there is no correlation between measured creativity and intelligence. The threshold theory assumes
that creativity and intelligence are separate constructs above a minimum level of ability. However,
there have been only a few studies that systematically investigated the threshold theory and results
are inconclusive (Runco, 1991). Kim’s meta-analysis (2005) found that the relationship between
creativity and intelligence is negligible at any IQ level, which undermines the threshold theory, and
supports the underlying belief that creativity and intelligence are separate constructs. The threshold
theory was further investigated using structural equation modeling but was not supported (Preckel,
Holling, & Wiese, 2006).
The role of personality

According to Silvia (2008), personality variables confound correlations between intelligence
and creativity. Personality variables such as openness to experience predict both IQ (DeYoung,
Peterson, & Higgins, 2005) and creativity (Feist, 1998). Openness to experience is found to be the
most influential factor on intelligence (Furnham & Thomas, 2004; Furnham, Zhang & Chamorro-
Premuzic, 2006), especially on gC (Brand, 1994) and is even more strongly r elated to creativity
(McCrae, 1987; Miller & Tal, 2007). However, according to Furnham, Zhang and Chamorro-Premuzic
(2006), openness to experience is positively related to gF but not related to general intelligence.

Feist’s (1998) meta-analysis reported that creative people tend to be autonomous and
introverted, open to new experiences, norm-doubting, self-confident, self-accepting, driven,
ambitious, dominant, hostile, and impulsive. After an extensive literature review, Batey and Furnham
(2006) concluded that the most common personality traits that are related to creativity are
confidence, independence, and openness to new ideas. Eminent creators have had a certain level of
knowledge to advance in a field although there is a curvilinear relationship betwe en knowledge and
creativity, which indicates that too much knowledge leads to entrenchment and an inability to
conceive of the field in a radically different light (Batey & Furnham, 2006).
Feist (1998) also found that openness to experience and extraversion were the most strongly
distinguishing characteristics of creative scientists In addition, he found that conscientiousness,
conventionality, and closed mindedness tend to be negatively related to being a creative scientist.
Extraversion was found to be strongly related to creativity as assessed on three measures of
creativity-- Guilford’s unusual uses divergent thinking test, the biographical inventory of creative
behaviors, a self-rated measure of creativity, and the Barron-Welsh Art Scale (Furnham & Bachtiar,
2008).
The creative brain

Research also suggests that creativity presents differently from intelligence .in brain studies.
Different patterns of EEG are produced when subjects are engaged in divergent thinking tasks and
convergent thinking tasks (Fink & Neubauer, 2006; Jausovec, 2000; Mölle, Marshall, Wolf, Fehm, &
Born, 1999; Razoumnikova, 2000): Creative problem-solving tasks are accompanied by
synchronization of alpha activity, whereas convergent tasks are accompanied by desynchronization
of alpha activity (Fink & Neubauer, 2006). Higher EEG complexity is accompanied by divergent
thinking tasks more than by convergent thinking tasks (Mölle, Marshall, Wolf, Fehm, & Born, 1999).
The highly creative group showed more decoupling of brain areas, wherea s the highly intelligent
showed a more intense cooperation between brain areas when resting (Jaušovec & Jaušovec, 2000).
Jausovec (2000) found that, when engaged in creative problem solving, the highly creative showed
less mental activity than the less creative , and the highly creative showed more cooperation
between brain regions, inter-intra-hemispheric cooperation between the far distant brain regions,
than the highly intelligent. Latent Inhibition (LI) is the ability to inhibit memory formation by preventing
associative learning of observed stimuli. LI is an automatic response and prevents information
overload. Reduced LI is found to be positively related to susceptibility to schizophrenia (Baruch,
Hemsley, & Gray, 1988a; 1988b); at the same time, it is also found to be positively related to creative
achievement (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2003) and to psychological openness (Peterson, &
Carson, 2000; Peterson, Smith, & Carson, 2000).
The problem of creativity in schools

Compared with highly intelligent individuals, highly creative individuals have distinctive
characteristics conducive to originating creative ideas or products. Some of these characteristics
cause difficulties in traditional school settings due to behaviors that are unconventional rathe r than
conforming, daydreaming rather than attending to tasks assigned, and disruptive when asked to
perform routine work (Cramond, 1995; Amabile, 1989). Torrance (Gowan, Khatena, & Torrance, 1979)
referred to highly creative students as “creatively handicapped” because their creativity may make
their achievement in traditional classrooms difficult although creativity can be an asset in their lives.
The energy of Thomas Edison and Nikola Tesla got them into trouble in childhood but helped them
when working the long hours on their creative tasks (Cheney, 1981). Virginia Woolf and Samuel
Taylor Coleridge were well known as being constant talkers in childhood, which is a characteristic of
creative individuals and is often a problem in school, but their verbal ability was an asset to their
creative tasks of writing (Cramond & Kim, 2007).
The creative process

It is fair to say that volumes have been written about the creative process from Torrance to
Perkins to Simonton. Yet when we synthesize these thinkers about the process, we are struck by
what they don’t focus on, namely hard work and the will to keep going in the face of failure. This

insight was noted by Ochse (1990) who wrote: “…creative ability is no spontaneous emergence of
inherent qualities; no special intellectual process; no gift—but a hard-earned prize. They are likely to
discover that before the Gates of Excellence the High Gods have placed sweat —the sweat of
labour—often mingled with the sweat of pain” (p. 260). Amabile (1983) too has written much about
the role of motivation and effort in being creative, seeing it as the most powerful aspect of the
process.
The role of nonintellective traits and habits of mind in the world of science are crucial to the
process yet become backdrop to the more interesting aspects of how the mind works to solve
problems and create eureka moments. Pinker (2003) observed that the nimble mind is capable of
creating theories out of whole cloth, testing those theories in the real world, and proclaiming them as
truth. Yet in science, in order for one’s truth to hold up, it must be accompanied by many
replications by others, rendering the process for the originator creative and for the replicators more
algorithmic.
The role of creativity in daily life

In the process of developing talent in children and young adults, educators are concerned
about the importance of producing eminent individuals in adulthood. This connection between
childhood giftedness and adult eminence is tenuous at best. All one can hope for is that students
develop the mental skills, attitudes, and knowledge base that will serve them well in the future. Most
scientists never exhibit high level creativity, especially by themselves. Their best hope is to find a
collaborator, like Watson and Crick, who played off complementary skills of each other or a team of
scientists who are working on an important problem. In this way, they may gain eminence and have
the opportunity to display creative abilities. For most scientists and the rest of us, creativity is a
concept that is applied in the more modest venue of daily life where we can engage in a project that
allows us to use the skills of fluency, flexibility, elaboration, and originality to bring about a desired
outcome such as a redecorated home or a remodeled addition to a house or a painting or poem.
We rarely consider that this type of creativity (little c) is also a critical part of optimal human
development that can stabilize a person’s mental health as well as contribute to their overall quality
of life. Thus the role of creativity is central to higher level living in the modern world as more and
more pressures impinge to take us away from tasks that are intrinsically enjoyable and allow for flow
(Csiksenmihalyi, 1991).
Conclusion
A society in which independence, ownership, and democracy are encouraged is beneficial to
individuals’ intrinsic motivation and creativity (Amabile, 1996). Thus countries that allow the industry
of science to flourish may become leaders in the next millennium as systemic thinking about the
doing of science becomes more the norm than the exception.
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Amabile, T. M. (1989). Growing up creative: Nurturing a lifetime of creativity. Williston, VT: Crown House
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Personality and Individual Differences, 9, 777-783.
Batey, M., & Furnham, A. (2006). Creativity, intelligence, and personality: A critical review of the scattered
literature. Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs, 132, 355-429.
Brand, S. (1994). How buildings learn. New York, New York: Viking.

Carson, S. H., Peterson, J. B., & Higgins, D. M. (2003). Decreased latent inhibition is associated with increased
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499-506.
Cheney, M. (1981). Tesla: Man out of time. New York: Prentice Hall.
Cramond, B. (1995). The coincidence of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and creativity (RBDM 9508).
Storrs, CT: The National Research Center on the Gifted and Talented, University of Connecticut.
Cramond, B., & Kim, K. H. (2007). The role of creativity tools and measures in assessing potential and growth. In
J. VanTassel-Baska (Ed.), Critical issues in equity and excellence in gifted education series: Alternative
assessment with gifted and talented students (pp.203-225). Waco, TX: Prufrock Press.
Csiksenmihalyi (2000). The costs and benefits of consuming. Journal of Consumer Research, 27, 267-272.
Csiksenmihalyi, M. (1991). Flow: The psychology of optimal experience. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers.
Denver, CO: Love Publishing Company.
DeYoung, C. G.., Peterson, J. B., & Higgins, D. M. (2005). Sources of openness/ intellect: Neuropsychological
correlates of the fifth factor of personality. Journal of Personality, 73, 825-858.
Feist, G. J. (1998). A meta-analysis of personality in scientific and artistic creativity. Personality and Social
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Fink, A., & Neubauer, A. C. (2006). EEG alpha oscillations during the performance of verbal creativity tasks:
Differential effects of sex and verbal intelligence. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 62, 46-53.
Florida, R. (2002). The flight of the creative class: The new global competition of talent. Creativity and Innovation
Management. 15(3), 323-324.
Furnham, A., & Bachtiar, V. (2008). Personality and intelligence as predictors of creativity. Personality and
Individual Differences, 45(7), 613-617.
Furnham, A., & Thomas, C. (2004). Parents’ gender and personality and estimates of their own and their
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About the Author

Joyce VanTassel-Baska is the Jody and Layton Smith Professor of Education and Executive
Director of the Center for Gifted Education at The College of William and Mary in Virginia where she
has developed a graduate program and a research and development center in gifted education.
Formerly, she initiated and directed the Center for Talent Development at Northwestern University.
She has also served as the state director of gifted programs for Illinois, as a regional director of a
gifted service center in the Chicago area, as coordinator of gifted programs for the Toledo, Ohio
public school system, and as a teacher of gifted high school students in English and Latin. She has
worked as a consultant on gifted education in all 50 states and for key national groups, including the
U.S. Department of Education, National Association of Secondary School Principals, and American
Association of School Administrators. She has consulted internationally in Australia, New Zealand,
Hungary, Jordan, Singapore, Korea, England, Germany, The Netherlands, and the United Arab
Emirates. She is past president of The Association for the Gifted of the Council for Exceptional
Children, and the Northwestern University Chapter of Phi Delta Kappa. She is currently President of
the National Association for Gifted Children. Dr. VanTassel-Baska has published widely including 22
books and over 500 refereed journal articles, book chapters, an d scholarly reports. Recent books
include: Comprehensive Curriculum for Gifted Education (3rd Edition) (2006) (with Tamra
Stambaugh), Curriculum for Gifted Students (2004), Designing and Utilizing Evaluation for Gifted
Program Improvement (2004) (with Annie Feng), Content-based Curriculum for Gifted Learners
(2003) (with Catherine Little) and Curriculum Planning and Instructional Design for Gifted Learners
(2003). She also served as the editor of Gifted and Talented International, a publication of the World
Council on Gifted and Talented, from 1998-2005. Dr. VanTassel-Baska has received numerous
awards for her work, including the National Association for Gifted Children’s Early Leader Award in
1986, the State Council of Higher Education in Virginia Outstanding Faculty Award in 1993, the Phi
Beta Kappa faculty award in 1995, the National Association for Gifted Children Distinguished Scholar
Award in 1997, and the President’s Award, World Council on Gifted and Talented Education in 2005.
She has received awards from five states - Ohio, Virginia, Colorado, South Carolina, and Illinois - for
her contribution to the field of gifted education in those states. She was selected as a Fulbright
Scholar to New Zealand in 2000 and a visiting scholar to Cambridge University in England in 1993.
Her major research interests are on the talent development process and effective curricular
interventions with the gifted. She holds B.A., M.A., M.Ed., and Ed.D. degrees from the University of
Toledo.
Address
Prof. Dr. Joyce VanTassel-Baska,
Jody and Layton Smith Professor in Education and Executive Director,
Center for Gifted Education,
College of William and Mary,
e-Mail: jlvant@wm.edu

Products Depend on Creative Potential:
A Comment on the Productivist
Production
Mark A. Runco
Ghassib (2010) presents a provocative view of science as industry. He ties science

specifically to a productivist industrial model and to knowledge production. If judged based on what
is explicit in this article, his theory is useful and logical. There are, however, several concerns as well.
Some of these are implied by the title of his article, which is “Where does creativity fit into a
productivistic industrial model of knowledge production?” This implies a connection between
creativity and knowledge, and between creativity and productivity for that matter, and both are in
fact complicated relationships. Additionally, there are a number of assumptions in Ghassib’s (2010)
article, and several of these can be questioned. The primary objectives of the present Commentary
are to examine these complex relationships and to identify and evaluate those assumptions.
Before identifying Ghassib’s (2010) assumptions, something should be said about less
dubious sections of his work. His history is, I believe, the best part of his article. Ghassib (2010) does
a wonderful job presenting an overview of the history and evolution of the scientific method. This
history is not slanted towards Western culture, or at least not nearly as much as man y of them are,
and Ghassib (2010) identifies several critical eras, or what he calls pockets in history. There was, for
example, the Hellenian pocket which of course represented the outstanding efforts of Ancient
Greece, and in particular astronomy and geometry. The idea of pockets may assist theories of
creativity that look to the effects of Zeitgeist on creative efforts (Simonton, 1999).
Ghassib (2010) discusses history and society, and which means an interplay
because it helps to understand why industry between industry and cultural context, and an
operates the way it does. Consider in this regard interplay between industry and the opinions
his claim that about uses of the scientific method.
“the socio-historical conditions in pre-
modern cultures were not ripe for the rapid This does bring us to assumptions.
expansion of such pockets at the expense Consider, for example, the assumption that
of their pre-modern context...They awaited science is tied to one kind of industry, and in
the advent of capitalistic, modernistic particular on the knowledge industry. At the very
Europe, which created the required least it glosses over the varied and complex
conditions for the so-called Scientific relationships between knowledge and creativity.
Revolution, whereby exact science broke On the level of the individual, knowledge and
the mythico-metaphysical shell asunder, creative thinking sometimes work together, but
disposing of ancient gnostic, a priorist sometimes do not. They may even conflict, as in
methods once and for all” (p. 9). the case when highly knowledgeable individuals
cannot think creatively because they stick with
This quotation is only one of several traditions (both personal and within a field), old
examples of the idea that there has been ideas, and routines. This kind of thing has been
through history an interplay between industry called the price of expertise. More importantly

for the present purposes is that, on an industrial Cognitive and Developmental Psychology.
level, creativity and innovation can be extricated Freud was trained in physiology but brought
from the knowledge industry. Kaufmann and many ideas to the study of the psyche and
Runco (2009) went into a great deal about this mental health. Darwin studied geology but then
and concluded that the knowledge industry has applied ideas which were conventional in the
recently given way to the creative industries natural sciences to evolutionary biology. The
(also see Florida, 2002). This could not happen if creativity literature also discusses other kinds of
knowledge and creativity were interdependent. marginality, including cultural and intellectual.
Consider next Ghassib’s (2010) For Ghassib (2010) the marginality of

recognition of the marginality of scientific efforts pre-modern science did not last and science
through history. The interesting thing here is that became part of the main stream. If he is correct
many endeavors actually benefited from in this, should have become, and will continue
marginality. Indeed, marginality (that is, working to become, less innovative. As a matter of fact,
this would be consistent with Ghassib’s (2010)
from outside the norm) very often facilitates
claim, for this easy to see how science can be
innovation and the creativity process. As a
led astray by funding and the non-scientific
matter of fact, and very close to home (given the values of industry. The primary virtue of science,
intent of this Commentary, to use creative which is objectivity, could easily be undermined-
studies to evaluate an industrial model), one - if there are special interests at work and if
way to bring assumptions into the light is to step science is controlled by supply, demand, and
outside or to work outside a particular area. This other industrial concerns, such as the bottom
is why many eminent individuals have been able line. Perhaps science should therefore be
to find creative solutions and insights: They removed from industry. Of course the flip side is
also true: Science should be involved in industry
have drawn from their own training when
and industry involved in science. How else will
working in a different area, one which is outside pharmaceutical research contribute to our
their own expertise. They were, in a word, health in a reliable fashion? As I said above, the
professionally marginal. This is true of Piaget, relationships among science, industry,
who was trained in Biology but worked in creativity, and knowledge are far from simple.
Process and products

