PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

100. LAPITAN VS. SALGADO payment should have been made as early as upon signing
A.C. No. 12452, February 18, 2020 the contract.

Facts Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

Lapitan  charged Respondent Atty. Elpidio S. Salgado
(Salgado) for violation of the Lawyer's Oath, Canon 1,
Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR. Atty
Salgado entered into a banquet event contract, amounting
to P200,000.00. Under the TICC's existing policy,
Salgado should have immediately made a down payment
of 50% of the total contract price or at least P100,000.00
before the event. However, through deceit and malicious
representation, and because Salgado was a lawyer,
Salgado was able to convince Lapitan that he will,
instead, pay the entire amount of P200,000.00 after the
conclusion of the event.
When the event was finished, Lapitan attempted to collect
the said amount from Salgado and the latter claimed that
he forgot to bring cash and instead issued a post-dated a
BPI check in the amount of P210,253.90. When the said
post-dated check was presented for payment on 2 July
2010, the post-dated check was dishonored for the reason
"ACCOUNT CLOSED." Despite demands to pay,
Salgado did not settle the amount and even went into
hiding. Thus, this prompted Lapitan to file an estafa case
against Salgado.
IBP CBD: Recommended disbarment. Lapitan has
proven his case by overwhelming evidence that Salgado
committed the crimes of Estafa and violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22. Salgado committed deceit and fraud
by making it appear that he forgot to bring cash during the
NREA event when truly Salgado had no intention to pay
the contracted amount.
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by
Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct,
or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
In Sps. Floran v. Atty. Ediza, the Court held that in
imposing the penalty of disbarment, the Court is aware
that the power to disbar is a power exercised by the Court
with utmost caution and such power is solely exercised
only in cases of misconduct that seriously affect the moral
standing and character of members of the Bar as officers
of the Court.
Clearly, in the present case, Salgado's utmost disrespect to
the Courts' proceedings coupled with his deceitful
conduct on Lapitan warrant such grave penalty. Salgado
is, convincingly, unfit to remain in the legal profession.
Disposition: Salgado is disbarred.

IBP BOG: Adopted above.

Issue: Whether Salgado is guilty of violating the Code

of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling: Yes.

The Court finds Salgado guilty of deceit. From the

evidence presented by Lapitan, which was not refuted by
Salgado after due notice, it is clear that Salgado had no
intention to pay the contracted amount for the 26 June
2010 event. In fact, the records show that the contract
amount has not been settled by Salgado to this date.
Salgado committed deceit by making it appear that he
forgot to bring with him the necessary cash to pay for the
contracted amount when the terms of the banquet event
contract clearly indicate that the fifty percent (50%) down
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

101. LAUREL V. DELUTE
AC NO. 12298 SEPTEMBER 1, 2020
Facts:
It was alleged that complainant engaged the services of
respondent as counsel in a dispute against Azucena
Laurel-Velez involving a parcel of land that complainant
inherited from his father. Sometime in 2003, respondent
fetched complainant and his wife from their home to sign
certain documents. Due to his lack of educational
background, complainant wanted to bring his daughter
(who is a college graduate) during the meeting to assist
them, but respondent refused.
Upon arriving at their destination, respondent represented
to complainant and his wife that Azucena were to pay
them partial rental payments for the land in the amount of
P300,000.00, and in connection therewith, presented to
them documents to sign. Initially, complainant refused to
sign the documents as he did not understand its contents
(which were written in English), but due to respondent's
prodding, he eventually did. After signing the documents
and before parting ways with complainant and his wife,
respondent allegedly took P100,000.00 out of the
P300,000.00 given by Azucena.
Later on, complainant found out that, contrary to
respondent's earlier representations, the documents which
he signed were: (a) a Compromise Agreement which
effectively caused him to cede his rights over the land that
he inherited from his father; and (b) a receipt stating that
he received the amount of P300,000.00 in consideration
therefor Further, he also found out that through the
Compromise Agreement, respondent was granted a three
(3)-meter wide perpetual road right of way on the subject
land.
Yes. Clearly, respondent fell short of the ethical standards
when he deceived and strong-armed complainant and his
wife into signing documents which effectively waived
their rights and interests over the land that complainant
inherited from his father.
Here, respondent not only neglected his duty to protect his
own client's interests by failing to explain the true import
of the Compromise Agreement; worse, he literally sold
out his client's cause in order to gain personal benefits. As
mentioned, it is unrebutted that respondent received(a) a
P100,000.00 cut from the P300,000.00 paid by Azucena
to complainant and his wife, and (b) a three (3)-meter
wide perpetual road right of way on the subject land.
Regarding the respondent’s invocation of laches due to
the supposed delay in filing the instant administrative
complaint, the Supreme Court said that prescription or
laches cannot be said to apply in disciplinary proceedings
against erring lawyer.
Reymelio M. Delute GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01,
Canon 1, Rule 15.03, Canon 15, Canon 17, and Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Delute is
DISBARRED from the pratice of law, and his name is
ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys.

IBP Commissioner: respondent be found administratively

liable and be meted with the supreme penalty of
disbarment

IBP-BOG: modified the Investigating Commissioner's

recommendations, lowering the recommended penalty to
a five-year suspension from the practice of law, and
further imposing a fine in the amount of P5,000.00

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held

administratively liable for the acts he committed
against complainant.

Held:
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES
102. ANACTA VS. ATTY. RESURECCION
A.C. No. 9074, 14 August 2012
"The purpose of disbarment is to protect the courts and
the public from the misconduct of the officers of the court
and to ensure the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function shall be
competent, honorable and trustworthy men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence.
Facts
A disbarment case was filed by ANacta against Atty.
Resurrecion for gross misconduct, deceit and malpractice.
Complainant engaged the services of respondent to file on
her behalf a petition for annulment of marriage before the
RTC for which she paid respondent P42,000.
Complainant received a supposed copy of a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage. However, she discovered that no
petition for annulment docketed as Civil Case No. 04-
25141 was ever filed before the said court.
IBP CBD: Found clear and convincing evidence that
respondent is guilty of deceit and dishonesty when he
misrepresented having filed the petition for annulment of
marriage after receipt of P42,000.00 when in fact no such
petition was filed. He thus recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
years and to reimburse/return to the complainant the
amount of P42,000.00.
IBP BPG: Adopted the findings of the Investigating
Commissioner but modified the recommended penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from two years to
four years and ordered respondent to return to the
complainant the amount of ₱ 42,000.00, otherwise his
suspension will continue until he returns the sum
involved.
ISSUE: W/N respondent violated the CPR.
Ruling: Yes.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
states that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
In this case, we find the confluence of the evidence
submitted by the complainant to have clearly,
convincingly and satisfactorily shown that indeed the
respondent has authored this reprehensible act.
Respondent committed deceitful and dishonest acts by
misrepresenting that he had already filed a petition for
annulment on behalf of the complainant and pocketing the
amount of P42,000.00. He even went to the extent of
presenting to the complainant a supposed copy of the
petition duly filed with the court. After he was found out,
he made himself scarce. He ignored all communications
sent to him by the complainant. After the disbarment
complaint was filed, he failed to file his answer despite
due notice. He totally disregarded the proceedings before
the IBP despite receipt of summons.
Complainant asks that respondent be disbarred. However,
we find that suspension from the practice of law is
sufficient to discipline respondent. The supreme penalty
of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of
misconduct that seriously affect the standing and
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar. While we will not hesitate to remove
an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not
disbar him where a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end. In this case, we find
suspension to be sufficient sanction against respondent.
Suspension, we may add, is not primarily intended as
punishment, but as a means to protect the public and the
legal profession.
We are convinced beyond doubt that respondent should
only be meted the penalty of four-year suspension as
properly recommended by the IBP Board of Governors.
In the exercise of our discretion, we are unquestionably
certain that the four-year suspension suffices and
commensurable to the infractions he committed. There
have been cases with more or less the same factual setting
as in the instant case where the Court also imposed the
penalty of suspension and not disbarment.
Disposition: Respondent is suspended from the practice of
law for four years. He is also DIRECTED to return to the
complainant the amount of P42,000.00 within thirty (30)
days from the promulgation of this Decision.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES
103. Taday v. Apoya
AC No. 11981 July 3, 2018
Facts:
Taday, an OFW staying in Norway, asked her parents in
the Philippines, Virgilio and Natividad, to seek legal
services for the nullification of her marriage.
Complainant's parents found respondent and contracted
his legal services. According to complainant, respondent
was informed that she was staying in Norway and
respondent assured her that this would not be an issue as
he can find ways to push for the resolution of the case
despite her absence.
Respondent drafted the Petition for annulment, notarized
it and sent it to the RTC. While petitioner was on a
vacation on the Philippines she paid the respondent and a
decision was delivered granting the annulment.
Complainant became suspicious as the said decision came
from a different branch presided by a different judge
where the case was originally filed. Complainant's family
became skeptical as the said decision seemed to come too
soon and was poorly crafted.
Verifications were made to ascertain the validity of the
decision. Complainant discovered that both Branch 162
and Judge Ma. Eliza Becamon-Angeles do not exist in the
RTC. respondent denied being informed that complainant
was an OFW and claimed that he was made to believe
that she was merely in the Bicol province, hence, he
agreed to draft the petition and gave it to complainant's
parents for her signature. The petition was returned to
respondent with complainant's signature so he notarized
and filed it before the court.
IBP-CBD: the fake decision originated from respondent
and that he violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 of the
Code. It recommended the penalty of suspension of two
(2) years from the practice of law.
IBP-BOG: modified the recommended penalty of two (2)
years suspension to a penalty of disbarment
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred,
as recommended by IBP-BOG.
Held:
Yes. The Court adopts the findings of the Commission
and agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board to
disbar respondent.
All those in the legal profession must always conduct
themselves with honesty and integrity in all their dealings.
Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to their
clients and to delay no man for money or malice. These
mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with
their clients considering the highly fiduciary nature of
their relationship.
In this case, the Court finds that respondent violated
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code and the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice.
Respondent notarized the verification and certification of
non forum shopping in the petition filed before RTC
Branch 131 supposedly executed by complainant as the
affiant. At that time, however, complaint was not in the
Philippines because she was still in Norway working as
an OFW. Undoubtedly, respondent violated the notarial
rules when he notarized a document without the personal
presence of the affiant. Aside from improperly notarizing
a petition, respondent committed an even graver
transgression by drafting a fake decision and delivering it
to his client in guise of a genuine decision.
The Court finds that complainant has established by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence that: (1) respondent
notarized the verification and certification of non forum
shopping of the petition without the personal presence of
complainant; (2) respondent is the author of the fake
decision to deceive complainant that her petition for
annulment of marriage was granted; and (3) respondent
retaliated against complainant for confronting him with
the fake decision by withdrawing the petition in the court,
resulting into the dropping of the case from the civil
docket of the court.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

104. MEJIA VS. REYES

A.C. NO. 378

Facts
Francisco S. Reyes was appointed bank attorney and
notary public for the Baguio Branch of the Philippine
National Bank. While still holding such position his
professional services were engaged by Jose G. Mejia and
Emilia N. Abrera, residents of Baguio City, to bring an
action in court against the Philippine National Bank and
the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now the DBP) as
successor-in-interest of the defunct Agricultural and
Industrial Bank for the cancellation of a mortgage on a
parcel of land situated in Baguio City.

Complainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera allege

that they had desired to take an appeal from the judgment
rendered by the Court of First Instance of Baguio but did
not, upon the respondent’s advice; that thereafter for the
first time they learned that the respondent was counsel
and notary public of the Baguio Branch of the PNB; that
his representing them against the PNB, in whose Baguio
Branch he was bank attorney and notary public, without
revealing to them such connection with the Bank,
constitutes malpractice; and pray this Court to disbar him.

ISSUE: W/N the Atty. Reyes is guilty of malpractice

and should be disbarred.

RULING: YES. But the malpractice committed is not so

serious. Respondent was just admonished and warned not
to repeat it.

Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting

interests in a case. The respondent’s act of appearing and
acting as counsel for the complainants Jose G. Mejia and
Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the Philippine
National Bank, that had appointed him bank attorney and
notary public, constitutes malpractice.

However, it does not appear satisfactorily proven that

during the pendency of their case the complaints did not
know of the respondents connection with the bank as
attorney and notary public. Evidence shows that the
Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was
appearing as counsel for the complainants, yet it did not
revoke or cancel his appointment as bank attorney and
notary public.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

105. Domingo v. Sacdalan

AC No. 12475 March 26, 2019
Facts:
Complainant alleged that she engaged the services of
respondent to recover possession of a parcel of land from
illegal settlers. The subject land is co-owned by
complainant with her sister. respondent sent an Email to
complainant seeking to borrow another P200,000.00 in
the form of a cash advance, which would allegedly be
charged against his appearance fees and other fees. He
claimed that he was borrowing money for his wife's
hospitalization. Complainant agreed to respondent's
request for cash advance and gave him P100,000.00 out
of compassion.
Respondent did not give any updates to complainant
regarding the case filed. Thus, she inquired directly with
the MTC on the status of her case. To her surprise, she
was informed that there was no such complaint for
ejectment filed with the MTC. Consequently, complainant
confronted respondent about the purported ejectment
complaint. The latter explained that the non-filing of the
complaint was due to the mistake of his office staff.
Respondent assured her that the complaint would be filed.
Respondent was tasked by complainant to file a complaint
for ejectment before the court. To show his compliance,
he furnished her with the alleged receiving copy of the
complaint for ejectment filed before the MTC. However,
it was discovered by complainant that no such complaint
was actually filed. When confronted, respondent admitted
the fake receiving copy but blamed his messenger for
such wrongdoing.
It must be underscored that borrowing money from a
client is prohibited under Rule 16.04. A lawyer's act of
asking a client for a loan, as what respondent did, is very
unethical. It comes within those acts considered as abuse
of client's confidence. The canon presumes that the client
is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his or her obligation.
Atty. Sacdalan is GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 16.04,
and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and his
name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. He is also
ordered to return complainant the amount of the legal
deposit, cash advance, and other fees.

A complaint for ejectment was eventually filed in the

MTC, however it was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. It
explained that the complaint did not comply with the
jurisdictional requirements for ejectment as it neither
alleged the requisites under forcible entry nor unlawful
detainer.

IBP-CBD: respondent violated the Code and

recommended a penalty of suspension from the practice
of law for two (2) years.

IBP-BOG: adopted with modification the penalty

recommended against respondent to suspension from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years; and to pay a
fine of P5,000.00.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

Held:
Yes. The Court adopts the findings of the IBP
Commission but modifies the recommended penalty of
the IBP Board.

In this case, the Court finds that respondent violated Rule

1.01, Rules 16.04, and 18.04 of the Code based on the
substantial evidence presented by complainant.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

106. ZAFRA III VS. PAGATPATAN
AC NO 12457, APRIL 2, 2019
Facts
A criminal suit for estafa was filed by complainant Fr.
Zafra against Buniel and Guirnalda. Respondent Atty.
Pagatpatan is their counsel on record.
Atty. Pagatpatan wrote a letter to the Bishop of the
Diocese of Tandag, Surigao Del Sur requesting an
investigation of Fr. Zafra for his activities, particularly,
concocting stories against his clients, Buniel and
Guirnalda, who were charged by Fr. Zafra of estafa; that
such action "was not only a sin but a MORTAL SIN."
Because of this, Fr. Zafra was embarrassed because of the
"malicious" letter sent by Atty. Pagatpatan. He was
eventually investigated by the Board of Consultors with
the Bishop, where he was able to clear his name.
Fr. Zafra now posits that Atty. Pagatpatan's action is a
clear violation of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that "(a) lawyer shall not
counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system."
Fr. Zafra claims that instead of Atty. Pagatpatan
defending his clients' case in court, the latter instigated
them to stir controversies by making libelous and
untruthful accusations. Fr. Zafra also argues that Atty.
Pagatpatan is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
He learned that, in 2005, Atty. Pagatpatan had been
suspended by this Court from the practice of law for two
(2) years in a decided case entitled Daniel Mortera, et al.
v. Atty. Renato B. Pagatpatan with docket number A.C.
No. 4562.
To Our mind, Atty. Pagatpatan's letter-request was not
based on a sincere purpose to discipline Fr. Zafra for his
actions, but mainly to bring threat to Fr. Zafra and force
him to settle the estafa case filed against his clients.
The more pressing issue to be tackled in this case is the
fact that Atty. Pagatpatan has been practicing law despite
the issuance of a suspension order by this Court on June
15, 2005. There were no records showing that he served
said suspension or moved to lift said order because Atty.
Pagatpatan, himself, admits that he continued practicing
the legal profession notwithstanding said order.
On record, Atty. Pagatpatan had been representing party
litigants in court from 2005 until the instant case was filed
before the IBP in 2016. Atty. Pagatpatan has made a
mockery of this Court's authority by defying this Court's
suspension order for over eleven (11) years. His actions
clearly constitute gross misconduct as defined under
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which is a
sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court. Atty. Pagatpatan's acts in wantonly disobeying his
duties as an officer of the court show utter disrespect for
the Court and the legal profession. Therefore, his
disbarment is warranted.

