Soccer & Society

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fsas20

Montevideo 1930: reassessing the selection of the

first World Cup host

Lorenzo Jalabert D’Amado

To cite this article: Lorenzo Jalabert D’Amado (2020): Montevideo 1930: reassessing the selection
of the first World Cup host, Soccer & Society, DOI: 10.1080/14660970.2020.1793621

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2020.1793621

Published online: 11 Jul 2020.

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SOCCER & SOCIETY
https://doi.org/10.1080/14660970.2020.1793621

Montevideo 1930: reassessing the selection of the first World Cup

host
Lorenzo Jalabert D’Amado
Sorbonne Nouvelle University, CNRS CREDA, Paris, France

ABSTRACT
The selection in 1929 of Uruguay as the host for the first World Cup might
seem surprising at first given football’s strong European centre of gravity
at the time. The incongruity of this choice has so far been mainly attrib­
uted to the fact that Uruguay was the twice-defending Olympic champion
(Paris 1924, Amsterdam 1928) and that it was about to celebrate its
centenary of independence. The idea that Montevideo represented a
sound choice has been primarily based on two sources broadly mobilized
in academic research, namely Jules Rimets’s memoires and FIFA’s 1929
congress minutes. However, a more in-depth analysis has revealed that
these two documents are highly misleading and that the path to success
of Montevideo’s candidacy was far more complex than previously
thought. The aim of this study was to re-examine what appears to have
been a South American coup in the context of a predominantly European
governing body.

Introduction
In the early afternoon of 13 July 1930, some 11,000 kilometres away from Europe, two football
matches kicked off, one between France and Mexico at the Estadio Pocitos in Montevideo, the other
between Belgium and the USA at the Estadio Parque Central. It marked the start of the now almost
century-long history of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup.
To those familiar with the stakes, the complex candidacy process and the colossal economic and
diplomatic specifications required to successfully win a World Cup bid today, the choice of Uruguay
back in 1929, a small country with just over two million inhabitants, may seem quite intriguing.
Football has of course come a long way since the first World Cup was held in Uruguay. The game
now enjoys unprecedented levels of popularity, and its symbiosis with the media – radio in the
1930s, television in the 1960s and digital media since the 2000s – has greatly increased the scale and
impact of the event. Football was by no means a low-profile affair in 1930, however. It was the
dominant sport in most European and South American countries, and its international competi­
tions, especially the Summer Olympic Games football tournaments, rallied huge crowds and
received enthusiastic global coverage.
Aside from the country’s modest scale, Uruguay may also seem a peculiar choice given FIFA’s
early geopolitical set-up. Although its scope was undeniably global from the outset (as shown by its
name and regulations), the organization was, nonetheless, a unilaterally European project. In 1904
seven European football federations1 had gathered in Paris to create FIFA. These geographically
homogeneous origins had led to a strong European anchorage of the organization during its first

CONTACT Lorenzo Jalabert D’Amado lorenzo.jalabert@gmail.com Institut des Hautes Études de l’Amérique latine,
Université Sorbonne Nouvelle - Paris 3 Campus Condorcet, Bâtiment de recherche Sud, 5e étage, 5 cours des Humanités, 93300
Aubervilliers, France.
© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
2 L. JALABERT D’AMADO

decades of existence.2 Up until the 1950s, the majority of its members were from Europe.3 FIFA’s
early Eurocentrism is also evidenced in the locations it chose for its congresses. From 1904 to 1948,
every one of its 26 annual congresses was held in Europe. In addition, the South American nations
felt no real need to affiliate to FIFA in its early stages.4 Only Chile and Argentina had done so by
1922, even though the continent already had a flourishing football scene with a number of national
championships and institutions. By 1916, the main South American associations5 had united to
create their own continental federation, which gave rise to the current Confederación Sudamericana
de Fútbol (CONMEBOL).6
Taking all these elements into account, one might rightfully wonder why FIFA believed Uruguay
would be a fitting choice as the host nation in charge of organizing its first full-scale and long-
anticipated international event.7 Current football historiography8 tends to overlook the paradox
posed by the Uruguayan choice. It maintains that the host was simply favoured by the FIFA
authorities and that the country had the symbolic weight both of being the twice-defending
Olympic champion (Paris 1924 and Amsterdam 1928) and of celebrating its centenary of indepen­
dence in 1930. This position is based mainly on two specific sources broadly mobilized in academic
research, namely the published memoires of FIFA’s then acting president, Jules Rimet, and the
minutes from FIFA’s 1929 annual congress.
Jules Rimet arrived in office as FIFA’s president in 1921, at a time when the institution was
struggling to overcome the damage done to international football by the First World War. When he
stepped down in 1954, the World Cup was in its 5th edition and destined to continue successfully
dominating the international sports scene every four years. It was around this time – when he was in
open dispute with fellow Frenchman Henri Delaunay over the authorship of the event9 – that Rimet
published his famous FIFA memoires under the evocative title L’Histoire merveilleuse des Coupes du
monde.10 Posing as the mastermind behind the triumphant World Cup project, Rimet effectively
fended off any possible interrogations raised by the somewhat odd selection of the Uruguayan
candidacy. For him, he says, Montevideo was a natural choice after witnessing La Celeste’s11
prowess12 on Colombes’ football pitches during the 1924 Summer Olympics. He also describes in
his book an enthusiastic discussion he claims to have had in 1925 of the possibility of Uruguay
hosting the future first FIFA tournament during a lakeside walk in Geneva with Enrique Buero, the
Uruguayan ambassador to Switzerland and the Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol’s (AUF)13 main
collaborator overseas.14
The official decision regarding the choice of host nation for the 1930 World Cup was taken
during FIFA’s 18th annual congress, held in the city of Barcelona in May 1929. Despite the
administrative zeal of FIFA’s then secretary general, C.A.W. Hirschman, the minutes of this
congress are, as would be expected, a somewhat succinct document. The topic, one of the last
items listed in the 14-page bilingual proceedings under the section ‘Fixing the place for the World’s
Championship in 1930ʹ, was addressed during the third and last sessions of the congress on the
afternoon of Saturday 18 May. The content of the discussions that ultimately led to the selection of
Montevideo’s candidacy is outlined in a bullet-point summary of just over 170 words. The brevity of
the report and more especially the comment that the decision was ‘agreed unanimously’ have
contributed to promoting the image of a fairly brief and consensual decision-making process that
was based on the legitimacy of Uruguay’s candidacy and the general approval it had received from
its peers. Taken together with Rimet’s visionary claims of having always favoured a Uruguayan bid
for the first edition of the World Cup, it is easy to understand how this idea that Montevideo was the
natural choice as the host city has filtered down in football historiography.15
However, further research strongly suggests that the two aforementioned documents are highly
misleading when it comes to understanding how Montevideo ended up hosting the 1930 tourna­
ment. In contrast to what Rimet’s memoires and the FIFA congress minutes purport to show, the
actual decision was hardly unanimous. Through an analysis of sources rarely or never previously
used, this article aims to reassess the complex selection process for this first edition of the World
Cup. The findings reveal a complicated trajectory leading up to the selection of the Uruguayan bid
 SOCCER & SOCIETY 3

