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Introduction to LOPA
Muhammad Raihan Syah Iman S.T, B. Eng (Hons)
PT Lebah Solusi Indonesia (LebSolution), Komplek Ruko Golden Madrid 2, Blok I-22, Banten 15310, Indonesia
+62-812-8488-7575; muhammad.iman@lebsolution.com
Wednesday, 11 May 2022

Introduction 1. Consequence Identification and Scenario

D
Screening
uring my time studying chemical engineering,
2. Scenario Selection
my exposure to the process safety industry has
3. Initiating Event Identification and Frequency
been limited to class room discussion on major
Determination
industrial accidents with extensive investigations and
4. IPL Identification and Determining Probability
media coverage. Bhopal, Piper Alpha, Buncefield, and
of Failure on Demand
Odessa are all too familiar for professionals and
5. Risk Estimation
budding engineers alike. While this has proven to be an
6. Evaluation of Risk and Decision Making
excellent approach to engaging students and inspiring
engineers such as myself, it lacks in teaching students
Step 1: Identify the consequence to screen the
about the wide range risk assessment methods
scenarios
corporations use to prevent such incidents in the first
place! LOPA begins with screening scenarios that has been
developed in a prior study, such as a HAZOP study.
As such, I would like to provide a short introduction to
These scenarios are often screened based on their
one of the many methods process safety engineers use
evaluated consequences.
to ensure that the risks imposed on us, our environment,
and our assets are kept within tolerable levels. In this Several approaches can be taken in this evaluation to
article we will discuss one such method of risk provide a semi-quantifiable result; including release
assessment, known as the Layer of Protection Analysis size/characterization, simplified injury/fatality
or LOPA. estimates, simplified injury/fatality estimates with
adjustments, or detailed injury/fatality estimates. In any
What is a LOPA? case, the method used for consequence characterization
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a simplified should be consistent with the company’s risk
form of risk assessment that uses order of magnitude assessment methodology and risk tolerance criteria.
categories for initiating event frequencies, consequence
Step 2: Select an accident scenario
severity, and likelihood of failure of independent
protection layers (IPLs) to approximate the risk of a A scenario is defined as an unplanned event or sequence
scenario. The primary purpose of which is to determine of events that results in an undesirable consequence.
whether or not sufficient layers of protection against a Each scenario consists of at least 2 elements; the
particular scenario have been implemented. The initiating event and a consequence.
analysis builds upon information developed during a Scenario = Initiating Event + Consequence
qualitative hazard evaluation; such as a Process Hazard
Analysis (PHA), on a single cause-consequence pair Although, in addition, it may also include enabling
basis. The resulting risk estimation can be extended to events or conditions, failure of safeguards, probability
assist in making risk judgements on how much of ignition, and/or probability of human presence in the
additional risk reduction measures may be required to affected area.
reach a tolerable level of risk. In general, the LOPA
process can be broken down into 6 steps (CCPS, 2001);

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Step 3: Identify the initiating event of the This value is written in order of magnitude, e.g.
scenario and determine the initiating event 10-1, 10-2, and so on. The smaller the value, the less
frequency likely it is for the scenario to occur.
LOPA is limited to a single initiating event for each
Step 6: Evaluate the risk to reach a decision
scenario. The frequency of the initiating event is
concerning the scenario
commonly expressed in events per year, but can also be
expressed as events per 106 hours or failure per 103 Generally risk management decisions can be
demand. Acquisition of IEF from an established and categorized as either the management of risk with the
well-maintained database of the company subjected to existing systems at its current tolerable level, mitigation
the LOPA is favourable as the data better reflects actual of the risk to a tolerable level, or abandoning the risk
conditions and experiences. However, the frequency (avoid the risk entirely by altering the design and/or
data can also be obtained from varying sources operation mode) due to it being too high. The
including industry data in the Guidelines for Initiating application of a LOPA allows for a quantifiable
Events and Independent Protection Layers in Layer of comparison of the existing risk with a pre-determined
Protection Analysis (CCPS, 2015), Guidelines for risk tolerance criteria and for cost-benefit analysis of
Process Equipment Reliability Data (CCPS, 1989), and competing options of safeguards should a risk be
many more. deemed intolerable.

Step 4: Identify IPLs and estimate the Summary


probability of failure on demand of each IPL A Layer of Protection Analysis or LOPA is a form of
A safeguard is a device, system, or action that is capable risk assessment used by corporations to provide a
of preventing a scenario from proceeding to its reproducible assessment of the risk imposed by a given
undesired consequence and/or reduce the severity of its scenario based on estimations of the likelihood for the
consequences. In the context of a LOPA only preventive initiating event to occur and the probability that of the
safeguards are taken into account, as the desired independent layers of protection will fail.
outcome is an evaluation of the likelihood of a scenario The resulting value can then be used to assess whether
and how the safeguard affects it and not how it mitigates additional layers of protection are required to reduce the
the consequences. This safeguard is considered an risk to a tolerable level.
Independent Protection Layer (IPL) when it is
independent of the initiating event or the action of any References
other layer of protection associated with the scenario. 1. CCPS, 1989. Guidelines for Process Equpment
Remember: All IPLs are safeguards but not all Reliability Data. New York: AIChE.
safeguards are IPLs!
2. CCPS, 2001. Layer of Protection Analysis:
The effectiveness of an IPL is quantified in terms of its Simplified Process Risk Assessment. New
probability of failure on demand (PFD). The smaller the York: AIChE.
value of the PFD, the larger the reduction in frequency
3. CCPS, 2015. Guidelines for Initiating Events
of the consequence for a given initiating event.
and Independent Protection Layers in Layer of
Step 5: Estimate the risk of the scenario by Protection Analysis. New York: Wiley.
mathematically combining the consequence,
initiating event and IPL data
The risk and frequency of a given scenario can be
quantified by multiplying the initiating event frequency
with the multiplication product of all the existing IPL’s
PFD. This value can be expanded upon by incorporating
the probability of ignition (flammable release),
probability of human presence in the affected area,
and/or probability of injury.

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