Ghassib (2010) refereed to here is that this is a rather mundane point, or a
transformations which occurred during the given. It is not very profound to claim that the
Renaissance. He wrote that “we could say that economy is a process rather than a static entity.
modern science was the necessary offspring of And if that is in fact a given, it is also nearly
this new mode of production.” This is not mundane to suggest that creativity and
entirely accurate because it is simplistic. Surely innovation are involved.
modern science contributed to the Renaissance
and new modes of production as well as It would be difficult to find any sort of
benefiting from them. To be realistic, is likely process which does not benefit from evolution
that a bidirectional process should be and innovation. This is why the evolutionary
acknowledged. model, which at the most fundamental level
The keyword there is process. And at involves variation and selection, describes such
first, that appears to be a part of Ghassib’s a wide range of processes. It has been applied
(2010) theory. He notes, for example, that to Biology, thanks to Darwin and many
change is inherent in the modern economy and individuals since then (e.g., Gould, 1999) but
that “the modern economy withers away and also applies to knowledge (Campbell, 1960) and
dies out unless the means of production, to many other social and personal and individual
transport, communication, and exchange are processes (Albert, in press; Simonton, 2005).
constantly revolutionized.” The only problem This is not an error, to tie the economy, which is

a process, to change and revolution. It is simply related specifically to the technical concept of
not very profound. reliability, which is vital for most scientific
Much the same could be said about the endeavors, for reliability is operationalised in
claim that “science in industry seems to be a terms of agreement, including frequently inter-
necessary condition of reproduction and judged or inter-rater reliability.) So when society
modern society.” This is not untrue, but not very does anything, such as supporting production
original. By definition society requires social and industry, it is not surprising that there would
activity; and social activity in turn requires be a benefit to looking to the most explicitly
agreements and a kind of objectivity. Otherwise objective process available, which is defined by
every individual would be doing his or her own science.
thing and there would be no shared domains for
collaboration or even communication. But again, this does not mean that there
Objectivity in this context is just a kind of social is an error in Ghassib’s (2010) reasoning or
agreement. Science makes this entirely explicit theory. At most his claim that this is a
and insures that objectivity is given the highest particularity of the modern economy could be
priority when making decisions. (This could be questioned.
Creating new needs

Things get more interesting when problem solving and problem finding
Ghassib (2010) brings up the fascinating subject (Csikszentmihali & Getzels, 1975; Runco, 1994).
of demand and “new needs.” He includes With that in mind it is not clear to me
illusory needs in his list, which is fine, especially why Ghassib (2010) describes the generation of
if you have any experience with contemporary new needs which characterizes modern industry
advertising. Advertisers very frequently make and the modern economy as “a tortuous, crisis-
claims about what each of us needs, and ridden march.” He previously admitted that
sometimes it is very clear that they are wrong change was an important part of the process,
and indeed the need they have identified is and it is not too much of the stretch to suggest
inaccurate or illusory. It will not be easy to that if change is involved, the variation and
objectively identify illusory needs. That is selection which are inherent in evolution and
because humans change not only the way they creative work are also required. Not to belabor
think, but also their beliefs, as they obtain and the point, but just as it makes a great deal of
process experiences. This is epitomized in the sense that creative solutions are often found by
research on cognitive dissonance. generating new problems, so too does it make
sense that industry and economy will both
It is possible that the process which benefit from the generation of new needs.
generates new needs is in fact the most creative
part of advertising and is itself a highly divergent One assumption arises when Ghassib
one. Just as the creative thinking process or (2010) explicates a productivistic industrial
brainstorming may benefit from divergent model of knowledge. His view is slightly
thinking and by considering all kinds of different surprising, in part because of what was just said
ideas, some of which are later rejected, so too is about the identification or even creation of new
it likely that the identification of needs is going needs. Are those needs in fact products?
to be the most creative when it considers wide Ghassib (2010) suggested that if knowledge
range of options, some of which are dubious. generation is an industry, then we must look to
its “its productive sites, the nature of its
The main point be made here, however, producers, the nature of its raw material, the
is that Ghassib’s (2010) description of needs, nature of the means of production, the methods
which he implies is distinct from an industry and of production employed in its productive sites,
the science which solves problems, actually and the peculiarity of its products.” Admittedly I
directly parallels what is widely recognized in have already gone on record as strongly against
the creativity literature as a distinction between a product perspective on creativity (Runco,

1995, 1996, 2003); and I am thus highly who is not famous. Much the same can be said
skeptical about any theory which focuses about research on socially recognized products.
entirely on objective products and productivity. Some people are creative and yet do not
Typically my concerns about a product views produce objects and tangible things, and even if
suggest the alternative view, which emphasizes they do, those objects may have a function in
process over product, and as a matter of fact their own homes or lives and therefore do not
that does help here as well. change the world (Richards, 1990; Runco,
1996).
One question, then, is whether industry
must in fact be defined the terms of products In part for these reasons I myself
and the productive sites and so on. This is a suggested that creative potential should be
significant question if the scientific method is acknowledged and included in the alliterative
defined as an industry and when creativity and scene. In fact my view is that potential should
innovation are included in the scientific method– be the top priority in studies of creativity
and these two conditions are acceptable to me, because it applies across the board, universally,
and apparently to Ghabssib (2010). As implied to children and adults, to everyday and eminent
above, more of a concern is the idea that the creativity. Additionally, anyone interested in
products of science and creative thinking are industry and the economics of creativity should
always objective and not products in the typical appreciate the fact that we will get “the most
sense of the word, as tangible things. They are bang out of our buck” if we invest in creative
often ideas, or concepts. And in fact, they are potential rather than in proven creative
always ideas or concepts, at least at first, and processes or people. For the latter, I would
sometimes that is all they are. They may never expect marginal returns. Note also that this
be solidified into a tangible thing. does not dismiss creative products. They too
depend on creative potential, as well as the
Admittedly ideas and concepts can be other part of the alliterative framework that is
considered as a kind of product, and as a antithetical to products, namely the creative
matter of fact that is a fairly clear in US process. Even products begin with an idea.
copyright laws. You can indeed copyright an Even products are created by individuals who at
idea. It happens all of the time as part of the one time were still developing the talents they
protection of intellectual rights. Still, in the would eventually use to bring something new
creativity literature ideas are not usually viewed into existence. They only had potential, and
as products (Besemer & O’Quin, 1999). There thank goodness they were able to fulfill it.
products are tangible and usually socially
valued. Many ideas are neither of these things.
Although I believe that we would get the
There may be a benefit at this point to most bang out of our buck if we invest in
summarize the alliterative framework that is creative potential rather than focus on only
frequently used to organize creativity research. individuals who are already productive,
This distinguishes the creative person, the obviously a great deal can be learned from
creative process, the creative place, or the individuals who are already productive, and
creative product (Rhodes, 1961). This view has from the products of the creative process
been widely used for quite some time, though it (Besemer & O’Quin, 1999). They simply do not
has been modified. Simonton (1995), for provide much information about the necessary
instance, added the category of persuasion. He underlying process. Look at it this way: a focus
argued that creative people and things tend to on a product only tells you about the end result
change the way that other people think. It is in of the process which led up to it. To understand
this sense that they are persuasive. That view is the process used to develop or construct the
logical but relegates everyday creativity, process, inferences must be drawn. For reasons
personal creativity, the creativity of children, like this a theory of products is always
and, for that matter, the creativity of anyone incomplete.

Ghassib’s (2010) discussion of describes Ptolemy benefiting from geometry, for
knowledge producers seems to be largely example, Galileo benefiting from the telescope,
consistent with several attempts to describe and Newton benefiting from calculus. The list of
current industry and science. I am thinking here tools advancing creative work is actually much
in particular of the work of Florida (2002), as well longer (Runco, 2007) but the point is that
as a number of others, on the creative class and something new might arise without analogical
creative sector of society. Florida (2002) and thinking and, in the case of true originality,
Rubenson and Runco (1995) also associated without changing contexts.
creativity with engineers, technicians,
researchers, and all other professionals who do Ghassib (2010) identifies only three
creative things for society. (Most do not conspicuous scientific intellectual tools, namely
included administrators, as did Ghassib (2010), induction, deduction and thought
but practically speaking they certainly are experimentation. It is not clear where creative
involved in the support, and unfortunately also thinking fits in to this since it is not synonymous
the inhibition, of the creative process.) It is with any of them. Ghassib’s (2010) idea of
curious that Ghassib (2010) felt that one kind of dialectical synthesis does come close to an
producer, the creative scientist, “constantly existing model of creative thinking, namely
takes ideas and mathematical techniques out of Rothenberg’s (1988) model of the Janusian
their original contexts, and employs them process. In Janusian thinking individuals bring
elsewhere, embedding them into new contexts.” seemingly contradictory or opposite things
This would seem to imply that only revolutionary together into one new creative product or
science is creative. I believe that a great deal of insight. This process is not the same as the
what Kuhn (1962) called normal science to also dialectical one, but they both are thought to
be creative! Normal science occurs in between allow an integration of unrelated or even
paradigm shifts. It is, however, necessary for the antithetical perspectives.
paradigm shifts. And surely if original and useful
ideas or techniques result from normal science, Ghassib (2010) moves too far from
and if they are valid, their creativity should be creativity and innovation at this point of his
acknowledged. argument. He pointed out, for instance, that
“The central tool of scientific verity and
With the focus of this Commentary on efficacy is, of course, logical and
the questioning of assumptions I must admit experimental testing. What ultimately
that paradigm shifts are not beyond question. makes an idea scientific is its testability.
This is true in studies of the history of science, And what makes an action scientific is
but also implied by the debate in the creativity being endowed with a theoretical purpose
literature about whether or not true originality is and being an embodiment of a testable
possible. One theory that questions the idea. That is the spirit of science resides in
possibility of originality explains all seemingly experimentation and testing, both logical
creative things as analogues to what was and practical” (p. 13).
already in existence. And in fact this is another
way of describing the idea, from Ghassib (2010), Where is the creativity? The process
that creative breakthroughs always involve described there could very easily lead to
taking an idea out of one context and applying it mundane but highly objective scientific
to another. The alternative perspective is that advances. They might be supported by tests but
true originality does occur and that creative aesthetically displeasing. More to the point, they
breakthroughs are found with other processes might be very practical but they might be
and tactics and not just via analogies. lacking in originality, and therefore lacking in
creativity. Perhaps evolutionary thinking is again
Speaking of tactics, Ghassib (2010) did relevant. Recall here that evolutionary theory
acknowledge how some scientists have points to variability and selection. One
benefited from the invention of new tools. He possibility is that creative thinking provides the

former, while the logical processes listed by hunches, intuitions, and the subjectivity involved
Ghassib (2010) provide the latter. Certainly in creative thinking and the generation of
science requires more than just objectivity and original ideas (Gruber, 1995), he would not
experimentation. It involves more than just ponder the question, “has science entered a self
inductive and deductive logic. It also involves contradictory, self distractive face with quantum
imagination, originality, and creativity. mechanics?”
It is not sufficient that Ghassib (2010) A huge portion of creative studies has
nods to “the ability to intuit great qualitative uncovered the subjective parts of ideation and
truth via very delicate quantitative nuances” and original thinking, which of course can help us to
the “ability to read universal principles into explain why knowledge is not static and entirely
minor quantitative differences.” He does not tie objective, and why the less then purely objective
these things to the scientific method. Perhaps if world described by quantum mechanics does
he did acknowledge that science involves not undermine the scientific method.
Conclusion
I hope that my bringing these connections to the creativity literature, and the questions and
concerns I offered above, do not imply an overly negative view of Ghassib’s (2010) efforts. I applaud
what he has done and can see that it is one of the many divergent and diverse perspectives which
are necessary for the evolution of scientific thought.
References
Besemer, S. P., & O’Quin, K. (1999). Confirming the three-factor Creative Product Analysis Matrix model in an
American sample. Creativity Research Journal, 12, 287-296.
Florida, R. (2004). The Rise of the Creative Class: And How It's Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and
Everyday Life. New York: Basic books.
Getzels, J. W., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1976). The creative vision: A longitudinal study of problem finding in art.
New York: Wiley.
Gruber, H. (1996). The Life Space of a Scientist: The Visionary Function and Other Aspects of Jean Piaget's
Thinking. Creativity Research Journal, 9, 251-265.
Kuhn, T. (1963). The essential tension: Tradition and innovation in scientific research. In C. W. Taylor & F. Barron
(Ed.), Scientific creativity: Its recognition and development (pp. 341-354). New York: Wiley.
Rhodes, M. (1961). An analysis of creativity. Phi Delta Kappan, 42, 305-310.
Richards, R. (1990). Everyday creativity, eminent creativity, and health: "Afterview" for Creativity Research
Journal issues on creativity and health. Creativity Research Journal, 3, 300-326.
Rothenberg, A. (1988). Creativity and the homospatial process: Experimental studies. Psychiatric Clinics of
North America, 11, 443-460.
Rubenson, D. L., & Runco, M. A. (1992b). The psychoeconomic approach to creativity. New Ideas in
Psychology, 10, 131-147.
Rubenson, D. L., & Runco, M. A. (1995). The psychoeconomic view of creative work in groups and
organizations. Creativity and Innovation Management, 4, 232-241.
Runco, M A. (2007). A hierarchical framework for the study of creativity. New Horizons in Education, 55 (3), 1-9
Runco, M. A. (1996). Personal creativity: Definition and developmental issues. New Directions for Child
Development, No. 72 (Summer), pp. 3-30.
Runco, M. A. (Ed.). (1994). Problem finding, problem solving, and creativity. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

About the Author
Mark A. Runco earned a Ph.D. in Cognitive Psychology from the Claremont Graduate School and
has taught assessment and developmental and cognitive psychology courses and studied creativity
ever since. He is currently the E. Paul Torrance Professor of Creative Studies a t the University of
Georgia, Athens. He is also Director of the Torrance Creativity Center, Editor of the Creativity
Research Journal, and co-editor of the Encyclopedia of Creativity. He is a Fellow and Past President
of the American Psychological Association’s Division 10 (Psychology, Art, and Creativity).
Address
Prof. Dr. Mark Runco,
Torrance Creativity Center,
Aderhold Hall, University of Georgia,
Athens, GA 30602, USA.
e-Mail: runco@uga.edu


Knowledge is Where You Make it:
Jonathan Alan Plucker; and Anne T. Ottenbreit-Leftwich
We appreciate the opportunity to comment on Ghassib’s (2010) thoughtful, provocative

article. As a comprehensive response and critique of each of his ideas is beyond the scope of this
paper, we focus on one aspect of Ghassib’s (2010) analysis of creativity and knowledge production
in the sciences – specifically, the influence of technology on changing where knowledge is generated
and how it is used.
Ghassib (2010) builds his analysis around a Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge,
which he describes in terms of knowledge creation’s productive sites, producers, raw materials,
means and methods of production, and products. To briefly summarize the article, the Model posits
that knowledge creation is the result of researchers working within universities and other research
institutions, using their epistemological heritage and unique methods, within a scientific culture of
evaluation. We believe this model contributes to the discussion of knowledge, specifically the
emphasis on originality and usefulness, two essential ingredients for creativity (Pluck er, Beghetto, &
Dow, 2004). As Ghassib (2010) notes, “A creative scientist constantly takes ideas … out of their
original contexts, and employs them elsewhere, embedding them into new contexts” (p. 12).
Similarly, he notes that science is “an essentially communal creative process” (p. 12).
However, the language used to describe the model, with a focus on rather traditional
conceptions of research and communication, is quite limited. This is due, in large part, to the
emergence of information technology as a transformative force in communication, which has, we will
argue, democratized research – with both positive and negative outcomes. The focus of our
comments is the exploration of the ramifications of this technological explosion for the proposed
model.
Technology: Knowledge creation game-changer