Atty. Pagatpatan, for his part, asserts that there was

nothing unethical in writing a letter for the investigation
of Fr. Zafra. As the lawyer of Buniel and Guirnalda, he
merely aided his clients in bringing to the attention of the
Bishop the actuations of Fr. Zafra in filing the complaint
for estafa. He reiterates that the letter was not intended to
malign the reputation of Fr. Zafra.

Atty. Pagatpatan does not deny in engaging in the practice

of law despite this Court's order of suspension in 2005.
He reasoned out that he needed to continue working in
order to maintain and sustain the needs of his family,
especially since his wife was ill and eventually passed
away in December 12, 2010.

ISSUE: W/N Atty. Pagatpatan should be disbarred.

RULING: YES.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

107. Barrios v. Martinez conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good

AC No. 4585 November 12, 2004 morals."

Facts:
Respondent Atty. Francisco Martinez was convicted for
violation of BP 22 dated March 1996. Complainant
Michael Barrios filed an action for disbarment against the
respondent for having convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude and submitted Court’s Resolution and
Entry of Judgment related to BP 22 case.
Respondent was required to comment on said petition
within ten (10) days from notice and on other several
occasions but failed to comply until the court declared the
respondent guilty of contempt dated February 1999 and
ordered his imprisonment until he complied with
aforesaid resolution. April 1999, the respondent was
arrested by NBI but was subsequently after having shown
proof of compliance with the resolutions.
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member
of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation
of the oath which he is required to take before admission
to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so.
Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check
without sufficient funds to cover the same constitutes
such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to
undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers.

A certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial Prosecution
Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter to the First
Division Clerk of Court alleging that respondent Martinez
also stood charged in another estafa case before the RTC.
The trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's
dilatory tactics during the trial, citing fourteen (14)
specific instances thereof. Martinez's appeal from the
above judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals
for his failure to file his brief, despite having been granted
three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so.
We find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. "Of all
classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly
bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and
for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override
the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and
office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate
and dangerous elements of the body politic."

IBP-CBD: recommended that respondent Atty. Francisco

P. Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out from
the Roll of Attorneys immediately.

IBP-BOG: adopted and approved the report and

recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of crime

involving moral turpitude.

Held:
Yes. The respondent has been found guilty and convicted
by final judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing
a worthless check in the amount of P8,000.

Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done

contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." It
involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

108. IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT

PROCEEDINGS vs. NARCISO N. JARAMILLO

Facts
The respondent was prosecuted for and convicted of
estafa in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and, on
appeal, was finally sentenced by the Court of Appeals.
While the respondent was serving sentence for said
conviction, the Solicitor General filed in this Court the
present complaint for respondent's disbarment.

In his answer respondent contends that his conviction was

a judicial error; that it was unfortunate on his part that the
trial court did not believe his explanation of the loss of the
amount involved in the criminal case; that his
imprisonment and the sufferings and mental anguish he
has suffered since the commencement of the criminal of
the criminal case constitute more than sufficient
punishment; that for this Court to further disbar him is
excessively inhuman, humiliating and cruel.

ISSUE: W/N respondent should be disbarred

RULING: Yes.
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves
moral turpitude. The review of respondent's conviction no
longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become
final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is
necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the
privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar.
Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has
proved himself unfit to protect the administration of
justice.

Wherefore, the respondent is hereby disbarred and

ordered to surrender to this Court, within fifteen days
from notice hereof, the lawyer's certificate heretofore
issued to him.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

109. In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles

Adm Case No. 350 August 7, 1959

Facts:
Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime
of attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day of destierro, and to pay a fine
of P2,300, with subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency
and under section 1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he
was required to show cause why he should not be
disbarred from the practice of his profession.

In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy

and mercy of this Court considering that he has six
children to support the eldest being 16 years old and the
youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if
disciplinary action be taken against him. He made
manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is
attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of
judgment which he honestly and sincerely deplores.

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

Held:
Yes. Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar
may be removed from his office as attorney if he is
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason
behind this rule being that the continued possession of a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the
rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law
with the result that the loss of such qualification justifies
his disbarment.

And since bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral

turpitude, this Court, much as it sympathizes with the
plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his
disbarment as ordained by section 25 of Rule 127.

It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from

his office as attorney and that his name be stricken out
from the Roll of Attorneys.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

110. DE JESUS-PARAS VS. VAILOCES
Facts
Respondent Atty. Vailoces acknowledged the execution
of a document purporting to be the last will and testament
of one Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus. However, when
presented for probate, the court found that the will was a
forgery. On the basis of this decision a criminal action for
falsification of public document was filed against
Vailoces and the three attesting witnesses to the will.
As finally adjudged, Vailoces was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public
document.  This sentence having become final, Vailoces
began serving it in the insular penitentiary. As a
consequence, the offended party instituted the present
disbarment proceedings.
In his answer, respondent not only disputes the judgment
of conviction rendered against him in the criminal case
but contends that the same is based on insufficient and
inconclusive evidence, the charge being merely motivated
by sheer vindictiveness, malice and spite on the part of
herein complainant, and that to give course to this
proceeding would be tantamount to placing him in double
jeopardy. He pleads that the complaint be dismissed.
the sufficiency of his conviction, for this is a matter which
we cannot now look into.
Sui Generis nature of disbarment proceedings
The plea of respondent that to disbar him now after his
conviction of a crime which resulted in the deprivation of
his liberty and of his office as Justice of the Peace of Bais,
Negros Oriental would be tantamount to placing him in
double jeopardy is untenable, for such defense can only
be availed of when he is placed in the predicament of
being prosecuted for the same offense, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any
offense necessarily included therein, within the meaning
of Section 9, Rule 113. Such is not the case here. The
disbarment of an attorney does not partake of a criminal
proceeding. Rather, it is intended "to protect the court and
the public from the misconduct of officers of the court"
(In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 588), and its
purpose is "to protect the administration of justice by
requiring that those who exercise this important function
shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom
courts and clients may repose confidence"
Disposition: Respondent is disbarred.

ISSUE: W/N the disbarment case should be dismissed

RULING: No.

Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a

member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney if it appears that he has been convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude, as
used in this section, includes any act deemed contrary to
justice, honesty or good morals.

The crime of which respondent was convicted is

falsification of public document, which is indeed of this
nature, for the act is clearly contrary to justice, honesty
and good morals. Hence, such crime involves moral
turpitude. Indeed, it is well-settled that "embezzlement,
forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote
moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which
fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral
turpitude.

It appearing that respondent has been found guilty and

convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude it is clear
that he rendered himself amenable to disbarment under
Section 25, Rule 127, of our Rules of Court. It is futile on
his part, much as we sympathize with him, to dispute now
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

111. In Re: Disbarment Proceedings against Atty.
Diosdado Gutierrez
AC No. L-363 July 31, 1962
Facts:
Respondent was convicted of the murder of Filemon
Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and
together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the
penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment
of conviction was affirmed, but the penalty was changed
to reclusión perpetua.
men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to
trample them under foot and to ignore the very bands of
society, argues recreancy to his position and office and
sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic."
Pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and considering the
nature of the crime for which respondent Diosdado Q.
Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered disbarred and
his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.

After serving a portion of the sentence respondent was

granted a conditional pardon by the President on August
19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison term was
remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines."

The widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in

the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this
Court praying that respondent be removed from the roll of
lawyers pursuant to Rule 127, section 5.

Under section 5 of Rule 127 a member of the bar may be

removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such
a crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or
good morals.

Issue: Whether or not the conditional pardon

extended to respondent places him beyond the scope of
the rule on disbarment aforecited.

Held:
No. The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute
but conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted
portion of his term. It does not reach the offense itself.

Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his

conviction for murder without regard to the pardon he
invokes in defense. The crime was qualified by treachery
and aggravated by its having been committed in band, by
taking advantage of his official position (respondent being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of a motor
vehicle.

