Legislative Department

Prepared by: Matt Joshua T.
Juan | JD – 4B | University of the Cordilleras | College of Law
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Tobias v. Abalos, GR L-114783, December 8, 1994

FACTS:
Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, filed a petition
questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three provisions of the
constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule. The bill provides for the conversion of
Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the division of congressional district of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into two separate district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution,
which provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts increased the members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by
the Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years following the return
of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners stated that the division was not made
pursuant to any census showing that the minimum population requirement was attained.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the law entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a
Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" may provide for the division of the congressional district
of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts without violating the one title-one subject
rule
2. Whether or not said law may be declared invalid due to the absence of any mention therein of
any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts
3. Whether or not the law violates the present limit on the number of representatives – 250
RULING:
1. Yes
2. No
3. No
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
A liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as
not to cripple or impede legislation. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title
expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject. The
Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such
precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices
if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation
Prepared by: Matt Joshua T. Juan | JD – 4B | University of the Cordilleras | College of Law
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.
On the second issue:
The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from
the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
On the third issue:
The present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law.
The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment.
Marcos v. COMELEC, GR 119976, September 18, 1995
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months.
On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and
also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the
COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as
she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representative.
In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since
childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The
COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be
suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes.
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner
of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET has jurisdiction over the issue of Imelda’s qualifications after the May 8,
1995 elections when Imelda was not yet a member of the HREP
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year
residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.
RULING:
No.
DISCUSSION: HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House
of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives
Yes. The honest mistake in the Certificate of Candidacy regarding the period of residency does not
negate the fact of residence if such fact is established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a
piece of paper. It is settled that when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually
means only “domicile.” It was held that Tacloban, Leyte was in fact the domicile of origin of Imelda by
operation of law for a minor follows the domicile of her parents (which was the same). In its Resolution,
COMELEC was obviously referring to Imelda’s various places of actual residence, not her domicile (legal
residence). An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment,* and
Imelda has clearly always chosen to return to her domicile of origin. Even at the height of the Marcos
Regime’s powers, she kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating important personal milestones there, instituting well-publicized projects for its benefit and
establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power always
with either her influence or consent.
To successfully effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) actual removal or an actual
change of domicile, (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with the purpose
BANAT v. COMELEC, GR 179271, April 21, 2009

FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining
20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is
entitled to 3 seats – this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of
Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the
votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that
the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to
qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list
election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical
impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill
the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3
seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to
sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
1. (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
2. Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional.
3. Whether or not major political parties may participate in the party-list elections
RULING:
1. No
2. No
3. No
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b)
of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list
seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two
percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the -broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
(3) No.Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the
Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

Major political parties are barred from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
Reason: to promote participation of all sectors, except the religious sector, as mandated by the
Constitution. (Puno Dissenting Opinion)
A Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in
Veterans:
The twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed
twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under
the party list;
The two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid
votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of Representatives;
The three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional seats;
Proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001
Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the COMELEC. This resolution
approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those impleaded, in the 2001
party list elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the
party list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream
political parties, the none-marginalized or
overrepresented.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
2. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors
and organizations
RULING:
1. Yes
2. Yes
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
Members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Political parties – even the major ones – may participate in the party-list elections. Under the
Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides
that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. "Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX
(C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. For its part,
Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a
political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties."
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any
political party – or any organization or group for that matter – may do so. The requisite character of
these parties or organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system – to give
genuine power to the people by making the marginalized and underrepresented to become lawmakers
themselves.
There should be a proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will
enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens:
1. Who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. Who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. Who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole.
"Proportional representation" refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented:

labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
The party-list organization or party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and
underrepresented constituencies. Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-
organization must be Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties.
Finally, "lack of well-defined constituency” refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to
those with disparate interests identified with the marginalized or underrepresented.
While RA 7941 mentions the labor, peasants, fisher folk, urban poor, ICCs, elderly, handicapped,
women, youth, veterans, OFWs and professionals as marginalized and underrepresented, the
ENUMERATION IS NOT EXCLUSIVE.The party list group (even political parties) must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented.
SC: CASE REMANDED TO COMELEC TO DETERMINE QUALIFICATIONS OF THESE POLITICAL PARTIES.

