1AC – Original Jurisdiction

1AC – Plan
The United States federal government should substantially increase its
protection of interstate water resources in the United States.
 1AC – Equitable Apportionment
Advantage one is equitable apportionment –
Article III vests original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to resolve interstate
water disputes, but the Court’s use of equitable apportionment has imprinted a
binding precedent of unfettered judicial discretion.
Colburn ’20 [Jamison E.; Joseph H. Goldstein Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law at Penn
State University; 10-2020; “TIME TO RETHINK THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERSTATE WATERS
JURISPRUDENCE,” ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REPORTER, 50 ELR 10840; downloaded 8-9-2021; RG]

The U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 2, vests original jurisdiction in the Court over
"Controversies between two or more States," a jurisdiction that has always been exclusive by statute.35 Yet, as the
Erie doctrine3 6 and other developments have long made clear, Article III's vesting of jurisdiction does
not necessarily imply the authority to make federal law.37 Indeed, the Supremacy Clause 38 implies
otherwise: judicial jurisdiction by itself is no authority to make the law.39

The conventional wisdom is that interstate waters constitute a special "enclave" of federal
common law grounded in the Court's many opinions on interstate waters disputes .4 0 Federal
courts specialists say so.4 1 Even the Court has said so occasionally.4 2 Yet, this conventional wisdom ignores
more than it reveals. The supposed basis of this reconciliation, Justice Louis Brandeis' opinion in Hinderlider v. La
Plata, did not arise in the Court's original jurisdiction , 4 3 did not involve a merits question about the water's
interstate allocation,4 4 and need not have resolved anything about collective rights to the La Plata River.45

Hinderlider was quintessentially about jurisdiction to adjudicate.4 6 Hinderlider, logically, could not have
resolved much at all about the legal basis of equitable relief against a sibling state for interstate waters
wrongs-nor about the force of the Court's past opinions thereon. And that leaves the hardest questions essentially
unanswered-by Hinderlider or any simple notion of law making by the Court from within its
equitable original jurisdiction .4 7
From its appellate docket, the Court made clear no later than the Willamette Iron Bridge case that, at least as to the obstruction of
interstate waters for navigational purposes, there was no federal common law binding inferior courts.4 8 Indeed, it was that signal
that prompted Congress into action through §10 of the 1890 Rivers and Harbors Act.4 9 In Arizona v. California,50 furthermore, the
Court stated unequivocally that it could not allocate waters contrary to the Boulder Canyon Project Act or the authority delegated to
the Interior Secretary thereby.5 1

Jurisdictionally, then, only

the Court may hear state state "controversies" involving state interests in interstate
waters. But when it decides to hear-sitting in equity, weighing the claims of opposing dignitaries-the Court
invariably provokes one of the Constitution's hardest questions: how may the Court itself be
making federal law? The more complex and interrelated these controversies become with the
governance of important natural resources, the more uncomfortable this question grows.

In the very first Kansas v. Colorado case, 5 2 the Court famously declared that its task was to
"apply Federal law, state law, and international law , as the exigencies of the particular case may demand."5 3
Seemingly anticipating its landmark decision in Erie decades later ,54 though, the Court adopted a
stance it still invokes today: the authority to decide stems directly from the states' equal
sovereignty and, in sitting as that tribunal, it merely provides or withholds relief as appropriate. 55 But can the Court
really skip around the core focus of all Article III court litigation-a decision on the merits ?5 6 This
has remained a continentally scaled equivocation. For, as remedies scholars have converged to agree lately, the
Court's
precedents on the granting or withholding of equitable relief confer no independent authority to change the
law.57

In the last analysis, then, unless

the interests that have animated this jurisdiction are in some real sense
constitutional, the Constitution suggests in too many ways to count that the Court's practices cannot be
squared with its broader understanding of Article III.58 Yet, the Court's opinions are still
alternatively cast as binding precedent5 9 or as mere record of the Court's unfettered remedial
discretion.6 0 The states' equal sovereignty, thus, has become the fulcrum between the two
distinct functions Article III confers on its courts: dispute resolution and the authoritative exposition
of federal law. Looking ahead, though, this functional divide itself could better organize the Court's
interstate waters jurisprudence, especially if the goal is to replace equivocations with tractable, forum-independent
principles of law. Parts II and III argue that there is a path to that end, albeit one with significant obstacles.

The judicial doctrine exacerbates uncertainty and conflict but fails to protect
water resources
Nelson ‘20 [Bernadette R; J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law; B.S.,
Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service; 2020; “Muddy Water Blues: How the
Murky Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment Should Be Refined”; Iowa Law Review, Vol.
L05:1827, page 1850-1851; downloaded 8-9-2021; RG]
On its own, the lack of clarity in the doctrine's application may not pose a great challenge for parties to an interstate water conflict
or practitioners. However, when
combined with the murky analytical structures the Court uses to find a
wasteful or beneficial use (two of the foundational aspects of the equitable apportionment
doctrine), the increasing strain on interstate water resources, and the frequency with which
interstate water disputes are coming before the Court147 the equitable apportionment doctrine poses
grave challenges for interstate water conflicts in the United States of the twenty-first century.

States and policymakers have little guidance about how the Court may approach an interstate
water conflict based on the patchy precedent; what will qualify as a demonstration of waste or
benefit; or just how subjective the Court will be in its application of the equitable apportionment
doctrine. All of these questions uniquely arise after the parties present their information to the Special Master, whose own report
and suggested solution the Court may choose to ignore. Of course, no party or attorney knows exactly how a court will
respond to a particular factual circumstance or line of argument, but courts, and especially the Supreme
Court, ought to give an indication through their precedent about the direction and the
application of the law. However, the Court's inconsistent application of the equitable apportionment
doctrine provides parties with little in terms of guidance for how they should present an argument to the Special
Master in a way the Court will recognize and respond to.

Such frustration may have the effect of burdening the Court with prolonged litigation or make
judicial apportionment as a remedy insufficient to account for states' needs. As the current and
prolonged litigation between Florida and Georgia over the water of the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-
Flint River basin demonstrates,'48 the Court is critical to mediating disputes between states over
water because other methods like interstate compacts are simply not working . Additionally, growing
populations and burdens on already-strained water sources means that conflicts are guaranteed to arise in the
future.,49 Water is essential for life, and states must be sure they have a relatively predictable avenue through which to make
their claims. With the state of the equitable apportionment doctrine today, the
path for litigation in this realm is simply
too disjointed to provide meaningful guidance for potential litigants.

Uncertainty in judicial apportionment leads to water over-use.

Sarine ‘12 [Elizabeth; Deputy Attorney General in 2021, Natural Resources Law Section, J.D.
Candidate in 2012, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law; 2012; "The Supreme Court's
Problematic Deference to Special Masters in Interstate Water Disputes", Berkeley Law;
https://lawcat.berkeley.edu/record/1125175?ln=en, accessed 2-13-2022; RG]

States want certainty about and control over the outcomes of interstate water conflicts in order to
achieve administrative efficiency, minimize their own costs, and address water conservation
and/or environmental concerns.83

First, when a state is uncertain about its share of interstate river flows, it encounters significant
administrative difficulties. Since states must manage and allocate in-state water in a manner consistent with the terms of
relevant interstate compacts and Court decrees,84 uncertainty about the size of the pie to be divided among in-
state water users could lead to more in-state litigation85 and a mismatch between “paper” water and “wet” water,86 as
well as lost opportunities to invest in economic growth or energy infrastructure dependent on
reliable water supplies.

