Newsweek v.

IAC, 142 SCRA 171

Facts:

Petitioner, Newsweek, Inc., a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the

Philippines, on March 5, 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane
planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual sugar
planters, filed Civil Case No. 15812 in their own behalf and/or as a class suit in behalf of
all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental, against petitioner and two of
petitioners' non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came. The
complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed libel against them by
the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the February 23, 1981 issue of
petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek.

On November 5, 1981, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that (1)
the printed article sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and (2) the complaint is
bereft of allegations that state, much less support a cause of action. It pointed out the non-
libelous nature of the article and, consequently, the failure of the complaint to state a cause
of action. Private respondents filed an Opposition to the motion to dismiss and petitioner
filed a reply.

On March 17, 1982, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied on May 28, 1982.

On June 18, 1982, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with respondent Court
respondent Court affirmed the trial court's Orders in a Decision dated December 17, 1982
and ordered the case to be tried on the merits on the grounds that -(1) the complaint
contains allegations of fact which called for the presentation of evidence; and (2) certiorari
under Rule 65 cannot be made to substitute for an appeal where an appeal would lie at a
proper time. Subsequently, on March 10, 1983, the respondent Court denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid decision, hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition for certiorari and prohibition is proper to question the denial of
a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action.
Held:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot
be subject of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 4 1). The ordinary
procedure to be followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse,
reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies to an order denying a
motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no appeal lies from a
judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then
certiorari or prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or
accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the motion to dismiss or
motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious exercise of
judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate.
Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633

Facts:
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this SC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to
enjoin the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with
Criminal Cases pending before them. This Court, in issuing said order, took into
consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment, originally set for June
5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of conserving
and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said
contingency.
On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the
arraignment of petitioner until further advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the
consideration of herein petitioner's motion to cancel her cash bond until further initiative
from her through counsel.
On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition
for certiorari and lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously
issued. The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality
in this Court's resolution dated September 10, 1992.
Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold
departure order against petitioner

Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it
issued the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of
the decision of this Court which dismissed her petition. 

Held:
It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on
January 18, 1992 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and
setting aside the temporary restraining order it previously issued. It is petitioner's
submission that the filing of her motion for reconsideration stayed the lifting of the
temporary restraining order, hence respondent court continued to be enjoined from acting
on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration. We
likewise reject this contention which is bereft of merit.
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by
the court, a judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and
before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the
execution of a judgment decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall
not be stayed before an appeal is taken or during the pendency of an appeal,and we see no
reason why the foregoing considerations should not apply to a temporary restraining order.
The rationale therefore is that even in cases where an appeal is taken from a judgment
dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the judgment, hence the
general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the dismissal
of the action.
It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately
effective, even though it is not final. A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in
which a restraining order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a
dissolution of the restraining order or temporary injunction1and no formal order of
dissolution is necessary to effect such dissolution.Consequently, a special order of the court
is necessary for the reinstatement of an injunction. There must be a new exercise
of .judicial power.
Condo Suite Travel v. NLRC, G.R. No. 125671. January 28, 2000

Facts:

Private respondent was employed as housekeeper. After two months, he signed a

new employment contract with petitioner Condo Suite Club Travel, Inc. under the same
terms of employment. Both firms belong to the ARCON group of companies. His salary was
reduced. He also owned a car-for-hire which he rented to Joselito Landrigan
who operated the car as a taxi with himself as driver. Landrigan approached the front desk
clerk at petitioner’s hotel requesting a collectible of Php 2000 be added to a certain Korean
guests, Mr. Hu’s bill.

Mr. Hu later complained that he was over billed. Private respondent explained his
side being the front desk supervisor and owner of the car. Eventually, petitioner’s staff
confirmed the error and refunded the amount to the Korean. Petitioner terminated
the services of private respondent on the ground of loss of confidence for the latter’s
malicious intent to defraud a guest of the hotel.

before his dismissal, private respondent filed a complaint for diminution of salary before the
Arbitration Branch of NLRC. Subsequently, after having been dismissed, private respondent
amended aforesaid complaint and included the charge of illegal dismissal from employment.
During the arbitration proceedings, petitioner offered to reinstate private respondent which
the latter rejected.

On appeal, public respondent NLRC affirmed the order dismissing the complaint for
diminution of salary, but modified the decision of the labor arbiter as regards illegal
dismissal.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed the present petition. It
seeks to annul the decision of public respondent ordering the reinstatement of private
respondent. However, petitioner does not state the grounds relied upon for said
annulment.  We note that petitioner imputes neither lack or excess of jurisdiction, nor
grave abuse of discretion, on the part of public respondent in rendering the assailed
judgment.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition for certiorari will prosper?