and rule out the idea of any consensus. Indeed, they strongly point towards what could be described
as a South American coup in the context of a predominantly European governing body. This
historiographical revision is not only interesting per se, it also provides some fundamental indica­
tors when trying to historicize the traditional football rivalry that characterizes the relationship
between Europe and South America,16 the two continental hearts of football.
The results presented in this paper were based mainly on an in-depth analysis of two specific
sources. The first was the documentation generated by the AUF during the organizational stages of
the tournament, which can be found in the institution’s archives in Montevideo. It includes official
correspondence with FIFA and fellow national associations as well as internal reports and
exchanges between the AUF’s top executives, especially those who were part of the organizing
committee. The second document was the long-ignored but fundamental Negociaciones
Internacionales, published by Buero in 1932. In 1922, ten years before the book was published,
there was a split in the AUF, and its governance of Uruguayan football was threatened by the rebel
organization, the Federación Uruguaya de Football (FUF). In an attempt to assert its authority, the
AUF decided to affiliate to FIFA in order to prevent the FUF from having any kind of international
recognition. When the AUF realized they were too late to attend the 1923 FIFA annual congress in
Geneva, its executives quickly availed themselves of the channels that commonly linked politics and
football in Uruguay at the time17 and contacted Uruguay’s ambassador to Switzerland, Enrique
E. Buero. The South American diplomat attended the congress and successfully carried out the
AUF’s mission. Subsequently appointed ambassador to Belgium, Buero resided in Europe all year
round, which proved advantageous for the AUF in terms of advancing its agenda within FIFA’s
geographically eurocentric activities. Buero became a valuable asset for the AUF, especially after his
election as a FIFA vice president in 1928, making him the first South American on the federation’s
executive board. He was pivotal in the journey from the AUF’s affiliation to FIFA in 1923 to
Uruguay hosting the first World Cup in 1930. Following the tournament’s success, he compiled and
published his many postal exchanges on the subject during that seven-year period. A combination
of official and personal correspondence, Bueros’s book is an unparalleled insider window onto the
gestation of the first World Cup.18

Parting with the IOC

Since the mid-1920s, the thorny question of amateurism had been taking its toll on the relationship
between FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). While the IOC had persistently
upheld the principle of amateurism and rejected outright any form of remuneration in sport, FIFA
had adopted a much more flexible stance.19 During its 1925 annual congress, FIFA proposed that,
under strict circumstances, players would be compensated for loss of earnings. However, a few
months before this decision was officially ratified at the 1926 FIFA congress in Rome, the IOC had
assembled in Prague and resolved that any athlete receiving reimbursement for lost earnings would
not qualify for participation in the Olympic Games. These decisions clearly conflicted. The
stalemate that followed between the two organizations spurred FIFA into actively considering
alternative options should the hosting of the football championship no longer be viable within
the Summer Olympics.20 At its 1927 meeting in Helsinki, the FIFA Congress passed a motion to
declare that they would stand by their 1926 decision on amateurism and that ‘for the case when an
agreement should not be arrived at, the Executive Committee should arrange a tournament on
behalf of the FIFA’.21 The task of devising a possible FIFA spinoff football tournament was
entrusted to a special committee composed of Bonnet (Switzerland), Meisl (Austria), Delaunay
(France), Ferretti (Italy), Fischer (Hungary) and Linnemann (Germany).22
After some heated discussions, the IOC and FIFA settled on a temporary agreement to allow the
football tournament to take place during the 1928 Amsterdam Summer Olympic Games. Football
was far too popular in Europe to do otherwise, and the Dutch organizing committee for the
Olympiad could not afford to exclude a sport that would ultimately generate a third of the event’s
4 L. JALABERT D’AMADO

total revenue. However, not all the IOC members were as pragmatic as those on the Dutch
committee.23 The football tournament had barely begun before the IOC raised the amateur issue
again. They questioned the current agreement between the two institutions and strongly implied
that football could be banned from the next Olympic Games in Los Angeles in 1932. This formed
the backdrop for FIFA’s annual congress on 25 and 26 May in Amsterdam’s Milietzaal. During the
sessions, the special committee examining the feasibility of an independent football tournament
presented its preliminary findings to the Congress. Their conclusions were deemed encouraging, so
the Congress decided ‘to organize in 1930 a competition open to the representatives of all affiliated
National Associations’.24 The host nation for the event was to be chosen at the next annual congress,
due to take place in Spain. In the meantime, FIFA’s special committee was charged with drawing up
suitable terms and conditions for the new tournament, because, although the decision had been
taken, the concrete reality of the project was still rather vague.