GUIDELINES:
1. Party must truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
2. Major political parties allowed but they must still represent the marginalized
3. Religious sector may not be represented but a religious leader may be a nominee
4. Must not be disqualified under Sec 6 RA 7941
5. Must be independent from the government (not adjunct, not funded, not assisted)
6. Nominees must themselves be qualified (age, residence, citizenship)
7. Nominees must belong to the marginalized/underrep
8. Nominee must be able to contribute to appropriate legislation
Atong Paglaum, Inc v. COMELEC, GR 203766, April 2, 2013

FACTS: Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in
the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors. Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition
for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in
disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the party-list system of election is for sectoral parties only
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: The party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties. the
party-list system is composed of three different groups and the sectoral parties belong to only one of
the three groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3)
sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from
sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized
along sectoral lines and need not represent any particular sector.
The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major
political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined
political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national
or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political
parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those
who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the
House of Representatives.
Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in
poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class.
More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low
income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board.
Parameters in determining who may participate in the party-list elections:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system .
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and
underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined
political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized
and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack
"well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees
of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or
that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their
respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa vs. COMELEC, GR 207134, June 26, 2015
ISSUE: Whether or not party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes are entitled to a
seat
RULING: Yes
DISCUSSION: Party-list groups garnering less than 2% of the party-list votes may yet qualify for a seat in
the allocation of additional seats depending on their ranking in the second round. There are two steps in
the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats,
38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the
17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of
the remaining available seats corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available seats. Second, we
assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely
distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally,
we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is
entitled.
Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based
on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. ***Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Ligot v. Mathay, GR L-34676, April 30, 1974
ISSUE: Whether or not a member of Congress may be paid his retirement gratuity on the basis of the
increased salary per annum of members of Congress which was already operative when his retirement
took effect
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: Emoluments of a member of Congress cannot be increased during the term for which he
was elected. Retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of
compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Sarmiento III v. Mison, GR 79974, December 17, 1987
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appointment by the President of a head of a bureau requires the
Commission on Appointment’s confirmation
2. Whether or not a law is needed first before President may appoint other officers lower in rank
RULING:
1. No
2. No
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint.
Heads of bureaus are excluded from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on