As stated in Ex parte Wall, "Of all classes and

professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold
the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

112. IN RE: G.R. No. 185806: ABELLANOSA VS.
COA AND NHA VS. ATTY. LUPEBA
A.C. No. 12426
Facts
This administrative complaint arose from the Petition
for Certiorari filed with the Court by Generoso
Abellanosa, et al. (Abellanosa, et al.) against the
Commission on Audit (COA) and National Housing
Authority (NHA) docketed as G.R. No. 185806.
Attorney Cipriano P. Lupeba (Atty. Lupeba) is the
counsel on record of Abellanosa, et al. The Court ordered
Abellanosa, et al. to indicate their contact details or their
counsel in all papers and pleadings filed with the Court; to
show proof of service of the Petition with a full statement
of the actual date, place and matter of service; and to
indicate Atty. Lupeba's current Professional Tax Receipt
Number and IBP Official Receipt Number or Life
Membership Number. However, Lupeba, failed to comply
with the directive of this Court. As a result, this Court
imposed a fine of P1,000.00 against Atty. Lupeba.
Court, but also constitute gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which
under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is a
sufficient cause for suspension or disbarment.
The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the
standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the
court. Atty. Lupeba's acts in wantonly disobeying his
duties as an officer of the court show utter disrespect for
the Court and a complete disregard of his duties as a
member of the legal profession. Therefore, his suspension
for five years is warranted.
Disposition: Atty. Lupeba is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of FIVE (5)
YEARS effective from notice and to pay a fine of
₱10,000.00; with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.

This was repeated several times apparently. Hence, the

Court referred Lupeba’s infractions to the IBP for
disciplinary investigation.  Atty. Lupeba failed to
participate at the proceedings with the IBP. Hence, the
case was submitted for resolution.

IBP CBD: Recommended that Atty. Lupeba be suspended

from the practice of law and as a member of the Bar for
five (5) years.

Atty. Lupeba's repeated and unjustified failure to obey the

orders of the Court was "disrespect to the judicial
incumbents and to the branch of government which they
belong.

IBP BOG: Adopted above.

Issue: W/N Atty. Lupeba should be suspended from

the practice of law
Ruling: Yes.

Atty. Lupeba failed to comply with the Court's lawful

orders. He did not give any justifiable reason why he
disobeyed the directives of this Court.1âшphi1 Atty.
Lupeba was given time from 2009 to 2015 to explain why
he should not be sanctioned, yet he failed to respond to
any of the said orders of the Court. In fact, he did not
even participate at the proceedings before the IBP. Atty.
Lupeba's actions not only stand his disrespect to the
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

113. Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool,Inc v. the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this
Naldoza Decision.
AC No. 4017 September 29, 1999

Facts:
Respondent’s disbarment is sought for deceitfully
obtaining from complainant the amount US$2,555
allegedly for "cash bond" in connection with an appealed
case to the Supreme Court and issuing a spurious
Supreme Court receipt to conceal his illegal act. The case
was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation. In his answer,
respondent denied the charges against him and claimed
that the amount demanded was part of his attorney's lien
and that he paid P10,000 to complainant "as his moral
obligation."

The IBP found that respondent, counsel of complainant,

appealed a decision of POEA adverse to complainant and
was given US$2,555 upon respondent's misrepresentation
that payment of a cash bond in said amount was necessary
before the appealed case could be heard or acted upon by
the Supreme Court.

Respondent, to conceal the misappropriation of the

money, gave complainant a xeroxed copy of a Supreme
Court receipt purportedly evidencing payment of the
subject amount. Verification with the Supreme Court,
however, disclosed that the original of the receipt showed
only the amount of P622.00 paid by respondent in
connection with the appealed case. Respondent, who was
also charged with the RTC for estafa, filed a
manifestation with motion to dismiss the disbarment case
when his estafa case was dismissed. Respondent was
acquitted on reasonable ground but was declared civilly
liable in the amount of US$2,555.

IBP-BOG: recommended the suspension of respondent

from the practice of law for one year

Issue: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.

Held:
Yes. Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he
demanded money from his client for a bogus reason,
misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake receipt
to hide his deed.

Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to

him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with
his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official
receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he
does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.

Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of

the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

114. Villarente vs. Villarente Jr
AC No. 8866, September 15, 2020.
Facts
Catherine Villarente (Catherine) filed a complaint for
Serious Misconduct as a Lawyer and as Judge against her
husband, respondent herein, Atty. Benigno Villarente, Jr.,
a retired judge, for allegedly delaying Civil Case No. PN-
0306 for Nullity of Marriage filed by respondent in the
RTC; and for continuously cohabiting with his concubine
and their illegitimate child, despite a previous disbarment
case which warned him against continuing such
relationship.
Earlier, complainant filed a disbarment case against
respondent for gross immorality  which meted the penalty
of 1 year suspension. Despite this suspension, respondent
continued to cohabit with the concubine which led to the
birth of their second son.
IBP CBD: Disbar.
IBP BOG: Disbar.
Issue: Whether respondent Atty. Villarente, Jr., a
retired judge, should be disbarred.
 Here, respondent's offense is compounded by the fact that
he sired two children with his mistress, one of whom was
born after he was warned by the Court about his illicit
relationship. Respondent's continuing illicit liaison with a
woman other than his lawfully-wedded wife, despite
previous sanction and warning, shows his cavalier
attitude, even arrogance towards the Court. His act of
cohabiting with his mistress while his marriage with
complainant subsists, and siring two children with said
mistress show his disregard of family obligations,
morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such
misbehavior over a long period of time shows a serious
flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to
scandal in the community, and his outright defiance of
established norms. As these acts put the legal profession
in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration
of justice in peril, the need for strict, but appropriate
action is therefore in order.
Disposition: Atty. Villarente, Jr. GUILTY of gross
immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for which he
is DISBARRED from the practice of law effective upon
receipt of this Decision. His name is ORDERED stricken
off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Ruling: Yes.

Respondent has been warned unequivocally by no less

than this Court that should evidence surface that his
alleged conduct be proven to be grossly immoral, the
matter shall be dealt with more severely.

Here, complainant was able to show that after the Court

slapped respondent with a one-year suspension for
immorality, with stern warning against its continued
commission, respondent still continued to cohabit with his
mistress in Lahug, Cebu City and even begot another
child.

Grossly immoral conduct is one that is so corrupt that it

amounts to a criminal act. It is so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.

Without a doubt, a married lawyer's abandonment of his

spouse in order to live and cohabit with another,
constitutes gross immorality. The offense may even be
criminal, amounting to concubinage or adultery.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES
Rogelio Pasamonte v. Atty. Teneza
AC No. 11104 June 9, 2020
Facts:
Rogelio alleged that he and Atty. Teneza have known
each other for at least 25 years. Atty. Teneza handled
Rogelio's ejectment cases and was even the godparent of
one of his children.
Rogelio went to the house of Atty. Teneza. To his
surprise, Atty. Teneza already planned and arranged
Rogelio's wedding with Mary Grace dela Roca (Mary
Grace). Rogelio objected since he is already married,
which Atty. Teneza knew because of their prior dealings.
However, Atty. Teneza assured him that their marriage
will not be registered with the Local Civil Registry.
Hence, reluctantly and "with a heavy heart," Rogelio was
forced into the marriage.
A few months later, Mary Grace, assisted by Atty.
Teneza, filed a case against Rogelio for bigamy and
violation of RA 9262. Rogelio then discovered that Atty.
Teneza himself was engaged in a bigamous marriage.
Atty. Teneza was still married to one Victoria Reyes
when he contracted a subsequent marriage with one
Charina dela Roca. As such, Rogelio filed a bigamy case
against Atty. Teneza.
Atty. Teneza admitted that he was a wedding sponsor in
the marriage of Francisco with Cristina and with
Michelle. He explained that "he acceded to the behest of
Cristina, and Michelle, that he stood as one of their
principal sponsors in their marriages with Francisco
because, if something goes wrong in any of these
marriage, he would stand witness and testify on the facts
of said marriages against his own brother-in-law
Francisco."
IBP-CBD: found Atty. Teneza to be wanting in integrity,
honesty, probity, trustworthiness and morality when he
conspired to a bigamous marriage. The IBP-CBD
recommended that Atty. Teneza be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years without prejudice to his
criminal and civil liabilities.
IBP-BOG: found Atty. Teneza's utter disregard for the
sanctity of marriage, not only of his own but also those of
around him, shows his unfitness to continue practicing
law and his unworthiness of the principles that the
privilege confers upon him.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Teneza should be
disbarred due to his alleged immoral acts.
Held:
Yes. The Court affirms the factual findings and
recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
Possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to membership in
the legal profession. 23 Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandate all lawyers to possess good moral character at
the time of their application for admission to the Bar, and
require them to maintain such character until their
retirement from the practice of law
Atty. Teneza admitted entering into a second marriage.
This admission more than proves his identity as husband
in both marriages and the existence of the two marriages.
Also, Atty. Teneza was complicit to two bigamous
marriages. Atty. Teneza knew that Rogelio had a
subsisting marriage when he contracted the second
marriage with Mary Grace. The complaint for ejectment
wherein Atty. Teneza was the counsel states that "Rogelio
is married but separated in fact from his wife."
The Court finds respondent Atty. Liberato Teneza
GUILTY of gross immorality in violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is ORDERED
DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name
stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective upon receipt
of this Decision.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