The birth of the Uruguayan bid

In 1928, La Celeste had returned to Europe to defend its Olympic title. Along with the team came
four AUF executives, specially appointed to participate in FIFA’s annual congress, which was taking
place at the same time as the Olympic football tournament. One of them in particular, José Gervasio
Usera Bermudez, took a special interest in the discussions about the future FIFA World Cup. In
informal conversations with fellow Congress members, he tried to discern how a hypothetical
Uruguayan candidacy would be regarded in the worldwide football sphere25 and became convinced
of its viability. At the same time, government plans were underway in Montevideo for large-scale
patriotic festivities to commemorate the promulgation of the country’s 1830 First Constitution.26
Argentina’s centenary celebrations in 1916 had included a football tournament between Brazil,
Chile, Uruguay and Argentina, marking the beginnings of the modern Copa América. Similarly,
Brazil had celebrated its centenary in 1922 with a major sports competition.27 Given the success of
these events and the growing importance of football in Uruguay since the beginning of the
twentieth century, the country’s political powers were keen to organize a similar type of event for
1930, whether a Pan American athletics competition or a South American football cup (El Día,
10 February 1929). It was anticipated that generous government funding would be made available
for the event. Given this context, it is easy to see why Usera Bermudez thought his World Cup
candidacy idea born during the Amsterdam Congress, could find some fertile ground.
Back in Uruguay, Usera Bermudez worked on a draft bid in collaboration with his friend and
fellow Club National de Football (CNdF) member Roberto Espil. On 18 February 1929, the two men
presented their eight-page draft proposal28 to the executive committee of their home institution in
Montevideo. It was immediately approved and forwarded by the board of the prestigious club to the
AUF’s executive committee.29 On 26 February, following swift deliberations, the AUF’s superior
council accepted the proposal and adopted it.30 It was decided that the AUF would effectively
submit Montevideo’s application at the next FIFA congress. The core idea underpinning Usera
Bermudez and Espil’s draft proposal was that Uruguay could present an exceptionally strong case
for a successful bid. They believed, on the one hand, that fellow FIFA member nations would be
supportive of the country’s 1830 centenary and, on the other, that winning the last two Olympic
football tournaments would give them sufficient sporting leverage to claim the honour of hosting
the first international FIFA competition. Nevertheless, the project’s Achilles heel, that is its funding,
was also highlighted in the proposal. Usera Bermudez had become aware from his discussions with
fellow FIFA delegates at the Amsterdam congress that, although Uruguay, Chile and Argentina had
managed to fund their teams’ trips to play on the other side of the world (in the 1924 and 1928
Olympic championships), the majority of European nations would not be willing to do the same in
the case of a South American tournament.31 In order to be feasible, therefore, Montevideo’s bid
would need to ensure it could fund the travel costs of all invited national teams. Such a proposal
would require substantial economic backing, which only the State could provide. The AUF board
 SOCCER & SOCIETY 5

thus created a special pro-tournament committee in charge of seeking political and more especially
financial support from the public authorities.32
On 5 March 1929, Usera Bermudez wrote to his friend Buero in Europe to tell him about the
daring but far from ‘preposterous’ Uruguayan World Cup proposal.33 The optimism of his letter
deeply contrasted with the gloomy response it received from the Uruguayan diplomat on 26 ­
March.34 Buero expressed strong reservations about the proposal. His scepticism mainly concerned
the project’s feasibility. In his view, Uruguay was far from able to meet the conditions required to
host such an event. He pointed out, for example, that Montevideo lacked the sporting infrastructure
for a tournament of such magnitude (not to mention the spectators to fill them), that the AUF did
not have the financial capacity to cope with the project and that the deadline imposed by FIFA was
too short. The coolness of Buero’s response combined with the lack of any reference to the supposed
enthusiastic lakeside discussion with FIFA’s president on the matter in 1925 cast serious doubt on
the credibility of Rimet’s version. Buero drew his friend’s attention to the fact that covering the
expenses of each invited delegation would result in a bill of several hundred thousand pesos, a sum
far beyond AUF’s means. Usera Bermudez did not seem fazed by his friend’s reticence, however. In
his response,35 he tried to reassure the diplomat by explaining that these issues had already been
considered and that plans were in place for the municipality of Montevideo to construct a purpose-
built stadium and for the national government to provide the substantial funding needed to
organize the tournament. He maintained that the project had the country’s full support and that
Uruguay was ‘willing to outdo any bid’36 that threatened the success of Montevideo’s candidacy.