Held: No

Resort to a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is

limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.The respondent acts without
jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case. There is excess of
jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case,
oversteps his authority as determined by law. And there is grave abuse of discretion where
the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise
of his judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.Since petitioner neither
assails the jurisdiction of public respondent nor attributes grave abuse of discretion on part
of the labor tribunal, this petition must fail.

Besides, petitioner did not comply with the rule on certification against forum shopping.
The certification in this petition was improperly executed by the external legal counsel of
petitioner. For a certification of non-forum shopping must be by the petitioner, or any of the
principal parties and not by counsel unless clothed with a special power of attorney to do
so. This procedural lapse on the part of petitioner is also a cause for the dismissal of this
action.

Even if the abovementioned procedural defects were to be set aside, the petition would still
not prosper. Public respondent cannot be faulted for grave abuse of discretion. For we find
its assailed judgment supported by factual and legal bases.
San Juan v. Cuento, 160 SCRA 277, G.R. No. 174263, Jan. 24, 2007
Spouses Guinyawan v. Ayogat , G.R. NO. 131913, June 8, 2007
Vital-Gozon v. CA 212 SCRA 235

Facts:
In 1987, by virtue of E.O. 119 issued by then Pres. Cory Aquino, a reorganization of
the Ministry of Health was effected. At the time of such reorganization, Dr. Alejandro Dela
Fuente was the Chief of Clinics of the National Children’s Hospital. In February 1988, Dr.
Dela Fuente received a notice from the Deparment of Health that he would be re-appointed
as Medical Specialist II. Such a position was considered as two ranks lower than his
previous position of Chief of Clinics. This prompted Dr. Dela Fuente to file a protest with
the DOH Reorganization Board. The protest was ignored. Dela Fuente then filed a case
before the CSC. In the meantime, the position of Chief of Clinics (then changed to Chief of
Medical Professional Staff) were turned over and thereafter exercised by a Dr. Merencilla.
CSC ruled in favor of Dr. Dela Fuente. It ruled that Dr. Dela Fuente is deemed having
retained his previous position. Neither an MR nor an appeal was filed assailing such a
decision thereby rendering the decision as final and executory.

Months have elapsed but still there was no action on the part of Vital-Gozon et. al.
to execute the decision of the CSC. CSC also told him that they believed they have no
coercive powers to enforce their own decision. This prompted Dela Fuente to file a petition
before the CA to compel Vital-Gozon et. al. to restore him to the position of Chief of Clinics
and pay him his backwages plus damages for Vital-Gozon’s refusal to comply with the CSC
resolution. CA granted the decision insofar as his restoration to his former position but
denied insofar as the grant of damages ruling that the petition is not the correct vehicle to
claim such damages not the CA is the correct forum for such relief. CA also took note to
representation by the SolGen of Dr. VitalGozon saying that pursuant to the ruling in
Urbano and Co cases, the SolGen is not authorized to represent her. MR was filed by Dela
Fuente arguing that CA has the power to grant damages in a mandamus action by virtue of
BP 129 which gave the SC, CA and RTCs concurrent jurisdiction over such petitions and
that CA was given the power to conduct hearings and receive evidence to resolve factual
issues.
To require him to separately litigate the matter of damages he continued, would lead
to that multiplicity of suits which is abhorred by the law. CA eventually granted the MR and
ordered setting a date for reception of evidence on the la Fuente's claim for damages. It
based its judgment on the last phrase of Sec. 3 Rule 65 ROC which expressly allows the
award of damages in a mandamus petition.

Issue:
               
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
matter of damages in a special civil action of mandamus.

Held:
               
Yes. CA has jurisdiction to award damages in mandamus petitions. Sec. 3 of Rule 65
of the Rules of Court explicitly authorized the rendition of judgment in a mandamus action
“commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained
by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.”  The provision makes
plain that the damages are an incident, or the result of, the defendant’s wrongful act in
failing and refusing to do the act required to be done. It is noteworthy that the Rules of
1940 had an identical counterpart provision. The Solicitor General’s theory that the rule in
question is a mere procedural one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another
for damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages arising from the omission
or failure to do an act subject of a mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the
latter, the matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of action
for mandamus, which is certainly not the case.
Flordelis v. Mar, 114 SCRA 41

That, on or about the 2nd day of July, 1977 the above-named accused, moved by a
desire to evade payment of a just debt and Attorneys' fees for legal services rendered, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously execute and sign a verified answer to
the complaint of Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay and filed with the City Court of Tagbilaran City
and which alleges, among other things, that the herein accused did not owe anything from
Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay; thus, said accused herein had in said manner willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts, thereby causing upon
said Atty. Sulpicio Tinampay trouble and embarrassment, to his damage and prejudice in
the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.

