[G.R. No. 88265. December 21, 1989.

SANTIAGO A. DEL ROSARIO, GEORGE G. GACULA, EDGARDO G. SANTOS, ALBANO S. SIBAL, ALBERTO C.
REYES, NONITO P. ARROYO, EMMANUEL F. TERENCIO, DOMINGO S. DE LEON, MODESTO O. LLAMAS,
FARIDA U. ALONTO, ZENAIDA A. FLOIRENDO, ISABEL A. MEJIA, LUZ P. MABANAG, RAMON U.
RABAGO, JR., SAMUEL D. TROCIO and OSCAR M. BRION, Petitioners, v. HON. ALFREDO R. BENGZON, in
his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Health, Respondent.

Facundo T. Bautista for petitioners.

DECISION

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

This is a class suit filed by officers of the Philippine Medical Association, the national organization of
medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their professional brethren who are of kindred
persuasion, wherein this Court is asked to declare as unconstitutional, hence, null and void, some
provisions of the Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act No. 6675), and of the implementing Administrative
Order No. 62 issued pursuant thereto, specifically:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) Section 6, Pars. (a) and (b) of the Generics Act which provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"a) All government health agencies and their personnel as well as other government agencies shall use
generic terminology or generic names in all transactions related to purchasing, prescribing, dispensing
and administering of drugs and medicines.

"b) All medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private practitioners, shall write
prescriptions using the generic name. The brand value may be included if so desired." (p. 6, Rollo.)

(b) Section 12, Pars. (b), (c) and (d) of the same law which provide:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"b) For the second conviction, the penalty of fine in the amount of not less than two thousand pesos
(P2,000.00) but not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) at the discretion of the court.

"c) For the third conviction, the penalty of fine in the amount of not less than five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00) but not exceeding ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and suspension of his license to practice
his profession for thirty (30) days at the discretion of the court.

"d) For the fourth and subsequent convictions, the penalty of fine of not less than ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) and suspension of his license to practice his profession for one year or longer at the
discretion of the court." (pp. 6-7, Rollo.) and.

(c) Sections 4 and 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order No. 62, Series of 1989 dated March 9, 1989, of the
respondent Secretary of Health, which read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 4. Violative, Erroneous and Impossible Prescriptions.

"4.1. Violative Prescriptions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"4.1.1 Where the generic name is not written;

"4.1.2 Where the generic name is not legible and a brand name which is legible is written;

"4.1.3 Where the brand name is indicated and instructions added, such as the phase ‘No Substitution’
which tend to obstruct, hinder or prevent proper generic dispensing.

"4.2 What to do with Violative Prescriptions.

"Violative prescriptions shall not be filled. They shall be kept and reported by the pharmacist of the drug
outlet or any other interested party to the nearest DOH Officer for appropriate action. The pharmacist
shall advise the prescriber of the problem and/or instruct the customer to get the proper prescription.

"4.3 Erroneous Prescriptions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"4.3.1 When the brand name precedes the generic name.

"4.3.2 Where the generic name is the one in parenthesis.

"4.3.3 Where the brand name in (sic) not in parenthesis.

"4.3.4 Where more than one drug product is prescribed in one prescription form.

"4.4 What to do with erroneous prescriptions.

"Erroneous prescriptions shall be filled. Such prescriptions shall also be kept and reported by the
pharmacist of the drug outlet or any other interested party to the nearest DOH Office for appropriate
action.

x       x       x

"Section 7. Timetable of Implementation.

"In order to give all affected parties adequate time for learning and adjustment, the implementation of
these Rules and Regulations shall be in three phases, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Phase 1 Education Drive . . .

"Phase 2 Monitoring of Compliance.

x       x       x
"Phase 3 Implementation.

"Beginning September 1, 1989 the DOH and the other relevant agencies of government shall monitor
compliance with these Rules and Regulations and all violations shall be subject to the appropriate
sanctions and penalties provided for under these Rules and Regulations and the Generics Act of 1988."
(pp. 7-9, Rollo.)

On March 15, 1989, the full text of Republic Act No. 6675 was published in two newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on March 30, 1989, fifteen (15) days after its
publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof.

Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order No. 62 was amended by Administrative Order No. 76 dated
August 28, 1989 by postponing to January 1, 1990 the effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for
violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the
Administrative Order.

The petitioners allege that "as of this date, there is no breach or violation yet" of the law (p. 9, Rollo),
which took effect on March 30, 1989. However, as the penal provisions will only take effect on January
1, 1990, it would have been more accurate to state that "as of this date, no breaches or violations of the
law have been punished yet" (p. 9, Rollo).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

The petition is captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which this Court does not exercise
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, we decided to treat it as a petition for
prohibition instead.