Building Montevideo’s candidacy

On 8 April, just 6 weeks after the AUF had decided to submit a bid to organize the World Cup, the
first public subsidy bill for the event was presented before parliament.37 Among the five signatories
of this first draft was Deputy Félix Polleri, the former president of Club Atlético Peñarol and more
importantly the head of the 1928 AUF delegation that had attended the Amsterdam congress. As
Morales pointed out,38 many political figures in Uruguay played a key role within Uruguayan
football institutions at the time, mainly for ideological and social background reasons. The strong
links that bound these two worlds together help explain why the AUF’s agenda was able to advance
so swiftly in public spheres. However, Uruguay was in the 1920 s – as it still is today – a functional
democracy.39 The subsidy bill generated some lively debates among its parliamentary members. In
total, half a million pesos were requested from the State to support Montevideo’s bid. Those sitting
in opposition to the governing party, the Partido Colorado, vigorously questioned the legitimacy of
such an enormous expenditure, which they claimed would be better spent on building ‘schools’ and
‘hospitals’.40 Although they acknowledged the importance of football both for the country and the
general population (especially after LaCeleste’s triumphs at Colombes and Amsterdam), the parlia­
mentary members were morally disquieted by the prospect of using public money to fund a non-
public event that would be charging entry fees. In order to find a compromise and to give guarantees
that this ‘patriotic’ tournament would be financially accessible to the working class, the project’s
sponsors added a special clause to the final draft stating that the ticket price for at least a third of the
Estadio Centenario’s total capacity would be capped at the modest price of 0.20 pesos. On 15 May,
hence two days before FIFA’s congress in Barcelona, the bill from Félix Polleri and his colleagues
was, after further parliamentary deliberations, finally approved by the chambers and ratified by
Uruguay’s executive power.41 The resulting Law no. 8409 of 16 May 1929 stipulated that the
treasury would allocate the AUF a 300,000 pesos grant to cover the costs of organizing the World
Cup plus a 200,000 pesos loan payable over 30 years (at zero percent interest rate) for the
construction of a new stadium in the capital.
The AUF’s executives had been well aware from the outset that FIFA had not yet set out an
economic model for the future tournament. They knew that their proposal would be subject to
rigorous scrutiny at the forthcoming congress and that they could not ‘go [to Spain] with flimsy
6 L. JALABERT D’AMADO

proposals and vague calculations’ (El Día, 29 March 1929). They had to present a strong economic
case for their proposal to be approved by Congress. While it had taken a little longer than they
initially expected, the ratification of Law no. 8409 prior to the congress was a considerable asset that
the Uruguayan delegates could use as their trump card during negotiations. However, the selection
of Montevideo as the host city for the first World Cup would still be subject to a vote by the FIFA
member nations, and the competition was looking tough. Several footballing powerhouses with
experience in hosting large-scale sports events had already announced they were keen to host the
tournament.42 In the run up to its 1929 annual congress, FIFA’s board received official applications
from Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. At the sight of this competition, Uruguay
carefully planned ahead and worked to gather as much support as possible.
One of the main problems relating to FIFA’s geographic eurocentricity was the absence of South
American delegates at its annual congresses. It was very expensive to send a few representatives
across the Atlantic just to take part in a two-day meeting, and most fledgling Latin American
federations either could not or would not pay out for it unless it was coupled with a major event like
the Olympic Games that ultimately justified the trip. The 1928 Amsterdam congress, held on the
sidelines of the Olympic tournament, was one of these occasions and the resulting unusual
attendance of South American delegates at the meetings had a direct impact on the decisions
taken. Without the presence of delegates from Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, Buero would
most probably not have secured the vice presidency, which he won by 13 votes to 10 over
Czechoslovakia’s delegate, Pelikan.43 The presence of the four founding nations of CONMEBOL
also helped raise again the question of the languages represented within FIFA. Spain had already
tried and failed to have Spanish recognized as an official FIFA language alongside English, French
and German, but it was decided at Amsterdam that each country would henceforth be able to take
part in discussions using their own language as long as they provided an interpreter translating into
one of the institution’s three official languages. The Amsterdam congress remained the exception
rather than the rule, however. If the timing of the FIFA congresses did not correspond with another
significant event, the delegate representation generally reverted to an exclusively European line-up,
as had been the case, for example, at FIFA’s 1927 congress in Helsinki, where, with the exception of
the USA, all of the 21 associations represented were from Europe.44
The vote on the host of the first World Cup was due to take place during the 1929 congress. The
possibility of another Helsinki-like representation greatly jeopardized Uruguay’s chances of
a successful bid, so, before they left for Spain, the Uruguayan football authorities sought the support
of their South American counterparts. The AUF sent one of its top executives Horacio Bacqué to the
Confederación Sudamericana congress in Buenos Aires on 26 March (El Día, 22 March 1929),
where he presented the Uruguayan proposal to the other South American member nations. He
reiterated Usera Bermudez and Espil’s arguments of ‘justice’ and ‘sympathy’ by citing Uruguay’s
sporting legitimacy as twice-defending Olympic champion and its upcoming centenary commem­
orations. The AUF executive also did his best to point out that their proposal should not be
regarded as merely Uruguayan but as truly South American. He stressed the fact that granting
the World Cup to South America would be a way for FIFA to acknowledge the advances the game
had made on the continent. As a result, the tiny republic’s proposal was met with great enthusiasm
and the full support of Bacqué’s fellow congress members, who officially approved it. More
importantly, they committed to sending a delegation to the forthcoming FIFA congress in Spain
to back up Uruguay’s bid in what would most probably be a tight ballot.45

The Barcelona Congress ‘Coup’

