AASJS vs DATUMANONG

G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition to prevent Justice Secretary Datumanong from
implementing R. A. 9225 entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens
Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act
No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." which was signed into law by President Gloria
M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Petitioner argued that R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates
Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which states that “dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

Petitioner contends that RA 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2 and
3 thereof, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains
that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign
citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section 3
permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to
regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting their
foreign allegiance.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state policy
that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3 does not
allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an effective
renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant taking the oath
recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an unmistakable and
categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.

Issues:

1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional

2. Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance

Held:

1. No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with
the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship from
natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No.
9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its
face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of
the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3,
Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country.
What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.

2. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-

executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2
and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set
specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual
allegiance.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we said that the courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with
the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and
forbearance. The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate
the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution
itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study
and legislation by Congress.

Abbas vs SET
Facts:

In the 1987 congressional elections, petitioners filed with respondent SET an election contest
against 22 senators-elect of the LABAN coalition. All members of the legislative component of
the SET at the time happened to be included in the senators assailed. Later, petitioners filed
with SET a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of all senators-members thereof for the
reason they are all interested parties (being respondents therein). SET denied the motion hence
this petition. Contending that SET committed a grave abuse of discretion, petitioners argue that
considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require
the mass disqualification sought, and propose to amend the Tribunal’s rules as to permit the
contest being decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
Issue:

Should the Senators-members be disqualified?

Held:

No. The SET must continue taking cognizance of the case with its current Senators-members.
Here is a situation which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any
of his other colleagues without inviting the same objections to the substitute’s competence.
However, the amendment proposed would, in the context of the situation, leave the resolution of
the contest to the only 3 Members, all Justices of this Court, who would remain whose
disqualification is not sought. It is unmistakable that the “legislative component” [of the SET]
cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contest
without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. Thus, the proposed mass
disqualification/inhibition, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Electoral Tribunal no
alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform. This, to the Court’s
mind, is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a
duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public
interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of
justice of the Members of the Tribunal. The charge that SET gravely abused its discretion in its
denial of the petition for [mass] disqualification/inhibition must therefore fail.

ABSCBN vs Comelec
G.R. No. 133486           January 28, 2000 ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION,
petitioner,  vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Facts : Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on
Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In the said
Resolution, the poll body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop
ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit survey
and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same. The Resolution was issued by the
Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has
prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections . . . and to
make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately." The electoral
body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the
unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it
had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey. On May 9,
1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed
the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed
Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were
actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

Issue : WON the Comelec acted with grave abuse of discretion in prohibiting ABS CBN in
conducting exit polls during the election

Held : two theoretical test in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as follows:
These are the "clear and present danger" rule and the "dangerous tendency" rule. means that
the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely serious and the degree
of imminence extremely high" before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded
against is the "substantive evil" sought to be prevented. . . . The "dangerous tendency" rule, on
the other hand, . . if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated
in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite
persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and
probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of
such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the "dangerous
tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the
time element; the danger must not only be probable but very likely to be inevitable.33 The evil
sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a
restraint of a writing instrument By the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants
are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or
reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey
result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of
the opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for,
based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the
credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and
independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot
undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome
of one can only be indicative of the other. With the foregoing premises, The SC conclude that
the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of
disrupting elections, exit polls — properly conducted and publicized — can be vital tools for the
holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-
fixing, fraud and other electoral ills.

ALDOVINO v ALUNAN III (230 SCRA 825)

Facts:
The petitioners herein were affected by reorganizing of Ministry of Tourism as provided
in Section 29 of Executive Order No. 120 which took effect on January 30, 1987. These
EO provides that incumbents whose positions are not included in the new position
structure and staffing pattern or who are not reappointed are deemed separated from
the service. Pursuant to this, the Department of Tourism issued various office orders
and memoranda declaring all positions thereat vacant. To that effect, it leads to the
separation of many of its employees including the petitioners. The court had previously
decided similar cases of Mandani, Abrogar and Arnaldo. The petitioners and intervenors
claimed that they should not be deprived of their life granted to their former co-
employees plead for reinstatement without the loss of seniority rights. Furthermore, they
claimed for back salaries will be computed under the new staffing pattern from dates of
their invalid termination at rates not lower than their former salaries. The court aims to
determine whether the separation of herein petitioners and intervenors from service was
pursuant to office orders and memoranda declared void in Mandani case, thus
reinstating and paying them with their back wages.

Issues:

Whether or not the petitioners and intervenors must be reinstated and paid of their back
wages.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that herein petitioners are reinstated immediately to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and with back salaries computed under
new staffing pattern from the dates of their invalid dismissal at rates not lower than their
former salaries but not to exceed a period of 5 years with several provisions. Having
found out that the Executive Order is unconstitutional, thus dismissal of the employees
is also unconstitutional. The courts declared its total nullity. An unconstitutional act is
not a law, it confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. In legal
contemplation, it is inoperative as if it had not been passed.

Aldovino VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three consecutive
terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005, during his third term of
office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day preventive suspension against him in
relation to a criminal case. The said suspension order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and
Asilo resumed the performance of the functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His disqualification was
sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three
consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of COMELEC?

RULING:
NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for purposes of
the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the 2007 elections
was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution since his
2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive suspension imposed on him, the SC
granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking
Asilo’s disqualification.
“Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of service within
a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term limitation,” held the Court. It
noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat “more potent” than the voluntary
renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to evade the three-term limit as it is easier to
undertake and merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed
soon after a preventive suspension has been imposed.

Case Digest: Alejandrino vs Quezon

 
ISSUE:  Whether or not the resolution disciplining Alejandrino is null and void? 

FACTS:  Senator Jose Alejandrino was declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de
Vera. He was deprived of his prerogatives, privileges and emoluments of being a senator. He
filed mandamus and injunction against respondent Senate President Manuel Quezon from
executing the said resolution and to declare the said resolution null and void. 

 
RATIO DECIDENDI:  Neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch thereof can be directly
controlled in the exercise of their legislative powers by any judicial process. The court lacks
jurisdiction to consider the petition. No court has ever held and no court will ever hold that it
possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive or the Legislature to take any particular
action. Also, if the Court does not have any authority to control the Philippine Senate, it has
likewise no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction
of the same.   

ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 9:25 PM
G.R. No. 163256, 10 Nov 2004 [Naturalization; Reacquisition]

FACTS:
Private respondents filed with the COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Ciceron P. Altarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and
that he made a false representation in his COC that he was not a permanent resident of the
Municipality of San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor in the May 10, 2004
elections. Altarejos answered that he was already issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the
Special Committee on Naturalization in December 17, 1997.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the registration of petitioner’s repatriation with the proper civil registry and with
the Bureau of Immigration a prerequisite in effecting repatriation.

RULING:
Yes. The registration of certificate of repatriation with the proper local civil registry and with the
Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting repatriation. Petitioner completed all the
requirements of repatriation only after he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty
position but before the elections. Petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the date he filed his
application  and was, therefore, qualified to run for a mayoralty position in the government in the
May 10, 2004 elections.
Angara vs. Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua,
Miguel Castillo, and Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National
Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
National Assembly and on Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last
date to file election protests.

On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against
Angara and praying, among other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the
National Assembly or that the election of said position be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for
filing of protests is on Dec. 9. Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive
jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as regards the merits of contested elections to
the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the
subject matter of the controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of
a grave constitutional nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral
Commission on the other. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when
and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of
the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional
restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and
even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in
justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”

The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously
exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral
Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And
thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the
Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its
exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been
lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a
resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the
National Assembly passed its resolution of Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner
to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that
said body had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the
election of members of the legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still
lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be “the sole
judge of all contests…”, to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.
The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua
against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the
National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing protest against
the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent
the filing of protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost
against the petitioner.

Arroyo v. De Venecia Case Digest

Arroyo v. De Venecia
GR No. 127255
Digest by Kirk Yngwie Enriquez
Facts:

Petitioners are members of the House of Reps, challenging the validity of RA 8420 amending
certain provisions of the NIRC by imposing so-called “sin taxes” on the manufacture and sale of
beer and cigarettes. Petition is against Speaker of the House Jose De Venecia, Deputy Speaker
Raul Daza, Majority Floor Leader Rodolfo Albano, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Finance,
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the riles of the House which are
“constitutionally mandated”, so their violation is tantamount to a constitutional violation.
The law originated in the House of Reps as HB 7198, was approved on 3rd reading on
September 12, 1996, and transmitted to the Senate on September 16, 1996 which approved it
with certain amendments on third reading on November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile disagreeing provisions of both Houses. The bicam
committee submitted its report to the House at 8AM on November 21, 1996. Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the committee on ways and means proceeded to deliver his sponsorship
speech and was interpellated. When Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was interpellating, he was
interrupted when petitioner moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. The motion was objected and
a roll call was done. Deputy Speaker Raul Daza decalred the presence of a quorum. Petitoner
appealed but was defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation proceeded.
Petitioner registered to interpellate and was 4th in order. Petitioner announced that he was
going to raise a question on the quorum, never did. The transcript on the session on November
21, 1996 as published by Congress in the newspaper issues shows that when petitioner was
asking the Speaker a question, the Speaker outright approved the bill acting on the motion by
Rep. Albano. When petitioner tried to clarify, session was suspended by the Speaker. On the
same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker and the Senate President and certified by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are 4 different versions of the transcript:
The transcript of audio-sound recording of the proceedings immediately after the session
adjourned at 3:40pm.
The transcript of proceedings from 3:00pm – 3:40pm of November 21, 1996 as certified by the
Chief of the Transcription Division on November 21.
The transcript of proceedings from 3:00pm – 3:40pm on November 21, 1996 as certified by the
Chief of Transcription Division on November 28.
The published version in the newspapers.
Petitioners claim that the four versions differ on 3 points:
In the audio-sound, the word “approved” cannot be heard
.
In the transcript certified on Nov 21, the word “no” appears only once, while in other versions it
is repeated 3 times.
The published version does not contain “you better prepare for a quorum because I will raise the
question of the quorum.”
Petitioners argue that RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House:
The chair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the yeas
or nays, but simply asked for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner from
questioning the presence of a quorum (in violation of Rule VIII 35 and Rule XVII 103).
The Chair ignored petitioner’s question (in violation of Rule XIX 112).
The Chair refused to recognize petitioner and proceeded to act on motion of Rep. Albano (in
violation of Rule XVI 97).
The Chair suspended the session without first ruling on petitioner’s question which was
allegedly a point of order or privileged motion.
Respondents argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the
House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Respondents
also argue that in passing the bill, the rules of the house were faithfully observed.
Issue:

WON the House of Reps committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240.

