1. Bagong Bayani v. Comelec, G.R. No.

147589, June 26, 2001

Facts:
Two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by the
Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the participation of 154
organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners seek
the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit
the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or
overrepresented

Issue:
1) WON political parties may participate in the party-list elections
2) WON the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and
organizations.

Held:
1) Yes. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list
elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."
2) It is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and underrepresented,
because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The partylist organization or party must factually
and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section 5.
Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be “Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.”

2. Aquino v. Comelec, 248 SCRA 400 (1995)

Facts:
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino
stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district for 10 months.

Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP filed a
petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than
one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.

Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his certificate of
candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a resolution that dismissed the
petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8 May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against
Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes. Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to
which, on May 15, the latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence. Aquino then filed a
Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.

Issue:
WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence in the district he was
running.

Held:
The Court ruled in the negative. While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right
to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro
Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati
(and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his
physical residence" is not to acquire new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City." The absence of clear and positive proof showing a
successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification -
 sentimental, actual or otherwise - with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease
agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in
the Second District of Makati.

3. Marcos vs. Comelec, 248 SCRA 300 (1995)

Facts:
The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte stating that she has lived therein as a resident for the last seven
months. Montejo, an opposition, filed a petition for cancellation and disqualification of her candidacy with the
grounds of Romualdez-Marcos does not have the residency requirement mandated by the constitution. She
then amended her candidacy changing her residency from seven months to since birth indicating that it was
an honest misrepresentation and that she has maintained domicile in Tacloban ever since.

Issue:
WON Romualdez-Marcos possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte.

Held:
The court ruled in the affirmative. The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil
Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is
concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the term residence should only be
interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of
origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessariu.

4. Torayno vs. Comelec, G.R. 137329, August 09, 2000

Facts:
In 1995 Vicente Y. Emano, was proclaimed provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, his third consecutive
term as governor of the province. In his Certificate of Candidacy dated March 1995, his residence was
declared to be in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental.

On June 1997, while still the governor of Misamis Oriental, Emano executed a Voter Registration Record in
Cagayan de Oro City, in which he claimed 20 years of residence. On March 1998, he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for mayor of the city, stating therein that his residence for the preceding two years and five
months was at 1409 San Jose Street, Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.

Among those who ran for the mayorship of the city, along with Emano, was Erasmo B. Damasing, counsel of
herein petitioners. On May 1998, Petitioners Rogelio M. Torayno, Sr., Generoso Q. Eligan and Jacqueline
M. Serino, all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, filed a Petition before the Comelec, seeking the
disqualification of Emano as mayoral candidate, on the ground that he had failed to meet the one-year
residence requirement. Prior to the resolution of their Petition, the Comelec proclaimed private respondent
as the duly elected city mayor. Thus, on May 1998, petitioners filed another Petition before the Comelec, this
time for quo warranto, in which they sought (1) the annulment of the election of private respondent; and (2)
the proclamation of Erasmo B. Damasing, who had garnered the next highest number of votes, as the duly
elected mayor of the city.

In its Resolution dated July 1998, the Comelec First Division denied the Petition for Disqualification. Upon
petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for Consolidation, the two cases were consolidated.

Issue:
WON Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Held:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. In the case at bar, the Comelec found that private respondent and his
family had actually been residing in Capistrano Subdivision, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, in a house he had
bought in 1973. Furthermore, during the three terms (1988-1998) that he was governor of Misamis Oriental,
he physically lived in that city, where the seat of the provincial government was located. In June 1997, he
also registered as voter of the same city. Based on our ruling in Mamba-Perez, these facts indubitably prove
 that Vicente Y. Emano was a resident of Cagayan de Oro City for a period of time sufficient to qualify him to
run for public office therein. Moreover, the Comelec did not find any bad faith on the part of Emano in his
choice of residence.

5. Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. 134577, November 18, 1998

Facts:
The Senate of the Philippines convened for the 1st regular session of the 11th Congress. On the agenda
was the election of officers. Nominated to the position of Senate President were Sen. Marcelo Fernan and
Sen.Francisco Tatad. By a vote of 20-2, the former was declared the duly elected President of the Senate.
Sen. Tatad, then, manifested that he was assuming the position of Minority Leader. However, Sen. Juan
Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party – numbering seven – are also a
minority, and had chosen Sen. Guingona as the Minority Leader. On 30 July 1998, the majority leader
informed the body that he received a letter signed by the seven senators, belonging to minority group,
stating that they had elected Sen. Guingona as the Minority Leader. By virtue, thereof, the Sen. President
formally recognized Sen. Guingona as the Minority Leader of the Senate. Hence, this petition was instituted
by Senators Defensor-Santiago and Tatad for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court,
seeking the ouster of Sen. Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad
as the rightful minority leader.

Issue:
WON respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader.

Held:
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a
clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent. 5" In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. The specific norms or standards that may be
used in determining who may lawfully occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the
Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut
guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or irregularity tainted Respondent Guingona's assumption
and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion
has been shown to characterize any of his specific acts as minority leader.

6. Avelino vs. Cuenco, 83 Phil. 17 (1949)

Facts:
The petitioner, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the
rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s
request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges against then Senate President Avelino was
approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to
delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP, with his supporters, employed delaying
tactics. They tried to adjourn the session, then walked out. Only 12 senators were left in the hall. The
members of the senate left to continue the session, and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting
President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.

Issue:
WON Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.

Held:
The court ruled in affirmative. ln fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the
practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the
days immediately after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will
side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the
Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the
senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by
that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,
 the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby
place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.

7. Pacete vs. Comm. On Appointments, 40 SCRA 58 (1971)

Facts:
Felizardo S. Pacete alleged that he was appointed by the then President of the Philippines on August 1964
as Municipal Judge of Pigcawayan, Cotabato. He assumed office on September 1964, and as his
appointment was made during the recess of Congress, it was submitted to the Commission on Appointments
at its next session in 1965. It was confirmed on May 1964.

On February 1966, Secretary of Justice, told petitioner to vacate his position as, stating that his appointment
had been bypassed. Petitioner sought clarification from the then Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments. He was informed that on May 1965, a day after his confirmation, one of the members of the
Commission on Appointments, then Senator Rodolfo Guanzon, wrote to its Chairman stating that he was
filing a motion for the reconsideration of the confirmation of the appointment of Pacete as municipal judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato, in view of derogatory information received. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments notified then Secretary of Justice accordingly, following what he considered to be the practice
that the presentation of such a letter vacated the confirmation on the appointment. Respondent Secretary of
Justice told petitioner that he should vacate his position as municipal judge, as he had not been duly
confirmed.

The Disbursing Officer of the Department of Justice then withheld Pacete’s salaries. Pacete filed a counter
petition, and the respondents answered that there was no violation of the Constitution, as the question is
merely one of interpretation or construction of the internal rules of the Commission, which cannot be subject
to judicial inquiry.

Issue:
WON of a motion for reconsideration with the Commission on Appointments, without its being thereafter
acted on, suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of an ad interim appointment.

Held:
The court ruled in the negative. Our holding was that the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration did not
have the effect of setting aside a confirmation. There was a need for its being duly approved. Respondent’s
theory would give to the mere filing of a motion for reconsideration the effect which it would have if the
motion were approved, and, hence, would dispense with the necessity of such approval, for which the
concurrence of a majority of the members present is necessary. It is inconsistent with Rule 21 of the Revised
Rules of the Commission. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that this Court is committed to the principle
that a mere motion for reconsideration to a confirmation duly made which is not approved cannot have the
effect of setting aside such confirmation, a principle that is based not merely on the express language of
Rule 21, but a reflection of the settled interpretation of the Commission on Appointments, speaking through
its Chairman.