States likely seek apportionment by compact or decree mainly to reduce this uncertainty. Apportionment of
either type allows states to “confidently grant water rights to users within a state that, in total, do not exceed that state’s
allocation.”87 Allocation by compact “confirm[s] that the status quo is not violative of the principles the Court now uses in equitable
apportionment cases,” which should (but do not always) protect uses existing at the time of ratification.88 Additionally,
apportionment give states the ability to conduct long-range water project planning.89

Second, states are understandably anxious about the prospect of paying large monetary damages
or, worse, having to deliver repayment in water for breach of compact obligations. Where the Supreme Court has
found breach of a defendant state’s water delivery obligations, it has been willing to award damages in the amount of the plaintiff
state’s losses plus compound prejudgment interest.90 For example, in
Texas v. New Mexico, the Court found that
the compact did not preclude the award of monetary damages where mandated repayment in water would
be inequitable or infeasible.91 After the Court returned to the Special Master the matter of determining the appropriateness and
size of monetary damages92 for a breach spanning thirtyfour years,93 the parties
settled the case for $14 million.94
Importantly, the Court held that a state was liable even if it had acted in good faith and breached
only because it had interpreted ambiguous compact language in a way that the Court later
rejected.95

In Kansas v. Colorado, the Court divided over how to determine the proper period of prejudgment
interest for losses from compact violations by Colorado that began in 1950.96 Kansas sought $62 million in
damages, with $41 million representing prejudgment interest compounded from 1950
“intended to compensate for lost investment opportunities .”97 The Special Master recommended an award of
damages that included prejudgment interest from 1969—the time when Colorado knew or should have known about the
violations.98 Even though the four plurality Justices agreed with the Special Master in order to “produce a majority for the
judgment,” the Court ultimately decided to allow prejudgment interest to run only from 1985, when Kansas filed the complaint.99
Professor Douglas Grant has commented that the Court failed to provide a rational basis for why prejudgment
interest should not begin to run until one state has filed suit, leaving open the question of whether this
approach is narrowly confined to the facts of the case or is a broad rule applicable in all breach of
compact cases.100
Finally, states
want certainty about the outcomes of interstate water disputes because many water
conservation and environmental concerns have grown in importance since the initial apportionment by
compact or decree. The compact mechanism has always been seen as an answer to “wasteful non-action or wasteful conflict,”101 a
classic “tragedy of the commons.”102 In other words, without a compact, a state that wants to “conserve
[its] water resources for either future intrastate use or for present in situ use [is] at risk of having sister
states use that water in other inconsistent ways.”103 Furthermore, within the last forty years, after most compacts
were created, new environmental awareness and legislation have emerged.104 More people now support “maintaining instream
flows to promote recreational and ecological values.”105 Environmental legislation, such as the federal Endangered Species Act,
now imposes additional responsibilities on states and new restrictions on water use.106 Similarly, Indian-reserved water rights have
become better defined and better protected.107 Unfortunately, as Professor Robert Abrams asserts, under
current
precedent, it appears that states engaged in present development and use of water will be the
“winners,” while states favoring conservation are likely to be “losers.”108

Increased knowledge about hydrology and society’s desire for more efficient use of water have led to conflicts
between compact states. For example, in Kansas v. Colorado, better understanding of the interconnectedness of surface water
and groundwater led Kansas to claim that increased groundwater pumping in Colorado had materially
depleted the waters of the Arkansas River in violation of compact.109 However, during the early years of the
compact, neither state “had any thought” that groundwater pumping might reduce stream flow.110 In Montana v.
Wyoming, on the other hand, Montana claimed that the switch from flood to sprinkler irrigation by
appropriators in Wyoming had harmed Montana appropriators because sprinklers increased irrigation efficiency,
reducing runoff that had previously contributed to river return flows—thereby increasing Wyoming’s net
consumption of water and decreasing the amount available for Montana to use. 111

For the foregoing reasons, states desire certainty about and control over the outcomes of interstate water conflicts. The
Supreme Court could better meet states’ needs by adopting new procedures and standards to
increase the uniformity and predictability of interstate water dispute decisions.112 First, the Court
could use a consistent procedural framework 113 and provide more active oversight of the Special
Masters appointed to cases involving interstate water disputes.114 The Court could refrain from delegating questions of law to
Special Masters, while allowing them to fulfill the traditional fact-finding functions of a Special Master.115 Most importantly, the
Court could become more comfortable plunging into the deep end of water compacts .116 The
familiar tools of statutory construction, principles of contract law, and various constitutional arguments are more
than enough to ensure the Court does not drown in complicated state water law .117

Which depletes water resources.