116. IGNACIO VS. IGNACIO
A.C. 9426, August 25, 2020
Facts
Corazon Kang Ignacio filed two disbarment complaints
against Atty. Monte Ignacio, her ex husband.
Corazon claimed that Atty. Ignacio committed bigamy
because prior to their marriage, respondent was actually
was previously married.
Taken together, Atty. Ignacio is guilty of gross
immorality. However, we do not agree with the IBP's
recommendation to disbar Atty. Ignacio. The penalty
of disbarment should be imposed with great caution for
clear cases or misconduct that seriously affects the
standing and character of an officer of the court. Although
the reason of Atty. Ignacio for contracting both marriages
is not a valid excuse, we note that he did not deceive the
Court and instead exhibited candor in admitting the
transgression.

Atty. Ignacio argued that Corazon knew of his previous
marriage but she insisted "for love as well as for
convenience because she can easily petition for [his]
immigration to the US, after several denials of [his]
tourist visa application with the US Embassy.
Moreover, there was no showing that Atty. Ignacio is
unfit to continue his membership in the bar.
In these circumstances, a penalty of suspension from the
practice of law for five years is proper.

Then, Corazon narrated that Atty. Ignacio fathered several

children with different women, namely: Maria Juliana,
Don Basilio and Monte John with Felisa Dela Cruz;
Michelle and an unnamed son with a certain Cecilia from
Mindoro; Monteson I and Monteson II with a certain
Virginia from Pangasinan; and Joker with Lily Dela Cruz.

For this, Atty. Ignacio explained that his children

Monteson I, Monteson II, Joker and Michelle were born
before his marriage with Corazon. On the other hand,
Maria Juliana, Don Basilio and Monte John were born
after the divorce.

Lastly, Corazon averred that she lent USD 9,300.00 to

Atty. Ignacio as bail in the murder case for which he was
implicated. Yet, Atty. Ignacio did not pay his debt despite
demand.

IBP CBD: Disbar.

IBP BOG: Adopted above.

Issue: W/N respondent should be disbarred because of

gross immorality.

Ruling: No.

True, Atty. Ignacio fell below the standards of morality

required of a lawyer when he contracted a bigamous
marriage. It is undisputed that Atty. Ignacio entered into
two marriages - in 1978 with Celia and in 198T with
Corazon. Atty. Ignacio exhibited reproachable conduct
when he engaged in extra-marital affairs and sired
children with different women other than his lawful wife.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

117. St. Louis University v. Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz

AC No. 6010 August 28, 2006
Facts:
This is a disbarment case filed by the Faculty members
and Staff of the SLU-LHS against Atty. Dela Cruz, its
principal, on the ff grounds:
A. Gross Misconduct: there were pending cases filed
against the respondent:
criminal case for child abuse; admin case for unethical
acts of misappropriating money for teachers; and the labor
case filed by SLU-LHS Faculty for illegal deduction of
salary.
B. Grossly Immoral Conduct: respondent contracted a
second marriage despite
the existence of his first marriage. He was married in
1982 and they separated in-fact a year after. 7 years after,
he contracts another marriage, but this was annulled for
being bigamous.
Undoubtedly, respondent's act constitutes immoral
conduct. Indeed, he exhibited a deplorable lack of that
degree of morality required of him as a member of the
Bar. In particular, he made a mockery of marriage which
is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His
act of contracting a second marriage while the first
marriage was still in place, is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality.
Respondent Atty. Rolando Dela Cruz guilty of immoral
conduct, in disregard of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years, and another
two (2) years for notarizing documents despite the
expiration of his commission or a total of four (4) years of
suspension.

C. Malpractice: respondent notarized documents (14 in

total), from 1988-1997 despite the expiration of his
notarial commission in 1987.

IBP-CBD: For contracting a second marriage, he be

suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year; For
notarizing certain legal documents despite full knowledge
of the expiration of his notarial commission, he be
suspended from the practice of law for another one (1)
year or for a total of two (2) years.

IBP-BOG: approved and adopted the recommendation of

Commissioner

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Dela Cruz is guilty of

immoral conduct.

Held:
Yes. In the case at bench, there is no dispute that
respondent and Teresita Rivera contracted marriage on 31
May 1982 before Judge Tomas W. Macaranas. In less
than a year, they parted ways owing to their irreconcilable
differences without seeking judicial recourse. After their
separation in-fact, respondent never knew the
whereabouts of Teresita Rivera since he had lost all forms
of communication with her. Seven years thereafter,
respondent became attracted to one Mary Jane Pascua,
who was also a faculty member of SLU-LHS. There is
also no dispute over the fact that in 1989, respondent
married Mary Jane Pascua.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

118. BUMANGLAG VS. BUMANGLAG

AM NO. 188

Facts
In the Court's decision of September 24, 1973. the Court
found respondent guilty of gross immoral conduct and
ordered his suspension from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years. Respondent filed several motions
for reconsideration, all of which were denied.

Then, on 1975, respondent filed for a petition thru a letter

addressed to the President of the Philippines that the order
of suspension by the Supreme Court be set aside and that
he be allowed to be an active member of the New Society.

This came to the attention of the Court so it to required

respondent to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why he should not be subjected to further
disciplinary action for making false statements and
misrepresentations in his petition to the President, and for
gross ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in
asking the President to set aside by decree this Court's
decision imposing upon him two-year suspension from
the practice of law.

Thus, respondent withdrew the first letter. Respondent

served his two-year suspension.

Issue: W/N respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of

law

Ruling: Yes.

Respondent is hereby administered a reprimand for gross

ignorance of the law and of the Constitution in having
asked the President to set aside by decree the Court's
decision which suspended him for two years from the
practice of law, with warning that the commission of any
transgression in the future of his oath and duties as a
member of the bar will be severely dealt with.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES
119. Vargas and Panes v. Ignes, Mann, Viajar, &
Nadua
AC No. 8096 July 5, 2010
Facts:
Koronadal Water District (KWD), a government-owned
and controlled corporation, hired respondent Atty.
Michael A. Ignes as private legal counsel for one (1) year.
The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
(OGCC) and the Commission on Audit (COA) gave their
consent to the employment of Atty. Ignes. However,
controversy later erupted when two (2) different groups,
herein referred to as the Dela Peña board and Yaphockun
board, laid claim as the legitimate Board of Directors of
KWD.
Dela Pena (DP) Board filed a case to annul the
appointment of two directors who will allegedly connive
with Director Allan Yapchockun who is against the
present Board of Directors.
Alleging that respondents acted as counsel for KWD
without legal authority, complainants filed a disbarment
complaint against the respondents before the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline. They likewise stated in
their position paper that Atty. Ignescontinued representing
KWD even after the OGCC had confirmed the expiration
of Atty. Ignes's contract.
Atty. Mann stated that he and his fellow respondents can
validly represent KWD since Atty. Ignes was not notified
of his contract's pre-termination. Atty. Mann also stated
that he stopped representing KWD after April 17, 2007 in
deference to the OGCC's stand. Attys. Ignes, Viajar, Jr.
and Nadua echoed Atty. Mann's defense.
IBP-CBD: held that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as
counsel of KWD for one (1) year, from April 2006 to
April 2007, and he was unaware of the pre-termination of
his contract when he filed pleadings; As to Attys. Viajar,
Jr., Mann and Nadua: they be fined P5,000 each for
appearing as attorneys for a party without authority to do
so.
IBP-BOG: reversed the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissed the case for
lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not respondents are administratively
liable.
Held:
Yes. We find that Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and Mann had
no valid authority to appear as collaborating counsels of
KWD in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799.
Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Nadua was
engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel.
In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also appeared as counsel of
KWD without authority, after his authority as its counsel
had expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his
retainership contract for one (1) year effective April 17,
2006. But even if we assume as true that he was not
notified of the pre-termination of his contract, the records
still disprove his claim that he stopped representing KWD
after April 17, 2007.
Thus, we entertain no doubt that they have full grasp of
our ruling therein that there are indispensable conditions
before a GOCC can hire private counsel and that for non-
compliance with the requirements set by Memorandum
Circular No. 9, the private counsel would have no
authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC. Still,
respondents acted as counsels of KWD without
complying with what the rule requires. They signed
pleadings as counsels of KWD.
Respondents Attys. Michael A. Ignes, Leonard Buentipo
Mann, Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr., and John Rangal D. Nadua
are found GUILTY of willfully appearing as attorneys for
a party to a case without authority to do so and FINED
P5,000 each, payable to this Court within ten (10) days
from notice of this Resolution. They are STERNLY
WARNED that a similar offense in the future will be dealt
with more severely.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