Ruling:
No. The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion
in enacting RA 8240. It is clear that what is alleged to have been violated are merely internal
rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a
law.
In Osmena v. Pendatun, the Court ruled that rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them. Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
In US v. Ballin, Joseph, & Co., the rule stated was the Constitution (US) empowers each house
to determine its rules of proceedings.
In City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, the SC of Ohio rules that the provision for consideration is
no part of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly.
Having made the rule, it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not subject-matter of
judicial inquiry.
According to Chief Justice Fernando, mere failure to conform to the rules of proceedings of
Congress does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular measure.
In the instant case, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the
House which the Court should not be concerned about. The claim was not that there was no
quorum, but only that petitioner was prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.
Also, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of HB 7198 by the presiding officers and
certification by the secretaries of both Houses that it was passed on November 21, 1996 is
conclusive of its due enactment. When there is no evidence to the contrary, the Court will
respect the certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
To disregard the enrolled bill doctrine would be to disregard the respect due the other
departments of the government.
Petitioners have not advanced any argument that warrants departure from the doctrine. The due
enactment of the law is likewise confirmed by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996
which shows that the conference committee report on HB 7198 which became RA 8240 was
approved on that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by Section 16 Article VI of the
Constitution. The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by
the Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other matters, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect.
Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974)
 upxateneo Uncategorized September 23, 20182 Minutes
Topic. Art. VI, Sec. 16 – Duty to keep journals
Case. Petition for prohibition and mandamus for Mayor et al to comply with Revised Manila City
Charter
Facts. House passed the Revised Manila City Charter on third reading. It submitted the bill to
Senate for concurrence. On first reading, Senator Roxas had certain amendments about the
City Engineer instead of the President Pro-tempore succeeding the Vice Mayor. Senator
Tolentino also had proposed some amendment. Upon discussion of the bill, the Senate adopted
Tolentino’s amendments but did not act on Roxas’s. Such is written in the journal. Senate
returned the bill to the House for inclusion of the amendments, but in the bill submitted to
House, the amendments included and said to be approved therein were Roxas’s, not
Tolentino’s. Not privy to the mistake, House made copies of the bill, and sent one to the
President. Pres. signed bill into law.
After the law’s ratification and later implementation, Tolentino issued a press release about the
error in amendment inclusion. Quickly, the Senate President recognized the mistake and
invalidated his signature to the bill quipping that the enrolled bill was not the bill they agreed to.
The Pres. also withdrew his signature.
In response to all this, Mayor issued a circular informing his office of the change to the extent of
recalling police force assigned to the Vice Mayor due to the Act. Vice Mayor files this present
petition arguing that the bill is valid following the enrolled bill doctrine.
Issue. Is the Revised Manila City Charter valid? -No
Ratio. It is not valid because the attestation was neutralized by the signature invalidation. The
enrolled bill doctrine provides that despite clerical errors in the enrolled bill, its ratification gives it
enforceable authority. The journal entry rule, meanwhile, follows the agreed upon decisions of
the committees. Though the court had deliberated on which between the enrolled bill doctrine
and journal entry rule should be followed, the entry journal rule in this case prevailed. The
problem here is whether the passed bill was the same text as that approved by the Senate.
Looking at the journal entries proved that it is not. It being not the same bill, attestation can be
invalidated as was done by the Senate President in this case. Such invalidation then results to
no attestation at all. With no attestation, the bill cannot be said to have been enacted into law.
The Court cannot take any risk undertaking such as to incorporate amendments into law similar
to CPC v. Gimenez. But it can, as in this present case, determine if the law passed was the
same as the bill approved.
ATO V. DAVID (G.R. NO. 159402; FEBRUARY 23, 2011)
CASE DIGEST: AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID & ELISEA RAMOS

FACTS: Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City
was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being
operated by petitioner Air Transportation Office (ATO). The respondents agreed after
negotiations to convey the affected portion by deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the
amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written
demands.
Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in
the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the
issuance of Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of
land that included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted
that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without the States consent considering
that the deed of sale had been entered into in the performance of governmental functions.

The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the
amount of P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO
as embodied in the Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of 12% from August 11, 1995, the date
of the Deed of Sale until fully paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages
and P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys
fees plus P15,000.00 representing the 10, more or less, court appearances of plaintiffs counsel;
(4) The costs of this suit.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision withmodification deleting the awarded cost, and
reducing the moral and exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorneys fees is lowered
to P10,000.00.

ISSUE: Could ATO be sued without the State's consent?

HELD: An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its
own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty.
Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated
government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions
has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is
governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose
function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a
business. National Airports Corporation v. Teodoro, Sr. and Phil. Airlines Inc., 91 Phil. 203
(1952)

Civil Aeronautics Administration vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 28 [1988]),the Supreme Court,
reiterating the pronouncements laid down in Teodoro, declared that the CAA (predecessor of
ATO) is an agency not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private
entity.

The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity. Although not
a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to maintain a
necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if revenues be
not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the travelling
public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state,
may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns. National
Airports Corp. v. Teodoro, 91 Phil. 203 (1952)

The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the
Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead
involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the
exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the
States immunity from suit. We uphold the CAs aforequoted holding.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper
expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90478, Nov. 2, 1991. DENIED.
AVELINO VS. CUENCO

Toni Calsado3 years ago

Avg. Rating:
Summary:
Jose Avelino submitted a petition for quo warranto  to the Supreme Court after Mariano
Cuenco replaced him as Senate President after he abandoned his Chair and left the session
hall on February 21, 1949. This petition was denied by the Supreme Court in votation, 6-4.
Senator Tanada had requested for a right to speak to draft charges against the then Senate
President Jose Avelino which was approved. He had submitted a written resolution of his
charges to the Secretary of the Senate before the session began.
When the Senate had reached quorum, the session still did not start, instead, Avelino
requested for the resolution of Tanada and he read it carefully and aloud. It was only after did
he open the session and used every tactic to delay and muzzle Tanada’s speech.
In the process, disorderly conduct arose which gave Senator Pablo Angeles David to move for
the adjournment of the session which was opposed by Senator Sanidad.
Avelino left the Chair and exited the session hall so the session continued with Senate
President Pro-tempore Melecio Arranz wherein Tanada was able to deliver his speech and
two resolutions were approved which removed Avelino was ousted as Senate President and
designated Senator Mariano Cuenco as acting Senate President. Cuenco took an oath the
same day.He was recognized by the president of the Philippines
Doctrine:
Each department has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme
within its own sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission)
In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs.
Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and
the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power
should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary.
Facts:
1. During the session on February 21, 1949, Senator Tanada had been granted the right
to speak in session to talk about charges he drew up against Senate President
Avelino.
2. Senate had reached quorum but the session did not start because Avelino had not yet
opened the session. Before opening it, he read the written resolution of Tanada and
Senator Sanidad on his charges. When he finally did, he used a lot of dilatory tactics to
postpone Tanada’s speech.
3. Disorderly conduct happened so Senator David filed a motion for adjournment but it
was opposed by Senator Sanidad.
4. Avelino banged his gavel and immediately left the session hall followed by Senator
David, Senator Tirona, Senator Francisco, Senator Torres, Senator Magalona, Senator
Clarin.
5. Session continued with Senator Arranz as Senate President Pro-tempore.
 6. Resolution 68 (ordering the investigation of charges filed against the Senate President,
Jose Avelino) and 67 (declaring vacant the Senate President chair and designating
Mariano Cuenco as acting Senate President) were approved by the remaining
senators present.
7. Mariano Cuenco took an oath and was recognized by the president of the Philippines.
8. Jose Avelino filed for a petition to declare himself the rightful Senate President and to
oust Mariano Cuenco.
Issues Ratio:
1. Whether or not the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter? NO. In view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon,
46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192; Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and
the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which
power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. Senators have the
liberty to select their officers and/or reinstate them. If Avelino wants to be the presiding
officer of the Senate, he should take it up there, not the Supreme Court.
2. Whether or not resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved? YES. The session was not
adjourned validly and  a there was majority of each House to constitute a quorum to do
business despite the number of senators who walked out of the session hall so
resolutions were approved validly.
3. Whether or not should the petition be granted? NO. Because all the procedures to put
a new Senate President in place we in order and recognized by the president of the
Philippines so petition for quo warranto will not prosper. 
Dispositive:
The Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to deny the petition.
Aznar vs. COMELEC
Aznar vs. COMELEC

Facts: 
Herein private defendant filed for a certificate of candidacy for 1988 elections which is contested
by Jose B. Aznar of Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council on the ground that private respondent
is allegedly not a Filipino citizen.

Petitioner submitted a Certification that Osmeña is an American, Application for Alien

Registration Form No.1, Alien Certificate Registration and Immigrant Certificate of Residence of
the defendant, thus causing the suspension of the proclamation of the private defendant.

Osmeña, in response, maintained his being Filipino by alleging, that his ancestors are all
Filipinos, that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport, that he has been
continuously residing in the Philippines since birth, that he hasn’t gone out of the country for
more than six months, and that he has been a registered voter since 1965.
COMELEC First division dismissed the petition for not having been timely filed aside from the
lack of proof to the allegation, after the proclamation of the defendant as a winner by the
aforementioned division.

Under the statutes related to election, there are only two instances where the qualifications of a
registered candidate may be questioned, both of which this case may not qualify, qualify,
however, the court found it necessary to ascertain respondent’s citizenship and qualification to
hold public office as a matter of interest.

Issue:
Whether or not private respondent is a Filipino citizen, thus, qualified to hold public office.

Held:
There are three modes thru which an individual loses his Filipino citizenship, (1) by
naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to a foreign county. None of the aforementioned
extinguished Osmeña’s Filipino citizenship.

Petitioner relied that private respondent was issued an alien certificate of registration as an
American Citizen and was given a clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines, hence, he is
an American, and must have sworn allegiance to a foreign country. This is found to be a case of
non sequitur or it does not follow. The mere fact that he bears a certification of being an
American does not follow that he is not anymore a Filipino. Swearing of allegiance is also
vehemently denied by the private respondent.

Also, repugnance of the Constitution to dual citizenship does not have retroactive effect.

Ruling: 
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed and the resolution of the COMELEC is
affirmed.
Case Digest: Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)
6/20/2020
0 COMMENTS
 
FACTS:  Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed
before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party
list representatives provided by the Constitution. However,  the recommendation of the head of
the legal group of COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and
academic was approved by the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the
winning party list will be resolved using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before
the SC assailing said resolution of the COMELEC. 
ISSUE:  (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of
the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?   (2)Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes
prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional.

DECISION:  Dismissed 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the
entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House
of Representatives to Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a
ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. (2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the
continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the
two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of
available party-list seats when the available party-list seat exceeds 50. The continued operation
of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of
the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of
party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to
the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Sec 5
(2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the  attainment of “the  -broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the  House of Representatives.”   (3) No.
Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major
political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by
vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.  