Hall ’10 [Noah D.; Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School; J.D., University of
Michigan Law School, 1998; B.S., University of Michigan School of Natural Resources &
Environment, 1995; 1-1-2010; "Interstate Water Compacts and Climate Change Adaptation",
Wayne State University, Law Faculty Research Publications;
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1185&context=lawfrp, accessed
2-13-2022; RG]
A. The Importance of Interstate Freshwater Resources

Most major freshwater resources in the U nited States are shared by two or more states . For better or for
worse, many rivers were used as the boundaries between neighboring states, usually giving the adjacent states shared rights to use
of the water. In every part of the country, the major freshwater systems cross state lines. Eight states (Illinois,
Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, as well as the provinces of Ontario and Quebec)
share jurisdiction and rights over the Great Lakes, which contain over 90% of the fresh surface water in
the United States.65 The Colorado River watershed covers seven states (California, Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming, as well as Mexico), and while it contains a relatively modest amount of water compared to the Great
Lakes, it is an extremely important water supply for these western states. The largest river on the United States' east coast, the
Susquehanna, is shared by New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland . The Great Lakes, Colorado River, and
Susquehanna River are all managed by interstate compacts. Other major interstate rivers subject to compacts include the Rio
Grande, Arkansas River, and Delaware River.

Interstate aquifers are also an extremely important part of the U.S. water supply . Approximately 130
million people in the U.S. depend on groundwater for drinking water. Sixty-five percent of groundwater
withdrawals are used for irrigation, and the amount of irrigation withdrawals in the U.S. has more than
doubled since 1950.66 Many aquifers have been depleted beyond their safe yields, making them
vulnerable to further stress from climate change.

The most significant aquifers in the United States are interstate in scope . Large, multi-state aquifers
include the Ogallala, the Edwards-Trinity System, the Columbia Plateau System, and the Floridian. Although these large aquifers
are crucial to the U.S. water supply, states have not yet used interstate compacts to manage them.
B. Management and Allocation of Interstate Waters in the United States

There are three ways to manage and allocate interstate waters in the United States. First, the federal government, through an act of
Congress, could establish standards for the use of interstate waters or even apportion specific water resources among the states.
While Congress has broad power over interstate waters, it has rarely exercised that power for managing and allocating interstate
waters. Congress has taken a central role in protecting interstate water quality through the Clean Water Act,6 7 but has not taken an
active role in managing interstate water quantity.

Second, the Supreme Court of the United States has on several occasions reluctantly allocated
interstate waters when a dispute between states has arisen. Pursuant to Article III of the United States
Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over disputes between
states. 68 The Court has invoked this jurisdiction several times over the past century to resolve disputes over allocation of
interstate waters. 69 In these cases, the Supreme Court has not developed a uniform approach to
interstate transboundary water allocation, instead resolving individual disputes with heavy reliance on the specific
facts and circumstances. This approach has been termed "equitable apportionment," which only provides that no single state can
command an entire interstate water to the detriment of other riparian states. The need for equity in allocating transboundary
waters was best stated by Justice Holmes in the Supreme Court's 1931 decision in New Jersey v. New York (1931):

A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among those who have
power over it. New York has the physical power to cut off all the water within its jurisdiction. But clearly the exercise of
such a power to the destruction of the interest of lower States could not be tolerated. And on the other hand equally
little could New Jersey be permitted to require New York to give up its power altogether in order that the river might
come down undiminished. Both States
have real and substantial interests in the River that must be
reconciled as best they may be. 70

Shortages destroy agriculture.

Katz ‘16 [Cheryl Katz; freelance science writer quoting Inge de Graaf, hydrologist at Colorado
School of Mines; Marc Bierkens, a hydrologist at Utrecht University; Jay Famiglietti, leader of the
NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory satellite sensing study; and Thomas Harter, a hydrologist at the
University of California, Davis. Her articles have appeared in National Geographic, Scientific
American, Eos and Hakai Magazine, among other publications, “As Groundwater Dwindles, a
Global Food Shock Looms,” 12/22/2016,
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/groundwater-depletion-global-food-
supply, cc]
Rising temperatures and growing demands for thirsty grains like rice and wheat could drain much
of the world’s groundwater in the next few decades, new research warns.

