INOCENTES, Raymond Justin T.

LCAS Writing Assignment #2

Enrico Velasco vs. Atty. Causing, March 2, 2021

A.C. No. 12883 [Formerly CBD Case No. 16~5016] EN BANC (Ponente: J. Inting)

Facts: Complainant Enrico R. Velasco (Enrico) files a verified complaint for disbarment

against Atty. Berteni C. Causing (Atty. Causing), counsel of Nina Ricci Narvaez

Laudato (Nina) in a declaration of nullity case against the complainant, before the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

(CPR).

The Complaint stemmed from a Facebook post authored by Atty. Causing titled

"WISE POLYGAMOUS HUSBAND?” of which he shared not only to a public Facebook

Group containing 3,500 members but also to the complainant’s son Jomel. Said post is

reported to have contained details about the aforementioned declaration of nullity case

which is still pending and very much confidential, as well as verbal jabs against the
complainant wherein he used such terms as “polygamous”, “criminal”, “dishonest”,

“arrogance”, “disgusting”, and “cheater”, among others.

In his defense, while hypothetically admitting that he indeed published the

subject post with photographs of complainant's petition in the nullity case in Facebook

and thereafter sent a link of the post to complainant’s son. In his defense, Atty. Causing

invokes his rights to freedom of expression and of the press and argues that he was

merely acting as a "spokesman-lawyer" and a "journalist-blogger" when he published

the subject post.

Issue(s): Whether Atty. Causing should be held administratively liable for publishing

the subject post and photographs of complainant's petition in the nullity case in his

Facebook accounts.

Held: Yes, Atty. Causing is administratively liable. A lawyer is not allowed to divide his

personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Regardless of

whether a lawyer is representing his client in court, acting as a supposed spokesperson

outside of it, or is merely practicing his right to press freedom as a "journalist-blogger,"

his duties to the society and his ethical obligations as a member of the bar remain

unchanged.

Here, Atty. Causing had clearly violated Sec. 1221 of Republic Act No. 8369, or

the Family Courts Act of 1997, which prohibits the publication or disclosure, in any

manner, of the records of Family Court cases. This is, in itself, a breach of his duties

under Canon 1 as well as Canon 13 and Rule 13.02 of the CPR as the subject post not

only disclosed confidential information regarding the nullity case, but also included his

own, strongly-worded opinion regarding complainant's character and the

circumstances surrounding the case. He also violated Rule 8.01 of the CPR through his

use of undignified and disrespectful language.

Comment: I wholeheartedly agree with the ruling of the Supreme Court in this case insofar as

the findings of Atty. Causing’s guilt is concerned, more specifically when the ponente pointed

out that the instant ruling is but a reiteration of the Belo-Henares (Vicki Belo) case. Truly,

maligning and insulting a person indeed could not assume the guise of an individual’s freedom

of speech and expression, more so if said person carries with him a duty to promote respect for

law and legal processes. However, I do disagree that the instant case only merits the same

punishment of 1 year suspension as in the Belo-Henares case, as Atty. Causing did more than
malign and insult as he not only intended to weaponize public opinion so that he could gain an

advantage in a pending case, but also scarred an innocent minor for life by disrespecting his

father. Hence, a harsher penalty is justified in this case.

Maximo Noble III vs. Atty. Orlando O. Ailes, July 1, 2015

AC No. 10628 (Ponente: J. Perlas-Bernabe)

Facts: Complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) filed a verified complaint charging

Atty Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire

Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509

and 192210, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of

damages before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

This instant administrative case for disbarment originated from an attempt made

by Orlando in trying to convince Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), the respondent’s own

brother, not to retain the services of Maximino as his lawyer as the latter is only trying

to impoverish him by charging attorney’s fees while never once appearing in court. As a
result of said act, Marcelo had Orlando prepare a Notice to Terminate Service of

Counsel which quite reasonably offended the modesty and values of the complainant.

In addition to this, the complainant alleges that Orlando filed a case in behalf of a client

despite failing to comply with his third MCLE compliance and payment of his IBP dues.

In his defense, Orlando denied the charges against him and claimed that his late

submission of the third MCLE compliance is not a ground for disbarment and that the

Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement were all made

upon the request of Marcelo when the latter was declared in default in the

aforementioned civil case. Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in

his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-to-brother communication"

and were uttered in good faith.

In a Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the IBP

Commissioner's Report and Recommendation that a transgression of the MCLE

compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in fact, failure to disclose the

required information would merely cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction

of the pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner find any violation

of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant any administrative liability on the part of
Orlando, considering that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who are

brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to Maximino nor intended to

be published and known by third persons. Hence, the filing of this instant review on

certiorari.

Issue(s): Whether or not the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.

Held: No, the IBP is not correct in dismissing the complaint against Orlando. Though a

lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and

respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language

and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial forum.

In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando sent to his brother

Marcelo as casual communications considering that they were conveyed privately. To

the Court's mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated lightly. The text

messages were clearly intended to malign and annoy Maximino. Likewise, Orlando's

insistence that Marcelo immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates

Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation of the CPR. Moreover,

Orlando's voluntary plea of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case

filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes, an admission that he
spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum

which exposes the lawyer to administrative liability. It is inconsequential that the

statements were merely relayed to Orlando's brother in private.

Comment: I disagree with the ruling of the Supreme Court only insofar as the dispositive portion

is concerned. I find it confusing as to how admonishment coupled with a stern warning befits an

attorney who is found to have violated no less than a WHOLE CANON of the CPR. Surely, said

acts could have been properly dissuaded and set as an example for the entire legal community if

only the Supreme Court actually metes out a penalty that amounts to more than a slap in the

wrist.

