Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.

Raul S. Roco and Lorna Patajo-Kapunan for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground that as a result of supervening events it has become moot
and academic. It is not as simple as that. Several lives have been lost in connection with this case, including that of the petitioner
himself. The private respondent is now in hiding. The purity of suffrage has been defiled and the popular will scorned through a
confabulation of those in authority. This Court cannot keep silent in the face of these terrible facts. The motion is denied.

The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates in Antique for the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984 elections. The
former appeared to enjoy more popular support but the latter had the advantage of being the nominee of the KBL with all its
perquisites of power. On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several
followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the latter's men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador,
are now facing trial for these murders. The incident naturally heightened tension in the province and sharpened the climate of fear
among the electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters against supporting the Opposition candidate or into supporting the candidate
of the ruling party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form. Owing to what he
claimed were attempts to railroad the private respondent's proclamation, the petitioner went to the Commission on Elections to
question the canvass of the election returns. His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by
the Second Division of the said body. The petitioner thereupon came to this Court, arguing that the proclamation was void because
made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength
of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa.

The case was still being considered by this Court when on February 11, 1986, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in
broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was
revolted by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were above the
law. This ruthless murder was possibly one of the factors that strengthened the cause of the Opposition in the February revolution
that toppled the Marcos regime and installed the present government under President Corazon C. Aquino.

The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private
respondent-both of whom have gone their separate ways-could be a convenient justification for dismissing this case. But there are
larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more
important purpose is to manifest in the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on the
simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to
us in quest of law but we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the
latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there are also times when
although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not
only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.

It is a notorious fact decried by many people and even by the foreign press that elections during the period of the Marcos dictatorship
were in the main a desecration of the right of suffrage. Vote-buying, intimidation and violence, illegal listing of voters, falsified returns,
and other elections anomalies misrepresented and vitiated the popular will and led to the induction in office of persons who did not
enjoy the confidence of the sovereign electorate. Genuine elections were a rarity. The price at times was human lives. The rule was
chicanery and irregularity, and on all levels of the polls, from the barangay to the presidential. This included the rigged plebiscites and
referenda that also elicited the derision and provoked the resentments of the people.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness of elections in other provinces dominated by the
KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as demonstrated by the killings previously mentioned, which victimized no less than one of the
main protagonists and implicated his rival as a principal perpetrator. Opposition leaders were in constant peril of their lives even as
their supporters were gripped with fear of violence at the hands of the party in power.

What made the situation especially deplorable was the apparently indifferent attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the
anomalies being committed. It is a matter of record that the petitioner complained against the terroristic acts of his opponents. All
the electoral body did was refer the matter to the Armed Forces without taking a more active step as befitted its constitutional role
as the guardian of free, orderly and honest elections. A more assertive stance could have averted the Sibalom election eve massacre
and saved the lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.

Public confidence in the Commission on Elections was practically nil because of its transparent bias in favor of the administration. This
prejudice left many opposition candidates without recourse except only to this Court.

Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival, the private respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the
petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and
falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular mention was made of the municipalities of Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an, and also of
San Remigio, where the petitioner claimed the election returns were not placed in the ballot boxes but merely wrapped in cement
bags or Manila paper.

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to
proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. 3 On June 7, 1984, the same
Second Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case
before the Commission.4 On certiorari before this Court, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as
premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably made. 5 Finally, on
July 23, 1984, the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F.
Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique. 6

This decision was signed by Chairman Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan. Previously
asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was a former law partner of private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had refused.7
The petitioner then came to this Court, asking us to annul the said decision.

The core question in this case is one of jurisdiction, to wit: Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to
promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming the private respondent the winner in the election?

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa
and elective provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions
except contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc. Unless otherwise
provided by law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision.

While both invoking the above provisions, the petitioner and the respondents have arrived at opposite conclusions. The records are
voluminous and some of the pleadings are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And well they might be, for the noble profession of
the law-despite all the canards that have been flung against it-exerts all efforts and considers all possible viewpoints in its earnest
search of the truth.

The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving the members of
the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure
a more careful decision, considering the importance of the offices involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only contests
need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with and decided only by any of the three
divisions.

The former Solicitor General makes much of this argument and lays a plausible distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases"
to prove his point. 8 Simply put, his contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy between the petitioner and the private
respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections,
consonant with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission under its power to
administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections,9 not its authority as sole judge of the election contest.

A contest, according to him, should involve a contention between the parties for the same office "in which the contestant seeks not
only to oust the intruder but also to have himself inducted into the office." 10 No proclamation had as yet been made when the petition
was filed and later decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the private respondent had at that time assumed office, there was
no Member of the Batasang Pambansa from Antique whose election, returns or qualifications could be examined by the Commission
on Elections en banc.

In providing that the Commission on Elections could act in division when deciding election cases, according to this theory, the
Constitution was laying down the general rule. The exception was the election contest involving the members of the Batasang
Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc. 11 The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for
the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as winner, for it was only then that a contest could be permitted under the law. All matters
arising before such time were, necessarily, subject to decision only by division of the Commission as these would come under the
general heading of "election cases."

As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two, viz.:
(1) over matters arising before the proclamation, which should be heard and decided by division in the exercise of its administrative
power; and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided only en banc in the exercise of its judicial
power. Stated otherwise, the Commission as a whole could not act as sole judge as long as one of its divisions was hearing a pre-
proclamation matter affecting the candidates for the Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet no contest; or to put it still another
way, the Commission en banc could not do what one of its divisions was competent to do, i.e., decide a pre-proclamation controversy.
Moreover, a mere division of the Commission on Elections could hear and decide, save only those involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa, all cases involving elective provincial and city officials from start to
finish, including pre-proclamation controversies and up to the election protest. In doing so, it would exercise first administrative and
then judicial powers. But in the case of the Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would begin only after the proclamation was made
and a contest was filed and not at any time and on any matter before that, and always in the exercise only of judicial power.

This interpretation would give to the part more powers than were enjoyed by the whole, granting to the division while denying to
the banc. We do not think this was the intention of the Constitution. The framers could not have intended such an irrational rule.
We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns and qualifications
of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to
hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation
of the winners.

It is worth observing that the special procedure for the settlement of what are now called "pre-proclamation controversies" is a
relatively recent innovation in our laws, having been introduced only in 1978, through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as the 1978
Election Code. Section 175 thereof provided:

Sec. 175. Suspension and annulment of proclamation.-The Commission shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies and any of its decisions, orders or rulings shall be final and executory. It may, motu proprio or upon written
petition, and after due notice and hearing order the suspension of the proclamation of a candidate-elect or annul any
proclamation, if one has been made, on any of the grounds mentioned in Sections 172, 173 and 174 thereof.

Before that time all proceedings affecting the election, returns and qualifications of public officers came under the complete
jurisdiction of the competent court or tribunal from beginning to end and in the exercise of judicial power only. It therefore could not
have been the intention of the framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth Charter was adopted, and even in 1973, when the past
Constitution was imposed, to divide the electoral process into the pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage and to
provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first administrative and the second judicial.

Besides, the term "contest" as it was understood at the time Article XII-C. Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973 Constitution did
not follow the strict definition of a contention between the parties for the same office. Under the Election Code of 1971, which
presumably was taken into consideration when the 1973 Constitution was being drafted, election contests included the quo
warranto petition that could be filed by any voter on the ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the contestee although such voter was
himself not claiming the office involved. 12

The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive the widest possible scope
conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution,
the term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after
proclamation of the winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term should be
given a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C of the Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of
the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that "election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing
of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and
the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of
the election returns and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner,
such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they applied to the members of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.

We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by the Commission on Elections, only
by division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest" involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be
heard and decided en banc.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang Pambansa
be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective
could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late
already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many unscrupulous candidates
which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the real winners in the election. The respondent's
theory would make this gambit possible for the pre- proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by
only three members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission en
banc.

After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in time the proclamation summarily and not
very judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant might be sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric
victory because the term of his office would have already expired.

It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question upon the division, the Constitution did
not intend to prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the power directly, on the theory that the greater power embraces the
lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could also allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose
of the provision, which precisely limited all questions affecting the election contest, as distinguished from election cases in general, to
the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even
the division of the Commission A decision made on the contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting
standard of care and deliberation ordained by the Constitution

Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in Section 175, supra, the law was
obviously referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation controversies involved in Aratuc vs. Commission on
Elections, 13 where the said provision was applied, were heard and decided en banc.

Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the respondent Commission on
Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free society. Commissioner
Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the private respondent, he obstinately
insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased. 14

Given the general attitude of the Commission on Elections toward the party in power at the time, and the particular relationship
between Commissioner Opinion and MP Pacificador, one could not be at least apprehensive, if not certain, that the decision of the
body would be adverse to the petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the
transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded
protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second Division when it rendered its decision.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of
due process. 15 To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be
impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just.16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should
be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise
they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such
confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair
play. Fair play cans for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other
party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a
formal hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach
his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent
law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just decision. Where
this is probable or even only posssible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of delicadeza. For
like Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer, should have recognized his duty and abided by
this well-known rule of judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he divested the Second Division of the necessary vote for the questioned
decision, assuming it could act, and rendered the proceeding null and void. 17

Since this case began in 1984, many significant developments have taken place, not the least significant of which was the February
revolution of "people power" that dislodged the past regime and ended well nigh twenty years of travail for this captive nation. The
petitioner is gone, felled by a hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose by assassins whose motive is yet to be disclosed. The private
respondent has disappeared with the "pomp of power" he had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang Pambansa itself has been abolished,
"an iniquitous vestige of the previous regime" discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It is so easy now, as has been suggested not
without reason, to send the rec•rds of this case to the archives and say the case is finished and the book is closed.

But not yet.

Let us first say these meager words in tribute to a fallen hero who was struck down in the vigor of his youth because he dared to speak
against tyranny. Where many kept a meekly silence for fear of retaliation, and still others feigned and fawned in hopes of safety and
even reward, he chose to fight. He was not afraid. Money did not tempt him. Threats did not daunt him. Power did not awe him. His
was a singular and all-exacting obsession: the return of freedom to his country. And though he fought not in the barricades of war
amid the sound and smoke of shot and shell, he was a soldier nonetheless, fighting valiantly for the liberties of his people against the
enemies of his race, unfortunately of his race too, who would impose upon the land a perpetual night of dark enslavement. He did not
see the breaking of the dawn, sad to say, but in a very real sense Evelio B. Javier made that dawn draw nearer because he was, like
Saul and Jonathan, "swifter than eagles and stronger than lions."

A year ago this Court received a letter which began: "I am the sister of the late Justice Calixto Zaldivar. I am the mother of Rhium Z.
Sanchez, the grandmother of Plaridel Sanchez IV and Aldrich Sanchez, the aunt of Mamerta Zaldivar. I lost all four of them in the
election eve ambush in Antique last year." She pleaded, as so did hundreds of others of her provincemates in separate signed petitions
sent us, for the early resolution of that horrible crime, saying: "I am 82 years old now. I am sick. May I convey to you my prayer in
church and my plea to you, 'Before I die, I would like to see justice to my son and grandsons.' May I also add that the people of Antique
have not stopped praying that the true winner of the last elections will be decided upon by the Supreme Court soon."
That was a year ago and since then a new government has taken over in the wake of the February revolution. The despot has escaped,
and with him, let us pray, all the oppressions and repressions of the past have also been banished forever. A new spirit is now upon
our land. A new vision limns the horizon. Now we can look forward with new hope that under the Constitution of the future every
Filipino shall be truly sovereign in his own country, able to express his will through the pristine ballow with only his conscience as his
counsel.

This is not an impossible dream. Indeed, it is an approachable goal. It can and will be won if we are able at last, after our long ordeal,
to say never again to tyranny. If we can do this with courage and conviction, then and only then, and not until then, can we truly say
that the case is finished and the book is closed.

WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the records of this case that were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot
and academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23, 1984, set aside
as violative of the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

Fernan and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur in the result.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

x----------------------x

G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL
VILLAR, respondents.

x----------------------x

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention

x----------------------x

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A.
JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors

DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented public
attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted
in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both
Houses of Congress.1

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech,
"Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public
Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
(respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director
Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour
taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the
recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. 2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to
prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. 3

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and
Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed
that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped
conversations in their committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference
thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using
the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse
That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s,
when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications
providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills 6 seeking to regulate the sale, purchase and use of
wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties. 7

In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the
possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28,
2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely
bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative
investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in
the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this
Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in
the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September
7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson,
Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment 16 on the petition on September 25, 2007.

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to
appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275. 18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275. 19

It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectives–the first is poised at
preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to
prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.

The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.

-I-

Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties’ standing, argued at length in their
pleadings.

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case
such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x x," thus,

generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions."22

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct
injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of
Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The
fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The
majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural
barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with
the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them." 26

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the
"Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the voices in the
recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges
of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and
members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide the country.
They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are
worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes
through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation. 28

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without
being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the
useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings. 29

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his
constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely being
citizens of the Republic.

Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s
and intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily
involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. had been injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the
petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal profession–which were also supposedly violated by the
therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are of
transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the
guidance of all.34

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case
of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor Sagge.

- II -

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle
that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By
actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise
the decision of the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions
because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes
moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question
as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced. 38

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit
the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in their committee report. He
likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were
already played in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the
"Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees. 40 Having been overtaken
by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy
to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.41

- III -

As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the
questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The
requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process. 42 Publication is indeed imperative,
for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines."44

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. 45 With respect to the
present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
and Investigations,46 we said:

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG’s
explanation:

The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of procedure
governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also
changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having
published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.

Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:

The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four
members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators expires
every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the
 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning
in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the
Senators continue into the next Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate
after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that
the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change in the
composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately
and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:

RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by
the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of
the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional
on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for
the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and
deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of
its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of
course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its business is
reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
 RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of
office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its approval.

RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended
or repealed.

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an election and the
possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators shall
begin their term.

However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their
adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply state
"(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does
not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the difference
in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue
into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come
within the rule on unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly
published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in
each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
 If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next Congress, it
could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have never been
amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at
the Senate’s internet web page.49

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make
any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said
rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.

Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:

The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not
sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is
mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to
support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message
or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law
merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished
rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be
deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the
October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure
the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the
legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published
rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition
be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of
legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice