[ G.R. No. 242695, June 23, 2020 ] Director for Operations Nemesio De Quia.
Director for Operations Nemesio De Quia.5 The defense, for its part, presented
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PO1 DENNIS JESS
ESTEBAN LUMIKID, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERALTA, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the September 25, 2017 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01558-MIN, which affirmed with modification the
May 26, 2016 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City.
The Facts
Accused-appellant PO1 Dennis Jess Esteban Lumikid was indicted for Murder as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The
accusatory portion of the Information, filed on August 16, 2010, alleged:
That on or about June 14, 2010 in Manay, Davao Oriental, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, while armed with
handgun and with deliberate intent to kill Desiderio "Jessie" Camangyan, with
treachery, evident premeditation and accused PO1 Lumikid taking advantage of
his position as police officer, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot said Desiderio "Jessie" Camangyan with the
use of said firearm, thereby inflicting upon the latter gun shot wound causing
his death.3
In his arraignment, PO1 Lumikid pleaded not guilty4 to the offense charged in
the information. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, PSI Felino Magbanua, Jr.,
Ruth Matinong, Alfonso Alcantara, SPO Rodante Palma Gil and Deputy Provincial
a total of ten (10) witnesses, namely, SPO3 Juddjit Daculan, PO3 Nonnel Alan
Mabini, SPO1 Roniechito Macadagat, Alvin M. Magdagasang, PSI Arnel Nueva,
Editha Andoyo, Jerome Pausta Aurelio Gonato, Jr., PO3 Normel Alan Mabini, and
the accused-appellant himself, PO1 Lumikid.6
Version of the Prosecution:
On the evening of June 14, 2010, Desiderio "Jessie" Camangyan and his
common-law partner, Ruth Matinong, attended an amateur singing contest in
Barangay Old Macopa, Manay, Davao Oriental, to which Jessie was invited by
Barangay Captain Romeo Antolin to host the event. Jessie was a media
practitioner and a block timer in a local FM radio station in Manay, Davao
Oriental. Matinong and her child were seated on one of the benches provided
for the audience, located just beside the stairs of the stage.7
At one point, Matinong went to the restroom. On her way to the restroom, she
observed two (2) men beside the comfort room talking, one of them was
wearing a black t-shirt, camouflage pants and combat boots, and was intently
watching Jessie with suspicious eyes, twelve (12) meters away from the stage
where Jessie was hosting. After she went back to her bench, Jessie went down
the stage. During that time, Matinong told Jessie, "Pang, there are two persons
talking near the comfort room and their eyes are focused on you and they were
looking at you." Jessie, after looking at the said men, assured Matinong that they
were part of Barangay Captain Antolin's security personnel who were there to
guard the event.8
At about 10:30 p.m., Matinong heard a single gunshot and allegedly saw one of
the two (2) suspicious-looking men shoot Jessie from behind. Matinong ran
towards Jessie and still saw the assailant, who was wearing a black t-shirt,
camouflage pants and combat boots, allegedly aiming a gun towards Jessie
outside the cyclone fence and walked downhill. Matinong shouted for help and
a commotion ensued. The security personnel fired warning shots in the air,
while the gunman fled towards a grassy and dark area at the back of the stage.
She continued to scream for help but nobody came to her succor. Even Barangay
Captain Antolin was seen going back to his house which was fronting the
covered court.9
It was only at 9:00 a.m. of the following day that Jessie's body was removed and
brought to Padilla Funeral Homes in Mati City. In the Medico-Legal Report issued
by PSI Pelino M. Brunia, Jr., the cause of death of Jessie was a gunshot wound
to the head.10
Thereafter, "Task Force Jessie" was created to investigate Jessie's death. In the
course of the investigation, Matinong gave the description of the gunman whom
she saw minutes before Jessie was killed. Out of the description given, a
cartographic sketch was made. When Matinong was shown the copies of the
pictures of seven (7) police personnel assigned in Manay, Davao Oriental, she
identified the accused-appellant, PO1 Lumikid, as the one who shot Jessie.11
Version of the Defense:
POl Lumikid alleges that in the afternoon of June 14, 2010, he went to the house
of Aurelio Gonato, Jr. in Barangay Guza, Manay, Davao Oriental, with Jerome
Pausta and Joel Mamparo, where they drank liquor and sang videoke until 1:00
a.m. of June 15, 2010. According to PO1 Lumikid, he slept over at Gonato's
house until 9:00 a.m. and left after receiving a text message from PSI Nueva to
report immediately at Manay Police Station.12
Upon arriving at the Manay Police Station, PO1 Lumikid was instructed to
proceed to White Sand Cone Beach Resort, and to report directly to PSI Nueva.
Thus, he went immediately to the White Sand Cone Beach Resort and arrived
there at around 12 noon of June 15, 2010.13
Six (6) days after the shooting incident, or on June 20, 2010, PO1 Lumikid, along
with other police officers, was instructed to attend a case conference at the PNP
Provincial Headquarters in Mati City, Davao Oriental. During the conference,
PO1 Lumikid just sat and listened. No questions were propounded to him. Two
(2) days after the conference, or on June 22, 2010, PO1 Lumikid received a text
message from PSI Nueva, informing him that he would be disarmed upon orders
of the PNP Provincial Director. Upon the instructions of PSI Nueva, PO1 Lumikid
complied with the orders and turned over his firearms. At that point, PO1
Lumikid was informed by PSI Nueva that he was to be placed under restricted
status, and was to be escorted immediately to the PNP Provincial Headquarters
in Mati City upon orders oi the PNP Provincial Director.14
For five (5) months, PO1 Lumikid was confined in the radio room of the PNP
Provincial Headquarters in Mati City under restricted status. On November 3,
2010, he was eventually transferred to the Provincial Jail in Mati City.15
On May 26, 2016, the RTC convicted PO1 Lumikid of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Dennis Lumikid guilty of the crime of
Murder with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and hereby sentences him
to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed
by law. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts of P75,000.00
for the death of Camangyan, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.16
In concluding that Matinong was able to convince the trial court that PO1
Lumikid indeed committed the killing of Jessie, the RTC ratiocinated:
Ruth Matinong is the only credible eye witness in the killing of Desiderio
Camangyan on June 14, 2010. The evidence presented by the accused failed to
destroy the credibility of prosecution's lone witness.
Her eyewitness account of what happened is credible compared to the
unreliable alibi of the accused conveniently stating that he was in a drinking
session with his three close friends, as rain poured out heavily as the reason why
he was not able to go home or went to other place which is only 60 kilometers
more or less to Barangay Old Macopa.
Such alibi not supported by any reliable evidence, cannot overcome the
convincing testimony of Ruth Matinong that accused is the gunman.
Moreover, there is no possible reason why Ruth Matinong would falsely testify
against accused and insists on his guilt for such serious and heavy offense as
charged.
"It is a well-settled rule that positive identification of the accused, where
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law".17
On appeal, the CA agreed with the findings of the trial court that the defense
failed to discredit the straightforward, unequivocal and convincing testimony of
Matinong who positively identified PO1 Lumikid as the perpetrator of the crime.
The appellate court was convinced that there is no showing of any ill or improper
motive on the part of Matinong to testify against PO1 Lumikid. Her relationship
with the victim even made her testimony more credible and truthful. Likewise,
the CA concurred with the RTC that the killing of Jessie was attended with
treachery, the prosecution having established that the fatal shooting of the
victim was swift and sudden, without any warning, leaving Jessie defenseless.
While the judgment of conviction was sustained, the award of damages was
modified. The fallo of the September 25, 2017 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 26 May 2016 of the Regional Trial Court,
11th Judicial Region, Branch 10, Davao City in Criminal Case No. 5630-10 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
The awards of civil indenmity ex delicto, moral and exemplary damages against
PO1 Dennis Jess E. Lumikid are hereby increased to Php100,000.00 each. PO1
Dennis Jess E. Lumikid is also ordered to pay interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the time of finality of this decision until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.18
Now before us, the People manifested that it would no longer file a
Supplemental Brief, taking into account the thorough and substantial
discussions of the issues in its appellee's brief before the CA.
Meanwhile, PO1 Lumikid filed his Supplemental Brief, summarizing his
arguments raised in his Appellant's Brief, Reply and Motion for Reconsideration
which he filed before the CA.
We find the appeal meritorious. The judgment of conviction is reversed and set
aside, and PO1 Lumikid should be acquitted based on reasonable doubt.
As a rule, the trial court's findings of fact are entitled to great weight and will
not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule does not apply where facts of
weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied in
a case under appeal.19 After a judicious examination of the records, this Court
found material facts and circumstances that the lower courts had overlooked or
misappreciated which, if properly considered, would justify a conclusion
different from that arrived by the lower courts.
It is a well-settled rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the
credibility of witnesses are accorded utmost respect since trial courts have first-
hand account on the witnesses' manner of testifying in court and their
demeanor during trial. The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation of the
testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to
determine the issue of credibility.20 However, this rule is not applicable in the
present case. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals,21 this Court stated that:
In general, factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. The rule, however, does
not apply in the present case. For one, the judge who penned the trial court's
judgment was not the same one who heard the prosecution witnesses testify.
For another, our review of the records indicates that both the trial court and the
appellate court have overlooked some material facts and circumstances of
weight which could materially affect the result of this case.22
In the instant case, Presiding Judge Retrina E. Fuentes, the ponente of the
Decision convicting PO1 Lumikid, did not observe or assess the demeanor of the
prosecution's material lone witness while testifying as it was another judge who
heard and received her testimony. Considering that the Court of Appeals and
the Office of the Solicitor General heavily relied on the Decision of the RTC, an
extensive review of this Court is proper.
While an accused stands before the court burdened by a previous preliminary
investigation finding that there is probable cause to believe that he committed
the crime charged, the judicial determination of his guilt or innocence
necessarily starts with the recognition of his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent of the charge he faces. This principle, a right of the accused, is
enshrined no less in our Constitution. It embodies as well a duty on the part of
the court to ascertain that no person is made to answer for a crime unless his
guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Its primary consequence in our
criminal justice system is the basic rule that the prosecution carries the burden
of overcoming the presumption through proof of guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, a criminal case rises or falls on the strength of the
prosecution's case, not on the weakness of the defense. Once the prosecution
overcomes the presumption of innocence by proving the elements of the crime
and the identity of the accused as perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, the
burden of evidence then shifts to the defense which shall then test the strength
of the prosecution's case either by showing that no crime was, in fact,
committed or that the accused could not have committed or did not commit the
imputed crime or, at the very least, by casting doubt on the guilt of the
accused.23
In every criminal case, the task of the prosecution is always two-fold: (1) to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged; and (2)
to establish with the same quantum of proof the identity of the person or
persons responsible therefor, because, even if the commission of the crime is a
given, there can be no conviction without the identity of the malefactor being
likewise clearly ascertained.24
The greatest care should be taken in considering the identification of the
accused, especially when this identification is made by a sole witness and the
judgment in the case totally depends on the reliability of the identification. This
level of care and circumspection applies with greater vigor when, as in the
present case, the issue goes beyond pure credibility into constitutional
dimensions arising from the due process rights of the accused.25
In the present case, the records show that PO1 Lumikid's arrest and eventual
conviction were wholly based on the testimony of Matinong who testified as an
eyewitness and who identified PO1 Lumikid as the perpetrator of the crime. To
the prosecution, the trial court, and the appellate com1, an eyewitness
identification coming from the common-law partner of the victim appeared to
have been enough to qualify the identification as fully positive and credible.
Thus, none of them appeared to have fully examined the real evidentiary worth
of the identification Matinong made.
The initial photographic identification in this case carries serious constitutional
law implications in terms of the possible violation of the due process rights of
PO1 Lumikid as it may deny him his rights to a fair trial to the extent that his in-
court identification proceeded from and was influenced by impermissible
suggestions in the earlier photographic identification. Here, an impermissible
suggestion was made when the photographs of the police officers, except PO1
Lumikid, shown to Matinong, were official photographs showing the police
officers in their proper uniform. Likewise, it appears that PO1 Lumikid's
photograph was only a cropped image, and not his official and formal picture in
the police records. In addition, except for PO1 Lumikid, all other policemen in
the pictures are stationed in Baganga, Davao Oriental, while PO1 Lumikid was
the only police officer stationed in Manay, Davao Oriental. At this point, the
initial photographic identification of PO1 Lumikid already cast a doubt as to the
identity of the person who killed Jessie.
Based from the records of the present case, there are three (3) versions as to
how Matinong, the prosecution's lone eyewitness, allegedly saw the
assailant. First, Matinong saw the gunman already running downhill after the
shooting.26 Second, while hugging Jessie, Matinong saw the gunman glance at
her from the cyclone wire near the back of the stage; the gunman then turned
his back and casually walked away.27 Third, prior to going up the stage, she
glanced at the direction where the gunman was positioned at, and she saw the
gunman still aiming his gun towards Jessie.28 Also, it must be noted that based
on Matinong's Sworn Statement, she averred that in the morning of June 15,
2010, while still in Barangay Old Macopa, she saw Barangay Captain Antolin,
together with two (2) camouflaged escorts, who was about to leave the area
She declared under oath that one of the escorts of Barangay Captain Antolin is
the same person she saw who shot the victim in the evening of June 14, 2010,
herein accused-appellant.29
Generally, whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and the
testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight
considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimonies in court, the
former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate,
sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from want of suggestions
and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may be unable to recall the
connected circumstances necessary for his accurate recollection of the
subject.30
The circumstances surrounding this case militate against the application of the
aforecited principle. The inconsistency between the three statements relates to
the identification of the assailant. At Matinong's initial interview, she
categorically declared that she did not see the actual shooting as the gunman
already ran away downhill. On the other hand, in her sworn affidavit, Matinong
saw the gunman glance at her from the cyclone wire near the back of the stage,
and turned his back and casually walked away.31 Meanwhile, during her cross-
examination, she stated that after she heard the gunshot, she looked at the
direction where the gunshot came from, and saw the gunman still aiming his
gun at Jessie. These inconsistencies of the lone witness cannot be taken lightly
as it will cast a doubt as to the true identity of the assailant and the credibility
of the lone witness.
Another glaring inconsistency in Matinong's declarations was apparent in her
sworn statement executed on June 21, 2010. According to her sworn statement,
she saw the assailant on June 15, 2010 which is the day after the shooting
incident. She declared under oath that the person who shot the victim on the
night of June 14, 2010 was the same person she saw in the morning of June 15,
2010 with Barangay Captain Antolin in Barangay Old Macopa. The following are
excerpts of the sworn statement:
41. Q - How sure are you that the person in photograph marked with letter "D"
was the same person who shot Jessie Camangyan on June 14, 2010 at around
10:30 in the evening at the gym arena of Brgy. Macopa, Manay, Davao Oriental?
(At this moment, witness Ruth Matinong shed tears)
A - I am very sure sir. For I clearly saw him as the very same person who was as
if monitoring Jessie Camangyan prior to the shooting, and then again the very
same person I saw face to face as he shot Jessie Camangyan, and then again he
was also the VERY SAME PERSON who escorted Brgy. Capt. Antoling (sic) at the
vicinity near the crime scene in the morning of June 15, 2010 at Brgy. Macopa,
Manay, Davao Oriental.32
However, a review of the entire open court testimony of Matinong will reveal
that no testimony was made by Matinong that she saw PO1 Lumikid on June 15,
2010. The following are Matinong's testimonial account of the second time she
allegedly saw and identified PO1 Lumikid.
Q: By the way Madam witness, after that incident on June 14, 2010, when for
the second time have you seen accused Lumikid?
A: June 21, Ma'am.
Q: Where did you see him?
A: At the Barracks of the Police, Police Camp at Dahican, Mati, Davao Oriental.
Q: Are you referring to the conference room of Davao Oriental Police Provincial
Office, Mati City?
A: Yes Ma'am.33
COURT: Just few clarificatory questions from the Court.
Q: From the time you allegedly saw the accused shot your live-in-partner, how
many days or months again were you able to see the accused?
A: I saw him again on June 21, 2010 when the PPO had a conference.
Q: How were you able to see the accused?
A: The CIDG made me identify if the accused is present.34
It is clear that Matinong asserted in open court that she saw PO1 Lumikid for
the second time only during the case conference. She did not bother to mention
that she saw PO1 Lumikid for the second time on June 15, 2010, as reflected in
her sworn statement. This fact is crucial in determining the identity of the
assailant. The whereabouts of PO1 Lumikid in Barangay Guza, Manay Police
Station and eventually at White Sand Cone Beach Resort were all corroborated
by several defense witnesses and even by police officials. How could Matinong
see PO1 Lumikid in Barangay Old Macopa if he was in another place? Is it
possible that the real assailant was the one Matinong saw in the morning of June
15, 2010 and not PO1 Lumikid? There is no other evidence in this case aside
from the testimony of the lone eyewitness which directly implicates PO1
Lumikid to the crime. The inconsistent statements could not be dismissed as
inconsequential because the inconsistency goes into the very identification of
the perpetrator of the crime, which is a crucial aspect in sustaining a conviction.
In People v. Tumambing,35 we declared that:
A successful prosecution of a criminal action largely depends on proof of two
things: the identification of the author of the crime and his actual commission
of the same. An ample proof that a crime has been committed has no use if the
prosecution is unable to convincingly prove the offender's identity. The
constitutional presumption of innocence that an accused enjoys is not
demolished by an identification that is full of uncertainties.
The inconsistency in the statements of the prosecution's lone witness on
material points significantly erodes the credibility of her testimony, juxtaposed
against the forthright and consistent testimonies of the defense witnesses. With
the probative value of the testimony of the prosecution's lone witness greatly
diminished, the alibi of the accused-appellant must be given credence.
In the face of the deficiency in the proof submitted by the prosecution anent
the identity of the perpetrator of the crime, the alibi of PO1 Lumikid assumes
credence and importance. While the defense of alibi is by nature a weak one, it
assumes commensurate significance and strength where the evidence for the
prosecution is also intrinsically weak. At any rate, even if the defense of the
accused may be weak, the same is inconsequential if, in the first place, the
prosecution failed to discharge the onus of their identity and culpability. Let it
be underscored that conviction must be based on the strength of the
prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense,
it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and not
the accused to prove his innocence.36
While judiciously reviewing the Decision of the RTC, this Court noted a
statement where the RTC began its disquisition of this case, it stated that:
After going over the evidence presented by both parties in this case, the court
finds that the accused has absolutely no solid evidence to rely on for his
acquittal.37
Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the
prosecution. The burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, not on the accused to prove his innocence.38 In the present case, it
appears that the trial court brought it upon PO1 Lumikid to produce evidence to
prove his innocence rather than the prosecution to do so. The statement made
by the trial court is contrary to the fundamental precept of criminal law that the
accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. This rule places upon the
prosecution the task of establishing the guilt of an accused, relying on the
strength of its own evidence, and not banking on the weakness of the defense
of an accused. Requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt finds basis not only in
the due process clause of the Constitution but, similarly, in the right of an
accused to be "presumed innocent until the contrary is proved." "Undoubtedly,
it is the constitutional presumption of innocence that lays such burden upon the
prosecution." Should the prosecution fail to discharge its burden, it follows, as
a matter of course, that an accused must be acquitted.39
Moreover, the prosecution has not completely ruled out the probability that
another person/s may have committed the crime.1âшphi1 It is unusual that
members of the Philippine Army or CAFGU assigned to secure the area, who
were most likely wearing a black t-shirt, camouflage pants and combat boots,
were not invited by the task force for questioning. In fact, it was not established
that PO1 Lumikid was in Barangay Old Macopa during the time of the killing.
Also, it must be emphasized that no physical evidence was presented by the
prosecution that will show that PO1 Lumikid was in Barangay Old Macopa
before, during and after the shooting. Another strange fact from the instant case
was the fact that of the three hundred (300) or more persons in attendance
during the time of the shooting, not even one was presented by the prosecution.
It is apparent in this case that the lower courts greatly relied on the testimony
of Matinong and disregarded all the witnesses presented by the defense for
reasons that the testimonies were mostly immaterial, dealing exclusively on
investigations of the incident, without the submission of any strong evidence in
favor of the accused-appellant to exculpate him from the crime charged.
However, this Court sees the testimony of SPO3 Juddjit Daculan material to the
case. He was one who responded first to the crime scene and investigated by
gathering information relative to the shooting incident. He was one of the first
police officers who interviewed Matinong. Pertinent portions of his testimony
are the following:
Q: What are the particular questions you propounded on Ruth Matinong?
A: First question that I asked her what was (sic) happened and she said that her
live-in-partner Jessie Camangyan was shot by unidentified person. She said he
was shot and then after that...
Q: Just a minute. Was shot?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: What was your subsequent question?
A: My second question is did you see the assailant.
Q: And what was the response?
A: She did not answer, Your Honor, in a yes or no but she elaborate[d] to me.
Q: What was the elaboration?
A: When the singing contest started and until 10:30 in the evening, she heard a
gun burst. When she heard the gun burst, she immediately looked at her live-
in-partner at the stage. She saw her live-in-partner Jessie Camangyan wet with
blood and then he fell on the ground of the barangay stage and she immediately
ran to her live-in-partner but before she ran, she looked around. She turned her
head leftward and she saw a man running at the back of the barangay stage.
xxxx
Q: Did you ask her if she saw the face of the assailant in your investigation?
A: I asked her if she saw the face of the assailant. She could not recognize
because the man was already running towards the back portion of the barangay
stage.40
The following testimony accompanied by the tickler41 of PO3 Mabini and video
footage of the interview of Matinong, where she declared that she only saw the
gunman near a "lubi" (coconut tree) which is clearly several meters away from
where the victim was seated, cast a serious doubt as to her testimony in court
identifying PO1 Lumikid as the assailant. Certainly, we can only speculate at this
stage on who perpetrated the crime as there is nothing on the records to
provide us with any better clue than what has heretofore been surmised.
However, the Court is not called upon to speculate on who committed the crime
and how it was committed. Our task is confined in resolving whether the
prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that the crime alleged in
the Information was committed and that the accused-appellant is the culprit
thereof. Regrettably, the prosecution failed to discharge the onus of proving the
identity of the malefactor.
In this jurisdiction, no less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to
support a judgment of conviction. While the law does not require absolute
certainty, the evidence presented by the prosecution must produce in the mind
of the Court a moral certainty of the accused's guilt. When there is even a
scintilla of doubt, the Court must acquit.42 Therefore, considering the above
circumstances, the acquittal of PO1 Lumikid is called for.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 25, 2017 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01558-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, accused-appellant PO1 Dennis Jess Esteban Lumikid
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged, based on reasonable doubt, and
is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully
held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Regional Superintendent of the G.R. No. 186417 July 27, 2011
Davao Prison and Penal Farm, for immediate implementation. Said Regional
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
Superintendent is ordered to report to this Court within five (5) working days
vs.
from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
FELIPE MIRANDILLA, JR., Defendant and Appellant.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
For Review before this Court is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00271,1 dated 29 February 2008, finding accused Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., (Mirandilla) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape; four counts of rape; and, one count of rape
through sexual assault.
Mirandilla is now asking this Court to acquit him. He contends that he could not
have kidnapped and raped the victim, AAA,2 whom he claims to be his live-in
partner. The records, however, reveal with moral certainty his guilt. Accordingly,
We modify the CA Decision and find him guilty of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and illegal detention with rape.
THE FACTS
AAA narrated her 39-day ordeal in the hands of Mirandilla.
It was 2 December 2000, eve of the fiesta in Barangay San Francisco, Legazpi
City. At the plaza, AAA was dancing with her elder sister, BBB.3
AAA went out of the dancing hall to buy candies in a nearby store. While making
her way back through the crowd, a man grabbed her hand, his arm wrapped her
shoulders, with a knife’s point thrust at her right side. She will come to know the
man’s name at the police station, after her escape, to be Felipe Mirandilla,
Jr.4 He told her not to move or ask for help. Another man joined and went beside
her, while two others stayed at her back, one of whom had a gun. They slipped
through the unsuspecting crowd, walked farther as the deafening music faded
into soft sounds. After a four-hour walk through the grassy fields, they reached
the Mayon International Hotel, where they boarded a waiting tricycle. Upon
passing the Albay Cathedral, the others alighted, leaving AAA alone with
Mirandilla who after receiving a gun from a companion, drove the tricycle
farther away and into the darkness. Minutes later, they reached the Gallera de
Legazpi in Rawis.5
Mirandilla dragged AAA out of the tricycle and pushed her inside a concrete
house. At gunpoint he ordered her to remove her pants.6 When she defied him,
he slapped her and hit her arms with a gun, forced his hands inside her pants,
into her panty, and reaching her vagina, slipped his three fingers and rotated
them inside. The pain weakened her. He forcibly pulled her pants down and
lifting her legs, pushed and pulled his penis inside.7 "Sayang ka," she heard him
whisper at her,8 as she succumbed to pain and exhaustion.
When AAA woke up the following morning, she found herself alone. She cried
for help, shouting until her throat dried. But no one heard her. No rescue came.
At around midnight, Mirandilla arrived together with his gang. Pointing a gun at
AAA, he ordered her to open her mouth; she sheepishly obeyed. He forced his
penis inside her mouth, pulling through her hair with his left hand and slapping
her with his right. After satisfying his lust, he dragged her into the tricycle and
drove to Bogtong, Legazpi. At the road’s side, Mirandilla pushed her against a
reclining tree, gagged her mouth with cloth, punched her arm, thigh, and lap,
and pulled up her over-sized shirt. Her underwear was gone. Then she felt
Mirandilla’s penis inside her vagina. A little while, a companion warned
Mirandilla to move out. And they drove away.9
They reached a nipa hut and AAA was thrown inside. Her mouth was again
covered with cloth. Mirandilla, with a gun aimed at her point blank, grabbed her
shirt, forced her legs open, and again inserted his penis into her vagina.10
The following evening, Mirandilla and his gang brought AAA to Guinobatan,
where she suffered the same fate. They repeatedly detained her at daytime,
moved her back and forth from one place to another on the following nights,
first to Bonga, then back to Guinobatan, where she was locked up in a cell-type
house and was raped repeatedly on the grassy field right outside her cell, then
to Camalig, where they caged her in a small house in the middle of a rice field.
She was allegedly raped 27 times.11
One afternoon, in Guinobatan, AAA succeeded in opening the door of her cell.
Seeing that Mirandilla and his companions were busy playing cards, she rushed
outside and ran, crossed a river, got drenched, and continued running. She
rested for awhile, hiding behind a rock; she walked through the fields and stayed
out of people’s sight for two nights. Finally, she found a road and followed its
