Public Perceptions Towards COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps

In times of crisis: Public perceptions towards COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps
in China, Germany and the US
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Genia Kostka and Sabrina Habich-Sobiegalla
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Abstract
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The adoption of COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps (CTA) has been proposed as an important
measure to contain the spread of COVID-19. Surveys that compare public perceptions of CTAs,
especially in different types of political regimes, remain limited. Based on a cross-national
dataset with 6,464 respondents from China (n=2,201), Germany (n=2,083), and the United
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States (n=2,180), this paper analyzes public perceptions towards CTAs and the factors that drive
CTA acceptance in these three countries. Results indicate that public acceptance is highest
among Chinese respondents where almost 60 percent strongly accept the use of CTAs to contain
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COVID-19. This stands in contrast to Germany and the United States, where fewer than 20
percent strongly accept its use. Despite these stark differences in cross-country acceptance rates,
our study shows that the factors influencing these rates are similar in all three countries
irrespective of the type of political regime. Health concerns during the pandemic and the fear
of a second wave of infections seem to have a positive impact on levels of CTA acceptance in
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the three countries. Other strong predictors of CTA acceptance in all three countries appear to
be the perceived effectiveness of these apps and other measures taken to contain COVID-19,
previous use of other health apps as well as levels of trust in the state which all show positive
effects. While levels of trust cannot be influenced through straightforward measures, short term
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acceptance rates could be increased by highlighting CTAs’ performance outcomes to users.
Keywords: COVID-19, contact tracing apps, acceptance, public perception

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This preprint research paper has not been peer reviewed. Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3693783
1. Introduction
Digital contact tracing apps (CTAs) have been proposed as a measure to limit the spread of
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COVID-19. Compared to manual contact tracing, which involves human contact tracers
identifying, locating and isolating individuals who have come into contacted with infected
persons; digital contact tracing uses smartphone apps to identify and notify individuals (Cho et
al. 2020; Ferretti et al. 2020).
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As of September 2020, a total of 47 CTAs in 46 different countries have been documented by
MIT Technology Review’s database on CTAs (Howell et al., 2020). While most of these apps
use Bluetooth proximity tracing, they differ in the location where data is stored with about half
of them using a centralized and the other half a decentralized system. In the centralized system,
the anonymized data gathered (including a person’s ID and all key codes received by the phone)
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is uploaded to a central server where matches are made with other contacts and from where
individuals who have come into close contact with infected people are notified. By contrast, in
the decentralized system only the anonymized ID of a person that has self-reported its infection
to the app is uploaded to a central database. Recent interaction data stays on the phone, which
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downloads information from the central database regularly. Contact matching is also done
locally on users’ phones (Criddle and Kelion, 2020; Fraser et al., 2020; Servick, 2020).
Despite the widespread introduction of CTAs, uptake by smartphone users has been limited.
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Highest download rates have been noted in Iceland where almost 40 percent of the population
had installed Rakning C-19, the local CTA, within the first month of its release (Hamilton 2020).
Despite a similar release date, and a survey showing that Singaporeans are less concerned about
data privacy during the pandemic, by April 2020, only 20 percent of Singaporeans had installed
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Singapore’s CTA TraceTogether (Volk 2020). This is in line with download rates in other
countries where by July 2020 the highest uptake rate of 20 percent was observed in Australia
and only 14 percent of users in Germany had installed the app (Statista 2020). Volk argues
rather than being related to users’ data privacy concerns, the limited uptake is caused by a social
dilemma. The latter refers to a situation in which widespread cooperation would benefit the
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collective, and individuals are incentivized to free ride on the cooperation of others (Volk 2020).
Research on social cooperation has shown that cooperation functions through reciprocity rather
than altruism, and that the majority of people are conditional cooperators that only pay taxes or
protect the environment, if they believe that others are doing the same (Axelrod 1984; Thöni
and Volk 2018). As of now, research has not explored to what extent people cooperate during
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a global health pandemic, and which factors influence their cooperation.

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Studies of public perceptions of CTAs remain limited as well. To our knowledge, as of now,
no large academic survey has been conducted on public attitudes towards CTAs in China in
spite of the extensive attention and heated discussion in domestic and international media
(Global Times, 2020; Huang, 2020; Mozur et al., 2020; Horwitz and Goh, 2020). For Germany
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and the United States, a range of on- and offline surveys have inquired about attitudes towards
CTAs (e.g., Abeler et al., 2020a; Abeler et al., 2020b; BR24, 2020; Hase Post, 2020; Kaptchuk
et al. 2020; Hargittai and Redmiles, 2020; Simko et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2020). However,
these studies exclusively focus on Western democracies. Not only do China, the United States
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and Germany represent different kinds of political systems with different data privacy laws and
related public perceptions, but also do these three countries expose different trajectories of the
pandemic. Undertaking a comparison of public perceptions of CTAs in the three countries thus
allows us to reveal how liberal and illiberal regime types feature in these perceptions and to
what degree different intensities of the pandemic determine acceptance rates.
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Given the continued spread of COVID-19 and the onset of what has been referred to as the
second wave of infections in a number of countries (Sly et al., 2020; Triggle, 2020), research
on public perceptions and acceptance of CTAs is becoming ever more relevant for policymakers.
At the same time, comparative research on the acceptance of digital tracing technology during
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a global pandemic provides a unique opportunity to study the factors that contribute to the
acceptance or rejection of tracing technologies in times of crisis and in different political
regimes. To fill this knowledge gap, between June 5, 2020 and June 19, 2020, we conducted a
cross-national online survey of Chinese (N=2,201), Germans (N=2,083) and Americans
(N=2,180). In our analysis of the survey results, we have developed five models that examine
individual attitudes toward CTAs in China, the US and Germany. Our models account for
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people’s experience with CTAs, health and financial concerns, perception of the pandemic,
social context and political believes, and sociodemographic factors.
The findings contribute to existing research in numerous ways. First, while there are a few
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cross-national surveys focusing on public attitudes of CTAs (e.g., Altmann et al. 2020), they
have focused on industrialized Western democracies, but have so far neglected both Asia and
different types of political regimes. Our unique dataset, with a total of 6,464 respondents
enables us to compare rates of acceptance between different user groups across countries.
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Secondly, as we are particularly interested in the effect that crisis perceptions have on CTA
acceptance, we introduce the expectation of a second wave of infections and a regional risk
factor as additional variables. Further, we introduce measures on the kind of actors that people
consider having the capacity and the responsibility to handle the crisis. This allows us to provide
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a more nuanced understanding of people’s socio-political belief systems. The remainder of this
paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review the current literature on public
perceptions of CTAs. This is followed by our research hypotheses and theoretical framework
presented in Section 3. Section 4 provides a detailed elaboration of our methodology. In Section
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5, our results are presented and discussed. This is followed by a conclusion in Section 6.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Global adoption
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Many countries have recently adopted COVID-19 tracing apps to combat the global spread of
COVID-19. The apps aim to identify the contacts of infected persons, isolate those affected and
break infection chains (Max-Planck-Institute, 2020). Internationally or regionally, no universal
approach has been taken, leaving it up to national decision-makers to decide if and what type
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of digital tracing they would adopt to contain the spread of COVID-19. National preferences
differed vastly, including choices in terms of app design, data privacy and storage, involvement
of private companies and research institutes in the development, and speed of adoption. For
instance, most European countries opted for higher privacy-preserving CTAs with Bluetooth
technology, like Austria, France and Germany (HealthWorld, 2020; Privacy-ticker, 2020).
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Other countries opted for more centralized approaches, including China, South Korea,
Singapore, and Israel (Zastrow, 2020). In the US, as of now, only individual states have so far
adopted CTAs which all rely on Bluetooth technology. The choices by governments in China,
Germany and the US illustrate how COVID-19 tracing apps differ.
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In February 2020, China was the first to roll out the so-called “health code”– a tracing app used
nationwide to control people’s movements and curb the spread of COVID-19. Jointly developed
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by internet giants Alibaba and Tencent, users could register with the app through Alipay,
WeChat or QQ with a phone number, full name and ID number. After registration, the health
code used self-reported travel histories or any suspect symptoms and automatically collected
travel and medical data to assign users a red, yellow or green QR code. Whereas a green code
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gave users unhindered access to public spaces, a yellow code indicated that the person might
have come into contact with a person with COVID-19 infection and therefore has to be confined
to their homes or an isolation facility. Finally, a red code was assigned to users infected with
the virus (Chen, 2020; Horwitz and Goh, 2020). Despite of its nationwide application, the
algorithms used by the health code varied regionally, and citizens from Hubei – the epicenter
of the outbreak in China – with a green code were not necessarily allowed to enter other
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provinces (Gan & Culver, 2020; Jao, 2020; Mozur et al, 2020). Being aware of these practical
challenges, since April 2020 the central government accelerated the nationwide standardization
of data sets and algorithms (Xinhua Net, 2020a). Due to the health code collecting a wide range
of information, including personal information, location, travel history, recent contacts and
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health status, data privacy concerns have been raised by Chinese users (Du, 2020). Again,
China’s bureaucracy quickly responded to these concerns with a Notice of Effectively
Protecting Personal Information and Using Big Data to Support Joint Prevention and Control
issued by the Cyberspace Administration of China in February 2020. The notice stipulates that
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all personal information collected for disease control should only be used for that express
purpose (Xinhua Net, 2020b).
By contrast, Germany launched the so-called “Corona-Warn-App” much later on June 16th,
2020 after a long-drawn discussion about data privacy issues and the related design of the app.
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Jointly developed by Deutsche Telekom and SAP, the app has been published by the Robert
Koch-Institut (RKI), Germany’s central institute for public health, and can be downloaded for
iOS and Android systems voluntarily (The Official Website of Berlin, 2020; DW, 2020; Schepp,
2020). The app uses Bluetooth technology to track the distance and length of interpersonal
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encounters between people that carry a mobile phone with the app installed. Once such an
interpersonal encounter matches previously set criteria of length and proximity, the mobile
phones exchange Bluetooth-IDs (i.e., random and anonymized codes) which are then stored on
the phones engaged in the encounter. Once a person has been tested positive with the virus, the
person may report that information to the app. Subsequently, all users of the app receive the
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Bluetooth-ID of the infected person, and the app checks whether other users have been in close
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contact with the infected. This verification process only takes place locally on people’s phones
and does not give away information about personal identities or locations (Die Bundesregierung,
2020). Thus, compared to China’s health code app, the German app is putting much more
emphasis on data privacy and protection. By August 2020, the app has been downloaded 17.5
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million times (Robert Koch Institute, 2020).