Louisito Chua vs. Atty. Oscar Pascua, Dec 5, 2016

AC No. 10757, (Ponente: J. Bersamin)

Facts: Complainant Louisito N. Chua (Dr. Chua) filed a verified petition before the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines to hold Atty. Oscar Pascua (Atty. Pascua)

administratively liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

 Atty. Pascua was the co-plaintiff in the ejectment suit filed against the

complainant and his mother in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (MeTC). After

the MeTC dismissed the ejectment suit, Atty. Pascua and his co-plaintiff appealed.

Although the RTC initially dismissed the appeal, it reversed itself and rendered

judgment in favor of Atty. Pascua and his co plaintiff upon their motion for

reconsideration. According to Dr. Chua, Atty. Pascua, in filing the motion for

reconsideration, did not furnish a copy of the motion to Dr. Chua and his mother,

thereby employing a fraudulent scheme designed to prevent him and his mother from

having their day in court. Dr. Chua further stated that only Atty. Pascua appeared at the

hearing of the motion for reconsideration at which he made his oral arguments.

Thereby, Atty. Pascua allegedly "obtained a favorable decision without [their]

knowledge." Being on the receiving end of an adverse judgment, Atty. Pascua

submitted a Comment/Opposition which employed foul language and insulting words.

It is even being alleged that Atty, Chua accused a Presiding Judge of the RTC in

bungling the case. Furthermore, it is being alleged Atty. Pascua used another lawyer’s

MCLE compliance and employing mail fraud to make it appear that court processes has

been duly served.

In his defense, Atty. Pascua focused on the untruthful statements Dr. Chua had

supposedly made regarding the ownership of the property subject of the litigation
between them. Anent the issue of his acquiring rights over the property from the client,

he asserted that such was a personal matter between him and his client. He denied

using foul language, insisting that "these are part of the pleadings filed by complainant

without malice but in good faith taking into consideration the facts under the

circumstances." He claimed that the errors made in indicating the date of issuance of his

MCLE compliance certificate number were merely typographical, not intentional.

As a result of the proceedings before the IBP, Atty. Pascua was suspended from

the practice of law for six months.

Issue(s): Whether or not the IBP is correct is suspending Atty. Pascua from the practice

of law for six months.

Held: No, the IBP is not correct in ordering Atty. Pascua’s suspension. Words and

phrases like duped, to take advantage of the innocence of, his ignorance and abusive

manner, foolishness, and bungling (even if the latter referred to the act of the trial

judge) are of common usage in our daily life. They should be understood by what they

ordinarily convey. Admittedly, they can at times be considered as off-color or even as

abrasive, but their being so considered depends on the specific context or situation in
which they are used or uttered. That they have synonyms or alternatives that are more

or less expressive does not warrant characterizing them as excessive, intemperate or

offensive. To depreciatingly generalize about them, as the Investigating Commissioner

obviously did, is to unwarrantedly relegate them to a negative light. Doing so herein

would be uncalled for because the Investigating Commissioner did not render any

justification for his negative conclusion about them. His omission has effectively

deprived the Court of the factual basis for reviewing and affirming his conclusion.

Atty. Pascua's alleged usage of a wrong MCLE compliance certificate number, or

of that pertaining to another lawyer, if established, could really constitute a violation of

Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which directs that "[a]

lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he

mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice." But for the Court to find

against him in this respect will be unwarranted considering the absence from the

Investigating Commissioner's report and recommendation of any factual finding

thereon. Neither did his report and recommendation advert to any evidence sufficiently

showing Atty. Pascua to have abused legal processes and procedure.

 We presume that the silence of the report and recommendation on the foregoing

matters was by virtue of the absence of a clear showing by the complainant of the

factual circumstances supporting the charges against Atty. Pascual. Otherwise, the

Investigating Commissioner would have easily stated his factual findings thereon

because it was his duty to do so under Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court

Comment: I strongly disagree with this ruling. The Supreme Court reversed the findings

of Investigating Commissioner of the IBP that words Atty. Pascua used in his

pleadings such as “duped”, “to take advantage of the innocence of”, “his ignorance and

abusive manner”, “foolishness”, and “bungling” as not excessive, intemperate or

offensive. While it is true that words should not be taken out of context, such words

hide beneath the surface latent albeit serious accusations. Take for example that the

word “duped” not only means misdirection was used, but rather a certain scheme was

employed to defraud. Similarly, “to take advantage of the innocence” does not merely

imply that an advantage was derived due to the inexperience of another, but rather as a

veiled assault in the dignity of an office of no less than an elected public official. The

other statements are not even necessary such as “ignorance and abusive manner” and

“foolishness” as they are mere speculation of one’s character. Finally, it is truly

evident that Atty. Pascua is well aware of the damage that his choice of words is
capable of when he alleged that Presiding Judge bungled a case considering that gross

ignorance a ground for an administrative case against a judge.

Furthermore, Atty. Pascua has no business in using an MCLE compliance

number that has not been assigned to him. The mere presence of such number in his

pleadings is prima facie evidence of wrongdoing that needs sufficient substantiation

from Atty. Pascua, with or without report or recommendation from the IBP which is

merely confirmatory in nature. It is far-fetched that errors made in indicating the date

of issuance of his MCLE compliance certificate number were merely typographical, not

intentional as Atty. Pascua failed to demonstrate how the typographical error was

made apart from his bare denial. This does not even address the issue that he failed to

MCLE compliance number in some of his pleadings, which only further reinforces the

allegation that he never actually exerted any effort with complying with this

requirement. The duplicity of occurrence of this omission likewise defeats the assertion

that this was a clerical mistake on his part.