path, leading her to the house of Evelyn Guevarra who brought her to the police
station. It was 11 January 2001. AAA was in foul smell, starving and sleepless.
Evelyn Guevarra gave her a bath and the police gave her food. When the police
presented to her pictures of suspected criminals, she recognized the man’s face
– she was certain it was him. He was Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., the police told her.12
The following morning, accompanied by the police, AAA submitted herself to Dr.
Sarah Vasquez, Legazpi City’s Health Officer for medical examination. The doctor
discovered hymenal lacerations in different positions of her hymen, indicative
of sexual intercourse.13 Foul smelling pus also oozed from her vagina - AAA had
contracted gonorrhoea.14
Mirandilla denied the charges against him. This is his version.
Mirandilla first met AAA on 3 October 2000. By stroke of fate, they bumped into THE RTC RULING
each other at the Albay Park where AAA, wearing a school uniform, approached
Mirandilla was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City,
him. They had a short chat. They were neighbors in Barangay San Francisco until
Branch 5, with kidnapping with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape
Mirandilla left his wife and daughter there for good.15
(Crim. Case Nos. 9274 to 9277), and rape through sexual assault (Crim. Case No.
Two days later, Mirandilla and AAA met again at the park. He started courting 9279).
her,16 and, after five days, as AAA celebrated her 18th birthday, they became
The RTC, in its decision dated 1 July 2004, convicted Mirandilla of kidnapping,
lovers. Mirandilla was then 33 years old.
four counts of rape, and one count of rape through sexual assault with this
Immediately, Mirandilla and AAA had sex nightly in their friends’ houses and in finding:
cheap motels. On 24 October 2000, after Mirandilla went to his mother’s house
This Court has arrived at the factual conclusion that Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., in the
in Kilikao, they met again at the park, at their usual meeting place, in front of
company of three others [conferrers], kidnapped AAA in Barangay xxx, City of
the park’s comfort room, near Arlene Moret, a cigarette vendor who also served
xxx, on or on about midnight of December 2, 2000 or early morning of December
as the CR’s guard.17 They decided to elope and live as a couple. They found an
3, 2000, held her in detention for thirty-nine days in separate cells situated in
abandoned house in Rawis, at the back of Gallera de Legazpi. Emilio Mendoza
the City of xxx; xxx; and xxx. Felipe Mirandilla, Jr., carnally abused her while
who owned the house, rented it to them for ₱1,500.00.18 They lived there from
holding a gun and/or a knife for twenty seven times, employing force and
28 October until 11 December 2000.19 From 12 December 2000 until 11 January
intimidation. The twenty seven sexual intercourses were eventually perpetrated
2001,20 Mirandilla and AAA stayed in Rogelio Marcellana’s house, at the
between the City of xxx and the towns of xxx and xxx. At least once, Felipe
resettlement Site in Banquerohan, Legazpi City.
Mirandilla, Jr., put his penis inside the mouth of AAA against her will while
Mirandilla and AAA’s nightly sexual intimacy continued, with abstentions only employing intimidation, threats, and force.26
during AAA’s menstrual periods, the last of which she had on 7 December
THE COURT OF APPEALS RULING
2000.21 In late December, however, Mirandilla, who just arrived home after
visiting his mother in Kilikao, saw AAA soaked in blood, moaning in excruciating On review, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC ruling, convicting
stomach pain.22 AAA had abortion – an inference he drew upon seeing the cover Mirandilla. It found him guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping with
of pills lying beside AAA. Mirandilla claimed that AAA bled for days until she left rape (instead of kidnapping as the RTC ruled), four counts of rape, and one count
him in January 2001 after quarrelling for days.23 of rape by sexual assault.27 It rejected Mirandilla’s defense that he and AAA
were live-in partners and that their sexual encounters were consensual. 28 It
Mirandilla, however, had a second version of this crucial event. He claimed that
noted that Mirandilla failed to adduce any evidence or any credible witness to
AAA missed her menstruation in December 200024 and that he would not have
sustain his defense.29
known she had an abortion had she not confessed it to him.25
Hence, this appeal.
Mirandilla repeats his allegations that the prosecution’s lone witness, AAA, was
not a credible witness and that he and AAA were live-in partners whose intimacy
they expressed in consensual sex.
OUR RULING
We find Mirandilla guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and illegal
detention with rape.
Mirandilla admitted in open court to have had sexual intercourse with AAA,
which happened almost nightly during their cohabitation. He contended that
they were live-in partners, entangled in a whirlwind romance, which intimacy
they expressed in countless passionate sex, which headed ironically to
separation mainly because of AAA’s intentional abortion of their first child to be
– a betrayal in its gravest form which he found hard to forgive.
In stark contrast to Mirandilla’s tale of a love affair, is AAA’s claim of her horrific
ordeal and her flight to freedom after 39 days in captivity during which
Mirandilla raped her 27 times.
First Issue:
Credibility of Prosecution Witness
Jurisprudence is consistent that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must
not only come from a credible witness but must be credible in itself – tested by
human experience, observation, common knowledge and accepted conduct
that has evolved through the years.30
Daggers v. Van Dyck,31 illuminates:
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and
observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We
have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.32
First, the trial judge, who had the opportunity of observing AAA’s manner and
demeanour on the witness stand, was convinced of her credibility: "AAA
appeared to be a simple and truthful woman, whose testimony was consistent,
steady and firm, free from any material and serious contradictions."33 The court
continued:
The record nowhere yields any evidence of ill motive on the part of AAA to
influence her in fabricating criminal charges against Felipe Mirandilla, Jr. The
absence of ill motive enhances the standing of AAA as a witness. x x x.
When AAA testified in court, she was sobbing. While she was facing Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., to positively identify him in open court, she was crying. Felipe
Mirandilla Jr.’s response was to smile. AAA was a picture of a woman who was
gravely harmed, craving for justice. x x x.34
Second, the trial court found AAA’s testimony to be credible in itself. AAA’s
ordeal was entered into the police blotter immediately after her
escape,35 negating opportunity for concoction.36 While in Mirandilla’s company,
none of her parents, brothers, sisters, relatives, classmates, or anyone who
knew her, visited, saw, or talked to her. None of them knew her
whereabouts.37 AAA’s testimony was corroborated by Dr. Sarah Vasquez,
Legazpi City’s Health Officer, who discovered the presence not only of hymenal
lacerations but also gonorrhoea, a sexually transmitted disease.
More importantly, AAA remained consistent in the midst of gruelling cross
examination. The defense lawyer tried to impeach her testimony, but failed to
do so.
The Court of Appeals confirmed AAA’s credibility in affirming the RTC decision.
We emphasize that a trial court’s assessment of a witness’ credibility, when
affirmed by the CA, is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight or
influence.38 This is so because of the judicial experience that trial courts are in a
better position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses
themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner of
testifying under gruelling examination.39 Thus, in Estioca v. People,40 we held:
In resolving issues pertaining to the credibility of the witnesses, this Court is
guided by the following principles: (1) the reviewing court will not disturb the
findings of the lower courts, unless there is a showing that it overlooked or
misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that may affect
the result of the case; (2) the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses are entitled to great respect and even finality, as it had the
opportunity to examine their demeanour when they testified on the witness
stand; and (3) a witness who testifies in a clear, positive and convincing manner
is a credible witness.41
Second Issue
"Sweetheart Theory" not Proven
Accused’s bare invocation of sweetheart theory cannot alone, stand. To be
credible, it must be corroborated by documentary, testimonial, or other
evidence.42 Usually, these are letters, notes, photos, mementos, or credible
testimonies of those who know the lovers.43
The sweetheart theory as a defense, however, necessarily admits carnal
knowledge, the first element of rape. Effectively, it leaves the prosecution the
burden to prove only force or intimidation, the coupling element of rape. Love,
is not a license for lust.44
This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult to defend, for it is
not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof;45 after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case,46 the burden of
evidence is shifted to the accused,47 who has to adduce evidence that the
intercourse was consensual.48
A prima facie case arises when the party having the burden of proof has
produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of
the issue in litigation.49
Burden of evidence is "that logical necessity which rests on a party at any
particular time during the trial to create a prima facie case in his favour or to
overthrow one when created against him."50(Emphasis supplied)
Mirandilla with his version of facts as narrated above attempted to meet the
prosecution’s prima facie case. To corroborate it, he presented his mother,
Alicia Mirandilla; his relatives, Rogelio Marcellana and Emilio Mendoza; and, his
friend Arlene Moret.
Arlene Moret, the cigarette vendor who also served as the CR’s guard, testified
that on 30 October 2000, AAA and Mirandilla arrived together at the
park.51 They approached her and chatted with her. On cross examination, she
claimed otherwise: Mirandilla arrived alone two hours earlier, chatting with her
first, before AAA finally came.52 She also claimed meeting the couple for the first
time on 30 October 2000, only to contradict herself on cross examination with
the version that she met them previously, three times at least, in the previous
month.53 On the other hand, Mirandilla claimed first meeting AAA on 3 October
2000 at the park.54
The accused’s mother, Alicia Mirandilla, testified meeting her son only once, and
living in Kilikao only after his imprisonment.55 This contradicted Mirandilla’s
claim that he visited his mother several times in Kilikao, from October 2000 until
January 2001.56
Even Mirandilla contradicted himself. His claim that he saw AAA soaked in
blood, agonizing in pain, with the abortifacient pills’ cover lying nearby, cannot
be reconciled with his other claim that he came to know AAA’s abortion only
through the latter’s admission.57
Taken individually and as a whole, the defense witnesses’ testimonies
contradicted each other and flip-flopped on materials facts, constraining this
Court to infer that they concocted stories in a desperate attempt to exonerate
the accused.
As a rule, self-contradictions and contradictory statement of witnesses should
be reconciled,58 it being true that such is possible since a witness is not expected
to give error-free testimony considering the lapse of time and the treachery of
human memory.59 But, this principle, learned from lessons of human
experience, applies only to minor or trivial matters – innocent lapses that do not
affect witness’ credibility.60 They do not apply to self-contradictions on material
facts.61 Where these contradictions cannot be reconciled, the Court has to reject
the testimonies,62 and apply the maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. Thus,
To completely disregard all the testimony of a witness based on the maxim
falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, testimony must have been false as to a material
point, and the witness must have a conscious and deliberate intention to falsify
a material point. In other words, its requirements, which must concur, are the
following: (1) that the false testimony is as to one or more material points; and
(2) that there should be a conscious and deliberate intention to falsity.63
Crimes and Punishment
An appeal in criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question,
including one not raised by the parties.64 This was our pronouncement in the
1902 landmark case of U.S. v. Abijan,65 which is now embodied in Section 11,
Rule 124 of the Rules of Court:
SEC 11. Scope of Judgment. – The Court of Appeals may reverse, affirm, or
modify the judgment and increase or reduce the penalty imposed by the trial
court, remand the case to the Regional Trial Court for new trial or retrial, or
dismiss the case. (Emphasis supplied)
The reason behind this rule is that when an accused appeals from the sentence
of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court,
which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate,
whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.66
To reiterate, the six informations charged Mirandilla with kidnapping and
serious illegal detention with rape (Crim. Case No. 9278), four counts of rape
(Crim. Case Nos. 9274-75-76-77), and one count of rape through sexual assault
(Crim. Case No. 9279).
The accusatory portion of the information in Criminal Case No. 9278 alleged that
Mirandilla kidnapped AAA and seriously and illegally detained her for more than
three days during which time he had carnal knowledge of her, against her will.67
The Court agrees with the CA in finding Mirandilla guilty of the special complex
crime of kidnapping with rape, instead of simple kidnapping as the RTC ruled. It
was the RTC, no less, which found that Mirandilla kidnapped AAA, held her in
detention for 39 days and carnally abused her while holding a gun and/or a
knife.68
Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation; xxx.
2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph
1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or
anal orifice of another person.
AAA was able to prove each element of rape committed under Article 266-A,
par. 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, that (1) Mirandilla had carnal knowledge of
her; (2) through force, threat, or intimidation. She was also able to prove each
element of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised
Penal Code: (1) Mirandilla inserted his penis into her mouth; (2) through force,
threat, or intimidation.
Likewise, kidnapping and serious illegal detention is provided for under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty,
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days. xxx
An imminent Spanish commentator explained:
la detención, la prición, la privación de la libertad de una persona, en cualquier
forma y por cualquier medio ó por cualquier tiempo en virtud de la cual resulte
interrumpido el libre ejercicio de su actividad."69
Emphatically, the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 7659,70 states that when the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. This provision gives
rise to a special complex crime. As the Court explained in People v.
Larrañaga,71 this arises where the law provides a single penalty for two or more
component offenses.72
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one
kidnapping with rape.73 This is because these composite acts are regarded as a
single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only
one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the seriousness of rape
because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present
case, there is only one crime committed – the special complex crime of
kidnapping with rape.
However, for the crime of kidnapping with rape, as in this case, the offender
should not have taken the victim with lewd designs, otherwise, it would be
complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. In People v. Garcia,74 we
explained that if the taking was by forcible abduction and the woman was raped
several times, the crimes committed is one complex crime of forcible abduction
with rape, in as much as the forcible abduction was only necessary for the first
rape; and each of the other counts of rape constitutes distinct and separate
count of rape.75
It having been established that Mirandilla’s act was kidnapping and serious
illegal detention (not forcible abduction) and on the occasion thereof, he raped
AAA several times, We hold that Mirandilla is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape,
warranting the penalty of death. However, in view of R.A. No. 9346 entitled, An
Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,76 the penalty imposition of death, but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting
of death is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua,77 without eligibility for the penalty of death attended the commission of the offense. 90 As explained
parole.78 in People v. Salome,91 while R.A. No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty, the fact remains that the penalty provided for by the law for a heinous
We, therefore, modify the CA Decision. We hold that the separate informations
offense is still death, and the offense is still heinous.92 (Emphasis supplied)
of rape cannot be considered as separate and distinct crimes in view of the
above discussion. In addition, AAA is entitled to moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 of the Civil
Code,93 without the necessity of additional pleadings or proof other than the
As to the award of damages, we have the following rulings.
fact of rape. This move of dispensing evidence to prove moral damage in rape
This Court has consistently held that upon the finding of the fact of rape, the cases, traces its origin in People v. Prades,94 where we held that:
award of civil damages ex delicto is mandatory.79 As we elucidated in People v.
The Court has also resolved that in crimes of rape, such as that under
Prades,80 the award authorized by the criminal law as civil indemnity ex delicto
consideration, moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the
for the offended party, aside from other proven actual damages, is itself
criminal proceeding, in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law.81 Thus, we held that
for pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice.
the civil liability ex delicto provided by the Revised Penal Code, that is,
Indeed, the conventional requirement of allegata et probata in civil procedure
restitution, reparation, and indemnification,82 all correspond to actual or
and for essentially civil cases should be dispensed with in criminal prosecutions
compensatory damages in the Civil Code.83
for rape with the civil aspect included therein, since no appropriate pleadings
In the 1998 landmark case of People v. Victor,84 the Court enunciated that if, in are filed wherein such allegations can be made. (Emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
the crime of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the
Corollarily, the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental,
victim shall be in the increased amount of NOT85 less than ₱75,000.00. To
physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
reiterate the words of the Court: "this is not only a reaction to the apathetic
damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the
societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuation over time, but
victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her
also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence
part as a gauge of her credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being
of heinous crimes..."86 xxx (Emphasis supplied)
ineludibly present in the case need not go through superfluity of still being
After the enactment R.A. 9346,87 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, proven through a testimonial charade. (Emphasis supplied)95
questions arose as to the continued applicability of the Victor88 ruling. Thus,
AAA is also entitled to exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00, pursuant to the
in People v. Quiachon,89 the Court pronounced that even if the penalty of death
present jurisprudence.
is not to be imposed because of R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity ex delicto of
₱75,000.00 still applies because this indemnity is not dependent on the actual
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00271 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Felipe
Mirandilla, Jr., is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape under the last
paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, by R.A. No.
7659, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without
eligibility for parole, and to pay the offended party AAA, the amounts of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
G.R. No. 227698
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
HERNANDO BONGOS, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal via Rule 45 from the Decision1 dated October 16,
2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06774, affirming in toto the
Decision2 dated March 7, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10,
Legazpi City in Criminal Case No. 11758, convicting accused-appellant Hernando
Bongos y Arevalo of the complex crime of robbery with rape.
On October 14, 2010, the prosecution charged Hernando Bongos y Arevalo alias
"Ando/Pat" and Ronel Dexisne y Altavano alias "Popoy" before the RTC, Legazpi
City with the complex crime of robbery with rape.
Only accused Bongos was arrested, while co-accused Ronel Dexisne was at-
large. The Information3 alleged
That on or about the 8th day of June, 2010, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a common purpose,
armed with a gun, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to gain and by means of violence and intimidation take, steal, and carry
away cash money in the amount of ₱20,000.00 by destroying the lock of the
drawer of spouses BBB and CCC without their knowledge and consent; that by
reason or on occasion of said robbery, above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and helping one another for a common purpose with lewd design,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force
and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of one [AAA] househelper of spouses
BBB and CCC, against her will and without her consent, and to the damage and
prejudice of the aforesaid victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on March 15, 2011, Bongos pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged, while Dexisne remained at-large. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
The facts are as follows:
At around 7 o'clock in the evening of June 8, 2010, at Barangay 123, Legazpi
City, AAA, helper of BBB and CCC, was left to tend the house when CCC went to
her mother's house. While AAA was washing dishes, two male persons entered
the house through the kitchen. She identified them as Bongos, the one wearing
bonnet up to his forehead, and Dexisne, the one wearing black short pants with
red stripes on the side. She knew them because they are neighbors of her
employers. Bongos pointed a gun at her, while Dexisne pointed his knife. They
forced her to enter the room where the money of her employer was and
demanded her to open the drawer. Since it was locked, Dexisne forced it open
using a steel, while Bongos remained at AAA's side poking the gun at her neck.
After they took the money, they forcibly dragged AAA outside the house until
they reached a clearing on the lower level of the yard. There, armed with a knife
and gun, both accused threatened and ordered AAA to undress herself. When
she refused to do so, Dexisne got violent and slashed her leg and then hit her
chest near her left breast which caused her to lose consciousness.4
When AAA woke up, she no longer had her clothes on and felt pain on her
private part. She was afraid so she went to DDD, the grandfather of CCC and
asked for help. DDD summoned someone to fetch CCC to come home. Together
with CCC, AAA reported the robbery incident to the authorities the following
day. However, AAA did not tell CCC of the rape incident because she was
ashamed and afraid that accused would really make good of their threat to kill
or harm her in case she makes a report about the incident.5
CCC confirmed that on June 8, 2010, at around 8 o'clock in the evening, the two
maids of her grandfather went to the house of her mother and told her that an
incident happened in her house. When she reached the house of her
grandfather, she saw AAA crying. She asked AAA what happened and the latter
told her that someone entered her house and took money. CCC testified that
she immediately went to her house where she discovered that Php20,000.00
was indeed missing from the drawer. CCC also testified that on June 12, 2010,
AAA told her that she was likewise raped by the accused. CCC knew accused
"Poypoy" as Dexisne and "Ando" as Bongos since both were her neighbors. They
had the incident blottered at the police station on June 14, 2010.6
In the Medico-Legal Report issued on June 17, 2010 by Dr. James Belgira,7 the
genital examination upon AAA revealed that her hymen was dilated and there
were deep-healed lacerations at 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock positions, which
concluded that there were clear signs of blunt vaginal penetrating trauma. Later,
Dr. Belgira testified that the approximate time wherein the deep-healed
lacerations were inflicted was around three to five days prior to the examination
day. He examined AAA on June 15, 2010. He further testified that the cause of
the dilation and lacerations of the hymen may be due to a blunt protruding hard
object inserted in the vagina which has a diameter sufficient enough to break
the maximum elasticity of the hymenal body.
For its part, the defense alleged that around 1 o'clock in the afternoon of June
8, 2010, Bongos was at the house of his parents in Barangay 123, Legazpi City
to fix the tricycle of his father. Those present at the house were his father and
mother, Nimfa Bongos and Dexisne. Bongos claimed that he finished fixing the
tricycle at around 8 o'clock in the evening and then he went directly to his house,
about 150 meters away from his father's house, while Dexisne was left behind.
He only knew of the case against him when he was summoned. Prior to June 8,
2010, he does not know any reason or ill-motive on the part of AAA or spouses
BBB and CCC in indicting him in the case. However, later on he was told by CCC
that because he testified in favor of Dexisne, he would also be included in the
case.
In a Decision8 dated March 7, 2014, the court a quo convicted Bongos of the
complex crime of robbery with rape. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads as follows:
Above premises considered, accused Hernando Bongos is hereby declared
GUILTY of the complex crime of robbery with rape, as defined and penalized
under Article 294 [1] of the Revised Penal Code. He is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is also ordered to return the amount of ₱20,000.00, which was proven by the
prosecution to have been taken by Bongos and his co-accused, to [CCC] and to
pay the latter the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages for accused' act of
having violated the sanctity of [CCC's] home. He is also ordered to pay
exemplary damages in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) to
[CCC].
Also, accused is hereby ordered to pay [AAA] the following amounts: (i)
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (ii) ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and (iii)
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
It is further understood that an interest rate of 6% per annum, reckoned upon
the finality of this judgment, is imposed on all the damages awarded both to
[CCC] and [AAA].
The case against Ronel Dexisne is hereby sent to the archives pending his arrest.
So Ordered.9
The court a quo rejected Bongos' defense of alibi and denial, and instead gave
credence and probative weight to AAA's testimony.1âwphi1 It held that
although AAA did not witness the actual rape as she was unconscious when it
happened, the circumstantial evidence taken all together proved that on the
occasion of robbery, she was raped by the malefactors. It, likewise, found that
there was also conspiracy between Bongos and Dexisne from their coordinated
acts from the time they gained entry into BBB and CCC's house, until they have
successfully taken the money from AAA through force and intimidation and the
eventual rape of her.
Unperturbed, Bongos appealed the court a quo's decision before the Court of
Appeals. However, on October 16, 2015, in its disputed Decision,10 the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
Hence, this appeal, raising the same issue brought before the appellate court,
to wit:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S
FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The appeal lacks merit.
Robbery with rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. To
be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the
taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is
accompanied by rape.11
For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown
that the rape was committed by reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not
the other way around. This special complex crime under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original intent of the
accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another
and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.12
After going over the records of the case, We find no compelling reason to disturb
the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court.1âwphi1 The
prosecution was able to establish that Bongos and Dexisne entered the house
of the victims armed with a handgun and knife and took spouses BBB and CCC's
money amounting to ₱20,000.00 without consent and by means of violence and
intimidation.
During trial, AAA testified as to the identity of Bongos and Dexisne as the
perpetrators, as well as the events that transpired during the incident, to wit:
xxxx
ARP CALLEJA
Q And, could you please tell us who were those two persons who entered the
house?
A Ronel Dexisne and Hernando Bongos y Arevalo.
Q Is this Ronel Dexisne present in Court now?
A He is not in court.
Q How about Hernando Bongos?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you please point to him?
A (At this juncture the witness points to a man seated in front of the row of
benches inside the court rooms wearing a yellow t-shirt and light blue pants with
white stripes, who when asked of his name answered that he is Hernando
Bongos)
Q Prior to June 8, 2010 are you familiar with Hernando Bongos?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Could you tell us the reason why you are already familiar with Hernando
Bongos?
A He is a neighbor of my employer in Banquerohan.
Q You said that those two persons, Ronel Dexisne and Hernando Bongos,
entered the house. After entering the house, what did they do?
A. The poked a gun and pointed a knife at me.
Q Who was the person who poked a gun at you?
A It was Hernando Bongos, Sir. (At this juncture the witness points to accused
Hernando Bongos)
Q How about the person who pointed a knife at you?
A It was Ronel Dexisne, Sir.
Q After those two persons poked a gun and pointed a knife at you, what
happened next?
A They forced me to enter the room.
Q And what happened next, after they forced you to enter the room.
A They were asking me to point where the money of my employer was.
Q Did you comply with that order? x x x x.13
A It took me quite a time before I pointed it to them. ATTY. RANESES ON CROSS-EXAMINATION:
Q After you pointed to them where the money was, what happened next? Q. Your complaint states that on June 8, 2010 at about 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, the two (2) accused with reference to Dexisne and Bongos, Bongos now
A After they get (sic) the money they still wanted me to go with them outside.
being present, entered the house where you were working. The house
Q Where was the money placed? belonging to [BBB]. Is that true?
A Inside the drawer. A Yes, Sir.
Q Who opened the drawer? Q At that time, Bongos was armed with a gun or a firearm?
A Ronel Dexisne. A Yes, Sir.
xxxx Q And Dexisne was also with a knife
Q How was it opened by Dexisne? A Yes, Sir.
A By a steel. Q Bongos poked a gun at you?
Q You mean he forcibly destroyed the lock then he opened the drawer? A Yes, Sir.
A. Yes, Your Honor. Q While Dexisne pointed his knife at you also?
xxxx A Yes, Sir.
Q While Dexisne was opening the drawer what was Hernando Bongos [d]oing? Q After that and while Bongos was still pointing a gun at you....
A He was poking a gun at me. (interrupted)
Q How far were you from Dexisne during that time? ARP CALLEJA
A Just near. Your Honor please may I just be clarified if the surname Bongos refers to the
Q On what part of your body was the gun poked? accused as the one arraigned?