Over the past generation, the growth of infrastructures has been truly global, with many
information technology across the world, countries understanding and capitalizing on the
especially its use in scientific and educational link between data infrastructure and economic
contexts, has been staggering. Even today’s development. In many cases, developing
“simplest” computers have processing power countries that lack landline infrastructure have
that rivals the rooms of mainframe computers skipped straight to wireless data networks,
used a few decades ago to drive the exploration creating even greater opportunities for their
of space. A student walking down the street can citizens to use these rapidly changing
listen to music, browse the Internet, text friends, technologies.
listen to a recorded lecture, and check the
weather forecast – all on cell phones that have Many aspects of these advances can be
hundreds of times as much storage capacity as readily incorporated into Ghassib’s (2010)
the most powerful desktop computers had just model. For example, when considering the
a generation ago. model’s emphasis on productive sites for
knowledge creation, The Economist (2008)
Perhaps more importantly, the rapid discussed the idea of using “user-generated
development of information technology science”: scholars are beginning to use Web-

based tools to engage in scientific interaction The model should be modified to

and debate. Previously, scientific knowledge in accommodate, in some form, the way that
the form of a peer-reviewed article could take technology has changed the productive site,
more than a year to go through the publication producers, and raw materials of knowledge
process and be disseminated (Economist, creation. From our perspective, the most
2008). important modification deals with the producers
Technologies supporting new avenues of knowledge. One only needs to witness the
of dissemination provide more timely decline in readership at most newspapers
opportunities for peer review and discussion. around the world (as opposed to the explosive
Researchers are also using technology to growth of blog readership) to realize that
change the definition of “productive sites” from knowledge generation has moved from a fairly
physical locations to virtual spaces. This shift well-defined group of experts (who were largely
greatly increases the speed of communication, self-defined and self-monitored; see
the amount of information that can be Csikszentmihalyi, 1988) to an amorphous,
communicated, and the number of people flexible group of people with varying levels of
involved in the sharing of information. expertise.
How technology changes who produces knowledge

Technology not only provides the with the advent of the Internet, and has
general public with access to more information, continued to become a larger issue with the
but it also provides laypeople with an increase of user-generated knowledge (Raban,
opportunity to engage in knowledge 2007). If knowledge is the building block of
construction. This “user-generated content” creativity, as Ghassib (2010) rightly asserts in
refers to the content that is developed by an his article, then the loss of data quality control
individual user within the particular context. may be a tremendous, negative influence on
Perhaps the most popular examples of user- human creativity and problem-solving.
generated content are videos uploaded to
YouTube or the encyclopedic entries posted on However, these technological changes
Wikipedia. Other examples include citizen are not necessarily bad. In a recent study,
journalism, product reviews, and collaborative researchers found a similar number of factual
filtering of books and music (Gruber, 2008). errors, omissions, or misleading statements in
Wikipedia and Britannica articles (Giles, 2005).
The availability of user-generated Some have suggested that instead of
content has greatly democratized the pool of knowledge publishing, the Internet provides us
people who can be considered “knowledge with the opportunity to engage in knowledge
producers.” The idea that such knowledge is the conversations (Raban, 2007).
sole, or even the primary, domain of university
researchers is no longer accurate. For example, one regular Wikipedia
contributor and neuropsychologist discussed
We do not mean to imply that these how disagreements stimulated his own
changes are uniformly positive. Before the knowledge construction: “One user posted a
advent of user-generated information, we section on schizophrenia and violence that [the
consumed media through the newspaper, radio, psychologist] considered little more than a ‘rant’
and television (Milne, 2007). Most information about the need to lock up people with the
consumers never doubted the information illness. ‘But editing it did stimulate me to look
retrieved from those knowledge sources, as up literature on schizophrenia and violence,’ he
there were strict criteria for responsible says. ‘Even people who are a pain in the arse
journalism (Janowitz, 1975). One of the largest can stimulate new thinking’” (Giles, 2005, p.
concerns about online knowledge management 901).
systems has been control over who is
publishing the information. Without the active In the same vein, even advertising
role of gatekeepers, fields, and domains (again, agencies are looking to user-generated content
see Csikszentmihalyi, 1988), the traditional for new ideas (Learmonth, 2009). The move from
assurances regarding information quality can no knowledge created by “experts” to that created
longer be assumed. This was an initial concern by “everyone” can indeed have beneficial

effects. After all, as a society, we have begun to makes knowledge management more efficient
place more emphasis on social-epistemological or simpler in several capacities: capture new
views of knowledge communities (Raban, 2007; data, store data, distribute information, and
Raza, Kausar, & Paul, 2007). These technology- communicate easier. However, it is important to
facilitated shifts in the locus of control over note that the technology is not the agent of
knowledge creation are both a cause and result change, but rather an enabler to facilitate
of this emphasis. change for people: “True collective intelligence
Concluding Thoughts can emerge if the data collected from all those
people is aggregated and recombined to create
Perhaps the struggle between existing new knowledge and new ways of learning that
knowledge and user-generated knowledge can individual humans cannot do by themselves”
be best explained through the notion of (Gruber, 2008, p. 5; see also Ertmer &
collective intelligence or knowledge systems. Ottenbreit-Leftwich, 2009). Technology has
Considered to be a goal of early Internet already facilitated fast transformations to
enthusiasts, such as Engelbart (as cited in collective knowledge, as well as facilitated
Gruber, 2008), collective intelligence capitalizes change to democratize knowledge production
on combining the knowledge power of people. and research. Adapting this distinction into
Gruber suggests that to achieve collective Ghassib’s (2010) model would strengthen its
intelligence, the Internet is the most likely application to knowledge creation as we see it
enabler to facilitate this change. Technology in the industrial world today.
References
Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1988). Society, culture, and person: A systems view of creativity. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.),
The nature of creativity: Contemporary psychological perspectives (pp. 325-339). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Ertmer, P. & Ottenbreit-Leftwich, A. (2009). Teacher technology change: How knowledge, beliefs, and culture
intersect. Manuscript submitted for publication.
Giles, J. (2005). Internet encyclopedias go head to head. Nature, 438, 900-901.
Gruber, T. (2008). Collective knowledge systems: Where the social web meets the semantic web. Journal of
Web Semantics, 6(1), 4–13.
Janowitz, M. (1975). Professional models in journalism: The gatekeeper and the advocate. Journalism Quarterly,
52(4), 618-626, 662.
Learmonth, M. (2009). Brands team up for user-generated-ad contest. Advertising Age, 80(10), 8.
Milne, A. J. (2007). Entering the interaction age: Implementing a future vision for campus learning spaces today.
EDUCAUSE Review, 42(2007), 12-31.
Plucker, J., Beghetto, R. A., & Dow, G. (2004). Why isn’t creativity more important to educational psychologists?
Potential, pitfalls, and future directions in creativity research. Educational Psychologist, 39, 83-96.
Raban, D. R. (2007). User-centered evaluation of information: A research challenge. Internet Research, 17(3),
306-322.
Raza, A., Kausar, A., & Paul, D. (2007). The social management of embodied knowledge in a knowledge
community. Journal of Knowledge Management, 11(5), 45-54.
The Economist. (2008). User-generated science: Web 2.0 tools are beginning to change the shape of scientific
debate. Retrieved on March 20, 2009 from http://www.economist.com/
science/displaystory.cfm?STORY_ID=12253189
Willinsky, J. (2005). The access principle: The case for open access to research and scholarship. The MIT Press.

About the Authors

Jonathan Alan Plucker is a Professor of Educational Psychology and Cognitive Science at Indiana
University, where he also directs the Center for Evaluation and Education Policy and the Consortium
for Education and Social Science Research. Dr. Plucker holds degrees from the University of
Connecticut (B.S. in chemistry education; M.A. in educational psychology) and the University of
Virginia (Ph.D. in educational psychology with an emphasis in statistics and research methodology).
His main research interest over the past 20 years has been the development of talent in children. He
has served as chair of the Research and Evaluation Division of NAGC and President of Division 10 of
the American Psychological Association.
Anne T. Ottenbreit-Leftwich is an Assistant Professor of Instructional Systems Technology at

Indiana University. Her research and teaching efforts focus on preservice and inservice teacher
education with regards to technology integration. Dr. Anne Ottenbreit-Leftwich is currently finishing
up a national research project examining how teachers use and are prepared to use technology in
the classroom.
Addresses
Prof. Dr. Jonathan Alan Plucker
Director, Center for Evaluation and Education Policy (CEEP),
1900 East Tenth Street,
Bloomington, IN 47406-7512, USA
e-Mail CEEP: ceep@indiana.edu
e-Mail: jplucker@indiana.edu
Dr. Anne T. Ottenbreit-Leftwich,

2220 Wright Education Building,
201 North Rose Avenue,
Bloomington, IN 47405, USA.
e-Mail: aleftwic@indiana.edu

Creativity and the Science Enterprise
Rena F. Subotnik
Ghassib (2010) describes science as the largest economic sector in modern society. This is
not correct unless he includes the defense industry, the service industry (like banking, insurance),
manufacturing, and health all as part of the science enterprise. However, he says that science is
conducted mostly in universities.
Science has also fed and been fed by entrepreneurship – for example those who designed
consumer products out of the space programmes were entrepreneurs. Typically entrepreneurs do
not work in universities. Ghassib (2010) doesn’t mention entrepreneurship at all.
Ghassib (2010) describes how modern science changed with industrialization. Yet much
great modern science was still conducted in small isolated laboratories. Think of the Curies and
much of the development of chemistry during the late 19th and early 20th century.
On one hand, Ghassib (2010) says there is no such thing as the scientific method and then
he has a paragraph on scientific verity and efficacy that describes the scientific method.
He also says that science is the exception in industrial processes to knowing the outcome/
product before hand. Yet, most scientists know what the outcome should be in advance of their
experiments. He also says that when you know the outcome, the process is routine. How about
education? The arts? We know the outcomes we want but the path to the outcomes is never routine.
Basically I can only critique the logic of the Ghassib’s (2010) article and not the content,
since he is coming from a tradition I don’t know very well. I’m sure that readers with greater
knowledge in the philosophy and history of science will find many interesting points in Ghassib’s
essay.
Reference
About the Author

Rena F. Subotnik, Ph.D. began her position as Director of the Center for Psychology in the Schools
and Education at the American Psychological Association (APA) in January 2002. From 1986 through
2001, Dr. Subotnik was Professor at Hunter College, where she coordinated the secondary
education program and served as research and curriculum liaison to the Hunter College laboratory
schools for gifted children (grades PK-12). From 1977-1984 she was a gifted education specialist in
the Seattle Public Schools. Dr. Subotnik is also Director of the Center for Gifted Education Policy at
the American Psychological Association. The Center’s mission is to generate public awareness,
advocacy, clinical applications, and cutting-edge research ideas that will enhance the achievement
and performance of children and adolescents with special gifts and talents in all domains (including
the academic disciplines, the performing arts, sports, and the professions). Dr. Subotnik has b een
awarded grants from the McDonnell Foundation, the Institute for Education Sciences, Jack Kent
Cooke Foundation, Camille and Henry Dreyfus Foundation, the American Psychological Foundation,

National Science Foundation, U.S. Department of Education Javits program, and the Spencer
Foundation. She is co-editor of Developing Giftedness and Talent Across the Life Span, Research
Methods for Gifted Education, Optimizing Student Success with the Other Three R’s: Reasoning,
Resilience and Responsibility, The Scientific Basis of Educational Productivity, The International
Handbook of Research on Giftedness and Talent(2nd Edition), Remarkable Women: Perspectives on
Female Talent Development, Beyond Terman: Contemporary Longitudinal Studies of Giftedness and
Talent. She is the first author of Genius Revisited: High IQ Children Grown Up. Dr. Subotnik was the
2002 recipient of the National Association for Gifted Children NAGC Distinguished Scholar award.
Address
Prof. Dr. Rena Subotnik,
Director, Center for Psychology in Schools and Education, and Associate Executive Director,
Education Directorate,
American Psychological Association,
750 First Street NE,
Washington, DC 20002-4242, U.S.A.
Tel: (202) 336-5923
e-Mail: rsubotnik@apa.org

A Brief Comment on the
Surge of Modern Scientific Knowledge
Joan Freeman
Ghassib (2010) presents three intriguing and novel ideas which are worth anyone’s attention.
Firstly, that the constantly increasing amount of scientific knowledge can be regarded as an industry.
Secondly, that science is a "communal creative process". Thirdly, he suggests a new model to
describe this surge of modern scientific knowledge.
His description of the surge of scientific thinking and “science an essential communal
creative process” is fine, although it did come to my mind that Isaac Newton summed it up brilliantly
in the 17th century, saying that “If I have seen a little further it is by standing on the shoulders of
Giants."
The writer is brave in talking of the individual scientists who “intuit great qualitative truths”.
But does this idea also not apply to groups such as Scientologists and Erich von Däniken’s ideas of
superior extraterrestrial peoples on earth before humans, based, of course, on scientific ‘evidence’? I
would have liked some specific words on intuition itself, and what it might be based on. Is it part of
scientific thought, and how does that relate to the intuition of say a witch doctor in treating his
patients?
This is essentially an essay on the origins of scientific thinking and its current production of
knowledge, and as such it is most interesting. But where are the references to gifts and talents,
given that it is appearing in Gifted and Talented International? They are, after all, the subject of this
journal. This is perhaps implicit in the widespread understanding that you have to be clever to be a
scientist, but if he shares that idea then it needs to be explicit. In fact, do you need to be gifted to be
scientific, and in what ways? There are schools of thought which state that scientific thinking can be
taught at any normal intellectual level (e.g., Adey, 1999). Yet Ghassib (2010) does not even nod in
that direction, or to any of the scientific work on gifts and talents (e.g., Freeman, 1998).
Although there is plenty of reference to ancient scientific thinking in the build-up to the
writer’s thesis of modern science as a knowledge industry, I felt a great lack of cultural
understanding. Where is this modern thinking coming from and why? It is not enough to simply
outline it. The thread of his argument implies that scientific thinking is common in modern life. Alas,
this is not true. Vast swathes of the world do not have that advantage, such as most of Africa. Much
of the middle-east and some states in America prohibit the teaching of Darwinism in schools, which
of itself indicates that children are not getting a scientific basis for their thinking. Religion does
matter. The author could point out how such inhibition affects the widening economic and cultural
gap between modern scientific countries and those without that way of thought and knowledge
production, not to mention its effect on industry.
Given the writer’s stated interest in creativity, I would also have liked to see some reference
made to the value of scientific thinking to the arts. Are they so different?