On 27 April 1929, Buero’s department sent him a dispatch to brief him ahead of the congress. He
was informed that the Uruguayan delegation would be headed by none less than Héctor
Rivadavia Gómez, a key footballing figure who had been the AUF’s president several times and
the brains behind the creation of CONMEBOL in 1916. Seen as CONMEBOL’s founding father,
 SOCCER & SOCIETY 7

he was thus the perfect person to consolidate South American efforts to secure the World Cup for
Montevideo. Despite the fact Law no. 8409 had not yet been voted on or ratified at the time of the
dispatch, the diplomatic message also informed Buero that, in relation to the negotiation rounds,
he could count on a public subsidy of 300,000 pesos.46 This anticipation shows the strong State
backing for the proposal and the absolute confidence the public authorities had in obtaining the
funds. By the time the Uruguayan delegates departed for Spain in late April 1929, they knew they
had two valuable assets that could help them win the bid, namely the promise of a substantial
public grant to insure the project’s economic viability and the assurance that they would be joined
in Spain by five other South American delegations who would do their best to promote
Montevideo’s candidacy.
The FIFA 1929 congress took place in Barcelona’s Casas Consistoriales on Friday 17 and
Saturday 18 May. One of the first items on the agenda was the question of an economic model
for the first World Cup. In the preliminary regulations that had been sent out to each national
association prior to the congress, article 17, which dealt with the budget, had merely stated
‘adjourned’.47 In the interim, however, FIFA’s World Cup special committee had come up with
a concrete proposal to create a common fund, which would be generated from the entry fees
revenue.48 To cover participants’ expenses, the fund would be redistributed in proportion to the
number of matches played and tickets sold by each national team. However, as Buero pointed out in
his post-congress report to his department, FIFA’s calculations were based on the case of
a European host.49 While most European teams would easily be able to recoup their travel costs
after only a couple of matches, the funds would certainly not cover the cost of transatlantic journeys.
As the AUF executives had anticipated, few federations were willing to risk funding a return trip
across the Atlantic for almost twenty men when there would be no means of compensating their
expenditure if the team was eliminated after its first match.
Buero wrote that ‘during the recess, the South American block, made up of the delegates from
Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Paraguay and Peru, agreed to scupper the committee’s proposal
as a preliminary step to the presentation of Uruguay’s candidacy’.50 The Uruguayan delegates took
to the floor to point out that this draft proposal ruled out de facto any South American candidacy
and that in order to be fair, the matter should be dealt with after the host country for the First World
Cup had been selected. The proposal was put to the vote. The Congress could either accept the draft
economic proposal formally forwarded by the French delegation51 or reject it and send it back for
discussion by the special committee. The key feature underlying this vote was yet again the question
of amateurism. On the one hand, by merely redistributing the match revenue, this draft proposal
would have been the closest the FIFA tournament would have come to amateurism. On the other,
the host country could cover all the expenditures on its own at sunk costs hoping the entry fees
would outstrip the expenses. The ballot took place later that day, and its results clearly show the rift
this question caused within FIFA. With 3 abstentions and only 8 votes from amateur countries
(including the Netherlands and Sweden), FIFA’s draft economic proposal was rejected by a majority
of 12, a contingent that was composed of the South American block and mainly professional nations
(including Spain, Italy, Hungary).52
This decision resulted in the withdrawal of the Swedish and Dutch bids and created a great
window of opportunity for Montevideo’s candidacy. Prior to the opening of the selection sessions,
the Latin American delegates spread the word that Uruguay would cover the full expense of the
tournament on very generous terms.53 Following instructions from Uruguay’s ministry of foreign
affairs, they disclosed during informal lobbying that the country would ‘provide first-class travel,
accommodation and subsistence costs for up to 20 players during their stay plus eight extra
days’and that the players would’receive compensation for loss of wages at the rate of two pesos
a day during the journey and four pesos a day during their stay in Montevideo’.54 This proposal
greatly contrasted with the special committee’s more measured draft proposal. The generosity of the
offer was well beyond anything expected by fellow FIFA member nations, especially considering the
8 L. JALABERT D’AMADO