A On my neck. ATTY. RANESES

He is not Atty. Bongos. Q Did you not ask them why they knew that there is money kept in the room of
your employer?
ARP CALLEJA
A No, Sir.
May we know from the defense counsel if that person he mentions as Bongos is
the one arraigned and now present in court? Q And did you point to them where the money was kept?
ATTY. RANESES A Yes, Sir
Admitted, Your Honor. Q Where was the money kept?
COURT A Inside the drawer.
Atty. Raneses, you are not the counsel for accused Dexisne? Just for accused Q And what did they do after you pointed the place where the money was kept?
Bongos?
A They got it, Sir.
ATTY. RANESES
Q Both of them took the money?
Yes, only for Bongos. I mentioned Dexisne Your Honor because at that time both
A Yes, Sir.
of them were present and both of them are supposed to be examined in the
rape of [AAA]. Q How were they able to get the money?

Q Now, while the accused Bongos poked a gun at you and Dexisne pointed his A The drawer was locked. They used a piece of steel to destroy the lock.
knife at you, they dragged you at a room in the house of your employer, is that Q You mean both of them used the steel to open the lock?
correct?
A Yes, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
Q. Who was carrying the piece of steel which they forced to open the lock?
Q And what did they do after they dragged you inside the room?
A. Dexisne Sir.
A They forced me to show to them where the money was kept.
COURT (To the Witness)
Q Which money are you referring to?
Q. He was the one who forced the lock of the drawer?
A The money of [BBB].
A. Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. RANESES
Q And after Dexisne took the money, where did he place the money? ARP CALLEJA ON DIRECT EXAMINATION OF AAA
A. In a bag, Sir. xxxx
Q. Whose bag was it? Q After the two, Dexisne and Bongos, got the money what did they do next?
A. Dexisne Sir. A They brought me outside of our fence.
COURT (To the Witness) Q Could you tell us how were you brought outside of your fence?
Q You mean when Dexisne and Bongos arrived at the house of [BBB], Dexisne A They pulled me.
had a bag with him?
Q And who was the person who pulled you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
A It was Ronel Dexisne, Sir.
COURT
Q And on what part of your body was being pulled by Ronel Dexisne?
Okay.
A Here, Sir. (Witness holding her left arm near the elbow.)
ATTY RANESES
Q And, while Dexisne was pulling you, what was Bongos doing then?
Q. In other words, Dexisne had with him a bag and he was likewise armed with
A He was pushing my back and at the same time poking the gun at me.
a knife?
Q And after the two pulled you out of the fence what happened next?
A. Yes, Sir.14
A On the lower part of the place outside the fence that was where they raped
Having established that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully
me.
taken by the accused-appellant, intent to gain was sufficiently proven. Intent to
gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of robbery, is an internal Q What do you mean by the word rape?
act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Thus, the first three A Before they raped be (sic) they forced me to undress myself but I did not do
elements of the crime were clearly established. it.
As to the last requirement, the courts a quo correctly held that although AAA Q What was your position when you were being forced to undress?
did not exactly witness the actual rape because she was unconscious at that
time, circumstantial evidence shows that the victim was raped by the appellant A I was then standing Sir.
and his co-accused, to wit: Q And did you undress yourself?
A No, Sir. A Yes, Sir.
Q And what happened next after you did not comply with their order? Q While the accused Bongos was pushing you from behind and at the same time
pointing his gun at you?
A Ronel Dexisne got mad at me and all I can remember is he hit me here?
(Witness pointing at the left side of her body just beside her left breast) A Yes, Sir.
Q After Dexisne hit you wbat happened next? Q When they reached the grassy patch with you did Dexisne and Bongos undress
you?
A I lost consciousness.
A Yes, Sir.
Q For how many minutes did you regain consciousness?
Q And because you refused he delivered a fistic blow at the left side of your
A I do not know, Sir.
breast?
Q After you regain (sic) consciousness what did you discover to (sic) your body?
A Yes, Sir.
A After I regained consciousness I found out that I have no longer my clothes on.
Q After that, the rape took place?
Q Are you telling us that when you regain (sic) consciousness you were totally
A I lost consciousness.
naked?
Q In other words, you are not sure whether or not you were raped because you
A Yes, Sir.
were unconscious?
Q Were you able to locate your dress after you regain (sic) consciousness?
A When I regained my consciousness, I was already undressed Sir.
A Yes, Sir.
Q I am asking you whether or not you knew that you were raped not whether
Q In what particular place? you were undressed or not after you regained your consciousness.
A A little far from where I was.15 ARP CALLEJA
xxxx May I put into the records Your Honor that the witness is crying while being
ATTY. RANESES ON CROSS-EXAMINATION OF AAA: cross-examined.

Q Actually it was Dexisne who dragged you by holding you by your left hand, is COURT (To the Witness)
that not correct?
Q Okay, I think what the counsel wants to ask you is whether you knew that you
were being raped actually because you said that you lost consciousness.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So you knew. How did you come to know that because you said earlier that
you lost consciousness?
A When I regained consciousness, I felt pain in my ....
Q In your vagina?
A Yes, Your Honor.16
Circumstantial evidence, also known as indirect or presumptive evidence, refers
to proof of collateral facts and circumstances when the existence of the main
fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. A judgment of conviction based on
circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form
an unbroken chain that results in a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.17
Here, the prosecution presented circumstantial evidence that when analyzed
and taken together, lead to the obvious conclusion that Bongos and Dexisne also
raped AAA on the occasion of the robbery: first, after appellant took the money,
they forcibly dragged AAA outside of the house's fence;18 second, appellant
forced AAA to undress; third, when AAA refused, co-accused Dexisne got mad
and hit her at her chest causing her to lose consciousness; fourth, when AAA
regained consciousness, AAA had no longer clothes on; and fifth, she felt pain in
her private part.
In several decided cases, the victim was unconscious and was not aware of the
sexual intercourse that transpired, yet the accused was found guilty on the basis
of circumstantial evidence.
In People v. Gaufo, 19 the victim was hit on her head by the accused when she
fought back and asked for help. The accused then punched her abdomen
causing her to lose consciousness. Upon regaining her bearings, she noticed that
she had no more underwear, her private part was bleeding and her body was
painful. The combination of these circumstances, among others, led the Court
to adjudge the accused guilty of rape.
In People v. Evangelia, 20 when one of the robbers stripped off AAA's clothes and
AAA resisted and fought back, appellant slammed her head twice against the
concrete wall, causing her to lose consciousness. When she regained her senses,
appellant and the other robbers were already gone, and she found herself lying
on the side on the floor of the comfort room with her feet untied and her hands
still tied behind her back. She saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side. She
suffered pain in her knees, head, stomach, and her vagina, which was bleeding.
The Court found that the accused raped the victim:
In People v. Pabol, 21 the victim shouted for help and then accused covered her
mouth and she fell unconscious. When she had woken up, she discovered that
her ears had been sliced, her blouse opened and her underwear stained with
her own blood. She also experienced pain in her private part after the incident.
Given the foregoing circumstances, the Court found that the accused raped the
victim.
Bongos, however, while he asserted that at the time of the incident, both him
and Dexisne were in his father's house in Purok 2, 'Banquerohan, Legazpi City,
he was unable to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime considering that his father's house was just around 250
meters away from BBB's house.22 Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was
committed and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the
place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where
it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.
Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene,
the defense of alibi must fail.23
Thus, between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one
hand, and the bare denial of the appellant, on the other, the former must
perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative
testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi
and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative
and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered
with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are
inherently weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and
concocted.24 Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of prosecution
witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the
appellant.25
We are also in concurrence with the findings of the courts a quo of conspiracy
between Bongos and Dexisne. Conspiracy was shown by the coordinated acts of
Bongos and Dexisne from the time they gained entry into BBB and CCC's
residence, went to their room and forcibly opened the drawer of the bedroom
table and took the money inside; and thereafter forcibly dragged AAA outside
of the house and raped her. There can be no other conclusion than that the
successful perpetration of the crime was done through the concerted efforts of
Bongos and Dexisne.
Moreover, the rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a
consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein
are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of
them took part in the rape. Thus, in People v. Verceles, et al., 26 We have ruled
that once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of
the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape
committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them
proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The
immediately preceding condition is absent in the instant case.27
We do not find it necessary anymore to belabor on the issue raised by the
appellant on the probative value of the medico-legal report. A medicolegal
report is not indispensable to the prosecution of the rape case, it being merely
corroborative in nature.28 At this point, the fact of robbery and rape and the
identity of the perpetrators were proven even by the lone testimony of AAA.
The credible disclosure of AAA that Bongos and Dexisne raped her on the
occasion of the robbery is the most important proof of the commission of the
crime.
Likewise, delay in reporting an incident of rape due to threats does not affect
the credibility of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of
rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was unreasonable and
unexplained.29 AAA explained that she did not immediately report that she was
also raped during the occasion of the robbery incident because appellant, who
was also a neighbor, threatened to kill her if she does.30 Nonetheless, the 9-day
delay in reporting the rape incident cannot be said to be unreasonable
considering the shame and fear that AAA felt. Such delay does not affect the
truthfulness of the charge in the absence of other circumstances that show the
same to be a mere concoction or impelled by some ill motive.31
Finally, the Information should have alleged that the crime was committed Accused-appellant is, likewise, ORDERED TO RETURN the amount of ₱20,000.00
inside the dwelling of the victims which was proven during the trial. We could which was stolen from Spouses BBB and CCC as proven during the trial.
not, therefore, consider this as an aggravating circumstance, although if alleged,
Accused-appellant is further DIRECTED TO PAY the victim AAA the amounts of
it should have been admitted since the crime committed is robbery with
₱l00,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱l00,000.00 as moral damages and ₱l00,000.00
violence and thus could have increased the penalty to death although it could
as exemplary damages. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum is
not be imposed because of the provisions of RA 9346 and the accused could not
imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from date of finality of this
be eligible for parole. However, as enunciated in People v.
Decision until fully paid.
Jugueta32citing People v. Catubig, 33 the said aggravating circumstance can be
appreciated but only for determining the civil liability awarded. Accordingly, the SO ORDERED.
award of civil, moral, and exemplary damages should be increased to
₱100,000.00 each.
In view of the foregoing, We find no basis to disturb the findings of the trial court
as affirmed by the appellate court with regard to accused-appellant's guilt. The
prosecution's evidence established with certainty that accused-appellant,
together with Dexisne, conspired with each other in stealing the money of BBB
and CCC through violence and intimidation by pointing the gun and poking the
knife on AAA who was then left alone in the house at the time of the incident.
Furthermore, the prosecution was able to show that, on the occasion of the
robbery, AAA was also raped. We, thus, agree with the courts a quo in their
appreciation that the original intent of Bongos and Dexisne was to take, with
intent to gain, the personal effects of BBB and CCC, and rape was committed on
the occasion thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06774
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Hernando Bongos is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of ROBBERY
WITH RAPE, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
G.R. No. 238889, October 03, 2018 were met by Marlyn Buhisan who offered girls for sex. The girls were made to
line up in front of the police officers. Thereafter, Buhisan led the police officers
ANTONIO PLANTERAS, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
upstairs where they saw petitioner at the reception counter who appeared to
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
be aware and listening to the on-going negotiation. When PO1 Rusiana asked
DECISION about the room rates, petitioner informed him that the room charge is P40.00
PERALTA, J.: per hour plus P50.00 for every succeeding hour. After that, the police officers
and the girls who were introduced to them left the lodge for drinks within the
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules vicinity of xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City.
of Court, dated May 18, 2018, of petitioner Antonio Planteras, Jr. that seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated April 24, 2017 and Resolution2 dated Subsequently, an entrapment operation was conducted on April 28, 2009 by
March 21, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02077, which members of the Regional Special Investigation Unit, the Carbon Police
affirmed the Decision3 dated November 10, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court Station, barangay tanods, and representatives from the Department of Social
(RTC), Branch 20, Cebu City convicting the same petitioner of violation of Section Welfare and Development (DSWD). PO1 Hazal Tomongtong (PO1 Tomongtong)
5, par. (a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9208 or promoting trafficking in persons. was assigned as the photographer and recorder, PO2 Linda Almohallas (PO2
Almohallas) as evidence custodian, and PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Ariel Llanes
The facts follow. (PO1 Llanes) as poseur-customers and were given the marked money consisting
of fifteen (15) P100.00 bills.
P/S Int. Audie Villacin directed the elements of the Regional Investigation
Detective Division (RIDM) to conduct surveillance operations at xxxxxxxxxxx At the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes were approached by
Lodge, located along xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, after receiving reports sometime Marichu Tawi who offered girls for sexual favors for the price of P300.00 each.
in the second week of March 2009, about the alleged trafficking in persons and PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, along with three (3) girls, namely, BBB, CCC,
sexual exploitation being committed at the said place. On March 16, 2009, DOD, then went upstairs. PO3 Dumaguit requested the services of one more girl
reports came in that pimps were indeed offering the sexual services of young from Tawi. At that time, Buhisan arrived and joined the on-going negotiation.
girls to various customers at the entrance/exit door of the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, Tawi left and when she returned, she brought with her a young girl, AAA.
owned by petitioner and his wife, Christina Planteras. Petitioner was behind the reception counter when the said negotiation took
place and appeared to be listening to the said transaction. PO3 Dumaguit and
On March 19, 2009, PO3 Jose Erwin Dumaguit (PO3 Dumaguit) and PO1 Arnold PO1 Llanes chose three (3) girls, one of whom was AAA, and then handed over
Rusiana (PO1 Rusiana) conducted another surveillance. They proceeded to the the marked money (P900.00) to Buhisan. The police officers also gave P200.00
xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge armed with a concealed camera and at the said place, they as "tip" for Tawi. After that, PO3 Dumaguit executed the pre-arranged signal, a
"missed call" on the rest of the team. When the rest of the team arrived at the accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each
xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit announced that they are police officers and other, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain, did then and there recruit,
immediately thereafter, Buhisan, Tawi, petitioner and his wife, Christina, were transport and then maintain for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, or
arrested. PO3 Dumaguit retrieved the marked money from Buhisan, and Tawi sexual exploitation four females, namely, DDD, CCC, BBB and one (1) of which is
then handed it over to PO2 Almohallas. Consequently, the police officers a child in the name of AAA, 17 years old, with the qualifying aggravating
brought the persons arrested to their office and turned over the girls who were circumstances:
exploited to the DSWD.
1. The trafficked persons are children; and
As a result, two (2) Informations were filed against Buhisan, Tawi, Christina and 2. That the crime is committed in large scale.
petitioner, thus:
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
In Criminal Case No. CBU-86038 (against [petitioner] Planteras and Christina
Planteras) On arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused all pleaded "not guilty" to their
respective charges.
That on or about the 28th day of April 2009, and for sometime prior thereto, in
the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO3 Dumaguit and PO2
the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping Almohallas. The prosecution also presented the testimony of AAA to
with one another, with deliberate intent, with intent of gain, did then and there corroborate the testimonies of the said police officers.
knowingly allow its establishment xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge located at xxxxxxxxxxx,
Cebu City, to be used for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons, that AAA, who was then 17 years old, testified that, in February 2009, while looking
is, by allowing BBB, CCC, DDD and AAA, a minor, 17 years old, to engage in for her sister at the vicinity of xxxxxxxxxxx, Cebu City, she met Buhisan who
prostitution in the said establishment. inquired whether she wanted money in exchange for her sexual services to
customers. AAA agreed and, thereafter. Buhisan would find customers for her.
CONTRARY TO LAW. Upon instructions of Buhisan, the latter would bring the customers to the
xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge where the illicit activity will be consummated. AAA further
In Criminal Case No. CBU-86039 (against Buhisan and Tawi) narrated that she is familiar with Tawi, who was also a prostitute. Tawi,
according to AAA, on previous occasions, also acted as a pimp for her. Each
That on or about the 28th day of April 2009, at about 10:00 p.m., in the City of customer would pay Php300.00 for AAA's services. Of the said rate, she receives
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said only Php200.00, while the remainder is kept by either Buhisan or Tawi as their
commission. of payment. However, according to Buhisan, petitioner instructed her to collect
the payment from the four (4) guests which she complied. The customers gave
Regarding petitioner, AAA said that he and his wife owned the xxxxxxxxxxx her P200.00, but they immediately took the payment back from her and was
Lodge and that the spouses received payments for room charges and sold then immediately handcuffed and arrested. Buhisan further testified that she
condoms at the hotel. AAA further testified that on one occasion, after providing knows AAA and the other girls in the Lodge that night, because they frequently
service to a customer, petitioner offered her to another customer. brought their customers to the New Perlito's Lodge.

After the prosecution had rested its case, all the accused, including petitioner, Tawi, during her testimony, admitted that she was a sex worker and that she
filed a Demurrer to Evidence. The Demurrer was granted, but only in favor of knows AAA and Buhisan because they were engaged in the same activity.
Christina Planteras and, accordingly, the case against her was dismissed in an According to Tawi, on April 28, 2009, upon the request ofPO3 Dumaguit and PO1
Order dated January 21, 2013. Llanes, she and Buhisan introduced some girls to them. Tawi even offered her
services in order to earn money for herself, however on that same night, they
The defense presented the testimonies of petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi. were arrested by the police officers.

During trial, petitioner testified that he is the registered owner of the The RTC rendered a Decision convicting petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi guilty
xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, and that on April 28, 2009, around 9 o'clock in the evening, beyond reasonable doubt of their respective charges, thus:
while he was watching television at the Lodge, three (3) males and three (3)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
females went inside the same Lodge. Petitioner denied hearing the conversation
that took place among the 6 persons and claimed that his attention was fixed
1. In Criminal Case No. CBU-86039, the Court finds accused MARLYN BUHISAN
on the television show. After a few minutes, petitioner noticed one of the
and MARICHU TAWI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified
women go down the stairs and then went back with another girl. Thereafter,
trafficking in persons in violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 6 of Republic
policemen arrived, searched the area, and arrested him and his wife, Christina.
Act No. 9208, and hereby sentences each of them to life imprisonment. Each
Petitioner insisted that he does not know Buhisan and Tawi.
accused is also ordered to pay fine in the amount of Two Million Pesos
(PhP2,000,000.00).
Buhisan testified that she was merely a helper at the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, and
that on April 28, 2009, petitioner called her to assist four (4) guests who were
2. In Criminal Case No. CBU-86038, the Court finds accused ANTONIO
accompanied by Tawi. After Buhisan was able to prepare their rooms, she was
PLANTERAS, JR. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of knowingly
requested by one of the guests to find for them girls. for hire which she refused
allowing xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge to be used for the purpose of promoting trafficking
to do. Buhisan also claimed that she declined the said request despite a promise
in persons of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9208, and hereby sentences him to THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN INTERPRETING THE TERM
a prison term of Fifteen (15) Years and to pay [a] fine in the amount of Five TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENT OF THE LAW.7
Hundred Thousand Pesos (PhP500,000.00).
According to petitioner, there is no evidence that he was engaged in the
trafficking of women or that his acts would amount to the promotion of the
The bail bond posted by accused Antonio Planteras, Jr. is hereby cancelled. Let
trafficking of women. He further argues that to be convicted of the charge
a warrant of arrest forthwith issue against accused Antonio Planteras, Jr.
against him, the offender must not just be conscious of the fact that he or she
is leasing the premises but that this consciousness must extend to being aware
SO ORDERED.5
that such acts promote the trafficking in persons. Petitioner also claims that the
Petitioner, Buhisan and Tawi, after their motion for reconsideration was denied prosecution's evidence is insufficient to prove the presence of criminal intent
by the RTC, elevated the case to the CA. Eventually, the CA denied their appeals and cannot be said to have successfully overthrown the constitutional
and affirmed their convictions, thus: presumption of innocence that he enjoyed. In addition, he avers that the case
against him is not a case against "trafficking in persons" within the meaning and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeals are DENIED. The Joint Decision
intent of the law.
dated 10 November 2014, and the Order dated 17 April 2015, of the Regional
Trial Court of Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 20, in Criminal Case Nos.
The petition lacks merit.
CBU-86038 and CBU-86039, are AFFIRMED.

The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in
SO ORDERED.6
petitions filed under Rule 45.8 This court is not a trier of facts. It will not
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of petitioner entertain questions of fact as the factual findings of the appellate courts are
Planteras, Jr. "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this [c]ourt"9 when
supported by substantial evidence.10 Factual findings of the appellate courts will
Petitioner raises the following errors: not be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.11
THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS OF THE CASE WHICH
RESULTED TO ITS ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION THAT THROUGH CIRCUMSTANTIAL However, these rules do admit exceptions. Over time, the exceptions to these
EVIDENCE THE PROSECUTION HAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE GUILT OF rules have expanded. At present, there are 10 recognized exceptions that were
THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT first listed in Medina v. Mayor Asistio, Jr.:12

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises

or conjectures; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the
judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee; (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals
is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the
evidence on record.13
These exceptions similarly apply in petitions for review filed before this court
involving civil,14 labor,15 tax,16 or criminal cases.17
A question of fact requires this court to review the truthfulness or falsity of the
allegations of the parties.18 This review includes assessment of the "probative
value of the evidence presented."19
There is also a question of fact when the issue presented before this court is the
correctness of the lower courts' appreciation of the evidence presented by the
parties.20 In this case, petitioner asks this Court to review the evidence
presented by the prosecution. Clearly, this is not the role of this Court.
Nevertheless, granting that this Court shall review the factual incidents of this
case, the petition must still fail.
Section 5 (a) of R.A. No. 9208, reads as follows:
Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. - The following acts, which
promote or facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or allow to be used any house, building
or establishment for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons.
xxx
Under the above provisions of the law, in order for one to be convicted of the
offense of promoting trafficking in persons, the accused must (a) knowingly
lease or sublease, or allow to be used any house, building or establishment, and
(b) such use of the house, building or establishment is for the purpose of
promoting trafficking in persons. Trafficking in persons is defined under Section
3(a) of R.A. No. 9208, thus:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or the giving, or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale
of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even
if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.
Petitioner insists that there is no direct evidence that he knowingly allowed the
use of the New Perlito's Lodge as a place for the trafficking of persons. He
further maintains that he has no participation in the negotiation for the sexual
services of, among others, AAA and that he did not hear the conversation among
the police officers, Buhisan, and Tawi on April 28, 2009. He also contends that
there was, in fact, no human trafficking because AAA was not recruited to be a
prostitute. As such, according to petitioner, he is not guilty of promoting
trafficking in persons. However, this Court finds otherwise.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, still convicted petitioner of the crime charged
against him based on circumstantial evidence and the credibility of the
testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution.
Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with
legal consequences.21
existence of a fact may be inferred."27 The same quantum of evidence is still
required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.28
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from
which it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime
exist and that the accused is its perpetrator.29 There is no requirement in our
jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict.30 After all, evidence is always
a matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the
prosecution provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.
Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that
should be established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:

The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves

(a)There is more than one circumstance;
the relationship of the fact inferred to the facts that constitute the
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
offense.22 Their difference does not relate to the probative value of the
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
evidence.23
beyond reasonable doubt.31

Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator,32 and the finding of
inference.24 Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves a guilt may all be established by circumstantial evidence.33 The circumstances
fact in issue, such that the fact-finder must draw an inference or reason from must be considered as a whole and should create an unbroken chain leading to
circumstantial evidence."25 the conclusion that the accused authored the crime. 34

The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a
superior to circumstantial evidence.26 The Rules of Court do not distinguish finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a quantitative one.35 The proven
between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the circumstances must be "consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except In the case at bar, the negotiation between Marlyn, Marichu and the girls, on
that of guilt."36 the one hand, and the poseur customers (police), on the other, for the use of
the girls for sexual intercourse happened in the Lodge, right in the presence of
The CA, therefore, did not err in finding that based on circumstantial evidence, Antonio Jr. Thus, he knew it. If he did not approve of it or that it be done at the
petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against him, lodge, he could have easily told them to go somewhere else. That he did nothing
thus: about it only means that he acquiesced and consented to it as he has been wont
to do.
Guided by the foregoing decisional and reglementary yardsticks, and based on
the evidence presented, We find that, through circumstantial evidence, the Of the foregoing circumstances, We agree with the Trial Court that the most
prosecution has sufficiently established that the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, with the full telling is accused-appellant Planteras' own act of pimping in a not so distant past
knowledge and permission of accused-appellant Planteras, was used for AAA herself. This occasion was vividly narrated by AAA on the stand. This
promoting trafficking in persons. The material circumstances that led the Trial circumstance further leads to the logical inference that accused-appellant
Court to the same conclusion are as follows: Planteras knows AAA and her trade. With accused appellant Planteras being
only 1.5 m. from where the indecent proposal was taking place among PO3
Admittedly, Antonio Jr. owns and manages the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge which is
Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, on one hand, and accused-appellants Buhisan and
engaged in the business of renting out rooms to lodgers/transients. It was issued
Tawi, on the other, the presence of AAA herself, accused-appellant Planteras'
a Mayor's Business Permit and a Sanitary Permit. The evidence has established
feigned ignorance of the real nature of the transaction taxes credulity too much.
that the pimps and prostitutes who hang around at the premises or sidewalk
outside xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge bring and engage their customers in sexual
The totality of these circumstances constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the
intercourse at the said lodge. The customer pays Php50.00 per hour. The
inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant Planteras, through his acts and
payment is received by Antonio Jr. who stays at the counter or, at times, by his
omissions, knew that the transaction happening within his hearing distance is
wife Christina. This goes on night after night, various prostitutes, different
for prostitution, and he knowingly permitted the use of his establishment
customers. Antonio Jr. cannot feign ignorance because he is always there. He
therefor.
sees it when the negotiation or transaction takes place between the pimp, the
prostitute and the customer. Definitely, he knew that the lodge was being used
We, therefore, find, as did the Trial Court, that the prosecution has, through
for prostitution or trafficking in persons and he allowed it. Yet, the most
testimonial, documentary, and object evidence, overwhelmingly proved the
damning evidence against Antonio Jr. was the testimony of AAA that at one time
elements of Promoting Trafficking in Persons with moral certainty against
he requested her to accommodate a customer for sex.
accused-appellant Plateras.37
xxx xxx xxx
It is indisputable that petitioner owns and manages the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge. woman of that customer always leave him.
Evidence was also presented to establish that the pimps, customers and
prostitutes who hang out near the said place utilize the same place for their Q: And who said that to you again, AAA?
illegal activities. Petitioner's knowledge about the activities that are happening A: Antonio Planteras.
inside his establishment was also properly established by the prosecution, most
notably, through the testimony of AAA, thus: COURT: (to witness)
ATTY. INOCENCIO, JR. (to witness)
Q: Did you agree to this request?
A: Yes, your Honor.
Q: You also testified earlier, AAA, that there was one occasion where Antonio
Planteras also provided you or gave you a customer, can you still recall that
Q: In effect, did you have sexual intercourse with that customer who was offered
incident?
to you by Antonio Planteras?
38
A: Yes, you Honor.
AAA: (witness)
A: I cannot recall the date, but I can remember that it happened. It must be remembered that, "[n]o general rule can be laid down as to the
quantity of circumstantial evidence which in any case will suffice. All the
Q: And so can you tell us where were you at that time when you said that circumstances proved must be consistent with each other, consistent with the
Antonio Planteras gave you a customer? hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
A: I had just came out from (sic) the room. hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt."39 In this case, the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented
Q: Why did you came (sic) out of the room? by the prosecution prove beyond reasonable ground that petitioner allowed the
A: I had just finished having sexual intercourse. use of his establishment in the promotion of trafficking in persons.