References
Adey, P. (1999). The Science of Thinking and Science for Thinking: a Description of Cognitive Acceleration
through Science Education. Geneva: International Bureau of Education. (www.ibe.unesco.org)
Freeman, J. (1998). Educating the Very Able: Current International Research. London: The Stationery Office.
(Translated into Thai) (Free on www.joanfreeman.com).
Gifted and Talented International, 25 (1), 13-20.
About the Author

Joan Freeman has worked in the area of gifts and talents for more than 30 years. For this, she has
been honoured with the Lifetime Achievement Award by the British Psychological Society. She has
conducted and supervised substantial scientific research, notably her continuing study of gifted
children since 1974, and has published widely in this area, including 17 books. For the UK
government she has written two major reports and provides advice. She is Visiting Professor at
Middlesex University, London, Founding President of the European Council for High Ability (ECHA),
Fellow of the British Psychological Society, Honorary Fellow of the College of Teachers and Patron
of the National Association for Able Children in Education (NACE). She has given hundreds of invited
addresses in most parts of the world and appears regularly in the popular media.
Address
Prof. Dr. Joan Freeman,
Middlesex University,
21 Montagu Square,
London W1H 2LF, U.K.
e-Mail: joan@joanfreeman.com
Web-site: www.joanfreeman.com

Creativity, Knowledge Production, and
Innovation Studies:
A Response to Ghassib’s “Where Does
Creativity Fit into a Productivist
Production?”
Tudor Rickards
The basic premise of the paper (Ghassib, 2010) provides much needed scope for scholarly
discussion regarding the location of creativity and innovation in the processes of knowledge
production. Its conceptualization may be examined alongside recent contributions to creativity
theory and practice at the levels of individual, team, and organization.
I applaud the rich historical scholarship evidenced in Professor Ghassib’s (2010) paper. I
concentrate rather on its analysis of modernist societies and the contributions that are being made
by contemporary researchers. It would be amiss, however, not to mention the debt owed to Joseph
Schumpeter for his seminal work into the institutionalization of science as a means of innovation and
change through creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1934, 1947).
Turning to contemporary issues emphasis retained). Professor Huber later

occupying creativity researchers, concerns expanded on this theme in a study of creativity
about the uniqueness of the high-creative and learning in project teams (Huber, 1999). He
individual remain (Simonton, 1999). However, made the insightful point that most project
there has also been attention what has been teams are assembled on a presumption that
referred to as everyday or garden variety they have adequate knowledge for their primary
creativity. Stafford (1998) notes “[T]o compete in organizational task. This ‘minimum-learning’
the knowledge society, managers must team needs to be assigned ‘… people who are
encourage the pursuit of creative options in all well-networked in the technical communities,
areas, from the most majestic and visible to the both in the firm’s and in the industry’s’. (Huber,
most mundane and invisible.” (Stafford, 1998: 1999: 72, original emphasis retained).
159) The insight contributed to the efforts to
identify team factors in effective project teams
In the same issue of the journal, Huber by Rickards and co-workers (Rickards & Moger,
places emphasis on the importance of 1999, 2000; Rickards, Chen & Moger, 2001) in
environmental sensing processes. Drawing on which Huber’s ‘well-networked’ knowledge
his seminal work on organizational learning workers seems related to the team role
(Huber, 1991) he comments that: “it is clear that designated ‘network activator’. More recently,
creating is a form of learning…learning makes Rickards, Runco & Moger (2009) suggested that
available the information and knowledge that creativity and knowledge management are
facilitates creativity (Huber, 1998:7, original inextricable.

The evaluation of assessing creativity in contributing to the effectiveness of

its context remains an important issue from the organisational performance in the so-called
pioneering work by Amabile and co-workers creative industries. Their work offers a
(Amabile, 1996; Amabile et al, 1996). Work promising approach for exploring and analysing
continues today as evidenced in Moultrie & social phenomena, and contributing to debate
Young, (2009), and Mayfield & Mayfield (2010). on more specific and unresolved issues of
Moultie and Young (2009) conducted an assessing creativity at the levels of the team and
empirical study examining the factors wider organizational group.
Richards Florida (2005) has attracted attention and criticism (Scott, 2006) for his explication
of the creative organization. However, there is growing interest in the central point in Ghassib’s
(2010) analysis, that a new form of institutionalisation may be underway which may be heralding the
rise of the creative manager (Xu & Rickards, 2009).
References
Amabile, T.M. (1996). Creativity in context. Boulder, Colorado: Westview.
Amabile, T.M.; Conti, R.; Coon, H.; Lazenby, J.; and Herron, M. (1996). Assessing the work environment for
creativity. Academy of Management Journal, 39(5), pp1154-1184.
Huber, G.P. (1991). Organizational learning: the contributing processes and the literatures. Organization
Science, 2(1), 88-115.
Huber, G.P. (1998). Synergies between organizational learning and creativity & innovation. Creativity and
Innovation Management, 7, 3-8.
Huber, G.P. (1999). Facilitating project team learning and contributions to knowledge management. Creativity
and Innovation Management, 8, 70-76.
Mayfield, M. & Mayfield, J. (2010). Developing a scale to measure the creative environments perceptions: A
questionnaire for investigating Garden Variety creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 22, 162-169.
Moultrie, J.; and Young, A. (2009). Exploratory study of organizational creativity in creative organizations.
Creativity and Innovation Management, 18, 299-314.
Rickards, T.; Chen M-W.; & Moger, S.T., (2001). Development of a self-report instrument for exploring team
factor, leadership and performance relationships. British Journal of Management. 12(3), 243 –250.
Rickards, T.; & Moger,S.T. (1999). Handbook for creative team leaders, Aldershot, Hants: Gower.
Rickards, T.; & Moger, S.T. (2000). Creative leadership processes in project team development: An alternative to
Tuckman’s stage model. British Journal of Management, Part 4, 273-283.
Rickards, T.; Moger, S.T. (2006). Creative Leaders: a decade of contributions from Creativity and Innovation
Management Journal. Creativity and Innovation Management, 18(1), 4-18.
Rickards, T.; Runco, M.A..; & Moger, S.T. (2009) (Eds..) The Routledge companion to creativity. Oxford:
Routledge.
Schumpeter, J.A. (1934). The theory of economic development. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press
(English Trans).
Schumpeter, J.A. (1947). Capitalism, socialism and democracy, 2nd ed., New York: Harper & brothers.
Scott, A. J. (2006). Creative cities: Conceptual issues and policy questions. Journal of Urban Affairs, 28, 1–17.
Stafford, S.P. (1998). Capitalizing on careabouts to facilitate creativity. Creativity and Innovation Management, 8,
159-167.
Xu, F.; & Rickards, T. (2007). Creative management: A predicted development from research into creativity and
management. Creativity and Innovation Management, 16, 216-228.

About the Author
Tudor Rickards is an author on creativity and leadership in business and management. He is based
at Manchester Business School in the UK, where he is Professor of Creativity and Organizational
Change. Rickards is an influential figure in the study and application of creativity, particularly in
Europe. By the mid-70s he had established international contacts. A collaboration with Horst
Geschka at the Battelle Institute in Frankfurt, Germany, lead to a joint publication comparing
practices and deficiencies in the application of creativity techniques in the UK and in Germany.
Furthermore he participated in most of the European creativity conferences as a speaker or active
participant. During this time he intensively worked on the development of networks enabling
European creativity practitioners to work together and explore alternatives to the dominant US
models. He co-founded the academic journal, Creativity and Innovation Management, in 1991 and is
Alex Osborn Visiting Professor at State University of New York, Buffalo, a lifetime position offered to
scholars who are deemed to enrich teaching at the University’s Centre for Studies in Creativity. He is
a pioneer and advocate of the ‘Manchester Method’ – the system of creative and applied learning
championed by Manchester Business School – on which he has written widely. Challenging
traditional models of creative thinking, leadership, problem solving and team building, Rickards’
research has been described by The Financial Times as non-traditional.
Address
Prof. Dr. Tudor Rickards,
Booth St West,
Manchester, M15 6PB
UK.
e-Mail: t.rickards@man.mbs.ac.uk


Critique of “Where Does Creativity Fit
into a Productivist Industrial Model of
Carole Ruth Harris
This is a fascinating approach to the rise of creativity as an industrial model. Beginning with
ancient discoveries, Ghassib (2010) gives us an overview of the philosophical foundations that led to
exact science, its role in what was later to become a driving force in the modern economy, and its
association with creative productivity. Ghassib (2010) posits that the creative aspects of science
transformed science from an isolated, highly individualized activity within a mythico-metaphysical
context to a widely accepted product -oriented industry powered by creativity.
Beginning with the Galilean Newtonian that develops from the pressure of incoherence,
project, Ghassib (2010) moves to the causal taking its energy from a drive to clarity that
factors that created the receptivity to innovation leads to creative, productive innovation.
in science. He asserts that the modern economy
requires a revolutionized constant that finds its Ghassib (2010) next moves to the
modus operandi through a knowledge industry means of knowledge production with a view to
that is self-perpetuating and powered by technique of scientific creativity. The method of
innovation. He contrasts premodern economies creativity to which he refers defines creativity in
that were dependent upon satisfying basic science as taking ideas and constructs out of
needs with a modern economy that creates new their original contexts and imbedding them into
needs. new contexts. He utilizes Ptolemy’s application
Although planned obsolescence is not of Euclidean geometry, Galileo’s creation of a
discussed it is implied. This, he states, is new astronomy with his invention of the
intimately connected with capital investment telescope, Newton’s construction of a new
arising from the changing role of universities system of mechanics using calculus, and
from institutions that preserved knowledge to Einstein’s theory of gravity predicated on the
institutions that produced knowledge. differential geometry perfected by Riemann,
Levi, Civita, and Ricci.
Ghassib (2010) refers to Kepler, who The methods of production are here
worked with ideas that reflected the influence of brought into question with reference to
Ptolemy, Copernicus, and Pythagoras and then approaches used by Einstein, Boltzmann,
contrasts these with Max Planck who utilized Planck, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, Dirac,
the practical applications of classical physics and Feynman. Others that are not mentioned
that included electro mechanical theory, but might be considered are here are de Broglie,
thermodynamics, and statistical mechanics. von Neumann, and Pauli. Ghassib (2010) here
Ghassib (2010) goes on to imply that although examines what he terms the “peculiarity” of the
scientific creativity depends upon past product and emphasizes that evaluation and
knowledge, which demonstrates gaps that are acceptance by the scientific community is
incoherent, scientific creativity evolves from this essential to the product. He makes the point
incoherent, “inhomogeneous” system to one that without such validation, the product does

not meet the standard of a contribution that by Newton and the explanation and prediction
reflects true creativity. Ghassib (2010) then that it produced still dominates and defines
illuminates this view by connecting it to creative modern science. What he does not say is that
leap that does not follow well-defined steps but much of Newton’s research began with
rather develops with the creative process. persistent investigation into and belief in
alchemy, which is not today regarded as
The article moves to the myth of scientific knowledge. Rationalistic thought,
scientific method and scientific practice, which reached its peak in the eighteenth century
identifying four global commons of scientific , the “age of reason,” embracing a mechanistic
practice. These are: scientific reason, scientific world view, is also absent from this overarching
intellectual tools, the ontology of natural being, thematic approach as well as the obverse and
and the qualification of a scientist. reactive movement that occurred in the
nineteenth century with the rise of romanticism.
Scientific reason, which had its Likewise, the industrial revolution is not
beginnings in antiquity became universal with mentioned, nor are scientific discoveries in
the discoveries of Galileo who envisioned nature engineering and medicine, both of which had a
as a global physical system constituted by an profound influence on economics, engineering
infinite number of physical systems that are with the transformation of agriculture and
described in a hierarchy of physical systems. manufacture, and medicine with eliminating
According to Ghassib (2010), this was extended disease and prolonging the life span.
In addressing scientific intellectual tools, Ghassib (2010) refers to induction, deduction,

experimentation, and synthesis with a view to experimental testing; that is, a testable idea, along
with intelligent reading of phenomena. Ghassib (2010) uses Eratosthenes as an example, again c ites
Newton and Einstein, and refers to Schrödinger. Maxwell and Hawking are remarkably absent from
this illustrious listing, though, and this undercuts the premise and weakens the presentation.
Ghassib’s (2010) approach to the ontology of natural being is likewise compromised by the
glaring absence of any mention of Leonardo Da Vinci whose vast, influential discoveries and
accomplishments in both art and science exemplify Ghassib’s (2010) attempt to define the
parameters both as interconnected mechanisms and systems and bring them into question in the
light of a productivist industrial model that powers creativity. Surely Da Vinci, whose creative efforts
continue to exercise profound influence in art and in science, can be cited as an exemplar of
inconnectedness and knowledge production. In addition, although Ghassib (2010) brings quantum
mechanics into play in this section of his commentary, he never defines its role in what he refers to
as a self-contradictory, self-destructive phase, nor does he substantiate this point of view with any
example.
The qualification of a scientist brings the reader back to the an appositional structure; that is,
the myth of scientific method and scientific practice. Here Ghassib (2010) is very clear about
emotional and intellectual commitment as a precursor to scientific creativity. This would be more
convincing if it were supported by example rather than generalization.
The article raises many questions and engages in important inquiry, addressing the concept
of science as industry. A thought-provoking, cerebral approach to an important underlying issue in
the development of creativity in the context of modern society, the article would benefit greatly by
defining terms, expanding definitions, and providing an historical time line to clarify the questions, to
substantiate the assertions, and to assist the reader to understand the connections and their
relationship to creativity and knowledge production.

Reference
About the Author

Carole Ruth Harris is the Director of G.A.T.E.S. Research & Evaluation, holds the Doctorate in gifted
Education from Columbia University, where she studied with A. Harry Passow and A. J.
Tannenbaum. Formerly Associate in Education in International Education at Harvard University and
researcher on the Hollingworth Longitudinal Study at Teachers College, Columbia University, she
has taught education of the gifted at University of Hawaii and international education of the gifted,
creativity, and qualitative research methods at University of Massachusetts -Lowell. Dr. Harris is the
author of more than 50 articles, and book chapters and has given mo re than 160 lectures and
workshops at national and international conferences both as participant and invited speaker. She is
a recipient of the Gowan Award from the National Association for Gifted Children and a Fellow of the
American Association for Educational Research. Recent publications include, Fostering Creativity in
Children, K-8: Theory and Practice, with M. Lynch (Allyn & Bacon), and The Fragility of the Faceted
Child: Gifted, Culturally Conflicted, Isolated. In Eriksson, G. & Wallace, B. (Eds.). Diversity in gifted
education: International perspectives on global issues. (Routledge).
Address
Dr. Carole Ruth Harris,
Director, G.A.T.E.S. Research & Evaluation,
Box 302,
20 Mason Street,
Winchester, MA 01890, U.S.A.
Tel: (781) 729-9446 (H); (781) 729-4283 (W)
Fax: (781) 721-6456
e-Mail: harris@gates-edu.com


Creativity in Science and Science
Education:
Lynn D. Newton
Ghassib’s (2010) paper is an interesting historical and philosophical discussion on the topic
of knowledge production and a productivist industrial model in science. As I see it from the point of
view of education, a weakness of the paper relates to the lack of discussion of the notion of
creativity in science. The title includes the word ‘creativity’ and yet he does not explicitly address the
nature of creativity in science, its relevance to science education or the teaching of gifted and
talented children. To have done so may have made his account more relevant to this journal’s
readers.
Creativity is generally seen as models, explanations and theories and when

something worthwhile but it is popularly viewed they test them in experiments. According to
as something which happens in the arts rather Osborne, et al. (2003) and Kind and Kind (2007)
than in the sciences. Although creativity has ideas in science are created through rationally-
been defined in several ways (Eysenck, 1996; governed, imaginative thought. However, Kind
Mayer, 1999) there are common elements, most and Kind recommend caution in expecting
notable being that creativity is successful children to be creative exactly like a scientist
personal activity intent on producing an and argue that it is simplistic to try to have
appropriate new idea or product. For example, learners imitate what scientists do, namely,
creativity is “Imaginative activity fashioned so as engage in constrained problem solving (see also
to produce outcomes that are both original and Klahr et al., 2000; Milne, 2007; Newton, 2010).
of value” (N.A.C.C.C,E., 1999, item 29). Children thinking meaningfully, however, are
However, it is for others to agree what is being intrinsically creative, something that most
considered of value. can do to some extent and so they might benefit
from teacher support (Newton, 2000; Howe,
Piaget believed that the main goal of 2004; Ovens, 2004). (Ghassib’s (2010)
education is to produce creative people (Fisher, description of ‘producers’ in science as being
1990, p.30) and Taylor (1999) argued that only a ‘bred’ is, perhaps, not helpful or accurate in this
creative life is meaningful. Greenfield (2008), in context.) While teachers try to support children
discussing human identity, emphasises the to help them notice what is important, the
importance of, “…the “Eureka” scenario, where noticing and mentally connecting (meaningful
the experience of creativity enables you to feel thinking) is something children have to do for
both fulfilled and to have a sense of individual themselves. Similarly, when we ask them to
identity.” Creativity contributes to personal devise a practical test of an idea (experiment),
independence, autonomy and the ability to cope the children must try to construct it themselves.
in new situations (Craft, 2002; N.A.C.C.C.E.,
1999). Of course, scientific creativity is “more
than having fun and coming up with wacky
Scientific processes can involve creative ideas” (Howe, 2004, p.15) or “doing your own
thought and action. Scientists are being creative thing” (Fisher, 1990, p. 33). There must be some
when they construct scientific arguments, form of quality control, perhaps stemming from

