GENESIS INVESTMENT, INC., et al. vs.

HEIRS of CEFERINO EBARASABAL

G.R. No. 181622              
November 20, 2013
Facts:

The Heirs of Ceferino Ebarasabal filed against the petitioners a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Documents, Recovery of Shares, Partition, Damages and Attorney’s
Fees on November 12, 2003 with the Regional Trial Court of Barili, Cebu. On the other hand
petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the RTC has no jurisdiction to try the case
on the ground that the case involves title to or possession of real property or any interest
therein and the assessed value of the subject property does not exceed P20, 000, thus the
action falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court. The Regional Trial Court granted
the Motion to Dismiss. This prompted the petitioners to file a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration arguing that their complaint involves several causes of action. One of which is
for annulment of documents, which is incapable of pecuniary estimation and falls within the
jurisdiction of the RTC but the said Motion for Partial Reconsideration was denied. Aggrieved,
the petitioners filed Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which was also denied.
The CA stated that the subject matter of respondents' complaint is incapable of pecuniary
estimation and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the RTC, considering that the main purpose
in filing the action is to declare null and void the documents. A Motion for Reconsideration was
then filed which was also denied. Thus, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Decision:

Yes, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case.

Well entrenched is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by
law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought,
irrespective of whether the party is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.

Section 5 (c), Rule 2 of the Rules of Court that where the causes of action are between
the same parties but pertain to different venues or jurisdictions, the joinder may be allowed in
the RTC provided one of the causes of action falls within the jurisdiction of said court and the
venue lies therein.

In the case at bar, even if one of the causes of action of respondents pertains to the
title, possession and interest over the contested property which the assessed value of which
falls within the jurisdiction of the MTC but he allegations in the complaint, and the reliefs
prayed for is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

   The respondents in filing their Complaint with the RTC sought to recover ownership and
possession of their shares in the disputed parcel of land by questioning the due execution and
validity of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale as well as the Memorandum of
Agreement entered into by and between both parties. Furthermore they also seek
the nullification of the Tax Declarations subsequently issued in the name of petitioner Cebu
Jaya Realty, Inc., partition of the property, the reconveyance of their respective shares and the
payment of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, plus appearance fees.
Thus, this implicates a joinder of action because it involves more than the issue of partition of
or recovery of shares or interest over the property but includes an action for declaration of
nullity of contracts and documents which is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, the
complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

POLYTRADE CORPORATION vs. VICTORIANO BLANCO

G.R. No. L-27033            
October 31, 1969
Facts:

Polytrade filed four causes of action against Victoriano Blanco in the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan to recover the purchase price of rawhide delivered by it to
Blanco. Polytrade has its principal office and place of business in Makati, Rizal while Blanco is a
resident of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Defendant moved to dismiss upon the ground of improper
venue. He claims that by contract suit may only be lodged in the courts of Manila which was
dismissed by the CFI of Bulacan. He did not answer the complaint. Thus, he was declared in
default and made to pay certain amounts.

Aggrieved, Blanco appealed. Thus, this, petition.

Issue: Whether or not venue was properly laid in Bulacan where defendant is a resident.

Decision:

Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court provides that such "actions may be
commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found,
or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff."
Furthermore, Section 3 of the same Rule provides that by written agreement of the parties the
venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one province to another.

In the case at bar the defendant contends that both parties agreed by written contracts
to sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila covering the four causes of action. This agreement is
valid. However the stipulation does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant. Qualifying or restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is
the venue are totally absent. Therefore the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. No
such stipulation also appears in the contracts covering the first two causes of action. The
stipulation is only found in the agreements covering the third and fourth causes of action. Thus,
venue was properly laid in Bulacan for the last two causes of action.

The stipulation in the contract is merely permissive that both parties can file an action in
Manila and not just their place of residence. This stipulation is permissive and not restrictive.
Thus, the venue is properly laid in Bulacan.

AVELINA ZAMORAet. Al. vs. HEIRS of CARMEN IZQUIERDO

G.R. No. 146195
November 18, 2004
Facts:

Carmen Izquierdo and Pablo Zamora entered into a verbal stipulation whereby the
Izquierdo leased to Zamora one of her apartment units ain Caloocan City.  They agreed that the
rental is P3,000.00 per month, it is only for residence and only a single family is allowed to
occupy it.

After the death of Carmen her attorney-in-fact, representing her heirs, , prepared a new
contract of lease wherein the rental was increased from P3,000.00 to P3,600.00 per month.
But, petitioners refused to sign it.

When Pablo died on January 1997.  His wife, Avelina Zamora, and their children continued
to reside in the apartment unit.  They also refused to pay the increased rental and operated a
photocopying business in the leased property.

Avelina applied with the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System for a water line
installation in the premises but the respondent’s attorney- in- fact declined to sign the permit
because the petitioners refused to pay the new rental rate and violated the on the agreement.

Avelina then filed with the Office of the Punong Barangay of Barangay 16, Sona 2, District I,
Lungsod ng Caloocan, a complaint against the respondents’ attorney-in-fact for her refusal to
file the permit.

During the barangay conciliation proceedings, Zamora said that she refused to sign the new
lease contract because she does not agree with its conditions. The following day, Punzalan sent
Avelina a letter informing her that the lease is being terminated and demanding that petitioners
vacate the premises within 30 days from notice.