Q: And how did you come to meet your customer at that time? Also, it has been maintained in a catena of cases that when the issues involve
A: It was him who approached me. matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of the trial court, its calibration
of the testimonies, and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well
Q: And so what happened next after you came out of the room at that time? as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect, if not
A: When I came out of the room, Antonio Planteras called me and he requested conclusive effect.40 The assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and their
me to have sexual intercourse with the customer, because in the past the testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor,
conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These factors are the most (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
significant in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.41 The factual findings of the RTC, (3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
therefore, are accorded the highest degree of respect especially if the CA (4) Adultery or concubinage;
adopted and confirmed these,42 unless some facts or circumstances of weight (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
were overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted as to materially affect the (6) Illegal search;
disposition of the case.43 In the absence of substantial reason to justify the (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, as when no significant (8) Malicious prosecution;
facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded, the (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309; and
reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings.44 (10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the claim of petitioner that AAA freely engaged in prostitution, thus, no
trafficking in person was committed, such is unmeritorious. Knowledge or
consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208. 45 The The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case
victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or to the crimes of seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. x x x.
deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking.46 Even WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is Court, dated May 18, 2018, of petitioner Antonio Planteras, Jr. is DENIED for
not given out of his or her own free will.47 lack of merit. Consequently, the Decision dated April 24, 2017 and the
Resolution March 21, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 02077
This Court further finds it proper to award P100,000.00 as moral damages and are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim, AAA. These amounts are in is ORDERED to PAY AAA the amounts of P100,000.00 as moral damages and
accordance with the ruling in People v. Casio,48 where this Court held that: P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary
damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
G.R. No. 171129 April 6, 2011
ENRICO SANTOS, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The lessee in this case resists ejectment by the lessor on the ground that the
leased property has already been foreclosed and is now owned by a third
person.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated September 6,
2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 89464 which recalled and
set aside the Decision2 dated April 1, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. 651-M-04. Likewise assailed is
the CA’s Resolution3 dated January 3, 2006 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.
Factual Antecedents
On February 10, 2004, petitioner Enrico Santos filed a Complaint4 for Unlawful
Detainer in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. He claimed
therein that he is the registered owner of the property located at No. 49,
National Road, Barrio Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. On January 2, 1998, he
entered into a Contract of Lease5 with respondent National Statistics Office for
the lease of 945 square meters (sq m) of the first floor of the structure on said
property for a monthly rental of ₱74,000.00. Subsequently, the parties agreed
to renew the lease for a period of one year from January 1, 2003 to December
31, 2003, covering a bigger area of the same floor for an increased monthly
rental of ₱103,635.00.6 As the area leased by respondent was not sufficient for
its use, petitioner and respondent again entered into another Contract of
Lease7 dated September 11, 2003 which covered an additional space for a
monthly rental of ₱45,000.00. For failing to pay despite demand the rentals for
the months of December 2003 and January 2004 in the total amount of
₱297,270.00, and for its refusal to vacate the property even after the
termination of the lease contracts on December 31, 2003, petitioner sent
respondent a formal demand8 for the latter to pay its unpaid monthly rentals
and to vacate the property. Notwithstanding receipt, respondent still refused to
pay and to vacate the property. Hence, the complaint.
In its Answer,9 respondent through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
alleged that petitioner and his wife obtained a loan10 from China Banking
Corporation (China Bank) in the amount of ₱20 million, the payment of which
was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage11 constituted over the subject property
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-95719(M). It claimed that
when petitioner entered into a contract of lease with it in 1998, he did not
inform respondent of the existence of said loan. When petitioner failed to pay
his obligation with China Bank, the property was eventually sold in an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale where said bank emerged as the highest bidder.
Since petitioner likewise failed to redeem the property within the redemption
period, title to the same was consolidated in favor of China Bank and TCT No. T-
370128(M) was issued in its name on August 21, 2000. Despite this and again
without informing respondent, petitioner misrepresented himself as still the
absolute owner of the subject property and entered into the second and third
contracts of lease with respondent in February and September 2003. According
to respondent, it was only in November 2003 that it knew of the foreclosure of
the subject property when it received a letter12 from China Bank informing it
that as early as August 2000, title to the property had already been effectively
consolidated in the name of the bank. Hence, China Bank advised respondent
that as the new and absolute owner of the subject property, it is entitled to the
rental payments for the use and occupancy of the leased premises from the date
of consolidation. Petitioner having ceased to be the owner of said property,
respondent believed that the second and third contracts of lease it entered with
him had ceased to be in effect. Hence, petitioner has no legal right to demand
that respondent pay him said rentals and vacate the leased premises.
Conversely, respondent has no legal obligation to pay to petitioner the rentals
for the use and occupancy of the subject property. Moreover, petitioner failed
to exhaust administrative remedies as there was no indication that he filed a
money claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by Act No.
308313 as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445.14 Lastly, respondent
alleged that petitioner is without any legal personality to institute the complaint
because he is neither the owner, co-owner, legal representative or assignee of
China Bank, landlord or a person entitled to the physical possession of the
subject property. By way of counterclaim, respondent asserted that petitioner
is obligated under the law and the equitable principle of unjust enrichment to
return to respondent all rental payments received, with legal interests, from
August 2000 to November 2003 in the total amount of ₱4,113,785.00.
Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court
The MTC rendered its Decision15 on September 6, 2004. It held that while it can
provisionally resolve the issue of ownership as raised by respondent, it did not
do so because of the latter’s admission that it originally leased the subject
property from petitioner. According to said court, when respondent admitted
that it was a lessee of the premises owned by petitioner, it took away its right
to question petitioner’s title and ownership thereof. The MTC then reiterated
the well settled rule that a tenant cannot, in an action involving the possession
of leased premises, controvert the title of his landlord. As the evidence showed
that respondent was no longer paying rents in violation of its obligation under
the second and third contracts of lease, and since said contracts already expired
and no new contract was entered into by the parties, the MTC declared
respondent a deforciant lessee which should be ejected from the property. The
dispositive portion of the MTC Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the latter to:
1. Vacate the premises known as No. 49 National Road, Bagbaguin, Santa Maria,
Bulacan and peacefully surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff;
2. Pay the plaintiff rental arrearages amounting to Two Hundred Ninety Seven
Thousand Two Hundred Seventy Pesos (₱297,270.00) for the period up to
January 2004;
3. Pay the plaintiff the monthly amount of Seventy Four Thousand Pesos
(₱74,000.00) from February 2004 up to the time that it finally vacates the
subject premises;
4. Pay the plaintiff the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as and by
way of attorney’s fees, and
5. Cost of the suit.
SO ORDERED.16
Hence, respondent appealed to the RTC.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Respondent faulted the MTC in not resolving the issue of ownership in order to
determine who has the better right of possession. It emphasized that it is not an
ordinary entity which may be compelled to pay under private contracts. As an
agency of the government tasked in generating general purpose statistics, it is
bound by government auditing rules to make payments only for validly executed
contracts with persons lawfully entitled thereto. Thus, it is necessary to
ascertain the ownership of the subject property in order to determine the
person lawfully entitled to the rental payments. And as it is clear in this case that
title to the property had already been consolidated in the name of China Bank,
respondent properly paid the rentals to said bank. Respondent argued that as
between petitioner, who had ceased to have legal title to the property, and
itself, which continuously pays rentals to China Bank, it is the one which has the
better right of possession. In addition, respondent insisted that petitioner
should return the amount of ₱4,113,785.00 wrongfully paid to him, with legal
interest, until fully paid.
On the other hand, petitioner countered that even if respondent is a
government agency, it cannot be permitted to deny his title over the property,
he being the lessor of the same. To support this, he cited Section 2(b), Rule 131
of the Rules of Court17 and Article 1436 of the Civil Code.18 Petitioner thus
prayed that the RTC affirm in toto the assailed MTC Decision.
In its Decision19 dated April 1, 2005, the RTC agreed with the MTC’s declaration
that respondent is a deforciant lessee which should be ejected from the leased
premises. This was in view of the settled rule that the fact of lease and the
expiration of its terms are the only elements in an action for ejectment, which
it found to have been established in this case. According to said court, a plaintiff
need not prove his ownership and defendant cannot deny it. If defendant denies
plaintiff’s ownership, he raises a question which is unessential to the action. The
RTC further held that if there was an issue of ownership, it is a matter between
China Bank and petitioner to settle in an appropriate proceeding. Hence, the
RTC found the appeal to be without merit, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises [considered], the assailed Decision of the Municipal Trial
Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.20
Petitioner promptly moved for the issuance of a writ of execution.21 This was,
however, denied by the RTC22 in view of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
issued by the CA through its May 5, 2005 Resolution23 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89464 -
the Petition for Review brought by respondent before said court.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the CA, respondent asserted that the RTC and MTC cannot turn a blind
eye on the transfer of ownership of the subject property to China Bank. As
petitioner fraudulently executed the last two lease contracts with respondent,
he having entered into the same despite knowledge that ownership of the
subject property had already passed on to China Bank, the rule that the lessee
cannot deny the title of his landlord does not apply. This is because petitioner
was no longer the owner of the leased premises at the time of the execution of
the last two contracts. Respondent also believed that said contracts are void
because to hold otherwise would be to condone the anomalous situation of a
party paying rentals to one who is no longer the owner and who no longer has
the right of possession over the leased property. It likewise insisted that it is
entitled to recover the rentals paid to petitioner from the time ownership of the
subject property was transferred to China Bank under the principle of solutio
indebiti. Lastly, respondent emphasized that petitioner failed to first file a
money claim before the COA.
Petitioner, for his part, basically reiterated the arguments he raised before the
RTC. In addition, he pointed out that the defense of ownership is being invoked
by respondent on behalf of another party, China Bank. What respondent
therefore would want the lower courts to do was to rule that the subject
property is owned by another person even if said person is not a party to the
ejectment case. To petitioner, this cannot be done by the lower courts, hence,
there was no error on their part when they decided not to touch upon the issue
of ownership.
It is noteworthy that before the petition was resolved, the CA first issued a
Resolution24 dated July 15, 2005 granting respondent’s prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction which enjoined the enforcement of the RTC’s April 1,
2005 Decision. Thereafter, the CA proceeded to decide the case and thus issued
a Decision25 dated September 6, 2005.
In its Decision, the CA recognized the settled rule that a tenant, in an action
involving the possession of the leased premises, can neither controvert the title
of his landlord nor assert any rights adverse to that title, or set up any
inconsistent right to change the relation existing between himself and his
landlord. However, it declared that said doctrine is subject to qualification as
enunciated in Borre v. Court of Appeals26 wherein it was held that "[t]he rule
on estoppel against tenants x x x does not apply if the landlord’s title has
expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been defeated by a title
paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee relationship." In
view of this, the CA concluded that the RTC erred when it relied mainly on the
abovementioned doctrine enunciated under Sec. 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court and skirted away from resolving the issue of ownership. The CA noted that
respondent was able to prove that title to the subject property has already been
effectively consolidated in the name of China Bank. Hence, it found petitioner
to be in bad faith and to have acted with malice in still representing himself to
be the owner of the property when he entered into the second and third
contracts of lease with respondent. Under these circumstances, the CA declared
that respondent was justified in refusing to pay petitioner the rents and thus,
the ejectment complaint against respondent states no cause of action.
In addition, the CA opined that there was no landlord-tenant relationship
created between the parties because the agreements between them are void.
The element of consent is wanting considering that petitioner, not being the
owner of the subject property, has no legal capacity to give consent to said
contracts. The CA, however, denied respondent’s prayer for the return of the
rentals it paid to petitioner by ratiocinating that to grant the same would be to
effectively rule on the ownership issue rather than merely resolving it for the
purpose of deciding the issue on possession.
The CA disposed of the case in this wise:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for review is GRANTED,
the assailed decision is RECALLED and SET ASIDE, and a new one
entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 651-M-04 (MTC Civil Case No. 1708). No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.27
Both parties moved for reconsideration28 of the above Decision but were,
however, unsuccessful as the CA denied their motions in a Resolution 29 dated
January 3, 2006.
Undeterred, petitioner now comes to us through this Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in overturning the
respective decisions of the RTC-Malolos City, Bulacan and MTC-Sta. Maria,
Bulacan which both held that a lessor has the better right of possession over a
realty.
II. Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals - in resolving the issue of who
between the lessor and the lessee has better possession of the premises known
as No. 49, National Road, Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan – erred in delving on
the issue of ownership in resolving the issues raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 89464.
III. Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not awarding damages
to the Petitioner, the lessor of the premises known as No. 49, National Road,
Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.30
The Parties’ Arguments
Petitioner contends that the ruling in Borre does not apply to this case because
here, there is nothing to show that his title to the subject property had expired,
or had been conveyed to another, or had been defeated by a title paramount.
In fact, petitioner informs this Court that the dispute between him and China
Bank concerning the ownership of the subject property is still pending litigation
before Branch 17 of RTC-Malolos, Bulacan. Hence, petitioner asserts that there
are yet no factual and legal bases for the CA to rule that he lost his title over the
property. Besides, petitioner believes that ownership is not an issue in actions
for ejectment especially when the parties thereto are the landlord and tenant.
Moreover, petitioner contends that based on Fige v. Court of
Appeals,31 respondent as lessee cannot be allowed to interpose a defense
against him as lessor without the former first delivering to him the leased
premises. Petitioner also claims that he is entitled to payment of damages in the
form of fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation
of the property. In sum, petitioner wants this Court to reverse and set aside the
assailed CA Decision and Resolution and to reinstate the respective Decisions of
the MTC and RTC.
Respondent, for its part, negates petitioner’s claim that he has not yet lost his
title to the property by emphasizing that such title has already been effectively
consolidated in the name of China Bank. And, considering that government
auditing rules preclude respondent from paying rentals to a party not entitled
thereto, it was proper for it to pay the same to the new owner, China Bank.
Moreover, respondent imputes bad faith upon petitioner for not informing it of
the change in ownership of the property and for still collecting rental payments
despite such change. Thus, respondent prays that the petition be denied for lack
of merit.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
The conclusive presumption found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court
known as estoppel against tenants provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive
presumptions:
xxxx
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them. (Emphasis
supplied).
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that "[w]hat a tenant is estopped
from denying x x x is the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement
of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have
been acquired subsequent to the commencement of that relation, the
presumption will not apply."32 Hence, "the tenant may show that the landlord’s
title has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped
to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title paramount."33
Thus, we declared in Borre v. Court of Appeals34 that:
The rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to a qualification. It does not
apply if the landlord’s title has expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has
been defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of
lessor-lessee relationship [VII Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines 87 (1973)]. In other words, if there was a change in the nature of the
title of the landlord during the subsistence of the lease, then the presumption
does not apply. Otherwise, if the nature of the landlord’s title remains as it was
during the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant, then estoppel
lies against the tenant. (Emphasis supplied.)
While petitioner appears to have already lost ownership of the property at the
time of the commencement of the tenant-landlord relationship between him
and respondent, the change in the nature of petitioner’s title, as far as
respondent is concerned, came only after the commencement of such
relationship or during the subsistence of the lease. This is precisely because at
the time of the execution of the second and third contracts of lease, respondent
was still not aware of the transfer of ownership of the leased property to China
Bank. It was only in November 2003 or less than two months before the
expiration of said contracts when respondent came to know of the same after
it was notified by said bank. This could have been the reason why respondent
did not anymore pay petitioner the rents for the succeeding months of
December 2003 and January 2004. Thus, it can be said that there was a change
in the nature of petitioner’s title during the subsistence of the lease that the rule
on estoppel against tenants does not apply in this case. Petitioner’s reliance on
said conclusive presumption must, therefore, necessarily fail since there was no
error on the part of the CA when it entertained respondent’s assertion of a title
adverse to petitioner.
We also find untenable petitioner’s argument that respondent cannot assert
ownership of the property by a third person considering that China Bank, as such
third person, is not a party to the ejectment case. As earlier said, a tenant in
proper cases such as this, may show that the landlord’s title has been conveyed
to another. In order to do this, the tenant must essentially assert that title to
the leased premises already belongs to a third person who need not be a party
to the ejectment case. This is precisely what respondent was trying to do when
it endeavored to establish that the property is now owned by China Bank.
From the above discussion, it is not difficult to see that the question of
possession is so intertwined with the question of ownership to the effect that
the question of possession cannot be resolved without resolving the question
of ownership. This is the reason why we are upholding the CA’s resolution of the
issue of ownership in this ejectment case. "It bears emphasizing that in
ejectment suits, the only issue for resolution is the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the party litigants."35 However, "[i]n cases where defendant raises the
question of ownership in the pleadings and the question of possession cannot
be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the court may proceed and
resolve the issue of ownership but only for the purpose of determining the issue
of possession. [Nevertheless], the disposition of the issue of ownership is not
final, as it may be the subject of separate proceeding[s] specifically brought to
settle the issue."36 Hence, the fact that there is a pending case between
petitioner and China Bank respecting the ownership of the property does not
preclude the courts to rule on the issue of ownership in this case.1avvphi1
Paragraph 3 of the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer states that petitioner is the
registered owner of the property located at No. 49, National Road, Barrio
Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.37 It is in fact by virtue of this alleged ownership
that he entered into contracts of lease with respondent and was ejecting the
latter by reason of the expiration of said contracts. However, we note that
petitioner, as plaintiff in the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, failed to discharge
his burden of showing that he indeed owned the property. "In civil cases, the
burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence. If he claims a right granted or created by law, he must prove his claim WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 6,
by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and 2005 and Resolution dated January 3, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
not on the weakness of that of his opponent."38 On the other hand, respondent SP No. 89464 are AFFIRMED.
has satisfactorily shown that title to the property has already been conveyed to
China Bank. It submitted the following documents: (1) the Promissory
Note39 executed by petitioner and his spouse in favor of China Bank for a loan
of ₱20 million and the (Real Estate) Mortgage40 over the subject property; (2)
the Petition for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of said Real Estate Mortgage;41 (3) the
Notice of Auction Sale By Notary Public, Certificate of Posting, Affidavit of
Publication and Certificate of Sale in favor of China Bank,42 all in connection with
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the leased premises; (4) the Affidavit of
Consolidation43 executed by China Bank’s Vice-President to inform the Registry
of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan that the one-year period of redemption has
expired without petitioner redeeming the property and to request said office to
issue the corresponding TCT under the bank’s name; and (5) TCT No. T-370128
(M)44 issued on August 21, 2000 in the name of China Bank covering the leased
property. Said documents, particularly TCT No. T-370128 (M), undeniably show
that China Bank is the owner of the property and not petitioner. "As a matter of
law, a Torrens Certificate of Title is evidence of indefeasible title of property in
favor of the person in whose name the title appears. The title holder is entitled
to all the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession, subject
only to limits imposed by law."45 Not being the registered titleholder, we hold
that petitioner does not have a better right of possession over the property as De Silva v. De Silva and Republic, G.R. No. 247985, October 13, 2021
against respondent who is in actual possession thereof and who claims to derive
(PDF)
its right of possession from the titleholder, China Bank, to whom it pays rents
for its use. Hence, petitioner’s action for unlawful detainer must fail. This being
settled, it is obvious that petitioner is likewise not entitled to payment of
damages for the fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the property.
G.R. No. 171428 November 11, 2013
ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH, Petitioner,
vs.
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC.,
RUPERTO V. TANKEH, VICENTE ARENAS, and ASSET PRIVATIZATION
TRUST, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari praying that the assailed October 25,
2005 Decision and the February 9, 2006 Resolution of the Court of Appeals 1 be
reversed, and that the January 4, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila Branch 32 be affirmed. Petitioner prays that this Court grant his claims
for moral damages and attorney’s fees, as proven by the evidence.
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is the president of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. It
was incorporated on April 23, 1979 to operate ocean-going vessels engaged
primarily in foreign trade.2 Ruperto V. Tankeh applied for a $3.5 million loan
from public respondent Development Bank of the Philippines for the partial
financing of an ocean-going vessel named the M/V Golden Lilac. To authorize
the loan, Development Bank of the Philippines required that the following
conditions be met:
1) A first mortgage must be obtained over the vessel, which by then had been
renamed the M/V Sterling Ace;
2) Ruperto V. Tankeh, petitioner Dr. Alejandro V. Tankeh, Jose Marie Vargas, as
well as respondents Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. and Vicente Arenas should
become liable jointly and severally for the amount of the loan;
3) The future earnings of the mortgaged vessel, including proceeds of Charter
and Shipping Contracts, should be assigned to Development Bank of the
Philippines; and
4) Development Bank of the Philippines should be assigned no less than 67% of
the total subscribed and outstanding voting shares of the company. The
percentage of shares assigned should be maintained at all times, and the
assignment was to subsist as long as the assignee, Development Bank of the
Philippines, deemed it necessary during the existence of the loan.3
According to petitioner Dr. Alejandro V. Tankeh, Ruperto V. Tankeh approached
him sometime in 1980.4 Ruperto informed petitioner that he was operating a
new shipping line business. Petitioner claimed that respondent, who is also
petitioner’s younger brother, had told him that petitioner would be given one
thousand (1,000) shares to be a director of the business. The shares were worth
₱1,000,000.00.5
On May 12, 1981, petitioner signed the Assignment of Shares of Stock with
Voting Rights.6 Petitioner then signed the May 12, 1981 promissory note in
December 1981. He was the last to sign this note as far as the other signatories
were concerned.7 The loan was approved by respondent Development Bank of
the Philippines on March 18, 1981. The vessel was acquired on September 29,
1981 for $5.3 million.8 On December 3, 1981, respondent corporation Sterling
Shipping Lines, Inc. through respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh executed a Deed of
Assignment in favor of Development Bank of the Philippines. The deed stated
that the assignor, Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.:
x x x does hereby transfer and assign in favor of the ASSIGNEE (DBP), its
successors and assigns, future earnings of the mortgaged M/V "Sterling Ace,"
including proceeds of charter and shipping contracts, it being understood that
this assignment shall continue to subsist for as long as the ASSIGNOR’S
obligation with the herein ASSIGNEE remains unpaid.9
On June 16, 1983, petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh
saying that he was severing all ties and terminating his involvement with Sterling
Shipping Lines, Inc.10 He required that its board of directors pass a resolution
releasing him from all liabilities, particularly the loan contract with Development
Bank of the Philippines. In addition, petitioner asked that the private
respondents notify Development Bank of the Philippines that he had severed
his ties with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.11
The accounts of respondent Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. in the Development
Bank of the Philippines were transferred to public respondent Asset
Privatization Trust on June 30, 1986.12
Presently, respondent Asset Privatization Trust is known as the Privatization and
Management Office. Asset Privatization Trust was a government agency created
through Presidential Proclamation No. 50, issued in 1986. Through
Administrative Order No. 14, issued by former President Corazon Aquino dated
February 3, 1987, assets including loans in favor of Development Bank of the
Philippines were ordered to be transferred to the national government. In turn,
the management and facilitation of these assets were delegated to Asset
Privatization Trust, pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 50. In 1999,
Republic Act No. 8758 was signed into law, and it provided that the corporate
term of Asset Privatization Trust would end on December 31, 2000. The same
law empowered the President of the Philippines to determine which office
would facilitate the management of assets held by Asset Privatization Trust.
Thus, on December 6, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed Executive
Order No. 323, creating the Privatization Management Office. Its present
function is to identify disposable assets, monitor the progress of privatization
activities, and approve the sale or divestment of assets with respect to price and
buyer.13
On January 29, 1987, the M/V Sterling Ace was sold in Singapore for $350,000.00
by Development Bank of the Philippines’ legal counsel Atty. Prospero N.
Nograles. When petitioner came to know of the sale, he wrote respondent
Development Bank of the Philippines to express that the final price was
inadequate, and therefore, the transaction was irregular. At this time, petitioner
was still bound as a debtor because of the promissory note dated May 12, 1981,
which petitioner signed in December of 1981. The promissory note subsisted
despite Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.’s assignment of all future earnings of the
mortgaged M/V Sterling Ace to Development Bank of the Philippines. The loan
also continued to bind petitioner despite Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.’s cash
equity contribution of ₱13,663,200.00 which was used to cover part of the
acquisition cost of the vessel, pre-operating expenses, and initial working
capital.14
Petitioner filed several Complaints15 against respondents, praying that the
promissory note be declared null and void and that he be absolved from any
liability from the mortgage of the vessel and the note in question.
In the Complaints, petitioner alleged that respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh,
together with Vicente L. Arenas, Jr. and Jose Maria Vargas, had exercised deceit
and fraud in causing petitioner to bind himself jointly and severally to pay
respondent Development Bank of the Philippines the amount of the mortgage
loan.16 Although he had been made a stockholder and director of the
respondent corporation Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., petitioner alleged that he
had never invested any amount in the corporation and that he had never been
an actual member of the board of directors. 17 He alleged that all the money he
had supposedly invested was provided by respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh. 18 He
claimed that he only attended one meeting of the board. In that meeting, he
was introduced to two directors representing Development Bank of the
Philippines, namely, Mr. Jesus Macalinag and Mr. Gil Corpus. Other than that,
he had never been notified of another meeting of the board of directors.
Petitioner further claimed that he had been excluded deliberately from
participating in the affairs of the corporation and had never been compensated
by Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. as a director and stockholder.19 According to
petitioner, when Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. was organized, respondent
Ruperto V. Tankeh had promised him that he would become part of the
administration staff and oversee company operations. Respondent Ruperto V.
Tankeh had also promised petitioner that the latter’s son would be given a
position in the company.20 However, after being designated as vice president,
petitioner had not been made an officer and had been alienated from taking
part in the respondent corporation.21
Petitioner also alleged that respondent Development Bank of the Philippines
had been inexcusably negligent in the performance of its duties. 22 He alleged
that Development Bank of the Philippines must have been fully aware of Sterling
Shipping Lines, Inc.’s financial situation. Petitioner claimed that Sterling Shipping
Lines, Inc. was controlled by the Development Bank of the Philippines because
67% of voting shares had been assigned to the latter.23 Furthermore, the
mortgage contracts had mandated that Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. "shall
furnish the DBP with copies of the minutes of each meeting of the Board of
Directors within one week after the meeting. Sterling Shipping Lines Inc. shall
likewise furnish DBP its annual audited financial statements and other
information or data that may be needed by DBP as its accommodations [sic]
with DBP are outstanding."24 Petitioner further alleged that the Development
Bank of the Philippines had allowed "highly questionable acts"25 to take place,
including the gross undervaluing of the M/V Sterling Aces.26 Petitioner alleged
that one day after Development Bank of the Philippines’ Atty. Nograles sold the
vessel, the ship was re-sold by its buyer for double the amount that the ship had
been bought.27
As for respondent Vicente L. Arenas, Jr., petitioner alleged that since Arenas had
been the treasurer of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. and later on had served as its
vice president, he was also responsible for the financial situation of Sterling
Shipping Lines, Inc.
Lastly, in the Amended Complaint dated April 16, 1991, petitioner impleaded
respondent Asset Privatization Trust for being the agent and assignee of the
M/V Sterling Ace.
In their Answers28 to the Complaints, respondents raised the following defenses
against petitioner: Respondent Development Bank of the Philippines
categorically denied receiving any amount from Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.’s
future earnings and from the proceeds of the shipping contracts. It maintained
that equity contributions could not be deducted from the outstanding loan
obligation that stood at ₱245.86 million as of December 31, 1986. Development
Bank of the Philippines also maintained that it is immaterial to the case whether
the petitioner is a "real stockholder" or merely a "pseudo-stockholder" of the
corporation.29 By affixing his signature to the loan agreement, he was liable for
the obligation. According to Development Bank of the Philippines, he was in pari
delicto and could not be discharged from his obligation. Furthermore, petitioner
had no cause of action against Development Bank of the Philippines since this
was a case between family members, and earnest efforts toward compromise
should have been complied with in accordance with Article 222 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.30
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh stated that petitioner had voluntarily signed the
promissory note in favor of Development Bank of the Philippines and with full
knowledge of the consequences. Respondent Tankeh also alleged that he did
not employ any fraud or deceit to secure petitioner’s involvement in the
company, and petitioner had been fully aware of company operations. Also, all
that petitioner had to do to avoid liability had been to sell his shareholdings in
the company.31
Respondent Asset Privatization Trust raised that petitioner had no cause of
action against them since Asset Privatization Trust had been mandated under
Proclamation No. 50 to take title to and provisionally manage and dispose the
assets identified for privatization or deposition within the shortest possible
period. Development Bank of the Philippines had transferred and conveyed all
its rights, titles, and interests in favor of the national government in accordance
with Administrative Order No. 14. In line with that, Asset Privatization Trust was
constituted as trustee of the assets transferred to the national government to
effect privatization of these assets, including respondent Sterling Shipping Lines,
Inc.32 Respondent Asset Privatization Trust also filed a compulsory counterclaim
against petitioner and its co-respondents Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., Ruperto
V. Tankeh, and Vicente L. Arenas, Jr. for the amount of ₱264,386,713.84.
Respondent Arenas did not file an Answer to any of the Complaints of petitioner
but filed a Motion to Dismiss that the Regional Trial Court denied. Respondent
Asset Privatization Trust filed a Cross Claim against Arenas. In his Answer33 to
Asset Privatization Trust’s Cross Claim, Arenas claimed that he had been
released from any further obligation to Development Bank of the Philippines
and its successor Asset Privatization Trust because an extension had been
granted by the Development Bank of the Philippines to the debtors of Sterling
Shipping Lines, Inc. and/or Ruperto V. Tankeh, which had been secured without
Arenas’ consent.
The trial proceeded with the petitioner serving as a sole witness for his case. In
a January 4, 1996 Decision,34 the Regional Trial Court ruled:
Here, we find –
1. Plaintiff being promised by his younger brother, Ruperto V. Tankeh, 1,000
shares with par value of ₱1 Million with all the perks and privileges of being
stockholder and director of SSLI, a new international shipping line;
2. That plaintiff will be part of the administration and operation of the business,