context of the global economic downturn, which was to result in the Black Thursday stock market
crash a few months later.
Having prepared the ground, Uruguay was ready to present its candidacy. In order to optimize
its chances of success, however, the AUF delegates arranged for the bid to be presented by the
country’s much larger neighbour Argentina. This tactic had a double objective. First, it would
showcase the fact that the candidacy enjoyed the backing of one of the wealthiest countries on the
planet, which had moreover established itself in recent years as a football superpower. Second,
because Argentina’s delegate, Adrián Beccar Varela, from the Asociación Amateurs Argentina de
Fooball, did not speak any of the three FIFA official languages, he would give his speech in Spanish
(as allowed by the FIFA regulation introduced in 1928), and Buero, who was proficient in French,
would interpret for him.55 Hence, the FIFA congress members would not only hear the Uruguayan
proposal twice, once in Spanish and once in French, but it would come from the mouth of a FIFA
vice president and executive board member, thus increasing its aplomb. Beccar Varela summed up
the main argument supporting Montevideo’s bid: ‘1° the excellent results obtained by that country
in the two last Olympiads; 2° enormous development of football in South America and Uruguay; 3°
celebration of the centenarian of Uruguay’s political independence in 1930; 4° in charging Uruguay
with the organization all the South American Associations would feel honoured’.56
Following the South American delegates’ intervention, Hungary also withdrew its bid.
According to Buero’s report,57 the Hungarians had met with the rest of the Central European
footballing nations58 prior to the opening of the Barcelona congress and had probably reached
a deal with the Italians not to compete with one another. The Italian delegate, Mauro, took to the
floor to respond to Beccar Varela’s speech. He warmly acknowledged the strong relations his
country had with both Uruguay and Argentina, which were home to millions of Italian immigrants,
and declared, to the great surprise of FIFA’s board, that he had therefore decided to withdraw Italy’s
candidacy.59 While, on the face of it, the friendship argument seems sufficient explanation of the
Italian turnaround, the reality appears to have been more complex. Buero’s report mentions a ‘deal’
reached with the Italian delegates in the vestibule during the session, although it gives no clues as to
its content. Furthermore, during the previous vote regarding the tournament’s economic model,
Italy had voted against the French federation’s low-cost option. It is therefore reasonable to suppose
that their bid was solid enough for them to believe that the Federazione Giuoco Calcio would be
able to cover the organizational costs. However, it was probably not in a position to match the
generous terms of the Uruguayan bid, which had been disclosed in the foyers prior to the session,
especially given Uruguay had the security of State funding, backed by an already ratified law.60 The
openly hostile attitude adopted by the Federazione towards the Montevideo tournament in the
following months suggests Italy was not at all pleased at being outdone and having to announce its
withdrawal.61
Italy’s withdrawal was closely followed by Spain’s. The candidacy of the congress’s host nation
had appeared solid. A few weeks prior to the opening of the FIFA annual congress, which had
initially been planned for Madrid, the Real Federación Española de Fútbol had sent out letters
announcing that the congress would be held in Barcelona. The Catalan capital was hosting the
World Fair that year, which was scheduled to start on 20 May, two days after the close of FIFA’s
congress. The change in venue was meant to give congress members the opportunity to visit the
Expo and its many installations. At a symbolic level, it was a way of showcasing to the FIFA
delegates that the country was not only willing but also ready to host a global event. Conveniently,
the main themes of the fair were the arts, industry and sport, so the city had built an impressive
stadium on the hills of Montjuïc. This Estadi Olímpic, whose 60,000 capacity made it
Europe’s second largest stadium after London’s Wembley Stadium, was an impressive sight for
the FIFA congress members. However, the Real Federación Española de Fútbol’s eagerness to host
the first World Cup was thwarted by Latin American machinations. A few days before the congress
opened, the Uruguayan ambassador to Spain had requested an audience with the president of
Spain’s council of ministers and its prime minister and dictator since 1923, Miguel Primo de Rivera
 SOCCER & SOCIETY 9

(El Día, 17 May 1929). During their meeting, the Uruguayan diplomat explained the importance of
the World Cup project for his country’s centenary commemorations and urged Primo de Rivera, in
an act of friendship towards its former dominion, to postpone his country’s candidacy to the next
tournament. The request met with sympathy from the Spanish leader, with the result that the Real
Federación Española de Fútbol delegates begrudgingly announced during the session that Spain was
prepared to withdraw its bid in favour of Uruguay but with the proviso that in the event that
Uruguay ‘should not be accepted, Spain would present itself’.62 Unfortunately for the Spanish bid,
there was no longer any obstacle in the way of Uruguay hosting the event. At that point in the
discussions, Chile’s representative requested that the session be brought to a vote by acclamation.
However, the FIFA president, Jules Rimet, who was chairing the discussions, observed that there
was no longer any need for a vote (El Sol, 18 May 1929). Uruguay’s bid was the last one in the
running, and as such the country was de facto appointed the host of the first World Cup. Closing the
session, Rimet called for an ovation to congratulate Uruguay and wish them the best of success as
the first World Cup hosts.

Conclusion
The round of applause that resonated around the halls of Barcelona’s Casas Consistoriales proved to
be at the root of many subsequent misinterpretations starting with FIFA secretary general’s choice
of word (i.e. ‘agreed unanimously’) for the minutes of the congress. The applause also led the
Uruguayans and their Latin American allies to believe that the battle was over and that victory had
been achieved. It became clear over the months that followed, however, that the setbacks were only
just beginning. Once the technical details had been agreed with FIFA, the AUF sent out its official
invitations to the tournament. The deadline for registration was fixed at 1 January 1930, but despite
the apparent unanimity expressed in Barcelona, not one European nation had positively responded
to the call by the end of 1929. Concerned by the prospect of mass European absenteeism, the AUF
and FIFA reached out to the countries in question to point out that the whole international football
community had made a commitment towards Uruguay when it had designated its capital as the
host city at the last congress.63 It seems the nature of this commitment was clearly a matter of
perspective though. The Swiss Football Association, for example, was quick to remind their
Uruguayan counterpart that they had not actually voted for their candidacy in Barcelona but had
merely congratulated them on their selection and that they therefore could hardly be reproached for
a lack of commitment.64 It is important to stress here that the decision in Barcelona was not based
on the ballot that FIFA had planned. In its relentless efforts to secure the hosting of the first World
Cup, Uruguay had managed to eliminate the competition before any vote could take place. It had
done so by (i) understanding the stakes of the economic model to be adopted and bringing to the
negotiations a State-backed proposal no other country could hope to match, (ii) making clever use
of the official channels the State had made available to them (especially the diplomatic service) to
advance AUF’s agenda and bypass opposing football federation proposals and (iii) rallying their
continental neighbours to their cause to effectively act as a pro-Uruguay lobby during the congress.
To a certain extent, the Barcelona congress was, mutatis mutandis, the political re-enactment of
the Colombes tournament in 1924. As the French press and Jules Rimet himself admitted during the
Olympic Games, no one had really known who the Uruguayans were and what they were capable of
on a football pitch. The press had depicted La Celeste as the unknown underdog and were
astonished when the team started knocking out one opponent after the next (Le Figaro,
10 June 1924). However, Europe’s football leaders did not share the enthusiasm shown by Paris’s
crowds as they wholeheartedly cheered them on during the tournament or by C.A.W. Hirschman,
who wrote in his 1924–25 annual FIFA report that ‘There is no doubt, that also from an interna­
tional point of view hardly a better winner could have been wished, as it will draw the attention of
football lovers to another part of the world, which had not yet come sufficiently to the front’.65 As
Buero noted in his post-tournament report to the Uruguayan minister of foreign affairs, the team’s
10 L. JALABERT D’AMADO