Despite several barangay conciliation sessions, the parties failed to settle their dispute

amicably.  Hence, the Barangay Chairman issued a Certification to File Action. Thus, Punzalan,
filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 49 of Caloocan City, a complaint for unlawful
detainer and damages against petitioners. On the other hand, petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that the controversy was not referred to the barangay for
conciliation. They alleged that the barangay Certification to File Action “is fatally defective”
because it pertains to another dispute, i.e., the refusal by respondents’ attorney-in-fact to give
her written consent to petitioners’ request for installation of water facilities in the premises. 
And, when the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, the Punong Barangay, did not constitute the Pangkat ng
Tagapagkasundo before whom mediation or arbitration proceedings should have been
conducted.

The MTC denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss and considered the case submitted
for decision in view of their failure to file their answer to the complaint. Aggrieved, petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Thus, petitioners, appealed before the
RTC which affirmed the decision of the MTC. Aggrieved, they appealed before the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC. Thus, this petition.

Issue: Whether respondent complied with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law providing for a
conciliation before any complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter within
the authority of the Lupon of the barangay shall be filled or instituted in the court.

Decision:

Yes, the respondent’s complied with the Katarungang Pambarangay Law providing for a
conciliation.
 Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160 provides that No complaint, petition, action, or
proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or instituted
directly in court or any other government office for adjudication, unless there has been a
confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by thelupon or pangkat secretary and
attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman x x x.”

In the case at bar, the Punong Barangay, as Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa,

conducted conciliation proceedings to resolve the dispute between the parties.  As correctly
pointed out by the RTC, the complaint does not only allege, as a cause of action, the refusal of
respondents’ attorney-in-fact to give her consent to the installation of water facilities in the
premises, but also petitioners’ violation of the terms of the lease.

The law also provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in court, the parties
shall go through the conciliation process either before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat. This
was complied in the case at bar because a conciliation proceeding was conducted with the
Lupon Chairman. It is clear that the respondent’s complied with the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law providing for conciliation. Thus, the motion to dismiss was not granted.

CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL vs. JERRY D. MONTANEZ

G.R. No. 191336
January 25, 2012
Facts:

On February 1, 2001, Jerry Montanez secured a loan payable in one (1) year from
Miguel. He gave as collateral therefor his house and lot at Caloocan City. Montanez failed to
pay the loan which prompted Miguel to file a complaint against the him before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The parties then entered into
a Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein Montanez agreed to pay his loan in installments in the
amount of P2,000.00 per month, and after the house and lot given as collateral is sold, the he
would settle the balance of the loan in full. He still failed to pay the loan thus the  Lupong
Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court in favor of the Miguel.

He then filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 66, a complaint
for Collection of Sum of Money. Montanez raised the defense of improper venue considering
that the petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong, Caloocan City while he lived in San Mateo,
Rizal. The MeTC ruled in favor of Miguel and ordered Montanez to pay.  Aggrieved, Montanez
appealed before the RTC of Makati City which affirmed the decision of the MeTC. Aggrieved,
respondent appealed before the CA which reversed the decision of the RTC dismissing
Miguels’s complaint for collection of sum of money, without prejudice to her right to file the
necessary action to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos. It also ruled that Kasunduang Pag-
aayos did not novate the loan agreement and considering that more than 6 months had elapsed
from the date of settlement, Miguel’s remedy is to file an action for the execution of the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos in court and not for collection of sum of money. The CA did not rule on
the issue of venue finding it unnecessary. Thus, this petition for review on certitorari before the
Supreme Court.

Issues:
 1. Whether or not a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the
petitioner, notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pag-aayos;
2. Whether or not the CA should have decided the case on the merits 
rather than remand the case for the enforcement of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.

Decision:

The Court ruled that because the respondent failed to comply with the terms of
the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said agreement is deemed rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the
New Civil Code and the petitioner can insist on his original demand. Furthermore the complaint
for collection of sum of money is the proper remedy in the case at bar.

Article 2037 of the Civil Code provides that, “A compromise has upon the parties the
effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with a
judicial compromise.”

The Court stated that an amicable settlement reached at the barangay

conciliation proceedings is binding between the contracting parties and, upon its
perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is not contrary to law, good morals,
good customs, public order and public policy. It has the force and effect of res
judicata even if not judicially approved.

Under Section 417 of the Local Government Code, such amicable settlement or

arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the Barangay Lupon within six (6) months
from the date of settlement, if the 6-month period had already lapsed by filing an action to
enforce such settlement in the appropriate city or municipal court. In case of non-compliance
two remedies are available. The first remedy which is covered by the Local Government Code
and the Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong
Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of
the terms of the settlement and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily
complying with his obligation under the settlement. The second remedy, which is governed by
the Rules of Court states that if the cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by
operation of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment. The enforcement by execution of
the amicable settlement is only applicable if the contracting parties have not repudiated such
settlement within 10 days from the date thereof in accordance with Section 416 of the Local
Government Code. If the amicable settlement is repudiated by one party, either expressly or
impliedly, the other party has two options, namely, to enforce the compromise in accordance
with the Local Government Code or Rules of Court or to consider it rescinded and insist upon
his original demand. 

Montanez did not comply with the terms and conditions of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos.
This non-compliance denotes that the respondent did not intend to be bound by the terms
thereof and is considered as repudiation thereof. Because of this Miguel has the option either
to enforce the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, or to considered it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand. She chose to rescind the Kasunduang Pag-aayos as evidenced by the filing for
collection of money.  Thus, the decision of the CA is set aside and the ruling of the RTC of
Makati City was reinstated by the Supreme Court.