8. Arroyo vs. De Venecia, G.R. 127255, August 14, 1997

Facts:
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the NIRC.
Petitioners, saying that there is violation of the rules of the House which is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives (HOR) which the Senate approved with amendments.
The bicameral conference committee reconcile the disagreeing provisions and subsequently submitted its
report to the House. During the interpellations, Representative Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum,
but after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence thereof. The interpellation then proceeded. Majority
Leader Albano moved for the approval and ratification of the committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion approving and ratifying the committee report and later declared: “There being none,
approved.” During this time, Representative Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” They were
talking instantaneously. Thus, though Representative Arroyo objected to the Majority Leader’s motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
 The bill was approved by the Speaker of the HOR and the President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses. This was later signed into law by President Ramos.

Issue:
WON RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House

Held:
The Court ruled in the negative. Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They
are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect
of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is
subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of
the legislative body, the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.

The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should
not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Representative Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Representative Arroyo’s earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the
purpose of delaying the business of the House

9. Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83 (1924)

Facts:
The Philippine Senate, composed of the respondent Senators adopted a resolution depriving Senator
Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one year from
the first of January, 1924.

The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect:
(1) to issue a preliminary injunction against executing the resolution;
(2) to declare the aforesaid resolution of the Senate null and void; and
(3) to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction ordering them to recognize the rights of the petitioner

The Attorney-General, objected to the jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has pressed the same
point.

Issue:
WON the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void?

Held:
Dismissed. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. So, it has
been held that there where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power,
irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his reinstatement.

10. Osmena vs. Pendatun, 109 Phil. 863 (1960)

Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmefia, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari
and prohibition with preliminary injunction“ against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution No. 59.
He asked for annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringement of his parliamentary immunity; he
also asked, principally, that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in
accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges
against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House
should not punish him.
 Issue:
WON the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for
speeches.

Held:
The Court ruled in the negative. While parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete freedom of
expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall, however, it does not protect him from responsibility before the
legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming
a member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Congress can be censured, committed to
prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

11. Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 126055, April 19, 2001

Facts:
The Court is called review the act of the Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the preventive
suspension of petitioner, Senator Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending in criminal cases filed
against her for alleged violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from investigator dela Llana after
having been constituted by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioner's request, came up with a
resolution which it referred, for approval, to the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the Ombudsman.
In his Memorandum, the Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate informations against
petitioner. On May 1991, OSP submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance; approved,
forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has authority to decree a 90-day preventive suspension against a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines.

Held:
The court ruled in the affirmative. The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive suspension of
an incumbent public official charged with violation of the provisions of RA 3019 has both legal and
jurisprudential support. It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of
suspension upon determination of the validity of the information filed before it. Once the information is found
to be sufficient in form and substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be “no ifs and buts about it.” In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner,
the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the
jurisprudence in which the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan’s authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it.

12. De Venecia vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 130240, Feb. 05, 2002
Facts:
An Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First Division) against then Congressman Paredes, Jr., for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).

After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a "Motion to Suspend the Accused Pendente
Lite." The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker to suspend the accused. But the
Speaker did not comply. Thus, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution requiring him to appear before it, to
show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court.

The Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers
and claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House as a body pursuant to House Resolution
No. 116 adopted on August 13, 1997.
 On August 29, 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered the now assailed Resolution, declaring Speaker De
Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice.

Issue:
WON the Suspension provided in the Antigraft law is a penalty or a pecuniary measure.

Held:
We ruled that the suspension provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of different nature and
purpose. It is imposed by the court, not as a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon the
filing of a valid Information. Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from frustrating his
prosecution by influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence and from committing further
acts of malfeasance while in office. It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before the court. On the
other hand, the suspension or expulsion contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction
against its members. It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in
its proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.

13. Casco Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)

Facts:
Pursuant to the provisions of RA 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the
Central Bank of the Philippines issued Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions. To supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing
the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said RA 2609.

Petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical CO., Inc., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange
for the importation of urea and formaldehyde, the main raw materials in the production of said glues and paid
the margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase of foreign
exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.

Petitioner sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the
Monetary Board of said Bank, declaring the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from
said fee. Petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72.

The Central Bank issued the margin fee vouchers for the refund, however, the Auditor of the Bank refused to
approve said vouchers, on the ground that the exemption violated the provisions of section 2, paragraph
XVIII of RA 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General affirmed said action of the Auditor of
the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.