Nearly half of our food comes from the warm, dry parts of the planet, where excessive
groundwater pumping to irrigate crops is rapidly shrinking the porous underground reservoirs called
aquifers. Vast swaths of India, Pakistan, southern Europe, and the western U nited S tates could face depleted
aquifers by mid-century , a recent study finds—taking a bite out of the food supply and leaving as
many as 1.8 billion people without access to this crucial source of fresh water .
To forecast when and where specific aquifers around the globe might be drained to the point that they’re unusable, Inge de Graaf, a hydrologist at the
Colorado School of Mines in Golden, Colorado, developed a new model simulating regional groundwater dynamics and withdrawals from 1960 to 2100.

She found that California’s agricultural powerhouses —the Central Valley, Tulare Basin, and southern San Joaquin Valley,
which produce a plentiful portion of the nation’s food —could run out of accessible
groundwater as early as the 2030s . India’s Upper Ganges Basin and southern Spain and Italy could be used up between 2040 and
2060. And the southern part of the Ogallala aquifer under Kansas , Oklahoma , Texas , and New
Mexico could be depleted between 2050 and 2070. (Read more about the threat to the southern High Plains.)
“The areas that will run into trouble the soonest are areas where we have a lot of demand and not enough surface water available,” says de Graaf, who
presented her results last week at the American Geophysical Union conference in San Francisco.

Farming has mushroomed across arid regions like these in the past half century . With scarce
rains and few rivers and lakes, they depend on water pumped up from underground . Since 1960, excessive
pumping has already used up enough groundwater worldwide to nearly fill Lake Michigan, estimates de
Graaf, who projects that with climate change and population growth, future groundwater use will soar. She considers an aquifer depleted when its
water level falls below a depth of around 300 feet, at which point it becomes too expensive for most users to pump up.

Shrinking groundwater supplies will dent the world’s food supply , says de Graaf's co-author Marc Bierkens, a
hydrologist at Utrecht University in the Netherlands. Bierkens points out that 40 percent of global food production now
relies on irrigation with groundwater . If the amount of available groundwater were to be cut in half, for example, he estimates
that farm output would drop by roughly 6 percent—reflecting the portion that’s absolutely dependent on unsustainable groundwater use.

“It’s not that the whole population will starve,” says Bierkens, “but it will have an impact on the food chain and food
prices .”
Water Mining

Groundwater depletion affects more than food: It also damages wetlands, makes land sink, and contributes to sea-level rise.

A 2015 study based on satellite observations showed that most of the world’s largest aquifers—21 out of 37—are being drained faster than they can
refill. “A number of studies point to the overuse of groundwater and the tremendous risk that our water and food security are under,” says water
scientist Jay Famiglietti of the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory, who led the satellite study. “The problem is, we don’t know how much groundwater is
left.”

De Graaf’s study begins to address that problem for regional aquifers. In normal conditions, those layers of sand or porous rock are recharged by water
from rain, snow, or streams seeping down through the ground. But recharge can’t keep up with today’s furious pace of pumping, especially in areas
that receive little precipitation.

Agriculture is by far the leading groundwater user , and overexploitation is on the rise . The volume
of groundwater depletion climbed 22 percent in the past decade, with nearly all of it going to watering crops, according to another study presented at
the San Francisco conference.
Fully 20 percent of agricultural irrigation is now unsustainable , University College London researcher Carole Dalin
reported. Nearly half goes to commercial crops of wheat and rice. And Pakistan, India, and the U nited S tates are responsible for
two-thirds of that outsize groundwater use.

Studies like these show how today’s unsustainable practices jeopardize the future of our planet’s
aquifers , says Thomas Harter, a University of California, Davis, hydrologist who studies California’s Central Valley, but was not involved in either
project.