ROBERT Z. BARBERS v. COMELEC, GR No. 165691, 2005-06-22

Facts:
Robert Z. Barbers ("Barbers") and Biazon were candidates for re-election to the Senate of the
Philippines... the COMELEC sitting en banc as the NBC for the election of Senators
promulgated Resolution... proclaiming the first 11 duly elected Senators in the elections.
The COMELEC declared that it would proclaim the remaining 12th winning candidate for
Senator after canvassing the... remaining unsubmitted COCs.
the COMELEC promulgated Resolution... proclaiming Biazon as "the 12th ranking duly elected
12th Senator of the Republic of the Philippines
Biazon obtained 10,685 more votes than Barbers.  The COMELEC stated that this "difference
will not materially be affected by the votes in certain precincts where... there was failure of
elections."
Claiming that Biazon's proclamation was void, Barbers filed a petition to annul the proclamation
of Biazon as Senator
Barbers asserted that the proclamation of Biazon was "illegal and premature being based on an
incomplete canvass." Barbers asserted that the remaining uncanvassed COCs and votes and
the results of the    special elections, which were still to be... conducted, would undoubtedly
affect the results of the elections.
Barbers further claimed that there were Municipal COCs still to be included in the senatorial
canvass and special elections still to be held in certain municipalities
Thus, Barbers insisted that
"suspension of the effects of the proclamation" of Biazon was necessary.  Barbers stressed that
there could be no valid proclamation based on an incomplete canvass.
the COMELEC issued the first assailed Resolution
DENIES the petition to annul the proclamation
Barbers filed a motion for reconsideration[11] which the COMELEC en banc denied
Issues:
Whether or not public respondent COMELEC gravely abused its discretion... when it
deliberately insisted in resorting to and in using and considering
MERE improvised Municipal COCs, which are NON-CANVASSED election documents...
instead of availing and relying on official CANVASS... documents PROVINCIAL COCs
submitted to COMELEC, as the National Board of Canvassers for Senators.
whether this Court can take cognizance of this petition.
Ruling:
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 17.  The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members.
The Senate and the House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals
which are the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members," thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its... jurisdiction
under the 1973 Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the
Batasang Pambansa (Congress).
The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring
to all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title.
"election" referred to the conduct of the... polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the
electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the
returns and the proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of
the board of canvassers... and the authenticity of the election returns; and "qualifications" to
matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such
as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.
The word "sole" in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 12 of the Revised
Rules of the Senate Electoral Tribunal ("SET") underscores the exclusivity of the SET's
jurisdiction over election contests relating to members of the Senate.
It is therefore clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition.
Since Barbers contests Biazon's proclamation as the 12th winning senatorial candidate, it is the
SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on Barbers' complaint.
"where the candidate has already been proclaimed winner in the congressional elections, the
remedy of petitioner is to file an electoral protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives."... as in the present case, Barbers assails Biazon's proclamation as the 12th
duly elected Senator, Barbers' proper recourse is to file a regular election protest with the SET.
While the resolution of the issues presented in this petition falls within the sole jurisdiction of the
SET, still we opt to discuss them to show the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of COMELEC.
An incomplete canvass of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation.
However, this is true only where the... election returns missing or not counted will affect the
results of the election.
The COMELEC, in... proclaiming Biazon as the 12th duly elected Senator, observed the
following provisions of the Omnibus Election Code:
SEC. 233.  When the election returns are delayed, lost or destroyed. In case its copy of the
election returns is missing, the board of canvassers shall... obtain such missing election returns
from the board of election... inspectors concerned... or... the board of canvassers, upon prior
authority of the Commission, may use any of the authentic copies of said election returns or
certified copy of said election returns issued by the Commission
The board of canvassers, notwithstanding the fact that not all the election returns have been
received by it, may terminate the canvass and proclaim the candidates elected on the basis of
the available election returns if the missing election returns will not affect the... results of the
election.
Assuming that the remaining uncanvassed votes of two thousand nine hundred thirty-one
(2,931) in places where special... elections are yet to be held were all votes in favor of petitioner
Barbers, nevertheless, this will not materially affect the results of the election.
To say the least, even if private respondent's lead was decreased to three thousand two
hundred ninety-nine (3,299) votes,... he remains to be the winner and therefore the lawful
occupant of the 12th slot for the senatorial position.
the Supervisory Committee's report shows that the total number of registered voters in areas
where special elections were still to be conducted was only 2,931, covering only 19 precincts in
three municipalities.
The alleged invalidity of Biazon's proclamation involves a dispute or contest relating to the
election returns of members of the Senate.  Indisputably, the resolution of such dispute falls
within the sole jurisdiction of the SET.
In addition, the COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed
Resolutions affirming Biazon's proclamation since the uncanvassed returns and the results... of
the special elections to be held would not materially affect the results of the elections.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition.

Principles:
BASCOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RODOLFO A. CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 101089
April 7, 1993
FACTS: Rodolfo A. Cipriano representing Cipriano Trading Enterprise (CIPTRADE for short)
entered into a hauling contract with Jibfair Shipping Agency Corp whereby the former bound
itself to haul the latter’s 2,000 m/tons of soya bean meal to the warehouse in Calamba, Laguna.
To carry out its obligation, CIPTRADE, through Cipriano, subcontracted with Bascos to transport
and to deliver 400 sacks of soya bean meal from the Manila Port Area to Calamba, Laguna.
Petitioner failed to deliver the said cargo. As a consequence of that failure, Cipriano paid Jibfair
Shipping Agency the amount of the lost goods in accordance with their contract.
Cipriano demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter refused to pay. Eventually,
Cipriano filed a complaint for a sum of money and damages with writ of preliminary attachment
for breach of a contract of carriage. The trial court granted the writ of preliminary attachment.
In her answer, petitioner interposed the defense that there was no contract of carriage since
CIPTRADE leased her cargo truck to load the cargo from Manila Port Area to Laguna and that
the truck carrying the cargo was hijacked and being a force majeure, exculpated petitioner from
any liability
After trial, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of Cipriano and against Bascos ordering
the latter to pay the former for actual damages for attorney’s fees and cost of suit.
The “Urgent Motion To Dissolve/Lift preliminary Attachment” Bascos is DENIED for being moot
and academic.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals but respondent Court affirmed the trial court’s
judgment.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
(1) WON petitioner a common carrier
(2) WON the hijacking referred to a force majeure
HELD: The petition is DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED.
1. YES
In disputing the conclusion of the trial and appellate courts that petitioner was a common carrier,
she alleged in this petition that the contract between her and Cipriano was lease of the truck.
She also stated that: she was not catering to the general public. Thus, in her answer to the
amended complaint, she said that she does business under the same style of A.M. Bascos
Trucking, offering her trucks for lease to those who have cargo to move, not to the general
public but to a few customers only in view of the fact that it is only a small business.
We agree with the respondent Court in its finding that petitioner is a common carrier.
Article 1732 of the Civil Code defines a common carrier as “(a) person, corporation or firm, or
association engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water or air, for compensation, offering their services to the public.” The test to determine
a common carrier is “whether the given undertaking is a part of the business engaged in by the
carrier which he has held out to the general public as his occupation rather than the quantity or
extent of the business transacted.” 12 In this case, petitioner herself has made the admission
that she was in the trucking business, offering her trucks to those with cargo to move. Judicial
admissions are conclusive and no evidence is required to prove the same. 13
But petitioner argues that there was only a contract of lease because they offer their services
only to a select group of people. Regarding the first contention, the holding of the Court in De
Guzman vs. Court of Appeals 14 is instructive. In referring to Article 1732 of the Civil Code, it
held thus:
“The above article makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the
carrying of persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary
activity (in local idiom, as a “sideline”). Article 1732 also carefully avoids making any distinction
between a person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis
and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither does
Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the
general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only from a
narrow segment of the general population. We think that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from
making such distinctions.”
2. NO
Likewise, We affirm the holding of the respondent court that the loss of the goods was not due
to force majeure.
Common carriers are obliged to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
transported by them. Accordingly, they are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated. There are very few instances when
the presumption of negligence does not attach and these instances are enumerated in Article
1734. 19 In those cases where the presumption is applied, the common carrier must prove that
it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption.
In this case, petitioner alleged that hijacking constituted force majeure which exculpated her
from liability for the loss of the cargo. In De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, the Court held that
hijacking, not being included in the provisions of Article 1734, must be dealt with under the
provisions of Article 1735 and thus, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
negligent. To exculpate the carrier from liability arising from hijacking, he must prove that the
robbers or the hijackers acted with grave or irresistible threat, violence, or force. This is in
accordance with Article 1745 of the Civil Code which provides:
“Art. 1745. Any of the following or similar stipulations shall be considered unreasonable, unjust
and contrary to public policy; xx
(6) That the common carrier’s liability for acts committed by thieves, or of robbers who do not
act with grave or irresistible threat, violences or force, is dispensed with or diminished;” xx
NOTES:
1.  She cited as evidence certain affidavits which referred to the contract as “lease”. These
affidavits were made by Jesus Bascos and by petitioner herself and Cipriano and CIPTRADE
did not object to the presentation of affidavits by petitioner where the transaction was referred to
as a lease contract. Both the trial and appellate courts have dismissed them as self-serving and
petitioner contests the conclusion. We are bound by the appellate court’s factual conclusions.
Yet, granting that the said evidence were not self-serving, the same were not sufficient to prove
that the contract was one of lease. It must be understood that a contract is what the law defines
it to be and not what it is called by the contracting parties. Furthermore, petitioner presented no
other proof of the existence of the contract of lease. He who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it.
2. Having affirmed the findings of the respondent Court on the substantial issues involved, We
find no reason to disturb the conclusion that the motion to lift/dissolve the writ of preliminary
attachment has been rendered moot and academic by the decision on the merits.

Case Digest: Bondoc vs Pineda

6/21/2020
0 COMMENTS
 
ISSUE:  Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with election
protests in the HRET by reorganizing the representation of the majority party in the HRET? 

FACTS:  On May 11, 1987, the petitioner (NP) and Pineda (LDP) were rival candidates for
Congressman of the Fourth District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed the winner having
garnered a total of 31,700 votes compared to Bondoc’s 28,400 votes. The petitioner filed a
protest with the HRET, composed of 9 members, 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, 6 members
of the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from political parties. A decision
was reached declaring Bondoc as the winner by 23 votes, another recount was insisted by the
LDP members of the tribunal which increased Bondoc to 107 votes more than Pineda’s.
Congressman Camasura (LDP) along with the Justices, voted to proclaim Bondoc as the
winner. Thereafter, Congressman Camasura received a letter informing him that he was
expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco
and inviting LDP members to join. The House voted for Cong. Cmasura’s removal from the
HRET and that his vote be withdrawn. 

DECISION:  Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  No, pursuant to Sec. 17 of Art. VI, the HRET is sole judge of all contests
in relation to the election, returns and qualification of their members. It is created as non-
partisan court to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for determination of contests.
The House cannot just shuffle and manipulate the political component for their benefit and
interests. The alleged “party disloyalty” of Cong. Camasura, as a reason for his removal from
the party, when he voted in favor of Bondoc, undermines the independence of the HRET. Such
members of the HRET have security of tenure. They can only be replaced in cases of term
expiration, death, permanent disability, resignation from the party. Disloyalty is not a valid cause
of termination.  