so with his son who is with the law firm Romulo Ozaeta Law Offices;
3. But this was merely the come-on or appetizer for the Real McCoy or the
primordial end of congregating the incorporators proposed - - that he sign the
promissory note (Exhibit "C"), the mortgage contract (Exhibit "A"), and deed of
assignment so SSLI could get the US $3.5 M loan from DBP to partially finance
the importation of vessel M.V. "Golden Lilac" renamed M.V. "Sterling ACE";
4. True it is, plaintiff was made a stockholder and director and Vice-President in
1979 but he was never notified of any meeting of the Board except only once,
and only to be introduced to the two (2) directors representing no less than 67%
of the total subscribed and outstanding voting shares of the company.
Thereafter, he was excluded from any board meeting, shorn of his powers and
duties as director or Vice-President, and was altogether deliberately demeaned
as an outsider.
5. What kind of a company is SSLI who treated one of their incorporators, one
of their Directors and their paper Vice-President in 1979 by preventing him
access to corporate books, to corporate earnings, or losses, and to any
compensation or remuneration whatsoever? Whose President and Treasurer
did not submit the required SEC yearly report? Who did not remit to DBP the
proceeds on charter mortgage contracts on M/V Sterling Ace?
6. The M/V Sterling Ace was already in the Davao Port when it was then diverted
to Singapore to be disposed on negotiated sale, and not by public bidding
contrary to COA Circular No. 86-264 and without COA’s approval. Sterling Ace
was seaworthy but was sold as scrap in Singapore. No foreclosure with public
bidding was made in contravention of the Promissory Note to recover any
deficiency should DBP seeks [sic] to recover it on the outstanding mortgage
loan. Moreover the sale was done after the account and asset (nay, now only a
liability) were transferred to APT. No approval of SSLI Board of Directors to the
negotiated sale was given.
7. Plaintiff’s letter to his brother President, Ruperto V. Tankeh, dated June 15,
1983 (Exhibit "D") his letter thru his lawyer to DBP (Exhibit "J") and another
letter to it (Exhibit "K") show no estoppel on his part as he consistently and
continuously assailed the several injurious acts of defendants while assailing the
Promissory Note itself x x x (Citations omitted) applying the maxim: Rencintiatio
non praesumitur. By this Dr. Tankeh never waived the right to question the
Promissory Note contract terms. He did not ratify, by concurring acts, express
or tacit, after the reasons had surfaced entitling him to render the contract
voidable, defendants’ acts in implementing or not the conditions of the
mortgage, the promissory note, the deed of assignment, the lack of audit and
accounting, and the negotiated sale of MV Sterling Ace. He did not ratify
defendants [sic] defective acts (Art. 1396, New Civil Code (NCC).
The foregoing and the following essays, supported by evidence, the fraud
committed by plaintiff’s brother before the several documents were signed (SEC
documents, Promissory Note, Mortgage (MC) Contract, assignment (DA)),
namely:
1. Ruperto V. Tankeh approaches his brother Alejandro to tell the latter of his
new shipping business. The project was good business proposal [sic].
2. Ruperto tells Alejandro he’s giving him shares worth ₱1 Million and he’s going
to be a Director.
3. He tells his brother that he will be part of the company’s Administration and
Operations and his eldest son will be in it, too.
4. Ruperto tells his brother they need a ship, they need to buy one for the
business, and they therefore need a loan, and they could secure a loan from DBP
with the vessel brought to have a first mortgage with DBP but anyway the other
two directors and comptroller will be from DBP with a 67% SSLI shares voting
rights.
Without these insidious, devastating and alluring words, without the
machinations used by defendant Ruperto V. Tankeh upon the doctor, without
the inducement and promise of ownership of shares and the exercise of
administrative and operating functions, and the partial financing by one of the
best financial institutions, the DBP, plaintiff would not have agreed to join his
brother; and the safeguarding of the Bank’s interest by its nominated two (2)
directors in the Board added to his agreeing to the new shipping business. His
consent was vitiated by the fraud before the several contracts were
consummated.
This alone convenes [sic] this Court to annul the Promissory Note as it relates to
plaintiff himself.
Plaintiff also pleads annulment on ground of equity. Article 19, NCC, provides
him the way as it requires every person, in the exercise of his rights and
performance of his duties, to act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith (Velayo vs. Shell Co. of the Phils., G.R. L-7817,
October 31, 1956). Not to release him from the clutch of the Promissory Note
when he was never made a part of the operation of the SSLI, when he was not
notified of the Board Meetings, when the corporation nary remitted earnings of
M/V Sterling Ace from charter or shipping contracts to DBP, when the SSLI did
not comply with the deed of assignment and mortgage contract, and when the
vessel was sold in Singapore (he, learning of the sale only from the newspapers)
in contravention of the Promissory Note, and which he questioned, will be an
injustice, inequitable, and even iniquitous to plaintiff. SSLI and the private
defendants did not observe honesty and good faith to one of their incorporators
and directors. As to DBP, the Court cannot put demerits on what plaintiff’s
memorandum has pointed out:
While defendant DBP did not exercise the caution and prudence in the discharge
of their functions to protect its interest as expected of them and worst, allowed
the perpetuation of the illegal acts committed in contrast to the virtues they
publicly profess, namely: "palabra de honor, delicadeza, katapatan, kaayusan,
pagkamasinop at kagalingan" Where is the vision banking they have for our
country?
Had DBP listened to a cry in the wilderness – that of the voice of the doctor –
the doctor would not have allowed the officers and board members to defraud
DBP and he would demand of them to hew and align themselves to the deed of
assignment.
Prescinding from the above, plaintiff’s consent to be with SSLI was vitiated by
fraud. The fact that defendant Ruperto Tankeh has not questioned his liability
to DBP or that Jose Maria Vargas has been declared in default do not detract
from the fact that there was attendant fraud and that there was continuing
fraud insofar as plaintiff is concerned.
Ipinaglaban lang ni Doctor ang karapatan niya. Kung wala siyang sense of
righteous indignation and fairness, tatahimik na lang siya, sira naman ang
pinangangalagaan niyang pangalan, honor and family prestige [sic] (Emphasis
provided).35
xxxx
All of the defendants’ counterclaims and cross-claims x x x including plaintiff’s
and the other defendants’ prayer for damages are not, for the moment, sourced
and proven by substantial evidence, and must perforce be denied and
dismissed.
WHEREFORE, this Court, finding and declaring the Promissory Note (Exhibit "C")
and the Mortgage Contract (Exhibit "A") null and void insofar as plaintiff DR.
ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH is concerned, hereby ANNULS and VOIDS those
documents as to plaintiff, and it is hereby further ordered that he be released
from any obligation or liability arising therefrom.
All the defendants’ counterclaims and cross-claims and plaintiff’s and
defendants’ prayer for damages are hereby denied and dismissed, without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.36
Respondents Ruperto V. Tankeh, Asset Privatization Trust, and Arenas
immediately filed their respective Notices of Appeal with the Regional Trial
Court. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with regard to the
denial of his prayer for damages. After this Motion had been denied, he then
filed his own Notice of Appeal.
In a Decision37 promulgated on October 25, 2005, the Third Division of the Court
of Appeals reversed the trial court’s findings. The Court of Appeals held that
petitioner had no cause of action against public respondent Asset Privatization
Trust. This was based on the Court of Appeals’ assessment of the case records
and its findings that Asset Privatization Trust did not commit any act violative of
the right of petitioner or constituting a breach of Asset Privatization Trust’s
obligations to petitioner. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner’s claim for
damages against Asset Privatization Trust was based merely on his own self-
serving allegations.38
As to the finding of fraud, the Court of Appeals held that:
xxxx
In all the complaints from the original through the first, second and third
amendments, the plaintiff imputes fraud only to defendant Ruperto, to wit:
4. That on May 12, 1981, due to the deceit and fraud exercised by Ruperto V.
Tankeh, plaintiff, together with Vicente L. Arenas, Jr. and Jose Maria Vargas
signed a promissory note in favor of the defendant, DBP, wherein plaintiff bound
himself to jointly and severally pay the DBP the amount of the mortgage loan.
This document insofar as plaintiff is concerned is a simulated document
considering that plaintiff was never a real stockholder of Sterling Shipping Lines,
Inc. (Emphasis provided)
More allegations of deceit were added in the Second Amended Complaint, but
they are also attributed against Ruperto:
6. That THE DECEIT OF DEFENDANT RUPERTO V. TANKEH IS SHOWN BY THE FACT
THAT when the Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. was organized in 1980, Ruperto V.
Tankeh promised plaintiff that he would be a part of the administration staff so
that he could oversee the operation of the company. He was also promised that
his son, a lawyer, would be given a position in the company. None of these
promsies [sic] was complied with. In fact he was not even allowed to find out
the data about the income and expenses of the company.
7. THAT THE DECEIT OF RUPERTO V. TANKEH IS ALSO SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS INVITED TO ATTEND THE BOARD MEETING OF THE STERLING
SHIPPING LINES INC. ONLY ONCE, WHICH WAS FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF
INTRODUCING HIM TO THE TWO DIRECTORS OF THE DBP IN THE BOARD OF THE
STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC., NAMELY, MR. JESUS MACALINAG AND MR. GIL
CORPUS. THEREAFTER HE WAS NEVER INVITED AGAIN. PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER
COMPENSATED BY THE STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC. FOR HIS BEING A SO-
CALLED DIRECTOR AND STOCKHOLDER.
xxxx
8-A THAT A WEEK AFTER SENDING THE ABOVE LETTER PLAINTIFF MADE
EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARDS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN HIM AND HIS
BROTHER RUPERTO V. TANKEH, WHICH EFFORTS WERE SPURNED BY RUPERTO
V. TANKEH, AND ALSO AFTER THE NEWS OF THE SALE OF THE ‘STERLING ACE’
WAS PUBLISHED AT THE NEWSPAPER, PLAINTIFF TRIED ALL EFFORTS TO
CONTACT RUPERTO V. TANKEH FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARRIVING AT SOME
COMPROMISE, BUT DEFENDANT RUPERTO V. TANKEH AVOIDED ALL CONTACTS
WITH THE PLAINTIFF UNTIL HE WAS FORCED TO SEEK LEGAL ASSISTANCE FROM
HIS LAWYER.
In the absence of any allegations of fraud and/or deceit against the other
defendants, namely, the DBP, Vicente Arenas, Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., and
the Asset Privatization Trust, the plaintiff’s evidence thereon should only be
against Ruperto, since a plaintiff is bound to prove only the allegations of his
complaint. In any case, no evidence of fraud or deceit was ever presented
against defendants DBP, Arenas, SSLI and APT.
As to the evidence against Ruperto, the same consists only of the testimony of
the plaintiff. None of his documentary evidence would prove that Ruperto was
guilty of fraud or deceit in causing him to sign the subject promissory note.39
xxxx
Analyzing closely the foregoing statements, we find no evidence of fraud or
deceit. The mention of a new shipping lines business and the promise of a free
1,000-share and directorship in the corporation do not amount to insidious
words or machinations. In any case, the shipping business was indeed
established, with the plaintiff himself as one of the incorporators and
stockholders with a share of 4,000, worth ₱4,000,000.00 of which
₱1,000,000.00 was reportedly paid up. As such, he signed the Articles of
Incorporation and the corporation’s By-Laws which were registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in April 1979. It was not until May 12, 1981
that he signed the questioned promissory note. From his own declaration at the
witness stand, the plaintiff signed the promissory note voluntarily. No pressure,
force or intimidation was made to bear upon him. In fact, according to him, only
a messenger brought the paper to him for signature. The promised shares of
stock were given and recorded in the plaintiff’s name. He was made a director
and Vice-President of SSLI. Apparently, only the promise that his son would be
given a position in the company remained unfulfilled. However, the same should
have been threshed out between the plaintiff and his brother, defendant
Ruperto, and its non-fulfillment did not amount to fraud or deceit, but was only
an unfulfilled promise.
It should be pointed out that the plaintiff is a doctor of medicine and a seasoned
businessman. It cannot be said that he did not understand the import of the
documents he signed. Certainly he knew what he was signing. He should have
known that being an officer of SSLI, his signing of the promissory note together
with the other officers of the corporation was expected, as the other officers
also did. It cannot therefore be said that the promissory note was simulated.
The same is a contract validly entered into, which the parties are obliged to
comply with.40 (Citations omitted)
The Court of Appeals ruled that in the absence of any competent proof, Ruperto
V. Tankeh did not commit any fraud. Petitioner Alejandro V. Tankeh was unable
to prove by a preponderance of evidence that fraud or deceit had been
employed by Ruperto to make him sign the promissory note. The Court of
Appeals reasoned that:
Fraud is never presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence not even being adequate. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of
the party’s evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. The
plaintiff clearly failed to discharge such burden.41 (Citations omitted)
With that, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the judgment and
ordered that plaintiff’s Complaint be dismissed. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated October 25, 2005 that was denied in a
Resolution42 promulgated on February 9, 2006.
Hence, this Petition was filed.
In this Petition, Alejandro V. Tankeh stated that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred and gravely abused its discretion in acting and deciding as if the evidence
stated in the Decision of the Regional Trial Court did not exist. He averred that
the ruling of lack of cause of action had no leg to stand on, and the Court of
Appeals had unreasonably, whimsically, and capriciously ignored the ample
evidence on record proving the fraud and deceit perpetrated on the petitioner
by the respondent. He stated that the appellate court failed to appreciate the
findings of fact of the lower court, which are generally binding on appellate
courts. He also maintained that he is entitled to damages and attorney's fees
due to the deceit and machinations committed by the respondent.
In his Memorandum, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh averred that petitioner had
chosen the wrong remedy. He ought to have filed a special civil action of
certiorari and not a Petition for Review. Petitioner raised questions of fact, and
not questions of law, and this required the review or evaluation of evidence.
However, this is not the function of this Court, as it is not a trier of facts. He also
contended that petitioner had voluntarily entered into the loan agreement and
the position with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. and that he did not fraudulently
induce the petitioner to enter into the contract.
Respondents Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset Privatization Trust
also contended that petitioner's mode of appeal had been wrong, and he had
actually sought a special civil action of certiorari. This alone merited its dismissal.
The main issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that
respondent Rupert V. Tankeh did not commit fraud against the petitioner.
The Petition is partly granted.
Before disposing of the main issue in this case, this Court needs to address a
procedural issue raised by respondents. Collectively, respondents argue that the
Petition is actually one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court43 and
not a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.44 Thus, petitioner’s failure
to show that there was neither appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy merited the dismissal of the Complaint.
Contrary to respondent’s imputation, the remedy contemplated by petitioner is
clearly that of a Rule 45 Petition for Review. In Tagle v. Equitable PCI Bank,45 this
Court made the distinction between a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari
and a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari:
Certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction, not
errors of judgment.1âwphi1 In Pure Foods Corporation v. NLRC, we explained
the simple reason for the rule in this light: When a court exercises its jurisdiction,
an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the jurisdiction
being exercised when the error is committed x x x. Consequently, an error of
judgment that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is not
correctable through the original civil action of certiorari.
xxxx
Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has jurisdiction over
the case, such correction is normally beyond the province of certiorari. Where
the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact a mistake of
judgment, appeal is the remedy.
In this case, what petitioner seeks to rectify may be construed as errors of
judgment of the Court of Appeals. These errors pertain to the petitioner’s
allegation that the appellate court failed to uphold the findings of facts of the
lower court. He does not impute any error with respect to the Court of Appeals’
exercise of jurisdiction. As such, this Petition is simply a continuation of the
appellate process where a case is elevated from the trial court of origin, to the
Court of Appeals, and to this Court via Rule 45.
Contrary to respondents’ arguments, the allegations of petitioner that the Court
of Appeals "committed grave abuse of discretion"46 did not ipso facto render
the intended remedy that of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.47
In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari,
this Court has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule
45 Petition for Review on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed
within the reglementary period for filing a Petition for review; (2) when errors
of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the
relaxation of the rules.48 When this Court exercises this discretion, there is no
need to comply with the requirements provided for in Rule 65.
In this case, petitioner filed his Petition within the reglementary period of filing
a Petition for Review.49 His Petition assigns errors of judgment and appreciation
of facts and law on the part of the Court of Appeals. Thus, even if the Petition
was designated as one that sought the remedy of certiorari, this Court may
exercise its discretion to treat it as a Petition for Review in the interest of
substantial justice.
We now proceed to the substantive issue, that of petitioner’s imputation of
fraud on the part of respondents. We are required by the circumstances of this
case to review our doctrines of fraud that are alleged to be present in
contractual relations.
Types of Fraud in Contracts
Fraud is defined in Article 1338 of the Civil Code as:
x x x fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one of the
contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which, without
them, he would not have agreed to.
This is followed by the articles which provide legal examples and illustrations of
fraud.
Art. 1339. Failure to disclose facts, when there is a duty to reveal them, as when
the parties are bound by confidential relations, constitutes fraud. (n)
Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an
opportunity to know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent. (n)
Art. 1341. A mere expression of an opinion does not signify fraud, unless made
by an expert and the other party has relied on the former's special knowledge.
(n)
Art. 1342. Misrepresentation by a third person does not vitiate consent, unless
such misrepresentation has created substantial mistake and the same is mutual.
(n)
Art. 1343. Misrepresentation made in good faith is not fraudulent but may
constitute error. (n)
The distinction between fraud as a ground for rendering a contract voidable or
as basis for an award of damages is provided in Article 1344:
In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious and
should not have been employed by both contracting parties.
Incidental fraud only obliges the person employing it to pay damages. (1270)
There are two types of fraud contemplated in the performance of contracts:
dolo incidente or incidental fraud and dolo causante or fraud serious enough to
render a contract voidable.
In Geraldez v. Court of Appeals,50 this Court held that:
This fraud or dolo which is present or employed at the time of birth or perfection
of a contract may either be dolo causante or dolo incidente. The first, or causal
fraud referred to in Article 1338, are those deceptions or misrepresentations of
a serious character employed by one party and without which the other party
would not have entered into the contract. Dolo incidente, or incidental fraud
which is referred to in Article 1344, are those which are not serious in character
and without which the other party would still have entered into the contract.
Dolo causante determines or is the essential cause of the consent, while dolo
incidente refers only to some particular or accident of the obligation. The effects
of dolo causante are the nullity of the contract and the indemnification of
damages, and dolo incidente also obliges the person employing it to pay
damages.51
In Solidbank Corporation v. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, et al.,52 this Court
elaborated on the distinction between dolo causante and dolo incidente:
Fraud refers to all kinds of deception -- whether through insidious machination,
manipulation, concealment or misrepresentation -- that would lead an
ordinarily prudent person into error after taking the circumstances into account.
In contracts, a fraud known as dolo causante or causal fraud is basically a
deception used by one party prior to or simultaneous with the contract, in order
to secure the consent of the other. Needless to say, the deceit employed must
be serious. In contradistinction, only some particular or accident of the
obligation is referred to by incidental fraud or dolo incidente, or that which is
not serious in character and without which the other party would have entered
into the contract anyway.53
Under Article 1344, the fraud must be serious to annul or avoid a contract and
render it voidable. This fraud or deception must be so material that had it not
been present, the defrauded party would not have entered into the contract. In
the recent case of Spouses Carmen S. Tongson and Jose C. Tongson, et al., v.
Emergency Pawnshop Bula, Inc.,54 this Court provided some examples of what
constituted dolo causante or causal fraud:
Some of the instances where this Court found the existence of causal fraud
include: (1) when the seller, who had no intention to part with her property, was
"tricked into believing" that what she signed were papers pertinent to her
application for the reconstitution of her burned certificate of title, not a deed of
sale; (2) when the signature of the authorized corporate officer was forged; or
(3) when the seller was seriously ill, and died a week after signing the deed of
sale raising doubts on whether the seller could have read, or fully understood,
the contents of the documents he signed or of the consequences of his
act.55 (Citations omitted)
However, Article 1344 also provides that if fraud is incidental, it follows that this
type of fraud is not serious enough so as to render the original contract voidable.
A classic example of dolo incidente is Woodhouse v. Halili.56 In this case, the
plaintiff Charles Woodhouse entered into a written agreement with the
defendant Fortunato Halili to organize a partnership for the bottling and
distribution of soft drinks. However, the partnership did not come into fruition,
and the plaintiff filed a Complaint in order to execute the partnership. The
defendant filed a Counterclaim, alleging that the plaintiff had defrauded him
because the latter was not actually the owner of the franchise of a soft drink
bottling operation. Thus, defendant sought the nullification of the contract to
enter into the partnership. This Court concluded that:
x x x from all the foregoing x x x plaintiff did actually represent to defendant that
he was the holder of the exclusive franchise. The defendant was made to
believe, and he actually believed, that plaintiff had the exclusive franchise. x x x
The record abounds with circumstances indicative that the fact that the
principal consideration, the main cause that induced defendant to enter into the
partnership agreement with plaintiff, was the ability of plaintiff to get the
exclusive franchise to bottle and distribute for the defendant or for the
partnership. x x x The defendant was, therefore, led to the belief that plaintiff
had the exclusive franchise, but that the same was to be secured for or
transferred to the partnership. The plaintiff no longer had the exclusive
franchise, or the option thereto, at the time the contract was perfected. But
while he had already lost his option thereto (when the contract was entered
into), the principal obligation that he assumed or undertook was to secure said
franchise for the partnership, as the bottler and distributor for the Mission Dry
Corporation. We declare, therefore, that if he was guilty of a false
representation, this was not the causal consideration, or the principal
inducement, that led plaintiff to enter into the partnership agreement.
But, on the other hand, this supposed ownership of an exclusive franchise was
actually the consideration or price plaintiff gave in exchange for the share of 30
percent granted him in the net profits of the partnership business. Defendant
agreed to give plaintiff 30 per cent share in the net profits because he was
transferring his exclusive franchise to the partnership. x x x.
Plaintiff had never been a bottler or a chemist; he never had experience in the
production or distribution of beverages. As a matter of fact, when the bottling
plant being built, all that he suggested was about the toilet facilities for the
laborers.
We conclude from the above that while the representation that plaintiff had the
exclusive franchise did not vitiate defendant's consent to the contract, it was
used by plaintiff to get from defendant a share of 30 per cent of the net profits;
in other words, by pretending that he had the exclusive franchise and promising
to transfer it to defendant, he obtained the consent of the latter to give him
(plaintiff) a big slice in the net profits. This is the dolo incidente defined in article
1270 of the Spanish Civil Code, because it was used to get the other party's
consent to a big share in the profits, an incidental matter in the agreement.57
Thus, this Court held that the original agreement may not be declared null and
void. This Court also said that the plaintiff had been entitled to damages because
of the refusal of the defendant to enter into the partnership. However, the
plaintiff was also held liable for damages to the defendant for the
misrepresentation that the former had the exclusive franchise to soft drink
bottling operations.
To summarize, if there is fraud in the performance of the contract, then this
fraud will give rise to damages. If the fraud did not compel the imputing party
to give his or her consent, it may not serve as the basis to annul the contract,
which exhibits dolo causante. However, the party alleging the existence of fraud
may prove the existence of dolo incidente.
This may make the party against whom fraud is alleged liable for damages.
Quantum of Evidence to Prove the Existence of Fraud and the Liability of the
Parties
The Civil Code, however, does not mandate the quantum of evidence required
to prove actionable fraud, either for purposes of annulling a contract (dolo
causante) or rendering a party liable for damages (dolo incidente). The
definition of fraud is different from the quantum of evidence needed to prove
the existence of fraud. Article 1338 provides the legal definition of fraud. Articles
1339 to 1343 constitute the behavior and actions that, when in conformity with
the legal provision, may constitute fraud.
Jurisprudence has shown that in order to constitute fraud that provides basis to
annul contracts, it must fulfill two conditions. First, the fraud must be dolo
causante or it must be fraud in obtaining the consent of the party. Second, this
fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In Viloria v. Continental
Airlines,58 this Court held that:
Under Article 1338 of the Civil Code, there is fraud when, through insidious
words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to
enter into a contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to. In
order that fraud may vitiate consent, it must be the causal (dolo causante), not
merely the incidental (dolo incidente), inducement to the making of the
contract. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, causal fraud was defined as "a
deception employed by one party prior to or simultaneous to the contract in
order to secure the consent of the other." Also, fraud must be serious and its
existence must be established by clear and convincing evidence. (Citations
omitted)59
In Viloria, this Court cited Sierra v. Court of Appeals60 stating that mere
preponderance of evidence will not suffice in proving fraud.
Fraud must also be discounted, for according to the Civil Code:
Art. 1338. There is fraud when, through insidious words or machinations of one
of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a contract which
without them, he would not have agreed to.
Art. 1344. In order that fraud may make a contract voidable, it should be serious
and should not have been employed by both contracting parties.
To quote Tolentino again, the "misrepresentation constituting the fraud must
be established by full, clear, and convincing evidence, and not merely by a
preponderance thereof. The deceit must be serious. The fraud is serious when
it is sufficient to impress, or to lead an ordinarily prudent person into error; that
which cannot deceive a prudent person cannot be a ground for nullity. The
circumstances of each case should be considered, taking into account the
personal conditions of the victim."61
Thus, to annul a contract on the basis of dolo causante, the following must
happen: First, the deceit must be serious or sufficient to impress and lead an
ordinarily prudent person to error. If the allegedly fraudulent actions do not
deceive a prudent person, given the circumstances, the deceit here cannot be
considered sufficient basis to nullify the contract. In order for the deceit to be
considered serious, it is necessary and essential to obtain the consent of the
party imputing fraud. To determine whether a person may be sufficiently
deceived, the personal conditions and other factual circumstances need to be
considered.
Second, the standard of proof required is clear and convincing evidence. This
standard of proof is derived from American common law. It is less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt (for criminal cases) but greater than preponderance
of evidence (for civil cases). The degree of believability is higher than that of an
ordinary civil case. Civil cases only require a preponderance of evidence to meet
the required burden of proof. However, when fraud is alleged in an ordinary civil
case involving contractual relations, an entirely different standard of proof
needs to be satisfied. The imputation of fraud in a civil case requires the
presentation of clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegations will not suffice
to sustain the existence of fraud. The burden of evidence rests on the part of
the plaintiff or the party alleging fraud. The quantum of evidence is such that
fraud must be clearly and convincingly shown.
The Determination of the Existence of Fraud in the Present Case
We now determine the application of these doctrines regarding fraud to
ascertain the liability, if any, of the respondents.
Neither law nor jurisprudence distinguishes whether it is dolo incidente or dolo
causante that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. It stands to
reason that both dolo incidente and dolo causante must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. The only question is whether this fraud, when proven, may
be the basis for making a contract voidable (dolo causante), or for awarding
damages (dolo incidente), or both.
Hence, there is a need to examine all the circumstances thoroughly and to
assess the personal circumstances of the party alleging fraud. This may require
a review of the case facts and the evidence on record.
In general, this Court is not a trier of facts. It makes its rulings based on
applicable law and on standing jurisprudence. The findings of the Court of
Appeals are generally binding on this Court provided that these are supported
by the evidence on record. In the recent case of Medina v. Court of
Appeals,62 this Court held that:
It is axiomatic that a question of fact is not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45. This rule provides that the parties may raise only
questions of law, because the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. Generally,
we are not duty-bound to analyze again and weigh the evidence introduced in
and considered by the tribunals below. When supported by substantial
evidence, the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding
on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under
any of the following recognized exceptions: (1) When the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) Where there is
a grave abuse of discretion; (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) When
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) When the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) When the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. (Emphasis provided) 63
The trial court and the Court of Appeals had appreciated the facts of this case
differently.
The Court of Appeals was not correct in saying that petitioner could only raise
fraud as a ground to annul his participation in the contract as against respondent
Rupert V. Tankeh, since the petitioner did not make any categorical allegation
that respondents Development Bank of the Philippines, Sterling Shipping Lines,
Inc., and Asset Privatization Trust had acted fraudulently. Admittedly, it was only
in the Petition before this Court that the petitioner had made the allegation of
a "well-orchestrated fraud"64 by the respondents. However, Rule 10, Section 5
of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that:
Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — When
issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied consent
of the parties they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in
the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause
them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend does
not effect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if
the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice
will be subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the
amendment to be made. (5a)
In this case, the commission of fraud was an issue that had been tried with the
implied consent of the respondents, particularly Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.,
Asset Privatization Trust, Development Bank of the Philippines, and Arenas.
Hence, although there is a lack of a categorical allegation in the pleading, the
courts may still be allowed to ascertain fraud.
The records will show why and how the petitioner agreed to enter into the
contract with respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh:
ATTY. VELAYO: How did you get involved in the business of the Sterling Shipping
Lines, Incorporated" [sic]
DR. TANKEH: Sometime in the year 1980, I was approached by Ruperto Tankeh
mentioning to me that he is operating a new shipping lines business and he is
giving me free one thousand shares (1,000) to be a director of this new business
which is worth one million pesos (₱1,000,000.00.),
ATTY. VELAYO: Are you related to Ruperto V. Tankeh?
DR. TANKEH: Yes, sir. He is my younger brother.
ATTY. VELAYO: Did you accept the offer?
DR. TANKEH: I accepted the offer based on his promise to me that I will be made
a part of the administration staff so that I can oversee the operation of the
business plus my son, the eldest one who is already a graduate lawyer with a
couple of years of experience in the law firm of Romulo Ozaeta Law Offices (TSN,
April 28, 1988, pp. 10-11.).65
The Second Amended Complaint of petitioner is substantially reproduced below
to ascertain the claim:
xxxx
2. That on May 12, 1981, due to the deceit and fraud exercised by Ruperto V.
Tankeh, plaintiff, together with Vicente L. Arenas, Jr. and Jose Maria Vargas,
signed a promissory note in favor of the defendant DBP, wherein plaintiff bound
himself to jointly and severally pay the DBP the amount of the mortgage loan.
This document insofar as plaintiff is concerned is a simulated document
considering that plaintiff was never a real stockholder of the Sterling Shipping
Lines, Inc.
3. That although plaintiff’s name appears in the records of Sterling Shipping
Lines, Inc. as one of its incorporators, the truth is that he had never invested any
amount in said corporation and that he had never been an actual member of
said corporation. All the money supposedly invested by him were put by
defendant Ruperto V. Tankeh. Thus, all the shares of stock under his name in
fact belongs to Ruperto V. Tankeh. Plaintiff was invited to attend the board
meeting of the Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. only once, which was for the sole
purpose of introducing him to the two directors of the DBP, namely, Mr. Jesus
Macalinag and Mr. Gil Corpus. Thereafter he was never invited again. Plaintiff
was never compensated by the Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. for his being a so-
called director and stockholder. It is clear therefore that the DBP knew all along
that plaintiff was not a true stockholder of the company.
4. That THE DECEIT OF DEFENDANT RUPERTO V. TANKEH IS SHOWN BY THE FACT
THAT when the Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. was organized in 1980, Ruperto V.
Tankeh promised plaintiff that he would be a part of the administration staff so
that he could oversee the operation of the company. He was also promised that
his son, a lawyer, would be given a position in the company. None of these
promises was complied with. In fact, he was not even allowed to find out the
data about the income and expenses of the company.
5. THAT THE DECEIT OF RUPERTO V. TANKEH IS ALSO SHOWN BY THE FACT THAT
PLAINTIFF WAS INVITED TO ATTEND THE BOARD MEETING OF THE STERLING
SHIPPING LINES, INC. ONLY ONCE, WHICH WAS FOR THE SOLE PUPOSE OF
INTRODUCING HIM TO THE TWO DIRECTORS OF THE DBP IN THE BOARD OF THE
STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC., NAMELY, MR. JESUS MACALINAG AND MR. GIL
CORPUS. THEREAFTER HE WAS NEVER INVITED AGAIN. PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER
COMPENSATED BY THE STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC. FOR HIS BEING A SO-
CALLED DIRECTOR AND STOCKHOLDER.
6. That in 1983, upon realizing that he was only being made a tool to realize the
purposes of Ruperto V. Tankeh, plaintiff officially informed the company by
means of a letter dated June 15, 1983 addressed to the company that he has
severed his connection with the company, and demanded among others, that
the company board of directors pass a resolution releasing him from any
liabilities especially with reference to the loan mortgage contract with the DBP
and to notify the DBP of his severance from the Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.
8-A. THAT A WEEK AFTER SENDING THE ABOVE LETTER, PLAINTIFF MADE
EARNEST EFFORTS TOWARDS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN HIM AND HIS
BROTHER RUPERTO V. TANKEH, WHICH EFFORTS WERE SPURNED BY RUPERTO
V. TANKEH, AND ALSO AFTER THE NEWS OF THE SALE OF THE "STERLING ACE"
WAS PUBLISHED AT THE NEWSPAPER [sic], PLAINTIFF TRIED ALL EFFORTS TO
CONTACT RUPERTO V. TANKEH FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARRIVING AT SOME
COMPROMISE, BUT DEFENDANT RUPERTO V. TANKEH AVOIDED ALL CONTACTS
[sic] WITH THE PLAINTIFF UNTIL HE WAS FORCED TO SEEK LEGAL ASSISTANCE
FROM HIS LAWYER.66
In his Answer, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh stated that:
COMES NOW defendant RUPERTO V. TANKEH, through the undersigned
counsel, and to the Honorable Court, most respectfully alleges:
xxxx
3. That paragraph 4 is admitted that herein answering defendant together with
the plaintiff signed the promissory note in favor of DBP but specifically denied
that the same was done through deceit and fraud of herein answering
defendant the truth being that plaintiff signed said promissory note voluntarily
and with full knowledge of the consequences thereof; it is further denied that
said document is a simulated document as plaintiff was never a real stockholder
of the company, the truth being those alleged in the special and affirmative
defenses;
4. That paragraphs 5,6,7,8 and 8-A are specifically denied specially the
imputation of deceit and fraud against herein answering defendant, the truth
being those alleged in the special and affirmative defenses;
xxxx
SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES x x x
8. The complaint states no cause of action as against herein answering
defendant;
9. The Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. was a legitimate company organized in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines with the plaintiff as
one of the incorporators;
10. Plaintiff as one of the incorporators and directors of the board was fully
aware of the by-laws of the company and if he attended the board meeting only
once as alleged, the reason thereof was known only to him;
11. The Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. being a corporation acting through its board
of directors, herein answering defendant could not have promised plaintiff that
he would be a part of the administration staff;
12. As member of the board, plaintiff had all the access to the data and records
of the company; further, as alleged in the complaint, plaintiff has a son who is a
lawyer who could have advised him;
13. Assuming plaintiff wrote a letter to the company to sever his connection
with the company, he should have been aware that all he had to do was sell all
his holdings in the company;
14. Herein answering defendant came to know only of plaintiff’s alleged
predicament when he received the summons and copy of the complaint; x x x.67
An assessment of the allegations in the pleadings and the findings of fact of both
the trial court and appellate court based on the evidence on record led to the
conclusion that there had been no dolo causante committed against the
petitioner by Ruperto V. Tankeh.
The petitioner had given his consent to become a shareholder of the company
without contributing a single peso to pay for the shares of stock given to him by
Ruperto V. Tankeh. This fact was admitted by both petitioner and respondent in
their respective pleadings submitted to the lower court.
In his Amended Complaint,68 the petitioner admitted that "he had never
invested any amount in said corporation and that he had never been an actual
member of said corporation. All the money supposedly invested by him were
put up by defendant Ruperto V. Tankeh."69 This fact alone should have already
alerted petitioner to the gravity of the obligation that he would be undertaking
as a member of the board of directors and the attendant circumstances that this
undertaking would entail. It also does not add any evidentiary weight to
strengthen petitioner’s claim of fraud. If anything, it only strengthens the
position that petitioner’s consent was not obtained through insidious words or
deceitful machinations.
Article 1340 of the Civil Code recognizes the reality of some exaggerations in
trade which negates fraud. It reads:
Art. 1340. The usual exaggerations in trade, when the other party had an
opportunity to know the facts, are not in themselves fraudulent.
Given the standing and stature of the petitioner, he was in a position to
ascertain more information about the contract.
70
Songco v. Sellner serves as one of the key guidelines in ascertaining whether a
party is guilty of fraud in obtaining the consent of the party claiming that fraud
existed. The plaintiff Lamberto Songco sought to recover earnings from a
promissory note that defendant George Sellner had made out to him for
payment of Songco’s sugar cane production. Sellner claimed that he had refused
to pay because Songco had promised that the crop would yield 3,000 piculs of
sugar, when in fact, only 2,017 piculs of sugar had been produced. This Court
held that Sellner would still be liable to pay the promissory note, as follows:
Notwithstanding the fact that Songco's statement as to the probable output of
his crop was disingenuous and uncandid, we nevertheless think that Sellner was
bound and that he must pay the price stipulated. The representation in question
can only be considered matter of opinion as the cane was still standing in the
field, and the quantity of the sugar it would produce could not be known with
certainty until it should be harvested and milled. Undoubtedly Songco had
better experience and better information on which to form an opinion on this
question than Sellner. Nevertheless the latter could judge with his own eyes as
to the character of the cane, and it is shown that he measured the fields and
ascertained that they contained 96 1/2 hectares.
xxxx
The law allows considerable latitude to seller's statements, or dealer's talk; and
experience teaches that it is exceedingly risky to accept it at its face value. The
refusal of the seller to warrant his estimate should have admonished the
purchaser that that estimate was put forth as a mere opinion; and we will not
now hold the seller to a liability equal to that which would have been created
by a warranty, if one had been given.
xxxx
It is not every false representation relating to the subject matter of a contract
which will render it void. It must be as to matters of fact substantially affecting
the buyer's interest, not as to matters of opinion, judgment, probability, or
expectation. (Long vs. Woodman, 58 Me., 52; Hazard vs. Irwin, 18 Pick. [Mass.],
95; Gordon vs. Parmelee, 2 Allen [Mass.], 212; Williamson vs. McFadden, 23 Fla.,
143, 11 Am. St. Rep., 345.) When the purchaser undertakes to make an
investigation of his own, and the seller does nothing to prevent this
investigation from being as full as he chooses to make it, the purchaser cannot
afterwards allege that the seller made misrepresentations. (National Cash
Register Co. vs. Townsend, 137 N. C., 652, 70 L. R. A., 349; Williamson vs. Holt,
147 N. C., 515.)
We are aware that where one party to a contract, having special or expert
knowledge, takes advantage of the ignorance of another to impose upon him,
the false representation may afford ground for relief, though otherwise the
injured party would be bound. But we do not think that the fact that Songco was
an experienced farmer, while Sellner was, as he claims, a mere novice in the
business, brings this case within that exception.71
The following facts show that petitioner was fully aware of the magnitude of his
undertaking:
First, petitioner was fully aware of the financial reverses that Sterling Shipping
Lines, Inc. had been undergoing, and he took great pains to release himself from
the obligation.
Second, his background as a doctor, as a bank organizer, and as a businessman
with experience in the textile business and real estate should have apprised him
of the irregularity in the contract that he would be undertaking. This meant that
at the time petitioner gave his consent to become a part of the corporation, he
had been fully aware of the circumstances and the risks of his participation.
Intent is determined by the acts.
Finally, the records showed that petitioner had been fully aware of the effect of
his signing the promissory note. The bare assertion that he was not privy to the
records cannot counteract the fact that petitioner himself had admitted that
after he had severed ties with his brother, he had written a letter seeking to
reach an amicable settlement with respondent Rupert V. Tankeh. Petitioner’s
actions defied his claim of a complete lack of awareness regarding the
circumstances and the contract he had been entering.
The required standard of proof – clear and convincing evidence – was not met.
There was no dolo causante or fraud used to obtain the petitioner’s consent to
enter into the contract. Petitioner had the opportunity to become aware of the
facts that attended the signing of the promissory note. He even admitted that
he has a lawyer-son who the petitioner had hoped would assist him in the
administration of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. The totality of the facts on record
belies petitioner’s claim that fraud was used to obtain his consent to the
contract given his personal circumstances and the applicable law.
However, in refusing to allow petitioner to participate in the management of
the business, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh was liable for the commission of
incidental fraud. In Geraldez, this Court defined incidental fraud as "those which
are not serious in character and without which the other party would still have
entered into the contract."72
Although there was no fraud that had been undertaken to obtain petitioner’s
consent, there was fraud in the performance of the contract. The records
showed that petitioner had been unjustly excluded from participating in the
management of the affairs of the corporation. This exclusion from the
management in the affairs of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. constituted fraud
incidental to the performance of the obligation.
This can be concluded from the following circumstances.
First, respondent raised in his Answer that petitioner "could not have promised
plaintiff that he would be a part of the administration staff"73 since petitioner
had been fully aware that, as a corporation, Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. acted
through its board of directors. Respondent admitted that petitioner had been
"an incorporator and member of the board of directors"74 and that petitioner
"was fully aware of the by-laws of the company."75 It was incumbent upon
respondent to act in good faith and to ensure that petitioner would not be
excluded from the affairs of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. After all, respondent
asserted that petitioner had entered into the contract voluntarily and with full
consent.
Second, respondent claimed that if petitioner was intent on severing his
connection with the company, all that petitioner had to do was to sell all his
holdings in the company. Clearly, the respondent did not consider the fact that
the sale of the shares of stock alone did not free petitioner from his liability to
Development Bank of the Philippines or Asset Privatization Trust, since the latter
had signed the promissory and had still been liable for the loan. A sale of
petitioners’ shares of stock would not have negated the petitioner’s
responsibility to pay for the loan.
Third, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh did not rebuff petitioner’s claim that the
latter only received news about the sale of the vessel M/V Sterling Ace through
the media and not as one of the board members or directors of Sterling Shipping
Lines, Inc.
All in all, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh’s bare assertion that petitioner had
access to the records cannot discredit the fact that the petitioner had been
effectively deprived of the opportunity to actually engage in the operations of
Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. Petitioner had a reasonable expectation that the
same level of engagement would be present for the duration of their working
relationship. This would include an undertaking in good faith by respondent
Ruperto V. Tankeh to be transparent with his brother that he would not
automatically be made part of the company’s administration.
However, this Court finds there is nothing to support the assertion that Sterling
Shipping Lines, Inc. and Arenas committed incidental fraud and must be held
liable. Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. acted through its board of directors, and the
liability of respondent Tankeh cannot be imposed on Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.
The shipping line has a separate and distinct personality from its officers, and
petitioner’s assertion that the corporation conspired with the respondent
Ruperto V. Tankeh to defraud him is not supported by the evidence and the
records of the case.
As for Arenas, in Lim Tanhu v. Remolete,76 this Court held that:
In all instances where a common cause of action is alleged against several
defendants, some of whom answer and the others do not, the latter or those in
default acquire a vested right not only to own the defense interposed in the
answer of their co-defendant or co-defendants not in default but also to expect
a result of the litigation totally common with them in kind and in amount
whether favorable or unfavorable. The substantive unity of the plaintiffs’ cause
against all the defendants is carried through to its adjective phase as ineluctably
demanded by the homogeneity and indivisibility of justice itself.77
As such, despite Arenas’ failure to submit his Answer to the Complaint or his
declaration of default, his liability or lack thereof is concomitant with the liability
attributed to his co-defendants or co-respondents. However, unlike respondent
Ruperto V. Tankeh’s liability, there is no action or series of actions that may be
attributed to Arenas that may lead to an inference that he was liable for
incidental fraud. In so far as the required evidence for both Sterling Shipping
Lines, Inc. and Arenas is concerned, there is no basis to justify the claim of
incidental fraud.
In addition, respondents Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset
Privatization Trust or Privatization and Management Office cannot be held liable
for fraud. Incidental fraud cannot be attributed to the execution of their actions,
which were undertaken pursuant to their mandated functions under the law.
"Absent convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions has to be upheld."78
The Obligation to Pay Damages
As such, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is liable to his older brother, petitioner
Alejandro, for damages. The obligation to pay damages to petitioner is based on
several provisions of the Civil Code.
Article 1157 enumerates the sources of obligations.
Article 1157. Obligations arise from:
(1) Law;
(2) Contracts;
(3) Quasi-contracts;
(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and
(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)
This enumeration does not preclude the possibility that a single action may
serve as the source of several obligations to pay damages in accordance with
the Civil Code. Thus, the liability of respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is based on
the law, under Article 1344, which provides that the commission of incidental
fraud obliges the person employing it to pay damages.
In addition to this obligation as the result of the contract between petitioner
and respondents, there was also a patent abuse of right on the part of
respondent Tankeh. This abuse of right is included in Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code which provide that:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh abused his right to pursue undertakings in the
interest of his business operations. This is because of his failure to at least act in
good faith and be transparent with petitioner regarding Sterling Shipping Lines,
Inc.’s daily operations.
In National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay,79 this Court
held that:
When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code,
and the exercise results to [sic] the damage of [sic] another, a legal wrong is
committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.80
The damage, loss, and injury done to petitioner are shown by the following
circumstances.
First, petitioner was informed by Development Bank of the Philippines that it
would still pursue his liability for the payment of the promissory note. This
would not have happened if petitioner had allowed himself to be fully apprised
of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.’s financial straits and if he felt that he could still
participate in the company’s operations. There is no evidence that respondent
Ruperto V. Tankeh showed an earnest effort to at least allow the possibility of
making petitioner part of the administration a reality. The respondent was the
brother of the petitioner and was also the primary party that compelled
petitioner Alejandro Tankeh to be solidarily bound to the promissory note.
Ruperto V. Tankeh should have done his best to ensure that he had exerted the
diligence to comply with the obligations attendant to the participation of
petitioner.
Second, respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh’s refusal to enter into an agreement or
settlement with petitioner after the latter’s discovery of the sale of the M/V
Sterling Ace was an action that constituted bad faith. Due to Ruperto’s refusal,
his brother, petitioner Alejandro, became solidarily liable for an obligation that
the latter could have avoided if he had been given an opportunity to participate
in the operations of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. The simple sale of all of
petitioner’s shares would not have solved petitioner’s problems, as it would not
have negated his liability under the terms of the promissory note.
Finally, petitioner is still bound to the creditors of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.,
namely, public respondents Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset
Privatization Trust. This is an additional financial burden for petitioner. Nothing
in the records suggested the possibility that Development Bank of the
Philippines or Asset Privatization Trust through the Privatization Management
Office will not pursue or is precluded from pursuing its claim against the
petitioner. Although petitioner Alejandro voluntarily signed the promissory note
and became a stockholder and board member, respondent should have treated
him with fairness, transparency, and consideration to minimize the risk of
incurring grave financial reverses.
In Francisco v. Ferrer,81 this Court ruled that moral damages may be awarded on
the following bases:
To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must
be palpably wanton, reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive.
Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or breach of contract,
moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was
guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his
contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract
itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries.
Moral damages may be awarded in breaches of contracts where the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a
breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes
of the nature of fraud.
xxxx
The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by
clear and convincing evidence for the law always presumes good faith. It is not
enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, serious
anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably such action
must be shown to have been willfully done in bad faith or will ill motive. Mere
allegations of besmirched reputation, embarrassment and sleepless nights are
insufficient to warrant an award for moral damages. It must be shown that the
proximate cause thereof was the unlawful act or omission of the [private
respondent] petitioners.
An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit:
(1) first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological,
clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be culpable act or
omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and
(4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code. (Citations omitted)82
In this case, the four elements cited in Francisco are present. First, petitioner
suffered an injury due to the mental duress of being bound to such an onerous
debt to Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset Privatization Trust.
Second, the wrongful acts of undue exclusion done by respondent Ruperto V.
Tankeh clearly fulfilled the same requirement. Third, the proximate cause of his
injury was the failure of respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh to comply with his
obligation to allow petitioner to either participate in the business or to fulfill his
fiduciary responsibilities with candor and good faith. Finally, Article 221983 of
the Civil Code provides that moral damages may be awarded in case of acts and
actions referred to in Article 21, which, as stated, had been found to be
attributed to respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh.
In the Appellant’s Brief,84 petitioner asked the Court of Appeals to demand from
respondents, except from respondent Asset Privatization Trust, the amount of
five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00). This Court finds that the amount of five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) is a sufficient amount of moral
damages.
In addition to moral damages, this Court may also impose the payment of
exemplary damages.1âwphi1 Exemplary damages are discussed in Article 2229
of the Civil Code, as follows:
ART. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example
or correction of the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages.
Exemplary damages are further discussed in Articles 2233 and 2234, particularly
regarding the pre-requisites of ascertaining moral damages and the fact that it
is discretionary upon this Court to award them or not:
ART. 2233. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right; the
court will decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.
ART. 2234. While the amount of the exemplary damages need not be proven,
the plaintiff must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory
damages before the court may consider the question of whether or not
exemplary damages should be awarded x x x
The purpose of exemplary damages is to serve as a deterrent to future and
subsequent parties from the commission of a similar offense. The case of People
v. Rante85 citing People v. Dalisay86 held that:
Also known as ‘punitive’ or ‘vindictive’ damages, exemplary or corrective
damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a
vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured
or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. These terms are
generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is
preference in the use of exemplary damages when the award is to account for
injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and humiliation suffered by a
person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,
the theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the
highly reprehensible conduct of the defendant—associated with such
circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud—that intensifies the
injury. The terms punitive or vindictive damages are often used to refer to those
species of damages that may be awarded against a person to punish him for his
outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good
measure to deter the wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.87
To justify an award for exemplary damages, the wrongful act must be
accompanied by bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if
the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent
manner.88 In this case, this Court finds that respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh acted
in a fraudulent manner through the finding of dolo incidente due to his failure
to act in a manner consistent with propriety, good morals, and prudence.
Since exemplary damages ensure that future litigants or parties are enjoined
from acting in a similarly malevolent manner, it is incumbent upon this Court to
impose the damages in such a way that will serve as a categorical warning and
will show that wanton actions will be dealt with in a similar manner. This Court
finds that the amount of two hundred thousand pesos (₱200,000.00) is
sufficient for this purpose.
In sum, this Court must act in the best interests of all future litigants by
establishing and applying clearly defined standards and guidelines to ascertain
the existence of fraud.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals as to the assailed Decision in so far as the finding of fraud is SUSTAINED
with the MODIFICATION that respondent RUPERTO V. TANKEH be ordered to
pay moral damages in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱500,000.00) and the amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(₱200,000.00) by way of exemplary damages.
G.R. No. 204544
MARLON BACERRA y TABONES, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The identity of the perpetrator of a crime and a finding of guilt may rest solely
on the strength of circumstantial evidence.
This resolves the Petition for Review1 assailing the Decision2 dated August 30,
2012 and the Resolution3 dated October 22, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 32923, which upheld the conviction of Marlon Bacerra y Tabones
(Bacerra) for the crime of simple arson punished underSection 1 of Presidential
Decree No. 1613.4
In the Information dated January 12, 2006, Bacerra was charged with violation
of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613:
That on or about 4:00 o'clock in the morning of November 15, 2005, at Brgy. San
Pedro Ili, Alcala, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with intent to cause damage to another, did then
and theres [sic], willfully, unlawfully and feloniously set fire to the rest house of
Alfredo Melegrito y Galamay, to his damage and prejudice in the amount of
Php70,000.00, more or less.
Contrary to Sec. 1, 1st par. Of P.D. 1613.5
Bacerra pleaded not guilty to the charge.6
During trial, the prosecution presented private complainant Alfredo Melegrito
(Alfredo), Edgar Melegrito (Edgar), Toni Rose dela Cruz, and P03 Marcos
Bautista, Jr. to testify on the alleged incident.7 Their collective testimonies
produced the following facts for the prosecution:
Alfredo and his family8 were sound asleep in their home on
November 15, 2005.9 At about 1:00 a.m., he was roused from sleep by the
sound of stones hitting his house. Alfredo went to the living room10 and
peered through the jalousie window. The terrace light allowed him to recognize
his neighbor and co-worker,11 Bacerra.12
Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo's house while saying, "Vulva of your
mother."13 Just as he was about to leave, Bacerra exclaimed, "[V]ulva of your
mother, Old Fred, I'll bum you now."14 Bacerra then left.15 Alfredo's son, Edgar,
also witnessed the incident through a window in his room.16
Troubled by Bacerra's threat, Alfredo waited for him to return. Alfredo sat down
beside the window.17 At around 4:00a.m.,18 he heard dogs barking
outside.19 Alfredo looked out the window and saw Bacerra walking towards
their nipa hut,20 which was located around 10 meters from their house.21
Bacerra paced in front of the nipa hut and shook it. 22 Moments later, Alfredo
saw the nipa hut burning.23
Alfredo sought help from his neighbors to smother the fire. 24 Edgar contacted
the authorities for assistance25 but it was too late. The nipa hut and its contents
were completely destroyed.26 The local authorities conducted an investigation
on the incident.27
The defense presented Bacerra, Alex Dacanay (Dacanay), and Jocelyn Fernandez
(Fernandez) as witnesses. Their collective testimonies yielded the defense's
version of the incident:
At around 11:00 p.m. of November 14, 2005, Bacerra was at the house of his
friend, Ronald Valencia. The two (2) engaged in a drinking session with Dacanay
and a certain Reyson until 1:00 a.m. of November 15, 2005.28
Bacerra asked Dacanay to take him to his grandmother's house. Dacanay
conceded but they found the gate closed. 29 Embarrassed to disturb his
grandmother,30 Bacerra asked Dacanay to bring him to Fernandez's house
instead.31 However, Dacanay was already sleepy at that time.32 Hence, Bacerra
requested his brother-in-law, Francisco Sadora (Sadora), to acconwany him to
Fernandez's house, which was located one (1) kilometer away.33
Bacerra and Sadora arrived at Fernandez's house at around 1:30 a.m. Fernandez
told Bacerra to sleep in the living room. She checked on Bacerra every hour.34 At
around 7:00 a.m., police officers who were looking for Bacerra arrived at
Fernandez's house.35 Knowing that he did not do anything wrong,36 Bacerra
voluntarily went to the police station with the authorities.37
In the Decision dated October 6, 2009, Branch 50 of the Regional Trial Court in
Villasis, Pangasinan38 found Bacerra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Marlon Bacerra y
Tabones GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Arson defined
and penalized in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613 and, there being no
modifying circumstance, is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six
(6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor,
as maximum, together with all the accessory penalties provided by law.
The accused is likewise ordered to pay the private complainant ₱50,000.00 as
temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.39 (Emphasis in the original)
Bacerra appealed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court.40 He argued that none
of the prosecution's witnesses had positively identjfied him as the person who
burned the nipa hut.41
42
In the Decision dated August 30, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
Decision dated October 6, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court in toto.43
Bacerra moved for reconsideration44 but the Motion was denied in the
Resolution45 dated October 22, 2012.
On January 15, 2013, Bacerra filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari46 assailing
the Decision dated August 30, 2012 and Resolution dated October 22, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals.
In the Resolution dated January 30, 2013, this Court required the People of the
Philippines to comment on the petition for review.47
On June 18, 2013, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Comment on the Petition48 to which petitioner filed a
Reply49 on January 27, 2014.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding his conviction
based on circumstantial evidence, which, being merely based on conjecture,
falls short of proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.50 No direct evidence
was presented to prove that petitioner actually set fire to private complainant's
nipa hut.51 Moreover, there were two (2) incidents that occurred, which should
be taken and analyzed separately.52
Petitioner adds that there were material inconsistencies in the testimonies of
the prosecution's witnesses.53 Petitioner also points out that private
complainant acted contrary to normal human behavior, placing great doubt on
his credibility.54 Persons whose properties are being destroyed should
immediately confront the perpetrator.55 Private complainant and his family,
however, merely stayed inside their house throughout the entire incident.56
Petitioner argues in the alternative that the mitigating circumstances of
intoxication and voluntary surrender should have been appreciated by the lower
tribunals in computing the imposable penalty.57 Petitioner was drunk at the
time of the alleged incident.58 In addition, he voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities despite the absence of an arrest warrant.59 Lastly, petitioner asserts
that temperate damages should not have been awarded because private
complainant could have proven actual damages during trial.60
In its Comment, respondent asserts that direct evidence is not the only means
to establish criminal liability.61 An accused may be convicted based on
circumstantial evidence as long as the combination of circumstances leads to
the conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt.62
Respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the trial court's
decision. For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must
be shown that it is not habitual.63 The state of drunkenness of the accused must
be of such nature as to affect his or her mental faculties. 64 Voluntary surrender
cannot likewise be considered as a mitigating circumstance because there is no
showing of spontaneity on the part of the accused.65
Lastly, respondent argues that temperate damages amounting to ₱50,000.00
was properly awarded because the burning of private complainant's nipa hut
brought some pecuniary loss.66
This case presents the following issues for this Court's resolution:
First, whether petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on
the circumstantial evidence adduced during trial;67
Second, whether the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and voluntary
surrender may properly be appreciated in this case to reduce the imposable
penalty;68 and
Finally, whether the award of temperate damages amounting to ₱50,000.00
was proper.69
This Court affirms petitioner's conviction for the crime of simple arson.
I
Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with
legal consequences.
The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves
the relationship of the fact inferred to the facts that constitute the offense. Their
difference does not relate to the probative value of the evidence.
Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any
inference.70 Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand, "indirectly proves a
fact in issue, such that the factfinder must draw an inference or reason from
circumstantial evidence."71
The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor
superior to circumstantial evidence.72 The Rules of Court do not distinguish
between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the
existence of a fact may be inferred."73 The same quantum of evidence is still
required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt.74
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from
which it may be inferred, beyond reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime
exist and that the accused is its perpetrator.75 There is no requirement in our
jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict.76 After all, evidence is always
a matter of reasonable inference from any fact that may be proven by the
prosecution provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.
Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that
should be established to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.77
The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator,78 and the finding of
guilt may all be established by circumstantial evidence.79 The circumstances
must be considered as a whole and should create an unbroken chain leading to
the conclusion that the accused authored the crime.80
The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a
finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a quantitative one.81 The proven
circumstances must be "consistent with each other, consistent with the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the
hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except
that of guilt."82
The crime of simple arson was proven solely through circumstantial evidence
in People v. Abayon.83 None of the prosecution's witnesses actually saw the
accused start the fire.84 Nevertheless, the circumstantial evidence adduced by
the prosecution, taken in its entirety, all pointed to the accused's guilt.85
In People v. Acosta,86 there was also no direct evidence linking the accused to
the burning of the house.87 However, the circumstantial evidence was
substantial enough to convict the accused.88 The accused had motive and
previously attempted to set a portion of the victim's house on fire.89 Moreover,
he was present at the scene of the crime before and after the incident.90
Similarly, in this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut.
Nevertheless, the prosecution has established multiple circumstances, which,
after being considered in their entirety, support the conclusion that petitioner
is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson.
First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner stoned
private complainant's house and threatened to bum him.91 Private complainant
testified that he saw petitioner throwing stones at his house and heard
petitioner say, "okinam nga Lakay Fred, puuran kayo tad ta!"92 (Vulva of your
mother, Old Fred, I'll bum you now.)93 Petitioner's threats were also heard by
private complainant's son94 and grandchildren.95
Second, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner
returned a few hours later and made his way to private complainant's nipa
hut.96 Private complainant testified that at 4:00 a.m.,97 he saw petitioner pass
by their house and walk towards their nipa hut.98 This was corroborated by
private complainant's son who testified that he saw petitioner standing in front
of the nipa hut moments before it was burned.99
Third, the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that
petitioner was in close proximity to the nipa hut before it caught fire.100
Private complainant testified that he saw petitioner walk to and fro in front
of the nipa hut and shake its posts just before it caught fire.101 Private
complainant's son likewise saw petitioner standing at the side of the nipa hut
before it was burned.102
The stoning incident and the burning incident cannot be taken and analyzed
separately. Instead, they must be viewed and considered as a
whole.1âwphi1 Circumstantial evidence is like a "tapestry made up of strands
which create a pattern when interwoven."103 Each strand cannot be plucked out
and scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire
picture.104 The events that transpired prior to the burning incident cannot be
disregarded. Petitioner's threat to bum occurred when he stoned private
complainant's house.
Also, there is no other reasonable version of the events which can be held with
reasonable certainty.
Private complainant could have actually seen petitioner bum the nipa hut by
stepping outside of his house. However, behavioral responses of individuals
confronted with strange, startling, or frightful experiences vary.105 Where there
is a perceived threat or danger to survival, some may fight, others might
escape.106 Private complainant's act of remaining inside his house during the
incident is not contrary to human behavior. It cannot affect his credibility as a
witness.
Furthermore, "the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a function ... of
the trial courts."107 It is a factual matter that generally cannot be reviewed in a
Rule 45 petition.108 Petitioner failed to prove, much less allege, any of the
exceptions to the general rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.109 Hence, this
Court will not disturb the trial court's findings on the matter.
II
For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, imposed by the trial
of the accused must neither be "habitual [n]or subsequent to the plan to commit court, stands.
[a] felony."110
III
Moreover, it must be shown that the mental faculties and willpower of the
Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be awarded when
accused were impaired in such a way that would diminish the accused's capacity
there is a finding that "some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
to understand the wrongful nature of his or her acts.111 The bare assertion that
[cannot], from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty." The amount of
one is inebriated at the time of the commission of the crime is
temperate damages to be awarded in each case is discretionary upon the
insufficient.112 There must be proof of the fact of intoxication and the effect of
courts115 as long as it is "reasonable under the circumstances."116
intoxication on the accused.113
Private complainant clearly suffered some pecuniary loss as a result of the
There is no sufficient evidence in this case that would show that petitioner was
burning of his nipa hut. However, private complainant failed to substantiate the
intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime. A considerable amount
actual damages that he suffered. Nevertheless, he is entitled to be indemnified
of time had lapsed from petitioner's drinking spree up to the burning of the nipa
for his loss. The award of temperate damages amounting to ₱50,000.00 is
hut within which he could have regained control of his actions. Hence,
proper and reasonable under the circumstances.
intoxication cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Decision dated August 30,
Neither can voluntary surrender be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
2012 and the Resolution dated October 22, 2012 of theCourt of Appeals in CA-
Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of G.R. CR No. 32923, finding petitioner Marlon Bacerra y Tabones guilty beyond
spontaneity. The accused's act of surrendering to the authorities must have reasonable doubt for the crime of arson is AFFIRMED.
been impelled by the acknowledgment of guilt or a desire to "save the
authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his [or her] search
and capture."114
Based on the evidence on record, there is no showing that petitioner's act of
submitting his person to the authorities was motivated by an acknowledgement
of his guilt.
Considering that no mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the
crime, the indeterminate sentence of six (6) years of prision correccional, as