In the US, no national top-down approach was taken by the central government. Instead,
developers pitched their apps directly to state and local governments (Fox Business, 2020;
Johnson, 2020). With the help of Apple and Google, states like Alabama, South Carolina, Utah,
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South Dakota, and North Dakota adopted a COVID-19 exposure notification app (Johnson,
2020; ABC News, 2020). Similar to Germany, the app relies on Bluetooth signal exchanges
and users who voluntarily mark themselves as having been diagnosed as COVID-19 positive.
Similarly, the app notifies users once they have been in close contact with infected persons for
at least five minutes. The app does not collect personal identification information, nor does it
upload information about personal encounters to a central server (Guynn, 2020; Kreps, Zhang
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& McMurry, 2020).
2. 2 Public attitudes of CTAs
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While a lot of resources and efforts were put into the development of COVID-19 tracing apps,
little is known with regards to users’ preferences. A small number of single country surveys
provide some first insight into how Chinese, Germans and Americans perceive these apps.
For China, no large academic survey has been conducted so far on public attitudes towards
contract tracing apps in spite of the extensive attention and heated discussion domestically and
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internationally. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that as authorities have made the health
codes compulsory, most people quickly embraced the system and it got much praise on the
microblogging platform Weibo for helping users navigate amid the outbreak (Jao, 2020).
However, due to the speedy implementation, various complaints emerged over time, including
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mistaken color codes, potential discrimination, privacy violation, and data security concerns
(Feng, 2020; Gan and Culver, 2020; Ye, 2020 et al.). Unclarity also persisted regarding the
criteria for assignments of particular color codes (Mozur et al., 2020). Further criticism
concerned the app’s reliance on self-reported information, which was seen as being too easy to
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circumvent by users who might choose not to report information honestly (Guo, 2020). Privacy
concerns also increased when the city government of Hangzhou announced to “normalize” the
health code practice by transforming the health code into a permanent health index app (Du,
2020; Ye, 2020). In a poll with 6,000 users on Weibo, 86% voted against the proposal. Faced
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with a barrage of questions and criticism, Hangzhou’s government refrained from the proposed
initiative (Zhang, 2020). The discussion illustrates that public opinion in China can at times be
critical, and further research is needed to better understand citizens’ concerns and preferences.
In Germany, numerous surveys look at public opinion towards the COVID-19 tracing app, but
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findings vary across different surveys and across time. Generally, the majority of opinion polls
report acceptance rates between 40% or 60% and attitudes seem to take a U shape with either
strong acceptance or strong disapproval.1 According to a YouGov online survey with 2,258
Germans conducted in late March 2020, 43% of the respondents were either willing or would
consider to install the app on their smartphones (Suhr, 2020). A very similar result was reported
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by ARD-Deutschland Trend in June 2020 showing that 42% respondents would use the official
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Corona-Warn-App, while 39% said they would not use it (ARD-Deutschland Trend, 2020).
Another online poll conducted in April 2020 showed slightly higher acceptance rates with more
than half of respondents (56%) in Germany saying they would voluntarily use a COVID19-
tracing app (BR24, 2020). Highest acceptance rates were reported by a survey of researchers
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from Oxford and Mannheim conducted among 1033 respondents in March and April 2020,
almost 75% of whom reported to probably or definitely download the app (Abeler et al., 2020b)
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One exception here is a cross-country survey by Altmann et al. (2020), which found a much higher rate, where
about 70% German respondents would “definitely or probably install the app”. The same study shows that this
high app acceptance rate in Germany was still lower compared to the answers in UK, France and Italy (Altmann
et al., 2020).
When looking at the survey results for Germany, the timing of conducting the survey seems
critical but it is unclear if public support increased or decreased over time. On the day of official
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release of the CTA in Germany (June 16th, 2020), YouGov conducted a follow-up survey with
1,242 respondents drawn from the same group questioned previously. On that day only 33% of
respondents answered that they were very or rather likely to use the app, while 42% reported
the opposite. Another German pollster also reported a drop in peoples’ willingness to download
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the app (from 47% in April to 42% in June 2020) (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen, 2020). This
stands in contrast to an online survey by Forsa, which observes an increase in the support rate
over time: in April only 36% respondents said they would download the app, which increased
to 59% respondents in mid-June 2020 (Hase Post, 2020). These fluctuations leave open the
important questions as to why people would use or reject the use of the app.
For the US, current studies on public perceptions of COVID-19 tracing apps show mixed
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attitudes. Some studies suggest that here is a widespread and majority support for CTAs among
respondents (Altmann et al., 2020; Hargittai and Redmiles, 2020; Simko et al, 2020); while
some other studies show that quite a large share of Americans are not willing to use the app
(Timberg, Harwell and Safarpour, 2020; Zhang et al, 2020). A large online cross-country survey
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finds that 68% of respondents in the US would definitely or probably install the app (Altmann
et al., 2020). Similarly, a survey with 2003 respondents shows that nearly half of the
respondents’ opinion (47%) about the government would improve if such an app would be
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introduced (Abeler et al., 2020a). A Washington Post-University of Maryland poll finds that
among Americans who do have smartphones, 50% would use such an app (Timberg, Harwell
and Safarpour, 2020). Zhang et al. (2020) find that just over 30% of respondents support CTAs,
which is lower than their support for expanding traditional contact tracing methods or
introducing new measures like temperature checks and centralized quarantine. However, the
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study finds that including privacy-preserving features such as non-location-tracking Bluetooth

technology or decentralized data storage would increase the acceptance of contact tracing apps.
The surveys in the US also show that attitudes are U-shaped and tightly linked with privacy
concerns, albeit the strength of these concerns is unclear, particularly in times of crisis. One
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online survey found that 72% of participants would be at least somewhat likely to download a
CTA if data was “protected perfectly” (Simko et al, 2020). Another survey in April 2020 found
that two thirds of Americans were willing to install an app that would help slow the spread of
the virus and reduce the lockdown period, even if that app would collect information about their
location data and health status (Hargittai and Redmiles, 2020).
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In summary, the few current surveys focus mainly on the US and European countries, excluding
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Asian countries like China, South Korea and Singapore, who were among the first to implement
CTAs in anti-pandemic work. Generally, looking at China, Germany, and US, current single
country studies on acceptance levels towards CTAs show general support for the apps as they
are considered to play a critical role in avoiding or leaving lockdown. These studies point to
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international differences in public opinion and offer a good starting point to derive hypotheses
for factors that explain cross-country variation in acceptance levels. The next section looks at
possible explanatory factors, including socio-demographic factors, personal risks, perceptions
about the COVID-19 pandemic, experiences with CTAs, and socio-political beliefs and context.
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2. 3. Socio-demographic factors
Findings from existing research are often inconclusive about how individual socio-
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demographic characteristics affect people’s technology acceptance as prior factors. A
qualitative study consisting of five focus groups with 22 participants carried out in May 2020
in the UK finds no patterns that relate to differences in demographics (Williams et al., 2020).
In terms of age, results are very mixed across surveys and regions. A number of surveys looking
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at the US find that people who are younger to be more likely or more willing to install COVID-
19 CTAs (Abeler et al. 2020a; Hargittai and Redmiles, 2020). These findings might be
explained by lower rates of smartphone ownership among older age groups in the US, with just
53% owning a smartphone in the group aged 65 or older (Timberg et al. 2020). Similarly,
Altmann et al. (2020) report in their cross-nation survey that respondents aged 18 to 50 are
more likely to install CTAs than respondents aged 50 and beyond, although the difference is
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not significant.
A Pew research center survey in 2020 in the US, on the other hand, finds that those over 30
years are more accepting of CTAs (Pew Research Center, 2020). A recent study in Germany
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finds that adoption rates for CTAs are slightly higher among younger respondents and those of
50 years and older, compared to respondents between 25 and 49 years of age (Buder et al.,
2020). Another German online survey suggests that people aged 65 and older are particularly
open to the use of CTAs: two thirds of them (66%) would install the, in contrast to 49% of
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people aged 30 to 39, and 51% of people aged 18 to 29 (BR24, 2020).
In terms of gender, one cross-country survey shows that gender difference in the intention to
install CTAs is not significant in the UK, Germany, Italy, France and the US (Altmann et al.,
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2020). Another survey in the US finds that female respondents are less likely to show
willingness to install CTAs due to privacy risks (Kaptschuk et al., 2020). Very few studies have
so far looked at education levels, except for a Pew research center survey, which revealed that
acceptance is higher among the better educated (Pew Research Center, 2020). Existing studies
have also not included income levels or the size of the city where respondents reside as
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explanatory factors. With higher income, people might have more time or access to information
about CTAs, which possibly could result in more acceptance. Those living in a larger city are
likelier to come into contact with a higher number of people, which might cause them to see
greater value in using a tracing app.
Based on these studies and assumptions, we derive the first set of hypotheses on socio-
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demographic factors for our study: H1.1 -H.1.5 (see Table 1).
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2. 4. Personal health or financial risks

