Case Full Text

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 111988 October 14, 1994
ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU)-TUCP in behalf of its members at AMS FARMING

CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ROSALINA LETRONDO-MONTEJO and AMS FARMING
CORPORATION, respondent.
Seno, Mendoza and Associates for petitioner.
Castro, Enriquez, Carpio, Guillen and Associates for private respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision dated July 19, 1993 of public respondent
Voluntary Arbitrator Rosalina Letrondo-Montejo insofar as it dismissed the claim of petitioner's
members for holiday pay for December 4, 1992, which had been declared a special day for the holding
of Sangguniang Kabataan election.
The facts are as follows:
On December 27, 1990, petitioner Associated Labor Unions (ALU-TUCP and private respondent AMS
Farming Corporation entered into a five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement beginning November 1,
1990 and
ending midnight of October 31, 1995. The CBA covers the regular daily-paid rank-and-file employees of
private respondent AMS Farming Corp. at Sampao, Kapalong, Davao del Norte and Magatos, Asuncion,
Davao del Norte.
Art. VII, sec 3. of the CBA provides:
New Year, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, Araw ng Kagitingan, 1st of May, 12th of June,
Araw ng Dabaw, 4th of July, Last Sunday of August, 1st November, 30th of November,
25th of December, 30th of December and the days designated by law for holding
referendum and local/national election shall be considered paid regular holidays.
Consequently, they shall receive their basic pay even if they do not work on those days.
Any employee required to work on these holidays shall be paid at last TWO HUNDRED
PERCENT (200%) of his daily wage. Covered employees performing overtime work on
these days shall be entitled to another THIRTY PERCENT (30%) overtime pay. It is
understood however, that any covered employee who shall be absent for more than
one day immediately preceding the paid holiday shall not be entitled to the holiday pay.
The President of the Philippines declared December 4, 1992 a "special day" for the holding of election
for Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) throughout the nation. Employees covered by the CBA subsequently filed
claims for the payment to them of holiday pay for that day. Private respondent, however, refused their
claims on the ground that December 4, 1992 was not a regular holiday within the contemplation of the
CBA.
The matter was eventually submitted to voluntary arbitration. At the conference held on February 19,
1993, the parties agreed, among others things, to submit the following issue:
Is the Sangguniang Kabataan Election Day considered a regular holiday for purpose of
said Section 3, Article VII of the CBA?
In connection with this issue, they agreed that the Sangguniang Kabataan Election Day was a holiday as
decreed by the President of the Philippines.
The parties presented position papers and thereafter submitted the case for resolution.
On July 19, 1993, public respondent rendered an "Award" 1 in which, while holding employees who had
become regular employees on November 1, 1990 entitled to salary increases under the CBA,
nonetheless dismissed their claim for holiday pay for December 4, 1992 on the ground that the
Sangguniang Kabataan election "by any stretch of the imagination cannot be considered as a local
election within the meaning of CBA because not all people can vote in the said election but only
qualified youths." According to the Voluntary Arbitrator, "A 'local election' is generally understood to
mean the election by the people of their local leaders like the governors, mayors, members of the
provincial and municipal councils, and barangay officials. And when a local election is held, the day is
declared a non-working holiday. This is our experience in local and national elections. In the case of the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections, it was a working holiday. Except for the qualified youthful voters,
not everybody noticed said election as not everyone voted in the said election."
Hence, this petition, the only issue in which is whether the election for the Sangguniang Kabataan on
December 4, 1992 was a "local/national election" within the contemplation of Art. VII, sec. 3 of the CBA
so as to entitle petitioner's members, who are employed at the AMS Farming Corp. to the payment of
holiday pay for that day.
We hold that it is and that, in denying petitioner's claim, respondent Voluntary Arbitrator denied
members of petitioner union substantial justice as a result of her erroneous interpretation of the CBA,
thereby justifying judicial review.2
First. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) is part of the local government structure. The Local Government
Code (Rep. Act. No. 7160) creates in every barangay a Sangguniang Kabataan composed of a chairman,
seven (7) members, a secretary and a treasurer. 3 The chairman and the seven members are elected by
the Katipunan ng Kabataan, which is composed of citizens of the Philippines residing in the barangay for
at least six (6) months, who are between the ages of 15 and 21 and who are registered as
members.4 The chairman of the SK is an ex officio member of the Sangguniang Baranggay with the same
powers duties, functions and privileges as the regular members of the Sangguniang Barangay. 5 The
President of the Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan, which is imposed of the SK chairmen of the
sangguniang kabataan of the barangays in the province, city, or municipality, is an ex officio member of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod, and Sangguniang Bayan. 6
Hence, as the Solicitor General points out, the election for members of the SK may properly be
considered a "local election" within the meaning of
Art. VII, sec 3 of the CBA and the day on which it is held to be a holiday, thereby entitling petitioners
members at the AMS Farming Corp. to the payment of holiday on such day.
Second. The Voluntary Arbitrator held, however, that the election for members of the SK cannot be
considered a local election as the election for Governors , Vice Governors, Mayors and Vice Mayors and
the various local legislative assemblies (sanggunians) because the SK election is participated in only by
the youth who are between the ages of 15 and 21 and for this reason the day is not a nonworking
holiday.
To begin with, it is not true that December 4, 1992 was not a nonworking holiday. It was a nonworking
holiday and this was announced in the media. 7 In Proclamation No. 118 dated December 2, 1992
President Ramos declared the day as "a special day through the country on the occasion of the
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections" and enjoined all "local government units through their respective Chief
Local Executives [to] extend all possible assistance and support to ensure the smooth conduct of
the general elections."
A "special day" is a "special day", as provided by the Administrative Code of 1987. 8 On the other hand,
the term "general elections" means, in the context of SK elections, the regular elections for members of
the SK, as distinguished from the special elections for such officers.9
Moreover, the fact that only those between 15 and 21 take part in the election for members of the SK
does not make such election any less a regular local election. The Constitution provides, for example, for
the sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives of, among others, women and
youth. 10 Only voters belonging to the relevant sectors can take part in the election of their
representatives. Yet it cannot be denied that such election is a regular national election and the day set
for its holding, a holiday.
Third. Indeed, the CBA provision in question merely reiterates the provision on paid holidays. Thus, the
Labor Code provides:
Art. 94. Right to holiday pay. — (a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage
during regular holidays except in retail and service establishments regularly employing
less than ten (10) workers;
(b) The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee
shall be paid a compensation equivalent to twice his regular rate; and
(c) As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Years Day, Maundy Thursday, Good
Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May, the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the
thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December, and the day
designated by law for holding a general election.
As already explained, the phrase "general election" means regular local and national elections.
Consequently, whether in the context of the CBA or the Labor Code, December 4, 1992 was a holiday for
which holiday pay should be paid by respondent employer.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated July 19, 1993 of public respondent Rosalina Letrondo-Montejo, insofar
as it dismissed petitioner's claim for holiday pay, is SET ASIDE and private respondent is ORDERED to pay
petitioner's members their regular holiday pay for December 4, 1992 in accordance with Art. VII, sec. 3
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992
HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
ROMERO, J.:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November 13, 1991,
Resolution No. 2312 which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Republic Act No. 7155 approved on September 6, 1991 creates the
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of
Barangays Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan,
Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in the Municipality of Labo, same province.
WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 1 the creation of a

municipality shall be subject to approval by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected, and pursuant to Section 134 of the Local Government
Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337) 2 said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission
on Elections;
WHEREAS, Section 6 of said Republic Act No. 7155 provides that the expenses in holding
the plebiscite shall be take out of the Contingent Fund under the current fiscal year
appropriations;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to promulgated

(sic) the following guidelines to govern the conduct of said plebiscite:
1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or

units affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed
Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother
Municipality of Labor, Camarines Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
73155, July 11, 1986).
x x x x x x x x x
In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes
favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa.
Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the
rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. 3
Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set
aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays
that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the
plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the
plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the
political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa,
Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area
of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. 4
In support of his stand, petitioner argues that with the approval and ratification of the 1987
Constitution, particularly Article X, Section 10, the ruling set forth in Tan v. COMELEC 5 relied upon by
respondent COMELEC is now passe, thus reinstating the case of Paredes v. Executive Secretary 6 which
held that where a local unit is to be segregated from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be
segrated should be included in the plebiscite. 7
Accordingly, the issue in this case is whether or not respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and, consequently, whether or not the plebiscite
conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas
of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid.
We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312
and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa, is
valid.
Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner
opines that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our
ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987
Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or."
We do not agree. The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected our ruling in Tan
vs. Comelec as explained by then CONCOM Commissioner, now my distinguished colleague, Associate
Justice Hilario Davide, during the debates in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, to wit:
Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit or," I would like
to inform the Committee that under the formulation in the present Local Government
Code, the words used are actually "political unit or units." However, I do not know the
implication of the use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but
I just want to inform the Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will there be no
objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the words "unit or"
because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must involve all the units affected. If it is the
creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a
territory.9 (Emphasis supplied)
It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units
directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated
by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is
contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which
would participate in the plebiscite. 10 Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the
inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in
the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALFREDO S. DIRIGE, MANUEL H. AFIADO, MARIANO V. BABARAN and ANDRES R.
CABUYADAO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, In his capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. EPIMACO VELASCO, in his
capacity as Secretary of Local Government, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Budget, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. BENJAMIN G. DY, in his
capacity as Governor of Isabela, THE HONORABLE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF ISABELA, ATTY.
BALTAZAR PICIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, and MR. ANTONIO CHUA, in his capacity
as Provincial Treasurer, respondents, GIORGIDI B. AGGABAO, intervenor.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction assailing the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8528 converting the city of Santiago, Isabela from an independent
component city to a component city.
On May 5, 1994, Republic Act No. 7720 which converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
independent component city was signed into law. On July 4, 1994, the people of Santiago ratified R.A.
No. 7720 in a plebiscite.1
On February 14, 1998, Republic Act No. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it
changed the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city, viz.:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 — AN ACT

CONVERTING THE MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT
CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF SANTIAGO.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled:
Sec. 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended by deleting the words "an
independent" thereon so that said Section will read as follows:
Sec. 2. The City of Santiago. — The Municipality of Santiago shall be

converted into a component city to be known as the City of Santiago,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise of the present
territory of the Municipality of Santiago, Isabela. The territorial
jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of
the Municipality of Santiago.
Sec. 2. Section 51 of Republic Act No. 7720 is hereby amended deleting the entire
section and in its stead substitute the following:
Sec. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang

Panlalawigan Members, and any Elective Provincial Position for the
Province of Isabela. — The voters of the City of Santiago shall be
qualified to vote in the elections of the Provincial Governor, Vice-
Governor, Sangguniang Panlalawigan members and other elective
provincial positions of the Province of Isabela, and any such qualified
voter can be a candidate for such provincial positions and any elective
provincial office.
Sec. 3. Repealing Clause. — All existing laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the
provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 4. Effectivity. — This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8528. 2 They alleged as ground the lack of provision in
R.A. No. 8528 submitting the law for ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.
Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago at the time of the filing of the petition at bar. Petitioner
Afiado is the President of the Liga ng mga Barangay ng Santiago City. Petitioners Dirige, Cabuyadao and
Babaran are residents of Santiago City.
In their Comment, respondent provincial officials of Isabela defended the constitutionality of R.A. No.
8528. They assailed the standing of petitioners to file the petition at bar. They also contend that the
petition raises a political question over which this Court lacks jurisdiction.
Another Comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondent public officials. The Solicitor
General also contends that petitioners are not real parties in interest. More importantly, it is contended
that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an independent component city to a
component city. It allegedly did not involve any "creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial
alteration of boundaries of local government units," hence, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is
unnecessary.
A third Comment similar in tone was submitted by intervenor Giorgidi B. Aggabao, 3 a member of the
provincial board of Isabela. 4 He contended that both the Constitution and the Local Government Code
of 1991 do not require a plebiscite "to approve a law that merely allowed qualified voters of a city to
vote in provincial elections. The rules implementing the Local Government Code cannot require a
plebiscite. He also urged that petitioners lacked locus standi.
Petitioners filed a Reply to meet the arguments of the respondents and the intervenor. They defended
their standing. They also stressed the changes that would visit the city of Santiago as a result of its
reclassification.
We find merit in the petition.
First. The challenge to the locus standi of petitioners cannot succeed. It is now an ancient rule that the
constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. 5 Petitioner Miranda was the mayor of Santiago City when he filed the present petition in
his own right as mayor and not on behalf of the city, hence, he did not need the consent of the city
council of Santiago. It is also indubitable that the change of status of the city of Santiago from
independent component city to a mere component city will affect his powers as mayor, as will be shown
hereafter. The injury that he would sustain from the enforcement of R.A. No. 8528 is direct and
immediate and not a mere generalized grievance shared with the people of Santiago City. Similarly, the
standing of the other petitioners rests on a firm foundation. They are residents and voters in the city of
Santiago. They have the right to be heard in the conversion of their city thru a plebiscite to be
conducted by the COMELEC. The denial of this right in R.A. No. 8528 gives them proper standing to
strike the law as unconstitutional.1âwphi1.nêt
Second. The plea that this court back off from assuming jurisdiction over the petition at bar on the
ground that it involves a political question has to be brushed aside. This plea has long lost its appeal
especially in light of Section 1 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which defines judicial power as
including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." To be sure, the cut between a political and justiciable issue has been made by this Court
in many cases and need no longer mystify us. In Tañada v. Cuenco, 6 we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. It refers "to those questions which under the Constitution are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government."
It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular
measure.
In Casibang v. Aquino, 7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:
A purely justiciable issue implies a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an
act or omission violative of such right, and a remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for
said breach of right.
Clearly, the petition at bar presents a justiciable issue. Petitioners claim that under Section 10,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution they have a right to approve or disapprove R.A. No. 8528 in a
plebiscite before it can be enforced. It ought to be self-evident that whether or not petitioners
have the said right is a legal not a political question. For whether or not laws passed by Congress
comply with the requirements of the Constitution pose questions that this Court alone can
decide. The proposition that this Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and nuances of the
Constitution need not be the subject of a prolix explanation.
Third. The threshold issue is whether R.A. No. 8528 is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the
conversion of the city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be
submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite. We hold that the Constitution requires a plebiscite.
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged,

abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
This constitutional requirement is reiterrated in Section 10, Chapter 2 of the Local Government
Code (R.A. No. 7160), thus:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of local government
units belongs to Congress. 8 This power is part of the larger power to enact laws which the Constitution
vested in Congress. 9 The exercise of the power must be in accord with the mandate of the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the issue is whether the downgrading of Santiago City from an independent
component city to a mere component city requires the approval of the people of Santiago City in a
plebiscite. The resolution of the issue depends on whether or not the downgrading falls within the
meaning of creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of municipalities
per Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will
reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominator — material change in the political and economic
rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is precisely for this
reason that the Constitution requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected."
It is not difficult to appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987 Constitution,
more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more reality to the sovereignty of our people for it
was borne out of the people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X addressed the
undesirable practice in the past whereby local government units were created, abolished, merged or
divided on the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people. Thus, the consent of
the people of the local government unit directly affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism
to any exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or altering the boundaries of
local government units. It is one instance where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a
matter that affects them — direct democracy of the people as opposed to democracy thru people's
representatives. This plebiscite requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution
granting more autonomy to local government units.
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an independent
component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the
independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council
of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by
the city will now have to be shared with the province. Petitioners pointed out these far reaching changes
on the life of the people of the city of Santiago, viz.: 10
Although RESPONDENTS would like to make it appear that R.A. No. 8528 had "merely re-
classified" Santiago City from an independent component city into a component city, the
effect when challenged (sic) the Act were operational would be, actually, that of
conversion. Consequently, there would be substantial changes in the political culture
and administrative responsibilities of Santiago City, and the Province of Isabela. Santiago
City from an independent component city will revert to the Province of Isabela,
geographically, politically, and administratively. Thus, the territorial land area of
Santiago City will be added to the land area comprising the province of Isabela. This will
be to the benefit or advantage of the Provincial Government of Isabela on account of
the subsequent increase of its share from the internal revenue allotment (IRA) from the
National Government (Section 285, R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of
1991). The IRA is based on land area and population of local government units,
provinces included.
The nature or kinds, and magnitude of the taxes collected by the City Government, and
which taxes shall accrue solely to the City Government, will be redefined (Section 151,
R.A. No. 7160), and may be shared with the province such as taxes on sand, gravel and
other quarry resources (Section 138, R.A. No. 7160), professional taxes (Section 139,
R.A. No. 7160), or amusement taxes (Section 140, R.A. No. 7160). The Provincial
Government will allocate operating funds for the City. Inarguably, there would be a (sic)
diminished funds for the local operations of the City Government because of reduced
shares of the IRA in accordance with the schedule set forth by Section 285 of R.A. No.
7160. The City Government's share in the proceeds in the development and utilization
of national wealth shall be diluted since certain portions shall accrue to the Provincial
Government (Section 292, R.A. No. 7160).
The registered voters of Santiago City will vote for and can be voted as provincial
officials (Section 451 and 452 [c], R.A. No. 7160).
The City Mayor will now be under the administrative supervision of the Provincial
Governor who is tasked by law to ensure that every component city and municipality
within the territorial jurisdiction of the province acts within the scope of its prescribed
powers and functions (Section 29 and 465 (b) (2) (i), R.A. No. 7160), and to review
(Section 30, R.A. No. 7160) all executive orders submitted by the former (Section 455 (b)
(1) (xii), R.A. No. 7160) and (R)eportorial requirements with respect to the local
governance and state of affairs of the city (Section 455 (b) (1) (xx), R.A. No. 7160).
Elective city officials will also be effectively under the control of the Provincial Governor
(Section 63, R.A. No. 7160). Such will be the great change in the state of the political
autonomy of what is now Santiago City where by virtue of R.A. No. 7720, it is the Office
of the President which has supervisory authority over it as an independent component
city (Section 25, R.A. No. 7160; Section 4 (ARTICLE X), 1987 Constitution).
The resolutions and ordinances adopted and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod
will be subject to the review of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sections 56, 468, (a) (1)
(i), 468 (a) (2) (vii), and 469 (c) (4), R.A. No. 7160). Likewise, the decisions in
administrative cases by the former could be appealed and acted upon by the latter
(Section 67 R.A. No. 7160).
It is markworthy that when R.A. No. 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city, it required the approval of its people thru a
plebiscite called for the purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this plebiscite should
not be called to determine the will of the people of Santiago City when R.A. No.
8528 downgrades the status of their city. Indeed, there is more reason to consult the people
when a law substantially diminishes their right. Rule II, Article 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code is in accord with the
Constitution when it provides that:
(f) Plebiscite — (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The
plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such
action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
x x x x x x x x x
The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or downward in character, so long as they
result in a material change in the local government unit directly affected, especially a change in
the political and economic rights of its people.
A word on the dissenting opinions of our esteemed brethren. Mr. Justice Buena justifies R.A. No. 8528
on the ground that Congress has the power to amend the charter of Santiago City. This power of
amendment, however, is limited by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Quite clearly, when an
amendment of a law involves the creation, merger, division, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units, a plebiscite in the political units directly affected is mandatory. He
also contends that the amendment merely caused a transition in the status of Santiago as a city.
Allegedly, it is a transition because no new city was created nor was a former city dissolved by R.A. No.
8528. As discussed above, the spirit of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution calls for the people of the
local government unit directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in
their rights and responsibilities. They may call the downgrading of Santiago to a component city as a
mere transition but they cannot blink away from the fact that the transition will radically change its
physical and political configuration as well as the rights and responsibilities of its people.
On the other hand, our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Mendoza, posits the theory that "only if the
classification involves changes in income, population, and land area of the local government unit is there
a need for such changes to be approved by the people . . . ."
With due respect, such an interpretation runs against the letter and spirit of Section 10, Article X of the
1987 Constitution which, to repeat, states: "No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,
divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected." It is clear that the Constitution imposes two
conditions — first, the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a
local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income,
population and land area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code fixed the said criteria
and they involve requirements on income, population and land area. These requirements, however, are
imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not
imposed to determine the necessity for a plebiscite of the people. Indeed, the Local Government Code
does not state that there will be no more plebiscite after its requirements on income, population and
land area have been satisfied. On the contrary, section 10, Chapter 2 of the Code provides: "No creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take
effect unless approved by a majority of the votes casts in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the
political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action,
unless said law or ordinance fixes another
date. 11 Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the principal author of the Local Government Code of 1991, opines
that the plebiscite is absolute and mandatory.12
It cannot be overstressed that the said two requirements of the Constitution have different purposes.
The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area are designed to
achieve an economic purpose. They are to be based on verified indicators, hence, section 7, Chapter 2 of
the Local Government Code requires that these "indicators shall be attested by the Department of
Finance, the National Statistics Office, and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources." In contrast, the people's plebiscite is required to achieve
a political purpose — to use the people's voice as a check against the pernicious political practice of
gerrymandering. There is no better check against this excess committed by the political representatives
of the people themselves than the exercise of direct people power. As well-observed by one
commentator, as the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries are
". . . basic to local government, it is also imperative that these acts be done not only by Congress but
also be approved by the inhabitants of the locality concerned. . . . By giving the inhabitants a hand in
their approval, the provision will also eliminate the old practice of gerrymandering and minimize
legislative action designed for the benefit of a few politicians. Hence, it promotes the autonomy of local
government units." 13
The records show that the downgrading of Santiago City was opposed by certain segments of its people.
In the debates in Congress, it was noted that at the time R.A. No. 8528 was proposed, Santiago City has
been converted to an independent component city barely two and a half (2 1/2) years ago and the
conversion was approved by a majority of 14,000 votes. Some legislators expressed surprise for the
sudden move to downgrade the status of Santiago City as there had been no significant change in its
socio-economic-political status. The only reason given for the downgrading is to enable the people of
the city to aspire for the leadership of the province. To say the least, the alleged reason is unconvincing
for it is the essence of an independent component city that its people can no longer participate or be
voted for in the election of officials of the province. The people of Santiago City were aware that they
gave up that privilege when they voted to be independent from the province of Isabela. There was an
attempt on the part of the Committee on Local Government to submit the downgrading of Santiago City
to its people via a plebiscite. The amendment to this effect was about to be voted upon when a recess
was called. After the recess, the chairman of the Committee announced the withdrawal of the
amendment "after a very enlightening conversion with the elders of the Body." We quote the
debates, viz.: 14
BILL ON SECOND READING
H.B. No. 8729 — City of Santiago
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move

that we consider House Bill No. 8729 as
reported out under Committee Report
No. 971.
The President. Is there any objection?

[Silence] there being none, the motion
is approved.
Consideration of House Bill No. 8729 is now in order. With the permission of the Body,
the Secretary will read only the title of the bill without prejudice to inserting in
the Record the whole text thereof.
The Acting Secretary [Atty. Raval]. House Bill No. 8729, entitled:
AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO.

7720 ENTITLED "AN ACT CONVERTING THE
MUNICIPALITY OF SANTIAGO INTO AN INDEPENDENT
COMPONENT CITY TO BE KNOWN AS THE CITY OF
SANTIAGO
The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729
Insert
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the

sponsorship, I ask that the distinguished
Chairman of the Committee on Local
Government be recognized.
The President. Senator Sotto is

recognized.
SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO

Mr. President. House Bill No. 8729,
which was introduced in the House by
Congressman Antonio M. Abaya as its
principal author, is a simple measure
which merely seeks to convert the City
of Santiago into a component city of the
Province of Isabela.
The City of Santiago is geographically located within, and is physically an integral part of
the Province of Isabela. As an independent component city, however, it is completely
detached and separate from the said province as a local political unit. To use the
language of the Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, the City of Santiago is an "island
in the provincial milieu.
The residents of the city no longer participate in the elections, nor are they qualified to
run for any elective positions in the Province of Isabela.
The Province of Isabela, on the other hand, is no longer vested with the power and
authority of general supervision over the city and its officials, which power and authority
are now exercised by the Office of the President, which is very far away from Santiago
City.
Being geographically located within the Province of Isabela, the City of Santiago is
affected, one way or the other, by the happenings in the said province, and is benefited
by its progress and development. Hence, the proposed bill to convert the City of
Santiago into a component city of Isabela.
Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august

Body Committee Report No. 971 of the Committee on Local Government,
recommending approval, with our proposed committee amendment, of House Bill No.
8729.
Thank you, Mr. President.
The President. The Majority Leader is

recognized.
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved

(sic) that we close the period of
interpellations.

[Silence] There being none, the period
of interpellations is closed.
Senator Tatad. I move that we now

consider the committee amendments.
Senator Roco. Mr. President.
The President. What is the pleasure of

Senator Roco?
Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask

for a reconsideration of the ruling on
the motion to close the period of
interpellations just to be able to ask a
few questions?
Senator Tatad. May I move for a

reconsideration of my motion, Mr.
President.
The President. Is there any objection to

the reconsideration of the closing of the
period of interpellations? [Silence]
There being none, the motion is
approved.
Senator Roco is recognized.
Senator Roco. Will the distinguished

gentlemen yield for some questions?
Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.
Senator Roco. Mr. President, together

with the Chairman of the Committee on
Local Government, we were with the
sponsors when we approved this bill to
make Santiago a City. That was about
two and a half years ago. At that time, I
remember it was the cry of the city that
it be "independent." Now we are
deleting that word "independent."
Mr. President, only because I was a co-author and a co-sponsor, for the Record, I want
some explanation on what happened between then and now that has made us decided
that the City of Santiago should cease to be independent and should now become a
component city.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the

officials of the province said during the
public hearing that they are no longer
vested with the power and authority of
general supervision over the city. The
power and authority is now being
exercised by the Office of the President
and it is quite far from the City of
Santiago.
In the public hearing, we also gathered that there is a clamor from some sectors that
they want to participate in the provincial elections.
Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not

mean to delay this. I did want it on
record, however. I think there was a
majority of 14,000 who approved the
charter, and maybe we owe it to those
who voted for that charter some degree
of respect. But if there has been a
change of political will, there has been a
change of political will, then so be it.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very

frank about it, that was a very
important point raised by Senator Roco,
and I will have to place it on the Record
of the Senate that the reason why we
are proposing a committee amendment
is that, originally, there was an
objection on the part of the local
officials and those who oppose it by
incorporating a plebiscite in this bill.
That was the solution. Because there
were some sectors in the City of
Santiago who were opposing the
reclassification or reconversion of the
city into a component city.
Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr.

President — because the two of us had
special pictures (sic) in the city — is that
I thought it should be put on record
that we have supported originally the
proposal to make it an independent
city. But now if it is their request, then,
on the manifestation of the Chairman,
let it be so.
Thank you.
Senator Drilon. Mr. President.
Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield

for a few questions, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to

the interpellation of our good friend,
the Senator from Bicol, on the matter of
the opinion of the citizens of Santiago
City, there is a resolution passed by the
Sanggunian on January 30, 1997
opposing the conversion of Santiago
from an independent city.
This opposition was placed on records during the committee hearings. And that is the
reason why, as mentioned by the good sponsor, one of the amendments is that a
plebiscite be conducted before the law takes effect.
The question I would like to raise — and I would like to recall the statement of our
Minority Leader — is that, at this time we should not be passing it for a particular
politician.
In this particular case, it is obvious that this bill is being passed in order that the
additional territory be added to the election of the provincial officials of the province of
Isabela.
Now, is this for the benefit of any particular politician, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of

it, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
The President. With the permission of

the two gentlemen on the Floor,
Senator Alvarez is recognized.
Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred

citizen of this city, Mr. President, may I
share some information.
Mr. President, if we open up the election of the city to the provincial leadership, it will
not be to the benefit of the provincial leadership, because the provincial leadership will
then campaign in a bigger territory.
As a matter of fact, the ones who will benefit from this are the citizens of Santiago who
will now be enfranchised in the provincial electoral process, and whose children will
have the opportunity to grow into provincial leadership. This is one of the prime reasons
why this amendment is being put forward.
While it is true that there may have been a resolution by the city council, those who
signed the resolution were not the whole of the council. This bill was sponsored by the
congressman of that district who represents a constituency, the voice of the district.
I think, Mr. President, in considering which interest is paramount, whose voice must be
heard, and if we have to fathom the interest of the people, the law which has been
crafted here in accordance with the rules should be given account, as we do give
account to many of the legislations coming from the House on local issues.
Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the

reason why I am raising this question is
that, as Senator Roco said, just two and-
a-half years ago we passed a bill which
indeed disenfranchized — if we want to
use that phrase — the citizens of the
City of Santiago in the matter of the
provincial election. Two-and-a-half
years after, we are changing the rule.
In the original charter, the citizens of the City of Santiago participated in a plebiscite in
order to approve the conversion of the city into an independent city. I believe that the
only way to resolve this issue raised by Senator Roco is again to subject this issue to
another plebiscite as part of the provision of this proposed bill and as will be proposed
by the Committee Chairman as an amendment.
Thank you very much, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the

Constitution does not require that the
change from an independent to a
component city be subjected to a
plebiscite.
Secs. 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,

divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except
in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code
and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in
the political units directly affected.
This change from an independent city into a component city is none of those
enumerated. So the proposal coming from the House is in adherence to this
constitutional mandate which does not require a plebiscite.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the key

word here is "conversion". The word
"conversion" appears in that provision
wherein we must call a plebiscite.
During the public hearing, the
representative of Congressman Abaya
was insisting that this is not a
conversion; this is merely a
reclassification. But it is clear in the bill.
We are amending a bill that converts, and we are converting it into a component city.
That is how the members of the committee felt. That is why we have proposed an
amendment to this, and this is to incorporate a plebiscite in as much as there is no
provision on incorporating a plebiscite. Because we would like not only to give the other
people of Santiago a chance or be enfranchised as far as the leadership of the province
is concerned, but also we will give a chance to those who are opposing it. To them, this
is the best compromise. Let the people decide, instead of the political leaders of Isabela
deciding for them.
Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

recognized.
Senator Tatad. At this point, Mr.

President, I think we can move to close
the period of interpellations.

[Silence] There being none, the motion
is approved.
Senator Tatad. I move that we now

consider the committee amendments,
Mr. President.

[Silence] There being none the motion
is approved.
Senator Sotto. On page 2, after line 13,
insert a new Section 3, as follows:
Sec 3. SECTION 49 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7720 IS HEREBY AMENDED BY DELETING THE
ENTIRE SECTION AND IN ITS STEAD SUBSTITUTE THE FOLLOWING:
Sec. 49. PLEBISCITE. — THE CONVERSION OF THE CITY OF SANTIAGO

INTO A COMPONENT CITY OF THE PROVINCE OF ISABELA SHALL TAKE
EFFECT UPON THE RETIFICATION OF THIS ACT BY A MAJORITY OF THE
PEOPLE OF SAID CITY IN A PLEBISCITE WHICH SHALL BE HELD FOR THE
PURPOSE WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS FROM THE APPROVAL OF THIS ACT.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS SHALL CONDUCT AND SUPERVISE
SUCH PLEBISCITE.
Senator Enrile. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Enrile is

recognized.
Senator Enrile. I object to this

committee amendment, Mr. President.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
Senator Tatad. May I ask for a one-

minute suspension of the session.
The President. The session is suspended

for a few minutes if there is no
objection. [There was none].
It was 7:54 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 7:57 p.m., the session was resumed.
The President. The session is resumed.
Senator Sotto is recognized.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, after a

very enlightening conversation with the
elders of the Body, I withdraw my
amendment.
The President. The amendment is
withdrawn.
Senator Maceda. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Maceda is

recognized.
Senator Maceda. We wish to thank the

sponsor for the withdrawal of the
amendment.
Mr. President, with due respect to the Senator from Isabela — I am no great fan of the
Senator from Isabela — but it so happens that this is a local bill affecting not only his
province but his own city where he is a resident and registered voter.
So, unless the issue is really a matter of life and death and of national importance,
senatorial courtesy demands that we, as much as possible, accommodate the request of
the Senator from Isabela as we have done on matters affecting the district of other
senators. I need not remind them.
Thank you anyway, Mr. President.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.
The President. Senator Alvarez is

recognized.
Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, may I

express my deepest appreciation for
the statement of the gentleman from
Ilocos and Laguna. Whatever he may
have said, the feeling is not mutual. At
least for now, I have suddenly become
his great fan for the evening.
May I put on record, Mr. President, that I campaigned against the cityhood of Santiago
not because I do not want it to be a city but because it had disenfranchised the young
men of my city from aspiring for the leadership of the province. The town is the gem of
the province. How could we extricate the town from the province?
But I would like to thank the gentleman, Mr. President, and also the Chairman of the
Committee.
Senator Tatad. Mr. President.

recognized.
Senator Tatad. There being no

committee amendments, I move that
the period of committee amendments
be closed.
The President. Shall we amend the title

of this bill by removing the word
"independent" preceding "component
city"?
Senator Sotto. No, Mr. President. We

are merely citing the title. The main title
of this House Bill No. 8729 is "An Act
Amending Certain Sections of Republic
Act 7720". The title is the title of
Republic Act 7720. So, I do not think
that we should amend that anymore.
The President. What is the pending

motion? Will the gentleman kindly state
the motion?
Senator Tatad. I move that we close the

period of committee amendments.

[Silence] There being none, the motion
is approved.
Senator Tatad. Unless there are any

individual amendments, I move that we
close the period of individual
amendments.

[Silence] There being none, the period
of individual amendments is closed.
APPROVAL OF H.B. NO. 8729 ON SECOND READING
Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move

that we vote on Second Reading on
House Bill No. 8729.
[Silence] There being none, we shall
now vote on Second Reading on House
Bill No. 8729.
As many as are in favor of the bill, say aye.
Several Members. Aye.
As many as are against the bill, say nay. [Silences]
House Bill No. 8279 is approved on Second Reading.
The debates cannot but raise some quizzical eyebrows on the real purpose for the downgrading
of the city of Santiago. There is all the reason to listen to the voice of the people of the city via a
plebiscite.
In the case of Tan, et al. v. COMELEC,15 BP 885 was enacted partitioning the province of Negros
Occidental without consulting its people in a plebiscite. In his concurring opinion striking down the law
as unconstitutional, Chief Justice Teehankee cited the illicit political purpose behind its enactment, viz:
The scenario, as petitioners urgently asserted, was "to have the creation of the new
Province a fait accompli by the time elections are held on February 7, 1986. The
transparent purpose is unmistakably so that the new Governor and other officials shall
by then have been installed in office, ready to function for purposes of the election for
President and Vice-President." Thus, the petitioners reported after the event: "With
indecent haste, the plebiscite was held; Negros del Norte was set up and proclaimed by
President Marcos as in existence; a new set of government officials headed by Governor
Armando Gustilo was appointed; and, by the time the elections were held on February
7, 1986, the political machinery was in place to deliver the "solid North" to ex-President
Marcos. The rest is history. What happened in Negros del Norte during the elections —
the unashamed use of naked power and resources — contributed in no small way to
arousing "people's power" and steel the ordinary citizen to perform deeds of courage
and patriotism that makes one proud to be a Filipino today.
The challenged Act is manifestly void and unconstitutional. Consequently, all the
implementing acts complained of, viz., the plebiscite, the proclamation of a new
province of Negros del Norte and the appointment of its officials are equally void. The
limited holding of the plebiscite only in the areas of the proposed new province (as
provided by Section 4 of the Act) to the exclusion of the voters of the remaining areas of
the integral province of Negros Occidental (namely, the three cities of Bacolod, Bago
and La Carlota and the Municipalities of Las Castellana, Isabela, Moises Padilla,
Pontevedra, Hinigaran, Himamaylan, Kabankalan, Murcia, Valladoid, San Enrique, Ilog,
Cauayan, Hinoba-an and Sipalay and Candoni), grossly contravenes and disregards the
mandate of Article XI, section 3 of the then prevailing 1973 Constitution that no
province may be created or divided or its boundary substantially altered without "the
approval of a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." It is plain
that all the cities and municipalities of the province of Negros Occidental, not merely
those of the proposed new province, comprise the units affected. It follows that the
voters of the whole and entire province of Negros Occidental have to participate and
give their approval in the plebiscite, because the whole is affected by its proposed
division and substantial alteration of its boundary. To limit the plebiscite to only the
voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and
illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded
against the wishes of the majority and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
Mr. Justice Mendoza and Mr. Justice Buena also cite two instances when allegedly independent
component cities were downgraded into component cities without need of a plebiscite. They cite the
City of Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, 16 and the City of San Carlos, Pangasinan 17 whose charters were
amended to allow their people to vote and be voted upon in the election of officials of the province to
which their city belongs without submitting the amendment to a plebiscite. With due respect, the cities
of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as the city of Santiago. The said two cities then
were not independent component cities unlike the city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but
were not independent component cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were
considered independent cities at that time. Thus, when the case of San Carlos City was under
consideration by the Senate, Senator Pimentel explained: 18
. . . Senator Pimentel. The bill under consideration, Mr. President, merely empowers the
voters of San Carlos to vote in the elections of provincial officials. There is no intention
whatsoever to downgrade the status of the City of San Carlos and there is no showing
whatsoever that the enactment of this bill will, in any way, diminish the powers and
prerogatives already enjoyed by the City of San Carlos. In fact, the City of San Carlos as
of now, is a component city. It is not a highly urbanized city. Therefore, this bill merely,
as we said earlier, grants the voters of the city, the power to vote in provincial elections,
without in any way changing the character of its being a component city. It is for this
reason that I vote in favor of this bill.
It was Senator Pimentel who also sponsored the bill 19 allowing qualified voters of the city of
Oroquieta to vote in provincial elections of the province of Misamis Occidental. In his
sponsorship speech, he explained that the right to vote being given to the people of Oroquieta
City was consistent with its status as a component city. 20 Indeed, during the debates, former
Senator Neptali Gonzales pointed out the need to remedy the anomalous situation then
obtaining ". . . where voters of one component city cannot vote simply because their charters so
provide." 21 Thus, Congress amended other charters of component cities prohibiting their people
from voting in provincial elections.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted. Republic Act No. 8528 is declared unconstitutional and the
writ of prohibition is hereby issued commanding the respondents to desist from implementing said law.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 127325 March 19, 1997
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA, and MARIA ISABEL ONGPIN, petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their
capacities as founding members of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents.
SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF

ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF
THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), and LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly, this demands
special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country, except perhaps
to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission
itself, through the original proponent 1 and the main sponsor2 of the proposed Article on Amendments or
Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative". 3 Indeed it is, for both under the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the
Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and
(2) by a constitutional convention.4 For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to
give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent Commission
on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective
Officials, by People's Initiative" (hereafter, Delfin Petition) 5 wherein Delfin asked the COMELEC for an
order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached "Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist

Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, 6 a
group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people power; that he and
the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution; that the
exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations shall be established all
over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who shall verify the signatures
affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other volunteers can gather signatures,
it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the purpose be first fixed in an order to be
issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the people of the electoral process involved, it is
likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be
published in newspapers of general and local circulation, under the control and supervision of the
COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7 of
Article VI,7 Section 4 of Article VII,8 and Section 8 of Article X9 of the Constitution. Attached to the
petition is a copy of a "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution" 10 embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning
term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT

OFFICIALS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4
OF ARTICLE VII, AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it is
signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037 (INITIATIVE),
the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order 11 (a) directing Delfin "to cause the publication of
the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution (including the
proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice of hearing in
three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense" not later than 9 December 1996;
and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and Atty. Pete
Q. Quadra; representatives of the People's Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA);
intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers, and representatives of,
or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon
(DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LABAN). 12 Senator Roco, on that
same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on the ground that it is not the initiatory petition
properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
"memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. 13
On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein — Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla,
and Maria Isabel Ongpin — filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on people's initiative to amend the Constitution can only
be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact,
Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act Prescribing and Regulating Constitution
Amendments by People's Initiative, which petitioner Senator Santiago filed on 24
November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative
on the Constitution, on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide
any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative,
which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This deliberate omission
indicates that the matter of people's initiative to amend the Constitution was left to
some future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in
his privilege speech delivered before the Senate in 1994: "There is not a single word in
that law which can be considered as implementing [the provision on constitutional
initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print
media. This indicates that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments
because the latter take effect only upon ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern "the conduct
of initiative on the Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local
laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned,
since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and regulations for the exercise of the
right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by the
Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5) The people's initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not

to revision thereof. Extending or lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is,
therefore, outside the power of the people's initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for people's initiative; neither the
COMELEC nor any other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds
for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that in the
event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the people's initiative spearheaded by PIRMA would
entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at least P180
million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be incurred in the
conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and the nation of the
issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and definitely, brushing
aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayer's and legislator's
suit. 14 Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order, effective
immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from proceeding
with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from conducting a
signature drive for people's initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment 15 on the petition.
They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT "IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00)" IF THE "COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE

COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO
THE COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING
SCHOOL TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID
BY DELFIN AND HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571,200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE

GATHERING WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND "TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY"
PURSUANT TO ITS "INITIATORY JURISDICTION" UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN
ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW
IMPLEMENTING THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A
DUPLICATION OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT

TO REP. ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER
26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY
VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO. 125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: "THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY
PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN
IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS."
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO'S SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A
PROVISION DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO "PROMULGATE SUCH RULES
AND REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT."
(SEC. 12, S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS

PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A "REVISION" OF THE
CONSTITUTION. IT IS ONLY AN AMENDMENT. "AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN
ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION
CONTEMPLATES A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW
AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT SHOULD BE ALTERED." (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097
PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment 16 which starts off
with an assertion that the instant petition is a "knee-jerk reaction to a draft 'Petition for Initiative on the
1987 Constitution'. . . which is not formally filed yet." What he filed on 6 December 1996 was an
"Initiatory Pleading" or "Initiatory Petition," which was legally necessary to start the signature campaign
to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under COMELEC power and
function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs
the conduct of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for
such initiative is not fatal, since subtitles are not requirements for the validity or
sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in
an initiative to amend the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a)
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A. 6735, which
empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary
to carry out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the
Constitution because it seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution,
or more specifically, only those which lay term limits. It does not seek to reexamine or
overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners' estimate of P180
million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will be a plebiscite
it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund requirements
for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of the sovereign
power of the people.
In the Comment 17 for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office of the
Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, people's initiative to amend the Constitution. Its
Section 2 on Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that
power; and its Section 3, which enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes
initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly
mentions initiative on the Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735
because, being national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the
subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply
overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that nothing therein was
provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735
does not deal with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the
Constitution, not a revision thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735
and under the Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to
implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b) noted
the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by private
respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latter's Manifestation stating that he is the counsel for
private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for the Pedrosas;
and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul Roco and allowed
him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set the case for hearing on
23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of

Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for Intervention.
Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an Amended
Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the
Constitution because, in the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., 18 it would involve a
change from a political philosophy that rejects unlimited tenure to one that accepts
unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated one, it can
affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy
of guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties. 19 A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution, is limited to amendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all
other national and local elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, "to
open up the political arena to as many as there are Filipinos qualified to handle the
demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic powers in
the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in
policy and decision-making for the common good"; hence, to remove the term limits is
to negate and nullify the noble vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a
conflict-of-interest situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be
availed of by the people only if they are dissatisfied with the performance of their
elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance. 20
(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that
implements the people's initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state
(a) the proper parties who may file the petition, (b) the appropriate agency before
whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d) the publication of
the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide
and 3% per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the
veracity of the signatures, (g) the role of the COMELEC in the verification of the
signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal from any decision of the
COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such
people's initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to hear Delfin's petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, since the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure
for a people's initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. That function
exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does not constitute a legal
basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in

Intervention. 21 He avers that R.A. No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the people's right to
initiate constitutional amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No.
21505; he co-authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise
submits that the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution is
the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters. He also
submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and resources
of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the COMELEC's role in
an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of the initiative petition
and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in Intervention
raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII
of the 1987 Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law
on the initiative to amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the
required number of signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed
only by Congress or a constitutional convention. 22
On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed by the
DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN; (b)
admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in Intervention of
Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a nonextendible period of five
days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to
file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period of three days from notice, and the
respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of five days from receipt of the said
Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues, which
the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and
Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or
cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution; and if so, whether the Act, as
worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum
on National and Local Laws) regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the
conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed
in the draft "Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution," would constitute a revision
of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition
solely intended to obtain an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering;
(b) instructing municipal election officers to assist Delfin's movement and volunteers in
establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication of, inter alia,
the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when
there is a pending case before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective
memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit copies of the
deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the Delfin
Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commission's failure or refusal to do
so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the Record of
the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well as the
transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP. 23 The parties thereafter filed, in due time, their
separate memoranda. 24
As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which appears
to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private
respondent Delfin. This being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from
proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court, Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for
prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of
superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the
inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with which it is not legally vested. (People
v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view of the highly
divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned
Comelec order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs
for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the
political ambitions of man, only the Supreme Court
can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution. 25
It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin Petition
on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the petition. 26 The
COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the arguments of Delfin and the
oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to submit within five days their
memoranda or oppositions/memoranda. 27 Earlier, or specifically on 6 December 1996, it practically gave
due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the publication of the petition, together
with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the notice of hearing; and by setting the
case for hearing. The COMELEC's failure to act on Roco's motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on
to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, which provides:
Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition. — Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in
excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the Delfin
Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of signatures of
registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to
dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of signatures. In light of these
claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action for certiorari under Section I of
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may brush
aside technicalities of procedure in
cases of transcendental importance. As we stated in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr. 28
A party's standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the
exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the
landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because
the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be
settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY, INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the

people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by
at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under this
section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution
nor oftener than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book, 29 Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of
amending the Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional
action, in the last analysis it still is dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution
until Congress provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has
recognized or granted that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason,
does not provide for its implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332). 30 That section
reads as follows:
Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article___ Section
___of the Constitution. 31
After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a
new formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call
attention of the Members of the Commission that pursuant to the
mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision
governing the matter of initiative. This is now covered by Section 2 of
the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members,
may I quote Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly
propose amendments to this Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten
percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7. 32
The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10

percent, there are no details in the provision on how to carry this
out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the
legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as

the legislature does not pass the necessary implementing law on this,
this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee
hearing, especially with respect to the budget appropriations which
would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We
deemed it best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman
is right. In any event, as envisioned, no amendment through the power
of initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the
ratification of this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that
could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative power would
be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year
period, the National Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules
governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature — the details on
how this is to be carried out — is it possible that, in effect, what will be
presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature
rather than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the
legislature itself as a body could propose that amendment, maybe
individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in
order to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that
proposal to the people for ratification through the process of an
initiative.
x x x x x x x x x
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in

the proposal is to vest constituent power in the people to amend the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal
in terms of institutionalizing popular participation in the drafting of the
Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of
difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would
the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal mandate,
constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is source of all legal mandates
and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the
drafting and in the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of

constituent power we have a separate article in the constitution that
would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the
Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are

drafted now, to again concede to the legislature the process or the
requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution
by people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed

in the hands of the National Assembly, not unless we can incorporate
into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the
conceivable situations. 33
It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to proposals to
AMEND — not to REVISE — the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. . . . This proposal was suggested on the theory that this
matter of initiative, which came about because of the extraordinary
developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes
of amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee
members felt that this system of initiative should not extend to the
revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation
of Section 1 of the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision. 34
x x x x x x x x x
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this

process of initiative as a separate section in the Article on Amendment.
Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms
of realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead
of setting it up as another separate section as if it were a self-executing
provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while

ago, this process of initiative is limited to the matter of amendment and
should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul
of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the
Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to

distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b) in Section 1 to include the
process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is
given to the public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the
Committee. 35
Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the

entire Section 2 with the following:
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed

amendment after taking into account the modifications submitted by
the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona,
Monsod, Rama, Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified
amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now read as
follows: "SECTION 2. — AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY
LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE
UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL
NUMBER Of REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION
SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE
RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE
EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed

amendment is reflective of the sense contained in Section 2 of our
completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed
amendment. 36
The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible

for the legislature to set forth certain procedures to carry out the
initiative. . .?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
x x x x x x x x x
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioner's amendment does not prevent

the legislature from asking another body to set the proposition in
proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the

implementation of this particular right would be subject to legislation,
provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of
the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the

proper form for submission to the people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to

initiate. In other words, none of the procedures to be proposed by the
legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures

which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes. 37
Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to — NOT REVISION of — the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed

amendment on line 1 refers to "amendment." Does it not cover the
word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision"

should be covered by Section 1. So insofar as initiative is concerned, it
can only relate to "amendments" not "revision." 38
Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments

through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal,

what is involved is an amendment to the Constitution. To amend a
Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National
Assembly by a vote of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional
convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to submit
the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the
National Assembly is required, the import being that the process of
amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably
initiating an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by
the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I cannot agree to
reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative
because it would require another voting by the Committee, and the
voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10 percent. Perhaps, I
might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the
Commission shall take up the Article on the Legislative or on the
National Assembly on plenary sessions. 39
The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final version,
which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended,

reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE
BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A
PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE
REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED
VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF
THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS
THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT. 40
The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9
July 1986. 41 Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed
to introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof,
the Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986. 42
However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by changing
"percent" to "per centum" and "thereof" to "therein" and deleting the phrase "by law" in the second
paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress 43 shall provide for the implementation of the
exercise of this right. 44 This amendment was approved and is the text of the present second paragraph
of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under Section
2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress "provided" for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer the
question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us R.A.
No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute
amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article
XVII then reading:
The Congress 45 shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The "rules" means "the details on how [the right] is to be
carried out." 46
We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No.
17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House of
Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497, 47 which dealt
with the initiative and referendum mentioned
in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, 48 which dealt with the
subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article
X (Local Government) and initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate
Bill No. 17 49 solely dealt with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local
government units. The Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill
No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate 50 and by the
House of Representatives. 51 This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to "provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?"
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not suggest an
initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
Sec. 2. Statement and Policy. — The power of the people under a system of initiative
and referendum to directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the
Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions passed by any legislative body upon
compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed, recognized and
guaranteed. (Emphasis supplied).
The inclusion of the word "Constitution" therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is
neither germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and
referendum on national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as
to amendments on the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is
confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly
propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system
of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section 1 of
Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and referendum and
appropriately used the phrases "propose and enact," "approve or reject" and "in whole or in part." 52
Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments to the
Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5 (Requirements)
restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters who must submit
the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does not provide for the
contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c) requires, among other
things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed,
as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of the petition, the provisions of the
Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads
in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected,

amended or repealed, as the case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;

c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words
which shall be legibly written or printed at the top of every page of the petition.
(Emphasis supplied).
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed" only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for Local
Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This
conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is initiative and
referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully provide for the
implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values,
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than
the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is subsumed
under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in scope. Our reading of
Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative and Referendum) leaves
no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the initiative involved, but on
its nature and character. It is "national initiative," if what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is
a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is "local initiative" if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative bodies of the
governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays can pass. This
classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on Section 3 of the Act, which we
quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms —
x x x x x x x x x
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to

the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national

legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,

provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Emphasis
supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. 53
A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not germane
to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs (b) and (c)
of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the
votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an

election called for the purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification
and proclamation of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies
of local governments; thus:
Sec. 11. Indirect Initiative. — Any duly accredited people's organization, as defined by

law, may file a petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives,
and other legislative bodies. . . .
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions
for both national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on "Authority of Courts" under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced, 54 since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative and
referendum. It reads:
Sec. 18. Authority of Courts. — Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper
courts from declaring null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for
violation of the Constitution or want of capacity of the local legislative body to enact the
said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details in the
implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving them
special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its
approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;