G.R. No. 172637 April 22, 2015
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS AND EMILY ROSE KO LIM
CHAO, Petitioners,
vs.
MARY ANN T. CASTRO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas (Ombudsman) against respondent Assistant City
Prosecutor Mary Ann T. Castro (respondent), assailing the decision 1 and
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 13, 2006 and May 2,
2006, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 78933.
BACKGROUND FACTS
Sometime in 2001, Mariven Castro (Mariven) purchased on credit a Fuso Canter
vehicle from KD Surplus. Mariven executed a promissory note, and then issued
six (6) post-dated checks to KD Surplus. The checks were dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds when presented for encashment.
Mariven inquired from Emily Rose Ko Lim Chao (Emily), the owner-manager of
KD Surplus, if it was still possible to just return the vehicle in exchange for the
issued checks.3
At around 2:00 p.m. on September 16, 2002, Mariven’s wife, Rosefil Castro
(Rosefil), accompanied by his (Mariven’s) sister, herein respondent, brought the
Fuso Canter to KD Surplus’ yard for appraisal and evaluation. Emily inspected
the vehicle and found out that it had a defective engine, as well as a rusty and
dilapidated body. Emily thus refused to accept the vehicle.
Rosefil requested the security on duty, Mercedito Guia (Guia), to register in the
company’s security logbook the fact of entry of the motor vehicle in the
premises of KD Surplus. Guia refused to do so as it was already past 5:00 p.m.
Upon the prodding of Rosefil, Guia inserted an entry on the upper right portion
of the logbook’s entry page for the date September 16, 2002, stating that the
vehicle had been "checked-in" on that day. This entry was signed by Rosefil.
The respondent then left the premises of KD Surplus, but returned there a few
moments later on board a Philippine National Police-Special Weapons and
Tactics (PNP-SWAT) vehicle. The respondent signed on the inserted entry in the
logbook as a witness, and then brought this logbook outside of KD Surplus’
premises. The respondent again left KD Surplus in order to photocopy the
logbook. She returned on board the PNP-SWAT vehicle after 30 minutes, and
handed the logbook to the security guard. The respondent also asked Emily to
sign a yellow pad paper containing a list of the issued checks, and told her to
return these checks. When Emily refused, the respondent threatened to file
cases against Emily; the respondent also threatened Emily’s staff with lawsuits
if they will not testify in her favor.
On September 26, 2002, Emily filed an administrative complaint for violation of
Republic Act No. 6713 (the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees) against the respondent before the Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas). The case was docketed as OMBV-A-0508-1.
The respondent essentially countered that the case Emily filed was a
harassment suit. She further maintained that the police arrived at the premises
of KD Surplus ahead of her.
The Ombudsman’s Rulings
In its decision4 dated May 6, 2003, the Ombudsman found the respondent guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and imposed on her
the penalty of "three (3) months suspension from the service without pay." The
Ombudsman held that the respondent’s act of summoning the PNP-SWAT to go
with her to KD Surplus, and riding on their vehicle, overstepped the conventions
of good behavior which every public official ought to project so as to preserve
the integrity of public service. It added that the respondent had encouraged a
wrong perception that she was a "dispenser of undue patronage."5 The
Ombudsman reasoned out as follows:
To our mind, the presence of SWAT in the vicinity was totally uncalled for as
there were neither serious nor even a slight indication of an imminent danger
which would justify their presence.1âwphi1 Verily, we cannot string along with
the complainant’s attempt to justify her aforesaid act as an act of prudence
because it is very clear that her recourse to the military by calling some
members of the SWAT PNP to go with her to complainant’s shop was a display
of overbearingness and a show of haughtiness. Certainly, respondent cannot
deny that if she were not Asst. City Prosecutor Mary Ann Castro, it would be
impossible for her to get in a snap of a finger the services of this elite police
team whose assistance she availed not for a legitimate purpose but for her
personal aggrandizement. Her power and influence as a public official had
indeed come into play which she had abused by not using it properly. Hence, we
cannot make any other conclusion except that the presence of the SWAT was
purposely intended to brag of her clout in the military to possibly bring about
fears and apprehension on the part of complainant and the latter’s employees.6
The respondent moved to reconsider this decision, but the Ombudsman denied
her motion in its Order7 dated July 14, 2003.
Proceedings before the CA
The respondent filed a petition for review before the CA challenging the May 6,
2003 decision and July 14, 2003 order of the Ombudsman. In its February 13,
2006 decision, the CA modified the Ombudsman’s ruling, and found the
respondent liable for simple misconduct only.
The CA held that the Ombudsman’s suspension order was not merely
recommendatory. It also ruled that the respondent was not denied due process
since she submitted a counter-affidavit where she refuted, among others,
Emily’s claim that she went to the premises of KD Surplus on board a PNP-SWAT
vehicle. The CA also held that the respondent was not suspended for her act of
calling for police assistance, but for abusing her position as the Assistant City
Prosecutor of Cebu City. According to the CA, the respondent used her office’s
influence, prestige and ascendancy to use the PNP-SWAT for a purely personal
matter.
The CA thus found the respondent liable for simple misconduct only, and
reduced the penalty of suspension imposed on her to one (1) month and one (1)
day. It held that the respondent’s acts were not characterized by the elements
of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established
rules.
The respondent and the Ombudsman filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. It its resolution of May 2, 2006, the CA denied these motions
for lack or merit.
The Present Petition and the Respondent’s Comment
In the present petition for review on certiorari,8 the Ombudsman essentially
argued that the respondent’s act of using her office’s influence to use the PNP-
SWAT for a purely personal matter constitutes conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. It argued that the respondent exhibited irresponsibility
and corruption, and showed her lack of integrity when she took advantage of
her position as Assistant City Prosecutor to summon the assistance of the elite
SWAT Team in order to pressure and harass Emily.
In her Comment,9 the respondent countered that she had been denied due
process since the act of calling for police assistance was not one of the specific
acts cited in Emily’s complaint as constituting abuse of authority.
OUR RULING
After due consideration, we modify the assailed CA decision and resolution. We
agree with the Ombudsman’s ruling that the respondent is guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service, but modify the imposed penalty.
No denial of due process
We clarify at the outset that contrary to the respondent’s claim, her act of
seeking police assistance and riding on a PNP-SWAT vehicle when she went to
the premises of KD Surplus formed part of Emily’s allegations. In Emily’s
affidavit-complaint, she mentioned that she saw the respondent on board the
SWAT vehicle twice: first, when the respondent first arrived at the premises of
KD Surplus; and second, when she returned there after photocopying the
company’s security logbook.
We emphasize that the respondent refuted these allegations in her counter-
affidavit: she admitted that she asked for police assistance while on her way to
KD Surplus, but maintained that she was on board a Revo car owned by one Jojo
Obera. According to the respondent, she sought police assistance because of a
possibility that a trouble might ensue between the parties. The respondent also
stated that the police arrived at KD Surplus ahead of her.
To us, the respondent would have found no need to state that: (1) she was on
board a Revo vehicle when she went to KD Surplus; (2) point out that the police
arrived ahead of her; and (3) explain why she sought the help of the police, if
Emily did not allege that she (respondent) was on board a SWAT vehicle when
she went to KD Surplus on two occasions.
Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative
proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. Due process is simply the opportunity given to
explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.10
As earlier stated, the respondent refuted Emily’s allegations in her counter-
affidavit. The respondent cannot now feign ignorance of the fact that her act of
calling for police assistance vis-à-vis riding on board the SWAT vehicle, was not
among those included in the charge against her. In addition, the security guard
on duty, Guia, stated in his affidavit11 (which was attached to Emily’s affidavit-
complaint) that the respondent "arrived riding in a SWAT PNP vehicle with Body
No. 240, x x x she signed the logbook as a witness on the inserted entry."12 Since
these allegations formed part of Emily’s affidavit-complaint, the Ombudsman
has the power to determine the respondent’s administrative liability based on
the actual facts recited in this affidavit complaint.
The Court’s ruling in Avenido v. CSC13 is particularly instructive:
The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted
with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that
he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is
the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.
We reiterate that the mere opportunity to be heard is sufficient. As long as the
respondent was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence,
the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with; what the law
abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.14
Notably, when the case was called for a preliminary conference, the respondent
opted to submit the case for decision on the basis of the evidence on record.
The respondent’s liability
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of
guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.15 The standard of substantial
evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that a person
is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might
not be overwhelming or even preponderant.16
In the present case, the respondent’s acts of seeking out the assistance of the
SWAT and riding on their vehicle on two occasions en route to KD Surplus are
factual matters that the Ombudsman and the CA have passed upon. It is settled
that factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when
supported by substantial evidence and are accorded due respect and weight,
especially when they are affirmed by the CA. Furthermore, only questions of law
may be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; the Court is
not a trier of facts and it is not its function to review evidence on record and
assess the probative weight thereof.17 The task of this Court in an appeal by
petition for review on certiorari is limited to the review of errors of law that the
CA might have committed. The issue that remains to be resolved, therefore, is
whether the CA correctly found the respondent liable for simple misconduct.
To our mind, the respondent’s acts of involving an elite police team like the
SWAT in a matter purely personal to her and riding on their vehicle in going to
and from the premises of KD Surplus are uncalled for: these were a haughty and
an excessive display of the influence that she could wield, ultimately aimed at
helping Mariven and Rosefil to compel Emily to accept the "depreciated"
vehicle, and to return the bum checks issued by Mariven. These send the wrong
impression that public officials could use and exploit the police force for their
personal interests. While it may be true that the respondent merely wanted to
ensure the safety of the parties in the event that an untoward incident may
happen between Emily and Rosefil, the calling of the SWAT was clearly an
overkill; there was also no justification for her to ride in a SWAT vehicle. By
calling out the SWAT to the premises of KD Surplus and by riding on their vehicle,
she clearly wanted to project an image of power and influence meant to
intimidate, bully, and/or browbeat Emily. How the respondent managed to
convince an elite police force like the SWAT to accompany her, and to allow her
to use their vehicle in a matter purely personal to her, does not favorably reflect
on her as well as on the police.
However, we do not agree with the CA that the respondent is guilty of simple
misconduct. Misconduct is "a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a
public officer."18 In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct,
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard
of established rules, must be manifest and established by substantial evidence.
Grave misconduct necessarily includes the lesser offense of simple misconduct.
Thus, a person charged with grave misconduct may be held liable for simple
misconduct if the misconduct does not involve any of the elements to qualify
the misconduct as grave.19
We point out that to constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should
relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and
duties of a public officer.20 The respondent in the present case summoned the
SWAT for a purely personal matter, i.e., to aid her brother and sister-in-law.
There was no link between the respondent’s acts and her official functions as a
city prosecutor. In Manuel v. Judge Calimag, Jr.,21 the Court explained that:
x x x Misconduct in office has been authoritatively defined by Justice Tuazon in
Lacson v. Lopez in these words: "Misconduct in office has a definite and well-
understood legal meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such
as affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such only as affects
his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has been said at all times,
it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the
officer x x x It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance
warranting removal from office of an officer must have direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the
duties of the office x x x."
The respondent’s actions, to my mind, constitute conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, an administrative offense which need not be related to
the respondent’s official functions. 22 In Pia v. Gervacio,23 we explained that
acts may constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as long
as they tarnish the image and integrity of his/her public office. Additionally and
contrary to the CA’s ruling, conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service may or may not be characterized by corruption or a willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules.24
In Manhit v. Office of the Ombudsman (Fact Finding & Intelligence
Bureau),25 the Court had the occasion to define "gross" and "prejudicial" in
connection with the offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, as follows:
The word "gross" connotes "something out of measure; beyond allowance; not
to be excused; flagrant; shameful" while "prejudicial" means "detrimental or
derogatory to a party; naturally, probably or actually bringing about a wrong
result."26
In Mariano v. Roxas,27 the Court ruled that the offense committed by a CA
employee in forging some receipts to avoid her private contractual obligations,
was not misconduct but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
because her acts had no direct relation to or connection with the performance
of her official duties." We similarly ruled in Cabalitan v. Department of Agrarian
Reform28 that the offense committed by the employee in selling fake Unified
Vehicular Volume Program exemption cards to his officemates during office
hours was not grave misconduct, but conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
Notably, the Court has also considered the following acts or omissions, among
others, as constituting conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service:
misappropriation of public funds, abandonment of office, failure to report back
to work without prior notice, failure to safe keep public records and property,
making false entries in public documents and falsification of court orders.29
In these lights, we hold that the Ombudsman correctly ruled that the
respondent’s acts of seeking the assistance of the SWAT and in riding on board
a SWAT vehicle constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
and not misconduct, since there is no nexus between these acts and her official
functions. As long as the questioned conduct tarnishes the image and integrity
of his/her public office, the corresponding penalty may be meted on the erring
public officer or employee.30
With regard to the other acts alleged by Emily in her affidavit-complaint, the
Ombudsman and the CA already ruled that the respondent is not
administratively liable for her acts of taking the company logbook outside of the
premises of KD Surplus; and for handing a yellow paper containing a list of the
checks issued by Mariven to Emily for the latter's signature. We see no reason
to overturn their findings and conclusions in the absence of any showing that
these had been arrived at arbitrarily.
We additionally note that Guia, stated in his affidavit that the respondent
"borrowed the security logbook for the purpose of securing a photocopy" and
later returned it to him. We thus find unpersuasive Emily's claim that the
respondent took the security logbook outside of the company's premises
without permission.
Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is classified as a grave
offense with a corresponding penalty of suspension for six ( 6) months and one
(1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and the penalty of dismissal for the
second offense. Since this is the first time that the respondent had committed
these acts, we deem it proper to impose on her the penalty of suspension for
six (6) months and one (1) day.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we MODIFY the decision and resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated February 13, 2006 and May 2, 2006, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 78933. Respondent Mary Ann T. Castro is declared guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and is suspended from
service for six (6) months and one (1) day.
[ G.R. No. 191914, August 09, 2017 ]
AGNES V. GUISON, PETITIONER, V. HEIRS OF LOREÑO TERRY, JOSE U. ALBERTO
III, SPOUSES MEDIN M. FRANCISCO AND FRANCIA M. FRANCISCO, FE M.
ALBERTO AND ELISA B. SARMIENTO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
This resolves the Petition[1] filed by Agnes V. Guison to assail the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision[2] and Resolution[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 90319. Reversing the
earlier Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA sustained the validity
of certain instruments of conveyance in favor of respondent Loreño
Terry.[5] These instruments pertained to a 3,000-square-meter parcel of land
located in Virac, Catanduanes, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
(TCT) 12244.[6]
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows.
On 14 March 1995, a Deed of Absolute Sale[7] was executed in favor of
respondent Terry by Angeles Vargas, the father of petitioner. The subject of the
sale was a parcel of agricultural land located in Moonwalk, Danicop,
Catanduanes, with an area of 1.3894 hectares and identified as Lot No. 10628-
pt. In the deed, Vargas acknowledged receipt of the payment for the lot in the
amount of P5,557.60.
Between September and December 1995, Terry sold certain parts of the lot to
third parties, namely, Jose U. Alberto III (583 square meters),[8] Alona M.
Guerrero (400 square meters)[9] and respondent Lino Gianan (200 square
meters).[10] Gianan is a respondent in this case.
On 22 January 1996, Vargas and Terry executed an Agreement of Revocation of
Sale[11] (Revocation Agreement) relating to the same parcel of land. The
instrument stated that Vargas had erroneously sold the entire area of Lot 10628-
pt to Terry. The parties, however, averred that their true intention was only to
convey a 3,000-square-meter portion of the land to Terry, considering that there
was no monetary consideration for the transaction. Consequently, they agreed
to revoke the earlier Deed of Absolute Sale to the extent of 1.0894 hectares,
while affirming the validity of the conveyance to Terry of a 3,000-square-meter
potion, whose actual location would later be determined by both parties in a
separate document. The agreement states:
WHEREAS, a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property was executed by [Angeles
S. Vargas] on March 14, 1995, in Manila, whereby a 1.3894 has. of land in
Moonwalk & Danicop, Virac, Catanduanes was erroneously sold to [Loreño
Terry];
WHEREAS, the intention of both parties was the transfer of only Three Thousand
(3,000) square meters [sic] portion thereof, considering that there was not even
any monetary consideration in the sale;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, the
parties hereto hereby REVOKE the sale said parties executed on March 14, 1995
to the extent of 1.0894 has. while retaining as valid the transfer to [Loreño Terry]
the area of Three Thousand (3,000) square meters.
That the actual location of said 3,000 square meters shall be determined by both
parties in a separate document consonant with this agreement but forming part
hereof.
Vargas died on 10 June 1998[12] with no agreement executed regarding the
actual location of the land conveyed to Terry.
On 3 May 2000, a Partition Agreement[13] was entered into by the Heirs of
Angeles Vargas, represented by petitioner, and respondent Terry. The
instrument, which was executed for the purpose of physically segregating the
3,000-square-meter portion allotted to Terry, provides:
1. WHEREAS, the late Angeles Vargas left a parcel of land more particularly
described as follows:
A parcel of agricultural land situated in Moonwalk, Virac, Catanduanes
designated as Lot No. 10628-portion containing an area of 1.3894 hectares,
more or less, declared under A.R.P. No. 011-0723 in the name of Angeles S.
Vargas and bounded as follows:
North ------- Lot No. 10628-part
----
East --------- Lot No. 10627; Lot No. 12438 and Lot No. 10649;
---
South ------- Lot No. 10630
----
West -------- Lot No. 10628-part
----
2. WHEREAS, Lorenio Terry is entitled to a portion of said land with an area of
Three Thousand (3,000) Square Meters;
3. WHEREAS, it is the mutual agreement of all parties to partition the said land
in order to physically segregate the 3,000 square meter portion belonging to
Lorenio Terry from the bigger remaining portion;
WHEREFORE, the parties do hereby [p]artition the abovesaid property in
accordance with the attached Subdivision Plan as follows:
TO LORENIO TERRY:
The Southwestern portion of Lot No. 10628-part with an area of Two Thousand
Six Hundred (2,600) Square Meters as indicated in the attached Subdivision
Plan;
The Western portion of Lot No. 10628-part with an area of Four Hundred (400)
Square Meters as indicated in the attached Subdivision Plan; and
The Three Thousand (3,000) Square Meters portion which is hereby adjudicated
to Lorenio Terry, already INCLUDES the portion which he sold to third persons
prior to the execution of the Revocation of Deed of Sale;
TO THE HEIRS OF ANGELES VARGAS:
The entire remaining portion of Lot 10628-part with an area of Ten Thousand
Eight Hundred Ninety Four (10,894) Square Meters more or less, as show[n] in
the attached Subdivision Plan;
The undersigned parties do hereby respect and recognize each other's rights as
absolute owners of the portion respectively adjudicated to them by virtue of
this Partition Agreement, and they hereby request the Assessor's Office to effect
the transfer of the A.R.P. to the names of the corresponding party in accordance
with this Partition Agreement and the attached Subdivision Plan.
Thereafter, Terry sold other portions of the property to third parties,
specifically, Alex Laynes (500 square meters),[14] Elisa Sarmiento (400 square
meters),[15] Fe Alberto (400 square meters),[16] Medin Francisco (200 square
meters),[17] Eddie Alcantara (100 square meters),[18] and Oswaldo de Leon (200
square meters).[19] All the foregoing transactions left Terry with ownership of
only 17 square meters of the lot.[20]
On 8 May 2000, the heirs of Vargas executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate Among Heirs.[21] In that instrument, Lot 10628-pt was allotted to
petitioner as part of her share of the estate.[22]
On 16 November 2006, petitioner filed a Complaint[23] for annulment of
contracts, accion publiciana, and damages against Terry and all those who had
allegedly purchased portions of Lot 10628-pt from him, i.e. Jose U. Alberto III,
Spouses Medin M. Francisco and Francia M. Francisco, Eddie Alcantara, Fe M.
Alberto, Elisa B. Sarmiento, Lino S. Gianan, Alex Laynes, Alona Guerrero and
Oswaldo de Leon.
