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In terms of foreign policy was Khrushchev a reformer?

Research · March 2016

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.34383.61602

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 In terms of foreign policy was Khrushchev a reformer?
Stefan Pelev

University of Aberdeen

“Support by United States rulers is rather in the nature of

the support that the rope gives to a hanged man.”

Nikita Khrushchev, 1957

Nikita Khrushchev is one of the most controversial figures in Soviet history and in the world for that
matter. He is seen by many contemporaries as a reformer and denouncer of many former practices
widely instituted in the USSR in the years before his ascendancy to power in 1956 and immediately
after the death of the former leader of the socialist country – Joseph Stalin (McCauley 1981:169).
Khrushchev’s character is widely recognised as being quite unrefined, direct, impulsive and risk-
taking which made his appearance and personality extremely unpredictable for Western observers as
well as politicians. However, exactly this peculiarity of his character made him so successful in his
dealings with issues in the Soviet Union, both internally and externally. The Soviet leader had the aura
of a “champion of the people” and his language and ethos were very close in proximity to the common
population of the USSR as his upbringing was based in the small village of Kalinovka, where his
family dwelled during Khrushchev’s youth (Medvedev 1982:4). He is controversial in the sense that
he truly succeeded internally in his task of reforming the Soviet society and the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union managing to liberalise and appease the system by denouncing the “cult of
personality” established by Stalin during his years at the helm of the Socialist country. Furthermore,
in terms of foreign policy the “relaxation of tensions” with the West, the strive for expanding the
Communist influence and bloc, the drive towards developing African and Asian nations as well as
turning the USSR into a global player and more importantly an “equal player” to the USA are his
greatest achievements.

In light of these achievements we can easily label him as a true reformer of the Soviet Union as his
policies at first sight are totally different from his predecessor’s (Tompson 1993:78). However, if we
are going to immerse ourselves completely in this statement we can find many facts and deeds that are
contrary to the “reformer label” as we can see many turns in both his domestic and foreign policy,
reverting to Stalinist methods and hard-line practices. This is the result of his impulsive and risk-
taking personality as it defines his decisions as constantly zig-zagging with many “U-turns”
(Chamberlin 1963:229). Khrushchev’s leadership style was truly unique as he actually tried to engage
with the world and involve the USSR in major political decisions. Moreover, influencing other
countries as well, as opposed to Stalin’s rule, who preferred to observe quietly the contemporary
affairs from the Kremlin. In addition, he wanted to dismantle the decision-making style of the Party
by delegating tasks along the line reaching to the local CPSU commissioners (McCauley 1981:172).
As a complete counter point to the aforementioned differentiation with Stalin, Nikita Sergeevich used
some of his methods of purging his opposition by instigating one party faction against another in the
post-Stalinist leadership, manipulating certain members of the party and then using them against his
opponents – a very typical Stalinist behaviour (Miller and Feher 1984:140).

This essay will support the argument that despite his controversial character, Khrushchev managed to
reform the policy-making decisions and the political atmosphere in the beginning of his career in the
collective leadership until his involvements in Africa in the late 1950s, especially in terms of foreign
policy. In the beginning the paper will embark upon the early deeds of the Soviet leader in the
“collective leadership” of the Party, leading to the “Secret Speech” in 1956 in which he denounced
Stalin and this act itself had a myriad of implications and consequences in terms of foreign policy.