G.R. No. 74621 February 7, 1990

BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF LABOR & EMPLOYMENT AND BROKENSHIRE
MEMORIAL HOSPITAL EMPLOYEES AND WORKER'S UNION-FFW Represented by
EDUARDO A. AFUAN, respondents.
Renato B. Pagatpatan for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:
This petition for review by certiorari seeks the annulment or modification of the Order of public
respondent Minister of Labor dated December 9, 1985 in a case for non-compliance with Wage
Order Nos. 5 and 6 docketed as ROXI-LSED Case No. 14-85 which 1) denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration dated February 3, 1986 and 2) affirmed the Order of Regional
Director Eugenio I. Sagmit, Jr., Regional Office No. XI Davao City, dated April 12, 1985, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Brokenshire Memorial
Hospital, Incorporated is hereby ordered to pay the above-named workers,
through this Office, within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof, the total sum of
TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY- FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE
(P284,625.00) PESOS representing their living allowance under Wage Order No.
5 covering the period from October 16, 1984 to February 28, 1985 and under
Wage Order No. 6 effective November 1, 1984 to February 28, 1985.
Respondent is further ordered to pay the employees who are likewise entitled to
the claims here presented, but whose names were inadvertently omitted in the
list and computation. (Rollo, p. 7)
Petitioner contends that the respondent Minister of Labor and Employment acted without, or in
excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in failing to hold:
A) That the Regional Director committed grave abuse of discretion in asserting
exclusive jurisdiction and in not certifying this case to the Arbitration Branch of
the National Labor Relations Commission for a full-blown hearing on the merits;
B) That the Regional Director erred in not ruling on the counterclaim raised by
the respondent (in the labor case, and now petitioner in this case);
C) That the Regional Director erred -in skirting the constitutional and legal issues
raised. (Rollo, p. 4)
This case originated from a complaint filed by private respondents against petitioner on
September 21, 1984 with the Regional Office of the MOLE, Region XI, Davao City for non-
compliance with the provisions of Wage Order No. 5. After due healing the Regional Director
rendered a decision dated November 16, 1984 in favor of private respondents. Judgment having
become final and executory, the Regional Director issued a Writ of Execution whereby some
movable properties of the hospital (petitioner herein) were levied upon and its operating
expenses kept with the bank were garnished. The levy and garnishment were lifted when
petitioner hospital paid the claim of the private respondents (281 hospital employees) directly, in
the total amount of P163,047.50 covering the period from June 16 to October 15, 1984.
After making said payment, petitioner hospital failed to continue to comply with Wage Order No.
5 and likewise, failed to comply with the new Wage Order No. 6 which took effect on November
1, 1984, prompting private respondents to file against petitioner another complaint docketed as
ROXI-LSED-14-85, which is now the case at bar.
In its answer, petitioner raised the following affirmative defenses:
1) That the Regional Office of the Ministry of Labor did not acquire jurisdiction
over it for want of allegation that it has the capacity to be sued and
2) That Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 are non-constitutional and therefore void.
Significantly petitioner never averred any counterclaim in its Answer.
After the complainants had filed their reply, petitioner filed a Motion for the Certification of the
case to the National Labor Relations Commission for a full-blown hearing on the matter,
including the counterclaim interposed that the complainants had unpaid obligations with the
Hospital which might be offset with the latter's alleged obligation to the former.
Issues having been joined, the Regional Director rendered a decision on April 12, 1985 in favor
of the complainants (private respondents herein) declaring that petitioner (respondent therein) is
estopped from questioning the acquisition of jurisdiction because its appearance in the hearing
is in itself submission to jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance of a previous
case where the hospital already willingly paid its obligations to the workers on orders of the
Regional Office. On the matter of the constitutionality of the Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6, the
Regional Director declared that only the court can declare a law or order unconstitutional and
until so declared by the court, the Office of the Regional Director is duly bound to enforce the
law or order.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Office of the Minister of Labor, which dismissed the appeal
for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by said Office, giving rise to
the instant petition reiterating the issues earlier mentioned.
The crucial issue We are tasked to resolve is whether or not the Regional Director has
jurisdiction over money claims of workers concurrent with the Labor Arbiter.
It is worthy of note that the instant case was deliberated upon by this Court at the same time
that Briad Agro Development Corporation v. de la Cerna, G.R. No. 82805 and L.M. Camus
Engineering Corporation v. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et al. G.R. No. 83225, promulgated on
June 29,1989 and Maternity Children's Hospital vs. Hon. Secretary of Labor, et al., G.R. No.
78909, promulgated 30 June 1989, where deliberated upon; for all three (3) cases raised the
same issue of jurisdiction of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor to pass upon
money claims of employees. Hence, we will be referring to these cases, most especially the
case of Briad Agro which, as will be seen later, was reconsidered by the court.
Contrary to the claim of petitioners that the original and exclusive jurisdiction over said money
claims is properly lodged in the Labor Arbiter (relying on the case of Zambales Base Metals Inc.
v. Minister of Labor, 146 SCRA 50) and the Regional Director has no jurisdiction over workers'
money claims, the Court in the three (3) cases above-mentioned ruled that in view of the
promulgation of Executive Order No. 111, the ruling in the earlier case of Zambales Base Metals
is already abandoned. In accordance with the rulings in Briad Agro, L.M. Camus, and Maternity
Children's Hospital, the Regional Director exercises concurrent jurisdiction with the Labor Arbiter
over money claims. Thus,
. . . . Executive Order No. 111 is in the character of a curative law, that is to say,
it was intended to remedy a defect that, in the opinion of the legislative (the
incumbent Chief Executive in this case, in the exercise of her lawmaking power
under the Freedom Constitution) had attached to the provision subject of the
amendment. This is clear from the proviso: "The provisions of Article 217 to the
contrary notwithstanding . . ." Plainly, the amendment was meant to make both
the Secretary of Labor (or the various Regional Directors) and the Labor Arbiter
share jurisdiction. (Briad Agro Dev. Corp. v. Sec. of Labor, supra).
Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises both visitorial and
enforcement power over labor standards cases, and is therefore empowered to
adj udicate money claims, provided there still exists an employer-employee
relationship, and the findings of the regional office is not contested by the
employer concerned. (Maternity Children's Hospital v. Sec. of Labor, supra).
However, it is very significant to note, at this point, that the decision in the consolidated cases of
Briad Agro Development Corp. and L.M. Camus Engineering Corp. was reconsidered and set
aside by this Court in a Resolution promulgated on November 9,1989. In view of the enactment
of Republic Act No. 6715, approved on March 2, 1989, the Court found that reconsideration was
proper.
RA 6715 amended Art. 129 and Art. 217 of the Labor Code, to read as follows:
ART. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits.—Upon
complaint of any interested party, the Regional Director of the Department of
Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the
Department is empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to
hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of wages and other monetary
claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person
employed in domestic or household service or househelper under this code,
arising from employer-employee relations, Provided, That such complaint does
not include a claim for reinstatement; Provided, further, That the aggregate
money claims of each employee or househelper do not exceed five thousand
pesos (P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall decide or
resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of
the same . . .
Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to
this provision may be appealed on the same grounds provided in Article 223 of
this Code, within five (5) calendar days from 11 receipt of a copy of said decision
or resolution, to the National Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the
appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the submission of the last pleading
required or allowed under its rules.
ART. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. —Except as
otherwise provided under this code, the Labor Arbiters shall have original and
 exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within thirty (30) calendar days after the
submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension, even in the
absence of steno graphic notes, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non-agricultural:
(1) Unfair labor practice cases;
(2) Termination disputes;
(3) If accompanied with a claim of reinstatement, those cases that workers may
file involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work and other terms and conditions
of employment;
(4) Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from
the employer-employee relation;
(5) Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including
questions involving the legality of strikes and lockouts; and
(6) Except claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits, all other claims arising from employer-employee relations,
including those of persons in domestic or household service, involving an amount
not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00), whether or not accompanied
with a claim for reinstatement.
It will be observed that what in fact conferred upon Regional Directors and other hearing officers
of the Department of Labor (aside from the Labor Arbiters) adjudicative powers, i.e., the power
to try and decide, or hear and determine any claim brought before them for recovery of wages,
simple money claims, and other benefits, is Republic Act 6715, provided that the following
requisites concur, to wit:
1) The claim is presented by an employee or person employed in domestic or
household service, or househelper under the code;
2) The claimant, no longer being employed, does not seek reinstatement; and
3) The aggregate money claim of the employee or househelper does not exceed
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
In the absence of any of the three (3) requisites, the Labor Arbiters have exclusive original
jurisdiction over all claims arising from employer-employee relations, other than claims for
employee's compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits.
We hereby adopt the view taken by Mr. Justice Andres Narvasa in his Separate Opinion in the
case of Briad Agro Dev. Corp., as reconsidered, a portion of which reads:
In the resolution, therefore, of any question of jurisdiction over a money claim
arising from employer-employee relations, the first inquiry should be into whether
the employment relation does indeed still exist between the claimant and the
respondent.
If the relation no longer exists, and the claimant does not seek reinstatement, the
case is cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, not by the Regional Director. On the
other hand, if the employment relation still exists, or reinstatement is sought, the
next inquiry should be into the amount involved.
 If the amount involved does not exceed P5,000.00, the Regional Director
undeniably has jurisdiction. But even if the amount of the claim exceeds
P5,000.00, the claim is not on that account necessary removed from the
Regional Director's competence. In respect thereof, he may still exercise the
visitorial and enforcement powers vested in him by Article 128 of the Labor Code,
as amended, supra; that is to say, he may still direct his labor regulations officers
or industrial safety engineers to inspect the employer's premises and examine his
records; and if the officers should find that there have been violations of labor
standards provisions, the Regional Director may, after due notice and hearing,
order compliance by the employer therewith and issue a writ of execution to the
appropriate authority for the enforcement thereof. However, this power may not,
to repeat, be exercised by him where the employer contests the labor regulation
officers' findings and raises issues which cannot be resolved without considering
evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection. In such an
event, the case will have to be referred to the corresponding Labor Arbiter for
adjudication, since it falls within the latter's exclusive original jurisdiction.
Anent the other issue involved in the instant case, petitioner's contention that the
constitutionality of Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6 should be passed upon by the National Labor
Relations Commission, lacks merit. The Supreme Court is vested by the Constitution with the
power to ultimately declare a law unconstitutional. Without such declaration, the assailed
legislation remains operative and can be the source of rights and duties especially so in the
case at bar when petitioner complied with Wage Order No. 5 by paying the claimants the total
amount of P163,047.50, representing the latter's minimum wage increases up to October 16,
1984, instead of questioning immediately at that stage before paying the amount due, the
validity of the order on grounds of constitutionality. The Regional Director is plainly ,without the
authority to declare an order or law unconstitutional and his duty is merely to enforce the law
which stands valid, unless otherwise declared by this Tribunal to be unconstitutional. On our
part, We hereby declare the assailed Wage Orders as constitutional, there being no provision of
the 1973 Constitution (or even of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution)
violated by said Wage Orders, which Orders are without doubt for the benefit of labor.
Based on the foregoing considerations, it is our shared view that the findings of the labor
regulations officers may not be deemed uncontested as to bring the case at bar within the
competence of the Regional Director, as duly authorized representative of the Secretary of
Labor, pursuant to Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended. Considering further that the
aggregate claims involve an amount in excess of P5,000.00, We find it more appropriate that
the issue of petitioner hospital's liability therefor, including the proposal of petitioner that the
obligation of private respondents to the former in the aggregate amount of P507,237.57 be used
to offset its obligations to them, be ventilated and resolved, not in a summary proceeding before
the Regional Director under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, but in accordance With
the more formal and extensive proceeding before the Labor Arbiter. Nevertheless, it should be
emphasized that the amount of the employer's liability is not quite a factor in determining the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director. However, the power to order compliance with labor
standards provisions may not be exercised where the employer contends or questions the
findings of the labor regulation officers and raises issues which cannot be determined without
taking into account evidentiary matters not verifiable in the normal course of inspection, as in
the case at bar.
Viewed in the light of RA 6715 and read in consonance with the case of Briad Agro
Development Corp., as reconsidered, We hold that the instant case falls under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter RA 6715 is in the nature of a curative statute. Curative
statutes have long been considered valid in our jurisdiction, as long as they do not affect vested
rights. In this case, We do not see any vested right that will be impaired by the application of RA
6715. Inasmuch as petitioner had already paid the claims of private respondents in the amount
of P163,047.50 pursuant to the decision rendered in the first complaint, the only claim that
should be deliberated upon by the Labor Arbiter should be limited to the second amount given
by the Regional Director in the second complaint together with the proposal to offset the
obligations.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Director dated April 12, 1985, is SET
ASIDE. The case is REFERRED, if the respondents are so minded, to the Labor Arbiter for
proper proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Case Digest #2-1 | GR No. 148208 | Central Bank Employees (Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
Association vs Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Executive Secretary | Dec 15, 2004