a child’s evaluative thought. This can happen approach. Such programmes can work (Osborn,
when a child alters an explanation to bring it in 1957; Torrance, 1975; Shneiderman, 2000;
line with new information or changes an Moseley et al., 2005) but they are not devices
investigation to make it feasible. However, it which make someone creative. Rather, they
must take into account the child’s practical introduce and practise routines which make
ability to translate an idea into a product creative thought more likely and establish skills,
(Sternberg and Lubart, 1995, 1999). There may traits and habits of thought which support
be other opportunities for creative activity and creative thinking. Teaching children to be
thought in a science lesson, as when children creative, then, amounts to providing conditions
draw what they think the surfaces of planets which draw attention to what matters, provides
look like or write a poem about pollution or act opportunities to practice being creative and
out dramatically the behaviour of electrons in a establish ways of thinking and working which
circuit. Such opportunities for expressing ideas make independent creativity more likely. When
and feelings are important and should not be what we mean by teach is to provide a conduit
ignored but they represent creativity in art, for success (such as these might do) then we
language or drama, not in science. can say that children can be taught to be
creative. But children may vary in creative
We know that young children can be capability, particularly in their independence,
creative (Torrance, 1975). The question is scope, interest in the detail and in their
whether or not they can be taught to be creative departure from common or stereotypical
in science. This depends upon what is meant by responses (Nystrand & Zeiser, 1970).
‘teach’. As with constructing an understanding,
being creative is something the learner has to In science education, instead of using
do for himself or herself. Teachers can provide the term ‘creativity’, it may be more useful to
opportunities and support with conditions which refer to ‘productive thought’ (Moseley et al.,
increase the possibility that children will make 2005, pp. 313-314). Productive thought (as
mental connections (Weisberg, 1988; Nickerson, opposed to reproductive thought) subsumes
1999; Newton, 2000). But we also want children creative thinking and critical thinking. It entails
to be creative in the absence of a teacher. imagining scientific situations, constructing
This is what Eysenck (1996) calls private understandings and explanations (creativity in
novelty, what Boden (1996; 2004) and Craft the “hypothesis space”), planning what to do
(2002) call personal creativity or small “c” and devising practical tests of ideas (creativity
creativity. In other words, learners should on the “experimental space”) and, in some
develop the skills and attributes which increase circumstances, applying scientific knowledge to
the likelihood that they will be creative unaided solve problems (creativity in the “application
and in independent contexts. There are space”) (see Newton, 2010). As far as gifted and
programmes which claim to enhance problem talented learners are concerned, teachers will
solving and creative abilities, some of which need to take care not to stifle whatever inherent
have been around for a number of years (for creative tendencies they have and foster and
example, Osborn’s (1957) training in guide their creative processes to make them
brainstorming or de Bono’s (1985) thinking hats more productive.

References
Boden, M. A. (1996). What is creativity? In M. A. Boden (Ed.) Dimensions of creativity. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 75-117
Boden, M. A. (2004). The Creative Mind - Myths and Mechanisms: London: Routledge.
Craft, A. (2002). Creativity and Early Years Education. London: Continuum.
de Bono, E. (1985). Six Thinking Hats. New York: Key Porter Books.
Eysenck, H. J. (1996). The measurement of creativity. In M. A. Boden (Ed.) Dimensions of creativity. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 199-242.
Fisher, R. (1990). Teaching Children to Think. Hemel Hempstead: Simon & Schuster.
Greenfield, S. (2008). Reinventing us: What is technology doing to human identity? New Scientist, 17, May,
pp.48-49.
Howe, A. (2004). Science is creative. Elementary Science Review, 81, 14-16.
Kind, P. M.; and Kind, V. (2007). Creativity in science education: perspectives and challenges for developing
school science. Studies in Science Education, 43, 1-37.
Klahr, D.; Dunbar, K.; Fay, A.; Penner, D.; and Schunn, C. (2000). Exploring science: The cognition and
development of discovery processes. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Press.
Mayer, R. E. (1999). Fifty years of creativity research. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of Creativity
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 449-460.
Milne, I. (2007). Children’s science. Elementary Science Review, 100, 33-34.
Moseley, D.; Baumfield, V.; Elliott, J.; Gregson, M.; Higgins, S.; Miller, J.; and Newton, D.P. (2005). Frameworks
for Thinking. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 119 et seq.
N.A.C.C.C.E. (National Advisory Committee on Creative and Cultural Education) (1999). All Our Futures:
Creativity, Culture and Education. London: D.f.E.E.
Newton, D. P. (2000). Teaching for Understanding. London: Routledge-Falmer.
Newton, D.P. (2010). Assessing the creativity of scientific explanations in elementary science: an insider-
outsider view of intuitive assessment in the hypothesis space. Research in Science and
Technological Education, 28(3), pp. 187-201.
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York: The Free Press.
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(Eds.), Scientific creativity: Its recognition and development. New York: Krieger, 173-183.
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 148-176.

About the Author

Lynn Newton is Professor of Primary Education in the School of Education at Durham University,
England. She is a science specialist and lectures on and researches into aspects of science, science
education and pedagogy, particularly in the areas of teaching for understanding and communication.
She has published over 100 papers and over a dozen books, including Co-ordinating Science
Across the Primary School (Falmer, 1998), Meeting the Standards in …Primary Science (Routledge-
Falmer, 2000) and Professional Studies in the Primary School: Thinking Beyond the Standards (David
Fulton, 2005). She is currently preparing a book for Routledge on Creativity Across the Primary
Curriculum. Prior to joining Durham University she worked as a teacher in primary schools in the
North of England, as an Advisory Teacher for Science, and as a lecturer for ten years at Newcastle
University.
Address
Prof. Dr. Lynn D. Newton,
School of Education,
Durham University,
Leazes Road, Durham, DH1 1TA, U.K.
e-Mail: L.D.Newton@durham.ac.uk

Creativity an Ultimate Goal and
Challenge for Education:
A Response to Ghassib’s Article
Dorothy A. Sisk
The transformation of the status of science to a major industry and its pivotal role in the
modern economy cannot be ignored by education. Realizing this, with a deft intellectual hand
Hisham Ghassib (2010) outlines a Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge Production, in which
he calls the knowledge enterprise an industry in which creativity and innovation play a central role in
the process. His observation that science has become the largest economic sector in m odern
society, both in terms of the number of scientists, engineers, technicians and administrators working
in it, and in terms of governmental and non-governmental investments in it, is both sobering and awe
inspiring for educators to ponder. The obvious question becomes: Why doesn’t education invest
more time and funds in creativity development, and if they did invest, what could educators do to
promote creativity?
There are two major reasons why adults become excited and employ their
education doesn’t invest more in creative creativity. Conversely, learning by authority, with
thinking and learning. One reason is the current an emphasis on standards-driven curriculum
near global standards-driven approach to calls for students to use thinking skills focusing
education coupled with the stifling effects of on recognition, memory, and logical reasoning,
accountability in a measuring “bean counting” which represent the abilities assessed by
culture. Both phenomena are extremely national and state tests, traditional tests of
constraining to most educators. Two decades intelligence, and scholastic aptitude tests.
ago, Tom Peters (1987) said, “What gets
measured gets done.” Yet, this data-based Knowledge industry
reform has morphed into an unintended Ghassib (2010) points out that the
obstacle to both effective instruction and an modern economy is based on a rapidly
intellectually rich, forward-looking education developing scientifically based technology and
(Schmoker, 2009). The second reason is a that this technology is constantly
conceptual one in which creativity is often revolutionizing. These are exciting concepts that
viewed as ability found in only a small number of form a foundation for a knowledge industry. He
individuals, and the misconception that people defines six components of the knowledge
are born with creativity. Since creativity resides enterprise as an industry including the
in only a small number of individuals, it cannot productive sites, the producers, and the
be taught; consequently, creativity remains on peculiarity of the product. I will initially address
the periphery of education, rather than at the the first component, that of the productive sites
center of the curriculum. of universities and research institutes which are
Creative thinking and learning call for crucial to the realization of the proposed model.
the use of abilities including: sensing problems,
inconsistencies and missing elements, divergent Productive sites
production (fluency, flexibility, originality and Increasingly in the United States,
elaboration) and redefinition. Creative learning universities and colleges are being held
according to Torrance and Goff (1989) is a accountable for their “product.” In Texas, the
natural process, in which both children and syllabi and vitae of every professor must be on a

state approved website available for access to research and outreach activities with middle and
the general public. The concept of the university high school studens for an average of ten hours
as a knowledge dispensing and knowledge per week.
preserving entity rather than a knowledge
producing entity is being examined and STAIRSTEP students experience the
questioned by the Texas State Legislature. “thrill of discovery” as they work in teams with
Ghassib (2010) calls for the productive site to be other students and faculty who serve as
a knowledge-producing factory rather than mentors and role models. The teams include
merely a knowledge-preserving or dispensing students from all levels, freshmen through
institute and I thoroughly agree. One current seniors, and they use a peer-instructional
challenge for universities in the United States is method. The students apply concepts they learn
the large number of undergraduate students in classes to their research, and their research is
who come to the university with deficits in in turn incorporated into relevant classes.
mathematics and in reading. As a result, STAIRSTEP students get experience in
developmental remedial classes have been teamwork, leadership, writing papers and
added to keep these struggling students making professional presentations. STAIRSTEP
enrolled. Tao Pang (2010) a Physics professor addresses one of the commons of Ghassib
says that when he teaches his classes, he must (2010), that of the qualification of a scientist, one
be mindful that half of the class probably needs who is emotionally and intellectually committed
to do some catch-up in math in order to follow and devoted to his work. The professors were
the class work, and if highly motivated students selected to work with the project who
are in these same classes, how can the demonstrated passion for their work and this
professor accommodate their needs? To passion is transmitted to the students working
address this dilemma in the United States, on research projects side by side with the
universities are being offered stimulus funds to professors.
develop and implement initiatives to encourage
more students to enroll and graduate in math In addition, a productive site can profit
and science through the National Science from a “pedagogy of adventure” as suggested
Foundation (NSF). by Forest & Faucheux (2010) from the University
of Lyon. They say that a pedagogy of adventure
Project STAIRSTEP (Student Advancing will lead students and professors to build a new
Through Involvement in Research Student relationship with knowledge and students would
Talent Expansion Program) be invited to become confronted with the
unknown and unforeseen. This engagement will
Project STAIRSTEP is one example of a keep professors from feeling they are the
program funded through NSF designed to guardians of a finite knowledge to be passed
increase the number of students receiving on. This concept is very complementary with
baccalaureate degrees in Computer Science, Ghassib’s ideas of the producers. The
Chemistry, Physics, Geology, Earth Science and knowledge factories would reproduce
Mathematics at Lamar University, Beaumont, themselves, as he suggests by breeding and
Texas. This program includes women and nurturing another network of highly qualified
minorities who are under-represented in science creative minds. This nurturing of another
and technology, as well as low income and first network is part of a positive organizational
generation college students. STAIRSTEP climate which has proven a primary factor in
engages and develops students through stimulating and ensuring successful use of
undergraduate experiences including: research organizational creative resources in the process
monitoring, tutoring, outreach, support and of nurturing and sustaining creativity. Individuals
other activities designed to enhance the need to feel they are working in a supportive
students’ learning experiences. The work context (Shalley & Gilson, 2004). Non-
participating students are paid to perform supportive coworkers have been found to

undermine intrinsic motivation and lower winners in Chemistry are similar to the list of
individual creativity (Shalley, Zhou & Oldham, creative characteristics in the research on
2004). Equally important in organizations or in creativity, and it can be surmised that creativity
this case productive sites is participative safety, was one of the driving abilities of the Nobel
or an atmosphere in which work is Prize winners. They were solidly rooted as
accomplished in a nonjudgmental and Ghassib (2010) says in the thick mesh of what
supportive team environment, and where group he termed the epistemic heritage. Both the
intuition is nurtured and facilitated (Belkin, Zhao, Nobel Prize winners in Chemistry and the
Talbom, & Farris, 2008). In situations where the original Nobel Prize winners surveyed by
jobs and salaries of teachers and administrators Shallcross & Sisk (1989) were emotionally and
are on the line for improved test scores and intellectually committed to their work.
achievement, creativity suffers a quiet death.
As an instructional staff member of the
Global commons of science practice Creative Problem Solving Institute (CPSI) in
As Ghassib (2010) outlines his concept Buffalo, New York, for over twenty-five years, I
of a scientific rationality or global commons of worked with groups of individuals, introducing
scientific practice, including scientific reason them to the Parnes/Osborne Creative Problem
and scientific intellectual tools, he adds the Solving technique. Essential in the CPS process
ability to intuit great qualitative truths via very is the evaluation component Ghassib (2010)
delicate nuances. In preparation for their book described in The Peculiarity of the product. The
Intuition: An Inner way of knowing (Sisk & evaluation process of the product is an essential
Shallcross, 1989) surveyed Nobel Prize winners component of its production, and the product
in science from 1983-1988 and found 85% must pass through the evaluation process set
reported relying on intuition, and the other 15% forth by the scientific community. As Ghassib
who said they did not rely on intuition described (2010) notes, one essential tool is to be able to
their scientific techniques as “finding quiet critique, and to deconstruct an idea to reveal its
moments” and “allowing ideas and connections limits, grounds and contradictions, primarily
to surface”. These descriptions were so similar before the client or the scientific community
to tapping the inner voice of knowing, or one’s reviews the product. The product must be
intuition, that Sisk and Shallcross (1989) rested regarded as creative by one’s culture. Essential
their case as to the relevance of intuition as a training of the educators, scientists and
scientific intellectual tool for scientists. business executives at CPSI was the
importance of creating new needs with the
Recently, in addressing teachers and client, being able to anticipate the client’s
their honors students at a National Academy of questions, and being prepared to “sell” your
Chemistry with an express purpose of product.
motivating the students to consider Chemistry Craig Loehle (1990) a research ecologist
as a career choice, I researched the biographies in the Environmental Sciences Section in Aiken,
of Noble Prize winners in Chemistry over the last South Carolina said the path of creativity is
l5 years. These individuals demonstrated the strewn with the bones of those consumed by
following characteristics: Open to new vultures of mediocrity, accountability and
experiences, curiosity, spontaneous and responsibility. I agree with this statement, but
expressive, tolerant of ambiguity, able to escape the Manifesto for Children introduced by E. Paul
perceptual sets, metaphorical thinkers, Torrance at a World Council for Gifted and
articulate and verbally fluent, playful with a Talented Children (WCGTC) meeting in Manila
sense of humor, self-dedicated, and a high need offers a more optimistic and positive view, as
to explore the environment. In addition, they well as insight into the creative individual. The
wanted to make a difference and were Manifesto is appropriate for adults and children;
concerned about leaving a “footprint on the particularly, for future scientists playing a key
planet.” The characteristics of the Nobel Prize role in the forward development of society:

Don’t be afraid to fall in love with something Find a great teacher or a mentor who will
and pursue it with intensity. help you.
Know, understand, practice, develop, and Don’t waste energy trying to be well
enjoy your greatest strengths. rounded.
Free yourself from the expectations of Do what you love and can do well.
others. Free yourself to play your own Learn the skills of interdependence (i.e.
game. depend on one another, give freely of your
strengths).
Creativity must be regarded as being much more than transforming or adding value to
products. Creativity is an integral necessity; a component of a sustainable economy and a key
determinant in the shaping of future global societies (Spendlove, 2002). This statement concurs with
Ghassib’s (2010) major concepts in his Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge Production and
points to the direction and need for more inter-cultural dialogue as stimulated by this most thought
provoking target paper.
A couple of questions to be addressed are:

 What are the most effective ways of encouraging creativity in productive sites?
 Does encouragement of creativity in schools have a positive effect of Big ‘C’ as well as little
‘c’? as described by Gardner (1993).
References
Belkin, L.; Zhao, G.; Talcom, N.; and Farris, G. (2008). Nature or nurture: Can psychometric tools help to foster
creativity in organizations? Raleigh, NC: Center for Innovation Management Studies.
Forest, J.; and Faucheux, M. (2010). Creative rationality and design education: Towards a pedagogy of
adventure. ICSID World Design Congress Proceedings. Singapore.
Gardner, H. (1993). Creating minds: An Anatomy of creativity seen through the lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso,
Stravinsky, Eliot Graham and Gandhi. N.Y.: Basic Books.
Loehle, C. (1990). A guide to increased creativity in research: Inspiration or perspiration? American Institute of
Biological Services.
Pang, T. (2010). Improve math education, improve student retention. Chronicle of Higher Education, p. 30
(January 22).
Peters, T. (1987). Thriving on chaos. New York: Knopf.
Schmoker, M. (2008). Measuring what matters. Educational Leadership, 66(4), 70-74.
Shalley, C.; and Gilson, L. (2004). What leaders need to know: A review of social and contextual factors that can
foster or hinder creativity. The Leadership Quarterly, 15: 33-53.
Shalley, C.; Zhou, J.; and Oldham, G. (2004). The effects of personal and contextual characteristics on
creativity: Where should we go from here? Journal of Management, 30(6), 933-958
Sisk, D.; and Shallcorss, D. (1989). Intuition: An inner way of knowing. Buffalo, NY: Bearly Limited.
Spendlove, D. (2010). Creativity in education: A review. Design and Technology Education; An International
Journal, 10(2), 9 -18.
Torrance, E. P.; and Goff, K. (1989). Fostering academic creativity in gifted students. Journal of Creativity
Behavior, 23(2), 136 –145.