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Individual risks – health-related or financial - can further influence acceptance levels. Two
surveys in the US suggest that people whom the Center for Disease Control has identified as
being higher risk, those with pre-existing health conditions or who had been personally affected
by the virus were more likely to install a CTA. The same study also finds that acceptance is
higher if people reported to know someone who has been tested positive with the virus
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(including themselves), and who had greater scores on indices capturing health and economic
impact of the virus (Hargittai and Redmiles, 2020; Zhang et al, 2020). A German survey reports
that respondents who have experienced COVID-19 symptoms, or who have been tested positive
or have family and friends who were infected, showed higher CTA adoption rates than
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respondents without such kind of experience (Buder et at., 2020). In a large online survey in
the UK, Germany, France, Italy and the US, Italian respondents demonstrate higher rates of app
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adoption and compliance with the request of self-isolation than participants in the other four
countries. This is likely related to the fact that the pandemic was more severe in Italy at the time
of the survey (Altmann et al., 2020). Another study based on the same survey data finds US
respondents’ willingness to install the app increases in all three scenarios, in which “someone
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in their community was diagnosed with the virus”, “someone they knew personally was
diagnosed with the virus”, and “lockdown restrictions would be lifted for those who have an
app that shows an ‘all clear’ message.” The study further finds that people who have sick pay
are more likely to install the app than those without in the country (Abeler et al, 2020a). Based
on these studies, we assume that those who have been negatively affected financially and
health-wise during the pandemic, to show a higher acceptance of CTAs. From this we derive
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the second set of hypotheses for our study: H2.1 -H2.2 (see Table 1).
2.5. Perception about the pandemic
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Attitudes towards CTAs are also likely being affected by individuals’ specific perceptions about
the COVID-19 pandemic. Previous studies and media reports show that the majority of
respondents in different countries were concerned about the COVID-19 pandemic (Ipsos, 2020;
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YouGov, 2020), while at the same time a significant share of the population also believed in
conspiracy theories or simply perceived the risks of COVID-19 to being similar to those of a
flu (Imhoff & Lamberty, 2020; Uscinski et al., 2020). One recent study on conspiracy beliefs
and individual pandemic behaviour, for instance, shows a statistical correlation between the
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two (Imhoff and Lamberty, 2020). The study finds that people who belittle the risk of the
COVID-19 pandemic are less likely to adapt containment-related behaviours, while people who
believe that the virus originated in a laboratory are more likely to adapt self-centred prepping
behavior (Imhoff and Lamberty, 2020). Individuals who do not perceive COVID-19 pandemic
as a conspiracy are thus more likely to accept anti-pandemic measures, including accepting the
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download of CTAs.
We argue that the perceived duration of the pandemic is also likely to affect attitudes: if
individuals believe the pandemic to stick around for a while or believe in a “second wave”, they
might accept CTAs more easily in order to reduce the negative consequences of the pandemic.
Based on these studies, we derive a third set of hypotheses for our study: H3.1 -H3.3 (see Table
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2.6. Experiences with and perceptions of CTAs

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Understanding of CTA technology, experience with similar apps or direct experience with
CTAs further influence acceptance levels. The hypothesis that the prior personal experience
with similar apps would increase the willingness of app installation is generally supported by
some national and cross-national surveys. A previous study in the US for instance shows that
people who are more technologically savvy were more willing to install CTAs (Abeler et al.,
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2020a; Hargittai and Redmiles, 2020).

Moreover, the perceived effectiveness of CTAs and perceived consequences are also possible
explanatory factors. For example, the polls from Germany find that surveillance and data
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misuse are the main reasons for opposing CTAs with 43% of respondents being afraid that they
would be potentially monitored after the pandemic (BR24, 2020). Another survey finds that
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among those who refuse to use the app, almost half of them reportedly had concerns over data
protection, surveillance and personal rights. Moreover, 13% among the opponents believe such
apps do not function well and thus won’t be useful and they regard other measures to be better.
In addition, 16% of respondents said they do not possess smartphones, which makes the app
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inaccessible to them in the first place (Tagesschau, 2020). In the US, reasons cited against the
use of CTAs include the fear of increased government surveillance, the concern that other
people might not use the app and the worry that one’s phone might get hacked (Abeler et al.,
2020a). Based on these studies, we derive a fourth set of hypotheses for our study: H4.1 -H4.5
(see Table 1).
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2.7. Sociopolitical belief and context
Other factors that influence adoption of CTAs broadly relate to respondents’ sociopolitical
believes and other contextual factors such as the actor developing the app. For example,
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differences in ownership and oversight significantly influence app adoption in Germany where
apps operated by international companies only get an adoption rate of 30%, compared with the
highest rates of adoption of 69% when an independent research institute like the Robert-Koch
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Institute oversees and controls the app (Buder er al., 2020). The situation differs in the US
where the identity of the app developer (the Center for Disease Control together with state
governments and university researchers) has no significant effect on support (Zhang et al.,
2020). Simko et al. (2020) report a general mistrust for a potential new CTA created by an
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industry start-up or an activist group and the most trust in a university-developed app. A
Washington Post-University of Maryland poll finds that smartphone users tend to trust public
health agencies (57%) and universities (56%) more than technology companies (43%) when
developing CTAs (Timberg, 2020).
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Moreover, people who report lower levels of trust in their government are less likely to install
CTAs (Altmann et al., 2020). However, some surveys indicate a partisan difference of
acceptance levels. Zhang et al (2020), for example, find that Democrats and Republicans were
both more supportive than independents, but did not differ significantly from each other. While
others suggest that 61% of Democrats say they would probably use such an app, compared to
48% of independents and 38% of Republicans (Timberg, Harwell and Safarpour, 2020). Abeler
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et al. (2020b) find that the majority of German participants indicated that their opinion of the
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federal government would improve were they to introduce the app and make installation
voluntary. Approval rates are stronger among Union parties’ (CDU/CSU) voters. Based on
these studies, we derive a fifth and final set of hypotheses for our study: H5.1 -H5.4 (see Table
1). Figure 1 summarizes our conceptual framework of CTA acceptance integrating the
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aforementioned explanatory factors and the perceptions illustrated above.

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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework
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3. Methodology
3.1 Data sources and questionnaire design
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In June 2020, we conducted a cross-national online survey in China, Germany, and the United
States through a Berlin-based survey firm. As the agency cooperates with app and mobile
website providers in each of the three countries, the survey was administered online through
mobile applications. As a sampling method, we used river sampling, also referred to as intercept
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sampling or real-time sampling, drawing participants from a base of 1-3 million unique users
(Lehdonvirta et al. 2020). 2 This allowed for both first-time and regular survey-takers to
participate. From a network of more than 40,000 participating apps and mobile websites, our
survey included respondents through more than 100 apps comprising different formats and
topics such as shopping (e.g., Amazon), photo-sharing (e.g., Instagram), lifestyle (e.g.,
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DesignHome), and messaging (e.g., Line). Offer walls provided participants options to receive
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small financial and non-monetary rewards as an incentive to take part in our survey, such as
premium content, extra features, vouchers, and PayPal cash. Users did not know the topic of
the questionnaire before opting in to participate. Instead, each participant underwent a pre-
screening before being directed to a survey that they were a match for. A sample of at least
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2,000 was generated in each country, considering a pre-defined distribution of age and gender
within the population. Respondents were also required to opt in twice to participate in the
research. As a first step, participants had to agree to the screening of the survey, and secondly,
once the survey had been shown, participants then saw a screen that further informed them
about the survey and that it would be used for research purposes. Participants were then asked
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to confirm that they understood the information before they proceeded with the survey. In
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River-sampling does not include a fixed number of potential survey respondents, as the survey is displayed on
offer walls within apps and websites and can, thus, reach millions of users.
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addition, questionnaires were deemed invalid if respondents completed them in a very short
period of time, with straight-lined responses (i.e., several consecutive identical answers on the
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Likert-Scale), or with inconsistent responses. The exclusion of these questionnaires provided
us with a total sample size of 6,464 from China (n=2,201), Germany (n=2,083), and the United
States (n=2,180).
Participants were sampled based on age (18-65), gender and region. As this was an online
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survey, all participants constitute a national representative group of the Internet-connected
population – meaning slightly younger and maybe more technology-affine than the overall
population. In Germany and the US, the target variables for weighting were age, gender,
settlement location (rural or urban) and education.3 In China the target variables for weighting
were age, gender, education and region (Central, East, West). Based on the distribution of
weights and the size of the sample the design effects (DF) and margins of error (MOE, at a
ev
confidence level of 95%) were calculated for China (DF: 1, MOE: 2.1%) Germany (DF: 1.01,
MOE: 2.2%) and the US (DF: 1, MOE; 2.1%).
The questionnaire consisted of six parts, including sections on personal experiences and
rr
perceptions of the COVID-19 pandemic demographics (11 questions), exposure to and
experiences with COVID-19 tracing apps (4 questions), acceptance and perceptions of COVID-
19 tracing apps (4 questions), regulatory measures regarding digital tracing (8 questions),
political context (4 questions), and socio-demographics (5 questions). Table A1 summarizes
ee
the respondents’ (i.e., unweighted) main characteristics: 49% of respondents are female and 51%
are male; 36% of respondents are aged 14-30, 44% are aged 31-50, and 20% are 51 and above.
63% of respondents are resident in urban areas as opposed to 37% stating to be residing in rural
areas. With regard to levels of education, 31% of respondents have a high level of education
tp
level (i.e., a university degree), 53% have reached a medium level of education (i.e., completed
high school or equivalent), and 14% have a low level of education, having received only some
form of high school or secondary education.
no
3.2 Data analysis