120. VALMONTE V. QUESADA JR. imposed upon him. The reason is obvious: "[o]nce a
A.C. No. 12487, December 04, 2019 lawyer is disbarred, there is no penalty that could be
imposed regarding his privilege to practice law.

Facts Nevertheless, it can still give the corresponding penalty

Complainant Eufemia Valmonte is the wife of Marcelo.
Marcelo was charged for the murder of Eufemia’s
brother, Manalo. Respondent Atty. Quesada is the private
prosecutor on behalf of the common law wife of Manalo.
Complainant then discovered that respondent entered his
appearance and filed pleadings in court while he was
serving his suspension from the practice of law.
only for the sole purpose of recording it in his personal
file with the OBC. In addition, the Court may also impose
a fine upon a disbarred lawyer found to have committed
an offense prior to his/her disbarment as the Court does
not lose its exclusive jurisdiction over other offenses
committed by a disbarred lawyer while he/she was still a
member of the Law Profession.

Despite due notice, respondent failed to file a comment
and to appear during the mandatory conference.
IBP CBD: Suspend respondent for 1 year.
IBP BOG: Adopted above.
Issue: W/N respondent committed unauthorized
practice of law.
All told, the Court finds respondent guilty of unauthorized
practice of law. And although he has already been
disbarred, the Court, nevertheless, deems it proper to give
the corresponding penalty of six months suspension from
the practice of law for the sole purpose of recording it in
his personal file in the OBC. The Court, likewise,
considers it necessary to impose upon respondent a
penalty of fine in the amount of PhP40,000.00.

Ruling: Yes. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby FINDS respondent Atty.

Jose C. Quesada, Jr. GUILTY of unauthorized practice of
In March 2014, or three months after the promulgation of law and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
the Resolution suspending him from the practice of law, for a period of six (6) months. However, considering that
respondent filed pleadings before the RTC of Bauang, La he has already been disbarred, this penalty can no longer
Union in Crim. Case No. 4573-BG. Respondent's acts of be imposed but nevertheless should be considered in the
signing and filing of pleadings for his client in Crim. Case event that he should apply for the lifting of his
No. 4573- BG months after the promulgation of the disbarment.
Resolution are clear proofs that he practiced law during
the period of his suspension. And as aptly found by the
IBP, respondent's unauthorized practice of law is
considered a willful disobedience to a lawful order of the
court, which under Section 27, 11 Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court is a ground for disbarment or suspension.

Issue: W/N a disbarred lawyer can still be suspended

and subsequently be imposed with fines and penalties

Ruling: Yes.
As to the penalty imposed, a review of recent
jurisprudence reveals that the Court has consistently
imposed an additional suspension of six months on
lawyers who continue to practice law despite their
suspension. However, considering that the Court had
already imposed upon respondent the ultimate penalty of
disbarment for his gross misconduct and willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of the court in an earlier
complaint for disbarment fled against him in Zarcilla v.
Quesada, Jr., the penalty of additional six months
suspension from the practice of law can no longer be
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

121. Feliciano v. Atty. Bautista-Lozada
AC No. 7593 March 11, 2015
Facts:
The Court en banc promulgated a Resolution suspending
Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the
CPR. However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for
injunction with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
where complainant was one of the respondents,
complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada appeared as
counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto
Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of
the case.
Complainant argued that the act of Atty. Lozada in
appearing as counsel while still suspended from the
practice of law constitutes willful disobedience to the
resolutions of the Court which suspended her from the
practice of law for two (2) years.
Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced by
circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her
husband who is embroiled in a legal dispute. She claimed
that she believed in good faith that her appearance as wife
of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to
practice law, considering that she is defending her
husband and not a client. She insisted that her husband is
a victim of grave injustice, and his reputation and honor
are at stake; thus, she has no choice but to give him legal
assistance.
actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for
and in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering
stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and
cross-examination, all constitute practice of law.
Furthermore, the findings of the IBP would disclose that
such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively engaging in
the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done within
the period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that
she was suspended from the practice of law by this Court
in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very
least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to
2008.
She knew very well that at the time she represented her
husband, she is still serving her two (2)-year suspension
order. Yet, she failed to inform the court about it. Neither
did she seek any clearance or clarification from the Court
if she can represent her husband. While we understand her
devotion and desire to defend her husband whom she
believed has suffered grave injustice, Atty. Lozada should
not forget that she is first and foremost, an officer of the
court who is bound to obey the lawful order of the Court.
Atty. Carmelita S. Bautista-Lozada is found GUILTY of
violating Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, and
is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months
from the practice of law, with a WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a
more severe penalty.

IBP-CBD: hound Atty. Lozada guilty of violating Rule

1.01 & 1.02, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the terms of her suspension from the
practice of law as imposed by the Court and
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Lozada.

IBP-BOG: adopt and approve with modification the

report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD such that it
recommended instead that Atty. Lozada be suspended
from the practice of law for three (3) months.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Lozada is guilty of

violating Sec. 27 Rule 138 of the ROC.

Held:
Yes. We adopt the ruling of the IBP-Board of Governors
with modification.

In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed.

Based on the records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES
122. LINGAN V. CALUBAQUIB AND BALIGA
Facts
In the resolution dated June 15, 2006, this court found
Attys. Romeo I. Calubaquib and Jimmy P. Baliga guilty
of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of CPR  and of the
Lawyer’s Oath. Respondents allowed their secretaries to
notarize documents in their stead, in violation of Sections
245 and 246 of the Notarial Law. The respondents from
the practice of law for one year, revoked their notarial
commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment
as notaries public for two years.
But then, Complainant Lingan filed his motion for
reconsideration, praying that respondents be disbarred,
not merely suspended from the practice of law. The court
denied complainant Lingan’s motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.
Meanwhile, Atty. Baliga, also the Regional Director of
the Commission on Human Rights Regional Office for
Region II, filed an undated ex parte clarificatory pleading
with leave of court.
There, Atty. Baliga alleged that on July 14, 2006,
complainant Lingan wrote the CHR. Lingan requested the
Commission to investigate Atty. Baliga following the
latter’s suspension from the practice of law.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the
practice of law, the CHR En Banc issued the resolution
dated January 16, 2007, suspending him from his position
as Director/Attorney VI of the CHR Regional Office for
Region II. According to the CHR En Banc, Atty. Baliga’s
suspension from the practice of law “prevented] [him]
from assuming his post [as Regional Director] for want of
eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice
law is suspended.”
Atty. Baliga argued that he cannot be suspended for acts
not connected with his functions as CHR Regional
Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from
the practice of law did not include his suspension from
public office.
As to Atty. Baliga’s claim that he did not practice law
while he held his position as Regional Director and only
performed generally managerial functions, complainant
Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying
the order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to
performing the functions of a “lawyer-manager,” which
under the landmark case of Cayetano v.
Monsod constituted practice of law.
The CHR filed its comment  and argued that “the penalty
imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is
separate and distinct from any penalty that may be
imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts.
According to the Commission, Atty. Baliga’s suspension
from the practice of law is a “bar matter” while the
imposition of penalty upon a CHR official “is an entirely
different thing, falling as it does within the exclusive
authority of the [Commission as] disciplining body.”
ISSUE: W/N being a Regional Director of CHR
constitutes practice of law.
RULING: YES. 
Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation
and Monitoring of Human Rights Violations and Abuses,
and the Provision of CHR Assistance, the Regional
Director has the following powers and functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to
“[CHR] matters;”
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional
offices; 
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial
investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of
the legal officer or investigator; 
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences
among parties and discuss “immediate courses of action
and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the
matter to an alternative dispute resolution”; 
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes,
including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas
within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office;
and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human
rights cases prepared by the legal officer. 
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal
profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually performed
by members of the judiciary and notaries public —
officers who are necessarily members of the bar.
Investigating human rights complaints are performed
primarily by the Commission’s legal officer. Discussing
immediate courses of action and protection remedies and
reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights
cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of
extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

must be an attorney — a member of the bar in good

standing and authorized to practice law. When the
Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or
she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the
Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the
position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended
lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional
Director.