Harter, an expert on sustainable groundwater management, doubts that the Central Valley will run out of groundwater in 2030. Although the region’s
aquifer has been ravaged by decades of rampant pumping—made even worse by the recent statewide drought—conservation can still help save this
vital resource, he says. The state recently passed a groundwater management act requiring local water agencies to devise sustainable use plans, and
giving them the authority to curtail runaway pumping.

“That doesn’t take away from the fact that this is a real threat,” says Harter. “Groundwater is sort of a black box that
everybody dips into . It’s seen as a local resource , but the consequences are global .”

Food insecurity escalates every hotspot – nuclear war.

Castellaw ‘17 [John, Lieutenant General, former President of the non-profit Crockett Policy
Institute, “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,”
https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/9203-opinion-food-security-strategy-is-essential-to-our-
national-security, dml]

The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with
extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power
Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral
out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and
refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government
factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National
Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy.

An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our
National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable
and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability,
unrest, and violence.

Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast
Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by
disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships . Food system shocks from extreme food-
price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled
governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related
to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a
strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth,
broad-based development progress, and long-term stability.

The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge
in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from
American farmers and ranchers. Emerging
markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports
and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom .
Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy.
To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the
entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent
future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability
before it occurs.

This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population
will grow by 2.5
billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the
most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that
the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million
people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the
unemployed in Africa are young people.

Too often these situations deteriorate into shooting wars requiring the deployment of our military forces.
We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national
resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those
who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population.

Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for
those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies
agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and
population well-being.

Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key
regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can
mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic
and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.

Robust empirical backing proves.

Richards et al. 21 [C.E. Richards is with the Department of Engineering, University of
Cambridge; R.C. Lupton is with the Department of Engineering, University of Cambridge, and the
Department of Mechanical Engineering, University of Bath; J.M. Allwood is with the Department
of Engineering, University of Cambridge, “Re-Framing the Threat of Global Warming: An
Empirical Causal Loop Diagram of Climate Change, Food Insecurity and Societal Collapse,”
Climatic Change, vol. 164, no. 3, 02/19/2021, p. 49]

The new empirical evidence base (Section 3, Step I), along with its colour-coded typology (Section 3, Step II), is presented
in Fig. 4. It consists of 41 evidence points, of which 9 examine the natural mortality (i.e. starvation, with respect to
food insecurity), 20 the conflict mortality and 12 the emigration societal collapse proxy, alongside other human
and natural world system factors. We discuss three key aspects of the evidence base, namely temporal and spatial distribution, data-
driven method distribution and advantages of each data-driven methods, below.
Summary and custom colour-coded typology of the new empirical evidence base of climate change, food insecurity and societal
collapse in contemporary society. A full reference list is contained in Supplementary Information (E)

The temporal scale and granularity of study varies across the evidence base; however, our methodology limited the possible scale of
study to the period from 1990 to present, representative of contemporary society. Within this period, approximately half of the
evidence points cover a scale of less than one decade and the other half a scale of greater than one decade. Approximately half of
the evidence points conduct analyses at yearly granularity and the other half conduct analyses at granularity greater than one year,
with only a few studies conducting analyses at monthly granularity. The spatial scale and granularity of study varies across the
evidence base. Approximately one third of the evidence points investigate the system at a global scale, with the remaining two
thirds focusing on regional or national scales, primarily in Africa as well as the Middle East and Asia. Approximately half of the
evidence points analyse the causal pathway at sub-national granularity, with the other half primarily focusing on national-level
granularity. This variation provided different coverage of the complex relationships within the system, which was informative for
constructing our CLD.
The distribution of data-driven methods used across the evidence base is notably different for each societal collapse proxy. Evidence
points for natural mortality mostly use collection/analysis of interview/survey data. This is likely because the minimum daily food
intake for human survival is well established (FAO 2004); as such, statistical analysis of food and mortality data sets would not yield
significantly new insights into thresholds whereas interviews/surveys can provide insight into an individual’s circumstances
influencing this relationship. Evidence points for conflict mortality mostly use statistical
analysis of existing datasets. This
likely reflects the interest in rigorously curated conflict datasets, such as UCDP/PRIO (2019), across the
conflict and peace fields. Evidence points for emigration mostly use collection/analysis of interview/survey data, likely
because this provides nuanced insight into an individual’s decision to migrate. It may also be due to data availability and quality
challenges that limit quantitative statistical analyses, which are being addressed by groups such as IOM GMDAC (2019). Amongst
these data challenges, it is important to recognise the issue of reconciling different types of voluntary and forced migration with
causal drivers, given the complex social, economic and political factors at play; this challenge similarly applies to the other societal
collapse proxies but is particularly noted in the migration studies. We observe from these studies that a food insecurity threshold for
natural mortality is well established but thresholds for conflict mortality and emigration are not. Indeed, distinguishing causal drivers
within datasets and defining quantitative thresholds for these determinants remains a ‘grand challenge’ (Kintigh et al. 2014).