Appointments. The first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks
only of appointment by the President without need of confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
The power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already
vested in the him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, in the second
sentence of the same Sec. 16, Article VII. “He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by
law to appoint.”
The Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, GR 105371, November 11, 1993
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a RA 7354 entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining
its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
Purposes Connected Therewith" is invalid for not reflecting in the title the withdrawal of the
franking privilege from the judiciary and its purposes
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may look examine the enrolled bill to determine if it
embodies the provisions passed by Congress despite a certification in the enrolled bill and the
journal that the law was duly enacted
RULING:
1. No
2. No
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to
cover every single detail of the measure. If the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably
covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is
sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. The details of a legislative act need not be
specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to
the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to
create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its
infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected
with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in
the title. The withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and
effective postal service system.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the
Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final
reading of the bill). The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court
COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla, GR 151992, September 18, 2002
ISSUE: Whether or not Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) may compel COMELEC by
mandamus to execute the contract for the modernization of voters’ registration list despite the lack of
budget appropriated by Congress for the contract
RULING: No.
DISCUSSION: The existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-
requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. The obvious intent is
to impose such conditions as a priori requisites to the validity of the proposed contract.
Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, GR 89914, November 20, 1991
ISSUES: Whether or not Congress, in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation, may look
into whether a person called for inquiry violated a law
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not
absolute or unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without
justification in terms of the functions of congress. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial agency.
These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No inquiry is an end in
itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress . Investigations conducted
solely for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to punish those investigated are
indefensible. Since congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or
appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other
branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire into
mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what
exclusively belongs to the Executive.
Evardone v. COMELEC, GR 94010, December 2, 1991
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1987 Constitution repealed the old LGC
RULING: No
DISCUSSION:
Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the
1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160
providing for the Local Government Code of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991,
specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337. But the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1
January 1992 and therefore the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to
the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P.
Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
The Election Code contains no special provisions on the manner of conducting elections for the recall of
a local official. Any such election shall be conducted in the manner and under the rules on special
elections, unless otherwise provided by law or rule of the COMELEC. Thus, pursuant to the rule-making
power vested in respondent COMELEC under the old LGC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23
May 1990.
We therefore rule that Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid and
constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for
recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.
Senate v. Ermita, GR 169777, April 20, 2006
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the provision of EO 464 requiring all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before
either House of Congress is valid
2. Whether or not the provision of EO 464 – providing that once the head of office determines that
a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the President’s
authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject
only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such
official – is valid
RULING:
1. Yes
2. No
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
Such requirement, however, is valid only insofar as appearances of department heads in the question
hour in Congress in the latter’s exercise of congressional oversight.
Sections 21 and 22 while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
***When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to
whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter
of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress
may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their
appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory.
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and
the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are
department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power — the President on
whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect
accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
Only the President himself may invoke the privilege. The President may of course authorize the
Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must
state that the authority is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with
the President. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official
in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise
such power.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Lagman v. Medialdea, GR 231658, July 4, 2017
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the graduated powers of the President should be exercised in sequence
2. Whether or not a nullification by the Supreme Court of the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus and the declaration of martial law by the President necessarily nullifies his