‘enormous technical superiority [. . .] has caused great astonishment and dismay in the European
sporting world [which is] unable to admit that they totally ignore anything outside its own borders
and why they perfidiously insinuate that the Uruguayan “revelation” should be attributed to the fact
that its players are professionals’.66
Uruguay had come to the 1924 party through the back door and had snatched the trophy right
from under Europe’s nose. They did exactly the same again at the 1929 FIFA congress. Prior to the
meeting, all indicators suggested that the first World Cup would be held in Europe. The special
committee’s preliminary work was based on the assumption of a European host. Five experienced
European associations had forwarded their candidacies, some with both the experience and the
infrastructure to host such an event. Even Jules Rimet had said in an interview hours before the
congress opened that he did not think ’the World Cup will be held outside of Europe’ (El Día,
17 May 1929). Yet, the Europeans had come to Barcelona split around five candidacies and still
divided on the perennial question of amateurism. Uruguay, on the contrary, had anticipated the
main hurdles it would have to overcome if its bid was to be successful. The AUF had sought and
obtained full support not just from the State to rule out any financial objections but also from the
whole South American continent. The European footballing nations had effectively been taken by
surprise. They were faced with a Latin American fait accompli and had difficulty accepting
Montevideo’s selection as a result. While the AUF’s scheming had managed to secure the bid’s
success, it was also ultimately at the root of the tournament’s downside. Europe’s decided reluctance
regarding the Uruguayan proposal was to dramatically resurface when the time came to register.
Despite the host country’s financial provisions and an extension of the registration deadlines, the
European football nations were putting forward various pretexts not to go to Montevideo. It was
only when the South American nations, led by Argentina, decided to take the European absence as
a personal insult and threatened that if no European teams showed up in Montevideo, they would
break off from FIFA and create an independent Pan American football federation that the World
Cup project was ultimately saved by the last-minute registrations of Belgium, France, Romania and
Yugoslavia. Although the tournament ultimately went ahead and was successful, the Barcelona
congress and its immediate aftermath created a lasting rift at an international governance level in
football. The following two decades would be marked by conflict within FIFA between the
European associations and their Latin American counterparts, with the former attempting to
maintain control over global football (and ensuring there was no repeat of the Barcelona congress)
and the latter advocating for a decentralization of the institution and wondering whether they
should leave FIFA altogether.67

Notes
1. The signatories of the foundation deed were as follows: Union des Sociétés Françaises de Sports Athlétiques
(France), Union Belge des Sociétés de Sports (Belgium), Dansk Boldspil Union (Denmark), Nederlandsche
Voetbal Bond (Netherlands), Madrid Football Club (Spain), Svenska Bollspells Förbundet (Sweden) and
Association Suisse de Football (Switzerland).
2. Vonnard and Quin, ‘Did South America foster European football?’.
3. This is explained by the absence of most of Africa and Asia during this period. Both continents were still
mainly under colonial rule at the time, so their football institutions were usually affiliated to the colonizer’s
football association rather than FIFA.
4. The Uruguayan federation’s initial international commitment was to the English Football Association, which
it joined in 1911. FIFA sent a formal invitation to the Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol (AUF) in 1913, but
effective registration did not take place until a decade latter (document: AUF, ‘Memorias y balance 1913ʹ,
Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo).
5. The founding members of CONMEBOL are Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.
6. Morales, Fútbol, identidad y poder, 117.
7. Quin, ‘The International Cup. 1927–1938ʹ.
8. See bibliography.
9. Wahl, Histoire de la Coupe du monde de football, 23.
 SOCCER & SOCIETY 11