The petitioner’s main argument against paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the law, is the alleged
unequal treatment of government physicians, dentists, and veterinarians, on one hand, and those in
private practice on the other hand, in the manner of prescribing generic drugs, for, while the former are
allegedly required to use only generic terminology in their prescriptions, the latter may write the brand
name of the drug in parenthesis below the generic name. The favored treatment of private doctors,
dentists and veterinarians under the law is allegedly a specie of invalid class legislation.

There is no merit in that argument for it proceeds from a misreading and misinterpretation of the letter
and intent of paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 6 of the Generics Act. Indeed, as explained by the public
respondent:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . while paragraph (a) enumerates the government transactions (’purchasing, prescribing, dispensing
and administering of drugs and medicines’) where the sole use of generic terminology has been
required, the ‘prescription’ of drugs is further governed by paragraph (b). And the we of the word ‘all’ in
the latter provision emphasizes the absence of any distinction between government and private
physicians. In other words, in prescribing drugs, physicians, whether in government service or in private
practice, are both governed by exactly the same rules, and thus, are both authorized to include the
brand name in their respective prescriptions." (p. 44, Rollo.)

Furthermore, it may be observed that while paragraph (a) refers to "all government health agencies, and
their personnel as well as other government agencies" (not necessarily physicians, dentists and
veterinarians), paragraph (b) refers to "all medical, dental and veterinary practitioners, including private
practitioners."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioners concede that the requirement for doctors, dentists, and veterinarians to use the generic
terminology in writing their prescriptions, followed by the brand name in parenthesis, is "well and good"
(p. 12, Rollo). However, they complain that under paragraph (d) of the law which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(d) Drug outlets, including drugstores, hospital and non-hospital pharmacies and non-traditional outlets
such as supermarkets and stores, shall inform any buyer about any and all other drug products having
the same generic name, together with their corresponding prices so that the buyer may adequately
exercise his option. Within one (1) year after approval of this Act, the drug outlets referred to herein,
shall post to conspicuous places in their establishments, a list of drug products with the same generic
name and their corresponding prices." (Annex A, p. 23, Rollo.)

the sales girl at the drugstore counter is authorized to "substitute the prescribed medicine with another
medicine belonging to the same generic group." Since doctors are not allowed to instruct the druggist
not to substitute the prescription, or to "Dispense only as Prescribed" (per Sec. 4, Adm. Order No. 62),
the petitioners argue that "the act of prescribing the correct medicine for the patient becomes the act of
the salesgirl at the drugstore counter, no longer the act of the physician, dentist, or veterinarian" (p. 12,
Rollo).

Here again, the petitioners have distorted the clear provisions of the law and the implementing
administrative order for it is plain to see that neither paragraph (d) of Section 6 of the Generics Act, nor
Section 4 of Administrative Order No. 62, gives the salesgirl and/or druggist the discretion to substitute
the doctor’s prescription.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On the contrary, Section 4, par. 4.1, of Administrative Order No. 62 directs the pharmacist not to fill
"violative prescriptions" (where the generic name is not written, or illegibly written, and the prescription
of a brand name is accompanied by the doctor’s instruction not to substitute it), as well as "impossible
prescriptions" (par. 4.5). Even a doctor’s "erroneous" prescriptions shall be filled," not substituted (par.
4.3, Adm. Order No. 62). And, Sections 3 and 5 of Adm. Order No. 63 enjoin the drug outlets "not (to)
favor or suggest" or "impose" a particular brand or product on the customer. The administrative order
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In order to ensure the informed choice and use of drugs by the patient/buyer, the drug outlet is
required to:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"3.1.1 Inform the patient/buyer of all available drug products generically equivalent to the one
prescribed with their corresponding prices. In so doing, the drug outlet shall not favor or suggest any
particular product so that the patient/buyer may fully and adequately exercise his option to choose (Sec.
3, Adm. Order No. 63 s. 1989).

x       x       x

"The following acts or omissions are considered violations of these rules and
regulations:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"5.1 Imposing a particular brand or product on the buyer. xxx." (pp. 46-47, Rollo.)