calling-out order
3. Whether or not the Supreme Court should give deference to Congress’ power to revoke in
reviewing the sufficiency of the factual bases for the declaration or suspension
4. Whether or not the Supreme Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
declaration or suspension through a petition for certiorari filed under the Art VIII Sec 1 or Sec 5
RULING:
1. No
2. No
3. No
4. No
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
The 1987 Constitution gives the "President, as Commander-in- Chief, a 'sequence' of 'graduated
power[s]'. From the most to the least benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law." It must be stressed,
however, that the graduation refers only to hierarchy based on scope and effect. It does not in any
manner refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-
called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or restrict the manner by which the President decides
which power to choose.
The calling out power is in a different category from the power to declare martial law and the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The President may exercise the power to call out the
Armed Forces independently of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and to
declare martial law, although, of course, it may also be a prelude to a possible future exercise of the
latter powers, as in this case.
On the third issue:
The Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power to
revoke by Congress.
On the fourth issue:
Under Section 18, Article VII, the Court is tasked to review only the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
President's exercise of emergency powers and not to determine whether the President committed
GADALEJ in declaring ML or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
Lagman v. Medialdea, GR 243522, February 19, 2019
ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution limits the number of extensions and the duration for which
Congress can extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution does not limit the period for which it can
extend the same. The only limitations to the exercise of congressional authority to extend such
proclamation or suspension are: a) the extension should be upon the President's initiative; b) it should
be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the demands of public safety; and c) it is
subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon the petition of any citizen.
Saez v. Arroyo, GR 183533, September 25, 2012
ISSUE: Whether or not a President may be automatically dropped as a respondent in a petition for writs
of amparo and habeas data filed against the military
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: The President cannot be automatically dropped as a respondent pursuant to the doctrine
of command responsibility.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
(Existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator
of the crime as his subordinate)
On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict
standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through
circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged
with constructive knowledge. (Superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or
had been committed)
As to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the
military. (Superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or
punish the perpetrators thereof)
Presidential immunity from suit exists only in concurrence with the president’s incumbency. Conversely,
this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts
committed during his or her tenure.
Brillantes v. COMELEC, GR 163193, June 15, 2004
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC, through a resolution, may allow the use of the third copy of the
Election Returns (ERs) for the positions of President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, intended for the COMELEC, as basis for the encoding and transmission of
advanced precinct results, and in the process, canvass the votes for the President and Vice-
President, ahead of the canvassing of the same votes by Congress
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: The sole and exclusive authority to canvass for the votes for the election of President and
VP belongs to Congress. The returns of every election for President and Vice-President duly certified by
the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress, directed to the
President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the Senate shall,
not later than thirty days after the day of the election, open all the certificates in the presence of the
Senate and the House of Representatives in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination
of the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, GR 83896, February 22, 1991
ISSUE: Whether or not cabinet members, their deputies or assistants may hold other office in the
government
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: Section 13, Article VII: "The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other
office or employment during their tenure." The disqualification is absolute, not being qualified by the
phrase "in the Government." The stricter prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is
therefore all-embracing and covers both public and private office or employment.
While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly
authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,
Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Estrada v. Desierto, GR 146710-15, March 2, 2001
ISSUES: Whether or not a non-sitting President may still claim presidential immunity over acts done
during his incumbency
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: Incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the
period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.
Marcos v. Manglapus, GR 88211, September 15, 1989
ISSUE: Whether or not the President, in the exercise of his powers under the Constitution, may prohibit
a person from returning to the Philippines
RULING: Yes
DISCUSSION:
The President is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such
positions pertain to the office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. The powers of the President
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words,
executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. Whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive.
The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is
founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. It is not only the power of the President
but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the
nation demand. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but
is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring
domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision.
Matibag v. Benipayo, GR 149036, April 2, 2002
ISSUE: Whether or not an ad interim appointment is merely a temporary appointment
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: An ad interim appointment (presidential appointment while congress is in recess) is a

permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the
President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes
an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.
Pimentel v. Ermita, GR 164978, October 13, 2005
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may issue appointments in an acting capacity to department
secretaries while Congress is in session
RULING: Yes
DISCUSSION: In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office
of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting
secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. The office of a department
secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter
ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the President’s
confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint
in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may
not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee
will also be the permanent appointee.
IBP v. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may call on the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility
patrols even in the absence of an emergency justifying the calling of the military to assist the police
force
RULING: Yes
DISCUSSION:
The power involved may be no more than the maintenance of peace and order and promotion of the
general welfare. this case calls for the exercise of the President’s powers as protector of the peace. The
power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief
powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring
domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the
relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the
President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the
President’s exercising as Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the
peace, and maintain public order and security.
It is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in
order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
People v. Patriarca, GR 135457, September 29, 2000
ISSUE: Whether or not it is correct for a trial court to convict a person who was granted amnesty by the
President for past crimes he has committed
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high
political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into
oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
Criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.
Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, GR 180643, March
25, 2008
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not impending answers to questions posed to a President’s cabinet member which
involve conversations or correspondence with the President regarding the latter’s executive and
policy decision-making process relating to a government contract with another country is
privileged
2. Whether or not a letter, stating that “this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of
executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly”
and withholding information on the ground that if disclosed, might impair our diplomatic as well
as economic relations with the People's Republic of China, is sufficient invocation of executive
privilege
RULING:
1. Yes
2. Yes
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
First, the communications relate to a "quintessential and non-delegable power" of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are "received" by a close advisor of the President. Under the "operational
proximity" test, a cabinet member can be considered a close advisor of the President.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority. Presidential communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be
overcome only by mere showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The
courts are enjoined to resolve the competing interests of the political branches of the government in the
manner that preserves the essential functions of each Branch.
For the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of
the department which has control over the matter. A formal and proper claim of executive privilege
requires a "precise and certain reason" for preserving their confidentiality. At any rate, the Congress
must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel
disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a
coordinate and co-equal department.
Clinton v. Jones, 520 US 681 (1997)
ISSUE: Whether or not the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages
litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: The principal rationale for affording Presidents immunity from damages actions based on
their official acts – to enable them to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a
particular decision may give rise to personal liability – provides no support for an immunity
for unofficial conduct. Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within official capacity are grounded in the
nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it.
Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, GR 203372, June 16, 2015
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not midnight appointments are valid
2. Whether or not the transmittal of the appointment paper and acceptance by the appointee
must happen before the appointment ban so as not to fall under the ban on midnight
appointments
RULING:
1. No
2. Yes
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
The period for prohibited appointments covers two months before the presidential elections until the
end of the President's term. The Constitution, with a specific exception, ended the President's power to
appoint "two months immediately before the next presidential elections." For an appointment to be
valid, it must be made outside of the prohibited period or, failing that, fall under the specified exception.
Any valid appointment, including one made under the exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, must consist of the (1) President signing an appointee's appointment paper to a
vacant office, (2) the official transmittal of the appointment paper (preferably through the MRO), (3)
receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee, and (4) acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or his or her assumption to office.
The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid appointment: (1) authority to
appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment paper and
evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt of the
appointment paper and acceptance of the appointment by the appointee who possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always
apply, regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during the
appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur and operate as a single
process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks even one step.
Boac v. Cadapan, GR 184461-62, May 31, 2011
ISSUE: Whether or not the President may be sued in petitions for habeas corpus and amparo which were
filed during his incumbency
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law . It will degrade the
dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations
while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment,
hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and
anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed
upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government. (In this case, the
petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyo permitted, condoned or performed any
wrongdoing against the three missing persons.)
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Casar v. Soluren, AM RTJ-12-2333, October 22, 2012
ISSUE: Whether or nor a judge may go to a provincial jail to solicit the sympathies and signatures of the
prisoners to dismiss the administrative case filed against him
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: This Court has consistently enjoined judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct
but even the mere appearance of impropriety because the appearance of bias or prejudice can be
damaging as actual bias or prejudice to the public’s confidence on the Judiciary’s role in the
administration of justice. To say the least, using detention prisoners who had cases before Judge Soluren
cannot be countenanced.
Madriaga v. China Banking Corp., GR 192377, July 25, 2012
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may still rule on a motion to quash a writ of possession that was
already implemented
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: Judicial power presupposes actual controversies, the very antithesis of mootness. Where
there is no more live subject of controversy, the Court ceases to have a reason to render any ruling or
make any pronouncement. Courts generally decline jurisdiction on the ground of mootness – save when,
among others, a compelling constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles
to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading judicial
review, which are not extant in this case.
People v. Perez, GR L-32282-83, November 26, 1970
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may transfer the hearing of a criminal case from the court
where it is filed to another place
RULING: Yes
DISCUSSION: The Constitution has vested the Judicial Power in the Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as may be established by law, and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent
attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. The courts can by appropriate
means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an
effective institution of government.
One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one
court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and
impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands.
In re: Atty. Edillon, AM 1928, August 3, 1978
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a lawyer may be compelled to become a member of the IBP
2. Whether or not the SC has the jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer from the Roll of
Attorneys
RULING:
1. Yes
2. Yes
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
Even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once
becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in
all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
The matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation
and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities.
The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional
or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice.
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by the Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court
the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
Maturan v. Gutierrez-Torres, AM OCA IPI 04-1606-MTJ, September 19, 2012
ISSUE: Whether or not a trial court judge may simply refuse to render judgment on a criminal case which
was already submitted to it for decision 2 years before
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution requires that all cases or matters filed
after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from
date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months
for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower courts. Thereby, the Constitution
mandates all justices and judges to be efficient and speedy in the disposition of the cases or matters
pending in their courts. A judge must exert every effort to timely rule upon a case submitted for
decision. If she thinks that she would need a period to decide a case or to resolve an issue longer than
what the Constitution prescribes, she may request an extension from the Court to avoid administrative
sanctions.
Caoibes v. Ombudsman, GR 132177, July 19, 2001
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman should defer the criminal case filed before it against a judge
pending the determination of the administrative case filed before the SC involving the same case and
the same judge
RULING: Yes
DISCUSSION: Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested
with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this
premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against
a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have
all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true
regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the
Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not
know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the
administrative authority of the Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is
involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative
concerns.
By virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel,
from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is
only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation
of powers.
In Re: Derogatory News Item Charging Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria with Interference
on Behalf of a Suspected Drug Queen, AM No. 00-7-09 CA, March 27, 2001
ISSUE: Whether or not a CA Associate Justice who tried to intercede on behalf of a suspected drug
personality who is an accused in a criminal case may be disciplined
RULING: Yes
DISCUSSION: Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves with honor, probity, fairness,
prudence and discretion. Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. They should avoid not
only acts of impropriety, but all appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must be
consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the
assigned role of preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity of the Judiciary.
The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice
is circumscribed with the heavy of responsibility. His at all times must be characterized with propriety
and must be above suspicion. His must be free of even a whiff of impropriety, not only with respect to
the performance of his judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom and as a private
individual.
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness that a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of
propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable
in orderly society cannot be preserved. There is simply no place in the Judiciary for those who cannot
meet the exacting standards of judicial conduct and integrity.
Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137 (1883)
ISSUE: Whether or not SC may be asked, on the strength of a law authorizing it to issue writs mandamus
to any courts appointed or persons holding office, to issue a writ of mandamus to a secretary of state
RULING: No
DISCUSSION: Congress does not have the power to pass laws that override the Constitution, such as by
expanding the scope of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. The Supreme Court shall have original
jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and those in which a
state shall be a party. In all other cases, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction. To enable
this court then to issue a mandamus, it must be shown to be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, or to
be necessary to enable them to exercise appellate jurisdiction.
Hebron v. Garcia, AM RTJ-12-2334, November 14, 2012
ISSUE: Whether or not a RTC judge may be disciplined for undue delay in resolving MR for almost 2 years
from the time it was filed on the ground of inadvertence and discovered the MR only when it conducted
an inventory of cases
RULING: Yes
DISCUSSION: Article VIII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that all cases or matters filed
after the effectivity of the Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from
date of submission for the SC, and, unless reduced by the SC, twelve months for all collegiate courts, and
three months for all other courts.
OCA v. Balut, AM RTJ-15-2426, June 16, 2015
ISSUE: Whether or not an MTC judge may be dismissed for borrowing money from the court funds
RULING: Yes
DISCUSSION: Judges must adhere to the highest tenets of judicial conduct. Because of the sensitivity of
his position, a judge is required to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and
to observe exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. He should adhere to the highest
standards of public accountability lest his action erode the public faith in the Judiciary. The judge is the
visible representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that the people draw
their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to return that regard, he must be the first to
abide by the law and weave an example for others to follow.
Re: Cases Submitted for Decision before Judge Baluma, AM RTJ-13-2355, September 2, 2013
ISSUE: Whether or not a trial court judge may be fined for failing to decide cases already submitted for
decision within the reglementary period
RULING: Yes
DISCUSSION: Article VIII, Section 15(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides that lower courts have three
months within which to decide cases or resolve matters submitted to them for resolution. The Court has
consistently impressed upon judges the need to decide cases promptly and expeditiously under the
time-honored precept that justice delayed is justice denied. Every judge should decide cases with
dispatch and should be careful, punctual, and observant in the performance of his functions for delay in
the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards and brings it into disrepute. Failure to decide a case within the reglementary period is not
excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions on the
defaulting judge. The Court has allowed reasonable extensions of time needed to decide cases, but such
extensions must first be requested from the Court. A judge cannot by himself choose to prolong the
period for deciding cases beyond that authorized by law.
People v. Mahiman, GR 200942, June 16, 2015
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court may award actual damages even in the absence of
documentary evidence and even if the case does not fall under any of the exceptions to the general rule
on the award of actual damages
RULING: Yes.
DISCUSSION: “However, we are inclined to award lost earnings considering that the deceased, as
testified by his widow, was the manager of Stanfilco-Dole, Phils. in Malaybalay City and was receiving a
monthly salary of ₱95,000.00. He was 54 years of age when gunned down by appellant. This testimony
was not objected to by appellant or questioned during cross-examination or on appeal. Clearly, the
existence of factual basis of the award has been satisfactorily established. However, the amount of the
award for lost earnings must be modified following the formula [2/3 x 80 – age] x [gross annual income -
necessary expenses equivalent to 50% of the gross annual income].” (See People v. Perez)
Disini v. Secretary of Justice, GR 203335, February 18, 2014

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court may rule upon the constitutionality of a penalty imposable
for a criminal offense
2. Whether or not the power to issue subpoenas is exclusively a judicial function
3. Whether or not the DOJ may seize and place computer data under its control and disposition
without a warrant
RULING:
1. No
2. No
3. No
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the
legislature prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. They
appear proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine penalties for offenses
is not diluted or improperly wielded simply because at some prior time the act or omission was but an
element of another offense or might just have been connected with another crime. Judges and
magistrates can only interpret and apply them and have no authority to modify or revise their range as
determined by the legislative department. The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the
lawmaking body.
The power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power
to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.
On the third issue:
No search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge. For
an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not
enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates some law, for to do so would make him
judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.
Republic vs. Sereno G.R. No. 237428 May 11, 2018
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a Supreme Court Justice, or any impeachable officer for that matter, may be
removed from office via quo warranto
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court may take cognizance of a petition for quo warranto filed
against its member without violating the doctrine of separation of powers
3. Whether or not the Supreme Court must exercise judicial restraint even if all the requisites of
judicial review are present to give deference to a future impeachment trial by the Senate
4. Whether or not the SC may inquire into the processes leading to JBC’s nomination
5. Whether or not failure to file SALN goes into the qualification of a SC justice that a member of
the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence
RULING:
1. Yes
2. Yes
3. No
4. Yes
5. Yes
DISCUSSION:
On the first issue:
A quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds distinct from those of impeachment. (R66 S1)
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are
distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal,
and (4) limitations.
The Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would
otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core
constitutional provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.
The role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional
separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication
of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law. The question of
whether a franchisee is in breach of the franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently
suited to a court of law, and not for an administrative agency, much less one to which no such function
has been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial review over laws does not
preclude Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the
viability of quo warranto does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by abrogating
the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough by the franchisees' violation of
the franchises extended to them.
On the third issue:
Judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
In the presence of all the requisites for the Court's exercise of judicial review, there can be no doubt that
the exercise thereof is not discretionary upon the Court, nor dependent upon the whims and caprices of
any of its Members nor any of the parties. Even in cases rendered moot and academic by supervening
events, the Court nevertheless exercised its power of review on the basis of certain recognized
exceptions. Neither is its exercise circumscribed by fear of displeasing a co-equal branch of the
government. Instead, the Constitution makes it crystal clear that the exercise of judicial power is a duty
of the Court.
As such, the exercise of judicial power could never be made dependent upon the action or inaction of
another branch of the government. The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate,
sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is thus
misplaced.
On the first issue:
The Court's supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its own
rules. The Court's supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and
procedures. As when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, the Court, through its supervisory
authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC is compliant
with its own rules.
The JBC's duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither
absolute nor unlimited. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, subject only to the
minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these
long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit
among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its
duties.
The nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC's actions
in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving. Questions of policy or
wisdom refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of government." the exercise of the JBC's discretion in the nomination
process is not full as it is limited by the requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the laws for
every position. It does not involve a question of policy but simply a determination, based on facts, of
whether a candidate possesses the requisite qualifications or not. The JBC neither assumes an existence
separate from the Judiciary as it is not intended to be an independent Constitutional body but merely a
Constitutional office created and expressly subjected to the Court's supervision. Judicial encroachment
upon the exercise of wisdom of a co-equal branch of the government, which is the very basis of the
political question doctrine, is therefore not attendant when the Court supervises and reviews the action
of the JBC which is neither an executive nor a legislative branch enjoying independent political
prerogatives.
On the fifth issue:
More than age, citizenship and professional qualifications, Our fundamental law is clear that a member
of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. Failure to
file the SALN is clearly a violation of the Constitution and the law. The offense is penal in character and is
a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees. It disregards the
requirement of transparency as a deterrent to graft and corruption. For these reasons, a public official
who has failed to comply with the requirement of filing the SALN cannot be said to be of proven
integrity and the Court may consider him/her disqualified from holding public office.