Issue: W/N the CHR has the power to reinstate Atty.

Baliga despite the fact that he is still suspended in the
practice of law.

Ruling: NO. The CHR erred in issuing the resolution

dated April 13, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga
to reassume his position as Regional Director/Attorney VI
despite lack of authority to practice law.

We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we

have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of
law. The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and
other issuances, modify or defy this court’s orders of
suspension from the practice of law. Although the
Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint
its officers and employees, it can only retain those with
the necessary qualifications in the positions they are
holding.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

123. Pedro Aguirre v. Crispin Reyes deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement
AC No. 4355 January 8, 2020 or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services."

Facts: Atty. Aguirre also charged Atty. Reyes with violating

Atty. Aguirre essentially stated that Atty. Reyes violated
Rule 3.01 by making false claims in his memo ddressed to
the Board of Directors of Banco Filipino. Atty. Reyes also
violated Rule 8.01 in relation to Rule 19.01 when he
drafted the following: 1) confidential/restricted memo
addressed to all Banco Filipino directors and executive
officers; and 2) Amended Complaint.
Atty. Reyes asserted that his legal services were engaged
to intervene in SEC Case Nos. 2693 and 219 specifically
through a derivative suit purposely to protect the interests
of BF Homes, which was being plundered by billions of
pesos worth of assets. The measures he took in the SEC
case were brought to the attention of BF Homes' directors
and management officers, yet, he was viciously subjected
to all sorts of blame, ridicule, and aspersion. The language
he used in his memo and amended complaint was not
abusive nor offensive. The words were apt, vivid,
picturesque, proper, and elegant. He did not initiate
unfounded criminal charges to gain improper advantage.
Rule 8.01 when the latter purportedly employed abusive,
offensive, or otherwise improper language in the
documents he drafted.
In a case, the SC held that while respondent is guilty of
using infelicitous language, such transgression is not of a
grievous character as to merit respondent's disbarment.
Applying this decision, the Court finds Atty. Reyes guilty
of simple misconduct for which he is fined P2,000.00.
Respondent Atty. Crispin T. Reyes is found guilty of
SIMPLE MISCONDUCT for using intemperate language
in violation of 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is required to pay a fine of two
thousand pesos (P2,000.00) within five (5) days from
notice thereof. For this purpose, he is DIRECTED to
formally inform the Court of the exact date when he shall
have received this decision.

IBP-CBD: recommended the dismissal of both the

complaint and the counter- complaint by reason of the
death of Atty. Aguirre and for failure of Atty. Reyes to
substantiate his charge against Atty. Aguirre who, as
stated, had already died.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint for disbarment

against Atty. Reyes still proceed despite the death of
complainant Atty. Aguirre.

Held:
Yes. At the threshold, the Court emphasizes anew that a
disbarment case, being sui generis, may proceed despite a
complainant's desistance or failure to prosecute. Atty.
Aguirre's death will not automatically warrant the
dismissal of the disbarment complaint against Atty.
Reyes.

Here, Atty. Aguirre charged Atty. Reyes with violating

Rule 3.01 of the CPR for allegedly making false
statements in his memo. The specific statements pertain to
Atty. Reyes claiming that he was "instrumental in
winning the Supreme Court case" and he made"special
arrangements." According to Atty. Aguirre, these
statements not only put the Court in a bad light, they too,
purportedly amounted to "false, fraudulent, misleading,
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES
124. TUDTUD V. COLIFLORES
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1347. September 18, 2003
Facts
Tudtud charged respondent Judge Coliflores with delay in
the disposition of a case involving complainant. Despite
complainant’s submission of his position paper as early as
August 27, 1998, respondent Judge did not act upon the
case. Hence, this administrative complaint was filed.
The court issued a resolution referring this case to the
Executive Judge of the RTC Cebu City for
recommendation.
However, complainant died and his only surviving heir is
in the USA. Thus, the Executive judge wrote to the Court
and recommended therein that the case may be considered
closed and terminated.
Issue: W/N the death of a complainant bars an
administrative case.
Ruling: No.
The death of the complainant herein does not warrant the
non-pursuance of the charges against respondent Judge. In
administrative cases against public officers and
employees, the complainants are, in a real sense, only
witnesses. Hence, the unilateral decision of a complainant
to withdraw from an administrative complaint, or even his
death, as in the case at bar, does not prevent the Court
from imposing sanctions upon the parties subject to its
administrative supervision.
The reason is given that the case cannot be deemed
submitted for decision since the Order directing the
parties to submit their respective position papers was not
yet served upon the defendants.
Respondent Judge is reminded that the duties and
responsibilities of a judge are not strictly confined to
judicial functions. He is also an administrator who must
organize his court with a view to prompt and convenient
dispatch of its business. Respondent Judge should not
have tolerated the neglect of his process server who, for
one year, failed to serve upon the defendants the said
Order directing them to submit their position paper.
Disposition: respondent Judge Mamerto Y. Coliflores is
found GUILTY of gross inefficiency and is fined 1,000
pesos with warning.
125. Chan v. Atty. Carrera
AC No. 10439 September 3, 2019
Facts:
Chan alleged that she met Carrera sometime in July 2006
while she was a trainee at Max's Restaurant. At that time,
he was dining with a woman companion she thought was
Carrera's wife. She was surprised when Carrera later
introduced himself as a widower.
After two (2) weeks, Carrera returned and requested for
Chan to be his server. While waiting for his food, he told
her that he just settled a case and earned P4 million. At
one point, however, Chan told Carrera that it was best he
pursued somebody else as she was still married albeit
separated. She told him that her husband left her for
another woman and that she was raising their daughter
alone.
Eventually, Chan grew fond of Carrera. He was able to
convince her to join him on a trip to Hong Kong. Upon
their return, he bought a house for them in Quezon City as
well as a car for her with a special plate number "ANA"
inspired by her name. They then went to his school in
Dagupan City where he called for a board meeting during
which he introduced her as his fiancé and a new member
of the board of trustees.
However, around the time when Chan and Carrera moved
to another house at Project 8, Quezon City, Chan
discovered that Carrera was not in fact a widower and that
his wife was still alive. Even though his wife was
confined in an institution, he was still validly married to
her. Chan further discovered that Carrera also had a child
with another woman. Unfortunately, she found out that
she was pregnant with his child. Nevertheless, while Chan
decided to stay with Carrera, their relationship was no
longer harmonious. Throughout her pregnancy, Carrera
often scolded her and treated her badly.
Carrera denied the accusations against him. He alleged
that the instant complaint was merely part of Chan's
elaborate plan of extorting money from him. Carrera
maintains that there is no truth to the assertion that he told
her that he was a widower. She knew from the very
beginning that he was married and that his wife was
incapacitated and confined at Estrella's Half-way House
due to her "schizophrenia."
Chan and Carrera's son, Rebene C. Carrera, Jr., was born.
According to Carrera, from the time that he and Chan
began living together up until the present, he was never
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

remiss in providing for her, her daughter, and their son.

He bought them houses, cars, toys, clothes, and enrolled
their son at an educational center even when he was only
1-and-1/2 years old. In fact, he even paid for her
education at St. Joseph's College where she took her
Master of Arts in Special Education.

IBP-CBD: recommended that Carrera be admonished and

warned
IBP-BOG: Carrera is suspended from the practice of law
for one (1) year instead of three (3) years.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Carrera should be

disbarred.

Held:
Yes. The Court finds that the actuations of Carrera
warrant the penalty of disbarment from the practice of law
and not merely suspension therefrom as found by the
BOG.