Each data-driven method offers different advantages. The complex systems

models each describe ‘chunks’ of the
system at different scale and granularity. The models provide mathematical definition, are
calibrated to real-world data and enable quantitative simulation of key relationships in the
system. The statistical analyses quantitatively examine relationships between a dependent
variable and one or more independent variables within the system, which can be used as a
mathematical basis for extending modelling capabilities . The collection/analysis of interview/survey data
provides insight into qualitative aspects of human perspective and decision-making that quantitative data sets cannot provide
directly. The data-led case
study/scenarios combine quantitative data with qualitative expert
interpretation to better understand global trends and forecasts. These latter two methods can also be used
to inform the development of modelling capabilities, the scenarios analysed by such models and their application in decision-making
processes. Collectively,
these different data-driven methods can yield useful insights into the
nuances of relationships in the system of interest.
Causal loop diagram of the climate change, food insecurity and societal collapse in contemporary society at global scale and national
granularity

The main result of this paper is the CLD (the f-CLD from Section 3, Step V), presented in Fig. 5. It structures the relationships between
climate change, food insecurity and societal collapse as described in our new empirical evidence base (presented in Fig. 4 and
discussed in Section 4.1.). We discuss three key aspects of the CLD, namely insights related to the spread of empirical evidence, the
qualitative complex system depicted, and quantitative complex system modelling, below, alongside consideration of well-
established benefits and limitations of CLDs.

Causal loop diagram of climate change, food insecurity and societal collapse in contemporary society at global scale and national
granularity. Variables are depicted as nodes in five different shapes, indicating different sub-systems. Links between variables are
depicted as arrowed lines, indicating the direction of the relationship. Each link has a positive (+) or negative (−) notation, indicating
that the two variables change in the same direction or opposite direction, respectively. The density and type of data-driven method
of the empirical evidence base, from which the causal loop diagram was constructed, are depicted by line thickness and colour,
respectively

Our CLD is presented in a novel format that documents the spread of our empirical evidence base. We use line thickness and colour,
respectively, to depict the density and type of the data-driven methods used by the empirical evidence points to analyse a given link
between two variables.

Doing this aids comprehension of where existing work has been focused with respect to the climate
change, food insecurity and societal collapse causal pathway. It may also help with the identification of gaps in
existing analyses. For example, we can see that the link between food insecurity and conflict has been investigated mostly by
evidence points using statistical analyses (blue), whereas the links between food insecurity and migration, and food insecurity and
natural mortality, have been investigated mostly by evidence points using interviews/surveys (green). This hints that it may be useful
to investigate the former using quantitative statistics, and the latter using qualitative interviews/surveys, to gain further insights
offered by the different data-driven methods as described in Section 4.1.
It is important to recognise that our CLD may show negligible density for important links or even be missing important variables
and/or links, either because they have not yet been studied or because our key word search failed to identify evidence points that
have studied them. For example, our study focused on the climate change, food insecurity and societal collapse causal pathway, so
the density of our empirical evidence is concentrated along links central to this pathway; whereas, the links between peripheral
variables in the system, such as between fertility and births, show a lower density of empirical evidence. Similarly, our use of the
population loss set of societal collapse proxies means that the evidence base details natural mortality, conflict mortality and
emigration; whereas, the institutional breakdown set are not detailed. In considering this issue, our methodology attempted to
maximise the rigour and transparency of our study by documenting the spread of our empirical evidence base to help make the
reader aware of exactly how much and what type of evidence was supporting the CLD presented here.