10. Rimet, L’histoire merveilleuse de la Coupe du monde.

11. This is the Uruguay national team’s nickname. It means ‘The Sky-Blues’ in English and derives from the
colour of their shirts.
12. Dietschy, ‘Did a “Europe of football” exist in the 1930s?’.
13. The AUF was founded in Montevideo in March 1900.
14. Rimet, L’histoire merveilleuse de la Coupe du monde, 25.
15. This idea of unanimity was taken up, for example, in FIFA’s official centenary publication (Eisenberg,
Lanfranchi, Mason and Wahl, FIFA 1904–2004, 106) as well as in Dietschy, Histoire du Football, 165 and
Dietschy, Mourlane and Gastaut, Histoire Politique des Coupes du monde, 38. Similarly, Barbara Keys stated
that Uruguay was ‘chosen’ by Jules Rimet to host the 1930 World Cup in order to steer FIFA towards
globalization (Keys, Globalizing Sport, 61). Vonnard and Quin believed Uruguay was selected through an
actual vote (Vonnard and Quin, ‘Did South America foster European football?’).
16. Vonnard and Quin, ‘Did South America foster European football?’.
17. Morales, ‘Batllismo y Fútbol’.
18. The fact that the book contains copies of correspondence rather than the usual memoire-type testimony made
it especially suited to an efficient information cross-check. Indeed, many of the original missives published in
the book were found to fully match those found in both the AUF’s and the Uruguayan Ministerio de
Relaciones Exteriores’s archives in Montevideo.
19. For more details see Carpentier, ‘Le conflit entre le C.I.O. et la F.I.F.A.’.
20. Quin, ‘The International Cup. 1927–1938ʹ.
21. (Document) Fédération Internationale de Football Association, minutes of the 16th annual congress, held in
Helsingfors on June 3–5, 1927, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
22. Quin, ‘The International Cup. 1927–1938ʹ.
23. (Document) British Olympic journal, June 1929.
24. (Document) FIFA, minutes of the 17th annual congress, held in Amsterdam (Militiezaal) on May 25 & 26,
1928, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
25. (Document) J.G. Usera Bermúdez, R. Espil, ‘Proyecto para un Campeonato del Mundo en Montevideo’,
Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
26. For many at that time (especially the ruling political party), the commemoration of the promulgation of the
First Constitution on 18 July 1830 was to be regarded as the true centenary over the country’s traditional
Independence Day of 25 August 1825. For a better understanding of this anniversary controversy, see Demasi,
La Lucha por el Pasado.
27. Malaia Santos and Andrade de Melo, 1922: celebrações esportivas do centenário.
28. We would like to warmly thank Juan Capelán, former curator of Montevideo’s football museum, for giving us
access to this invaluable document.
29. (Document) Letter from Don Melitón Romero, CNdF president, to Raúl Jude, president of the AUF,
Montevideo, 19 February 1929, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
30. (Document) AUF, memorandum of 26 February 1929, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol,
Montevideo.
31. (Document) J.G. Usera Bermúdez, R. Espil, ‘Proyecto para un Campeonato del Mundo en Montevideo’,
Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
32. (Document) AUF, memorandum of 26 February 1929, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol,
Montevideo.
33. Buero, Negociaciones, 58.
34. Ibid., 59.
35. Ibid.
36. Unless otherwise indicated, this and all subsequent quotations from non-English sources have been translated
into English.
37. (Document) Diario de Sesiones de la Honourable Cámara de Representantes, 20.a Sesión Ordinaria, volume
351, 1929, Archivo Legislativo, Montevideo.
38. Morales, Fútbol, identidad y poder.
39. Vanger, El país modelo: José Batlle y Ordóñez, 1907–1915.
40. (Document) Diario de Sesiones de la Honourable Cámara de Representantes, 38.a Sesión Ordinaria, volume
352, 1929, Archivo Legislativo, Montevideo.
41. Armando Ugón,Compilación de Leyes y Decretos, Ley no 8409, Montevideo, 1929.
42. The Netherlands had successfully organized the 1928 Olympics, while Italy and Hungary had acquired some
experience in hosting large-scale international events through the Mitropa and International Cups. In
addition, Spain had the advantage of a new sporting infrastructure, built for the 1929 Expo.
43. (Document) FIFA, minutes of the 17th annual congress, held in Amsterdam (Militiezaal) on May 25 & 26,
1928, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
12 L. JALABERT D’AMADO

44. (Document) FIFA, minutes of the 16th annual congress, held in Helsingfors on June 3–5, 1927, Archivo de la
Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
45. (Document) Letter from Sylvio W. Netto Machado, secretary of the Confederação Brasileira de Desportos, to
the president of the Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Rio de Janeiro, 24 April 1929, Archivo de la Asociación
Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
46. (Document) Dispatch from the Uruguayan foreign ministry to Enrique Buero, 27 April 1929, Archivo de la
Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
47. (Document) FIFA, appendix no 2 to the agenda of the congress to be held in Barcelona on May 17 and 18 (and
if necessary 19), 1929, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
48. Ibid.
49. (Document) Enrique Buero’s letter to Raúl Jude, president of the AUF, dated 22 May 1929, Archivo de la
Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
50. Ibid.
51. FIFA, appendix no 2 to the agenda of the congress to be held in Barcelona on May 17 and 18 (and if necessary
19), 1929, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
52. (Document) FIFA, minutes of the 17th annual congress, held in Amsterdam (Militiezaal) on May 25 and 26,
1928, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
53. (Document) Enrique Buero’s letter to Raúl Jude, president of the AUF, dated 22 May 1929, Archivo de la
Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
54. Buero, Negociaciones, 61.
55. (Document) Enrique Buero’s letter to Raúl Jude, president of the AUF, dated 22 May 1929, Archivo de la
Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
56. (Document) FIFA, minutes of the 18th annual congress, held in Barcelona on May 17 and 18, 1929, FIFA
Archives.
57. Ibid.
58. Austria, Hungary, Italy and Czechoslovakia.
59. (Document) Enrique Buero’s letter to Raúl Jude, president of the AUF, dated 22 May 1929, Archivo de la
Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
60. Prior to the Barcelona congress, Italy had informed FIFA that it intended to restrict its candidacy to the
procurement of 30% of the overall competition winnings (Wahl, Histoire de la Coupe du monde de football,
20). Given the largesse of the competing Uruguayan bid, this would hardly have found any favour within
FIFA.
61. A detailed analysis of the Italian footballing archives and of the internal correspondence in particular would be
required to fully clarify this point.
62. (Document) FIFA, minutes of the 18th annual congress, held in Barcelona on May 17 and 18, 1929, FIFA
Archives.
63. Buero, Negociaciones, 117.
64. (Document) Letter from Rufino T. Dominguez, minister of foreign affairs, to Raúl Jude, president of the AUF,
Montevideo, 18 February 1930, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
65. (Document) FIFA, secretary’s report, 1924–1925, Archivo de la Asociación Uruguaya de Fútbol, Montevideo.
66. Buero, Negociaciones, 24
67. Vonnard and Quin, ‘Did South America foster European football?’.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest is reported by the author.

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