During its first year at the helm of the Soviet Union, inside the “collective leadership” many notable
differences among the members were noted and the future general secretary of the Party seemed to be
out of the limelight, whereas Malenkov, Beria and Molotov were prominent aparatchiks in the Party
machine and especially Beria and Molotov who were hard-line supporters of Stalin’s policies
(Kennedy-Pipe 1998:105). However, Beria was quickly demoted and discharged as he posed a serious
threat to the new “reformist winds” embodied by Malenkov and Khrushchev as the Minister of the
Internal Affairs was a close associate of Stalin and was used to enforce Stalin’s decisions by the
coercive apparatus of the Ministry (Bociurkiw 1960:579).With Malenkov in charge as Premier
alongside Khrushchev adopted a policy of accommodation with the West and settling unresolved
issues such as signing the armistice between the belligerents in Korea in July 1953 and later on signing
a ceasefire agreement regarding the Vietnam conflict and partitioning the country into two halves after
a prolonged and protracted process. The period up to the “Secret Speech” was full with a number of
concessions in which the primary initiator was Khrushchev, who realised after the war in Korea that
the USA had a considerable military advantage in terms of nuclear capabilities and a future conflict
will cause severe damage to the USSR, which in turn fed into the fear of destruction and annihilation
of the Revolution and the Communist Party.
A Soviet delegation in that period visited the People’s Republic of China, where Khrushchev
announced the withdrawal of Soviet troops at Port Arthur and all the equipment there would be
transferred to Chinese authority (Medvedev 1982:73). At that point Nikita Sergeevich realised the
huge military and economic potential of China and that a change in relations had to be implemented as
Mao’s governance was turning the state into the second communist power in the socialist system and
even there was the possibility of equalling the Soviet Union. However, for the time being Mao Zedong
was satisfied to follow Soviet decisions and abstain from taking an independent course as he could
easily weigh the pros and cons of every decision that the USSR made and learn from its mistakes
(Sharlet 1978:772). In light of these events, it is purposeful to note that after the 20th Congress of the
Soviet Communist Party the rift between both parties becomes more evident with every year but that is
a topic for another discussion (Jones and Kevill 1985:5).

At the end of 1954 a rapprochement with Tito was starting to build up due to the strategic purposes of
Khrushchev to maintain the unity of the Socialist bloc and to try to entice Yugoslavia again into their
sphere of influence, so Nikita Sergeevich used the perfect timing for that to gain leverage and put
basically the blame to Beria and Stalin for the rift between the two countries. Rubinstein (1972:251)
with hindsight argued that “...Soviet leaders hoped to weaken Yugoslav ties with the West, eliminate
the military usefulness of the Balkan Pact and gain more opportunities for increasing Soviet influence
over the regime.” Clearly, Khrushchev and Mikoyan during their visit to Belgrade in 1955 could not
possibly relay these words as it would cost them dear. In addition to that they perfectly knew that the
Red Army did not install Tito’s regime in Belgrade but it was a result of a continuous struggle of the
Yugoslav partisans against the Nazi occupiers and all the negotiations had to be conducted with great
care as well as the “revisionist” rhetoric from Moscow towards Yugoslavia had to be severed
instantaneously in order sizeable results to be achieved. Another aim of Khrushchev was to reduce the
appeal of Titoism in Eastern Europe which was related to “the desire of many Eastern European
communists for greater national autonomy” (Rubinstein 1972:73).

The culmination of this “relaxation of tensions” was the Austrian treaty and the Geneva summit held
in 1955 in Switzerland. The Austrian State Treaty is one of the most successful neutralising treaties
signed in the post-war period. In essence, it prevented a dangerous conflict between NATO and Soviet
troops over the control of a state situated in the heart of Europe. Its significance came from the fact
that Austria was viewed as a gate to both Western and Eastern Europe, so if one of the main opposing
blocs toppled the government and took control in Vienna, it would gain access to the enemy’s zone of
influence (Larson 1987:29). In her article Larson (1987) lays out her view of this issue offering the
readers a substantial psychological analysis and techniques used to decipher the behaviour of both
parties and the underlying objectives as well as the hidden principle of reciprocity. The idea is that
when one side is making a concession the other one is forced to oblige in most cases as we can clearly
see in this case too – the Soviets agreed on the neutrality of Austria and then in return the USA agreed
on holding the Geneva Summit the same year. Later during the July session of the Central Committee
of the CPSU, Khrushchev defended the concession he made to the Americans that all troops would be
withdrawn and the abolition of all Soviet economic footholds there. The reason for his defence was
that his policies were deviating from the Stalin-Molotov line and this concession played with the fear
of inferiority and encirclement, if the Soviets lose Austria. However, Khrushchev defended himself by
referring to Lenin’s works that temporary losses need to be incurred in order significant gains to be
achieved – by retreating from its foreign bases the USSR would proof its peaceful orientation and
opposition to conflicts that would appeal to the neutral states around the world (Dallin 1961:228).
However, as we shall see later this state treaty will have severe implications in the Hungarian uprising
in 1956.