(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition. 55
As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative body's failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power
of initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit
concerned as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters
for their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies. 56
Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of its
twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word "Constitution" in Section 2; (b) defines "initiative
on the Constitution" and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in Section 3; (c)
speaks of "plebiscite" as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the Constitution may be
approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements as to the number of
voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of the approved
proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. RA. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments to
the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service. 57
The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in
essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its
lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to
promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. 58
The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest. 59 The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the
Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies. 60
Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate

rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in
every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid
only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or
implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate
and determinable — to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 61 A
sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and
specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative
command is to be effected. 62
Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735 miserably
failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power to the
COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND REGULATIONS ON THE
CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the
exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the COMELEC's power
under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws and regulations referred
to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution,
or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which satisfies the "completeness" and the
"sufficient standard" tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of Congress to
implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested upon the
COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is valid, the
COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The Delfin
Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that he has
not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain assistance in his
drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be deemed validly
initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition then is
the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only
participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1) to prescribe the
form of the petition; 63 (2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate on the
total number of registered voters in each legislative district; 64 (3) to assist, through its election
registrars, in the establishment of signature stations; 65 and (4) to verify, through its election registrars,
the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters' affidavits, and voters' identification cards
used in the immediately preceding election. 66
Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC Resolution No.
2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The respondent Commission
must have known that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the
petition a docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed.
That petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term limits
of elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the Constitution is
rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments to the Constitution until a
sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should no
longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress should not
tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the implementation of the
right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolution No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections prescribing rules
and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against the
Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED as against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179313 September 17, 2009
MAKIL U. PUNDAODAYA, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONSN and ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition1 for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the August 3, 2007 Resolution 2 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 07-202, which declared private respondent Arsenio Densing
Noble (Noble) qualified to run for municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Makil U. Pundaodaya (Pundaodaya) is married to Judith Pundaodaya, who ran against Noble
for the position of municipal mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.
On March 27, 2007, Noble filed his Certificate of Candidacy, indicating therein that he has been a
resident of Purok 3, Barangay Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental for 15 years.
On April 3, 2007, Pundaodaya filed a petition for disqualification 3 against Noble docketed as SPA No. 07-
202, alleging that the latter lacks the residency qualification prescribed by existing laws for elective local
officials; that he never resided nor had any physical presence at a fixed place in Purok 3, Barangay
Esperanza, Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; and that he does not appear to have the intention of residing
therein permanently. Pundaodaya claimed that Noble is in fact a resident of Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro
City, where he also maintains a business called OBERT Construction Supply.
In his Answer,4 Noble averred that he is a registered voter and resident of Barangay Esperanza,
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that on January 18, 1992, he married Bernadith Go, the daughter of then
Mayor Narciso Go of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he has been engaged in electoral activities since
his marriage; and that he voted in the said municipality in the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections.
In a resolution dated May 13, 2007, 5 the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of Pundaodaya
and disqualified Noble from running as mayor, thus:
Respondent Noble’s claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in the past three (3)
elections in the said municipality does not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected residency at
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does campaigning in previous elections sufficiently establish
residence.
Respondent Noble failed to show that he has indeed acquired domicile at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.
He failed to prove not only his bodily presence in the new locality but has likewise failed to show that he
intends to remain at Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental and abandon his residency at Lapasan, Cagayan de
Oro City.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition to Disqualify Aresnio Densing Noble is hereby
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.6
Noble filed a motion for reconsideration of the above resolution. In the meantime, he garnered the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed the winning candidate on May 15, 2007. Pundaodaya then
filed an Urgent Motion to Annul Proclamation. 7
On August 3, 2007, the COMELEC En Banc reversed the decision of the Second Division and declared
Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position.
The COMELEC En Banc held that when Noble married Bernadith Go on January 18, 1992, the couple has
since resided in Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental; that he was a registered voter and that he participated in
the last three elections; and although he is engaged in business in Cagayan de Oro City, the fact that he
resides in Kinoguitan and is a registered voter and owns property thereat, sufficiently meet the
residency requirement.8 Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (en banc) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to
GRANT the instant Motion for Reconsideration and to REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Resolution
promulgated on May 13, 2007 issued by the Commission (Second Division).
ACCORDINGLY, respondent ARSENIO DENSING NOBLE is QUALIFIED to run for the local elective position
of Municipal Mayor of the Municipality of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2007
Synchronized National and Local Elections.
SO ORDERED.9
Pundaodaya filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC En Banc acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it declared Noble qualified to run; when it did not annul Noble’s proclamation;
and when it failed to proclaim the true winning candidate, Judith Pundaodaya.
In a resolution dated November 13, 2007,10 the Court required the respondents to comment on the
petition.
Public respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Manifestation and
Motion11 praying that it be excused from filing a separate comment and that the said pleading be
considered sufficient compliance with the November 13, 2007 Resolution.
Meanwhile, for Noble’s failure to comply, the Court issued Resolutions 12 dated July 15, 2008 and
December 9, 2008 requiring him to show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in
contempt, imposing a fine of ₱1,000.00, and requiring him to file a comment. On June 2, 2009, the Court
deemed Noble to have waived the filing of the comment. 13
The issues for resolution are: whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion: 1) in
declaring Noble qualified to run for the mayoralty position; and 2) in failing to order the annulment of
Noble’s proclamation and refusing to proclaim Judith Pundaodaya as the winning candidate.
Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, requires that an
elective local official must be a resident in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he intends
to serve for at least one year immediately preceding the election. 14
In Japzon v. Commission on Elections,15 it was held that the term "residence" is to be understood not in
its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal
residence, that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where
he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi)."
In Domino v. Commission on Elections,16 the Court explained that domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to
return. It is a question of intention and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules
must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when
once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or
domicile at a time.1avvphi1
If one wishes to successfully effect a change of domicile, he must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. 17 Without clear and
positive proof of the concurrence of these three requirements, the domicile of origin continues. 18
Records show that Noble’s domicile of origin was Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. However, he claims to
have chosen Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental as his new domicile. To substantiate this, he presented before
the COMELEC his voter registration records; 19 a Certification dated April 25, 2007 from Election Officer II
Clavel Z. Tabada;20 his Marriage Certificate;21 and affidavits of residents of Kinoguitan 22 attesting that he
established residence in the municipality after his marriage to Bernadith Go. In addition, he presented
receipts23 from the Provincial Treasurer for payment of his water bills, and Certifications from the
Municipal Treasurer and Municipal Engineer that he has been a consumer of the Municipal Water
System since June 2003. To prove ownership of property, he also presented a Deed of Sale 24 over a real
property dated June 3, 1996.
The above pieces of documentary evidence, however, fail to convince us that Noble successfully
effected a change of domicile. As correctly ruled by the COMELEC Second Division, private respondent’s
claim that he is a registered voter and has actually voted in the past 3 elections in Kinoguitan, Misamis
Oriental do not sufficiently establish that he has actually elected residency in the said municipality.
Indeed, while we have ruled in the past that voting gives rise to a strong presumption of residence, it is
not conclusive evidence thereof. 25 Thus, in Perez v. Commission on Elections,26 we held that a person’s
registration as voter in one district is not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. The
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient to consider him to
have abandoned or lost his residence.27
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicative of that intention. It requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also a declared
and probable intent to make it one’s fixed and permanent place of abode. 28
In this case, Noble’s marriage to Bernadith Go does not establish his actual physical presence in
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental. Neither does it prove an intention to make it his permanent place of
residence. We are also not persuaded by his alleged payment of water bills in the absence of evidence
showing to which specific properties they pertain. And while Noble presented a Deed of Sale for real
property, the veracity of this document is belied by his own admission that he does not own property in
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental.29
On the contrary, we find that Noble has not abandoned his original domicile as shown by the following:
a) Certification dated April 12, 2007 of the Barangay Kagawad of Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City
stating that Noble is a resident of the barangay; 30 b) Affidavit31 of the Barangay Kagawad of Esperanza,
Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental dated April 14, 2007, attesting that Noble has not resided in Barangay
Esperanza in Kinoguitan; c) photos32 and official receipts33 showing that Noble and his wife maintain
their residence and businesses in Lapasan; d) tax declarations 34 of real properties in Cagayan de Oro City
under the name of Noble; and e) the "Household Record of Barangay Inhabitants" 35 of Mayor Narciso
Go, which did not include Noble or his wife, Bernadith Go, which disproves Noble’s claim that he resides
with his father-in-law.
From the foregoing, we find that Noble’s alleged change of domicile was effected solely for the purpose
of qualifying as a candidate in the 2007 elections. This we cannot allow. In Torayno, Sr. v. Commission on
Elections, 36 we held that the one-year residency requirement is aimed at excluding outsiders "from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain." Establishing
residence in a community merely to meet an election law requirement defeats the purpose of
representation: to elect through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of
the community.37 Thus, we find Noble disqualified from running as municipal mayor of Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental in the 2007 elections.
Notwithstanding Noble’s disqualification, we find no basis for the proclamation of Judith Pundaodaya, as
mayor. The rules on succession under the Local Government Code, explicitly provides:
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-
Mayor. – If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the xxx mayor, the xxx vice-mayor concerned
shall become the xxx mayor.
xxxx
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher
vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify or is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
Thus, considering the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental
occasioned by Noble’s disqualification, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall then succeed as mayor. 38
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 3, 2007 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA
No. 07-202 declaring respondent Arsenio Densing Noble qualified to run as Mayor of Kinoguitan,
Misamis Oriental, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. In view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the
Mayor of Kinoguitan, Misamis Oriental, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor is ORDERED to succeed as Mayor.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be
preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the
ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will of the
majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications
however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving
effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided
the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM VILLAGE,
MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and 10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I
will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities;
That the obligation imposed to such is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion, and that the facts therein are true to the best of my knowledge. 1
On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on
the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which,
under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was
assigned to the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another
certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in
Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l)
year and thirteen (13) days.3
On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of the
disqualification case.4
On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner testified
and presented in evidence, among others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995, 5 lease contract between
petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994, 6 Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April
28,19957 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995. 8
After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a
Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to

DISMISS the instant: petition for Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO AQUINO
and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative in the Second
Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED.9
On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995
resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied for the
congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty
seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five thousand
nine hundred ten (35,910) votes.10
On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to
Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of
the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to
Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. The
dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to complete the canvassing
of election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the proclamation of
respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning number of votes for the
position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion
for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by
the Commission.
The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate

implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise directed
to inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and to calendar the
hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning,
PICC Press Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED.11
On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of
suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve
Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his
intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of
petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an
Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof residing:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the case,
the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules,
to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be heard thereon
because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied with more
reflection and judiciousness. 12
On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the
Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the

Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED.
Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a candidate
for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the
May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.
Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent should he
obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now
made permanent.
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati shall
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of election returns,
determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates, who shall be
immediately be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED. 13
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2, 1995, as
well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the
following errors for consideration, to wit:
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE

DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8,
1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY
WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID JURISDICTION

CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE
TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE
HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO

PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX "C", PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN
RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY
REVIEWED AGAIN, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE
COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN
DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE
PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE THE
MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING THE FINALITY OF THE
DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY NOT TO THWART THE
PEOPLE'S WILL.
THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT

OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE AND TO
APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
E
IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE
ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY
FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION

WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO "DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE
WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING QUALIFIED CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS
DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL
DISREGARD OF THE WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR
PERSON WHO WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE
PROCLAIMED AS SUBSTITUTE
WINNER.15
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for
member of the House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given
the yet unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed serious error
and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in
the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of
Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does
not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only
when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate
who has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member
of the House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a
winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows
suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner's contention that
"after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral
exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon
the question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the elections the COMELEC is
empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and decide questions
relating to qualifications of candidates Section 6 states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate, who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to
continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the
highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against him
when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to
suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions
of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of B.P. 881. Section
7 states:
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The

procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not
just residence but domicile of choice. 17
The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be
a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the
elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held that the term "residence"
has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions
but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held: 20
The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of

residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain the
same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971

Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of
domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the

National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, and a resident thereof', that is, in the district,
for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation
given to it was domicile (emphasis ours) Records of the 1987
Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I think

Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has
been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty especially

considering that the provision in the Constitution in the Article on
Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile
and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as
explained in Gallego vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions
and needs of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing residence in
a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of
representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the
needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency mandated by law for
him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual
residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or
by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to
whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed
by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was
domiciled in the same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992
elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he
was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. 23 At the time, his
certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data
furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands
consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his
most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of
condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing
a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of
respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since,
by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself
testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other
"residences" in Manila or Quezon City. 26
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon,
the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the
short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his
stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence" 27 is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City." 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing
a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification —
sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the
lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the
Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by
itself establish; a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do better. 29
Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion
which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. 30 These requirements are hardly met by the
evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second
District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed to
continue requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a
change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive
proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency
requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political
district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in
this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area
encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be
allowed take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in
such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing
conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was
disqualified from running in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop
around for a place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he must first prove
with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the
period required by law. This he has not effectively done.
III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the Board of
Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of
votes. The answer must be in the negative.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified candidates
in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the
sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The result suggested by private
respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast
their vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had
petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would have been different. The
votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone
to second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute
our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the
elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the
first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such
circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one end to the other. In
the early case of Topacio v. Paredes. 32 we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a disqualified,
ineligilble or dead candidate provided the people who voted for such candidate believed in good faith
that at the time of the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible or alive. The votes cast in
favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the next higher number of votes
cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to this Court in the said case, "there is not, strictly speaking,
a contest, that wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any other
candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving the plurality of the legally cast
ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-candidate in view of his
unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a ground for disqualification) cannot be considered
in the canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the category of invalid and nonexistent votes
because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a candidate in the eyes of the law. As a
result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the only candidate left in the disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the candidate who lost in an
election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the portion is
ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally

guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that
they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental
idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous ruling in Geronimo
v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the category of invalid
or non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the law,"
reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.
In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella v. Comelec; 37 and Benito v. Comelec, 38 this

Court reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that
the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher number of votes to be declared elected, and that
a minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to the office. In these cases, we put
emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in
the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy
on the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate was alive, qualified,
or eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of
city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner
Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief
that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent
disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of
the recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before
Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local
elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with
Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the
province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor. Her votes was counted and she
obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that petitioner
lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . What
matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is
voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for
not possessing the eligibility, requirements at the time of the election as
provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number
of votes for the same position cannot assume the vacated position.
(Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling reason
to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case
with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's
(Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for
petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted
upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality
(Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent,

who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as
mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the
second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not
the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on

Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his
winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-
candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer
won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then (Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin,
Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera)
and another two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One
was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members
of the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v.
Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes
intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void.
This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom, sovereignty resides. At
the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner
Labo bona fide without any intention to missapply their franchise, and in the honest
belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to
be disqualified and cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed,
under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the
office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the
27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio
City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No. 105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another shift of
the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has
been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly
represents a minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and English
court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up, though obviously qualified,
could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be
tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just one vote. In such a case, it
is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in
instances where the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically
insignificant, voters preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among
qualified candidates, should the equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible
candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the
choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer. By any
mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have obtained a
majority or plurality of votes cast where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or
plurality of the votes.
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner
ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of
respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated by
the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican
government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they
dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks
one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even
the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order restraining
respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the
congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 163295 - January 23, 2006]
FRANCIS G. ONG, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondents.
[G.R. NO. 163354 - January 23, 2006]
ROMMEL G. ONG, Petitioner, v. JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two separate petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set
aside certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc.
The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a Petition for Certiorari with petitioner Francis G. Ong
impugning the COMELEC en banc resolution1 dated May 7, 2004 in SPA Case No. 04-048, granting private
respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre's motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated March 31,
20042 of the COMELEC's First Division.
The second, G.R. No. 163354, is for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for injunctive
relief, filed by petitioner Rommel Ong, brother of Francis, seeking, among other things, to stop the
COMELEC from enforcing and implementing its aforesaid May 7, 2004 en banc resolution in SPA Case
No. 04-048 pending the outcome of the petition in G.R. No. 163295.
Per its en banc Resolution of June 1, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of these petitions.
The recourse stemmed from the following essential and undisputed factual backdrop:
Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates
who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004
elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due
Course and Cancel Certificate of Candidacy3 of Francis. Docketed as SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to
disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in
the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor and
discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office
of mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC
winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly
elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest, 4 albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when
Francis had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the
2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
Acting on Alegre's petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis' certificate of candidacy for the May 10,
2004 elections, the First Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution 5 dismissing
the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing as follows:
We see the circumstances in the case now before us analogous to those obtaining in the sample
situations addressed by the Highest Court in the Borja case. Herein, one of the requisites for the
application of the three term rule is not present. Francis Ong might have indeed fully served the mayoral
terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001
cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The [RTC] of Daet, Camarines Norte,
Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Stanley Alegre was
the "legally elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte." This
disposition had become final after the [COMELEC] dismissed the appeal filed by Ong, the case having
become moot and academic.
xxx
On the basis of the words of the Highest Court pronounced in the Lonzanida case and applicable in the
case at bench, Ong could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998 to 2001 because "he
was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as a presumptive winner; which presumption
was later overturned - when [the RTC] decided with finality that [he] lost in the May 1998 elections."
(Words in bracket and emphasis in the original).
Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration, contending, in the main, that there was a
misapplication of the three-term rule, as applied in the cited cases of Borja v. Comelec and Lonzanida v.
Comelec, infra.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued, in SPA No. 04-048, a resolution6 reversing the March 31,
2004 resolution of the COMELEC's First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis "as disqualified to run
for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the 'May 10, 2004"; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis'
name from the official list of candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not
to count the votes cast in his favor.
The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine copy of the aforecited May 7, 2004 resolution,
sending him posthaste to seek the assistance of his political party, the Nationalist People's Coalition,
which immediately nominated his older brother, Rommel Ong (Rommel), as substitute candidate. At
about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy,
Rommel filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his
brother Francis.
The following undisputed events then transpired:
1. On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10 elections, Alegre filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Rommel Ong.
2. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong brothers, addressed a letter 7 to Provincial Election
Supervisor (PES) of Camarines Norte Liza Z. Cariño and Acting Election Officer Emily G. Basilonia in which
he appealed that, owing to the COMELEC's inaction on Alegre's petition to cancel Rommel's certificate of
candidacy, the name "Rommel Ong" be included in the official certified list of candidates for mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte. The desired listing was granted by the PES Carino.
3. On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote8 to then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, Commissioner-in-
Charge for Regions IV and V, seeking clarification on the legality of the action thus taken by the PES
Cariño. Responding, Commissioner Garcillano issued a Memorandum under date May 10,
20049 addressed to PES Liza D. Zabala-Cariño, ordering her to implement the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004. 10 Said Memorandum partly stated:
The undersigned ADOPTS the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig [Director IV, Law Department],
which he quote your stand, "that substitution is not proper if the certificate of the substituted candidacy
is denied due course. In the Resolution of the Commission En banc, the Certificate of candidacy of Francis
Ong was denied due course," and elaborated further that:
"x x x there is an existing policy of the Commission not to include the name of a substitute candidate in
the certified list of candidates unless the substitution is approved by the Commission.
In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan
Ong, should be denied due course; and 2) the election officer be directed to delete his name from the
list of candidates."
The above position of the Commission was in line with the pronouncement of Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Abaya (311 SCRA 617) which states:
"There can no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by
denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy."
In view thereof, you are hereby directed to faithfully implement the said Resolution of the Commission
En Banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket
added].
4. Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Memorandum, it would seem that the Chairman of the
Municipal Board of Canvasser of San Vicente issued an order enjoining all concerned not to canvass the
votes cast for Rommel, prompting the latter to file a protest with that Board. 11
5. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alegre as the winning candidate for
the mayoralty post in San Vicente, Camarines Norte. 12
On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the Court a Petition for Certiorari, presently docketed as G.R. No.
163295. His brother Rommel's petition in G.R. No. 163354 followed barely a week after.
In our en banc resolution dated June 1, 2004, G.R. No. 163295 and G.R. No. 163354 were consolidated. 13
Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order dismissing private respondent
Alegre's Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for being
moot and academic.14
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
In G.R. No. 163295, whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing its en banc resolution dated May 7, 2004 declaring petitioner Francis as
disqualified to run for Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections and
consequently ordering the deletion of his name from the official list of candidates so that any vote cast
in his favor shall be considered stray.
In G.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due
course to Rommel's certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother
Francis.
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question of whether or not petitioner Francis's
assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001
should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule.
Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on the other hand,
disagrees. He argues that, while he indeed assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor of San
Vicente for three consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-elect in the May 1998 election was
contested and eventually nullified per the decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte dated July 4,
2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues, citing Lonzanida v. Comelec15 , that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all and one assuming office on the strength of a
protested proclamation does so as a presumptive winner and subject to the final outcome of the
election protest.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as follows:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites
must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in
the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms. 16
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively
barring petitioner Francis from running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004
elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly elected mayor of that
municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995 - June 30,
1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-
2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same
municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by virtue of a
proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question that
begs to be addressed, therefore, is whether or not Francis's assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be considered as one full term service
in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, "service for the full term", and should be
counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional
and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from being elected and serving for more
than three consecutive term for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, 17 that it was
Francis' opponent (Alegre) who "won" in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected
mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was without practical and legal use
and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner
Francis' contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by
the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty
election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the
three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view
would mean that Alegre would - under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by
virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.
Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the Court's ruling in, Lonzanida v.
Comelec,18 citing Borja v. Comelec19 . In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran
again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor.
However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC of
Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of elections and
declared the position vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida acceded to the
order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and performed his duties up to March 1998 only.
Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to
disqualify, under the three-term rule, was filed and was eventually granted. There, the Court held that
Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 election, and
that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of
office. As the Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida "cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to
1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact vacated] his post before the expiration of the
term."
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the
result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and,
as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an
order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine,
there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. But more
importantly, here, there was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis' service
respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated during the term in
question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte for the entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.
The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it
disqualified Francis from running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post of San Vicente
and denying due course to his certificate of candidacy by force of the constitutional and statutory
provisions regarding the three-term limit rule for any local elective official cannot be sustained. What
the COMELEC en banc said in its May 7, 2004 assailed Resolution commends itself for concurrence:
As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-Movant [Alegre]in applying the ruling in

the Borja and Lonzanida cases in the instant petition will be erroneous because the factual milieu in
those cases is different from the one obtaining here. Explicitly, the three-term limit was not made
applicable in the cases of Borja and Lonzanida because there was an interruption in the continuity of
service of the three consecutive terms. Here, Respondent Ong would have served continuously for three
consecutive terms, from 1995 to 2004. His full term from 1998 to 2001 could not be simply discounted
on the basis that he was not duly elected thereto on account of void proclamation because it would
have iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality as it rewards a legally disqualified and
repudiated loser with a crown of victory. (Word in bracket added; emphasis in the original)
Given the foregoing consideration, the question of whether or not then Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano
overstepped his discretion when he issued the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering the
implementation of aforesaid May 7, 2004 COMELEC en banc resolution even before its finality20 is now
of little moment and need not detain us any longer.
Just as unmeritorious as Francis' petition in G.R. No. 163295 is Rommel's petition in G.R. No. 163354 in
which he (Rommel) challenges the COMELEC's act of not including his name as a substitute candidate in
the official list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. As it were, existing COMELEC
policy21 provides for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute candidates in the certified list of
candidates pending approval of the substitution.
Not to be overlooked is the Court's holding in Miranda v. Abaya,22 that a candidate whose certificate of
candidacy has been cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the
same political party as that of the former, thus:
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party
may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not
include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied
due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the Code.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be
validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing
rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance
candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted.
If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included
those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the
provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
xxx
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same
way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the
imagination, be a candidate at all.
xxx
After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why in
Bautista [Bautista v. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person with a
cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that
Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or
accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a
person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course.
In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections were already passé, Rommel Ong's
petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7,
2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 134015 July 19, 1999
JUAN DOMINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NARCISO Ra. GRAFILO, JR., EDDY B. JAVA, JUAN P. BAYONITO, JR.,
ROSARIO SAMSON and DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondent, LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-SOLON, intervenor.
DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:
Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction are the Resolution of 6 May
19981 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring petitioner
Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate for representative of the Lone Legislative
District of the Province of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May 1998 2 of
the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents are not disputed.1âwphi1.nêt
On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the
Lone Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that he
had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2) months
immediately preceding the election.3
On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr.,
Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and assigned to the Second
Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the
certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani
where he seeks election. To substantiate their allegations, private respondents presented the following
evidence:
1. Annex "A" — the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the

position of Congressman of the Lone District of the Province of
Sarangani filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where in item 4 thereof he wrote his date
of birth as December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have resided in the
constituency where he seeks election for one (1) year and two (2)
months; and, in item 10, that he is registered voter of Precinct No. 14A-
1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
2. Annex "B" — Voter's Registration Record with SN 31326504 dated

June 22, 1997 indicating respondent's registration at Precinct No. 4400-
A, Old Balara, Quezon City;
3. Annex "C" — Respondent's Community Tax Certificate No. 11132214C

dated January 15, 1997;
4. Annex "D" — Certified true copy of the letter of Herson D. Dema-ala,

Deputy Provincial & Municipal Treasurer of Alabel, Sarangani, dated
February 26, 1998, addressed to Mr. Conrado G. Butil, which reads:
In connection with your letter of even date, we are furnishing you

herewith certified xerox copy of the triplicate copy of COMMUNITY TAX
CERTIFICATE NO. 11132214C in the name of Juan Domino.
Furthermore, Community Tax Certificate No. 11132212C of the same

stub was issued to Carlito Engcong on September 5, 1997, while
Certificate No. 11132213C was also issued to Mr. Juan Domino but was
cancelled and serial no. 11132215C was issued in the name of Marianita
Letigio on September 8, 1997.
5. Annex "E" — The triplicate copy of the Community Tax Certificate No.
11132214C in the name of Juan Domino dated September 5, 1997;
6. Annex "F" — Copy of the letter of Provincial Treasurer Lourdes P.

Riego dated March 2, 1998 addressed to Mr. Herson D. Dema-ala,
Deputy Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer of Alabel,
Sarangani, which states:
For easy reference, kindly turn-over to the undersigned for safekeeping,

the stub of Community Tax Certificate containing Nos. 11132201C-
11132250C issued to you on June 13, 1997 and paid under Official
Receipt No. 7854744.
Upon request of Congressman James L. Chiongbian.
7. Annex "G" — Certificate of Candidacy of respondent for the position

of Congressman in the 3rd District of Quezon City for the 1995 elections
filed with the Office of the Regional Election Director, National Capital
Region, on March 17, 1995, where, in item 4 thereof, he wrote his birth
date as December 22, 1953; in item 8 thereof his "residence in the
constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election" as 3 years and 5 months; and, in item 9, that he is a registered
voter of Precinct No. 182, Barangay Balara, Quezon City;
8. Annex "H" — a copy of the APPLICATION FOR TRANSFER OF

REGISTRATION RECORDS DUE TO CHANGE OF RESIDENCE of respondent
dated August 30, 1997 addressed to and received by Election Officer
Mantil Alim, Alabel, Sarangani, on September 22, 1997, stating among
others, that "[T]he undersigned's previous residence is at 24 Bonifacio
Street, Ayala Heights, Quezon City, III District, Quezon City; wherein he
is a registered voter" and "that for business and residence purposes, the
undersigned has transferred and conducts his business and reside at
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Province of Sarangani prior to this
application;"
9. Annex "I" — Copy of the SWORN APPLICATION FOR OF

CANCELLATION OF THE VOTER'S [TRANSFER OF] PREVIOUS
REGISTRATION of respondent subscribed and sworn to on 22 October
1997 before Election Officer Mantil Allim at Alabel, Sarangani. 4
For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and
that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. In support of the said contention, DOMINO
presented before the COMELEC the following exhibits, to wit:
1. Annex "1" — Copy of the Contract of Lease between Nora Dacaldacal

as Lessor and Administrator of the properties of deceased spouses
Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal and respondent as Lessee executed
on January 15, 1997, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public
Johnny P. Landero;
2. Annex "2" — Copy of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with

Absolute Deed of sale executed by and between the heirs of deceased
spouses Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal, namely: Maria Lourdes,
Jupiter and Beberlie and the respondent on November 4, 1997,
subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Jose A. Alegario;
3. Annex "3" — True Carbon Xerox copy of the Decision dated January
19, 1998, of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35,
Quezon City, in Election Case NO. 725 captioned as "In the Matter of the
Petition for the Exclusion from the List of voters of Precinct No. 4400-A
Brgy. Old Balara, Quezon City, Spouses Juan and Zorayda Domino,
Petitioners, -versus- Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer, Quezon City,
District III, and the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct No. 4400-A,
Old Balara, Quezon City, Respondents." The dispositive portion of which
reads:
1. Declaring the registration of petitioners as voters of
Precinct No. 4400-A, Barangay Old Balara, in District III
Quezon City as completely erroneous as petitioners
were no longer residents of Quezon City but of Alabel,
Sarangani where they have been residing since
December 1996;
2. Declaring this erroneous registration of petitioners in

Quezon City as done in good faith due to an honest
mistake caused by circumstances beyond their control
and without any fault of petitioners;
3. Approving the transfer of registration of voters of

petitioners from Precint No. 4400-A of Barangay Old
Balara, Quezon City to Precinct No. 14A1 of Barangay
Poblacion of Alabel, Sarangani; and
4. Ordering the respondents to immediately transfer

and forward all the election/voter's registration records
of the petitioners in Quezon City to the Election Officer,
the Election Registration Board and other Comelec
Offices of Alabel, Sarangani where the petitioners are
obviously qualified to excercise their respective rights of
suffrage.
4. Annex "4" — Copy of the Application for Transfer of Registration

Records due to Change of Residence addressed to Mantil Alim,
COMELEC Registrar, Alabel, Sarangani, dated August 30, 1997.
5. Annex "5" — Certified True Copy of the Notice of Approval of

Application, the roster of applications for registration approved by the
Election Registration Board on October 20, 1997, showing the spouses
Juan and Zorayda Bailon Domino listed as numbers 111 and 112 both
under Precinct No. 14A1, the last two names in the slate indicated as
transferees without VRR numbers and their application dated August
30, 1997 and September 30, 1997, respectively.
6. Annex "6" — same as Annex "5"
7. Annex "6-a" — Copy of the Sworn Application for Cancellation of

Voter's Previous Registration (Annex "I", Petition);
8. Annex "7" — Copy of claim card in the name of respondent showing

his VRR No. 31326504 dated October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of
Precinct No. 14A1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
9. Annex "7-a" — Certification dated April 16, 1998, issued by Atty.
Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer IV, District III, Quezon City, which
reads:
This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and ZORAYDA DOMINO are no
longer registered voters of District III, Quezon City. Their registration
records (VRR) were transferred and are now in the possession of the
Election Officer of Alabel, Sarangani.
This certification is being issued upon the request of Mr. JUAN DOMINO.
10. Annex "8" — Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and Maria Lourdes

Dacaldacal stating the circumstances and incidents detailing their
alleged acquaintance with respondent.
11. Annexes "8-a", "8-b", "8-c" and "8-d" — Copies of the uniform
affidavits of witness Myrna Dalaguit, Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda
Lomibao and Elena V. Piodos subscribed and sworn to before Notary
Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998, embodying their alleged
personal knowledge of respondent's residency in Alabel, Sarangani;
12. Annex "8-e" — A certification dated April 20, 1998, subscribed and
sworn to before Notary Public Bonifacio, containing a listing of the
names of fifty-five (55) residents of Alabel, Sarangani, declaring and
certifying under oath that they personally know the respondent as a
permanent resident of Alabel, Sarangani since January 1997 up to
present;
13. Annexes "9", "9-a" and "9-b" — Copies of Individual Income Tax
Return for the year 1997, BIR form 2316 and W-2, respectively, of
respondent; and,
14. Annex "10" — The affidavit of respondent reciting the chronology of

events and circumstances leading to his relocation to the Municipality of
Alabel, Sarangani, appending Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D", "D-1", "E", "F",
"G" with sub-markings "G-1" and "G-2" and "H" his CTC No. 111`32214C
dated September 5, 1997, which are the same as Annexes "1", "2", "4",
"5", "6-a", "3", "7", "9" with sub-markings "9-a" and "9-b" except Annex
"H".5
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as
candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year
residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy, on the basis
of the following findings:
What militates against respondent's claim that he has met the residency requirement
for the position sought is his own Voter's Registration Record No. 31326504 dated June
22, 1997 [Annex "B", Petition] and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., Ayala
Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This evidence, standing alone, negates all his
protestations that he established residence at Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as
early as January 1997. It is highly improbable, nay incredible, for respondent who
previously ran for the same position in the 3rd Legislative District of Quezon City during
the elections of 1995 to unwittingly forget the residency requirement for the office
sought.
Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22, 1997 when respondent registered at
Precinct No. 4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on May 11, 1998,
respondent clearly lacks the one (1) year residency requirement provided for candidates
for Member of the House of Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the
Constitution.
All told, petitioner's evidence conspire to attest to respondent's lack of residence in the
constituency where he seeks election and while it may be conceded that he is a
registered voter as contemplated under Section 12 of R.A. 8189, he lacks the
qualification to run for the position of Congressman for the Lone District of the Province
of Sarangani.6
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No.
3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning,
considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory. 7
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers,8 shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the
position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which
was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the present Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did
not meet the one-year residence requirement.
On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINO's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order, the Court
directed the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the instant petition. 9
On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate receiving

the second highest number of votes, was allowed by the Court to Intervene. 10 INTERVENOR in her
Motion for Leave to Intervene and in her Comment in Intervention 11 is asking the Court to uphold the
disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and to proclaim her as the duly elected representative of
Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.
Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:
a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of

Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of
Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world,
including the Commission on Elections.
b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject

congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the May 11, 1998 elections; and
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the

petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner.12
The first issue.
The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the
exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is
final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, over a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it
is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material
facts was made in the certificate of candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the
candidate.
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings as to the
right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial
jurisdicton, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of DOMINO's qualification as a
candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character.
Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on
matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive
upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any
question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of citizenship and residence of the
challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily
caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority.
However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the
particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or
inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.13 In this
sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take concerning the subject
passed upon in the proceeding.14 Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be
conclusive on the voter's political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as
a voter in any other election.15
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar16 we ruled that:
. . . It is made clear that even as it is here held that the order of the City Court in
question has become final, the same does not constitute res adjudicata as to any of the
matters therein contained. It is ridiculous to suppose that such an important and
intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon and determined with finality in such
a summary and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion and exclusion of persons in
the registry list of voters. Even if the City Court had granted appellant's petition for
inclusion in the permanent list of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino citizen
qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino citizenship would still have been left open to
question.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its
jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered
the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to
precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the trial
court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality.
The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter
to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the
precint in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has
no power to order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is
the function of the election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. 17 The only
effect of the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the
Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's registration record
from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and thereafter place the
record in the inactive file.18
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity of parties, subject matter and
cause of action are indispensable requirements for the application of said doctrine. Neither herein
Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is a party in the exclusion proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion
was filed by DOMINDO himself and his wife, praying that he and his wife be excluded from the Voter's
List on the ground of erroneous registration while the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy was filed by private respondents against DOMINO for alleged false
representation in his certificate of candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the dismissal by reason
of res judicata, it is essential that there must be between the first and the second action identity of
parties, identity of subject matter and identity of causes of action. 19 In the present case, the aforesaid
essential requisites are not present. In the case of Nuval v. Guray, et al., 20 the Supreme Court in
resolving a similar issue ruled that:
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the
judgment rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's
name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and
prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act
No. 3387, is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not
appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the
capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first
instance, with whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for exclusion was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as
qualified voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the
office of president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered voter in
the election list of said municipality. The present proceeding of quo warranto was
interposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for the
office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate
for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it is
not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must be an identity of
capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs. Estate of
Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165)
In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious
matter was the exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the
municipality of Luna, while in the present que warranto proceeding, the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter is his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he
has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray
had not the six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified
voter thereof, while in the present proceeding of quo warranto, the cause of action is
that Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for eligibility to the
office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist therefore, identity of
causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) identity of parties;
(b) identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850).
And as in the case of the petition for excluision and in the
present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no identity of parties, or of things or
litigious matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.
The Second Issue.
Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately preceding the 11
May 1998 election as stated in his certificate of candidacy?
We hold in the negative.
It is doctrinally settled that the term "residence," as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for
suffrage and for elective office, means the same thing as "domicile," which imports not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention.21 "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for
business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return. 22 "Domicile" is a question of intention
and circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances, three rules must be borne in mind, namely:
(1) that a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) when once established it remains until
a new one is acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time. 23
Records show that petitioner's domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos

Sur 24 and that sometime in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights,
Old Balara, Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of candidacy for the position of representative of the
3rd District of Quezon City in the May 1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively
abandoned his "residence" in Quezon City and has established a new "domicile" of choice at the
Province of Sarangani.
A person's "domicile" once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new
one is established. 25 To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the
purpose. 26 In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual.27
It is the contention of petitioner that his actual physical presence in Alabel, Sarangani since December
1996 was sufficiently established by the lease of a house and lot located therein in January 1997 and by
the affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that place that they have seen petitioner
and his family residing in their locality.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to show that from said date he had
transferred his residence in that place. To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the
place must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While "residence" simply requires
bodily presence in a given place, "domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also
a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode, one's home. 28
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence in the locality involved and
intention to adopt it as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of
domicile will result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual
residence in the locality does not result in acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence
without intention.29
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of
domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does
not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile. The
mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of
Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the
reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.
Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further strengthened by
his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While voting is not conclusive of
residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence especially in this case where DOMINO
registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of election franchise is a deliberate public
assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon
the place the elector claims as, or believes to be, his residence. 31 The fact that a party continously voted
in a particular locality is a strong factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile. 32
His claim that his registration in Quezon City was erroneous and was caused by events over which he
had no control cannot be sustained. The general registration of voters for purposes of the May 1998
elections was scheduled for two (2) consecutive weekends, viz.: June 14, 15, 21, and 22.33
While, Domino's intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be
bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous
registration in Qezon City on 22 October 1997, 34 and that he applied for transfer of registration from
Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, 35 DOMINO still falls short
of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution.
In showing compliance with the residency requirement, both intent and actual presence in the district
one intends to represent must satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. 36 Domino's
failure to do so rendered him ineligible and his election to office null and void. 37
The Third Issue.
DOMINO's contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft of merit.
As previously mentioned, the COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has
jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction
continues even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before
the election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number of
votes38 and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken his oath
of office.39
It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's
sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the Constitution begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 40
The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position
in the winning candidate.41 A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office
before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives.
In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone Congressional
District of the Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus Resolution issued by the
COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the suspension of DOMINO's proclamation should he
obtain the winning number of votes. This resolution was issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-
finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying DOMINO as candidate for the position.
Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional
District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representatives.
Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his
ineligibility as a candidate.42
Issue raised by INTERVENOR.

After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the province
of Sarangani, may INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest number of votes, be
proclaimed as the winning candidate?
It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not
be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. 43 In every election, the people's
choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When
the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place. 44
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him. 45 To simplistically assume that the second placer
would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the
qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. 46
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. 47
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails
entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred 48 from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes 49 and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice
and the election is a nullity.50 To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective
position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on
their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect
officials of their choice.51
INTERVENOR's plea that the votes cast in favor of DOMINO be considered stray votes cannot be
sustained. INTERVENOR's reliance on the opinion made in the Labo, Jr. case 52 to wit: if the electorate,
fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety, would nevertheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying
their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next
higher number of votes may be deemed elected, is misplaced.
Contrary to the claim of INTERVENOR, petitioner was not notoriously known by the public as an
ineligible candidate. Although the resolution declaring him ineligible as candidate was rendered before
the election, however, the same is not yet final and executory. In fact, it was no less than the COMELEC
in its Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046 that allowed DOMINO to be voted for the office and
ordered that the votes cast for him be counted as the Resolution declaring him ineligible has not yet
attained finality. Thus the votes cast for DOMINO are presumed to have been cast in the sincere belief
that he was a qualified candidate, without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, said votes can
not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. 53
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated 6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd
Division and the decision dated 29 May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby
AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135691. September 27, 1999]
EMMANUEL SINACA, Petitioner, vs. MIGUEL MULA and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order assailing the Resolution of 6 October 1998, of respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC) in SPA No. 98-292, declaring as invalid the substitution of
mayoralty candidate Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by herein petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca. 1
The records disclose that in the 11 May 1998 elections, the two opposing factions of the ruling party
LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD (hereafter LAKAS) filled in separate candidates for the position of mayor of the
Municipality of Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction headed by Robert Z. Barbers (hereafter
BARBERS Wing) nominated Grachil G. Canoy (hereafter CANOY), while the other group lead by Francisco
T. MATUGAS (hereafter MATUGAS Wing) endorsed the candidacy of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. (hereafter
TEODORO).
Miguel H. Mula (hereafter MULA), a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the BARBERS Wing, filed
before the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against TEODORO which was docketed as SPA 98-
021. On 8 May 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying TEODORO as
candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte and ordering the cancellation of
his certificate of candidacy because of prior conviction of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude. 2
On 10 May 1998, TEODORO filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. On even date,
herein petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, (hereafter EMMANUEL), an independent candidate, withdrew his
certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member, joined and became a member of the LAKAS
party and was nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute mayoralty candidate for the
Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. On the basis of said nomination, EMMANUEL filed his
certificate of candidacy3 attached thereto is his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate
signed by Governor Francisco T. MATUGAS (hereafter MATUGAS), as party provincial chairman together
with EMMANUEls written acceptance of the partys nomination. 4
On 11 May 1998, MULA filed through mail another petition for disqualification, this time against
EMMANUEL, which was received by the COMELEC on 14 May 1998 and was docketed as SPA No. 98-
292. In his petition MULA contended that the nomination of EMMANUEL as substitute candidate is
illegal on the following grounds:
a) The substitute, before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy as LAKAS candidate, was an independent
candidate. Being so, he cannot rightfully substitute the disqualified one;
b) The nomination of respondent substitute bears only the approval of Provincial Chairman Matugas and
without consultation and consent of the higher political hierarchy especially Mr. Robert Ace Barbers
who has also a say on nomination of candidates within his jurisdiction, as evidenced by an authority
hereto attached as Annex E;
c) Substitution generally takes place when by reason of a candidates disqualification the party to which
he belongs loses such representation. In the instant case, the disqualification did not at all prejudice
LAKAS NUCD-UMDP because Mr. Garchil G. Canoy is still there representing the party after the
disqualification. The substitution is a redundancy and not necessary under the circumstances, more so
that it was done with malice and without the required consensus of the political hierarchy. 5
In his answer, EMMANUEL moved for the dismissal of the petition for the following reasons:
a) The petition does not state a cause of action as it is not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as provided under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 40(A) of the Local
Government Code of 1991;
b) The issue of who in LAKAS has the authority to nominate candidates for local officials, is an intra-party
matter hence beyond the jurisdiction of the Comelec;
c) Gov. Matugas was duly authorized by LAKAS as its Provincial Chairman and official candidate for
Provincial Governor to nominate the partys local candidates; and
d) The petition is already moot and academic because of the proclamation of EMMANUEL as mayor of
the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. 6
On 28 May 1998, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification and upheld
the candidacy for mayor of EMMANUEL.7 The pertinent part of the resolution reads:
It is therefore clear, that candidate for governor Matugas was clothed with the authority to nominate
the respondent as substitute candidate for the position of mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, vice
the disqualified candidate, Apropos thereto, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code states:
xxx
Considering that on May 10, 1998 the proper nomination was issued by the official of the party
authorized therefor, it stands to reason that the substitution was valid, respondent having accepted the
nomination and his certificate of candidacy dated May 10, 1998, correspondingly filed.
Respondent is correct in stating that the question of nomination is a party concern which is beyond the
ambit of the Commission. What matters is, the candidate has been certified as a party member and the
nomination duly issued in his favor.
Be that as it may, the petition is rendered moot and academic by the proclamation of respondent on
May 12, 1998, as evidenced by the certificate of canvass and proclamation of winning candidates for
municipal offices with SN 16671298 and his oath of office dated May 13, 1998, which forms part of the
record of this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant
petition for lack of merit.
MULA filed a motion for reconsideration raising in the main that the signature alone of MATUGAS in the
nomination was not sufficient because the partys authority to nominate was given to both MATUGAS
and Senator Robert S. Barbers (hereafter BARBERS), in their joint capacity, and that the nomination of
EMMANUEL is void since he was an independent candidate prior to his nomination. 8
On 6 October 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution9 which set aside the resolution dated 28
May 1998 of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL, for the following reasons:
In the motion for reconsideration, petitioner argues that the signature only of Governor Matugas in the
nomination was not sufficient because the partys authority to nominate was given to both Governor
Matugas and Senator Robert Barbers, in their joint capacity.
We do not have to resolve this issue because the more important issue is whether respondent is
disqualified as a substitute candidate. He was an independent candidate for councilor at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor as a substitute of a disqualified candidate. Thus, he did not
belong to the same political party as the substituted candidate.
We sustain petitioners position. We declare that the substitution of disqualified mayoralty candidate
Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by respondent Emmanuel D. Sinaca was not valid because the latter was an
independent candidate for councilor prior to his nomination as substitute candidate in place of the
withdrawing candidate who was a Lakas party member.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Commission en banc hereby resolves to SET ASIDE the Commission (Second
Division)s resolution dated May 28, 1998. We declare Emmanuel D. Sinaca DISQUALIFIED to be a
substitute candidate for mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, and ANNUL his proclamation as such
being void ab initio. Upon finality of this resolution, he is ordered to vacate the position of mayor of the
municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, to which the vice-mayor elected in the May 11, 1998
elections shall succeed by operation of law.
Not satisfied therewith, EMMANUEL is now before us alleging that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution. EMMANUEL principally contends that his nomination as a
substitute candidate was regular and valid hence, his proclamation as mayor of the Municipality of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte must be upheld.
In the assailed resolution, the COMELEC disqualified EMMANUEL solely on the basis that he was an
independent candidate prior to his nomination as a substitute candidate.
The rule on substitution of an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party who dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy is
governed by Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or
accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who
died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned
may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not
later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate maybe filed with any
board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Thus, under the said provision it is necessary, among others, that the substitute candidate must be of
the same political party as the original candidate and must be duly nominated as such by the political
party.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the above said requirements. EMMANUEL
was properly nominated as substitute candidate by the LAKAS party MATUGAS wing to which TEODORO,
the disqualified candidate, belongs, as evidenced by the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance
signed by MATUGAS, the Partys provincial chairman. 10 That EMMANUEL is a bona fide member of the
LAKAS party is shown not only by the certificate of membership, 11 which is being controverted for having
been presented as new evidence for the first time before this court, but more importantly by his
certificate of candidacy filed before the COMELEC stating therein that he belongs to the LAKAS party. 12
A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidates
political creed or lack of political creed. 13 It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office
certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office,
the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for
all election purposes being as well stated. 14
The certificate of candidacy of EMMANUEL permitted the placing of his name before the electorate. It
constituted an authorized badge, which the voter could scrutinize before casting his ballot. Thus, with
the declaration of EMMANUEL in his certificate of candidacy that he is affiliated with the LAKAS party, he
was effectively voted by the electorate not as an independent candidate, but as a member of the LAKAS
party. His allegation in the certificate of candidacy as to political party to which he belongs is sufficient
to make the electorate conscious of the platform of the said political party. 15
The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent candidate prior to his nomination is immaterial. What is
more significant is that he had previously withdrawn his certificate of candidacy as independent
candidate for Sangguniang member before he filed his certificate of candidacy as a substitute for
TEODORO at which time he was, for all intents and purposes, already deemed a member of the LAKAS
party MATUGAS wing. As such, EMMANUEL is obliged to pursue and carry out the partys ideology,
political ideas and platforms of government. As the official candidate of an organized political party, he
is bound by the partys rule. He owes loyalty to the party, its tenet and its policies, its platforms and
programs of government. To the electorate he represents the party, its principles, ideals and
objectives.16
Even the fact that EMMANUEL only became a member of the LAKAS party after the disqualification of
TEODORO, will not affect the validity of the substitution. There is nothing in the Constitution or the
statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member
of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such. Section 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute candidate should be a person belonging to
and certified by the same political party as the candidate to be replaced. We cannot provide for an
additional requirement or condition not provided under the said provision without encroaching into the
domain of the legislative department.
As aptly observed by Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores in her dissenting opinion, to wit:
x x x. With due respect to the majority opinion, I find that at the time the substitute candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor and at the time of his election as such, he was an independent
candidate no more. He was, at that time, a nominee of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP Political Party. This fact
is evidenced by the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance dated 10 May 1998 executed by the
Provincial Chairman of the said party of Surigao del Norte and by herein respondent. This certificate
presupposes that respondent is a bonafide member of the said party. To rule that respondent was still
an independent candidate and not a member of the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP political party at the time of
filing his certificate of candidacy as a substitute candidate for mayor is to arrogate upon this Commission
what would have been the sole and exclusive prerogative of any political organization -- to determine
party membership and its nominees to elective positions. It is an accepted fact that, in this country,
politicians switch party affiliations more frequently than the ebb and flow of the tides. 17
The argument advanced by private respondent MULA that MATUGAS has no authority to nominate a
candidate without the concurrence of BARBERS is devoid of merit.
Firstly, MATUGAS, was designated by the LAKAS National Headquarters through its Deputy Secretary
General and National Secretariat Executive Director Reynaldo L. Maclang, as the party officer authorized
to nominate, sign, attest under oath, and issue Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance for the Partys
official candidates for the positions of Board Members, City Councilors, Municipal Mayors, Vice-mayors
and councilors for the Province of Surigao del Norte. 18
This authorization which was dated March 26, 1998 replaced and/or modified the former authorization
given by the party to both BARBERS and MATUGAS. 19 Both BARBERS and MATUGAS were given separate
and distinct authorizations when the mother of BARBERS ran for governor against MATUGAS.
Secondly, there are only two official candidates for mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, namely
TEODORO and CANOY,20 both of whom are members of the LAKAS party but from different factions.
TEODORO was indorsed by the MATUGAS wing and CANOY by the BARBERS Wing. The certificates of
candidacy of these candidates were never questioned despite the fact that they belong to the same
political party and were separately and independently endorsed by either BARBERS or MATUGAS.
Therefore, if the absence of a joint nomination is to be considered fatal to the validity of the certificate
of candidacy of TEODORO or CANOY, then there would in effect no candidates running for mayor in the
Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.
Verily, it stands to reason that with the disqualification of TEODORO, who is a member of the LAKAS
MATUGAS wing, the substitute must come from the same faction as the candidate to be substituted and
since it was MATUGAS who indorsed the nomination of TEODORO, then MATUGAS nomination of
EMMANUEL in substitution of TEODORO is sufficient and in order.
There is also no irregularity in the act of EMMANUEL in joining a political party. The right of individuals
to form an association as guaranteed by the fundamental law includes the freedom to associate or
refrain from association.21 No man is compelled by law to become a member of a political party; or after
having become such, to remain a member. He may join such a party for whatever reason seems good to
him, and may quit the party for any cause, good, bad, or indifferent, or without cause. 22 The decision of
a candidate on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or
aggrupation is left entirely to his discretion.23
We also agree with the contention of EMMANUEL that the decision as to which member a party shall
nominate as its candidate is a party concern which is not cognizable by the courts.
A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to select a
standard bearer who best represents the partys ideologies and preference. 24 Political parties are
generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision; this common-law principle
of judicial restraint, rooted in the constitutionally protected right of free association, serves the public
interest by allowing the political processes to operate without undue interference. 25 Thus, the rule is
that the determination of disputes as to party nominations rests with the party, in the absence of
statutes giving the courts jurisdiction.26
Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court will not
assume jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within a political party, but will leave the
matter for determination by the proper tribunals of the party itself or by the electors at the
polls.27 Similarly, in the absence of specific constitutional or legislative regulations defining how
nominations are to be made, or prohibiting nominations from being made in certain ways, political
parties may handle party affairs, including nominations, in such manner as party rules may establish. 28
An election in which the voters have fully, fairly, and honestly expressed their will is not invalid even
though an improper method is followed in the nomination of candidates. 29 This is because in
determining the effect of a particular irregularity in a party nomination for office on the result of the
general election, the pivotal issue is whether the irregularity complained of has prevented a full, fair,
and free expression of the public will. Thus, in the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, an
election may not even be invalidated by the fact that the nomination of the successful candidate was
brought about by fraud, and not in the manner prescribed by the statute, provided it appears that
noncompliance with the law did not prevent a fair and free vote. 30
None of the situations adverted to above are obtaining in the case at bar as to warrant this Courts
intervention in ascertaining the propriety of EMMANUELs nomination as a substitute candidate by the
LAKAS MATUGAS wing.
Finally, the issue as to the validity of EMMANUELs nomination as substitute candidate has been
rendered moot and academic by his proclamation on May 12, 1998, by the Board of Canvassers of
Malimono as the duly elected municipal mayor and after he has assumed into office. The fact that the
nomination of a substitute lacks the signature of one of the authorized signatory is but a technicality
which cannot be used to frustrate the will of the electorate.
It has been held that the provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy, such as
signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated therein, are
considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely directory. With
respect to election laws, it is an established rule of interpretation that mandatory provisions requiring
certain steps before election will be construed as directory after the elections, to give effect to the will
of the electorate. Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy was not duly signed or if it does not contain
the required data, the proclamation of the candidate as winner may not be nullified on such ground. The
defects in the certificate should have been questioned before the election; they may not be questioned
after the election without invalidating the will of the electorate, which should not be done. 31 In Guzman
v. Board of Canvassers,32 the Court held that the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality
that the certificate of candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and
non-compliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the
electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be defeated
by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.
Thus, were a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all
possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidates eligibility for to rule otherwise is to defeat
the will of the people.33 Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate
should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is
the democracy we continue to hold sacred. 34
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6 October 1998 of the COMELEC en
banc is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered declaring EMMANUEL SINACA as
having been duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2539 May 28, 1949
JOSE P. MONSALE, protestant-appeal,
vs.
PAULINO M. NICO, protestee-appellant.
Cirio Mapa, Jr. and Jose Gaton for appellant.