FACTS:
The Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc, filed a Petition for Prohibition against
BSP and the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from
further implementing the last provisio in Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, on the ground
that it is unconstitutional.
BACKGROUND:
July 3, 1993, RA No 7653 (The New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central
Bank of the Philippines and created a new BSP.
Article II, Section 15 (c) RA 7653: A compensation structure based on job evaluation studies
and wage surveys and subject to the Boards approval, shall be instituted as an integral
component of the Bank Sentrals human resource development program. Provided that the
Monetary Board shall make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles
provided for under RA No 6758 (Salary Standardization Act). Provided, however, that
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and
below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under RA No 6758.
7 Subsequent Laws were enacted exempting all other rank-and-file employees of Government
Financial Institutions from the SSL. These are: RA No 7907 (1995) – LBP, RA No 8282 (1997) –
SSS, RA No 8289 (1997) – SBGFC, RA No 8291 – GSIS, RA No 8523 (1998) – DBP, RA No
8763 (2000) – HGC, and RA No 9302 (2004) – PDIC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that “No person shall be … denied equal protection of the laws”
HELD:
The last paragraph of Section 15 (c), Article II of RA No 7653, is unconstitutional.
RULING:
With the passage of the subsequent laws amending the charter of the other government
financial institutions (GFIs), the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA
No 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas.
The prior view on the constitutionality of RA 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because
there were substantial distinction that made real differences between the 2 classes.
The subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in circumstance that
considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last provisio of Sec 15 (c),
Art II of RA No 7653. This relates to the constitutionality of classifications between the rank-and-
file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must
also apply equally to all members of the class. The provisio may be fair on its face and impartial
in appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make
unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.
The inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion that each exemption rests
on the policy determination by the legislature. The policy determination argument may support
the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot
justify the inequality of treatment between the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs who
are similarly situated.
The issue is not the declared policy of the law per se, but the oppressive results of Congress
inconsistent and unequal policy towards the rank-and-file of the BSP and the 7 other GFIs. The
challenge to the constitutionality of Sec 15 (c), Art II of RA No 7653 is premised precisely on the
irrational discriminatory policy adopted by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly
situated.
In the field of equal protection, the guarantee that “no person shall be denied the equal
protection of the laws” includes the prohibition against enacting laws that allow invidious
discrimination, directly or indirectly.
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but it requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to priveleges conferred
and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principles
is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstance which, if
not identical are analogous.
Chavez v. JBC Case Digest

(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the
Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. (Sec. 8, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)

Facts: 
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the Judicial and Bar Council was substantially
altered. Instead of having only 7 members, an eighth member was added as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In 2001,
the JBC En Banc, allowed the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. Senator Escudero and Congressman Tupas, Jr.
simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. Francisco Chavez filed a
petition questioning this practice.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned
a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to
the JBC. The phrase, however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism
which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also
contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of having a bicameral
legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would have made the corresponding adjustment in
the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a
member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of
balance. They further argue that the presence of two (2) members from Congress will most
likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees.

Issues:

1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have
been met in this case?
2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of
Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members unconstitutional?
 3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current composition of the JBC is
unconstitutional?

Held:

1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non are
present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by a co-equal branch of government is
put in issue.

The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that petitioner lost his standing to sue
because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
“personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus standi, this is not to say that only official
nominees for the post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the JBC composition
for being unconstitutional. The JBC likewise screens and nominates other members of the
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s duty is not at all limited to the
nominations for the highest magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial posts
all over the country may be affected by the Court’s ruling. More importantly, the legality of the
very process of nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of the controversy.
The claim that the composition of the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern,
not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have the right to seek judicial
intervention for rectification of legal blunders.

2.  Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

 Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated
Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the
private sector.
From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it can readily be discerned that the
provision is clear and unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a JBC and
places the same under the supervision of the Court. Then it goes to its composition where the
regular members are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired member of the Court and a representative from the private sector. On the second part
lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex officio or special members of the
JBC composed of the Chief Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice and “a
representative of Congress.”

The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is unequivocal and
leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from
the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute
are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non
est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure.

Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress”
used in Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No
particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives
is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be allowed to sit
in the JBC.

It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of the JBC serves a practical purpose,
that is, to provide a solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This underlying reason leads
the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
This unsanctioned practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle the JBC’s voting
process, especially in the event a tie is reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered
illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the Constitution itself created. While it would be
unreasonable to expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario, it is sensible to
presume that they knew that an odd composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.

The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of Congress, the word “Congress”
in Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution should be read as including both the Senate and
the House of Representatives. They theorize that it was so worded because at the time the said
provision was being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral form of Congress.
Then, when the Constitutional Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of Congress,
the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in
government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of
the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers.
An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a
vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case
of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the
JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.

3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed
at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous
to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This is
essential in the interest of fair play.

The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the
existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will
impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy
or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.

Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its
prior official actions are nonetheless valid. (Chavez v. JBC, G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012)

THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA G.R. NO.L-

13250 October 29, 1971
FACTS:

Respondent Antonio Campos Rueda is an administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano
Vda. De Cerdeira by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier,
Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left,
among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines.

Respondent Campos Rueda file a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the
properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending investigation,
issued an assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of
P111,592.48 and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which tax liabilities were paid by
petitioner. Rueda filed an amended return stating that intangible personal properties worth
P396,308.90 should be exempted from taxes. The CIR denied the request on the ground that
the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code.

The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals which ruled in favor of the
respondent. The principal question as noted dealt with the reciprocity aspect as well as the
insistence by the Collector of Internal Revenue that Tangier was not a foreign country within the
meaning of Section 122.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tangier is a state.

HELD:

YES. A foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound’s
formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control
bound by ties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government
functioning under a regime of law. It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it
viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to
exact obedience its commands. It has been referred to as a body-politic organized by common
consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare

Further, the Supreme Court noted that there is already an existing jurisprudence (Collector vs
De Lara) which provides that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an
international personality in the sense, did fall under the exempt category provided for in Section
22 of the Tax Code. Thus, recognition is not necessary. Hence, since it was proven that Tangier
provides such exemption to personal properties of Filipinos found therein so must the
Philippines honor the exemption as provided for by our tax law with respect to the doctrine of
reciprocity.

CITY OF DAVAO v RTC (467 SCRA 280)

FACTS:

GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling public bidding of
its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994, amounting to the sum total of
Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however, subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline
extension given by Davao City.

On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three parcels of land
it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that same year, GSIS filed a
petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or Declaratory Relief with the Davao City
RTC.

During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local Government
Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also withdrawn from the GSIS
its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.

RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.

ISSUE/S:

Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC

HELD:

Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing powers of
LGUs cannot extend to the levy of “taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.”

However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to natural or
juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are withdrawn upon
effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows that its exemption has been
withdrawn.

Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting exemption,
Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the amendatory second
paragraph.

Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to enact
future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the plenary power
of the legislature to amend or repeal laws.

Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment or repeal
laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the precise effect of limiting
the powers of Congress.

Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second paragraph of sec.
33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous means employed through
legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two
conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt
status of GSIS.

Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that “any tax exemption,
incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code shall be construed
strictly against the person claiming it.”

The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored by the
GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-1994 were
assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be collected by the
City of Davao.

CO v CIVIL REGISTER (423 SCRA 420)

G.R. NO. 138496 February 23, 2004

CO VS CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA
FACTS:
HUBERT TAN CO was born March 23, 1974. His sister, ARLENE TAN
CO, was born May 19, 1975 in their respective certificates of birth,
it is stated that their parents CO BOON PENG AND LOURDES VIHONG K. TAN
are CHINESE CITIZENS.
CO BOON PENG filed an application for his
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the Special
Committee on Naturalization under LETTER OF INSTRUCTION no. 270.
His application was granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship
under PD 1055. He was issued a certificate of naturalization and
consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February 15, 1977.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the RTC Manila a petition under
Rules of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth
which was denied on the ff. grounds:
a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same
subject matter, they do not provide the same beneficial effects with
respect to the minor children of the applicant;
**Sec. 15: effects of naturalization on the wife and the children
b) LOI 270: refers to qualified individuals only;
c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and
applied to LOI 270;
d) Application of “pari material” rule of construction is misplaced.
ISSUE: Whether or not Arlene and Hubert are Filipino citizens on
account of the naturalization of their Father Co Boon Peng.
HELD: It is not enough that the petitioners adduce in evidence the
certificate of naturalization of their father, to entitle them to
Philippine citizenship. They are likewise mandated to prove the ff.
material allegations in their petition:
1) That they are legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;
2) They were born in the Philippines;
3) That they were still minors when Co Boon Peng was naturalized
as a Filipino citizen.

CO v HRET (423 SCRA 420)

Facts:

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of

the 2nd district of Northern Samar. His adversaries, which include
petitioners Co et al., filed election protests against him averring that he
is not a natural-born citizen of the Phils. and that he is not a resident
of the 2nd district of Northern Samar and therefore he did not satisfy
the qualification for representatives mandated in Art VI, Sec 6 of the
Constitution. It is argued that Ong does not even have real properties
in that district. Respondent HRET found for Ong, hence his petition for
certiori. Ong was born of a natural-born citizen mother and a Chinese
father who was later naturalized while Ong was a minor. Ong was
born in the said district of Samar and grew up there. Their house was
twice burned and, in both times, they rebuilt their residence in the
same place. After elementary, he pursued his studies in Mla. and
practiced his profession as CPA in the Central Bank of the Phils.
Later, he engaged himself in the management of the family business
in Mla. He married a Filipina. In between, he made periodical journeys
back to his home province. However, Ong does not have property in
the district.

Issues:
(1) Is Ong a naturally-born Filipino citizen?

(2) Is Ong a resident of the 2nd district of Northern Samar?

Held:

(1) Yes. When Ong’s father was naturalized, Sec 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him for he was then a
minor residing in this country. Thus, it was the law itself which elected
Philippine citizenship to him when he was only 9. Election through a
sworn statement when he turned 21 (age of majority) would have
been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who is already a
Filipino citizen. Moreover, formal declaration is a requirement for those
who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos, when
the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which
cannot be less binding and, in this case, Ong’s establishment of his
life here are themselves formal manifestations of choice.

(2) Yes. The domicile of origin of Ong, which was the domicile of his
parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar (in the district). Although no merit
was found in the petitioners’ argument that Ong does not even have
property in the district, the Court nonetheless held, for the sake of
argument, that did it is not required that a person should have a house
in order to establish his residence and domicile because that would
tantamount to a property qualification. It is enough that he should live
in the municipality. Although he studied in Manila and practiced his
profession therein, the periodical journeys made to his home province
reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.