About the Author
Dorothy A. Sisk, Ph.D., holds an endowed chair in education of gifted students at Lamar University
in Beaumont, Texas. Dr. Sisk is an international consultant focusing on leadership and creativity
development. She was a professor at the University of South Florida, coordinating programs for
training teachers of the gifted, and the former director of the U.S. Office of Gifted and Talented in
Washington, DC. She currently directs the C.W. Conn Gifted Child Center at Lamar University, and
teaches the courses for endorsement in gifted education. She received the Distinguished Leaders
Award from the Creative Education Foundation (CEF) in 1989, the Distinguished Service Award from
the National Association for Gifted Children (NAGC) in 1983 and 1994, the Creative Lifetime Award
from CEF in 1994, and was selected for the Hall of Fame Award of CEF in 2005. Dr. Sisk served as
one of the founders and first president of the American Creativity Ass ociation, and president of The
Association for Gifted and Talented (TAG), the Florida Association for Gifted, and the World Council
for Gifted and Talented Children (WCGTC), where she was executive administrator, and editor of
Gifted International from 1980-1990. She has conducted training sessions throughout the United
States and internationally. Dr. Sisk is author of Creative Teaching of the Gifted, and Making Great
Kids Greater; coauthor with Doris Shallcross of Leadership: Making Things Happen, The Growing
Person, and Intuition: An Inner Way of Knowing; coauthor with E. Paul Torrance of Gifted Children in
the Regular Classroom and Spiritual Intelligence: Developing Higher Level Consciousness; and
coauthor with Susan Israel and Cathy Block of Collaborative Literacy: Using Gifted Strategies to
Enrich Learning for Every Student. In addition, she has contributed numerous articles and chapters in
books on gifted education.
Address
Prof. Dr. Dorothy A. Sisk,
Director, The Gifted Child Center,
Lamar University,
P.O. Box: 10034, Beaumont, Texas 777l0, U.S.A.
e-Mail: dorothy.sisk@lamar.edu


Knowledge Production in Small and
Medium Sized Enterprises
Han Van der Meer
It is indeed a great honour for me to respond to this elegant article on the role of creativity in
knowledge production (Ghassib, 2010). While a great honour it may be, it is also difficult since our
worlds seem so much apart. When I try to characterise Ghassib’s (2010) world, three words come
into mind: University, Scientific Knowledge, and Marx. My world on the other hand may be
characterised more by SME (Small and Medium sized Enterprises), Practical Innovation, and
Schumpeter.
Upon first reading Ghassib’s (2010) article left me quite flabbergasted - such clear and
intelligent reasoning and such a rich literate background! What a wonderful global approach in
combining the western and the Arab world of science. My limited frame of reference has been
exposed as I personally find little time or courage to read Persian love poems. Typically I only reread
Proust. Even so, after rereading this work several times the possibility our worlds meeting emerged
for me.
Ghassib (2010) is comparing scientific equally important processes. One process –

knowledge production to industrial production. effectivity - concentrates on doing the right
Yet, while intelligent and clear in his reasoning, I things. The other – efficiency – looks at doing
wonder if the author oversimplifies the the things right. The art of maintaining continuity
complexity of the industrial enterprise. I am within an enterprise largely requires establishing
tempted to look to Marx for causality but with a fine balance between these two processes (De
little background it is difficult. Rather I would Weerd, 2001).
prefer to explain my point from a more
Schumpeterian perspective on industry If we focus only on the second process,
(Schumpeter, 1911). i.e., production and the strive for efficiency,
Ghassib (2010) might be right. He may
“In what sense is the knowledge reasonably observe differences in the
enterprise an industry?” Ghassib asks. “And, in production of knowledge while exploring
what sense does it differ from other scientific knowledge and industrial production.
conventional industries?” (Ghassib, 2010, p. 9) However, it may be argued that these
Later on he states, “In all industrial processes, differences will fade in the context of effectivity,
the product is imaginatively and operationally especially when breakthrough innovations are
specified beforehand, prior to the production needed (Nayak & Ketteringham, 1986).
process” (Ghassib, 2010, p. 10). In my opinion,
this is a somewhat limited view, reducing an Industrial communities are linked in a
industrial enterprise to one only producing or similar way like science communities (Van der
reproducing goods and services. Meer, 2007) and certainly the peer review
become part of the production process. We
When we see an enterprise as an might expect well-known mechanisms for
organisation with an inbuilt drive to survive and industrial innovation, for example, Focus
strive for continuity (Collins & Porras, 2003; de Groups, Lead Users and, in recent times,
Geus, 1997) it is common to distinguish two Crowdsourcing, being used in much the same

way as academic peer review. In daily practice that this type of knowledge production is not
in the real world, systems using Open limited to large corporations but are widespread
Innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) provide evidence amongst SME’s.
Despite my pondering, maybe it is wiser not to concentrate on the differences in our worlds
but seek the benefits derived from the inspiration that comes out of the world of others. In this
respect Ghassib’s (2010) work presents a rich source for those interested in innovation in SME.
And … may be I will start reading Sa’di (1258) and refrain from rereading, Un amour de
Swann (Proust, 1913), or the poetry of Rudyard Kipling where his famous three lines continue:
Oh, East is East and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,
But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth,
When two strong men stand face to face, tho' they come from the ends of the earth!
References
Chesbrough, H. (2003). Open innovation: The new imperative for creating and profiting from
technology. Boston: Harvard Business School Publishing.
Collins, J. C.; and Porras, J. I. (2004). Built to last: Successful habits of visionary companies. 3rd ed.
London: Random House Books
De Geus, A. (1997). The living company. London: Nicholas Brealy.
De Weerd-Nederhof, P. C. (2001). Qualitative case study research: The case of a Ph.D. research
project on organising and managing new product development systems. Management
Decision, 39(7), 513-553.
Ghassib, H. B. (2010). Where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of knowledge
production? Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 13-20.
Kipling, R. (1999). Selected poems. London.
Nayak, P. R.; and Ketteringham J. M. (1986). Breakthroughs. New York: Rawson.
Proust, M. (1913). Un amour de swann. Dutch translation (1979). Amsterdam.
Proust, M. (1913-1927). A la recherche du temps perdu, Dutch translation (1979). Amsterdam.
Sa’di (1258). Gulistan, The Rose Garden, English translation: Eastwick E., 1979, London.
Schumpeter, J. (1911). Theorie der Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung; eine Untersuchung über
Unternehmergewinn, Kapital, Kredit, Zins und Konjunkturzyclus. Zweite, neubearbeitete
Auflage, 1926, München und Leipzig.
Van der Meer H. (2007). Open innovation, The Dutch treat: Challenges in thinking in business
models. Creativity and Innovation Management, 16(2), 192-202.
About the Author

Han Van der Meer (1952) was educated as Chemical Engineer and Master Business Engineering. In
1979 he founded Van der Meer & van Tilburg, management consultants for innovation and growth. In
1985 he started as part-time professor innovation management at the University of Twente moving
to the University of Delft in 2004. Since 2006 Han is ABNAmro chair in innovative entrepreneurship at
Saxion University for applied sciences.
Address
Dr. Han Van der Meer,
Van der Meer & van Tilburg,
Zeisteroever 11,
NL-3704 GB Zeist, The Netherlands.
e-Mail: meer@innovation.nl

A Response to a Plethora of Responses
Hisham B. Ghassib
I was truly overwhelmed by the plethora of responses to my paper (Ghassib, 2010) entitled"
Where Does Creativity Fit Into a Productivist Industrial Model of Knowledge Production". It would, of
course, be pointless to go through all the responses point by point, as this would enlarge my
response unmanageably and repetitively. I shall, therefore, respond by clarifying some
presuppositions, meanings and grounds.
Contrary to what certain responses imply, the central issue in my paper (Ghassib, 2010) is
scientific creativity. However, the paper (Ghassib, 2010) does not view scientific creativity as a mere
private affair, a mere emanation of individual psychology, but rather, as a collective affair. In fact, the
paper (Ghassib, 2010) addresses what may be called "collective creativity"— the creativity of a
society, a nation, a culture or a class. Of course, ultimately, creativity is individual, but individual
creativity is rooted into, and presupposes, collective creativity. The relationship between them is
truly dialectical in the sense that one existentially – or, rather, ontologically—presupposes the other.
The paper (Ghassib, 2010) avoids both a structural approach, whereby knowledge is
produced by subject-free structures, and an existentialist approach, whereby the producing subject
is a pure creative "pour soi" unrelated to a material world and a social collectivity. Instead, the paper
(Ghassib, 2010) follows a dialectical approach, whereby the individual subject is endowed with a
substantive presence and reality, but within the context of a historically conditioned collective
creativity, or creative socio—historic collectivity. Such an approach is essential if we are to
understand the history of science in all its complexity and variety. For, how are we to understand
why certain ages were almost totally barren and produced no genuine creative scientists, whilst
others overflowed with creative geniuses? On the other hand, one cannot understand an Einstein
only in terms of his age and its social relations, forces, trends and institutions. Something else,
something private and individual, something related to Einstein's intellectual, psychological and
spiritual constitution, must also be taken into account.
The productivist model presented in the reduced to mechanical drudgery, and man has
paper (Ghassib, 2010) is a representation of this been reduced to a cog in the machine. Even
dialectical approach, in that it tries to specify the intellectual production has been alienated in this
intricate mesh of dialectical relations between way. However, the original relationship between
individual and collective creativities. It locates production and creation has survived in certain
individual creativity in the very heart of the select intellectual activities – primarily in science
knowledge production process; in its specificity and creative art (though not in mass
as an essentially evaluative process with an entertainment)--because otherwise there would
intrinsically unevisageable product. be neither science nor creative art. These forms
of production are of necessity creative, and I
According to the dialectical approach, think, my model amply illustrates that for
man is both a productive and a creative animal. science.
Individually speaking, all human production is
creative; for all production entails a vision of the Modern thought tends to proclaim,
possible, as opposed to the actual, the almost triumphantly, the death of creative art,
translation of the former into the latter, and the and to condemn the scientific spirit as an anti-
transformation of the latter into the former. humanist spirit. My analysis opposes this
However, modern society has alienated man by prevalent tendency by considering science as a
severing the dialectical relationship between quintessentially creative beacon of humanism.
production and creation. Production has been Thus, a crucial task awaiting modern humanism

is to appropriate the scientific spirit in its living epistemological problems I have encountered
totality, disseminate it and transform it into arose from these perspectives, and I have had
collective consciousness. to overcome the latter to resolve many of the
problems and contradictions I have faced. In the
Needless to say, I have been engaged process, I have developed my own dialectical
with the problem of science as a cultural project approach, but I have benefited enormously, in
and socio—historic organism for decades. This understanding modern man and modern
problem has been engaging the attention of science, from such dialectical thinkers as Hegel,
philosophers, sociologists and historians in Marx, Engels, Lenin, Georg Lukacs , Lucien
Western countries ever since Galileo and Goldman and Louis Althusser.
Descartes.
The underlying idea informing the model
The new disciplines of philosophy of presented in my paper (Ghassib, 2010) is that
science and sociology of knowledge are witness science is basically an humanistic cultural
to that. However, the phenomenon of science project. However it is grafted onto a chillingly
has been treated in the West from the point of inhumanistic socio-economic reality. This tends
view of the modern societies that have to give rise to the false notion that science is the
produced this phenomenon. The latter have felt primary source of the inhumanism of the
the need for understanding and controlling what modern age. (See Peter Merrotsy`s (2010)
they have created. response).
On the other hand, my concern with this The romantics of the late 18th century,
phenomenon springs from an opposite including Goethe, William Blake and Jean
perspective. The central concern of the nation I Jacque Rousseau, certainly thought so. Even
belong to is the problem of underdevelopment. 20th century rationalists, such as Max Weber,
A once culturally vibrant nation for thousands of Georg Lukacs and Theodor Adorno, tended to
years wakes up in the modern era to find itself think so. However, a correct analysis of
at the bottom in almost every aspect of modern scientific production helps to illumine and reveal
life. One of the most conspicuous features of the humanistic core of science, and that seed of
underdevelopment in my part of the world is the wisdom that science could plant in our alienated
near absence of knowledge production. reality. The wisdom that Robert Sternberg rightly
Needless to say, this absence lies at the heart of emphasizes lurks in the heart of science and is
my nation's underdeveloped socio-historic inseparable from it, just as ethics is inseparable
condition. The problem is compounded when from Reason and Knowledge.
one knows that my nation was a leader in
science for thousands of years. What has A controversial point in my paper
happened? (Ghassib, 2010) is the absolute separation
between the craftsman's knowledge and
This paradoxical situation lies at the scientific knowledge. In view of the gigantic
basis for my quest to understand this transformation of crafts and professional skills
quintessentially modernist phenomenon with brought about by modernity, and by science
ancient roots. However, I view it not from the itself, the relationship between the two forms
perspective of its creators, but from the could be much more complex in the modern era
perspective of those who have lost its roots and than it used to be. It may be that the relationship
are trying to appropriate it. They are trying to between scientific knowledge and know-how,
understand modernity in order to critically and its impact on my historical analysis and
appropriate it. model, needs further elaboration and
investigation.
My paper (Ghassib, 2010) has come as
a result of years of trying to come to terms with Other controversial points that should
science as a cultural project from the be addressed are Ken Muclusky's (2010)
perspective of a once leading nation which finds
pregnant idea of "an ecosystem of learning",
itself today sunk in the mire of
underdevelopment. It has been a tortuous and his clever observation that, implicit in my
journey full of obstacles and pitfalls. Many of remarks is "the possibility that creativity, at least
these arose from the inadequacy of the in part, may be taught or enhanced". I fully
prevalent perspectives. Many of the concur with both points, which, of course, need

further elaboration, even though my friend, Taisir quintessentially creative activity, to this or to
Subhi Yamin, abhors the idea of "nurturing that extent. It also entails a highly qualified
genius". subject endowed with the skill of dealing with
My model (Ghassib, 2010) views the the highly intricate epistemic heritage creatively.
production of new knowledge as a In this respect, genius could indeed be nurtured.
Roland Persson (2010) addresses the limitations of the models and judgments of the paper
(Ghassib, 2010). I certainly agree with his remark that the paper (Ghassib, 2010) confines itself to
exact (natural) science. To what extent it can be extended to other sciences is a pertinent question.
However, I totally disagree with his remark that the paper's "epistemological basis is a positivist
one". The basis of my treatment is indeed critical realist (I have Roy Bhaskar in mind), as opposed to
positivist. I presuppose the existence of natural processes, structures and mechanisms, which
generate phenomena. This is an anti-positivist stance.
Persson (2010) has also formed the impression that the paper (Ghassib, 2010) endorses the
viewpoint that "only the Natural Sciences are true science". I emphatically deny that, even though I
deem natural science to be the foremost productive force in modern society. On the contrary, I deem
certain traditions in social science to be epistemologically superior to natural science in certain
respects. There are many other controversial and interesting points in Persson`s (2010) response,
which I hope I will have the opportunity to address in detail in the future.
Don Ambrose (2010) raises the issue of political manipulation and distortion of science and
scientific results. This is an important issue that deserves to be addressed in detail as an
autonomous field of study – the dynamic, multifaceted nexus between science and ideology. An
essential point in my account of science is that, hitherto, capitalism has confined political and
ideological encroachment in science within very strict limits, because it cannot afford to jeopardize
the scientific enterprise, as this would jeopardize its very survival. Whether or not this tendency
would persist in the future, or whether capitalism would suffocate itself and commit suicide, is an
open question.
Heinz Neber`s (2010) cogent critique of my paper (Ghassib, 2010) deserves a long and
focused discussion, which I hope I will have the opportunity to carry out in the future. However, in
this context, I would like to clarify my stance on the scientific method. My denial of the existence of a
specific scientific method means no more than my denial of the existence of an assembly – line type
of production process in science. Science is open to an infinite variety of approaches and ways of
thinking, experimenting and imagining. No well – defined ordered sequence of steps can actually
capture the essence of scientific practice. However, that does not mean that we cannot demarcate
scientific practice from other practices. Admittedly, this is a very controversial issue in the
philosophy of science, but I firmly believe that science is a distinct practice, which presupposes a
specific scientific reason (which is more of a normative than a substantial reason), a scientific
ontology and a set of scientific values.
Marcia Gentry (2010) raises several pertinent questions, and I will try to throw light on some
of these issues. First of all, by "modern science" I mean the fundamentally quantitative,
mathematized and experimental project of enquiry that was launched by Galileo and Newton in the
17th century. It differs distinctly from the philosophy of nature, that was the mark of science in Greek
and Arabic antiquity, and from the mythical appropriation of the world that was prevalent in ancient
civilizations. I aver that all modern science has been based on the Galilean-Newtonian project,
including the socio-human sciences. The modern scientific enterprise (industry) comprises the
totality of modern science, including the socio-human sciences. The survival of capitalism demands

that. Whether or not the socio-human sciences have succeeded in emulating the exact (natural)
sciences is an altogether different question. Regarding the issue of whether or not scientists are
bred, I aver that they are indeed bred as creative workers. After all, what are schools and universities
for? I also assert that an active participant in the scientific enterprise is necessarily creative, because
knowledge production is necessarily creative. Otherwise, he/ she would not survive in such a highly
competitive environment.
Peter Merrotsy`s (2010) skeptical remarks could fire a whole debate on the value of science.
However, his objection to spending billions of dollars on such a remotely abstract topic as finding
TOE smacks of a pragmatism which fails to take into account the wholeness and implicat e order of
knowledge.
Todd Lubart`s and Frank Zenasni`s (2010) detailed paper has raised in my mind the
questions of the grounds and meanings of creativity, intelligence, creative giftedness and academic
giftedness, and their interconnections.
Plucker`s and Leftwich`s (2010) comments on the role of ICT in knowledge production,
collective intelligence and user-generated knowledge are very interesting indeed. However, what is
missing in their analysis and vision of a democratic research enterprise is the question of the user's
qualifications and proficiencies and the degree of dissemination of ICT within the context of
contemporary relations of production and property.
Mark Runco (2010) has decided to delve into the heart of the matter—the underlying
assumptions and presuppositions. There are three points to make as regards his interesting analysis.
First, he tends to complicate the issue by introducing a dichotomy between process and product.
Second, the reason why I have described the development and repro duction of modern society as
"a tortuous, crisis-ridden march" is that a close concrete analysis of the CMP and its history,
including the most recent, reveals crisis as an essential element of the reproductive process of
modern society. This is not revealed by an abstract general logical analysis of the concepts of
change, development and process, but by a concrete analysis of the capitalist mode of production.
Third, contrary to what Runco (2010) believes, the employment of the conventional tools of scien tific
practice, such as induction, deduction, thought experimentation, practical and logical testing,
hypothesis, significant observation and dialectical synthesis is not routine and assembly –line–like,
but is a highly creative practice, which involves all the creative powers of scientific practitioners,
including scientific imagination.
An interesting question raised by Marilyn Fryer (2010) is: "What lessons could be learned
from science in the pre-modern era?" This is a perspicatious question that deserves pondering, but I
refer Fryer (2010) to the French philosopher, Roger Garaudy, who favoured the medieval Islamic
model of science to the productivist industrial model of modernity, which has brought humanity to
the brink of global extermination.
Lee Martin (2010) poses the problem of the relationship between creativity and productive
work. In reply, I reiterate my position on this point to the effect that productive work is essentially
creative, but that modern capitalist division of labour has severed the intimate relationship between
productive work and creativity, and reduced most of the former to mere drudgery. However, it would
not do that to science, literature, music and art, because they could not have survived this operation;
they are pure creativity. Of course, I fully commend his emphasis on ontology and objectivity.
I find Joyce VanTassel-Baska`s (2010) remark, that "the premise of (my) article (Ghassib,
2010) is that science is a unique knowledge industry that produces predictable products, thus

representing a system that can be controlled", rather puzzling and peculiar. The whole point of my
article (Ghassib, 2010) is that the progress of science is unpredictable and uncontrollable, which
makes it a quintessentially creative activity and the prime creator of new needs and demand in
modern capitalist society. I also find her (VanTassel-Baska`s, 2010) separation of intelligence from
creativity, at least in science, incomprehensible. In fact, my model implies that intelligence is a
necessary condition of creativity in science. A scientist has to be very intelligent in order to deal
effectively – i.e., creatively – with his/ her raw material, with his/ her epistemic heritage. Without a
high level of intelligence, he/ she would not be able to grasp, appropriate and think his/ her
epistemic heritage, which is, of course, a necessary condition for transforming it creatively.
Even more puzzling, because much more confused and muddled, is the whole of the paper
prepared by Mumford et. al. (2010) I have sought in vain to recognize any of my theses in the issues
tackled in the article. The point is that the object of my article is not creativity per se. Rather, it is the
production of scientific knowledge as revealed by history and the necessary role of cr eativity in this
process. To think otherwise is to confuse the issue. The quixotic character of the paper by Mumford
et. al. (2010) is revealed right from the start with the baffling statement, "Ghassib (2010) argues that
the production of new knowledge is the basis for organizational innovation." Which windmill are they
talking about? Unfortunately, the paper is so full of such quixotic statements that it would be fruitless
to respond to the details. However, this quixotic exercise reaches its climax in th e following
statement:" In Ghassib`s (2010) analysis creativity is the property of an individual–an individual
working alone". Of course, the very notions of a knowledge industry, epistemic heritage and
scientific reason belie this statement. In fact, my paper (Ghassib, 2010) emphasizes science as a
socio-historic process, and presupposes the notion of collective creativity and the notion of the
individual as a socio– historic product and agency.
Last, but not least, I have found Rena Subotnik`s (2010) remarks rather amusing, particularly
her reference to Marxism (in the midst of the worst financial crisis in world history, a crisis
anticipated by Marx 160 years ago) and to entrepreneurs’ involvement in knowledge production.
Of course, this article could not give justice to the wealth of ideas presented in the
responses to my paper (Ghassib, 2010), and I hope that time and opportunity will enable me to
pursue this interesting discussion in the future.
I think Lynn Newton (2010) has confused two distinct, though related, processes –
knowledge production and knowledge acquisition or learning. The theory I have explicated in my
paper (Ghassib, 2010) is a theory of knowledge production, not a theory of learning. Also, creativity
is not a peripheral notion in the theory, but a central one. The whole analysis is geared towards
showing that scientific practice is intrinsically creative. The whole model of scientific practice in its
various philosophical facets rests on this intrinsic character. However, the theory focuses on what I
call “collective creativity”, rather than “individual creativity”. I have conducted a number of case
studies on individual creativity (Kepler, Planck, and Einstein), which I hope I shall put in a publishable
form in the near future.
Even though I reject the notion of scientific method, I subscribe to the notion that there is a
sharp boundary of demarcation separating science from pseudo -science (e.g., scientology, Erich
von Danikin, astrology, magic, alchemy). What I call significant observation, and what Joan Freeman
calls intuition, is sharply different from the irrational intuitive claims of mystics and pseudo-scientists.
Scientific intuition is a rational process related to the other dimensions of scientific practice. In fact,
each of these dimensions acquires its rationality and logical legitimacy from the whole scientific
enterprise. The essence of scientific practice resides in the dialectical relationship between

mathematized theorization and exact measurement. Even though this rel ationship is multi-
dimensional, it constitutes a whole, and each of its dimensions can only be understood in relation to
the whole.
As for cultural issues, no one is more painfully aware of scientific underdevelopment in such
areas as the Arab world and Africa than I. In fact, I have shown in my “Response to a Plethora of
Responses” (Ghassib, 2010b), what has driven me in the first place to focus my research on
knowledge production is this cultural awareness and sensitivity. I am also aware of the role of
religion, particularly in my part of the world, in impeding science and modernity. However, I could not
address this complex issue in a focused paper like the one under discussion in this issue, but I have
dealt with it in depth in many other publications.
Tudor Rickards (2010) tends to focus on knowledge management , rather than on knowledge
production per se. Of course, management is a very important issue both in knowledge production
and knowledge dissemination and application. My model (Ghassib, 2010) presupposes the
importance of this issue, but does not explicitly deal with it, even though it is of paramount
importance to developing nations aspiring to build a genuine national knowledge industry. Building
on my experience as university president and researcher in an applied science institute, I hope I will
have the opportunity to deal with this issue in the near future.
Carole Ruth Harris (2010) focuses on what she considers deficiencies in my paper (Ghassib,
2010), such as condoning Maxwell, Hawking, and Leonardo Da Vinci. However, had I dealt with
those examples, and with many other, equally important, examples, my paper would have lost focus
and grown out of all proportions. In fact, it would have turned into a detailed book. One more point is
that there is no evidence that Newton’s alchemy, which occupied much of his time, played a
significant role in his physics. A case could be built for his theology’s role in his physics, but not for
his alchemy.
I have found Han Van der Meer’s (2010) response very interesting and clever. But, I can
assure him that the gap is not as absolute as Kipling’s famous “three lines” seem to imply. Nor is the
gap between Marx and Schumpeter so wide. We all seem to belong to modernity and its fatal
problems.
Last but not least, Dorothy Sisk’s (2010) response is replete with many pregnant ideas and
observations, which I cannot adequately deal with in this quick response. All I can say here is that
what is truly lacking today in our modern educational space is the culture of revolt, non-conformity,
revolution.

References
Ambrose, D. (2010). Expanding views of creative science: A response to Ghassib’s productivist industrial model.
Freeman, J. (2010). A brief comment on the surge of modern scientific knowledge. Gifted and Talented
Fryer, M. (2010). Creativity, scientific practice, and knowledge production. Gifted and Talented International,
25(1), 65-68.
Gentry, M. (2010). A short commentary on “where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of
Ghassib, H. B. (2010b). A response to a plethora of responses. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 117-
124.
Harris, C. R. (2010). Critique of “where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of knowledge
production?” Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 101-104.
Lubart, T.; and Zenasni, F. (2010). A new look at creative giftedness. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 53-
58.
Martin, L. (2010). Science and creativity: The importance of ontology for scientific understanding. Gifted and
Talented International, 25(1), 69-74.
McCluskey, K. W. (2010). Comments on Ghassib’s “where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model
of knowledge production?” Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 23-26.
Merrotsy, P. (2010). A chaos of delight: A response to Hisham Ghassib. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1),
49-52.
Mumford, M. D.; Hester, K. S.; and Robledo, I. C. (2010). Scientific creativity: Idealism versus pragmatism.
Neber, H. (2010). Review of Hisham Ghassib: Where does creativity fit into the productivist industrial model of
Newton, L. D. (2010). Creativity in science and science education: A response to Ghassib. Gifted and Talented
Persson, R. S. (2010). The importance and weaknesses of the productivist industrial model of knowledge
production. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 31-34.
Plucker, J. A.; and Ottenbreit-Leftwich, A. T. (2010). Knowledge is where you make it: A response to Ghassib.
Rickards, T. (2010). Creativity, knowledge production, and innovation studies: A response to Ghassib’s “where
does creativity fit into a productivist industrial model of knowledge production?”. Gifted and Talented
Runco, M. A. (2010). Products depend on creative potential: A comment on the productivist industrial model of
knowledge production. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 81-88.
Simonton, D. K. (2010). Little science to big science: Big scientists to little scientists. Gifted and Talented
Sisk, D. A. (2010). Creativity an ultimate goal and challenge for education: A response to Ghassib’s article.
Sternberg, R. J. (2010). Limits on science: A comment on where does creativity fit into a productivist industrial
model of knowledge production?. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 21-22.
Subotnik, R. S. (2010). Creativity and the science enterprise. Gifted and Talented International, 25(1), 93-94.
Van der Meer, H. (2010). Knowledge production in small and medium sized enterprises. Gifted and Talented
VanTassel-Baska, J. (2010). Can creativity be systematized?: A response to Ghassib. Gifted and Talented


Book Review
Editors:
Taisir Subhi Yamin
International Centre for Innovation in Education (ICIE).
e-Mail : taisir@icieworld.net
Heinz Neber
University of Munich; Germany.
e-Mail: heinz.neber@online.de
Sandra K. Linke
Hochschule für Bildende Künste Braunschweig; Germany.
e-Mail: sandra.linke1@web.de
Hava E. Vidergor
Oranim Academic Teachers’ College; Israel.
e-Mail: vidergor@bezeqint.net


Book Review (1)
Light Up Your Child’s Mind

Joseph S. Renzulli; Sally M. Reis; and Andrea Thompson
(1st edition) (2009)
In the preface, the authors wrote: In Part I of this volume, “What is this
“When you envision your child’s future and Thing Called Giftedness”, the authors
what you want for him/ her, perhaps words investigated academic giftedness vs. out-of-
such as happiness, health, and success come the-box gifts, and looked at kids whose
to mind. When you consider how such learning styles and intellectual curiosity go
desirable, understandable goals might be against the current definition. According to the
reached ̶ that is, what your child needs in the authors, “to become capable of doing new
way of informed, sensitive attention ̶ you things, your child must acquire skills that go
probably find yourself caught up in the beyond reading, writing, and arithmetic during
stressful concerns of the here and now” (p. his critical formative years” (p. 3).
ix).
Based on the renowned "Renzulli “Creative-productive learning takes
Method", which has been adopted in schools place when a youngster is intent on
in different parts of the world, This book, developing an original something; a product
“Light Up Your Child’s Mind” presents a that he hopes will have a positive impact on
practical program to help children fire up a an audience of some kind. We might also call
love of learning to last a lifetime. World- it personalized learning by doing” (p. 12).
renowned experts Renzulli and Reis illustrate
the crucial role parents can play in their The authors listed a number of
children's development and address how they characteristics of the creative child, and
can work with teachers to enhance their asserted that the “creatively gifted child tends
children's education. to be an independent and original thinker,
curious about many things, willing to take
Renzulli, whose model for the risks, and attracted to the novel and the
education of gifted children has been widely complex. He will attack a topic of interest with
adopted, presents a program for parents to energy and enthusiasm, showing a high
identify and foster their school-aged tolerance for ambiguity and a willingness to
children's interests and abilities. Inspired by surmount obstacles and persevere. He
education pioneers John Dewey and Jean demonstrates what’s called a global mode of
Piaget, he tells parents how to help their information processing ̶ thinking abstractly,
children acquire new skills and interests and generalizing, and extrapolating” (p. 27). In
fully utilize the ones they have. Every child, addition, they have senses of humor.
gifted or not, has unique talents and
strengths, not always apparent in the Enrichment activities and
classroom, that can be cultivated through a programmes, recommended by Renzulli and
variety of parent-directed exercises in creative Reis emphasized four elements: The problem,
thinking and productivity. the process, the product, and the audience.

Research studies pointed to “one overriding parental influence enter the picture? What
and universal finding: the greatest source of amounts to “something useful” anyway, and
satisfaction almost always results from who decides?
children’s freedom to pursue topics of their In the next chapter, the authors look
own choosing in a manner with which they at how he/ she can proceed according to
feel most comfortable” (p. 60). styles of learning and expression that feel
most natural, and that honor and capitalize on
Part II, the bulk of the book, offers his/ her uniqueness. The book offers some
practical paths to recognizing and developing ideas that should help parents appreciate
those gifts and talents, and includes bulleted their child’s style that is revealed by several
lists, dialogues, checklists and evaluations, indicators: Preferred mode of instruction,
chapters full of concrete advice, dozens of preferred surroundings, preferred way of
ideas and activities, plus case studies of thinking, and preferred forms of expression.
individual kids' creative-productive projects.
According to the authors, “all style
In chapter four, “passions of the Mind preferences may change over time, with age,
and Heart”, the authors considered the routes greater exposure, heightened confidence,
by which the child might identify an area of developing abilities, and all other factors that
investigative activity that appeals to him/ her, go along with growing up” (p. 107).
and they addressed four intriguing questions:
Why does a youngster develop a particular Part III covers special considerations:
interest in a particular subject or area of The twice exceptional, i.e., kids with gifts and
activity? Is the “Aha! Falling-in-love” moment talents coupled with learning disabilities, ways
necessary in terms of uncovering an interest to reclaim the “Lost Prize” underachiever, and
and sustaining it over time? How does how to partner with teachers and schools.
This book concludes with Renzulli’s best resources including: Renzulli Learning System. It is
the first integrated system introduced to the educational system in different countries. It is used to
identify and develop the gifts and talents of all children by providing easily accessible high quality
materials and resources. It is an exciting on-line comprehensive system that matches students'
abilities, interests, styles of learning and expression, and can help teachers access a wealth of
opportunities to provide packages for productive thinking skills and appropriate differentiation
activities for students of all levels of achievement and abilities
In agreement with the authors, “if we are not conscious of ways to help our children pursue
their creative productivity, we must consider the consequences” (p. 229).
Based on their first-hand experiences, Joseph Renzulli and Sally Reis wrote this book. It is
filled with practical information. This book is a must for parents and educators interested in helping
children identify and nurture their talents, develop a love of learning, and build a strong foundation
for life.
Reference
Renzulli, J. S.; Reis, S. M.; and Thompson, A. (2009). Light up your child’s mind. New York: Little, Brown and
Company.
ISBN-13: 978-0-316-00398-8

Book Review (2)
Being Smart about Gifted Education:

A Guidebook for Educators and Parents
Dona J. Matthews; and Joanne F. Foster
(2nd edition) (2009)
"Being Smart About Gifted Education with the gifted learners” (p. xviii). Special
– A Guidebook for Educators and Parents” is provisions designed to meet the gifted
an updated version of the 2004 book. The learner’s needs must begin by reflecting upon
authors, Dona Matthews and Joanne Foster, individual differences, including: Abilities,
have rewritten the book to include the most interests, learning styles, expression styles, in
recent research on brain development, recent addition to emotional, social, academic and
trends in the education system, and new ways developmental.
of focusing efforts to meet the needs of gifted
learners. Matthews and Foster (2009) Matthews and Foster (2009)
provided an updated set of ideas, references, incorporated Carol Dweck’s work on
and resources. mindsets, as well as recent research findings
on expertise and cognitive neuroscience that
In the preface, the authors asserted show the importance of habits of mind in
that they “support optimal development in cognitive development.
those who have been labeled gifted and those
who have not” (p. xvii). In this book, the authors offered
alternative approaches to gifted programming,
The authors of this book discuss ideas about teacher training initiatives, advice
effort and persistence as being fundamental about advocacy, thoughts on the relationship
to gifted-level achievement, and they describe between creativity and giftedness, and a
how teachers and parents can support this in description of a dynamic scaffolding
children. In addition, they share research approach to gifted consultancy. They also
evidence that shows that working hard is discussed topics that affect children’s well-
actually how people become smart. Matthews being, including social, emotional,
and Foster (2009) examined how the neural extracurricular, and motivational factors.
plasticity findings support the move in the
field of gifted education from a static mystery Throughout these sections and
model to the more dynamic and chapters, the authors challenge the
developmental approach of the mastery conventional thinking about gifted education
model. Matthews and Foster (2009) described and include only those policies and practices
how the mastery model of giftedness which are solidly grounded theoretically and
exemplifies and supports the growth mindset, empirically.
as well as how the mystery model fosters In the first chapter, Matthews and
fixed mindset beliefs and behaviors. Foster (2009) made a comparison of the
mystery and mastery models of giftedness. In
In this edition, as with the first one, the second chapter, the authors addressed
there “is no single formula for living or working the nature of creativity from a mastery

perspective in the context of its connection to context of mismatch diagnostics rather than
giftedness. the traditional focus on the categorical
identification toward a more careful and
According to Matthews and Foster intelligent assessment of learning
(2009), “creativity is an important component requirements. They argue the importance of
of actualizing giftedness in every domain, and addressing a mismatched curriculum and a
domain-specific mastery is a prerequisite for child’s exceptional needs. They conclude
high level creative work” (p. 31). The authors chapter four with some important and
reported that their perspective is much closer cautionary advice:
to that expressed by David Henry Feldman: “Remember that the real value of test
“To be creative means to use your full scores is in their interpretation. Only
set of capabilities for some valued and when test interpretation is done with
valuable purpose, the consequences of sensitivity to an individual child’s unique
which make a significant difference to an situation can test scores be used
established field of endeavor. … intelligently to diagnose an educational
Creativity is quintessentially a matter of mismatch and inform educational
devotion, mastery, patience, decisions” (p. 86).
persistence, and talent … applied in full
measure over a sustained period of In chapter six, “Adaptations: The
time” (p. 31). Gifted Learner in the Regular Classroom”
Matthews and Foster (2009) pointed out that
Matthews and Foster (2009) pointed “many advanced learning needs can be met in
out that “creativity can be elusive, and it a regular classroom by a teacher who is well-
requires hard work. It involves preparation, trained and well-supported in working with
incubation, illumination, and verification. Too exceptionally capable learners” (p. 111).
often, the impetus is on the final product
instead of on the creative process itself” (p. The authors of this book pointed out
38). that motivation is more important than
cognitive ability in achievement outcomes.
The authors of this book do believe Matthews and Foster (2009) concluded in
that fostering creativity, as with any expertise, chapter nine: “Let’s try to teach each child
involves nurturing four habits of mind: Active each day something he or she doesn’t know
engagement in learning and experimentation; already and really wants to learn” (p. 202).
the progressive tackling of higher-level
problems; a matching of talents and task In the next chapter, “How Does
demands; and practice. Giftedness Develop?”, the authors addressed
the developmental pathways, and offered a
“The importance of these domain- number of provisions that could be employed
specific habits of mind in generating high- to meet the special needs of the gifted and
level creativity has been demonstrated over talented.
the past few years in a number of fields from a
number of different angles, including talent “The affective and social-emotional
development, expertise, equity and diversity, needs of students should not be
and wisdom.” (Matthews and Foster, 2009: overlooked in the talent development
39) commitment. Students must be able to
develop a healthy perspective about
In the next three chapters, Matthews their own talents and limitations, and
and Foster (2009) addressed the who, what, those of others; a positive self-image; a
when, where, and why questions that parents, positive regard for the processes of
and educators ask, and offered answers in the learning and inquiry; and a commitment

to a guiding set of moral and ethical teacher development (e.g., what do teachers
values” (p. 239). need, administrative support, what can
parents expect, the Dynamic Scaffolding
In the last section, “Being Smart Model (DSM) of teacher development,
about Families, Advocates, and Educators”, engagement in teaching and learning); and
the authors addressed three important topics: the optimal learning for all children (e.g.,
Parenting matters (e.g., making decisions sharing resources in a changing world,
about programming, placement, and change; university-based gifted education resource
advocacy; supportive parenting; sibling centres, the importance of staying up to date,
relationships; seeking professional help); and being smart about tomorrow).
This is a thoughtful, helpful, and instructive handbook which will be quite useful to teachers
and administrators, as well as parents of gifted children. It is informed by the most recent research,
and takes into account the latest developments in this field of knowledge. It is a handbook that will
be valued by all stakeholders. It is an essential book for anyone interested in gifted education.
Reference
Matthews, D. J.; and Foster, J. F. (2009). Being smart about gifted education: A guidebook for
educators and parents. Second edition, Scottsdale, AZ: Great Potential Press, Inc.
ISBN-13: 978-0-910707-95-4
ISBN-10: 0-910707-95-2


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Include title of paper, name(s) of author(s), affiliation, mailing address (include postal codes, if
applicable also e-mail address and fax-number) and a running headline. The title page will be
removed by the Editor-in-Chief prior to the refereeing process to allow for a masked review.
Abstract
Should consist of a maximum 150 words on a separate page. The abstract must, if the result of
empirical research, briefly outline theoretical basis, research question(s) (in one sentence if possible),
methodology and instrumentation, sample(s) and pertinent characteristics (e.g., number, type,
gender, and age) as well as the main findings of the study (if applicable include statistical
significance levels). Also, include conclusion and the implications or applications.
An abstract for a review or a theoretical article should describe in no more than 150 words the topic
(in one sentence), the purpose, thesis or organising structure and the scope of the article. It should
outline the sources used (e.g., personal observation and/ or published literature) and the
conclusions.
Length
A paper submitted should not exceed 6000 words including abstract, keywords, references, and
illustrations.
Language
The GTI is an international scholarly journal and papers should be written in English. It is
recommended that non-native English speakers have their papers checked in regard to language
accuracy prior to submission. British spelling, as well as American spelling is accepted.
Manuscript
Papers must be word processed, and printed or photocopied with a clear print, double -spaced and
with margins of at least 4 cm (approximately 1.5 inches) on all four sides. Use one side of the page
only.

Statistics
Are an aid to interpretation and not an end in themselves. If reporting statistics, include sufficient
information to help the reader corroborate the analyses conducted (cf APA-manual).
Qualitative data
If submitting a qualitative study, be sure to include a discussion on the stringency observed whilst
obtaining and analysing the data (e.g., biases, analysis model, transcription keys, validation of
results and so on). Include sufficient data to help the reader, as far as possible, to corroborate the
analyses conducted.
Footnotes
Should be kept to a minimum or preferably avoided completely. If used, they should be numbered
consecutively with superscript Arabic numerals.
Abbreviations
Must be kept to a minimum and not followed by a full stop, for example cm (not cm.), kg (not kg.)
References
See the APA-manual for a full description of how to make references and how to quote other
research or other sources. The reference list should be double-spaced like the rest of the paper,
alphabetically sorted with names and journal titles. Note that journal titles may not be abbreviated.
Illustrations
Authors should follow APA-format in designing tables and figures and consider the fact that
illustrations supplements - not duplicates - the text. In the text, refer to every table and figure and tell
the reader what to look for.
Figures
Must be computer drawn or photographed and submitted on separate pages in t he manuscript; not
included in the text. Note that they must also be included as separate computer files (jpg, jpeg or gif
format). Figures should be identified with Arabic numbers and an explaining text, and their
approximate place in the text should be clearly indicated in the manuscript.
Tables
Should be placed on separate pages; not included in the text. Note that tables also should be
submitted as separate file(s). Tables must have an Arabic number, an explaining text and a title. Their
approximate place in the text should be clearly indicated in the manuscript. Observe also that
templates for tables provided with most word processing software may not be used unless
templates follow APA-format. Spreadsheets, while inevitable when constructing diagrams with
software such as for example Microsoft Excel of SPSS, should not be used as basis for table
construction in the paper.
Proofs
One proof will be sent to the author(s) to be corrected and returned—within three days of receipt—to
the Editor-in-Chief. The cost of corrections in the first proof resulting from extensive alterations in the
text will be charged to the author.
Early electronic offprints

Corresponding authors can now receive their article by e-mail as a complete PDF. This allows the
author to print up to 50 copies, free of charge, and disseminate them to colleagues. In many cases
this facility will be available up to two weeks prior to publication. A copy of the journal will be sent by
134 Gifted and Talented International – 24(2), December, 2009.

post to all corresponding authors after publication. Additional copies of the journal can be purchased
at the author’s preferential rate of US$25.00 per copy.
Copyright
Authors of accepted manuscripts must transfer copyrights to the GTI which holds copyrights to all
articles and reviews. Authors, may, of course, use the article elsewhere after publication, providing
that prior permission is obtained from the WCGTC. Authors are themselves responsible for obtaining
permission to reproduce copyrighted material from other sources.
Submission
Please send manuscript(s), which will not be returned, to the Editor-in-Chief:
Prof. Dr. Taisir Subhi Yamin;
Editor-in-Chief;
General Director, The International Centre for Innovation in Education (ICIE);
Heilmeyersteige 93;
D-89075, Ulm;
Germany.
Phone: (+49) 731.50.94494
Mobile: (+49) 172.929.7632
e-Mail: taisir@yahoo.com
Note that you must submit also, on a separate page together with your manuscript, 10 -15 lines of
biographical information about each author to be published with the article. Contact address should
be included.

__________________________________________________________________________
Notes

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Notes

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Notes

A New Look at Creative Giftedness

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A New Look at Creative Giftedness

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Gifted and Talented International

Volume 25, Number 1, August, 2010.

Gifted and Talented International – 25 (1), August, 2010. 1

Executive Committee and Officers (2009-2011)

2 Gifted and Talented International – 25 (1), August, 2010.

Editor-in-Chief: World Council for Gifted and Talented

Gifted and Talented International – 25 (1), August, 2010. 3

4 Gifted and Talented International – 25 (1), August, 2010.

Little Science to Big Science: Big Scientists to Little Scientists.

Expanding Views of Creative Science: A Response to Ghassib’s Productivist Industrial

A Chaos of Delight: A Response to Hisham Ghassib.

A New Look at Creative Giftedness.

Creativity, Scientific Practice, and Knowledge Production.

Science and Creativity: The Importance of Ontology for Scientific Understanding.

Gifted and Talented International – 25 (1), August, 2010. 5

Can Creativity be Systematized?: A Response to Ghassib.

Knowledge is Where You Make it: A Response to Ghassib.

Creativity and the Science Enterprise.

A Brief Comment on the Surge of Modern Scientific Knowledge.

A Response to a Plethora of Responses.

(2) Being Smart about Gifted Education.

6 Gifted and Talented International – 25 (1), August, 2010.

Scientific Creativity and Knowledge

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 7

Model of Knowledge Production?” Ken W. Bearing in mind what we know about

According to McCluskey (2010), In the next response article,

8 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 9

10 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

The concluding article (Ghassib,

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 11

12 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

Keywords: Scientific creativity, knowledge production, productivist industrial model, innovation,

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 13

The Peculiarity of the Modern Economy

14 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

Let us define the components named above.

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 15

4. The means of knowledge production: Knowledge is produced by means of knowledge.

5. Methods of production: The history of science reveals a variety of methods of scientific

Following the preceding discussion, we method as such, but there is a scientific

16 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 17

18 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

About the Author

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 19

20 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

There are three great advantages to scientific knowledge.

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 21

About the Author

22 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

(1) The productive sites

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 23

(2) The producers

(3) Raw material

(4) Means of knowledge production

(5) Methods of production

(6) Peculiarity of the product

24 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 25

About the Author

26 Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010.

Professor Ghassib’s (2010) essay This ordinal placement is founded on

Gifted and Talented International – 25(1), August, 2010. 27