Felix V. Macalalang for appellee.
OZAETA, J.:
This is appeal by the protestee from a decision of the Court of instance of Iloilo declaring the protestant
elected municipal mayor of Miagao as a result of the general elections held on November 11, 1947.
It appears that the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, but on
November 7, attempted to revive it by withdrawing his withdrawal. The commission on Election,
however, rules on November 8 thatthe protestant could no longer be a candidate in spite of his desire to
withdrawal. A canvass of the election returns showed that the protestee Paulino M. Nico received 2,291
votes; another candidate, Gregorio Fagutao126, votes; and the protestant Jose F. Monsale, none,
evidently because the vote cast in his favor had not been counted for the reason that he was not a
registered candidate. Consequently, Nico was proclaimed elected.
The pivotal question presented in this appeal is whether a candidate who has withdrawn his certificate
of candidacy may revive it, either by withdrawing his letter of withdrawal or by filling a new certificate of
candidacy, after the deadline provided by law for the filling of such certificate.
Section 31 of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180) providesthat "no person shall be eligible
unless, within the time fixed by law, he files a duty signed and sworn certificate of candidacy." Section 36
provides that "at least sixty days before a regular election and thirty days at least before a special
election, the . . . certificates of candidacy for municipal offices shall be filed with the municipal secretary,
who shall immediately send copies thereof to the polling place concerned, to the secretary of the
provincial board and to the Commission on Elections." Section 38 further that "if, after the expiration of
the time limit for filling certificate of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed
should die or become disqualified, any legally qualified citizen may file a certificate of candidacy for the
office for which the deceased or disqualified person was a candidate in accordance with the preceding
section on or before midday of the day of the election, and, if the death or disqualification should occur
between the day before the election and the midday of election day, said certificate may be filed with
any board of inspection of the political division where he is a candidate or in the case of candidates to
be voted for by the entire electorate, with the Commission on Elections."
In the present case the protestant withdrew his certificate of candidacy on October 10, 1947, and
requested the Commission on Election that it "be considered as though it has never been filed at all."
There is no question as to the right off a candidate to withdraw or annul his own certificate of candidacy,
there being no legal prohibition against such withdrawal. Therefore, on October 10, or thirty-on days
before the election, the protestant ceased to be candidate by his own voluntary act, and as a matter of
facts the boards of election inspectors of the municipality of Miagao we duly notified of his letter to the
Commission on Election dated November 6, 1947, which subscribed and swore to before a notary public
on November 7, whereby he withdrew his withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, can only be
considered as a new certificate of candidacy which, having been filed only four days before the election,
could not legally be accepted under the law, which expressly provides that such certificate should be
filed at sixty days before the election.
The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filling of certificates of candidacy and in fixing a time
limit therefor are (a) to enable the voter to know, at least sixty days before a regular election the
candidate among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in
the tabulation of the votes cast; for if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voter to duly
registered candidates, there might be as many person voted for as there were voters, and votes might
be cast even for unknown or fictitious person as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for
another office in the same election.
The only instance wherein the law permit the filling of a certificate ofcandidacy after the expiration of
the time limit for filing it is when a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duty filed dies or becomes
disqualified.
The Commission on Election was, therefore, right in holding as it did that the protestant "can no longer
be a candidate in spite of his desire to withdraw his withdrawal." In the case Clutario vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. L-1704, this court sustained the ruling of said commission upon similar facts that "by
own voluntary act and deed petitioner has nullified his certificate of candidacy and in the light of the
election laws such certificate of candidacy has been definitely withdrawn hence nonexisting."
Under section 174 of the Revised Election Code, "a petition contesting the election of a provincial or
municipal officer-elect shall be filed with the Court of First Instance of the province by any candidate
voted for insaid election and who has presented a certificate of candidacy." This clearly implies that a
candidate voted for who has not presented a certificate of candidacy has no right to contest the
election. In other words, the herein protestant, not being a registered candidate, has no standing before
the court.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the protest is ordered dismissed with costs against the
appellee. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-28348. December 15, 1967.]
BERNARDINO ABES, CARLOS L. ALBERT, ANTONIO C. AMOR, NORBERTO CONDEZ, BENJAMIN GRECIA,
LUISA G. ORENDAIN, JOSE ABRENICA, ROSARIO L. PLANAS, PROCESO SEBASTIAN, VIDAL A. TAN,
LORENZO YUSON, THE LIBERAL PARTY, THE QUEZON CITY CITIZENS LEAGUE FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT,
and THE NACIONALISTA REFORM PARTY, Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE QUEZON
CITY BOARD OF CANVASSERS, NORBERTO S. AMORANTO, ISMAEL MATHAY, JR., EDUARDO PAREDES,
SATURNINO BERMUDEZ, RAFAEL MISON, FLORENTINO LAPUZ, HERMOGENES CALUAG, FRED MONTILLA,
JESUS PERLAS, JR., ROMULO LUCASAN, and THE QUEZON CITY COMELEC REGISTRAR, Respondents.
Antonio C. Amor for and his own behalf.
Ramon Barrios for respondent COMELEC.
Crispin D. Baizas & Associates for other respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; ELECTIONS; BOARD OF CANVASSERS; DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS. — The board
of canvassers is a ministerial body. It is enjoined by law to canvass all votes on election returns
submitted to it in due form. It has been said, and properly, that its powers are "limited generally to the
mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the election by
adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the face of the returns before them,
and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; ID. — COMELEC is the constitutional body charged with the
duty to enforce all laws relative to elections, duty bound to see to it that the board of canvassers
perform its proper function. Pertinent rulings of this Court have since defined Comelec’s powers in
pursuance of its supervisory or administrative authority over officials charged with specific duties under
the election code. It is within the legitimate concerns of Comelec to annul a canvass or proclamation
based on incomplete returns, or on incorrect or tampered returns; annul a canvass or proclamation
made in an unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it lacked a quorum or
because the board did not meet at all. Neither Constitution nor statute has granted Comelec or the
board of canvassers the power, in the canvass of election returns, to look beyond the face thereof, once
satisfied of their authenticity.
3. ID.; ID.; ELECTION RETURNS; SUSPENSION OF CANVASS UNWARRANTED IN CASE AT BAR. —

Petitioners argue that the canvassing should be stopped. But nothing in the petition herein would
indicate that the returns were falsified after they left the hands of election inspectors or that the returns
are not genuine. The petition stresses the existence of other irregularities. For Us now to give our stamp
of approval to the petition to suspend canvass and proclamation is to stop both Comelec and the board
of canvassers: the first, from performing its constitutional and legal duty to administer the election laws
and supervise elections; and the second, from discharging its legal obligation to canvass the returns and
proclaim the elected candidates. And worse, to suspend canvassing and proclamation at this late date
may result in a vacuum in office of Quezon City elective officials after the term of the present
incumbents shall have ended on December 31, 1967. Some such eventuality must be prevented.
Canvassing and proclamation must proceed.
4. ID.; ID.; COMELEC WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO ANNUL AN ELECTION. — Nothing in Section 2, Article X of
the Constitution will imply authority for Comelec to annul an election. So, too, did the Revised Election
Code withhold from Comelec the specific power to annul an election. The boundaries of the forbidden
area into which Comelec may not tread are also marked by jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the
proper forum to seek annulment of an election based on terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is
a principle emphasized in decisions of this Court. Expressive of this rule is the following culled from
Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil. 149, 155-156." . . the power vested in the
Commission to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections and to insure free,
orderly, and honest elections... is preventive only and not curative also; that is to say, it is intended to
prevent any and all forms of election fraud or violation of the Election Law, but if it fails to accomplish
that purpose it is not the Commission on Elections that is charged with the duty to cure or remedy the
resulting evil but some other agencies of the Government ..." In the more recent case of Ututalum v.
Commission on Elections, L-25349, Dec. 3, 1965, this Court bolstered jurisprudence on this point by
reiterating that Comelec’s powers are "essentially executive (ènforcement’) and administrative
(àdministration’) in nature."cralaw virtua1aw library
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF ELECTION IRREGULARITIES TO BE VENTILATED IN A REGULAR ELECTION

PROTEST. — The course to pursue is pointed out in City Board of Canvassers v. Moscoso, L-16365, Sept.
30, 1963 — "The question of whether or not there had been terrorism, vote-buying and other
irregularities in the 1959 elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election protest,
pursuant to section 174 of the Election Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers
from canvassing the election returns and proclaiming the winning candidates for municipal offices. The
duty of the board in this regard is more or less ministerial; it does not pass upon the validity or invalidity
of the ballots cast, and its action is necessarily without prejudice to the determination of such question
in a proper court proceeding later. This proceeding, under section 174, should be filed within two weeks
after the proclamation of the result of the election and hence necessarily implies a previous canvass of
the votes by the board of canvassers...."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. ID.; ID.; COMELEC WITHOUT THE POWER TO DIRECT THE HOLDING OF NEW ELECTIONS. — There is no
constitutional or legal precept that empowers the Comelec to direct a new election after one had
already been held. All that there is in the statute books is Section 8 of the Revised Election Code which
empowers the President to postpone an election fixed by law upon recommendation of the Comelec,
but this refers to postponement before elections, and not a remedy thereafter.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; MANDAMUS WILL NOT ISSUE IN THE ABSENCE OF COMELEC’S LEGAL DUTY TO ANNUL
THE ELECTIONS. — The petition in effect seeks to nullify Comelec’s order denying the petition for the
suspension of the canvass and the proclamation of the winning candidates. There was no lack nor excess
of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion was involved. Correctly did Comelec decline to direct the
Quezon City board of canvassers to suspend canvass and proclamation. Comelec is powerless to annul
the election. Nor can it direct a new election. We cannot compel Comelec to act as petitioners prayed
for. Absent Comelec’s legal duty, mandamus will no issue.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; INABILITY TO AFFORD REMEDY OR NEEDED REFORMS FOR

SERIOUS DEFECTS IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS; REASON. — Under our constitutional system, only the
people are possessed of rights, to protect which governmental agencies are delegated powers. There
can be no presumption then of authority or competence; it must be shown to exist. It could have been
different if we had in our Civil Code a comparable provision to that found in the Swiss Civil Code of 1907
which provides that in default of an applicable statute, the judge is to pronounce judgment according to
the customary law, and in default of custom according to the rules which he would establish if he were
to assume the part of a legislator. Even in such a case, as Cardozo pointed in words that have the ring
both of beauty and of truth: "The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to spasmodic
sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by tradition,
methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to `the primordial necessity of order in
the social life.’ Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion that remains." (Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process (1921), p. 141.
2. ID., ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION BELONGS TO CONGRESS UNDER THE THEORY OF SEPARATION OF POWERS.
— While, as Holmes pointed out, judges "do and must legislate, ... they can do so only interstitially; they
are confined from moral to molecular motions." (Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen (1917), 244 US 205, 221).
For under the theory of separation of powers, it is to the Congress that the power of legislation belongs.
At the most then to paraphrase Cardozo, the judiciary can fill in the gaps or clear up the ambiguities.
DECISION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Petitioners’ cry for relief, so their petition avers, is planted upon the constitutional mandate of free,
orderly, and honest elections. 1 Specifically, they list a number of represented acts. Amongst these are:
(1) blank official registration forms were taken from the office of the Quezon City Comelec Registrar
several weeks before election day, November 14, 1967; (2) active campaigning within the polling places
by Nacionalista leaders or sympathizers of Nacionalista candidates were allowed; (3) voters were
permitted to vote on mere mimeographed notices of certain Nacionalista candidates; (4) voters were
compelled to fill their official ballots on open tables, desks and in many precincts outside the polling
places; (5) forms of petitions for inclusion proceedings were obtainable only in the offices of candidates
of the Nacionalista Party; (6) thousands of voters were allowed to vote on the strength of inclusion
orders issued indiscriminately by two City Judges on election day; (7) thousands of voters sympathetic to
the Nacionalista candidates were allowed to vote beyond the hours for voting allowed by law; (8)
thousands of voters’ I.D. registration cards of voters sympathetic to non-Nacionalista candidates were
thrown and scattered in the Office of the Nacionalista candidate for Mayor; (9) voters’ I.D. cards were
delivered by partisan leaders of respondents Nacionalista candidates, and those who did not signify
their Reference for Nacionalista candidates were not given their I.D. cards, (10) the office of the
corporation of which respondent Ismael Mathay, Jr. is the President was used as a place of registration
which is "unauthorized" ; (11) most of the precinct books of voters were not sealed within the deadline
fixed by law; and (12) the resulting effect of irregularities is that about 51% of the registered voters were
disenfranchised.
Petitioners, candidates of the Liberal Party, the Nacionalista Reform Party and the Quezon City Citizens
League for Good Government, first went to the Commission on Elections (Comelec). Upon the claim that
more than 50% of the registered voters were not able to vote during the elections of November 14,
1967, they prayed for Comelec’s declaration that there was failure of election. They petitioned for
suspension of the canvass and the proclamation of winning candidates. They sought nullification, too, of
elections in Quezon City for city officials and asked that new elections be held. Comelec, in a minute
resolution of November 23, 1967, denied the petition, ordered the board of canvassers to proceed with
the canvass but not to proclaim any winning candidate for city offices and gave petitioners time "to go
to the Supreme Court for the proper remedy."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioners thus came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction.
Upon the petition and respondents’ returns, the case was heard on the merits.
We plowed through a maze of allegations in the petition and the returns and the affidavits and other
annexes. The whole problem funnels down to the issue of whether Comelec has jurisdiction (1) to order
the board of canvassers to suspend the canvassing and proclamation of the winning candidates; (2) to
annul the elections in Quezon City; and (3) following such annulment, to direct the holding of another
election.
1. By way of prefatory statement, it may serve our purpose if we emphasize once again that the board of
canvassers is a ministerial body. 2 It is enjoined by law to canvass all votes on election returns submitted
to it in due form. 3 It has been said, and properly, that its powers are "limited generally to the
mechanical or mathematical function of ascertaining and declaring the apparent result of the election by
adding or compiling the votes cast for each candidate as shown on the face of the returns before them,
and then declaring or certifying the result so ascertained." 4 Comelec is the constitutional body charged
with the duty to enforce all laws relative to elections, duty bound to see to it that the board of
canvassers perform its proper function. 5
Pertinent rulings of this Court have since defined Comelec’s powers in pursuance of its supervisory or
administrative authority over officials charged with specific duties under the election code. It is within
the legitimate concerns of Comelec to annul a canvass or proclamation based on incomplete returns, 6
or on incorrect or tampered returns; annul a canvass or proclamation made in an unauthorized meeting
of the board of canvassers either because it lacked a quorum 7 or because the board did not meet at all.
8 Neither Constitution nor statute has granted Comelec or the board of canvassers the power, in the
canvass of election returns, to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.
Petitioners argue that the canvassing should be stopped. But nothing in the petition herein would
indicate that the returns were falsified after they left the hands of the election inspectors or that the
returns are not genuine. The petition stresses the existence of other irregularities. For us now to give
our stamp of approval to the petition to suspend canvass and proclamation is to stop both Comelec and
the board of canvassers: the first, from performing its constitutional and legal duty to administer the
election laws and supervise elections; and the second, from discharging its legal obligation to canvass
the returns and proclaim the elected candidates. And worse, to suspend canvassing and proclamation at
this late date may result in a vacuum in office of Quezon City elective officials after the term of the
present incumbents shall have ended on December 31, 1967. Some such eventuality must be prevented.
Canvassing and proclamation must proceed. Because, as Mr. Justice Querube C. Makalintal correctly
observed in City Board of Canvassers v. Moscoso, L-16365, September 30, 1963, "to enjoin the city
board of canvassers from assessing the returns would result in a lack of incumbents in the offices
concerned after the termination of the current term and while the case remains pending in
court."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. Petitioners’ next prayer is for the annulment of the elections held on November 14, 1967. Their bases:
fraud, terrorism, and other illegal practices committed before and during the elections.
The primary grant of power to Comelec is found in Section 2, Article X of the Constitution,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration
of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other functions which may be
conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative
questions, affecting elections, including the determination of the number and location of polling places,
and the appointment of election inspectors and of other election officials. All law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government, when so required by the Commission, shall act as its deputies
for the purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest elections. The decisions, orders, and rulings of the
Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Nothing in the foregoing constitutional precept will imply authority for Comelec to annul an election. So,
too, did the Revised Election Code withhold from Comelec the specific power to annul an election.
The boundaries of the forbidden area into which Comelec may not tread are also marked by
jurisprudence. That Comelec is not the proper forum to seek annulment of an election based on
terrorism, frauds and other illegal practices, is a principle emphasized in decisions of this Court.
Expressive of this rule is the following culled from Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, 85 Phil.
149, 155-158:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"What are the implications of the power vested in the Commission to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and to insure free, orderly, and honest election? Does it include the
power to annul an election which may not have been free, orderly, and honest?
It seems clear from the context of the constitutional provision in question as well as from other
provisions already quoted above [Secs. 8 and 166, Revised Election Code] that such power is preventive
only and not curative also; that is to say, it is intended to prevent any and all forms of election fraud or
violation of the Election law, but if it fails to accomplish that purpose, it is not the Commission on
Elections that is charged with the duty to cure or remedy the resulting evil but some other agencies of
the Government. We note from the text that the power to decide question involving the right to vote is
expressly withheld from the Commission although the right to vote is provided in the Election Law, the
enforcement and administration of which is placed in the exclusive charge of the Commission. Parallel to
the withholding of such power from the Commission is the vesting in other agencies of the more
inclusive power to decide all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of Congress, namely, the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate in the case of the senators and the Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives in the case of the members of the latter. Election contests
involving provincial and municipal officials are entrusted to the courts. (Sections 172 et seq., Revised
Election Code.) The power to decide election contests necessarily includes the power to determine the
validity or nullity of the votes questioned by either of the contestants." 9
There has been neither deviation nor retreat from the foregoing pronouncement.
Indeed, in the more recent case of Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, L-25349, December 3, 1965,
this Court, speaking thru then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Roberto Concepcion, rather than
break away from Nacionalista Party v. Commission on Elections, bolstered jurisprudence on this point by
reiterating that Comelec’s powers are "essentially executive (ènforcement’) and administrative
(àdministration’) in nature."cralaw virtua1aw library
Not that petitioners are bereft of remedy. The course to pursue is pointed out to them in City Board of
Canvassers v. Moscoso, heretofore cited, (L-16365, September 30, 1963) —
"The question of whether or not there had been terrorism, vote- buying and other irregularities in the
1959 elections in Tacloban City should be ventilated in a regular election protest, pursuant to section
174 of the Election Code, and not in a petition to enjoin the city board of canvassers from canvassing the
election returns and proclaiming the winning candidates for municipal offices. The duty of the board in
this regard is more or less ministerial; it does not pass upon the validity or invalidity of the ballots cast,
and its action is necessarily without prejudice to the determination of such question in a proper court
proceeding later. This proceeding, under section 174, should be filed within two weeks after the
proclamation of the result of the election and hence necessarily implies a previous canvass of the votes
by the board of canvassers . . ." 10
The ratiocination advanced that there was failure of election due to rampancy of terrorism, frauds, and
other irregularities, before and during elections, such that allegedly about 51% of the registered voters
were not able to vote, will not carry the day for petitioners. For, in the first place, this is grounded upon
bare assertions. Respondents contest the correctness thereof. And in the answer of respondents
Amoranto, Mathay and others, they aver that out of 162,457 registered voters in Quezon City, 100,382
voters actually cast their votes — about 62% of the registered voters. But above all, as pointed out in
City Board of Canvassers v. Moscoso, supra, nullity of an election for municipal officials should be
determined in a petition contesting the election of municipal officers-elect to be filed before the Court
of First Instance. 11
3. As unconvincing is petitioners’ prayer that Comelec direct a new election in Quezon City. We have
searched in vain for any constitutional or legal precept that would grant Comelec that power. All that
there is in the statute books is Section 8 of the Revised Election Code, which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 8. Postponement of Election. — When for any serious cause the holding of an election should
become impossible in any political advision or subdivision, the President, upon recommendation of the
Commission on Elections, shall postpone the election therein for such time as he may deem necessary."
12
This refers to postponement before elections. This is not a remedy after elections. Just a few days ago,
we were called upon to rule on a petition (Janairo v. Commission on Elections, L-28315, December 8,
1967) praying that this Court direct Comelec to order the holding of an election in a precinct located in
the island-barrio of Sibay, Caluya, Antique, where elections failed to take place on the day verified by
law. And this, because "when the persons entrusted by the local COMELEC registrar with the delivery of
the list of registered voters arrived at the island they were fired upon and had to go back to Caluya,
returning to Sibay only at 6:30 in the evening of the same day, at which time however the board of
election inspectors refused to hold the election on the ground that it was against the law to do so."
Citing Sections 8 and 21 (c) of the Revised Election Code, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Makalintal,
there held (citing Ututalum v. Commission on Elections, supra) that "no elections may be held on any
other date, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to
whom Congress may have delegated either its aforementioned power or the authority to ascertain or fill
in the details in the execution of that power," and added that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the same decision [Ututalum v. Commission on Elections] this Court not only took note of the failure
of the law to afford redress, either before the Commission on Elections or before the courts, to persons
adversely affected by such failure, but recognized its possible effects upon the very institution of
suffrage. The voters in precincts where no election is held on the date fixed by law, we said, `will in
effect . . . be disfranchised, and unscrupulous politicians would be encouraged to resort to acts of
terrorism in areas favoring their opponents, in order to offset the latter’s advantage therein, and thus
eventually defeat the will of the majority and undermine the foundation of our democracy. It is
undeniable that the situation is fraught with dangerous possibilities.
The remedy, however, lies in Congress. The hiatus in our election law may be filed only by legislation,
not by judicial fiat."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. The petition before this Court in effect seeks to nullify Comelec’s order of November 23, 1967
heretofore adverted to. There was no lack nor excess of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion was
involved. Correctly did Comelec decline to direct the Quezon City board of canvassers to suspend
canvass and proclamation. Comelec is powerless to annul the election. Nor can it direct a new election.
We cannot compel Comelec to act as petitioners prayed for. Absent Comelec’s legal duty, mandamus
will not issue.
For the reasons given, we vote to dismiss the petition. No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The opinion of Justice Sanchez is impressive both for exhaustiveness and scholarly research. It reflects
with care and fidelity the state of the law. The result arrived at is thus immune from any valid objection.
It deserves assent, which I give.
Why the concurring opinion then? For one thing, the subject is the utmost importance for the litany of
grievances cited by petitioners, even if due allowances be made for excess of partisan zeal and
disappointment of expectations, exposes serious defects in the electoral process. Add to this the
inability of the judiciary to afford any remedy, if there be full and scrupulous adherence to the rule of
law, which certainly should be the case always. allowing for human imperfection of course, and it
becomes understandable why there should be stress on the need for an effort to improve matters, both
earnest, and, it is to be hoped, effective. Otherwise, the law itself might indeed be in disrepute. That is
something that should, by all means, be avoided.
One might say that assuming the truth of the sad and unfortunate plight in which petitioners, through
no fault of their own, found themselves, an election protest affords a remedy. In theory it is so. The
actualities many a time have proved the opposite. The long period required for a final decision and
expenses that must be met render this remedy not only costly but in not a few occasions futile.
Why then, it may pertinently be asked by those burning with impatience and zeal for the needed
reforms, cannot the judiciary do anything about the matter? The answer is simple. Under our
constitutional system, only the people are possessed of rights, to protect which governmental agencies
are delegated powers. There can be no presumption then of authority or competence; it must be shown
to exist.
Whatever may be said in favor of the petition, it is quite barren as the answer of respondent so clearly
shows of any legal precept, whether statute or decision, that reveals that the grievance is a matter
proper for judicial correction. One of the counsel of petitioners, with commendable candor, admitted at
the oral argument that at the time of the filing of this petition, their search for any such legal support
was fruitless. It must have been so also as of the time they were heard. Certainly then, in a government
of laws and not of men, such absence of a legal mooring is fatal.
Should this not be a case then for the judiciary to fill a gap, one could very well say an aching void in the
law? The answer as is expressed so clearly and so plausibly in the majority opinion is that such a power
was thus withheld, as shown by the past decisions of this Court to which adherence is indeed called for.
It could have been different if we had in our Civil Code a comparable provision to that found in the Swiss
Civil Code of 1907 which provides that in default of an applicable statute, the judge is to pronounce
judgment according to the customary law, and in default of custom according to the rules which he
would establish if he were to assume the part of a legislator. Even in such a case, as Cardozo pointed in
words that have the ring both of beauty and of truth: "The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly
free. He is not to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knighterrant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own
ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to
yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion
informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to `the
primordial necessity of order in the social life.’ Wide enough in all conscience is the field of discretion
that remains." 1
While, as Holmes pointed out, judges "do and must legislate,. . . they can do so only interstitially; they
are confined from molar to molecular motions." 2 For under the theory of separation of powers, it is to
the Congress that the power of legislation belongs. At the most then, to paraphrase Cardozo, the
judiciary can fill in the gaps or clear up the ambiguities. Unfortunately for petitioners, in this instance,
there is no gap to be filled nor ambiguities to be cleared. Hence, with due awareness of the possibility
that grave shortcomings vitiated the past election in Quezon City, but with full recognition that to cure
what could be assumed to be an existing evil the very great evil of assuming power where none exists
should be avoided, this petition cannot prosper.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs.

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 111988 October 14, 1994

ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU)-TUCP in behalf of its members at AMS FARMING

Seno, Mendoza and Associates for petitioner.

Castro, Enriquez, Carpio, Guillen and Associates for private respondents.

The facts are as follows:

Art. VII, sec 3. of the CBA provides:

G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992

WHEREAS under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution 1 the creation of a

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as the Commission hereby resolves, to promulgated

1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 133064 September 16, 1999

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED 7720 — AN ACT

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

Sec. 2. The City of Santiago. — The Municipality of Santiago shall be

Sec. 51. Election of Provincial Governor, Vice-Governor, Sangguniang

We find merit in the petition.

xxx xxx xxx

In Casibang v. Aquino, 7 we defined a justiciable issue as follows:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, or divided, merged,

(f) Plebiscite — (1) no creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or substantial

BILL ON SECOND READING

H.B. No. 8729 — City of Santiago

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I move

The President. Is there any objection?

AN ACT AMENDING CERTAIN SECTIONS OF R.A. NO.

The following is the full text of H.B. No. 8729

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, for the

The President. Senator Sotto is

SPONSORSHIP SPEECH OF SENATOR SOTTO

Mr. President, it is my pleasure, therefore, to present for consideration of this august

Thank you, Mr. President.

The President. The Majority Leader is

Senator Tatad. Mr. President, I moved

The President. Is there any objection?

Senator Tatad. I move that we now

The President. What is the pleasure of

Senator Roco. Mr. President, may I ask

Senator Tatad. May I move for a

The President. Is there any objection to

Senator Roco is recognized.

Senator Roco. Will the distinguished

Senator Sotto. Willingly, Mr. President.

Senator Roco. Mr. President, together

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, the

Senator Roco. Mr. President, I did not

Thank you, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, to be very

Senator Roco. All I wanted to say, Mr.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Will the gentleman yield

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, further to

Senator Sotto. If it is, I am not aware of

Senator Alvarez. Mr. President.

The President. With the permission of

Senator Alvarez. As a born inbred

Senator Drilon. Mr. President, the

Thank you very much, Mr. President.

Senator Alvarez. Mr. President, the

Secs. 10, 11, 12 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides as follows:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created,