The Court has ruled that a married person's abandonment

of his or her spouse in order to live and cohabit with
another constitutes immorality. The offense may even be
criminal — either as concubinage or as adultery.

The facts of the present case are beyond dispute. Both

Chan and Carrera acknowledged their undeniable love
affair, with the latter designating the same as a "chemistry
of two consensual adults." At the same time, both of them
did not deny the reality that they were still legally married
to another. In a heartbeat, they left their respective homes
and moved into a house that Carrera had bought and
where they wilfully resided for a good three (3) years.

The Court hereby DECLARES respondent Atty. Rebene

C. Carrera guilty of Gross Immorality in violation of Rule
1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, DISBARS him from the practice of law
effective upon receipt of this Decision, and ORDERS his
name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

126. PERLA PAO, ASSISTED BY HER MOTHER
EMERENCIANA V. CUNANAN vs. SILO
Adm. Case No. 794, April 30, 1973
Facts
Perla Pao was allowed by her mother, Emerenciana, to go
with Sarte, to attend a conference for a film production; in
which picture complainant was promised the role of a
Japanese girl.
Relying on Sarte's and herein respondent Silo's
representations, she went with them in the car of Sarte
and together with another girl, named Josie Galapin, they
were taken instead to the Winston Motel, at Pasay City
where both girls were sexually abused by Sarte and by the
respondent. As a result thereof she became pregnant and
gave birth to a baby boy.
suffice to support die charges. What would have been
crucial, in view of the nature of the charges against the
respondent, is the testimony of the complainant herself,
but, as already said, the same is unavailing.
It results that the charges against the respondent have not
been clearly established, for the power to disbar attorneys
ought always to be exercised with great caution, and
should follow only where there is a clear preponderance
of evidence against the respondent. For the presumption
is. until overthrown by convincing proof -that an attorney
is innocent of the charges against him and has performed
his duty as an officer of the court in conformity with his
oath.
Disposition: The present complaint is dismissed, and the
respondent exonerated of the charges.

Respondent denied the material averments of the

complaint and claimed that the filing thereof was part of a
malicious and well-planned scheme to extort money from
him and Sarte, for which he presented several annexes.

The case was referred to the SolGen. However, in view of

the failure of the complainant, Perla Pao, and her lawyer
to appear, coupled with the filing of her Affidavit of
Desistance by her mother, Emerenciana Cunanan, the
hearing of the case was reset. Unfortunately, complainant
still failed to appear. Thus, counsel for respondent moved
that the direct testimony of Perla Pao be stricken from the
record on the ground that he has not cross-examined her.

Solicitor General: recommended the dismissal of the case

and the respondent's exoneration.

Issue: W/N respondent should be disbarred

Ruling: No.

First and foremost, a case of suspension or disbarment

may proceed "regardless of interest or lack of interest of
the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant," for what
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts; borne out by
the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proved.

The complainant's election to desist notwithstanding, this

Court has therefore to determine on the basis of the record
whether the charges against respondent lawyer have been
convincingly proved.

The only evidence left for the complainant is therefore her

mother's testimony, but the same, standing alone, does not
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

127. Hierro v. Atty. Plaridel Nava order to show supposed maltreatment of Hierro to
AC No. 9459 January 7, 2020 Annalyn.

Facts: We are not convinced by Atty. Nava's defense that he

Hierro filed a letter-complaint for disbarment charging
Atty. Nava of violating Canons 7.03, 15.03, 17, 21.01 and
22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through the
following acts:
1) Conflict of interest on the part of Atty. Nava for acting
as counsel for Annalyn Hierro, Hierro's spouse, in her
petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
protection order against Hierro.
2) Grossly immoral conduct for engaging in adulterous
relations with Annalyn and fathering a child with her; and
3) Dereliction of duty for abandoning Hierro as the latter's
counsel in a case for Grave Threats with the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities after the filing of the petition which
resulted to Hierro’s conviction.
Atty. Nava vehemently denied the allegations against
him. On the allegation of conflict of interest, Atty. Nava
contends that he was compelled to sign the petition with
prayer for the issuance of a TPO out of exigency and for
humanitarian consideration.
As to the allegation of grossly immoral conduct, Atty.
Nava said that such allegation is a mere afterthought and
has no factual basis. As a matter of fact, the complaint for
adultery filed against him was dismissed by the
investigating prosecutor as the latter found the case to be
without merit.
accepted the engagement by Annalyn because of
emergency, exigency and on temporary capacity only. As
a lawyer, he should have used better judgment to foresee
the possibility of conflict of interest as that is what the
society expects of him. Besides, even if the filing of the
TPO is an emergency which requires a swift response, he
could have easily recommended another competent
lawyer in his place.
In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, public
interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit
person to be allowed to practice law.
The Court finds and declares respondent Atty. Plaridel C.
Nava II GUILTY of conflict of interest and gross
immorality in violation of Rule 15.03 and Rule 7.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, respectively;
DISBARS him from the practice of law effective upon
receipt of this Decision; and ORDERS his name be
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

Regarding the allegation of abandonment of Hierro in his

Grave Threats case which led to his conviction, Atty.
Nava vehemently denied such allegation saying it was
Hierro who terminated his services.

IBP-CBD: recommended that Atty. Nava be disbarred and

his name be stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys
IBP-BOG: adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the Commissioner

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Nava should be disbarred.

Held:
Yes. In the instant case, it is undisputed that Atty. Nava
became the retained counsel of Hierro in the latter's cases
and also as counsel for Annalyn in the petition for the
issuance of a TPO against Hierro. It must be highlighted
that the petition for the issuance of a TPO contains
reference to the criminal cases that were handled by Atty.
Nava to demonstrate Hierro's propensity for violence in
PALE- DISBARMENT CASES

128. HEIRS OF ALILANO V EXAMEN
A.C. No. 10132, March 24, 2015
Facts
The heirs of Alinano filed a complaint for disbarment
charging Atty. Examen for misconduct and malpractice
for falsifying documents and presenting these as evidence
in court thus violating the Lawyer's Oath, Canons 1, 10,
and 19, and Rules 1.01, 1.02, 10.01, and 19.01 of the
CPR.
The heirs stated in their complaint that Atty. Examen
violated the notarial law by notarizing a document even if
the party to it is his brother; and that he notarized it
knowing that the cedula (residence) certificate number
was not Ramon’s but Florentina’s, then he introduced
these documents into evidence.
In his defense, Atty. Examen said that there was no longer
a prohibition under the Revised Administrative Code for a
notary public to notarize a document where one of the
parties is related to him by consanguinity and affinity.
With regard to the use of Florentina's residence certificate
as Ramon's, Atty. Examen said that the was in good faith
and that it was office practice that the secretary type
details without him personally examining the output. He
said that the use of another's residence certificate is not a
ground for disbarment and is barred by prescription based
on IBP Resolution No. XVI-2004-13 where it was
proposed that the Rules of Procedure of the Commission
on Bar Discipline IBP, Section 1, Rule VIII, be revised to
include a prescription period for professional misconduct:
within two years from the date of the act.
Atty. Examen interposes that he was in good faith in that
it was office practice to have his secretary type up the
details of the documents and requirements without him
checking the correctness of same.
However, good faith cannot be a mitigating circumstance
in situations since the duty to function as a notary public
is personal. We note that the error could have been
prevented had Atty. Examen diligently performed his
functions: personally checked the correctness of the
documents.  To say that it was his secretary’s fault
reflects disregard and unfitness to discharge the functions
of a notary public for it is he who personally
acknowledges the document.  He was behooved under
Section 251, Chapter 11 of the Revised Administrative
Code to check if the proper cedulas were presented and
inspect if the documents to be acknowledged by him
reflected the correct details.
We cannot stress enough that as a lawyer, respondent is
expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and refrain from any act or omission
which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by
the public in the integrity of the legal profession.
Disposition: The Court deems it proper to suspend Atty.
Examen from the practice of law for a period of two years
following this Court’s decision in Caalim-Verzonilla v.
Pascua.
Laurel vs. Delute, supra. See Pg. 2

IBP CBD: Disbar.

IBP BOG: 2 years suspension of Atty. Examen’s Notarial
Commission and from the practice of law.

Issue: W/N Atty. Examen can be held administratively

liable

Ruling: Yes.

Based on the submission of the complainants, it is clear

that the residence certificate number used by Ramon
Examen and as notarized by Atty. Examen in both
Absolute Deeds of Sale was not in fact the residence
certificate of Ramon but Florentina’s residence certificate
number.