Responses to the questionnaire were examined using ordered logistics regression analysis. As
we sought to analyze the effects of socio-demographic factors, people’s personal risks and
perceived crisis feeling, our dependent variable of interest is “acceptance of the use of COVID-
t
19 CTAs”. The question reads: In general, do you accept or oppose the use of COVID-19
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tracing apps to curb the current pandemic in your country? allowing the responses strongly
oppose, somewhat oppose, neither oppose nor accept, somewhat accept or strongly accept.
Levels of acceptance were investigated by analyzing people’s individual characteristics and
beliefs, followed by studying different personal risks, including economic and health risks as
ep
well as general perception of the COVID-19 crisis. Table 1 gives an overview of the
measurements and hypotheses related to our selected independent variables. Of the 6,464
respondents in our sample, 25% (N=1661) of whom had “never heard about CTA” prior to
taking the survey. We have checked for multicollinearity by running a linear regression to
calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) with a mean VIF between 1.68 and 2.87 for our
Pr
models, allowing us to rule out multicollinearity (see Table A2). In addition, we created
3
Quotas for each country were created based on the most recent national statistics available.
11
correlation matrices to detect potential correlations amongst our independent variables.
However, no strong correlations could be detected, with the highest correlations being 0.66
ed
between perceived relative effectiveness of CTA and CTA acceptance.
Our independent sociodemographic variables include age, gender, net monthly household
income, education, and size of the city where respondents reside. As for factors regarding
personal health and financial risks, we included two dummy variables on whether a person has
iew
been concerned about their or others’ health and whether their financial situation has worsened
in the wake of the pandemic. As for peoples’ perceptions of the pandemic, we include risk
region that measures whether people think that the area they live in has seen many or somewhat
more COVID-19 infections than the national average. We also include a dummy variable for
whether people agree or disagree that the pandemic is a conspiracy and a question about
whether people expect a second wave of infections. As for experience and perception of CTAs
ev
and other health apps, we include dummies about whether people understand how CTAs work,
whether they have been using similar health apps, if and how they have become aware of CTAs,
whether they consider them to be effective compared to other measures to contain the spread
of COVID-19, and what they think the perceived consequences of the use of CTAs are. Finally,
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in sociopolitical belief and context variables we include measures about how effective other
measures to contain the virus have been perceived, which actors are attributed with the capacity
and responsibility to handle the crisis, and the extent of trust in the state.
ee
Table 1: Variables, measurement and hypotheses.
tp
Category Measurement Hypothesis

Socio-
demographics
H1.1: CTA acceptance is
higher among younger
Age in years (open box)
no
people.

Gender 0 = male, 1 = female higher among female
people.
1 = under 250, 2 = 250-500, 3 = 500-1,000, 4 = 1,000 -
2,000, 5 = 2,000-3,000, 6 = 3,000-4,000, 7 = 4,000 -
t
6,000, 8 = 6,000-8,000, 9 = 8,000-10,000, 10 = 10,000- H1.3: CTA acceptance is

Household Income 12,000, 11 = 12,000-15,000 = 12 = more than 15,000, higher among people with
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13 = prefer not to say (in local currency); higher income.

Recoded: 1 = low (1-3), 2 = medium (4-6), 3 = high (7-
12), 4 = prefer not to say (13)
1 = no formal education, 2 = high school diploma or

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equivalent, 3 = vocational training, 4 = bachelor’s
Education higher among people with
degree, 5 = master’s or doctorate’s degree
higher education level.
Recoded: 1 = low (1), 2 = medium (2-3), 3 = high (4-5).

Pr
1 = a major city, 2 = a medium-sized city, 3 = a small

City Size higher among people living
city, 4 = a town, 5 = the countryside
in larger cities.
Personal financial and health risks
Assumption: those who have been negatively affected financially and health-wise during
the pandemic are more accepting of CTAs
12
Chose all that applies: 1 = catching the virus myself, 2
higher among people who
= family catching the virus, 3 = friends catching the
Health concern worry about themselves and
ed
virus, 4 =None of the above
others getting infected with
Dummy: 1 = 1-3, 0 = 4
COVID-19.

1 = improved significantly, 2 = improved somewhat, 3
higher among people whose
= stayed the same, 4 = worsened somewhat, 5 =
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Financial situation financial situation has been
worsened significantly, 6 = don’t know/prefer not to say
worsened during the
Dummy: 0 = 1-3, 6, 1 = 4-5
pandemic.
Perceptions of the pandemic

Assumption: those who have a higher sense of crisis and fear during the pandemic are
more accepting of CTAs
ev
1 = much more, 2 = somewhat more, 3 = about the H3.1: CTA acceptance is
Perceived risk same, 4 = somewhat fewer, 5 = much fewer, 6 = don’t higher among people who
region know believe to live in a riskier
Dummy: 0 = 3-6, 1= 1-2 region.
rr
1 = yes, 2 = maybe, 3 = no, 4 = don’t know higher among people who
Conspiracy belief
Dummy: 0= 3-4, 1 = 1-2 belief the pandemic was not
a conspiracy.
1 = strongly agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = neither
ee
Second wave agree nor disagree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 =
believe there will a second
strongly disagree
wave.
Experiences with and perceptions of the apps
Assumption: those who are more exposed to CTAs or similar health tracking apps, and
those who believe CTAs would bring positive results are more accepting of CTAs
tp

1 = fully understand, 2 = somewhat understand, 3 = not
Understanding of higher among people who
understand at all
the app understand how CTA
Dummy: 0 = 3, 1 = 1-2
works.
no
1 = several times per week, 2 = several times per H4.2: CTA acceptance is
month, 3 = yes, but not often, 4 = only once, 5 = never higher among people who
Similar app usage
used before have used health tracking
Dummy: 0 = 5, 1 = 1-4 apps before.

1 = have used one myself, 2 = have seen other use the
Source of higher among people who
apps, 3 = have heard about the apps, 4 = none
awareness are more exposed to the
t
Dummy: 0 = 4, 1 = 1-3
CTA.
rin

1 = strongly agree, 2 = somewhat agree, 3 = neither
Relative higher among those who
agree nor disagree, 4 = somewhat disagree, 5 =
effectiveness of believe digital method is
strongly disagree
CTA better than manual contact
Dummy: 0 = 3-5, 1 = 1-3
tracing.
ep
Pr
13
1 = fewer COVID-19 infections, 2 = isolating infected
ed
people, 3 = making it safer to go out, 4 = better health
information, 5 = privacy violations, 6 = discrimination
against people who test positive for COVID-19, 7 =
Perceived higher among those who
government surveillance, 8 = use of data for
consequence think CTA will result in
commercial purposes, 9 = other, 10 = none
positive consequences.
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Dummies for: health information, fewer infections,
isolating infected people, privacy violations,
surveillance
Sociopolitical belief and context

Assumption: those with higher trust in the state and who attribute capacity and
responsibility of handling the crisis to individuals and who view other measures of
ev
containing the crisis as ineffective are more accepting of CTAs
1 = very effective, 2 = somewhat effective, 3 = neither higher among people who
Measure
effective nor ineffective, 4 = somewhat ineffective, 5 = think containing measures
effectiveness
rr
very ineffective taken have not been
effective.
1 = central government, 2 = local government, 3 =
private companies, 4 = non – government
organizations, 5 = international organizations, 6 =
think individuals are more
ee
Capacity individual citizens, 7 = scientific expert community, 8 =
capable of managing the
other, 9 = none
pandemic.
Dummies for: central government, local government,
individual citizens, international organization (IO)
tp
1 = central government, 2 = local government, 3

=private companies, 4 = non – government H5.3: CTA acceptance is
organizations, 5 = international organizations, 6 = higher among people who
Responsibility individual citizens, 7 = scientific expert community, 8 = think individuals are more
other, 9 = none responsible for managing
Dummies for: central government, local government, the pandemic.
no
individual citizens, international organization (IO)

1= a lot, 2 = somewhat, 3 = neither trust nor distrust, 4
Trust in the state = not much, 5 = not at all, 6 = Prefer not to answer
have more trust in the
Dummy: 0 = 3-6, 1 = 1-2
government.
t
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4. Results
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4. 1 Social acceptance of CTA

Our survey finds that in the overall population, 54% of respondents either strongly or somewhat
accept the use of CTAs in general. Responses vary across countries, with 80% of Chinese
showing the highest levels of acceptance, while only 39% of the US and 41% of German
Pr
respondents strongly or somewhat accept CTAs. Opposition to CTAs shows interesting cross-
country variation again. While overall 18% expressed either some or strong opposition to CTAs
overall, a rather low 2% in China, a much higher 27% in Germany, and 22 % in the US did so.
Noticeably, a third of the surveyed sample are neutral towards CTAs; out of the entire sample,
14
29% feel neutral towards CTAs, with again a wide range observed across countries: 17% of
Chinese, 33 % of German, and 39 % of the US participants. Figure 2 summarizes variation
ed
levels of acceptance overall and by country.
Figure 2: Public acceptance of CTAs - country distribution
iew
ev
rr
ee
tp
Note: Sample size = 6464, China = 2201, Germany = 2083, US = 2180, weighted
no
4.2 Socio-demographic factors

As shown in Figure A1, interesting cross-country variation emerges in terms of demographics.
Only in Germany does acceptance of CTAs rise with age, with 35% of the younger respondent
group (18-35) either somewhat or strongly accept CTAs, while this increases to 49% in the
t
older group of respondents (51-65). In China and the US, acceptance levels are similar across
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age groups with slightly higher acceptance in the middle-aged group (36-50) for China. In terms
of gender, no strong differences can be noted towards CTA acceptance in all three countries.
One exception might be that German men are slightly more opposed to the technology (29%)
than German women (24%). CTA acceptance rate rises with higher education: among the
respondents with high education, acceptance is 87% in China, 50% in Germany, and 51% in
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the US. High household income also correlates positively with CTA acceptance – 86%
respondents in China and 49% in Germany and 45% in the US with high income somewhat or
strongly support CTA, as compared to much lower figures for the medium and low-income
groups. With regards to household type, it is noticeable that in China and Germany, CTA
Pr
acceptance levels are lowest for respondents living in single-households. People living in larger
cities have slightly higher acceptance of CTAs as compared to those living in smaller towns or
in the countryside. Acceptance among Germans living in a town seems to be an exception here:
acceptance level in a town is 46%, as compared to major city (44%), medium-sized city (38%),
15
small (37%), and countryside (22%). This could possibly be explained by the fact that smaller
towns rather than bigger cities were COVID-19 epicenters in Germany. In summary, we find
ed
that acceptance of CATs is higher among the highly educated and higher income population
that live in a major city.
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4. 3 Effects on acceptance
Our hypotheses generated a range of predictor variables related to socio-demographic factors

