159. ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs.

Comelec
G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001
BAYAN MUNA vs. Comelec
Facts:

Petitioners challenged the Comelec’s Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the
disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the
marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresented.
Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner’s recourse to the Court was proper.

2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections.

3. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785.

RULING:

1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue
raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case
rendered it justiciable.

2. Political Parties -- even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements
laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System.

Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections,
merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of
the House of Representative may “be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
parties or organizations”. It is however, incumbent upon the COMELEC to determine proportional representation of the
marginalized and underrepresented”, the criteria for participation in relation to the cause of the party lsit applicants so
as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3. The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of respondents in the Omnibus
Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court
not being a trier of facts.

However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Consitution, the
Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Consitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The
Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists.

160. AQUINO vs. COMELEC

(248 SCRA 400)
Facts:

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new
Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the
aforementioned district for 10 months. Faced with a petition for disqualification, he amended the entry on his residency
in his certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the petition on 6 May and
allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino won. Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above
dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and disqualified for the
elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.

Issue:

Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the disqualification of
Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

Held:

The place “where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution
refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The purpose is to exclude strangers or newcomers
unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain. Aquino’s certificate of candidacy in a previous (1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose,Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that election. Aquino’s
connection to the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a condominium unit in the area. The
intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. The short length of time he claims to be a resident of Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac
and his claims of other residences in Metro Manila) indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his physical residence is
not to acquire a new, residence or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City. Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the Commission on Elections.

161. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO,
respondents. G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
Facts:

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate
for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did
not comply with the constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to since childhood under
residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation showing that she obtained the
highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the
highest number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections
based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers.

Issue:

Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one year residency requirement
to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:

Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of
Leyte.
Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile for actual
residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for the election to the
House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different places. In the case
at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that
Marcos lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner’s various places of
(actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and
May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative
of the First District of Leyte.

162.

163. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. GUINGONA

June 29, 2013
GR No. 134577, November 18, 1998
FACTS:

During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan was declared the duly elected President
of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon
as majority leader.

Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other member of
the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who had voted for Senator
Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the
"minority."

During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate "minority," Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party — numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority — had chosen Senator
Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The following session day, the debate on
the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering privilege speeches. On the third session day, the
Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.

On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body chat he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the
Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate.

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo warranto, alleging in
the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.

ISSUES:

1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?

2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority
leader?
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE

The Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful Senate President, since it was deemed a
political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however,
the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) "in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention;" and (2)
because the resolution of the issue hinged on the interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a
quorum to hold a session and therein elect a Senate President (read Avelino vs. Cuenco about the scope of the Court's
power of judicial review).

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the senators was not a
political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senate's "full discretionary authority," but was
subject to mandatory constitutional limitations. Thus, the Court held that not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to
pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was also its duty to consider and determine the issue.

SECOND ISSUE

There was no violation. The Court finds that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The Constitution mandates
that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members
thereof, it however does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the
"minority," who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate
shall automatically become the minority leader. While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate
President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both
chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the
Senate itself, not by this Court.

THIRD ISSUE

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or
who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title
to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor
general or a public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully
held or exercise by another.

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clearright to
the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the
respondent. In this case, petitioners present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the
Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific
acts as minority leader.

FOURTH ISSUE

Grave abuse of discretion - such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.

By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in
recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. To recall, the latter belongs to one of the minority parties in
the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority
leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only
after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.

Therefore, the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the
rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion
cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

164. JOSE AVELINO, petitioner, vs. MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent

83 PHIL 17, March 4, 1949
Facts:

In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate
President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they
deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. Before Senator Tañada could deliver his
privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned
the session of the Senate and walked out with his followers.

Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:

The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the functions of the
Senate.

Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the session which
suggestion was carried unanimously.

The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.

Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz, because the Assistance Secretary, who
was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the session.

Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter
Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval thereof
and the same was unanimously approved.

The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate
President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco, contending that the latter had not been validly elected because
twelve members did not constitute a quorum – the majority required of the 24-member Senate.

Issues:

Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.

Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.
Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful President of the Philippines Senate and oust
respondent.
Rulings:

In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:

The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will be against the doctrine of
separation of powers.

In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of
the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves
who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If, as the petition must imply to be
acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall — not in
the Supreme Court.

Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.

Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the
business of the Senate, because, firstly, the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of such session there
were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from
the country of Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators.

When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House: does not mean
“all” the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority
of “the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of
the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

The Court adopts a hands-off policy on this matter.

The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the office depends
exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that
body being amenable at any time by that majority.

At any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved
the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

Hence, by a vote of 6 to 4, The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground as it involved a political question.
The Supreme Court should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators
themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them.

165. Pacete vs The Secretary of Commission on Appointments, G.R. No. 25895, 23 July 1971

Facts: Feliciano Pacete was appointed by the President as municipal judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office
on 11 September 1964. His appointment was made during recess of Congress and was only submitted to COA in 1965
session and was unanimously confirmed on 20 May 1965. On 07 February 1966 the Secretary of Justice advised him to
vacate his post on the ground that his appointment was by-passed. Pacete clarified the matter with Commission on
Appointments.COA took no action and the Secretary of Justice still moved to Pacete to vacate his post and withheld his
salaries.

Issue: Whether or not a motion for consideration with COA without being acted on is a new one?

Decision: Petition granted. The constitutional requirement is clear; there must be either a rejection by COA or nonaction
on its part. Pacete’s confirmation became final and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the Fifth Congress as no rule of
the Commission as to a motion for reconsideration could have the forece and effect of defeating the constitutional
provision that an ad interim appointment is effective until disapproved by COA or until next adjournment of the
Congress.

166. Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the
rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.
The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum.
The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee
report had by then already been declared by the Chair.

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate
and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos.

Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:

Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern
with their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a
particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other
than members of the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open
to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in
the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be
concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been
defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House.

167. ALEJANDRINO V. QUEZON, 46 PHIL. 83 (1924)

Facts: Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the
Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and
emoluments of being a senator. He filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon
from executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void?

Decision: Petition dismissed. Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly controlled in the
exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition.

168. OSMEÑA VS. PENDATUN, 109 PHIL. 863 (1960)

Facts:

Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House making serious
imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was issued authorizing the
creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to summon
petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show cause why he
should not be punished by the House.

Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it infringes his
constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special Committee
continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously
disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.

Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, and
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.

Issue:

Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for speeches

Ruling: No. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators
or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is a
copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always been
understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the
members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in
any other place” than Congress.

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably necessary
that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment of every one,
however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior,
not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on
factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black and white for presentation
to, and adjudication by the Courts.

Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.

169. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR No. 128055, 2001-04-18

Facts:

Accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the exercise of her official functions, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application for legalization of the stay of the following
aliens in violation of Executive Order no. 324.

Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the arrest of
petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand (P15,000.00) Pesos.

Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical appearance as she was... then recuperating from injuries
sustained in a vehicular accident.
Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her
physical appearance in court.

Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May
1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment on 27 May 1991.

Petitioner moved for the cancellation of her cash bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty upon a
recognizance.

Petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition for Certiorari with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before the Court,
docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 and a
motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer her arraignment.

The Court, taking cognizance of the petition, issued a temporary restraining order.

Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order deferring petitioner's arraignment and the consideration of her motion
to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the court.

The Court rendered its decision dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining order.

When media reports announced petitioner's intention to accept a fellowship from the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from leaving the country.

Petitioner moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment
pending action on her motion to inhibit.

Her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

She filed a new a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary Injunction with the Court

At the same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of
the aliens whose applications she purportedly approved and thereby supposedly extended undue advantage were
conspicuously omitted in the complaint.

The OSP and the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two amended informations.

Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the 32 informations.

Once again came to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266, assailing the 03rd March 1993
resolution of the Sandiganbayan which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice... the Court issued a temporary
restraining order directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease and desist from sitting in the case, as well as from
enforcing the 11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 amended informations, and
from proceeding with her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his disqualification would have been resolved
by the Court.

All the 32 informations were consolidated into one information under Criminal Case No. 16698... the prosecution filed
on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending... petitioner.

The Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to file her opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion for the prosecution within
fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.

Sandiganbayan resolved:

"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants the motion under consideration and hereby suspends the
accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as Senator of the Republic of the Philippines

Hence, the instant recourse.

Issues:

Whether or not the petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day preventive suspension of
Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position, and
furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the suspension order.

Ruling:

The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged with
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential support

"SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. - any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud
upon... government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of
execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or... gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

"In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already received
such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government.

It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the
validity of the information filed before it.

Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order... of
suspension as a matter of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."

It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.

In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's
authority to decree the suspension of public officials... and employees indicted before it.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the
office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the
use of the word "office" would... indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not
only the particular office under which he stands accused.

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial
on the merits proceeds.

All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do
not constitute a... specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019

The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own
ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-

"x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty... days.
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

Petitioner's invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution - which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior,' andsuspend or expel a Member' by a vote of two-
thirds of all... its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed
sixty days - is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which
is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive... measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed
on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore, the
Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.

170. De Venecia v Sandiganbayan GR 130240, 5 February 2002

Facts: On 12 March 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal Case 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic
Act 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution
filed a “Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite.” In its Resolution dated 6 June 1997, the Sandiganbayan granted
the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the Speaker did not comply. Thus, on 12 August 1997,
the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, on 18 August 1997 at 8:00 a.m., to show cause
why he should not be held in contempt of court. Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the
House as a body pursuant to House Resolution 116 adopted on 13 August 1997. On 29 August 1997, the Sandiganbayan
rendered a Resolution declaring Speaker Jose C. de Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of
P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice. Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives;
Roberto P. Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño,
Cashier, House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property Division, House of Representatives, filed the
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the suspension provided in the Anti-Graft law is a penalty or a precautionary measure; and

Whether the doctrine of separation of powers exclude the members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019.

Held: As held in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan (GR 118354, 8 August 1995), the suspension provided for in
the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but
as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the filing of valid Information.

As held in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, et al., the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of RA 3019. The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act 3019 is distinct
from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the
above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon a determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon an erring member.

Ratio: Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by influencing witnesses or
tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an
incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in
the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to
enforce discipline, maintain order in its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.

The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress
from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes that each of the three co-equal and
independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government – the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary – has
exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively prevents one branch from
unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.

171. Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez [G.R. No. L-17931 (1963)]

Facts:

Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in bonding lumber and veneer by
plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are
the main raw materials in the production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and
P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second sum relying upon
Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass
in audit and approve the said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the
provision of section 2 of RA 2609.

Issue:

Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the margin fee.

Held:

No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly a finished product which is distinct
from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioner’s contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction
“and” between the terms “urea” and “formaldehyde” separately as essential elements in the manufacture of “urea
formaldehyde” and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the intent of the House of
Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was passed the only
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.

172. United States vs Juan Pons, 31 Phil. 729

Facts:

Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were trading partners. On April 5, 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived in Manila from
Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said bottles of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently
delivered 5 barrels to Pons' house. On the other hand, customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine
on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Belisto not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an
investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the act of trading
and dealing opium is against Republic Act No. 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently
importing and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that
Republic Act No. 2381 was approved while the Philippines Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his
witnesses claim that the said law was passed or approved on March 1, 1914 while the special session of the Commission
was adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. Since this is the case, the Republic Act No. 2381 should be null and
void.

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court must go beyond the recitals of the journals to determine if Republic Act No.
2381 was indeed made a law on February 28, 1914.

Held:

No. The SC looked into the journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the recitals in
the legislative journals. The said journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of
the Philippine Legislature would violate both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws, by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the government and to
interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the legislature. Pons' witnesses cannot be given due weight against
the conclusiveness of the journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the legislature adjourned at 12
midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question and the court did not err in declining to go beyond these
journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

173. Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay (G.R. No. L-25554) 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the Auditor of the
Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the
increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before
December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives
set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of
Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in
1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of
the members of the House who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members of the House but
also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for legislators becomes
fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to “all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in
the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the Senators and Representatives
that approved the measure, using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to
consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in
the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and the House,” underscores
that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all
members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can
become operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative until December
30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired.

174. Ligot vs Mathay GR No 34676 30 April 1974

Facts: Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to
the salary increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs.
Mathay. He lost his next bid and filed for retirement claim. House of Representative issued a treasury warrant using the
unapproved amount. Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant. Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was denied,
hence the petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to retirement using 32,000 Php.

Decision: Petition denied. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30,
1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the
Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect
increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency.

175. NICANOR T. JIMENEZ v. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, (A)

G.R. No. L-15905 August 3, 1966
FACTS:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs
Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication
of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.

According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958,
when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers
of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, he was not performing his official duty,
either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, said communication is not absolutely
privileged.

Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not
libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged communication.

This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the corresponding
order of dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.q

HELD:

No, the publication in question is not a privileged communication.

The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of
the phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in
Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and
of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts
in question.

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open
letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or about
said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by His
Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely privileged.

176. People vs. Jalosjos

G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000
Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant
filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.

Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the First District
of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he
has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by
the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from
pending criminal cases.

Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states, inter alia, that –

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would
be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When a people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with the knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically
overrule the will of the people.

Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical reasons.

Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that
since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect his mandate.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of Representatives

Held:

NO. The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of its importance, the privileges
and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not
inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather
than exemption.

Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. xxx

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence
is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than
six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases

The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless
expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must
protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling
temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings will virtually make him a free man

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the
limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results
which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with
full knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve
his full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the
correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws." This simply means that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman
a substantial differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly
confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.

177. HOMOBONO ADAZA v. FERNANDO PACANA JR (D)

135 SCRA 431 March 18, 1985
FACTS:

Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental. He took his oath of office and started
discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980.

Elected vice-governor for said province was respondent Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and assumed
said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.

March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections;
petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the
candidates, while respondent lost.

July 19, 1984, petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa and since then he has discharged the
functions of said office.
July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Ferdinand E. Marcos,
and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984.

Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the
province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary
system.

Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be considered to have abandoned or resigned from the
position of vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since
respondent had reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in the Batas Pambansa elections, he could
no longer continue to serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office of governor.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] can exercise
and discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously.

Whether or not a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue serving as
vice-governor and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.

HELD:

No, a provincial governor who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas Pambansa [MP] cannot exercise and
discharge the functions of both offices simultaneously.

The constitutional prohibition against a member of the Batasan Pambansa from holding any other office or employment
in the government during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides
as follows: Sec 10. “A member of the National Assembly [Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or
employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .”

The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain and free from ambiguity. The only exceptions mentioned
therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member. The wisdom or expediency of the said provision is a
matter which is not within the province of the Court to determine.

Yes, a vice-governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa, but lost, can continue serving as vice-governor
and subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office is vacated.

The law governing the election of members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which
specifically provides that "governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing
a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably, respondent falls within the
coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Batasan
Pambansa election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.

178. Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982

Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group, the
respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice Estanislao
Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero
to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel
before any administrative body,” and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his
appearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following the
notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10
IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’
ownership of the said 10 shares.

Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without violating
Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution

Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of
the matter in litigation.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He
had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He
acquired them “after the fact” that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto suit had been
filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is more, before he
moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to
by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal
interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as
counsel before an administrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of the Constitutional
prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to
appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.

179. screenshot abbas SETribunal

Facts:

On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No.
002-87 against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman), Associate
Justices Andres R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T.
Guingona, Jose Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.

On November 17, 1987, the petitioner, with the exception of Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
(who had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal
Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the Tribunal filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87
on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case, as respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V.
Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had filed a Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to
Recuse the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another
respondent in the same contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the petitions to recuse and the motion for
disqualification or inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral arguments were heard by the
respondent Tribunal, with the latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the hearings and
deliberations of the respondent Tribunal in both SET Case No. 002-87 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another
contest filed by Augusto S. Sanchez against him and Senator Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his
personal involvement as a party in the two cases.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process
imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine of necessity which they perceive to be the
foundation of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both practicable and constitutionally
unobjectionable namely: the amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so as to permit the contest
being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.

The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24) -- requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature -- is a proviso that where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt
resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the petition for
disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only three
Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.

Issue: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of which are sitting in the tribunal?

Decision: Petition dismissed. The Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations of for the
substitution of senators designated to the Tribunal. Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes for the vindication
in the fairness and sense of justice of the Tribunal.

Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify
himself from sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience
dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or
biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of
the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators
and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.

The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must
therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or
inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Should any three (3) Senator-Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from
participating in the proceeding in SET Case No. 002-87, a Tribunal would result that be balanced between the three (3)
Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members and still constitute more than a barge quorum. In such a Tribunal,
both the consideration of public policy and fair play raised by petitioners and constitutional intent above noted
concerning the mixed "Judicial" and "legislative" composition of the Electoral Tribunals would appear to be substantially
met and served. This denouement, however, must be voluntarily reached and not compelled by certiorari.

180. MELANIO D. SAMPAYAN et al vs. RAUL A. DAZA et al

G.R. No. 103903. September 11, 1992

Facts:

On February 18, 1992, petitioners, filed the instant petition for prohibition seeking to disqualify respondent RaulDaza,
then incumbent congressman, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office, on the ground that the latter is a
greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States since October 16, 1974.Petitioners allege that
Mr.Daza has not renounced his status as permanent resident.Petitioners manifested that on April 2, 1992, they filed a
petition before the COMELEC to disqualify respondent Daza from running in the recent May 11, 1992 elections on the
basis of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and that the instant petition is concerned with the unlawful
assumption of office by respondent Daza from June 30, 1987 until June 30, 1992.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code?

Held:

No. The prohibition case should be dismissed because this case is already moot and academic for the reason that
petitioners seek to unseat respondent from his position forthe duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987
and ending June 30, 1992. Moreover the jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal and a
writ of prohibition can no longer be issued against respondent since his term has already expired. Furthermore as a de
facto public officer, respondent cannot be made to reimburse funds disbursed during his term of office becaus e his acts
are as valid as those of a dejure officer. Moreover, as a de facto officer, he is entitled to emoluments for actual services
rendered.

181. Bondoc vs. Pineda 201 SCRA 792

FACTS:

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP were candidates for
the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a
protest in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are
Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and
1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman
Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of
the contest.

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he
was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for
allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the promulgation of the
decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
House of Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to
the HRET.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party therein, may change that
party’s representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election
contest pending therein.

RULING:

The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to provide an independent and
impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.

As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete
detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence,
disloyalty to party and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In
expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a “conscience vote” in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on
the result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.

Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura’s right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are
entitled to security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the Constitution.
Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as, the expiration of the
member’s congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he
represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid cause. A member may
not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with
another.