After the enormous magnitude of this concession a summit in Geneva was agreed to be convened the
same year. As Levering (1988:68-69) analysed the Summit, he concluded that no actual progress had
been made as each side was viewing the other with mistrust. The example the author gave about the
proposition of the American delegation wrapped up the whole summit as they put forward the concept
of “open skies” in which both parties would exchange maps of strategic military positions and in
addition permit aerial inspection in order to make each other’s military arsenal more transparent.
However, the Soviet representatives refused to that suggestion as this would mean that their inferiority
and weaknesses would not be concealed anymore. As a counter point the Soviets proposed a military
reduction in the strength of armies of non-great-power forces up to 200.000 and the reduction of the
GFR’s Bundeswehr to 500.000 troops, however the Americans rejected this proposal as they were
hoping to exploit the admission of West Germany into NATO and arm the country with nuclear
arsenal as a deterrent to the Socialist bloc (Bloomfield et al. 1966:25). The real outcome from this
summit was that mistrust was on the verge of disappearing and both parties realised that through
constructive talks actually could work together towards a more peaceful world.

The apotheosis of Khrushchev’s rise to power was at the Twentieth Party Congress of the CPSU in
February 1956, where he laid out his vision of governance, especially, his ideas and beliefs in terms of
foreign politics as well as denouncing some of the deeds of Stalin. During his “Secret speech” he laid
several theses that were to be the pillars of his tenure as leader of the Soviet Union until his demise in
1964. Firstly, Khrushchev outlined the idea that wars and conflicts are not inevitable, which was at
that time a complete negation of the principles held by Lenin and Stalin that there will be no end of
conflicts until the system of capitalism ceases to exist (Medvedev 1982:73). This was true because by
its innate nature capitalism had to continue expand and gain new colonies in order to exist. However,
Khrushchev and Mikoyan together acknowledged this fact but stated also that everything in times
evolves and ideology too. So, there would be no incentive at all for capitalist countries to engage with
the Socialist bloc as the socialist bloc is no longer constituted by the Soviet Union only but of several
other countries and now it represented a formidable opposition to the capitalistic system – that is the
shifting “correlation of world forces” as Khrushchev puts it (Whelan 1961:132). Whelan’s (1961)
article provides a significant insight and in-depth information about the decision-making process of
the Soviet leader regarding world affairs. Essentially, Khrushchev makes an appraisal of the state’s
military forces, economic problems, demographic situation and then he benchmarks all these factors to
the Western powers. So, if success is a likely outcome, he will definitely take the risk for the particular
event. In addition, with the rising strength of the Socialist bloc the principle of “peaceful coexistence”
could be applied, essentially the two world systems could coexist with no friendly and no detrimental
relations between each other. This principle would be the path of rapprochement with the capitalist
countries (Medvedev 1982:88). Jones and Kevill (1985) outline the five tenets of “peaceful
coexistence” – “mutual respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference, equality,
peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation”. In light of these powerful statements the idea of
different roads to socialism was accepted at the Congress and the People’s Democracies of Eastern
Europe were an embodiment of this idea – “national communism”. Secondly, Khrushchev presented
another major thesis – that violent revolutions are not inevitable, which again was a complete
differentiation of the Marxist-Leninist principles. Khrushchev believed that in other countries
communists would gain power by enhancing their reputation and strengthening their numbers in order
to win parliamentary elections. This non-violent way of gaining power was set out to emphasise the
peaceful nature of the Socialist bloc and the hidden meaning of this was to entice the neutral countries
and the newly emerged states from colonial yoke (Dallin 1961:237). Dallin (1961) continued his
analysis and pointed out that the last but not least outcome of the Speech was the revision of Stalinism
in foreign affairs. In particular, Stalin’s view of the world separated into two camps. Khrushchev made
this view redundant and articulated a more contemporary approach to world affairs by breaking the
two-camp view into five sectors – at the two extremes were situated the USSR and the USA and in
between were the Communist countries and China, which comprised the second segment; the third one
was represented by non-aligned countries, India and Indonesia; and the fourth segment were members
of the NATO alliances and Japan, which were closer to the US. The Soviet leader believed that with
the constant accumulation of power the Socialist bloc surpassed in strength the Western allies and that
the concept of capitalist encirclement was no longer valid (Whelan 1961:136). By exposing Stalin’s
deeds internally and changing the course of foreign politics of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev truly left
his mark in Soviet politics and reformed the system, although not radically.

The next part of the essay will discuss briefly the Polish and Hungarian rebellion as examples of
miscalculations made by Khrushchev and his underestimation of the influence that his “Secret
Speech” had in those two countries. The paper will conclude with his endeavours in Africa,
particularly the attractiveness of the Soviet model to the newly-emerging states.

There is a general pattern that is observed regarding Soviet interventions in the internal affairs of
Eastern European states when certain ideological or strategic issues are at stake (Jones 1977:217).
Jones (1977) very competently managed to present one key finding, which to a greater extent is
absolutely valid, that in all the conflicts with Eastern European leaders there was only one issue at
stake – the control over the local Communist Party by loyal Muscovite factions which were challenged
by domestic factions based on popular support. Precisely, these domestic factions were fuelled and
sparked by Khrushchev’s reformist vision as well as the denunciation of Stalin and his cult of
personality. So, the cornerstone of Moscow’s intervention was how far these factions were willing to
go and reform their countries as well as their ability to raise popular and military support against the
grip of the Soviet Union. At that time Nikita Sergeevich probably did not realise what were the likely
consequences of his speech but he was faced with enormous pressure by the Central Committee of the
CPSU to quell down the rise of the domestic factions in Poland and Hungary. He was compelled to
use force to show the Party and the rest of the Socialist bloc that Moscow had not given up yet its
empire and influence (Medvedev 1982:106). However, if we think critically about the Polish and
Hungarian case we can see that there are very important strategic implications, it is not just defending
the Communist principles and fraternal help as the rhetoric often signifies. If Khrushchev lost control
over Poland his path towards the German Democratic Republic would be cut off, hence this might be a
chance for the GDR to break away. Also another trend could be identified here, especially in the case
of Hungary that many people were inspired by the resolution of the Austrian problem and that
resonated in the reactions of the Hungarian public as well. As Austria shared a common border with
Hungary combined with the fact that Imre Nagy was gaining popularity for the domestic faction things
would easily get out of hand, so a surgical strike was needed due to the fact that Nagy’s clique had
toppled the Muscovites and the Hungarian Communist Party there was virtually non-existent. Losing
the heart of Central Europe would be a humiliating loss for the Soviet Union, so this in a way could
justify the bloody crackdown of the rebellion and the subsequent execution of Nagy as well as
replacing his government by that of Janos Kadar, a pro-Muscovite loyalist (Terry 1984:93). In the
Polish situation Wladyslaw Gomulka exploited the nationalistic sentiments in Poland because if we
turn to historical complexities, we could see the numerous conflicts and the resentment between Poles
and Russians since tsarist times. His idea of a form of “national communism” accompanied by a
continuation of Soviet-Polish relations gained him the necessary autonomy and the breathing space to
settle conflicts within Poland. So, Khrushchev was ready to go along with this situation as it were
(Dallin 1961:361). If we have to relate this downturn in the reformist fervour of the Soviet leader, we
have to attribute it to some conservative elements of the Party in the higher echelons of power.
Essentially, these people were statists as Tsygankov (2013:4) in his “three schools of thought”
describes them, who sought a stronger Soviet Union that never gives up its gains without a fight.

After the Soviet leader managed to deal successfully with the issues in Hungary and Poland he set an
ambitious course towards reaffirming Soviet influence around the world and truly turning the USSR
into a global player and superpower not limiting itself in Eastern Europe and Asia. Until
Khrushchev’s era the USSR did not have any significant contacts with countries from Africa except
for Ethiopia and that was during tsarist times. The reason for this was that Lenin and Stalin were both
focused and bogged down in preserving the Revolution and the Soviet Union. Although Lenin had
theorised that class struggle in colonies would put pressure on the metropole countries as they will lose
their markets and that will lead to the disintegration of the middles class at home, hence leading to a
revolution there. In addition this nationalistic bourgeois revolution would be the first step in a two-
phased process preceding the actual socialist revolution (Triska and Finley 1968:256). Moreover,
despite the nature of national liberation movements, the USSR had the obligation to support them in
their fight (Heldman 1981:36). On the other hand, Stalin upon his ascendance to power abided to that
principle set by Lenin and supported Chan Kai-shek, Reza Pahlavi and Kemal Ataturk despite all of
them being nationalistic leaders. However his decisions and attempts were mostly done with
reluctance, so eventually he abandoned that policy in favour of a policy enabling him to consolidate
his power in Moscow and build “Socialism in One Country”. In Stalin’s view “nationalist politicians
are untrustworthy as well as national democracies, their anti-imperial stance was a façade and only
true communist groups could be counted as allies” (Heldman 1981:39). Heldman continues that when
Khrushchev delivered his “Secret Speech” it was obvious that a new reformist policy was to be
introduced; he stated that “The Awakening of the African people has begun”. However, the decision of
the Soviet leader was very controversial as truly there were many examples of aiding African national
democracies where local leaders would accept it and continue crushing the local communist parties
and arresting its members as in Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia were prime examples (Lopatov 1987:32).
Kremnev (1963:4) pointed out that this controversy could be averted, when he asserted that “national
democracy” does not require direct participation of communist by all means but it could be achieved
by greater influence though the various trade unions, students unions, teachers unions and so on.
Basically, this argument justified the support and interference of Khrushchev in various African
regimes and national liberation movements. This strange “marriage” between the Soviet leadership
and African countries is probably the result of the desire of the leaders of the Black continent to follow
the Soviet model of development. This model in their view was better that what the West had to offer
as two main advantages were highlighted – firstly, it promised rapid gains in several industries and,
secondly, it avoided all evils inherent in capitalism such as social strife, large inequality and riots
(Heldman 1981:54). The main aim of Khrushchev was to lure these nations from the third segment in
which he put all developing countries during his “Secret speech” and convert them to socialist
countries allied to the USSR like those in the second sector. This he tried to achieve by giving aid and
support to these developing countries that were on the right “non-capitalist path” of development.

To conclude, this paper tried to present the argument in favour of the statement that Nikita
Khrushchev was a reformer. The author believes that despite his unrefined and “common folk”
character, Nikita Sergeevich showed tremendous flexibility and capabilities to outflank his opponents
and rise to be the leader of the USSR. In terms of his foreign policy he achieved things that previous
leaders could not even aspire to – he relaxed tensions with the West, further consolidated the Soviet
sphere of influence, denounced Stalin’s theories in international relations, turned the Soviet Union into
a global player focusing on Third world countries and even rewrote the Leninist principle about
revolutions. In spite of all these achievements his character and shadow will always be controversial as
he had an unorthodox approach to events. This essay acknowledges that some limitations do exist as
the discussion did not include his later period at the helm of the USSR and definitely some useful
insights could be utilised from there. However, the overall impression is that Khrushchev did manage
to change the way foreign affairs in the Soviet Union were conducted and we can label him as a
reformer.
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