(H1.1-H1.5), personal financial and health risks (H2.1-H2.2), perceptions of the COVID-19
pandemic (H3.1-H3.3), experience and perception of CTAs (H4.1-H4.5) and sociopolitical
ev
belief and context (H5.1-5.4). To assess the power of these variables and to examine how they
affect acceptance of CTAs, we undertook several ordered logit regressions, see Table 2. Our
five models measured the effects of socio-demographics and experience (Model 1), personal
financial and health risks (Model 2), perceptions of the pandemic (Model 3), perceptions and
rr
experience with CTAs (Model 4) as well as social and political beliefs and context (Model 5).
ee
tp
t no
rin
ep
Pr
16
Table 2: Ordered log-odds estimates of effects on CTA acceptance- Model 1-Model 5
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

e d
Model 5
CTA
Sociodemographic
CN GER US
Personal financial &
health risks
CN GER US
Perception of the
CN
pandemic
GER US CN
CTAs
GER
i w
Perception of & experience with
e
US
Social, political belief &
CN
context
GER US
Acceptance
Age
0.008** 0.008*** -
0.006**
0.008* 0.008**
*
-
0.007**
0.009** 0.009**
*
e
-
0.007**
0.003
v
0.007** 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.002
Gender
Female
(0.004)
0.072
(0.086)
(0.003)
0.068
(0.079)
(0.003)
-0.098
(0.078)
(0.004)
0.078
(0.087)
(0.003)
-0.053
(0.080)
(0.003)
-
0.156**
(0.079)
(0.004)
0.098
(0.087) r
(0.003)
-0.012
r
(0.081)
(0.003)
-0.146*
(0.079)
(0.004)
0.010
(0.092)
(0.003)
0.148*
(0.084)
(0.003)
0.073
(0.081)
(0.005)
0.005
(0.093)
(0.004)
0.151*
(0.085)
(0.003)
0.094
(0.083)
e
Income
0.531*** 0.143 -0.215* 0.533** 0.076 - 0.524** 0.092 - 0.449** 0.073 -0.097 0.402** 0.054 -0.116
e
Medium *
0.253** *
0.272** *
(0.154) (0.123) (0.124) (0.155) (0.123) (0.126) (0.155) (0.127) (0.125) (0.166) (0.143) (0.129) (0.166) (0.146) (0.130)
High
0.443***
(0.148)
-0.420**
0.331**
(0.138)
-0.228
-0.065
(0.119)
-
0.436**
*
(0.148)
-
0.268*
(0.140)
-0.249*
-0.104
(0.120)
-
t p0.428**
*
(0.148)
-
0.259*
(0.143)
-
-0.134
(0.120)
-
0.263*
(0.156)
-0.023
0.023
(0.158)
-0.096
-0.079
(0.123)
-0.205
0.206
(0.158)
-0.008
-0.037
(0.161)
-0.097
-0.116
(0.125)
-0.221
o
Prefer not to
0.606** 0.423** 0.592** 0.369** 0.309** 0.592**
say * * *
Education
Medium
(0.179)
0.196
(0.206)
(0.142)
0.086
(0.166)
(0.129)
t
0.162
(0.190)
(0.183)
0.189
(0.205) n
(0.145)
0.105
(0.162)
(0.133)
0.115
(0.201)
(0.183)
0.215
(0.205)
(0.150)
0.073
(0.164)
(0.133)
0.164
(0.194)
(0.183)
-0.040
(0.219)
(0.166)
0.072
(0.182)
(0.138)
0.050
(0.214)
(0.186)
-0.136
(0.228)
(0.170)
0.025
(0.183)
(0.140)
0.110
(0.211)
in
0.412* 0.362* 0.550** 0.393* 0.321* 0.454** 0.372* 0.181 0.442** 0.027 0.023 0.048 -0.067 -0.066 0.075
High *
City size
Major/medium
(0.217)
0.076
(0.092)
p r
(0.189)
0.033
(0.080)
(0.211)
0.370**
*
(0.079)
(0.217)
0.068
(0.093)
(0.186)
0.016
(0.080)
(0.220)
0.368**
*
(0.079)
(0.217)
0.071
(0.093)
(0.189)
0.024
(0.081)
(0.213)
0.320**
*
(0.081)
(0.233)
-0.147
(0.100)
(0.207)
0.010
(0.083)
(0.229)
0.159*
(0.082)
(0.242)
-0.163
(0.101)
(0.210)
-0.024
(0.084)
(0.226)
0.155*
(0.083)
Health
concerns
r e
city
P 17
Myself
0.194*
(0.103)
0.524**
*
(0.091)
0.506**
*
(0.093)
0.191*
(0.103)
0.454**
*
(0.093)
0.440**
*
(0.093)
0.191*
(0.110)
0.281**
*
(0.096)
0.327**
*
(0.095)
0.175
(0.112)
e d
0.240**
(0.098)
0.338**
*
(0.097)
Family/friends
None
0.195
(0.203)
0.236
0.542**
*
(0.181)
-
0.043
(0.177)
-
0.211
(0.204)
0.264
0.551**
*
(0.183)
-0.296
-0.043
(0.179)
-0.409*
0.287
(0.218)
0.483*
0.497**
(0.210)
-0.124
i w
-0.038
e
(0.178)
-0.203
0.263
(0.217)
0.484*
0.426**
(0.217)
-0.075
-0.069
(0.179)
-0.177
v
0.449** 0.471**
(0.236) (0.214) (0.210) (0.237) (0.216) (0.210) (0.252) (0.241) (0.214) (0.251) (0.247) (0.215)
e
0.067 - -0.039 0.053 - -0.033 0.102 - -0.009 0.107 - 0.027
Financial
0.327** 0.295** 0.255** 0.223**
r
situation * * *
Worsened (0.091) (0.083) (0.080) (0.091) (0.084) (0.081) (0.094) (0.088) (0.084) (0.095) (0.089) (0.084)
Riskier region
Yes
-0.062
(0.143)
0.080
er
0.330**
*
(0.120)
-
0.356**
*
(0.098)
-
-0.080
(0.156)
0.063
0.140
(0.123)
-
0.331**
*
(0.098)
-0.124
-0.043
(0.156)
0.053
0.067
(0.125)
-
0.296**
*
(0.099)
-0.114
Conspiracy
Yes | Maybe
p(0.092)
e
0.717**
*
(0.087)
0.321**
*
(0.081) (0.099)
0.355**
*
(0.092) (0.084) (0.100)