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Legislative Department

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Prepared by: Matt Joshua T.

Juan | JD – 4B | University of the Cordilleras | College of Law

Tobias v. Abalos, GR L-114783, December 8, 1994

On the first issue:

On the second issue:

On the third issue:

Marcos v. COMELEC, GR 119976, September 18, 1995

BANAT v. COMELEC, GR 179271, April 21, 2009

On the first issue:

On the first issue:

On the second issue:

"Proportional representation" refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented:

SC: CASE REMANDED TO COMELEC TO DETERMINE QUALIFICATIONS OF THESE POLITICAL PARTIES.

Atong Paglaum, Inc v. COMELEC, GR 203766, April 2, 2013

Parameters in determining who may participate in the party-list elections:

Procedure in determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives:

Ligot v. Mathay, GR L-34676, April 30, 1974

Sarmiento III v. Mison, GR 79974, December 17, 1987

On the first issue:

Heads of bureaus are excluded from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on

On the second issue:

The Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, GR 105371, November 11, 1993

On the first issue:

On the second issue:

COMELEC v. Quijano-Padilla, GR 151992, September 18, 2002

Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, GR 89914, November 20, 1991

Senate v. Ermita, GR 169777, April 20, 2006

On the first issue:

On the second issue:

Lagman v. Medialdea, GR 231658, July 4, 2017

On the first issue:

On the second issue:

On the third issue:

On the fourth issue:

Lagman v. Medialdea, GR 243522, February 19, 2019

Saez v. Arroyo, GR 183533, September 25, 2012

Brillantes v. COMELEC, GR 163193, June 15, 2004

Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, GR 83896, February 22, 1991

Estrada v. Desierto, GR 146710-15, March 2, 2001

Marcos v. Manglapus, GR 88211, September 15, 1989

Matibag v. Benipayo, GR 149036, April 2, 2002

ISSUE: Whether or not an ad interim appointment is merely a temporary appointment

DISCUSSION: An ad interim appointment (presidential appointment while congress is in recess) is a

Pimentel v. Ermita, GR 164978, October 13, 2005

IBP v. Zamora, GR 141284, August 15, 2000

People v. Patriarca, GR 135457, September 29, 2000

On the first issue:

On the second issue:

Clinton v. Jones, 520 US 681 (1997)

Velicaria-Garafil v. Office of the President, GR 203372, June 16, 2015

On the first issue:

On the second issue:

Boac v. Cadapan, GR 184461-62, May 31, 2011

Casar v. Soluren, AM RTJ-12-2333, October 22, 2012

Madriaga v. China Banking Corp., GR 192377, July 25, 2012

People v. Perez, GR L-32282-83, November 26, 1970

In re: Atty. Edillon, AM 1928, August 3, 1978

On the first issue:

On the second issue:

Maturan v. Gutierrez-Torres, AM OCA IPI 04-1606-MTJ, September 19, 2012

Caoibes v. Ombudsman, GR 132177, July 19, 2001

Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch 5 U.S. 137 (1883)

Hebron v. Garcia, AM RTJ-12-2334, November 14, 2012