COMMISSIONER v SANDIEGO (31 SCRA 616)

DA v NLRC (227 SCRA 693)

November 11, 1993 | G.R. No. 104269

Department of Agriculture, petitioner

National Labor Relations Commission, et al., respondents

FACTS:

On April 1, 1989, the Department of Agriculture (DoA) office in Cagayan de Oro and Sultan Security
Agency (SSA) entered into a contract where the latter was to provide security services to the former. On
September 13, 1990, several guards from SSA filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, as well as for
damages, against DoA and SSA. Both the DoA and SSA were subsequently found guilty by the Executive
Labor Arbiter, which also held both of them liable for the payment of money claims amounting to
P266,483.91.

On July 18, 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. As a response, the DoA filed a petition for
injunction, prohibition, and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ of injunction, before the NLRC. The
DoA's petition was dismissed.
Following the dismissal of its petition before the NLRC, DoA filed a petition before the SC arguing that: (a)
it was COA, not NLRC, that was supposed to have jurisdiction over money claims against the
Government pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445; and (b) that NLRC
had disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not it was COA that has exclusive jurisdiction over money claims against the Government.
2. Whether or not DoA, as an agency of the State, is covered by the principle of the non-suability of the
State.

HELD:

1. Yes, the Court ruled that money claims against the Government should be filed before the Commission
on Audit pursuant to CA Act No. 327 as amended by PD No. 1445. In the instant case, underpayment of
wages, holiday pay, overtime pay, and other similar items arising from the Contract for Service clearly
constitute money claims. As such, the writ of execution issued by the Labor Arbiter and the resolution
issued by NLRC were reversed by the Court in favor of DoA.

2. No, DoA cannot use the principle of non-suability of the State as an excuse not to be sued.

Section 3, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution states that "the State may not be sued without its consent."
This principle reflects a recognition of the sovereign character of the State and an express affirmation of
the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the jurisdiction of the courts. As per Justice Holmes, a
sovereign State is exempt from suits "not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on
which the right depends."

DE AGBAYANI v PNB (38 SCRA 429)

FACTS: Plaintiff obtained a loan from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944, secured
by real estate mortgage. On July 13 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, defendant instituted
extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the loan remaining unpaid.
Plaintiff countered with his suit against both alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed had
long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB on the other hand
claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March 10, 1945,
when Executive Order No. 32 1 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the subsequent legislative
act 2 extending the period of moratorium was declared invalid, were to be deducted from the
computation of the time during which the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. The
lower court did not find such contention persuasive and decided the suit in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: W/N the period of the effectivity of EO 32 and the Act extending the Moratorium Law before
the same were declared invalid tolled the period of prescription (Effect of the declaration of
Unconstitutionality of a law)
HELD: YES. In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: «The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination [of unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private
and official.» 4
The now prevailing principle is that the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. Precisely because of
the judicial recognition that moratorium was a valid governmental response to the plight of the
debtors who were war sufferers, this Court has made clear its view in a series of cases impressive in
their number and unanimity that during the eight-year period that Executive Order No. 32 and
Republic Act No. 342 were in force, prescription did not run.
The error of the lower court in sustaining plaintiff’s suit is thus manifest. From July 19, 1944, when
her loan matured, to July 13, 1959, when extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings were started by
appellant Bank, the time consumed is six days short of fifteen years. The prescriptive period was
tolled however, from March 10, 1945, the effectivity of Executive Order No. 32, to May 18, 1953,
when the decision of Rutter v. Esteban was promulgated, covering eight years, two months and
eight days. Obviously then, when resort was had extra-judicially to the foreclosure of the mortgage
obligation, there was time to spare before prescription could be availed of as a defense.

DE LEON v ESGUERRA (153 SCRA 602)

Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay Captain together with
the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province
of Rizal in a Barangay election held under Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay
Election Act of 1982.

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but
signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay Dolores and the other
respondents as members of Barangay Council of the same Barangay and Municipality.

Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8, 1987 be
declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their positions of Barangay
Captain and Barangay Councilmen.

Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982 (BP Blg. 222),
their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June 7, 1988 and shall continue
until their successors shall have elected and shall have qualified. It was also their position that with
the ratification of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the
authority to replace them and to designate their successors.

On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and appointive officials
were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional
Constitution and not because their term of six years had not yet expired; and that the provision in the
Barangay Election Act fixing the term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to
have been repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly made during
the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.

Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8,
1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional
Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov
could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions
occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office
of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.

DELA LLANA v CHAIRPERSON (665 SCRA 176)

 G. R. No. 180989 | 665 SCRA 176 | February 7, 2012 | En Banc | Justice Sereno
Political and International Law | Constitutional Law | Constitutional Commissions | Commission on Audit

Statutory Construction | When the language of the law is clear, there is no need for interpretation.
FACTS:

On 26 October 1982, the COA issued Circular No. 82-195, lifting the system of pre-audit of
government financial transactions, albeit with certain exceptions. The circular affirmed the state
policy that all resources of the government shall be managed, expended or utilized in
accordance with law and regulations, and safeguarded against loss or wastage through illegal
or improper disposition, with a view to ensuring efficiency, economy and effectiveness in the
operations of government. After the change in administration due to the February 1986
revolution, grave irregularities and anomalies in the government’s financial transactions were
uncovered. Hence, on 31 March 1986, the COA issued Circular No. 86-257, which reinstated
the pre-audit of selected government transactions. The selective pre-audit was perceived to be
an effective, although temporary, remedy against the said anomalies. Two years later, or on 22
July 2011, COA issued Circular No. 2011-002, which lifted the pre-audit of government
transactions implemented by Circular No. 2009002. In its assessment, subsequent
developments had shown heightened vigilance of
government agencies in safeguarding their resources. On 15 January 2008, petitioner filed this
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. He alleges that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA
cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that pre-audit is a constitutional mandate
enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution. He further claims that, because
of the lack of pre-audit by COA, serious irregularities in government transactions have been
committed, such as the P728-million fertilizer fund scam, irregularities in the P550-
million call center laboratory project of the Commission on Higher Education, and many others.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COA’s power includes the duty to conduct pre-audit.

RULING:

Petitioner’s allegations find no support in the

aforequoted Constitutional provision.

There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-audit of all
government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-
audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a post-audit is
mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity and only when
the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the COA may
adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct the deficiencies. Hence,
the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may compel the COA to
perform. This discretion
on its part is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive
authority to define the scope of its audit and examination.

When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for interpretation, only
application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED.

DFA v NLRC (262 SCRA 39)

Facts:

On 27 January 1993, private respondent Magnayi filed an illegal dismissal case against Asian
Development Bank. Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the ADB and the other
through the Department of Foreign Affairs. ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor Arbiter that
the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an immunity from legal process
except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of
the Agreement Establishing the Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and
Section 44 of the Agreement Between The Bank and The Government Of The Philippines Regarding
The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the ADB had waived its
diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision in favor Magnayi. The ADB did not
appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November 1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC; in its
referral, the DFA sought a "formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a
favorable decision from the NLRC, it filed a petition for certiorari.

Issues:

1. Whether or not ADB is immune from suit

2. Whether or not by entering into service contracts with different private companies, ADB has
descended to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction giving rise to a waiver of its
immunity from suit
3. Whether or not the DFA has the legal standing to file the present petition

4. Whether or not the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is proper in this case

Held:

1. Under the Charter and Headquarters Agreement, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of
every form, except in the specified cases of borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the
purchase, sale and underwriting of securities. The Bank’s officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in
respect of all acts performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters
Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and commitments
voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be respected.

Being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic status, the ADB is
independent of the municipal law. "One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal writs and processes issued by
the tribunals of the country where it is found.  The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of
such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium thru
which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies
and decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local jurisdiction would impair the
capacity of such body to discharge its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."

2. No. The ADB didn't descend to the level of an ordinary party to a commercial transaction, which
should have constituted a waiver of its immunity from suit, by entering into service contracts with
different private companies. “There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely
held and firmly established. According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot,
without its consent, be made a respondent in the Courts of another sovereign. According to the
newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public
acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private act or acts jure gestionis.

 “Certainly, the mere entering into a contract by a foreign state with a private party cannot be the
ultimate test. Such an act can only be the start of the inquiry. The logical question is whether the
foreign state is engaged in the activity in the regular course of business. If the foreign state is not
engaged regularly in a business or trade, the particular act or transaction must then be tested by its
nature. If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure
imperii, especially when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.”

The service contracts referred to by private respondent have not been intended by the ADB for profit
or gain but are official acts over which a waiver of immunity would not attach.
3. Yes. The DFA's function includes, among its other mandates, the determination of persons and
institutions covered by diplomatic immunities, a determination which, when challenged, entitles it to
seek relief from the court so as not to seriously impair the conduct of the country's foreign relations.
The DFA must be allowed to plead its case whenever necessary or advisable to enable it to help
keep the credibility of the Philippine government before the international community. When
international agreements are concluded, the parties thereto are deemed to have likewise accepted
the responsibility of seeing to it that their agreements are duly regarded.  In our country, this task
falls principally on the DFA as being the highest executive department with the competence and
authority to so act in this aspect of the international arena. In Holy See vs. Hon. Rosario, Jr., this
Court has explained the matter in good detail; viz:

"In Public International Law, when a state or international agency wishes to plead sovereign or
diplomatic immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the state where it is sued to
convey to the court that said defendant is entitled to immunity.

"In the United States, the procedure followed is the process of 'suggestion,' where the foreign state
or the international organization sued in an American court requests the Secretary of State to make
a determination as to whether it is entitled to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the
defendant is immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit to the court a
'suggestion' that the defendant is entitled to immunity.  

"In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the international organization to first
secure an executive endorsement of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts varies. In International Catholic
Migration Commission vs. Calleja, 190 SCRA 130 (1990), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs just sent a
letter directly to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, informing the latter that the respondent-
employer could not be sued because it enjoyed diplomatic immunity. In World Health Organization
vs. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242 (1972), the Secretary of Foreign Affairs sent the trial court a telegram to
that effect. In Baer vs. Tizon, 57 SCRA 1 (1974), the U.S. Embassy asked the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs to request the Solicitor General to make, in behalf of the Commander of the United States
Naval Base at Olongapo City, Zambales, a 'suggestion' to respondent Judge. The Solicitor General
embodied the 'suggestion' in a manifestation and memorandum as amicus curiae.

"In the case at bench, the Department of Foreign Affairs, through the Office of Legal Affairs moved
with this Court to be allowed to intervene on the side of petitioner. The Court allowed the said
Department to file its memorandum in support of petitioner's claim of sovereign immunity.

"In some cases, the defense of sovereign immunity was submitted directly to the local courts by the
respondents through their private counsels.  In cases where the foreign states bypass the Foreign
Office, the courts can inquire into the facts and make their own determination as to the nature of the
acts and transactions involved."

4. Yes. Relative to the propriety of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the Court has, under
special circumstances, so allowed and entertained such a petition when (a) the questioned order or
decision is issued in excess of or without jurisdiction, or (b) where the order or decision is a patent
nullity, which, verily, are the circumstances that can be said to obtain in the present case. When an
adjudicator is devoid of jurisdiction on a matter before him, his action that assumes otherwise would
be a clear nullity.