0.226**
(0.095) (0.085)
t
0.353** 0.521** 0.475** 0.174* 0.291** 0.243** 0.150 0.239** 0.232**
Second wave * * * * * *
o
Yes (0.090) (0.083) (0.089) (0.100) (0.086) (0.092) (0.101) (0.088) (0.094)
Understandin 0.399** 0.420**
0.044 0.154 -0.008 0.128
n
* *
g
Yes (0.137) (0.108) (0.095) (0.138) (0.110) (0.096)
t
Used similar 0.517** 0.398** 0.520** 0.384**
0.162 * * 0.172* * *
app
in
Yes (0.100) (0.100) (0.091) (0.101) (0.101) (0.092)
CTA 0.572** 0.502**
0.085 -0.098 0.100 -0.111
r
* *
experience
Yes (0.152) (0.128) (0.096) (0.155) (0.130) (0.097)
p
1.652** 1.652** 1.905** 1.711** 1.590** 1.791**
Relative effectiveness * * * * * *
re
Yes (0.111) (0.114) (0.113) (0.112) (0.116) (0.116)
Perceived
consequences
P
Health 0.463** 0.587** 0.755** 0.416** 0.540** 0.692**
* * * * * *
information
18
Fewer
infections
(0.094)
0.175 *
(0.103)
0.654**
*
(0.098)
0.602**
*
(0.096)
0.143
e d
(0.104)
0.612**
*
(0.099)
0.598**
*
Privacy
violations
(0.095)
-
0.492**
*
(0.092)
-
0.843**
*
i ew
(0.091)
-
0.647**
*
(0.095)
-
0.441**
*
(0.093)
-
0.814**
*
(0.091)
-
0.608**
*
v
(0.138) (0.098) (0.103) (0.140) (0.100) (0.104)
- - - -
Gov.
e
-0.145 0.604** 0.503** -0.177 0.544** 0.466**
surveillance * * * *
Effective
measures
Very/Somewha
r r (0.117) (0.100) (0.107) (0.118)
0.311
(0.101)
0.354**
*
(0.107)
0.247**
*
e
(0.229) (0.111) (0.087)
t effective
Trust in the
state
A lot |
Somewhat
p e 0.816**
*
0.433**
*
0.431**
*
t
Capacity (0.159) (0.104) (0.096)
-
-
o
Individualist -0.313 0.445**
* 0.299**
n
(0.295) (0.152) (0.141)
Government -0.059 0.074 -0.076
t
(0.106) (0.122) (0.133)
International
-0.376 0.173 0.093
in
organization
(0.247) (0.201) (0.193)
r
Responsibility
Individualist -0.009 -0.238* -0.237*
p
(0.138) (0.127) (0.123)
Government 0.050 0.129 -0.038
re
(0.153) (0.135) (0.159)
International
0.105 0.026 0.061
organization
(0.243) (0.209) (0.171)
P 19
Constant
-
3.497***
-
1.182***
-
1.949**
*
-
3.196**
*
-
0.963**
*
-
1.989**
*
-
3.011**
*
-
0.946**
*
-
1.870**
*
-
1.883**
*
-
0.771**
-
1.190**
*
-
1.167**
e
-
d
0.674**
-
1.035**
*
cut1
Constant
(0.341)
-
2.820***
(0.211)
-0.367*
(0.229)
-
1.325**
*
(0.418)
-
2.518**
*
(0.272)
-0.098
(0.298)
-
1.348**
*
(0.424)
-
2.332**
*
(0.284)
-0.052
(0.303)
-
1.217**
*
(0.443)
-
1.175**
*
(0.327)
0.328
i w
(0.318)
-0.436
e
(0.507)
-0.454
(0.342)
0.461
(0.322)
-0.270
v
cut2 (0.312) (0.209) (0.226) (0.394) (0.271) (0.296) (0.400) (0.283) (0.301) (0.419) (0.325) (0.314) (0.484) (0.340) (0.319)
-0.541* 1.054*** 0.407* -0.235 1.418** 0.445 -0.041 1.528** 0.616** 1.429** 2.624** 1.973** 2.194** 2.816** 2.175**
Constant
e
* * * * * * * *
r
cut3 (0.282) (0.210) (0.224) (0.368) (0.274) (0.294) (0.376) (0.286) (0.299) (0.403) (0.328) (0.316) (0.474) (0.342) (0.320)
0.586** 2.303*** 1.676** 0.893** 2.726** 1.746** 1.094** 2.885** 1.937** 2.812** 4.485** 3.744** 3.601** 4.696** 3.970**
Constant * * * * * * * * * * * *
cut4 (0.279) (0.217) (0.228) (0.366) (0.282)
er
(0.297) (0.373) (0.295) (0.302)
Standard errors in parentheses
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
(0.406) (0.341) (0.327) (0.478) (0.354) (0.331)
p e
o t
t n
r in
e p
P r 20
Our analysis shows a low and significant effect of age for all three countries for Model 1 to 4.
ed
For China and Germany, the effect is positive, confirming H1.1 for both countries, but for the
US it is negative. We find a low, nonsignificant negative or positive effect for gender,
disconfirming H1.2 as CTA acceptance seems not to differ much between men and women. In
Germany, if one is female, this has a positive, significant effect on acceptance in Model 4 and
iew
5, while for the US this seems to be the opposite with a significant but negative effect in Model
2 and 3. The ordered log-odds for income show an significant positive effect for the high income
group in China and Germany, confirming that in these countries, a high income increases
likelihood of acceptance (H1.3), while the effect for the US is not significant and negative for
Model 1-3. The finding for China is particularly interesting as the medium and high-income
group shows a very strong significant positive effect with a log-odds of 0.53 and 0.44
ev
respectively. Possible explanation is that in China the higher-income group might be more
informed about CTAs and thus more accepting. Overall, we find a positive, significant effect
of high education for all three countries, confirming H1.4, although the effect is particularly
strong for the US. The predictor related to city size is high, positive and significant only in the
rr
US, while in Germany and China the size of the city seems to have no significant effect
(disconfirming H1.5). Overall, the findings for socio-demographics are inconclusive across the
three countries, with the exceptions of high income and high education.
ee
In terms of the effects of personal financial and health risks (Model 2), we find that a person’s
concern about health has a strong positive significant effect in China, Germany and the US with
log-odds of 0.19, 0.52 and 0.51 respectively. Being concerned about the health of family
members or friends has no significant effect with the exception of Germany, with even higher
tp
(significant) log-odds of 0.54. If the respondent’s financial situation had worsened in the wake
of the pandemic, this had a small positive but insignificant effect in China, but had surprisingly
a significant, negative effect in Germany with log odds of -0.33. For the US, this also had a
negative effect, but non-significant.
no
The regression further showed that perceptions about the pandemic in general affect acceptance
levels. If someone thought that the area they live in is a lot more or somewhat riskier than the
national average in terms of number of COVID-19 infections, than this had a significant
positive effect in Germany and the US (confirming H3.1), while for China findings are not
significant with a negative effect. CTA acceptance is particularly high among people who
t
disagree that the pandemic is a conspiracy with significant log-odds of -0.73 for Germany and
rin
-0.32 for the US. China again seems to be different with no significance here, which could
possibly be due to the fact that this question might be sensitive and resulted in some preference
falsification. Another explanatory factor is whether people expect a second wave, confirming
H3.3 as whether one expects a second wave of infections has a significant positive effect for all
ep
three countries. This effect is strongest for the case for Germany with a log odd of 0.52 (as
compared to 0.35 in China and 0.47 in the US).
As for experience and perception of CTAs and other health apps, we find that an understanding
how CTAs work has an insignificant positive effect for Germany and the US, but a significant
Pr
positive effect in China (-0.40). Interestingly, if people have used other health apps before, CTA
acceptance is significantly higher in all three countries, especially in Germany and the US with
log-odds of 0.52 and 0.40, confirming H.4.2. This suggests that technology affinity seems to
play a large role in explaining variation in acceptance levels at least in Germany and the US.
21
CTA acceptance is also higher among those who have used CTAs before in China. The levels
for Germany and the US are insignificant, as only a tiny fraction had CTA experience at the
ed
time of the survey. Whether respondents consider CTAs to be effective compared to other
measures to contain the spread of COVID-19, is one of the strongest factors across all three
countries with log-odds of 1.65 (China), 1.91 (Germany) and 1.71 (US). In terms of perceived
consequences of the use of CTAs, respondents who report positive consequences like receiving
iew
health information or reduced infections due to CTAs, appear to be more likely to accept CTAs
with positive and significant log-odds for all three countries. In contrast, negative perceptions
such as the fear of privacy violations or government surveillance are negatively correlated with
CTA acceptance. Worries about privacy violations are strongest in the model for Germany with
negative log-odds of 0.84, compared to -0.49 in the China model and -0.65 in the US model.
The log-odds for government surveillance in the German model are again stronger than those
ev
in the US model, while in the case of China, the coefficient is insignificant. Thus, apart from
this latter exception, hypothesis 4.5 can be confirmed.
When factors of sociopolitical belief and context variables are included in the models, we find
that acceptance is higher among respondents who stated that the government had very or
rr
somewhat effectively adopted other measures to contain the COVID-19 virus, with significant,
positive log-odds for Germany and US. Trust in the state had a significant positive effect in all
three countries, with the highest log-odd of 0.82 in China, as compared to 0.43 in China and
ee
Germany. In other words, trust in the state seems to increase people’s willingness to accept
CTAs. In terms of responsibility and capacity to handle the crisis, respondents who believed it
is the responsibility of individuals, rather than governments or international organizations, were
opposing of CTAs, with significant negative log-odds for Germany and US. Similarly, if
respondents believed that individuals, rather than governments or international organizations
tp
have the highest capacity to handle the crisis, this also had a negative and significant effect on
acceptance levels in Germany and US, while for China this seems not to be of significance.
no
4. 4 Discussion
Our model for acceptance sought to integrate perceptions and experiences of individuals and
sociopolitical context affecting their stance on COVID-19 CTAs. Since initial studies of CTA
acceptance have focused mostly on personal characteristics and mainly applied in national
studies for individual (Western) countries, this research derives a number of illuminating
t
observations about the expanding realm of CTA acceptance studies.

rin
First, noticeably, CTA acceptance is much higher in authoritarian China than in Germany and
the US. Socio-demographic factors seem to be not so helpful in explaining CTA attitudes.
Concerns about one’s own health on the other hand results affects CTA attitudes positively in
ep
all three countries. Among those who tested positively (N=114, 1.8%), 41% very strongly
accept CTAs. Concerns about the health of family members or friends or financial concerns
have a positive effect in Germany, but surprisingly no effect in China or the US.
Second, how people perceive the pandemic also strongly influences their attitude towards the
Pr
technology. Among those who believe COVID-19 to be a conspiracy, 24% strongly oppose
CTAs. Similarly, among those who do not believe in a second wave, more than 33% are
strongly against CTAs. In other words, the more an individual believes COVID-19 to be a
health crisis that will stick for a while, the higher the acceptance of CTAs.
22
Third, if people have used similar health apps, the acceptance of CTAs is higher, especially in
the US and Germany. While more than 4000 respondents in the sample have never used a
ed
similar health app before, around 900 respondents in China, 770 in US, and 600 in Germany
report some experience with this. These technology-affine respondents have a higher
acceptance towards CTAs, suggesting that familiarity with healthcare apps positively helps
with CTA adoption. Understanding and experience with CTAs only was significant in China,
iew
which is likely due to the timing of the survey as China was the only country which had CTAs
being rolled out nationally at that time. It is likely that the results would be different in Germany
and US if a follow-up survey was conducted after the rollout of CTAs. Moreover, since CTA
are mandatory in China, a much higher share of the population has experience with it.
Fourth, an important explanatory factor seems to be that respondents in Germany and US fear
negative consequences such as privacy violations and government surveillance much stronger.
ev
This is interesting, as the design of CTAs in both countries already took into account data
privacy concerns through Bluetooth and other measures, but this seems to be insufficient for
some respondents. In China, fear of privacy violations was also strong, but less respondents
stated a “fear of government surveillance”. Very likely, this could be due to preference
rr
falsification, which is not uncommon in online surveys in an authoritarian context (see
discussion below). This could, however, also be due to limited access to information as the
downsides of CTAs are less openly discussed in the state-controlled media or simply due to the
ee
fact that a lot of people resign and simply accept that the Communist Party can have access to
any information they want anyway. It is also important to note that in China the CTA was
mandatory, as compared to voluntary CTAs in China and Germany. This possibly results in
acceptance of the technology simply due to the limited choice given to Chinese users.
tp
Across all three countries, positive consequences also matter. If respondents thought CTAs to
be effective and if they believed in positive consequences such as improved health information
access via CTAs or fewer infections, this strongly and positively affected people’s attitudes
toward CTAs. However, the effect of the perceived negative consequences was higher than the
no
perceived positive consequences, which suggests that policy makers need to address negative
concerns if they want to increase CTA acceptance rates.
Finally, acceptance closely links with the finding that trust in the state is a key factor affecting
people’s attitudes towards CTAs in all three countries. The more they trust the state, the more
likely people are to adopt the apps. This trust in the state was highest in China, which mirrors
t
previous studies finding high popular trust in the Chinese central government (Kostka et al.
rin
2020).
4.5 Research limitations