On February 13, 1978, petitioner filed a motion to quash this information on the two
grounds already stated at the outset of this opinion. On even date, respondent judge denied
the said motion to quash .

It is plain from even a cursory reading of the above-quoted information that the allegedly

The assertion of respondent judge in his order in question that the prosecution should first
be allowed to "present in court the questioned pleadings as basis of the charge of perjury"
overlooks quite surprisingly that petitioner had attached to his motion to quash the
complaint and the verified answer, and it is not claimed that the authenticity of any of them
has been put in issue by the prosecution. Thus, further evidence to show (1) that those
pleadings were filed in an ordinary action where there is no requirement that the answer to
a complaint does not have to be verified and (2) the relevancy of the allegedly perjured
statements and consequently their absolutely privileged character was superfluous. Actual
presentation thereof at the formal trial could not have altered their legal import in the
determination of whether or not under the facts alleged in the information petitioner could
be convicted of perjury.

Issue:

The propriety of certiorari and prohibition under the circumstances of this case,

Held:

As to the contention of respondents that the denial of a motion to quash is not a

ground for certiorari and prohibition, suffice it to state that to allow an accused to undergo
the ordeals of trial and conviction when the information or complaint against him is
patently defective or the offense charged therein has an indisputably Shown to have already
prescribed is unfair and unjust for which reason, procedurally, the ordinary remedy of
appeal cannot be plain and adequate. (Page 69, Record.)

WHEREFORE, the petition herein is granted and the respondent court is hereby
ordered to dismiss the abovequoted information for perjury against petitioner in Criminal
Case No. 918 of said court. No costs.
Bloomfield Academy vs CA, GR No. 99042, 06/26/94

Facts:

Private respondent, the association of parents and guardians of students enrolled in

petitioner Bloomfield Academy, a non-stock, non-profit educational institution, filed a
complaint for injunction against the latter. The complaint alleged that petitioner decided to
increase its tuition fees in lieu of RA 6727 granting mandatory increase of minimum wage of
the teachers without prior consultation to the parents which is a requirement before any
increase should be made effective. Respondent court ordered the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction. In the petition for certiorari attributing to the court a quo grave
abuse of discretion in the issuance of the writ, the appellate court held the petition to be
without merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the court a quo has acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned order and, in the affirmative,

whether or not it has committed grave abuse of discretion specifically in granting

private respondent’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Held

We see merit in the petition.

The pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 6728, also commonly known as “An Act
Providing Government Assistance to Students and Teachers in Private Education, And
Appropriating Funds Therefor,” provide: Sec. 10. Consultation. — In any proposed increase
in the rate of tuition fee, there shall be appropriate consultations conducted by the school
administration with the duly organized parents and teachers associations and faculty
associations with respect to secondary schools, and with students governments or councils,
alumni and faculty associations with respect to colleges. For this purpose, audited financial
statements shall be made available to authorized representatives of these sectors. Every
effort shall be exerted to reconcile possible differences. In case of disagreement, the alumni
association of the school or any other impartial body of their choosing shall act as arbitrator.

In passing, we also observe that the parties have both remained silent on the
provisions of Republic Act No. 6728 to the effect that in case of disagreement on tuition fee
increases (in this instance by herein private parties), the issue should be resolved through
arbitration. Although the matter has not been raised by the parties, it is an aspect,
nevertheless, in our view that could have well been explored by them instead of immediately
invoking, such as they apparently did, the administrative and judicial relief to resolve the
controversy.

All told, we hold that the court a quo has been bereft of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of private respondent’s complaint. We see no real justification, on the basis of
the factual and case settings here obtaining, to permit a deviation from the long standing
rule that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any time even on appeal.

Wherefore, conformably with our above opinion, the instant petition is granted and the
questioned ordered of the court a quo and the decision of the appellate court are set aside.
1. Gelindon vs De La Rama, GR No. 105072, 12/09/93
2. Alcasid vs CA, 217 SCRA 436
3. Lalican vs. CA, GR no. 108917, 07/31/97
4. Republic vs. Caguioa, 02/20/13
5. NPC vs Vera, GR No. 83558, 02/27/89
6. Ongsuco vs Malones, GR no. 182065, 10/27/09
7. Uy kiao Eng vs. Lee, GR No. 176831, 01/15/10
8. Hegerty vs CA, GR No. 154920, 08/15/03