Petition for certiorari is GRANTED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter, dated 31 August 1993 is
VACATED for being NULL AND VOID.  (DFA vs NLRC, G.R. No. 113191, 18 September 1996)

DIMAPORO v MITRA (202 SCRA 779)

GR 96859, 202 SCRA 779 [Oct 15, 1991]

TERM of the Members of the House of Representatives Art VI, Sec 7. “Term” of office is different
from “tenure” of office.

Facts:
Petitioner incumbent Rep. Dimaporo of Lanao del Sur filed on Jan 15, 1990 for Certificate of Candidacy
for the position of Regional Governor of the ARMM. Respondent Speaker Mitra and the Sec. of the House
then excluded Dimaporo’s name from its Roll of Members xxx, considering him permanently resigned
from his office upon filing of his Certificate of Candidacy pursuant to the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881)
Art IX, Sec 67 which states “any elective official xxx running for any office other than the one which he is
holding in a permanent capacity except for the Pres. and VP shall be considered ipso facto resigned from
his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Having lost in the election, Dimaporo expressed
his intention “to resume performing” his “duties as elected Member of Congress” but he failed his bid
hence this petition. He argues that Sec 67, Art IX of BP 881 is unconstitutional in that it provides for the
shortening of a congressman’s term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution.

Issue:

Does Sec 67, Art IX of BP 881 shorten a term of a congressman by means other than that provided in the
Constitution?

Held:

No. Dimaporo seems to confuse “term” with “tenure” of office. The term of office prescribed by the
Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the period during which an officer
actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances xxx. Under the questioned provision,
when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to
have voluntarily cut short his tenure not his term. The term remains xxx. Forfeiture is automatic and
permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office xxx. It is not
necessary that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Sec 13, Art VI of the
Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Sec 67, Art. IX of BP, Blg. 881, which is actually a
mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Sec 7(2) of Art VI of the Constitution. Petition dismissed.

DOMINO v COMELEC (310 SCRA 546)

Summary:
A petition to cancel Domino's COC was filed by private respondents arguing that
Domino is not a resident of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement.

Doctrine:
The term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and
for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.  "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons,
one intends to return. 

Facts:
Petitioner Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he had resided there for 1
year and 2 months immediately preceding the election. A petition to cancel his COC
was filed by private respondents arguing that Domino is not a resident, much less a
registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. For his
defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997.
COMELEC declared Domino disqualified as candidate due to lack of the one year
residence requirement. Previously, Domino ran for the same position in Quezon City
in 1995.

 
Issues Ratio:
Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections

NO, petitioner has not resided in Sarangani for at least 1 year immediately preceding
the elections.

The term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and
for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention.  "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons,
one intends to return.  "Domicile" is a question of intention and circumstances. In the
consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a
man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it
remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or
domicile at a time. 

Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that
sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala
Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City.

A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be

deemed lost until a new one is established.  To successfully effect a change of
domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose.  In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must
be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality
involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a
new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either of these elements is absent.
Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in
acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention. 

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately
support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's
intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency
required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The mere absence of
individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change of domicile. Thus the date of the contract
of lease of a house and lot located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997,
cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of the
one-year residence requirement.

In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual
presence in the district one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time
prescribed by the fundamental law.  Domino's failure to do so rendered him ineligible
and his election to office null and void.

Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of
the COMELEC 2nd Division and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En
Banc, are hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
Other Notes:
Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition
a quo for the disqualification of petitioner

YES, the COMELEC has jurisdiction.

COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate
of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues even after election, if for any reason no final
judgment of disqualification is rendered before the election, and the candidate facing
disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of votes  and provided
further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath of
office. On the other hand, HRET has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress as
provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the HOR.

Considering that Domino has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member
of the HOR. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the HRET which has jurisdiction over
the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate. 

EPG CONSTRUCTION v VIGILAR (354 SCRA 566)

Topic: Sovereignty - Suits not against the State - Justice and Equity
Facts:
In 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlement (MHS), through the BLISS Development
Corporation, intiated a housing project on a government property along the east bank of
Manggahan Floodway in Pasig
The MHS entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Ministry of Public Works and
Highways (MPWH) where the latter undertook to develop the housing site and construct
thereon 145 housing units
By virtue of the MOA, MPWH forged individual contracts with petitioners EPG, Ciper, Septa,
Phil. Plumbing, Home Construction, World Builders, Glass World, Performance Builders, and
De Leon Araneta Construction for the construction of the housing units
Under the contracts, the scope of construction and funding covered only around "2/3 of each
housing unit"
Petitioners agreed to undertake and perform "additional constructions" for the completion of the
housing units despite the fact that there was only a verbal promise, and not a written contract,
by the MPWH Undersecretary Aber Canlas that additional funds will be available and
forthcoming
Unpaid balance for the additional constructions amounted to P5,918,315.63
Upon a demand letter from the petitioners, on November 14, 1988, DPWH Asst. Secretary
Madamba opined that payment of petitioners' money claims should be based on quantum
meruit (what one has earned) and should be forwarded to the Commission on Audit (COA)
In a Letter of the Undersecretary of Budget and Management dated December 20, 1994, the
amount of P5,819,316.00 was then released for the payment of the petitioners' money claims
under Advise of Allotment No. A4-1303-04-41-303
In an indorsement dated December 27, 1995, the COA referred anew the money claims to the
DPWH
In a letter dated August 26, 1996, respondent Secretary Gregorio Vigilar denied the subject
money claims
Petitioners filed before the RTC of QC, Branch 226 a Petition for Mandamus to order the
respondent to pay petitioners their money claims plus damages and attorney's fees.
Lower court denied the petition on February 18, 1997
Issue:
Whether or not the implied, verbal contracts between the petitioners and then Undersecretary
Canlas should be upheld
Whether or not the State is immune from suit
Holding:
Yes.
No.
Ratio:
While the court agrees with the respondent that the implied contracts are void, in view of
violation of applicable laws, auditing rules, and lack of legal requirements, it still finds merit in
the instant petition
The illegality of the implied contracts proceeds from an express declaration or prohibition by
law, not from any intrinsic illegality
"in the interest of substantial justice," petitioners-contractors' right to be compensated is upheld,
applying the principle of quantum meruit
Even the DPWH Asst. Sec. for Legal Affairs recommends their compensation; even the DPWH
Auditor did not object to the payment of the money claims
2. The respondent may not conveniently hide under the State's cloak of invincibility against suit,
considering that this principle yields to certain settled exceptions.
The State's immunity cannot serve as an instrument perpetrating injustice
Petition granted. RTC decision reversed and set aside.

NHA v HEIRS OF GUIVELONDO (404 SCRA 389)

Fact:  Petitioner filed an Amended Complaint for eminent domain against the property of the
Respondent, that the lands are within a blighted urban center which petitioner intends to
develop as a socialized housing project. Respondents herein, filed a Manifestation stating that
they were waiving their objections to petitioner’s power to expropriate their properties. Hence,
the trial court issued an Order declaring that the Petitioner has a lawful right to expropriate the
properties of the Respondents. Petitioner, filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss complaint
for eminent domain, alleging that the implementation of its socialized housing project was
rendered impossible by the unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which
the intended beneficiaries can not afford. The Motion was denied on the ground that the Partial
Judgment had already become final and executory and there was no just and equitable reason
to warrant the dismissal of the case. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
denied, thus filing a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which summarily dismissed
the petition. Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review.

Issue: Whether the petitioner can withdraw the expropriation proceedings after the
determination of the Power of Eminent Domain
Held: No, petitioner did not appeal the Order of the trial court dated December 10, 1999, which
declared that it has a lawful right to expropriate the properties of respondent Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo. Hence, the Order became final and may no longer be subject to review or reversal
in any court. A final and executory decision or order can no longer be disturbed or reopened no
matter how erroneous it may be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error
should be corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits on the same claim.

ONGSUCO v MALONES (604 SCRA 499)

(G.R. No. 182065. October 27, 2009)

FACTS:

Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public Market. After a meeting with the stall
holders, Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01
entitled "The Municipal Revised Revenue Code." The Code contained a provision for
increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees in the amount
of P20,000.00 and P15,000.00 for stalls located on the first and second floors of the
municipal public market, respectively. The same Code authorized respondent to enter
into lease contracts over the said market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of
lease for the stall holders at the municipal public market.

Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approved Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, moving to
have the meeting declared inoperative as a public hearing, because majority of the
persons affected by the imposition of the goodwill fee failed to agree to the said
measure. However, Resolution No. 68, series of 1998, of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Maasin was vetoed by respondent on 30 September 1998. Respondent wrote a letter to
petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls in the newly renovated
municipal public market without any lease contract, as a consequence of which, the
stalls were considered vacant and open for qualified and interested applicants.

Petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition/Mandamus, with Prayer for Issuance

of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, against
respondent. The RTC found that petitioners could not avail themselves of the remedy of
mandamus or  prohibition. Because they failed to show a clear legal right to the use of
the market stalls without paying the goodwill fees and also on the ground of non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies. This decision was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was a need for the exhaustion of administrative remedies

RULING:

The Court determines that there is no need for petitioners to exhaust administrative
remedies before resorting to the courts. It is true that the general rule is that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed
himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.
However, there are several exceptions to this rule.

Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower courts over cases
involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance.

In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to
present evidence. The sole issue petitioners rose before the RTC was whether
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite the absence, prior to
its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article 276 of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This is
undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the RTC
to resolve.

OPOSA v FACTORAN (224 SCRA 792)

(G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted
that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. 

Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country
and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. 

Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of
action against him and that it raises a political question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.

Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his
discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.

(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING:

First Issue: Cause of Action.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by
the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The
complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is
incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain
from impairing the environment and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization,
development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is
also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and
Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they
represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the
said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the
TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and
healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show,
prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.

Second Issue: Political Issue.

Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction
vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of
the Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because
it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the
utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract
within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can
be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of
license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights. 

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise
by the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In
short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET
ASIDE.

OSMEñA v PENDATUN (109 PHIL 863)

FACTS: Congressman Osmena petitioned for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
against Congressman Pendatun and 14 others in their capacity as member of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution # 59. Specifically, petitioner asked for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of
infringement of his parliamentary immunity; and asked the member of the Special Committee be enjoined from
proceeding, as provided by Resolution # 59, requiring the petitioner to substantiate his charges against the President
during his privilege speech entitled “A Message to Garcia” wherein he spoke of derogatory remarks of the President’s
administration selling pardons. For refusing to provide evidence as the basis of his allegations, Osmena was
suspended for 15 months for the serious disorderly behavior.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner has complete parliamentary immunity as provided by the Constitution.
2. Whether or not petitioner’s words constitute disorderly conduct.
3. Whether or not the taking up of other business matters bars the House from investigating the speech and words of
Osmena.
4. Whether or not the House has the power to suspend its members.

HELD:
1. Petitioner has immunity but it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself as stated in
the provision that “xxx shall not be questioned in any other place”.

2. What constitutes disorderly conduct is within the interpretation of the legislative body and not the judiciary, because
it is a matter that depends mainly on the factual circumstances of which the House knows best. Anything to the
contrary will amount to encroachment of power.