The salesgirl at the drugstore counter merely informs the customer, but does not determine (for she is
incompetent to do so), all the other drug products or brands that have the same generic name, and their
corresponding prices. That information she may obtain from the list of drug products determined by the
Bureau of Food and Drugs to have the same generic name, or which are the chemical, biological, and
therapeutic equivalent of the generic drug. All drugstores or drug outlets are required by the law to post
such list in a conspicuous place in their premises for the information of the customers, for the choice of
whether to buy the expensive brand-name drug, or the less expensive generic, should be exercised by
the customer alone.

The purpose of the Generics Act is to carry out the policy of the State:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To promote, encourage and require the use of generic terminology in the importation, manufacture,
distribution, marketing, advertising and promotion, prescription and dispensing of drugs;

"To ensure the adequate supply of drugs with generic names at the lowest possible cost and endeavor
to make them available for free to indigent patients;

"To encourage the extensive use of drugs with generic names through a rational system of procurement
and distribution;

"To emphasize the scientific basis for the use of drugs, in order that health professionals may become
more aware and cognizant of their therapeutic effectiveness; and.

"To promote drug safety by minimizing duplication in medications and/or use of drugs with potentially
adverse drug interactions." (pp. 38-39, Rollo.)

or, as stated by the public respondent, "to promote and require the use of generic drug products that
are therapeutically equivalent to their brand-name counterparts" (p. 39, Rollo) for "the therapeutic
effect of a drug does not depend on its ‘brand’ but on the ‘active ingredients’ which it contains." The
medicine that cures is the "active ingredient" of the drug, and not the brand name by which it has been
baptized by the manufacturer.

The public respondent points out that the institution of generics in the Philippines will compel physicians
to prescribe drugs based on their therapeutic or "active ingredient," instead of their well-known brand
names. Multiple medications which may produce potentially adverse, even lethal, chemical reactions in
the patient will thereby be avoided. Patients with limited means will be able to buy generic drugs that
cost less but possess the same active ingredients, dosage form, and strength as brand names, many of
which are priced beyond the reach of the common tao because the high costs of advertising, packaging,
royalties, and other inputs of production determine their pricing for the market.

The Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act. It, on the contrary,
implements the constitutional mandate for the State "to protect and promote the right to health of the
people" and "to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at
affordable cost" (Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).
The prohibition against the use by doctors of "no substitution" and/or words of similar import in their
prescription, is a valid regulation to prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the
right to choose between the brand name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write
both the generic and the brand name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a
brand-name drug with "no substitution," the patient’s option to buy a lower-priced, but equally
effective, generic equivalent would thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and
often sickly) majority of the population in a still developing country like ours, not the affluent and
generally healthy minority.

There is no merit in the petitioners’ theory that the Generics Act impairs the obligation of contract
between a physician and his patient, for no contract ever results from a consultation ‘between patient
and physician. A doctor may take in or refuse a patient, just as the patient may take or refuse the
doctor’s advice or prescription. As aptly observed by the public respondent, no doctor has ever filed an
action for breach of contract against a patient who refused to take prescribed medication, undergo
surgery, or follow a recommended course treatment by his doctor (p. 53, Rollo). In any event, no private
contract between doctor and patient may be allowed to override the power of the State to enact laws
that are reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or general welfare of
the community. This power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away. All contractual and property
rights are held subject to its fair exercise (Anglo-Fil Trading Corporation v. Lazaro, 124 SCRA
495.)chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

Petitioners have also assailed Section 12, paragraphs b, c and d, of the Generics Act prescribing
graduated penalties (ranging from a reprimand to a fine of not less that P10,000 and the suspension of
the physician’s license to practice his profession for one [1]) year or longer, at the discretion of the
court) for violations of its provisions. Petitioners’ allegation that these penalties violate the
constitutional guarantee against excessive fines and cruel and degrading punishment, has no merit.
Penal sanctions are indispensable if the law is to be obeyed. They are the "teeth" of the law. Without
them, the law would be toothless, not worth the paper it is printed on, for physicians, dentists and
veterinarians may freely ignore its prescriptions and prohibitions. The penalty of suspension or
cancellation of the physician’s license is neither cruel, inhuman, or degrading. It is no different from the
penalty of suspension or disbarment that this Court inflicts on lawyers and judges who misbehave or
violate the laws and the Codes of Professional and Judicial Conduct.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

We hold that the Generics Act and the implementing administrative orders of the Secretary of Health
are constitutional. In light of its beneficial provisions, we cannot heed the petitioners’ plea to kill it
aborning, i.e., before it has had a chance to prove its value to our people as envisioned by its makers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 122156 February 3, 1997

MANILA PRINCE HOTEL petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

The FiIipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos,1 is in oked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation
(MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision is not
self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask
whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony covered by the protective
mantle of the Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the
privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986,
decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide management expertise
and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the
profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at
P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.

Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state —

I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC —

1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to purchase
the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified
Bidders:

a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC
the Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its
strategic plan for the Manila Hotel. . . .
 b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS . . . .

K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER —

The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:

a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than

October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and

b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on

Privatization)/OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are
obtained.3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of
the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October
1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33.000.000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs. Renong
Berhad . . .5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and
consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18
October 1995 the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.

On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it was referred to it by
the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.

In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that
the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical
monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its power and
capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a
part of the national patrimony.6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries
with it the ownership of the business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-
owned and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism
industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the
shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.7

It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national patrimony and its business
also unquestionably part of the national economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched
the bid offer of the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that
have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in
terms of price per share.8

Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires
implementing legislation(s) . . . Thus, for the said provision to Operate, there must be existing laws "to
lay down conditions under which business may be done."9

Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under the term national
patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second paragraphs
of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests
who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired therein which make the hotel historic,
these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of
the Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its
own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the constitutional provision
invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition of
the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right
from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which provides that if for
any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to
match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege
of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason, the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is
premature since Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the condition
giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should fail since respondent
GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its
discretion it was not so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has no
clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative duty to perform the act
required of them by petitioner.

We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance and administration
of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable except by the authority from which it
emanates. It has been defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes the
permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their respective
powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which government is founded. The
fundamental conception in other words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform
and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or contract violates any norm
of the constitution that law or contract whether promulgated by the legislative or by the executive
branch or entered into by private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force
and effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it
is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles. Their provisions
command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the purposes of the framers who merely establish
an outline of government providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision which lays down a general
principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a
provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or
enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be
enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and
extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language indicating
that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13

As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally drafted upon a different
principle and have often become in effect extensive codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the
people in a manner similar to that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional
conventions has evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is
that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that —

. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than

non-self-executing . . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the
legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These
provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make
them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing
statute. 15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is clearly not self-
executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission —

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the

Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is
given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to
qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we
not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
 THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to
remove the word "QUALIFIED?".

MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as
against whom? As against aliens or over aliens?

MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the

word "QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will
always lay down conditions under which business may be done. For
example, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera (emphasis supplied by respondents)

MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.

MR. NOLLEDO Yes, 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it appear that it
is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
from enacting other further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated
statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the
self-executing nature of constitutional provisions.

In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation to facilitate the
exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the operation of such a provision,
prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of
the rights secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of
the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a penalty for the
violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not render such a provision ineffective in the
absence of such legislation. The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-executing.
The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative
power on the subject, but any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise
of constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation however does not
necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.

Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is implied
from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same section which undoubtedly are not self-
executing. 18 The argument is flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because
Congress is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned
by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and exercise
authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then
a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights,
privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may
be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions are merely
statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-executing and only placed in the
Constitution as moral incentives to legislation, not as judicially enforceable rights — are simply not in
point. Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on
personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in nation-building 23 the
promotion of social justice, 24 and the values of education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance 26 refers to
the constitutional provisions on social justice and human rights 27 and on education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan,
Inc. v. Morato 29 cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the
vital role of the youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially
enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions
manifest that they are only principles upon which the legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.

On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or
rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in
operation. It is per se judicially enforceable When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to
qualified Filipinos, it means just that — qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce
such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no
statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own
inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is
a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.

As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission 34 explains —

The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not only to
out rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of out race. It also refers to
our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our
lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of
our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage. 35 When the
Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines,
as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural
heritage of the Filipinos.

Manila Hotel has become a landmark — a living testimonial of Philippine heritage. While it was
restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino,
Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the venue of various significant events
which have shaped Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site of
the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed as the Official Guest
House of the Philippine Government. it plays host to dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the
traditional Philippine hospitality. 36
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The Heart and Memory of a
City. 37 During World War II the hotel was converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a
military headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected
by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places fro their final stand. Thereafter, in the
1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international
recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a
failed coup d' etat where an aspirant for vice-president was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine
Republic.

For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves
and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity
associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has
become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so
that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of the hotel. In
this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel
edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the
corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which the building stands. 38

The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in Our Constitution also includes
corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the
1986 Constitutional Commission

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo

amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the
words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR
CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is

agreeable, but we have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation
that is 80-percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?

MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual

Filipino. What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?

MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.

MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?

 MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say
that the preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.