ep
The findings are subject to a number of limitations. First, as this was an online survey using
mobile phones and desktops, the findings can only be representative for the Internet-connected
population in each country. Second, respondents who chose to participate in our survey may
already have a particular affinity with technology, which could positively affect their stance
Pr
towards innovations in this field, including the focus of this study. This effect may have been
heightened by the virtual rewards individuals were promised for their participation, as they
might have been more likely to associate the positivity of incentives with positivity towards
CTAs.
23
Moreover, in China, the authoritarian political context might be reflected in the reported levels
of social acceptance, as dissent of technologies that are officially endorsed by the government
ed
can be difficult. Though participants were aware that any identifying data was anonymized and
analyzed for research purposes only, we cannot exclude the possibility of preference
falsification as some more cautious respondents may have given false answers due to concerns
about reprisals from the state. 4 For instance, variables such as trust in government might be
iew
overreported, while attitudes towards surveillance might actually be underreported among
respondents.
Lastly, some questions might have also been understood or interpreted differently across
countries. As the implementation and use cases of COVID-19 CTAs vary widely in the three
contexts studied, mentions of the technology may conjure up diverse associations and scenarios.
This could influence the connotation participants have when asked about its acceptability. Some
ev
questions might also have been misunderstood; for instance, the question Do you think that the
COVID-19 pandemic is a conspiracy, i.e. engineered deliberately by humans? might be
understood differently in the three country contexts. In addition, our survey likely also contains
question biases as offering possible issues or consequences as options may have induced the
rr
respondents to report their views accordingly (on limited answer possibilities and acquiescence
bias, see Furnham 1986).
ee
5. Conclusion
Under which circumstances do people cooperate during a pandemic? Based on a cross-national
survey in China, Germany, and the US resembling the Internet-connected population in these
tp
three countries our study shows that concerns over one’s health during the pandemic is a
predictor of CTA acceptance in all three countries, however, less so in China. A concern about
the health of family members or friends is only relevant in the case of Germany. Hence, self-
regarding individuals are more inclined to accept being traced digitally, if they are in a state of
no
concern about themselves.

Levels of cooperation are also mediated by the perceived effectiveness of CTAs and
anticipations of possible outcomes (fewer infections vs privacy violations). Again, predictors
are stronger in the case of Germany and the US. In both of these countries, and less so in China,
the impact of mental associations, whether based on factual knowledge or inferred perceptions,
t
and the perceived utility of CTAs have a powerful impact on CTA acceptance. Moreover,
rin
frequent use of other health smartphone applications might be subtly increasing public
acceptance of this technology. This supports previous research showing that people are more
accepting of technologies that they are most familiar with (Buckley and Nurse, 2019; Kostka
et al., 2020).
ep
The implementation of CTAs is ongoing on an international scale and it is conceivable that

public opinion could shift as CTAs software gets more widely adopted or the pandemic
continues. Public opinion might also shift if perceived negative consequences, such as increased
fear of government surveillance, are not addressed. As this study shows, authoritarian countries
Pr
4
Despite the challenges of conducting public opinion research in authoritarian China, experienced survey
researchers argue persuasively that respondents do not systematically falsify their preferences Tang W (2005)
Public opinion and political change in China.. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
24
such as China can make CTAs mandatory and not fear public disapproval, as the majority of
people show acceptance. This is not to say that Chinese people do not fear negative
ed
consequences such as privacy violations, in fact this study shows that the opposite is true, but
that people accept mandatory instruments more easily due to lack of choice and the fact that
social cooperation functions through reciprocity. Hence, in the case of China, high levels of
acceptance are at least partly caused by the fact that people are ensured that everyone has to
iew
cooperate and free riding is impossible (see also Fehr and Gintis 2007).
Finally, given the large cross-country differences in state use of the technology as well as
variations in people’s acceptance levels, our results underline that the implementation of cross-
national CTAs by for instance international organizations is unrealistic at this point. In order to
increase the currently still limited adoption of CTAs in countries where app use is voluntary (as
of July 2020 the adoption rate in Germany was at 14%), policymakers should address peoples’
ev
fears concerning privacy infringements. At the same time, our data shows that highlighting the
positive aspects of CTAs also has the potential to increase acceptance and therefore adoption
rates. Here it is likely insufficient to report positive aspects of CTAs through media channels,
but rather add features to the app itself that notify users when and how the app works in the
rr
background. This is also in line with suggestions by Farronato and colleagues (2020) who
propose more targeted launch strategies of CTAs in small communities (such as churches or
restaurants) where people see direct value in CTA usage to protect themselves and others.
ee
Acknowledgements
tp
We acknowledge funding from the Volkswagen Foundation Planning Grant on “State-business

relations in the Field of Artificial Intelligence and its Implications for Society” (grant 95172).
We are also very grateful for Danqi Guo and Hanyu Jiang for excellent research assistance. We
also thank Lukas Antoine and Yuchen Liu for comments on earlier versions of this paper. All
no
remaining errors are our own.

t
rin
ep
Pr
25
Appendix
Table A1: Summary statistics of dependent variable and independent variables
ed
DV:
In general, do you accept or oppose the use of COVID-19 tracing apps to curb
the current pandemic in your country? (weighted, in %)
Acceptance
Neither
Strongly Somewhat oppose Somewhat Strongly
iew
N
accept accept nor oppose oppose
accept
30.6 23.2 29.3 7.5 9.5 6464
Variable Value Sociodemographic
Age 18-35 35.1 21.5 29.3 6.7 7.3 3058
36-50 30.2 22.6 28.6 8.0 10.5 2091
51-65 20.5 27.9 30.2 8.8 12.7 1315
ev
Gender Male 32.1 22.9 27.7 7.7 9.6 3318
Female 29.0 23.5 30.9 7.4 9.3 3146
Income Low (<1,000) 27.3 21.6 34.1 7.3 9.7 891
Medium (1,000-
28.0 22.6 29.6 9.1 10.7 2099
4,000)
rr
High (>4,000) 38.5 25.9 22.8 6.0 6.8 2564
Prefer not to say 17.2 18.4 42.0 8.6 13.9 910
Education Low (No
27.5 18.2 33.8 8.5 12.0 330
education)
Medium (High
ee
school or
27.2 21.8 32.9 8.0 10.1 4359
vocational
training)
High (Bachelor
39.4 27.5 19.4 6.3 7.4 1775
and above)
tp
Household type Single 22.7 22.4 32.7 9.7 12.4 1290

Couple 32.6 25.2 25.5 7.1 9.5 2755
(Multiple responses One or more
32.3 24.7 26.9 7.7 8.4 2382
possible) children
Parents and/or
40.3 22.3 26.7 5.7 5.0 1618
grandparents
no
Others 17.8 18.0 43.5 6.3 14.4 574

City size A major city 33.8 24.5 25.9 6.3 9.5 1586
A medium-sized
30.0 24.2 30.2 7.5 8.2 1644
city
A small city 32.8 22.7 29.0 8.2 7.3 1603
A town 24.5 22.3 31.8 9.1 12.4 1026
Countryside 27.8 19.7 32.4 6.5 13.6 604
t
rin
Personal financial and health risks

Health status Test positive 41.3 22.3 26.8 4.4 5.2 114
myself
No test but think 26.9 23.7 23.8 12.8 12.8 190
infected myself
ep
Know someone 25.0 29.4 29.3 8.5 7.8 590

infected
Have problems 27.0 26.4 28.4 7.8 10.4 939
that put me at
higher risk
Pr
Know someone 26.3 26.4 28.9 10.2 8.2 1609

with problems that
put him/her at
higher risk
None of the above 33.4 20.7 29.7 6.1 10.0 3692
26
Health concern Catching the virus 34.0 26.7 27.4 6.4 5.6 3009
myself
Family members 31.4 25.7 28.6 7.5 6.8 4371
ed
catching the virus
Friends catching 33.5 27.3 26.7 6.8 5.7 2591
the virus
None of the above 28.2 15.1 31.2 7.8 17.7 1495
Financial situation Improved 40.8 23.4 23.2 5.7 7.0 212
iew
significantly
Improved 36.0 25.7 23.7 7.1 7.4 442
somewhat
Stay the same 25.1 23.7 31.3 9.2 10.7 2361
Worsened 36.0 24.3 26.8 5.9 7.0 1931
somewhat
Worsened 32.8 20.6 28.8 6.8 11.0 1087
significantly
ev
Don’t know/prefer 19.7 19.4 39.2 8.5 13.3 431
not to say
Perception of the pandemic

Perceived risk region
rr
Much higher
Somewhat higher
About the same
Somewhat lower
37.5
26.9
21.5
34.1
21.0
28.8
26.5
27.1
27.8
29.3
33.4
26.0
3.1
8.4
8.9
6.8
10.6
6.7
9.7
6.0
311
747
865
1575
ee
Much lower 38.6 20.6 23.8 7.0 10.0 2094
Don’t know 14.3 14.8 44.8 9.7 16.4 871
Conspiracy believe Yes 21.5 16.4 28.0 9.7 24.4 786
Maybe 28.5 23.5 28.8 9.4 9.8 1677
No 33.5 26.7 26.9 7.1 5.8 2680
tp
Don’t know 32.5 19.7 35.4 4.8 7.6 1321

Second wave Strongly agree 32.7 20.0 28.1 8.2 10.9 1382
Somewhat agree 27.3 30.7 27.5 7.8 6.8 2116
Neither agree nor 30.7 18.8 37.3 6.0 7.2 1893
disagree
no
Somewhat 36.5 24.2 19.9 9.5 10.0 754

disagree
Strongly disagree 27.8 11.1 20.6 7.4 33.1 319
Pandemic outlook 0 day, already 49.4 15.6 21.0 2.7 11.3 635
over
A few more days 46.9 16.0 26.9 2.8 7.5 173
t
1-2 weeks 36.1 24.1 20.6 11.1 8.0 159

3-4 weeks 31.8 25.5 26.0 8.1 8.6 365
rin
2-3 months 37.5 23.9 25.5 7.3 5.9 1157

4-5 months 26.8 26.6 30.5 7.2 9.0 495
6 months 30.2 24.9 28.4 8.2 8.2 770
Up to a year 22.1 25.4 34.6 9.3 8.7 1452
Longer than a year 22.8 21.6 33.2 8.0 14.4 1257
ep
Experiences with/perception of digital health

technology
Understanding of the Fully 45.3 19.1 16.8 6.9 11.8 1352
app understand
Pr
Somewhat 33.7 28.1 25.4 6.4 6.4 3064

understand
Not at all 16.1 18.5 43.3 9.6 12.5 2048
understand
27
Similar app usage Several times 48.8 23.2 18.1 4.6 5.2 888
per week
ed
Several times 37.7 31.7 21.0 4.8 4.7 350
per month
Yes, but not 34.5 28.3 28.0 5.4 3.8 821
often
Only once 40.0 22.8 21.9 8.4 7.0 209
Never used 24.9 21.5 32.9 8.8 12.0 4194
iew
before
Source of awareness Have used one 64.1 20.6 13.3 1.2 0.8 1619
myself
Have seen other 43.7 26.0 22.4 4.9 3.0 558
use
Have heard 22.8 26.3 28.6 10.2 12.1 2986
about it
ev
None 14.4 18.5 45.0 8.7 13.5 1654
Relative effectiveness of Strongly agree 76.7 15.1 5.4 1.1 1.6 1465
CTA Somewhat agree 29.1 44.3 21.4 3.8 1.5 1957
Neither agree 10.7 15.9 57.2 9.0 7.2 2051
rr
nor disagree
Somewhat 9.7 13.5 32.8 31.7 12.3 502
disagree
Strongly 2.8 3.3 11.5 10.9 71.5 489
disagree
ee
Perceived use Fewer 43.1 32.0 20.7 2.5 1.6 2248
consequences infections
Isolating the 36.8 27.0 23.5 6.6 6.1 2126
infected
Safer to go out 49.0 30.3 17.8 1.8 1.0 2315
tp
Better health 47.7 29.0 19.8 2.4 1.0 2177

information
Privacy 13.1 18.8 32.8 16.2 19.1 1798
violation
Discrimination 16.0 19.1 31.9 15.6 17.4 1336
no
against who
tested positive
Government 20.3 18.6 28.7 14.2 18.2 1921
surveillance
Use the data for 19.4 20.9 29.4 14.0 16.3 1526
commercial
t
purposes
Other 20.0 16.2 39.1 11.8 12.8 368
rin
None 14.6 9.8 51.0 6.3 18.4 646
Social political beliefs and context

Measure Very effective 52.1 22.2 19.4 3.1 3.3 2838
ep
effectiveness Somewhat 15.7 30.1 35.1 11.0 8.0 2029

effective
Neither effective 8.9 15.3 42.5 12.0 21.3 882
nor ineffective
Somewhat 10.8 20.8 37.7 12.2 18.5 430
Pr
ineffective
Very ineffective 18.8 11.9 32.3 5.8 31.1 284
Public concern Economic growth 39.0 24.5 24.2 6.1 6.2 2739
Healthcare system 40.0 25.0 24.8 5.4 4.8 2973
28
Social inequality 28.9 24.8 29.6 8.1 8.5 2889
and poverty
ed
Crime and 23.6 23.4 34.4 8.1 10.5 2185
violence
Political 19.0 21.5 30.1 11.7 17.7 987
suppression
Individual freedom 23.9 22.1 28.6 9.7 15.7 1795
Climate change 37.0 26.7 25.0 6.6 4.6 2163
iew
and environmental
degradation
Others 19.0 17.9 43.1 8.2 11.9 308
None 16.6 11.5 41.0 9.4 21.5 329
Capacity Central 47.0 26.7 19.0 4.5 2.9 2812
government
Local government 39.6 26.9 24.2 5.0 4.3 1671
ev
Private companies 37.9 24.0 25.2 5.9 7.0 617
Non-government 27.2 22.1 27.9 10.0 12.7 366
organizations
International 36.2 26.4 27.4 5.9 4.0 1846
rr
organizations
Individual citizens 27.3 21.8 30.0 9.3 11.7 1667
Scientific expert 38.2 26.1 25.9 5.7 4.1 2712
community
Others 19.1 19.6 41.6 9.6 10.1 261
ee
None 6.5 7.7 43.6 11.6 30.6 587
Responsibility Central 36.7 27.0 24.4 6.4 5.5 2846
government
Local government 39.7 23.6 25.9 5.6 5.2 1909
Private companies 36.7 26.3 24.8 6.5 5.8 473
tp
Non-government 36.4 23.4 25.5 7.9 6.9 263

organizations
International 35.4 25.8 27.9 6.2 4.7 1559
organizations
Individual citizens 33.2 23.3 27.1 7.2 9.2 2466
no
Scientific expert 34.9 25.4 27.2 7.3 5.2 1567

community
Others 23.1 18.2 42.9 7.6 8.3 343
None 16.6 9.6 40.2 8.9 24.6 585
Trust in the state A lot 58.9 21.7 15.9 2.0 1.6 2289
Somewhat 22.7 35.3 28.8 8.4 4.8 1573
t
Neither trust nor 11.6 20.7 49.5 10.6 7.6 1007

distrust
rin
Not much 9.1 20.9 34.2 16.8 19.0 746

Not at all 9.4 10.5 31.0 9.7 39.4 533
Prefer not to say 11.5 8.7 49.6 7.8 22.4 315
ep
Table A2: Model test results

Pr
Mean vif
Total China Germany US
Model 1 2.39 2.57 2.15 2.62
29
Model 2 2.56 2.87 2.33 2.65
Model 3 2.26 2.51 2.08 2.35
ed
Model 4 1.95 2.10 1.83 2.03
Model 5 1.76 1.86 1.68 1.82
iew
Figure A1: CTA acceptance and sociodemographic factors
ev
rr
ee
tp
t no
rin
ep
Pr
30
ed
iew
ev
rr
ee
tp
t no
rin
ep
Pr
31
ed
iew
ev
rr
ee
References
tp
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com/Technology/apple-google-launch-digital-contact-tracing-system/story?id=70789376
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app-based contact tracing of Covid-19: Cross-country evidence. Apr 15. https://osf. io/v45y2/
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In times of crisis: Public perceptions towards COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps

in China, Germany and the US

acceptance rates could be increased by highlighting CTAs’ performance outcomes to users.

Keywords: COVID-19, contact tracing apps, acceptance, public perception

a global health pandemic, and which factors influence their cooperation.

million times (Robert Koch Institute, 2020).

2. 2 Public attitudes of CTAs

study finds that including privacy-preserving features such as non-location-tracking Bluetooth

2. 4. Personal health or financial risks

2.5. Perception about the pandemic

2.6. Experiences with and perceptions of CTAs

2020a; Hargittai and Redmiles, 2020).

aforementioned explanatory factors and the perceptions illustrated above.

3.2 Data analysis

Category Measurement Hypothesis

H1.2: CTA acceptance is

6,000, 8 = 6,000-8,000, 9 = 8,000-10,000, 10 = 10,000- H1.3: CTA acceptance is

13 = prefer not to say (in local currency); higher income.

1 = no formal education, 2 = high school diploma or

H1.4: CTA acceptance is

H1.5: CTA acceptance is

1 = a major city, 2 = a medium-sized city, 3 = a small

H2.2: CTA acceptance is

Perceptions of the pandemic

H4.1: CTA acceptance is

H4.3: CTA acceptance is

H4.4: CTA acceptance is

Sociopolitical belief and context

1 = central government, 2 = local government, 3

individual citizens, international organization (IO)

H5.4: CTA acceptance is

4. 1 Social acceptance of CTA

Figure 2: Public acceptance of CTAs - country distribution

4.2 Socio-demographic factors

Our hypotheses generated a range of predictor variables related to socio-demographic factors

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

(0.092) (0.084) (0.100)

cut4 (0.279) (0.217) (0.228) (0.366) (0.282)

observations about the expanding realm of CTA acceptance studies.

4.5 Research limitations

concern about themselves.

The implementation of CTAs is ongoing on an international scale and it is conceivable that

We acknowledge funding from the Volkswagen Foundation Planning Grant on “State-business

remaining errors are our own.

Household type Single 22.7 22.4 32.7 9.7 12.4 1290

Others 17.8 18.0 43.5 6.3 14.4 574

Personal financial and health risks

Know someone 25.0 29.4 29.3 8.5 7.8 590

Know someone 26.3 26.4 28.9 10.2 8.2 1609

Perception of the pandemic

Don’t know 32.5 19.7 35.4 4.8 7.6 1321

Somewhat 36.5 24.2 19.9 9.5 10.0 754

1-2 weeks 36.1 24.1 20.6 11.1 8.0 159

2-3 months 37.5 23.9 25.5 7.3 5.9 1157

Experiences with/perception of digital health

Somewhat 33.7 28.1 25.4 6.4 6.4 3064

Better health 47.7 29.0 19.8 2.4 1.0 2177

None 14.6 9.8 51.0 6.3 18.4 646

Social political beliefs and context

effectiveness Somewhat 15.7 30.1 35.1 11.0 8.0 2029

Non-government 36.4 23.4 25.5 7.9 6.9 263

Scientific expert 34.9 25.4 27.2 7.3 5.2 1567

Neither trust nor 11.6 20.7 49.5 10.6 7.6 1007

Not much 9.1 20.9 34.2 16.8 19.0 746