3. Resolution # 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such approval amounted to the suspension of the
House Rules, which according to the standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent.

4. For unparliamentary conduct, members of the Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison,
even expelled by the votes of their colleagues.

PAMATONG v COMELEC (472 SCRA 96)

GR No. 161872 April 13, 2004

FACTS:

When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give the petition its due
course. Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However, the COMELEC again denied
his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along with 35 other people, as nuisance
candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC noted that such
candidates “could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are either not nominated by a
political party or not supported by a registered political party with national constituency.”
Pamatong argued that this was against his right to “equal access to opportunities for public
service,” citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and that the COMELEC was indirectly
amending the Constitution in this manner. Pamatong also stated that he is the “most qualified
among all the presidential candidates” and supported the statement with his legal qualifications,
his alleged capacity to wage national and international campaigns, and his government
platform.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC’s refusal of Pamatong’s request for presidential candidacy, along
with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal access to opportunities for public
service.

RULING:

NO
The Court noted that the provisions under Article II are generally considered not-self executing.
As such, the provision in section 26, along with the other policies in the article, does not convey
any judicially enforceable rights. Article 2 “merely specifies a guideline for legislative or
executive action” by presenting ideals/standards through the policies presented. Article 2,
Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is subject to limitations
provided by law. As long as these limitations are enforced without discrimination, then the equal
access clause is not violated. The Court justified the COMELEC’s need for limitations on
electoral candidates given the interest of ensuring rational, objective, and orderly elections. In
the absence of any limitations, the election process becomes a “mockery” if anyone, including
those who are clearly unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to run. Note:
Pamatong presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible for candidacy. The Court
however stated that it is not within their power to make such assessments.

PEOPLE v JALOSJOS (324 SCRA 689)

Facts:

The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is

confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a
non-bailable offense.

Jalosjos’ primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the sovereign
electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their representative in
Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he has the duty to perform the
functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible by
the intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural
restraints arising from pending criminal cases.
Jalosjos also invoked the doctrine of condonation citing Aguinaldo v. Santos, which states,
inter alia, that –

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of
office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
When a people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with the
knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by reason of such fault or
misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people.

Jalosjos further argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court of Makati granted
several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or medical
reasons.

Jalosjos avers that his constituents in the First District of Zamboanga del Norte want their
voices to be heard and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House of
Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate.

Issue:

Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as member of

House of Representatives

Held:

NO.

The privilege of arrest has always been granted in a restrictive sense.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, in spite of
its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged
or restricted by law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a
position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather
than exemption.

Section 11, Article VI, of the Constitution provides:

A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by

not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. xxx

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable
considerations.

The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal cases

The Aguinaldo case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior
to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the
enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not
removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless
expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public
self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to
others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all

prisoners.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of
Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee

meetings will virtually make him a free man

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress, they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the
confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time,
he may no longer serve his full term in office.

To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5

days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellant’s status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of
the correction system.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question of constitutional equal
protection.

The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
laws." This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in
rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any
undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be
displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allows different
treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiation which removes the
accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined under
law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been
an excuse to free a person validly in prison.

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare
may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable
classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom
and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. (People vs.
Jalosjos
G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000)
PEREZ v PEOPLE (544 SCRA 532)
Malversation of Public Funds   

Facts:
An audit team conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the
acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. In the course of the audit, the amount of
P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. The audit team embodied their findings in the
Report of Cash Examination, which also contained an inventory of cash items.  Based on the
said audit, petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of
the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57. When asked by the auditing team as to the
location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that part of the money was used to
pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the
rest for his medicine.

            As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum dated January 13,
1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the appropriate
criminal case against petitioner.

            Petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public funds,
defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code  

Issue:

 Is petitioner guilty of malversation?

  Ruling:

            YES. Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code. The acts punished as malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or property,
(2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3) consenting, or
through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or
property, and (4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property.

There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the crime. 
They are: (a)   That the offender be a public officer; (b)   That he had the custody or control of
funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;(c)   That those funds or property involved
were public funds or property for which he is accountable; and (d)   That he has appropriated,
took or misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take them.

Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar.  At the time of the commission
of the crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting municipal treasurer of
Tubigon, Bohol.  By reason of his public office, he was accountable for the public funds under
his custody or control. In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant
received in his possession public funds; that he could not account for them and did not have
them in his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its disappearance. 
An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even if there is no direct
evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in his accounts which he has
not been able to explain satisfactorily.

            Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there is
no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure
of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand
by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of
conversion.      Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is
shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or property under his
custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has appropriated or misappropriated
for himself the missing funds.  Failing to do so, the accused may be convicted under the said
provision.

            However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one.  The accountable

officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary.  If he adduces evidence
showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to personal use, then that
presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed. In the case at bar, petitioner was
not able to present any credible evidence to rebut the presumption that he malversed the
missing funds in his custody or control

PHIL. COCONUT v REPUBLIC (600 SCRA 102)

Philippine Coconut, Producers Federation, Inc.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Rights of the Accused; Right to be Heard; Right to
Speedy Trial;
Facts:

In 1971, R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund. The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance
of several presidential decrees purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through
the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. In G.R. Nos. 177857-58, class action petitioners
COCOFED and a group of purported coconut farmers and COCOFED members, hereinafter
“COCOFED et al.” collectively seek the reversal of the judgments and resolutions of the anti-
graft court insofar as these issuances are adverse to their interests. As a procedural issue,
COCOFED, et al. and Ursua contends that in the course of almost 20 years that the cases have
been with the anti-graft court, they have repeatedly sought leave to adduce evidence (prior to
respondent’s complete presentation of evidence) to prove the coco farmers’ actual and
beneficial ownership of the sequestered shares. The Sandiganbayan, however, had repeatedly
and continuously disallowed such requests, thus depriving them of their constitutional right to be
heard.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioners COCOFED et al. were not deprived of their right to be heard;
(2) Whether or not the right to speedy trial was violated.

Ruling:

(1) No, petitioner COCOFED’s right to be heard had not been violated by the mere issuance of
PSJ-A and PSJ-F before they can adduce their evidence. As it were, petitioners COCOFED et
al. were able to present documentary evidence in conjunction with its “Class Action Omnibus
Motion” dated February 23, 2001 where they appended around four hundred (400) documents
including affidavits of alleged farmers. These petitioners manifested that said documents
comprise their evidence to prove the farmers’ ownership of the UCPB shares, which were
distributed in accordance with valid and existing laws. Lastly, COCOFED et al. even filed their
own Motion for Separate Summary Judgment, an event reflective of their admission that there
are no more factual issues left to be determined at the level of the Sandiganbayan. This act of
filing a motion for summary judgment is a judicial admission against COCOFED under Section
26, Rule 130 which declares that the “act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact
may be given in evidence against him.”

(2) No. As a matter of settled jurisprudence, but subject to equally settled exception, an issue
not raised before the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. The sporting idea
forbidding one from pulling surprises underpins this rule. For these reasons, the instant case
cannot be dismissed for the alleged violation of petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of the
case. It must be clarified right off that the right to a speedy disposition of case and the accused’s
right to a speedy trial are distinct, albeit kindred, guarantees, the most obvious difference being
that a speedy disposition of cases, as provided in Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution. In
fine, the right to a speedy trial is available only to an accused and is a peculiarly criminal law
concept, while the broader right to a speedy disposition of cases may be tapped in any
proceedings conducted by state agencies.
PHILCONSA v MATHAY (18 SCRA 300)

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay (G.R. No. L-25554)

Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
Facts: Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines
and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from
authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134
to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.

The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of
the House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
Petitioner contends that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10)
of the Constitution. The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963,
and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, would have expired only on December 30,
1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said
Act expired on December 30, 1965.

Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must
have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?

Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to
“all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives” in the same sentence, as a
single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the “expiration of the full term” of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not
the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the
purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word “term” in
the singular, when combined with the following phrase “all the members of the Senate and
the House,” underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the
fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that
enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become
operative.

The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and
House that approved it will have expired.
PIMENTEL v HRET (393 SCRA 231)
PNB v CIR (81 SCRA 314)
PROFESSIONAL VIDEO v TESDA (591 SCRA 83)
PUYAT v DE GUZMAN (113 SCRA 31)
QUA CHEE GAN v DEPORTATION (9SCRA 27)
REPUBLIC v LIM (419 SCRA 123)
REPUBLIC v NLRC (263 SCRA 290)
REPUBLIC v UNIMEX (518 SCRA 19)
REPUBLIC v VILLASOR (54 SCRA 83)
REVIEW CENTER v ERMITA (538 SCRA 428)
RSQT OF J HERRERA (MAR 19,’91)
SANTIAGO v GUINGONA (298 SCRA 756)
SANTIAAGO v SB (356 SCRA 638)
SAYSON v SINGSON (54SCRA 282)
SERRANO v. GALLANT (582 SCRA 254)
TABASA v CA (500 SCRA 9)
TAÑADA v ANGARA (272 SCRA 18)
TAÑADA v CUENCO (103 PHIL 105)
TAÑADA v TUVERA (136 SCRA 27)
TAÑADA v TUVERA (146 SCRA 446)
TOLENTINO v COMELEC (420 SCRA 438)
TONDO MEDICAL v CA (527 SCRA 746)
US v PONS (34 PHIL 729)
FARINAS v EXECUTIVE (417 SCRA 503)
FERNANDEZ v HRET (608 SCRA 733)
FIELD v CLARK (36 L. ED. 294, 1891)
FLORES v DRILON (223 SCRA 568)
FROILAN v PAN ORIENTAL (95 PHIL 90)
FUNA v VILLAR (670 SCRA 570)
GALICTO v AQUINO (667 SCRA 255)
GARCIA v HRET(312 SCRA 353)
GUEVARA v INOCENTES(16 SCRA 379)
GUINGONA v GONZALES (214 SCRA 789)
GUINGOA v GONZALES (219 SCRA 326)
GUY v IGNACIO (622 SCRA 678)
HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN v ATO (629 SCRA 451)
IDEALS v PSALM (682 SCRA 602)
IN RE: BERMUDEZ (145 SCRA 160)
IN RE: CHING (316 SCRA 1)
JACOT v DAL (572 SCRA 295)
JAVIER v COMELEC (144SCRA 194)
JIMENEZ v CABANGBANG (17SCRA 876)
KILOSBAYAN v ERMITA (526 SCRA 353)
LAMP v DBM SECRETARY (670 SCRA 373)
LAWYERS LEAGUE v AQUINO (MAY 22, ’86)
LETTER OF REYNATO PUNO,AJ(210SCRA589)
LIBAN v GORDON (593 SCRA 68)
LIBANAN v HRET (266 SCRA 520)
LIGOT v MATHAY (56 SCRA 823)
LOPEZ v COMELEC (559 SCRA 698)
MA v FERNANDEZ (625 SCRA 566)
MACARIOLA v ASUNCION (114 SCRA 77)
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL v GSIS (267 SCRA 408)
MERCADO v MANZANO (307 SCRA 630)
MERRIT v GOVERNMENT (34 PHIL 311)
MUNICIPALITY v DUMDUM (616 SCRA 1)
VETERANS v CA (214 SCRA 286)
YNOT v IAC (148 SCRA 659)
YU v DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO (169 SCRA 364)