MR: DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.

MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President. 39

x x x           x x x          x x x

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be

read again.

MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY
AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS." And the word "Filipinos" here, as intended by the
proponents, will include not only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-
controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40

The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus —

MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner

Nolledo to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.

MR. NOLLEDO. "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND

CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY,
THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."

MR FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is

qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?

MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.

MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?

MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is "yes."

MR. FOZ. Thank you, 41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo continues —

MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL — THE
STATE SHALL GlVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-called
 "Filipino First" policy. That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant
of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. 42

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding the subject provision
was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo 43 —

Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in all economic

concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy . . . This provision was never
found in previous Constitutions . . . .

The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and
inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be
made between a "qualified foreigner" end a "qualified Filipino," the latter shall be
chosen over the former."

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by respondent GSIS and
selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its
own guidelines so that the sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of
proven management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to successfully operate the
Manila Hotel. 44

The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing that the subject
provision is not self-executory and requires implementing legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to
violate a clear constitutional provision — by the government itself — is only too distressing. To adopt
such a line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For, even
some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need implementing legislation have juridical
life of their own and can be the source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a
defense that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In
fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt —

The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including the
Constitution, even before Congress acts — provided that there are discoverable legal
standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by its own
understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility
for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole prerogative
of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask Congress, or perhaps the Court,
for an interpretation every time the executive is confronted by a constitutional
command. That is not how constitutional government operates. 45
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the State, not to respondent
GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct personality. This argument again is at best
specious. It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior
approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out by
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and MHC a
"state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from the government are
considered "state action" covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public
function;" (2) when the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the
action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes
under the second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the transaction.
although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore subject to
the constitutional command. 46

When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also to the government
as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of three (3) divisions of power — legislative,
executive and judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three(3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent GSIS,
a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.

It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not yet the winning
bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder shall only be declared the winning
bidder after it has negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite
approvals. Since the "Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified
Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under
obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional provision is, as it should
be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for
being violative of the Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts
must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the Constitution lose their
reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [if] for any reason the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted
bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In
fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.

In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding concerning the grant
of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding
the bid of a Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It
must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is, omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous
skirting of the basic law.

This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage foreign investors. But the
Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any
person therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of
the forum.

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning the sale to Renong
Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that a foreigner could participate in the
bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But
foreigners may be awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match
the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was already
preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet
matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm
and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause
of action.

Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless perhaps the award has
been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino group
willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that government be treated as any other
ordinary market player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is regrettable. Thus we
would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government
develop the habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for
its actions.

Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad pursuant to the bidding
rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC
and to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with
the bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS
to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules after the latter
has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the 1987 Constitution not
merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but primarily to be enforced; so must it be
enforced. This Court as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable
circumstance, the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to defend. It is
worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede and diminish, much less
undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more
business opportunities but avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is
ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more
appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa —

As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and feasibility of
legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for
decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in
connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain statements were
published in a major daily to the effect that injunction "again demonstrates that the
Philippine legal system can be a major obstacle to doing business here.

Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court to
intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of whether
they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they do not violate
the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no
matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and preventing further
losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take precedence over non-material values. A
commercial, nay even a budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the Court will
always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free society; after all, there is nothing so
sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is
involved. 49

Nationalism is inherent, in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic and republican state,
with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from whom all government authority emanates. In
nationalism, the happiness and welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no
higher purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such basic concept.
Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a policy. It cannot override the demands of
nationalism. 50

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the
highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property
in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most
important events in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where
heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity
of the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played
and continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history
and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of respondents to sell the
historical landmark — this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified
Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-
Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign
entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is
safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple
meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the
clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will
continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION,

COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed
to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG
BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and
thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary
for purpose.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into
focus in this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The
petitioners ask us to prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case
No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al. vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management
Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being
the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the
questioned premises of North EDSA.1 Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private
respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the
"People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-
complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late
CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr.,
of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July
1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and
shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission"
and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as
CHR's own ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the
demolition of private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1
August 1990, ordered the disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of
the private respondents to purchase light housing materials and food under the Commission's
supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist from further demolition, with the warning that
violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and arrest." 6

A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred,
among other things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-
Agency Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a
moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to

therein refers to moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business
entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990
that the complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of
EDSA corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and

6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and
authority whether or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to
operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already
issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the
motion to dismiss set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested
that they would bring the case to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the
Commission's authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of
civil and political rights, and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political
rights, (but) their privilege to engage in business." 9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the
contempt charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to
by petitioners (on the ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10

In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a
fine of P500.00 on each of them.
On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental
motion to dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had
jurisdiction over the complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the
gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should
be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper
tiger limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial
body with the power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines . . . ." It added:

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to
dignity. All these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with
little regard at the same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their
health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized
the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's
inhumanity to man.