The instruments sought to be annulled were the following: (a) the original Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by Vargas in favor of Terry; (b) the Agreement of
Revocation of Sale signed by Vargas and Terry; (c) the Partition Agreement
entered into by petitioner and Terry; and (d) the Deeds of Absolute Sale
executed by Terry in favor of third parties.
Petitioner argued that the original Deed of Absolute Sale and the Agreement of
Revocation of Sale should be considered void for lack of consideration. She then
contended that the nullity of those earlier instruments led to the invalidity of
the Partition Agreement, because it was signed in the mistaken belief that Terry
had a right to the property.
On 11 January 2007, Terry filed his Answer[24] before the RTC. Refuting the
assertions in the Complaint, he insisted that the 3,000-square-meter lot was
conveyed to him by Vargas. Terry explained that the property was in fact
originally owned by his grandfather, but incorrectly registered in the name of
Fernando Vargas, who was petitioner's predecessor-in-interest. The original
Deed of Absolute Sale was purportedly executed to rectify the error in
registration and restore the property to its rightful owner. Terry further alleged
that he had only signed the Agreement of Revocation of Sale in consideration of
his closeness to the Vargas family and in order to avoid litigation. He pointed
out that petitioner herself confirmed the validity of the instruments of sale by
executing the Partition Agreement after the death of Vargas.
For their part, respondents Laynes, Spouses Francisco, Alcantara, Gianan, De
Leon, Sarmiento and Fe Alberto all claimed to be buyers in good faith. In their
respective Answers[25] before the RTC, they insisted that they had merely relied
upon the Partition Agreement; in particular, the statements made by petitioner
acknowledging Terry's entitlement to the property. These declarations, it was
argued, estopped petitioner from now seeking recovery of the portions of the
property sold to third persons.
Respondents Guerrero and Jose Alberto III did not file Answers with the RTC.
Petitioner later withdrew her Complaint against them.[26]
RTC RULING
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision[27] in favor of petitioner. Citing the
absence of certain elements of a sale, the trial court declared that the Deed of
Absolute Sale, Revocation Agreement, and Partition Agreement were invalid
contracts:
The following belies defendant's claim of ownership over the 3,000 sq. m. lot.
1. Vargas and defendant Terry revoked the Deed of [A]bsolute Sale dated
March 14, 1995 because of want of monetary consideration and failure
of the contract to reflect the true intention of the parties. Thus, there was
no sale at all of any portion of Lot No. 10628.
2. The Agreement of Revocation of [S]ale merely affirms the intention of the
parties to transfer the 3,000 sq. m. lot to defendant Terry as gleaned from
the parties['] promise to specify the actual location of the 3,000 sq. m. lot
in a separate document and the absence of agreement as to the price of
the 3,000 sq. m. lot and the absence of [any] statement that defendant
Terry had already paid therefor.
Verily, the allege[d] conveyance of the 3,000 sq. m. lot to defendant Terry under
the Agreement of Revocation of Sale was also without valuable consideration.
As it was, defendant Terry capitalized on the Agreement of Revocation of Sale
and lured the heirs of Vargas into signing the Partition Agreement dated May 3,
2000. The Court gives credence to the testimony of the plaintiff that she signed
the Partition Agreement only because of the promise of defendant Terry that
he shall cause the approval of the draft of the subdivision plan that he had
shown to plaintiff and that he shall pay the heirs of Vargas the prevailing price
for the 3,000 sq. m. lot upon the approval of the subdivision plan (Exh. "D"). But
defendant Terry failed to make good his promise to cause the approval of the
subdivision plan nor pay for [the] lot. Indeed, defendant Terry miserably failed
to present any receipt or proof of payment for the said 3,000 sq. m. lot nor
produce the approved subdivision plan as stipulated in the Partition
Agreement.[28]
With respect to the other respondents, the RTC declared that they were not
purchasers in good faith, as they had failed to exercise the required diligence
before buying the property:
Facts and circumstances surrounding this case debunk the presumption of good
faith on the part of defendants. To elucidate, it was clear to them that, at the
time of sale, defendant Terry [had] no certificate of title to prove ownership
over the lot being sold, instead, they merely relied on several documents which
they did not verify and [the] genuineness of which were doubtful at the
beginning. The lots sold by defendant Terry to his co-respondents are part of
the lot registered in the name of Angeles Vargas under TCT No. 8193 and later
in the name of the plaintiff under TCT No. 1224. The herein buyers of defendant
Terry simply failed to exercise the diligence of investigating the ownership of
the vendor.
Thus on the issue on whether Terry's co-defendants are buyers in good faith,
the Court rules in the negative.[29]
Based on the above findings, the RTC ordered respondents to vacate the land
and surrender possession to petitioner within 15 days from notice of the
Decision. Respondents were likewise held solidarily liable to petitioner for (a)
P50,000 as attorney's fees and (b) P5,000 per appearance of counsel before the
trial court.
Respondents Alcantara, De Leon, Gianan and Spouses Francisco sought
reconsideration[30] of the Decision, but their motion was denied.[31] They no
longer appealed the Order denying their Motion for Reconsideration.
Meanwhile, respondents Terry, Alberto, and Sarmiento opted to file a Notice of
Appeal[32] instead of a motion for reconsideration. The RTC gave due course to
the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the case to the CA.[33]
THE CA RULING
In its Decision[34] dated 19 March 2009, the CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
While recognizing the nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale given the parties'
admission that there was no consideration for the transaction, the appellate
court found no reason to invalidate the Revocation Agreement. It ruled that this
independent document proved the true intent of the parties to transfer 3,000
square meters of the disputed property to Terry, even without consideration.
The CA also declared that the claims of petitioner were barred by laches,
considering that she had allowed more than six years to elapse before asserting
her rights against respondents.
The appellate court further noted that petitioner was estopped from refuting
the validity of the instruments, because she was equally to blame for the
predicament of those who had purchased the property from Terry. In particular,
the CA referred to the representations made by petitioner in the Partition
Agreement, as well as her contemporaneous and subsequent acts, as sufficient
bases for respondents to believe that the property had been validly sold to
Terry.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the Decision, but her motion was denied
by CA.[35] She then elevated the matter to this Court via the instant Petition for
Review.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
In her Petition filed before this Court, petitioner persists in her claim that the
Revocation Agreement and the Partition Agreement are invalid. She maintains
that Vargas and Terry never gave effect to the Revocation Agreement, since they
never executed the document needed for the segregation of the portion
allegedly conveyed to Terry. As to the Partition Agreement, she insists that the
instrument was not supported by any consideration.
Petitioner also asserts that her claim was not barred by either estoppel or
laches. In her view, the six-year delay incurred in asserting the claim was not
sufficient to constitute laches. She also claims that estoppel cannot be applied
in favor of respondents, because they have likewise been negligent.
In their Comment,[36] respondents reiterate that petitioner was estopped from
asserting her claim over the land, given her statements in the Partition
Agreement. They further emphasize their status as buyers in good faith, citing
their awareness of all the transactions involving the property. Finally, they allege
that Terry paid Vargas the amounts of P5,557.60 and P3,000 as consideration
for the lot.
On 7 July 2012, Terry died[37] and his heirs were substituted as respondents in
this case.
In her Reply,[38] petitioner insists that no consideration was ever paid for the
transactions. She points out that the assertion that payment was made was a
mere afterthought, as Terry never alleged payment as a defense when he filed
his Answer. He also allegedly failed to submit proof of his assertion.
ISSUES
The following issues are presented to this Court for resolution:
1. Whether or not the CA erred when it refused to annul the Revocation
Agreement and the Partition Agreement subject of this case;
2. Whether or not the CA erred when it ruled that petitioner's claims were
barred by estoppel and laches.
OUR RULING
The Petition for Review is PARTLY GRANTED.
After a judicious consideration of the merits of the case, we reverse the ruling
of the CA insofar as it upheld Terry's right to the property. We find sufficient
basis to declare the Revocation Agreement and the Partition Agreement null
and void because of the absence of the required meeting of the minds regarding
the consideration for the sale. Consequently, we are compelled to conclude that
the property was never validly conveyed to Terry.
Nevertheless, we agree with the conclusion of the CA that petitioner is estopped
from questioning the title of those who purchased the lot from Terry and relied
upon petitioner's representations in the Partition Agreement.
The CA committed a grave error when
it upheld the validity of the Revocation
Agreement and the Partition
Agreement.
The principal issue in this case pertains to the validity of two instruments - the
Revocation Agreement and the Partition Agreement -purporting to convey a
portion of the subject lot to Terry.
Before proceeding to discuss the validity of the contract, however, a clarification
must be made. Based on the provisions of the Revocation Agreement and the
Partition Agreement, we conclude that the two instruments must be read as
part of a single contract of sale. In the Revocation Agreement, the parties
recognized the transfer of a 3,000-square meter portion of Lot No. 10628-pt to
Terry. However, instead of identifying the specific segment of the property
allegedly conveyed, they stipulated that "the actual location of the said 3,000
square meters shall be determined by both parties in a separate document
consonant with this agreement, but forming a part hereof."[39] That separate
document was the Partition Agreement subsequently executed by the parties
to physically segregate the portion of the property sold to Terry.
It is therefore evident that the two instruments in question are not separate
contracts, but are mere components of the same sales transaction. Accordingly,
we must examine both documents together to determine whether a valid
contract of sale exists.
Article 1458 of the Civil Code describes a contract of sale as a transaction by
which "one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefore
a price certain in money or its equivalent." The elements of a perfected contract
of sale are the following: (1) the meeting of the minds of the parties or their
consent to a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price; (2) the determinate was reached on the sale of the property to Terry at the prevailing market
object or subject matter of the contract; and (3) the price certain in money or price.[45]
its equivalent as consideration for the sale.[40] The absence of any of these
As stated above, we find no evidence that the parties ever agreed upon a "price
elements renders a contract void.
certain" as consideration for the property.
In this case, the Revocation Agreement and the Partition Agreement are silent
This Court considers Terry's claim of payment untenable considering his failure
on the matter of consideration. Neither instrument mentions the purchase price
to present any evidence of his assertion other than his bare testimony. We also
for the sale of the lot. The CA, however, sustained the validity of both
note significant inconsistencies in his allegations before the trial court. He
instruments. It held that the true intent of the parties was to transfer 3,000
insisted during his testimony that he had paid for the property. In his Answer,
square meters of the disputed property to Terry without reserving his right to
however, he never asserted the payment of consideration as a
consideration. Petitioner, on the other hand, insists that the RTC correctly
defense.[46] Instead, he emphasized that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
declared both contracts void - the Revocation Agreement, because of the
executed by Vargas to return the land to him as the heir of the true owner of
absence of consideration and the failure of Vargas and Terry to execute the
the property.[47]
document needed to segregate the portion allegedly conveyed; and the
Partition Agreement for lack of consideration. Further, Terry did not mention any form of consideration in connection with the
Revocation Agreement. In fact, he admitted in his Answer that no consideration
Given the contradictory findings of the CA and the RTC in this case, we have
was given to him in exchange for his consent to the revocation of the earlier
been compelled to look into the records of the case in order to arrive upon our
contract. He supposedly agreed to the revocation only because of his closeness
own factual determinations.[41] After carefully studying the records, we
to the Vargas family and in order to avoid litigation.[48] This statement directly
conclude that not all the elements of a perfected contract of sale were present.
contradicts his later assertion that there was monetary consideration for the
In particular, we find no sufficient evidence that the parties ever agreed on a
sale.
specific purchase price for the property.
In the same manner, the allegation made by petitioner that the parties agreed
We note the competing allegations of the parties on this point. While the
to the sale of the lot at the prevailing market price is bereft of factual basis.
purchase price for the property was not indicated on either of the
Other than her own bare allegation, there was no evidence submitted to
instruments,[42] respondents insist that consideration was paid twice for the
support her claim that the sale was agreed upon by the parties upon the
same lot (P5,557.60 upon the execution of the original Deed of Absolute Sale
execution of the Partition Agreement. In fact, that instrument did not refer to
and P3,000 upon the signing of the Revocation Agreement).[43] On the other
any supposed agreement as to the price for the lot.
hand, petitioner contends that there was no consideration stated in the
Revocation Agreement, because the parties agreed to determine the price of Given that both the Revocation Agreement and the Partition Agreement are
the property in a separate document.[44] She then asserts that an agreement silent on the issue of consideration, and further considering the conflicting
accounts of the parties themselves as to the exact amount of the purchase price,
this Court agrees with the finding of the RTC that the parties did not reach any
agreement as to the amount of monetary consideration for the property.[49]
This lack of consensus as to the price prevented the perfection of the sale. We
emphasize that the law requires a definite agreement as to a "price certain";
otherwise, there is no true meeting of the minds between the
parties.[50] In Villanueva v. Court of Appeals,[51] this Court stated:
The price must be certain, otherwise there is no true consent between the
parties. There can be no sale without a price. In the instant case, however, what
is dramatically clear from the evidence is that there was no meeting of mind as
to the price, expressly or impliedly, directly or indirectly.
Sale is a consensual contract. He who alleges it must show its existence by
competent proof. Here, the very essential element of price has not been proven.
As there was no sufficient evidence of a meeting of the minds between the
parties with regard to the consideration for the sale, we are compelled to
declare the transaction null and void.
Typically, the foregoing ruling would likewise invalidate all of Terry's subsequent
transactions involving the property, pursuant to the principle that the spring
cannot rise higher than its source.[52] Nevertheless, we come to a different
conclusion in this case as regards the rights of respondents Sarmiento and
Alberto given the applicability of the equitable principle of estoppel in pais.
Petitioner is estopped front assailing
the sale transactions in favor of
respondents Alberto and Sarmiento.
The CA ruled in the assailed Decision that by virtue of the principles of estoppel
and laches, petitioner was barred from questioning the sale of the property to
respondents:
[A]ppellee waited more than six (6) years from the time she executed said
Partition Agreement before asserting her supposed claim. Thus, even assuming,
for the sake of argument, that appellee has a valid claim against appellant Terry,
laches has ineluctably set in.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not merely a question of time but
is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or
claim to be enforced or asserted.
xxxx
Indeed, it would be [iniquitous] to allow appellee to assert her supposed claim
under the present circumstances, especially when all of appellant Terry's co-
defendants relied on the strength of appellee's representation in the Partition
Agreement which she executed allotting the disputed portion to appellant
Terry. The error in appellee's line of argument is that she is merely tucking (sic)
the alleged bad faith on the part of appellant Terry's co-defendants to appellant
Terry's alleged bad faith in acquiring the disputed portion, such that any and all
rights acquired by appellant Terry's co-defendants cannot be better than those
of appellant Terry himself. Appellee failed to realize that she herself is equally
at fault as appellant Terry's co-defendants relied on her representations in the
Partition Agreement which she voluntarily and freely executed.[53]
This Court does not agree that the doctrine of laches is applicable here. The
interval of six years between the date of execution of the Partition Agreement
and that of the institution of the Complaint in this case does not, by itself, render
the demands of petitioner stale.
We emphasize that laches does not merely concern the lapse of time. [54] As we
explained in Heirs of Nieto v. Municipality of Meycauayan:[55]
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence could
or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to
assert his right has either abandoned or declined to assert it.[56]
Here, petitioner did not exhibit any conduct that would warrant the
presumption that she had abandoned or declined to assert her right over the
property. It was her initial belief that the lot was truly sold by her father to Terry,
albeit pending the determination of the consideration and the specific location
of the subject portion. Moreover, the latter's repeated assurances that he would
pay for the lot explained the delay in the institution of the case. For this reason,
this Court does not find the delay unreasonable.
However, we do find sufficient basis to utilize the doctrine of estoppel in pais to
bar the claims of petitioner against respondents Sarmiento and Alberto. In GE
Money Bank, Inc. v. Spouses Dizon,[57] the Court clarified the meaning of this
doctrine:
Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or admissions, or
by his own silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable
negligence, induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other
rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former
is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. The principle of estoppel would
step in to prevent one party from going back on his or her own acts and
representations to the prejudice of the other party who relied upon them. It is
a principle of equity and natural justice, expressly adopted in Article 1431 of the
New Civil Code and articulated as one of the conclusive presumptions in Rule
131, Section 2 (a) of our Rules of Court.[58]
For the principle to apply, certain elements must be present in respect of both
the party sought to be estopped and the party claiming estoppel:
The essential elements of estoppel in pais, in relation to the party sought to be
estopped, are: 1) a clear conduct amounting to false representation or
concealment of material facts or, at least, calculated to convey the impression
that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party
subsequently attempts to assert; 2) an intent or, at least, an expectation, that
this conduct shall influence, or be acted upon by, the other party; and 3) the
knowledge, actual or constructive, by him of the real facts. With respect to the
party claiming the estoppel, the conditions he must satisfy are: 1) lack of
knowledge or of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question;
2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be
estopped; and 3) action or inaction based thereon of such character as to
change his position or status calculated to cause him injury or prejudice. It has
not been shown that respondent intended to conceal the actual facts
concerning the property; more importantly, petitioner has been shown not to
be totally unaware of the real ownership of the subject property.[59]
All the foregoing requisites have been fulfilled in this case. When petitioner
signed the Partition Agreement, she clearly recognized Terry's right as absolute
owner of the portion of the property assigned to him, with no reservation
whatsoever. She recognized that right despite her doubts about the validity of
the sale made by her father and the knowledge that Terry had not yet paid for
the land. Moreover, she could not have been oblivious to the fact that the
document might be used to influence others to buy the land, because she knew
that Terry had previously sold portions of the property to third persons.
Respondents Sarmiento and Alberto, on the other hand, clearly relied in good
faith on the Partition Agreement. Since there was no evidence that they knew
of the true state of the transaction between petitioner and Terry, it was
reasonable for them to rely on the statement of petitioner alone, who
unconditionally recognized Terry's right to the property. To allow her to now
adopt a contrary position would cause respondents undue injury and prejudice.
This Court is thus compelled to rule that petitioner is estopped from asserting
her right to the property as against Sarmiento and Alberto. In this respect, the
CA ruling is affirmed.
The Heirs of Terry must remit to
petitioner the payments received by
their predecessor-in-interest from
Sarmiento and Alberto.
Given our conclusions on the nullity of the sale and the applicability of the
principle of estoppel, we deem it proper to order the Heirs of Terry to remit to
petitioner all the payments received by their predecessor-in-interest from
Sarmiento and Alberto in connection with the sale of the property. Based on the
Deeds of Absolute Sale executed by the two purchasers, Sarmiento and Alberto
paid Terry P2000[60] and P10,000,[61] respectively, for their portions of the lot.
The Heirs of Terry must now turn over the proceeds of these sale transactions
to petitioner.
This ruling is demanded by the equitable principle of unjust enrichment. We
have declared that "[t]here is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains
a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of
another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience."[62] Since Terry never paid any consideration and the property was
never validly conveyed to him, he and his heirs should not be allowed to benefit
from the sale thereof.
Moreover, while petitioner is barred by estoppel from recovering the lot from
Sarmiento and Alberto, her right to enforce claims against Terry remained
unaffected. Under the circumstances, it is only fair and reasonable to allow her
to recover the payments received by Terry for the lot. Given that Terry died in
2012, his heirs are liable for the reimbursement of these amounts.[63]
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated 19 March 2009 and its Resolution dated 29 March 2010
are AFFIRMED insofar as the rights of Fe M. Alberto and Elisa B. Sarmiento are
concerned. However, in respect of the Heirs of Loreño Terry, the Decision and
the Resolution are MODIFIED as follows:
1. The Revocation Agreement dated 22 January 1996 and the Partition
Agreement dated 3 May 2000 are hereby declared NULL and VOID.
2. The Heirs of Loreño Terry are ORDERED to vacate the property and surrender
the peaceful possession thereof to Agnes Guison.
3. The Heirs of Loreño Terry are likewise ORDERED to remit to Agnes Guison the
payments received by their predecessor-in-interest from Fe M. Alberto and Elisa
B. Sarmiento in the amounts of P2,000 and P10,000, respectively.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No. 196359, May 11, 2021 (PDF)