Issue:
WON there was mistake in printing of bill.

Held:
The court ruled in the negative. The enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the
measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing
of a bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive, the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

14. United States vs. Pons, 34 Phil. 729 (1916)

Facts:
Juan Pons was charged and found guilty of a crime involving bringing of opium in Manila. In his motion,
counsel offered to prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was
the 28th day of February and that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not
passed or approved February 28 but on March 1 of that year. Therefore, the same is null and void. The
validity of the Act is not questioned, as it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the
Governor-Generals proclamation, February 28 and that the appellant is charged with having violated the
provisions of Act No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the Legislature, and this reduces
itself to two others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous
evidence and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals.
 Issue:
WON the court go beyond the recital of the legislative journal when it is clear and explicit.

Held:
The court ruled in the negative. The court cited numerous decisions of the various states in the American
Union in support of the rule laid down, and we have been unable to find a single case of a later date where
the rule has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative journals cover the point. As the
Constitution of the Philippine Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government and the various
states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court
did not err in declining to go behind these journals.

15. Philconsa vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)

Facts:
The PHILCONSA, filed a suit against former Acting Auditor General and Jose Velasco, Auditor of the
Congress, assigned by the Auditor General as his representative, seeking to enjoin the said officials from
authorizing the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 (approved June 10, 1964) to the
Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30,1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget (RA. No. 4642) implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. The petitioners
contend that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as
amended in 1940 which reads “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration
of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such,
increase.”

The reason given being that the term of the eight senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the
approval of RA 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House
who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue:
WON the salary increase was constitutional.

Held:
The Court agrees with petitioners that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is not operative
until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on
June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for such increased compensation may not be
disbursed until December 30, 1969. In so far as RA 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the
disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also violates the Constitution and
must be held null and void.

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby granted, and the items of the
Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1965-1966 (RA 4642) purporting to authorize the disbursement of the
increased compensation to members of the Senate and the House of Representatives even prior to
December 30, 1969 are declared void, as violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the Congress of the
Philippines, are prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing in audit any disbursements of the
increased compensation authorized by RA 4134 for Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, before December 30, 1969..

16. Ligot vs. Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974)

Facts:
Petitioner was reelected to a third term but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000.00 by
virtue of the Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay.
 Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969 elections and his term having expired on
December 30, 1969, filed a claim for retirement. The House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in
the sum of P122,429.86 in petitioner’s favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress which he never received during his incumbency.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant, pending resolution by the Auditor
General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Singson. On July 1970, respondent auditor Velasco
requested petitioner to return the warrant for a recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing a copy of the
Auditor General’s adverse decision on ex-Congressman Singson’s claim for retirement gratuity.

Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was denied by the Auditor General. Hence the present petition for
review by way of appeal from the adverse decision of the Auditor General.

Issue:
WON petitioner is entitled to retirement using P32,000.

Held:
The Court ruled in the negative. The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms the Auditor-
Generals decision that petitioner as a Congressman whose term of office expired on December 30, 1969
and qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of a minimum of twenty years of government service is entitled
to a retirement gratuity based on the salary actually received by him as a member of Congress of P7,200.00
per annum. To grant petitioner's contention that the retirement gratuity of members of Congress; such as
himself whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 should be computed on the basis of an increased
salary of P32,000.00 per annum under RA 4134 which could only by operative with incoming members of
Congress whose terms of office would commence on December 30, 1969, by virtue of the Constitutional
mandate that such salary increases could take effect only upon the expiration of the full term of all members
of Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary, would be a subtle way of going around
the constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their compensation during their term of office and of
doing indirectly what could not be done directly.

17. People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. 132875, February 03, 2000

Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of Iasciviousness on six
counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

Issue:
WON membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons in general.

Held:
The Court ruled in the negative. The Court find that election to the position of Congressman is not a
reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in
liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all
those belonging to the same class.

Incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in society. Prison officials have the difficult and
often thankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of attempting to
provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these
demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights. Premises considered, we are constrained
to rule against the accused-appellant's claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right
or interest, including the police power of the State.