In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated,
however, in our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order,
directing the CHR to "CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls
were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment
for public respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of
its Commissioners. The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque
Fermo, who had since failed to comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No.
163,20 issued on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so
superseded as well, the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21

The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons
within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been
violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance

respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to
provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty

obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the
truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the
performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the
intention of the members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This
view, however, has not heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human
Rights,24 the Court, through then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that
it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication
or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself.
The Court explained:
 . . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over
the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not
adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even
a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining
therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be
considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual
conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as
may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this
controversy and, its is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define
it, albeit not a few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium
on human rights in the Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the
questions that has been propounded is "(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants,
representing different sectors of the society, have given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They
are the same in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the
Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom
of speech, of the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to
due process of law; political rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be
elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and
social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services. 25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer
fact of his humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the
State but can only be recognized and protected by it. 26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part
of his natural birth, right, innate and inalienable. 28

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests
that the scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social,
economic, cultural, political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the
universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be
his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional
Commission in adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent
commission to safeguard these rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under
the martial law regime which may have, in fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our
fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the
sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a respected jurist and an advocate
of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines,"29 observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most
of the human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became
unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary
action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest
upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years,
without charges, until ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this
representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances became useless, since
group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were
subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of
tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of
resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty
International and the International Commission of Jurists.

Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following
discussions during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the
importance of human rights and also because civil and political rights have been
determined by many international covenants and human rights legislations in the
Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent
legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its
impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be
most effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very
broad. The Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right
of an individual involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the
line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the
language of human rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which addresses a number of articles on the right to life, the right against torture,
the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights that are
considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as
constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend
here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights distinguished this right against torture.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights,
and there are other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper
courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and,
therefore, in doing that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases
which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary
investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the
specific parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international
standards governing the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and
civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect
we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really
trying to say is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the
rights that we envision here?

MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution.
They are integral parts of that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of
Rights covered by human rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like
to state that in the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the
Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended
the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with
human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that
the sense of the committee, so as not to confuse the issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the
previous speaker.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act
effectively: 1) protection of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the
prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings
and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.

xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in
order to make the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible,
without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional
area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the
reference was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal
Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer to civil and
political rights contained therein.

If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of
human right with other human rights specified in other convention which I do not
remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights of which we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant
mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified in that other convention
which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our
concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the
rights contained in the convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee,

before the period of amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the
Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of
including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of the
Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion
later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of
Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be considered a civil or
a social right. It is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political
rights that we felt must be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political
detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as
crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is
limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a
specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite
areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer
linking his concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called
civil or political rights as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was
referring to an international instrument.

MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article
therein, but only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we
understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between
civil and social rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights. The second covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to
organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to
those that the Gentlemen has specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

 MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot
stress more on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers
will accept clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and
oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate — torture, salvaging,
picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who are allegedly
guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore,
this Human Rights Commission must be independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for
the little Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I
think we should concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this
to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we will not receive
any response. . . .30 (emphasis supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision
empowering the Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party,
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense,
to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of
the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the
laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term
may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a
civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution,
unreasonable searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32

Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in
the establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office,
the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of
government.34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the
delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe
cases of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3)
fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes
committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any
preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the
tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to
resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should
fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-
sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land
which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North
EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The
consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that
a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it
is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the
circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the
demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the
Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and
rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court."
Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold
any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with
the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt,
however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and
rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for
contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its
investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance
before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it
does not possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court,
speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and
legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection" may not be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a
restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution
would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by
law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the
Constitution refer to extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary
injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of
human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to
issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of
any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court
of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary
remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or
 protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose."
(footnotes omitted).

The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and
recommendations to any appropriate agency of government. 37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the
vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there
lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly,
the matter lies with the appropriate administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become
moot and academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and
that the matter is merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to
restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR
Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from
precisely doing that.39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is
hereby prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the
P500.00 fine for contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made
permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED