JOSEPH E.

ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs.
ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES,
VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE
PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA,
ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
G.R. No. 146710-15      
March 2, 2001

PUNO, J.:

FACTS:

 In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected
President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-
President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by
problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur
Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the
petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng
lords. The expose’ immediately ignited reactions of rage.

On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of

Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the
members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20,
2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On
January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the
opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing
that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose
Velarde.” The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the
streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew
their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries,
undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their
posts.

On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide

administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On
the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving
Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter
stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise
the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the
Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the
letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the
same day.
 After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems appeared
in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the
Ombudsman were set in motion.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court ruled that in a resignation, there must be an

intent to resign, and that intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.
The validity of a resignation is not government by any formal requirements as
to form since it can be oral or written, expressed or implied. So long as the
resignation is clear, the same act must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any
formal letter of resignation before leaving Malacanang Palace. Consequently,
whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and
omissions before, during and after Jan. 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a
material relevance on the issue. The Court had an authoritative window on the
state of mind of the petitioner provided by the diary of Executive Sec. Angara
serialized in the Phil. Daily Inquirer. During the first stage of negotiation
between Estrada and the opposition, the topic was already about a peaceful
and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
During the second round of negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was
again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the
measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition
period. The Court held that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted.
It was confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his
final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as
President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality; (2) he
emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say
he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to
reassume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed
his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he assured
that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in
the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
 The Court also tackled the contention of the petitioner that he is merely
temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency, and
hence is a President on leave. The inability claim is contained in the Jan. 20,
2001 letter of petitioner sent to Senate Pres. Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Despite said letter, the House of Representatives passed a resolution
supporting the assumption into office by Arroyo as President. The Senate also
passed a resolution confirming the nomination of Guingona as Vice-President.
Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner
Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner’s claim
of inability. The Court cannot pass upon petitioner’s claim of inability to
discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political in
nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political
issue which cannot be decided by the Court without transgressing the principle
of separation of powers.
ROSELLER DE GUZMAN, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
ANGELINA DG. DELA CRUZ, Respondents.
G.R. NO. 180048
June 19, 2009

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

Section 44 of RA 8189 or the Voter’s Registration Act provides that no

election officer shall hold office in a particular municipality or city for more
than 4 years. In accordance with it, the Comelec reassigned petitioners, who
were election officers to other stations. Petitioners argue that the law is
unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause enshrined in the
constitution; that it violates constitutional guarantee on security of civil
servants; that it undermines the constitutional independence of comelec and
comelec’s constitutional authority; that it contravenes the basic constitutional
precept; that it is void for its failure to be read on 3 separate readings

Issue: Whether or Not section 44 of RA 8189 is unconstitutional

Ruling: No, RA 8189 Sec 44 is not unconstitutional. It has not violated the
equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality of election
officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their
place of assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot
be carried out without the complicity of election officers, who are the highest
representatives of Comelec in a city or municipality.

G.R.No. 129118 (July 19, 2000) FACTS: Section 44 of the Voter’s Registration
Act provided that no election officer shall hold office in a particular
municipality or city for more than 4 years. In accordance with it, the Comelec
reassigned petitioners, who were election officers to other stations. Petitioners
argued that the provision was not expressed in the title of the law, which is “An
Act Providing for a General Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of
Continuing Registration, Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing
the Appropriation of Fund Thereof”. HELD: The contention is untenable.
Section 44 is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure
the integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the Comelec
to follow in the reassignment of election officers.

FACTS: HELD: The law merely provides the basis for the transfer of an election
officers and does not deprive the Comelec of its power to appoint its officials.
Facts:
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order,
assailing the validity of Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189)
otherwise known as
"The Voter's Registration Act of 1996".
RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V.
Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides:
"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold
office in a particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any
election officer who, either at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent
thereto, has served... for at least four (4) years in a particular city or
municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission to a new
station outside the original congressional district."
Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives... reassigning the
petitioners, who are either City or Municipal Election Officers, to different
stations.

ISSUE:

Whether Section 44 of RA 8189 violates the constitutional guarantee on

security of tenure of civil servants;
Whether Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the constitutional
independence of Comelec and Comelec's constitutional authority to name,
designate and appoint and then reassign and transfer its very own officials and
employees.
RULING:
NO. The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a
guarantee of perpetual employment. It only means that an employee cannot be
dismissed (or transferred) from the service for causes other than those provided
by law and after due process is accorded the employee.
What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to dismiss. But,
where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the
transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so
long as the remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the
purposes of the law.
Untenable is petitioners' contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines
the authority of COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As
stressed upon by the Solicitor General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for
the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides the criterion or basis for the
reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not deprive the
COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials
and employees.
CESAR Z. DARIO petitioners,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR M. MISON, HON. VICENTE JAYME and HON. CATALINO
MACARAIG, JR., in their respective capacities as Commissioner of
Customs, Secretary of Finance, and Executive Secretary, respondents.
G.R. No. 81954    
August 8, 1989

SARMIENTO, J.:

FACTS:

President Aquino promulgated EO 127 which provided for the

reorganization of the BOC and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Pursuant to the EO, Mison issued a Memorandum, in the nature of “Guidelines
on the Implementation of Reorganization Executive Orders,” prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement. It also provided that by February 1988, all
employees covered by EO 127 and the grace period extended to the Bureau of
Customs by the President on reorganization shall be: a) informed of their re-
appointment, or b) offered another position in the same department or agency,
or c) informed of their termination.  The records indeed show that
Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced
them with 522 as of August 18, 1988.

ISSUE;

Whether the reorganization is valid?

RULING:
As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event,
no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be
a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat
security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes
place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid
"abolition" as where there is merely change of nomenclature of positions, or
where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
The Court finds that Commissioner Mison did not act in good faith since
after February 2, 1987 no perceptible restructuring of the Customs hierarchy -
except for the change of personnel - has occurred, which would have justified
(all things being equal) the contested dismissals. There is also no showing that
legitimate structural changes have been made - or a reorganization actually
undertaken, for that matter - at the Bureau since Commissioner Mison
assumed office, which would have validly prompted him to hire and fire
employees. With respect to E.O. No. 127, Commissioner Mison submits that
under Section 59 thereof, "Those incumbents whose positions are not included
therein or who are not reappointed shall be deemed separated from the
service." He submits that because the 394 removed personnel have not been
"reappointed," they are considered terminated. To begin with, the
Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive
Order No. 39. Under E.O. No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint
all Bureau personnels except those appointed by the President." Thus, with
respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr.,
Commissioner Mison could not have validly terminated them, they being
Presidential appointees. That Customs employees, under Section 59 of E.O. No.
127 had been on a mere holdover status cannot mean that the positions held
by them had become vacant. The occupancy of a position in a holdover
capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have lapsed on
25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to
February 2, 1987 when the 1987 Constitution became effective. After the said
date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern. Hence the petition
of the employees was granted while the petition of Mison was dismissed.