Further, we can see that while empirical studies have linked climate change via food insecurity to our societal collapse proxies of
natural mortality, conflict mortality and emigration, we found no empirical studies linking these proxies to the explicit term of
societal collapse. This was expected given the motivation of this study (Section 1) and is due to the fact that there are no
contemporary events of societal collapse, under the same definition as those in the historical studies pre-dating contemporary
society, that enable these links to be empirically studied (Beard et al. 2020).

Having considered the spread of empirical evidence, we now consider the complex system documented. A key benefit of CLDs is that
they simply present a myriad of information in a single diagram; in doing so, CLDs enable comprehension of the structure and
behaviour of complex systems, including feedbacks, intervention points and far-reaching interdependencies (Sterman 2011). Our
CLD visually depicts a system of 39 variables, 105 links and 32,000 feedback loops,Footnote1 integrating information from different
fields including climate science, food security, conflict, migration and health research.

Walking through the CLD at a high-level, we can see how population growth and lifestyle emissions, influenced by
institutional/demographic factors (e.g. emission reduction incentives), combine to directly drive climate change. Similarly, they
indirectly drive climate change via consumer demand on food production, which produces emissions directly (e.g.
ruminant livestock) and indirectly via industrial capital/output (e.g. processing factories). The environmental risk factors (e.g.
extreme weather events) of climate change may cause losses of food production either directly (e.g. plant disease) or
indirectly via agricultural input availability (e.g. loss of water source for irrigation). A country’s food availability is influenced by
domestic food production and international food trade. Food accessibility is influenced by its food price, which responds to domestic
(e.g. cost of food production and distribution) and international (e.g. international food price) markets, and
institutional/demographic factors (e.g. food subsidies). Food utilization is influenced by infrastructure/services (e.g. education) and
institutional/demographic factors (e.g. cultural traditions). Food insecurity is underpinned by these three pillars of food availability,
food accessibility and food utilization. For a given country, food insecurity can drive natural mortality (i.e. starvation), conflict and
migration, contributing to population loss, as well as economic shocks and socio-political instability, contributing to institutional
breakdown, which exacerbates the risk of societal collapse.

Beyond a given country suffering increased natural mortality, famines (i.e. food insecurity) can
place pressure on
international humanitarian efforts (i.e. institutional risk factors). Conflict may occur domestically or
internationally and can feedback to exacerbate food insecurity and institutional fragility (i.e.
institutional risk factors). Potential mass emigration can increase pressure on food availability, natural
resources and infrastructure/services in the destination nation, which can lead to socio-cultural
tensions (i.e. institutional risk factors) that fuel conflict. Food insecurity can also directly contribute to
institutional risk factors such as social unrest, political instability and economic inequality, which increase
the risk of societal collapse due to institutional breakdown, that may also cascade internationally. While
already fragile states are expected to be hit the worst directly, these insights reveal the indirect ramifications of climate change on
our globalised society (Kemp 2020), with serious consequences for humanity’s ‘existential security’ (Sears
2020).

While some of these relationships may appear obvious, it is the act of bringing this information ,
which may otherwise be siloed and thus preventing consideration of the full story, together in one place that is of value
(Sterman 2011). In doing so, our CLD attempts to provide readers with the opportunity to explore the climate
change, food insecurity and societal collapse causal pathway, consider worst-case scenarios that we want to
avoid, develop transformative narratives of “where we want to go” and think about
interventions that may help us attain this desired future (Hinkel et al. 2020).
The impact is linear – supply tightening now spikes the risk of conflict, and
markets are stabilizing slowly from Ukraine and COVID.
Laborde et al. ‘4/12 [Joseph, David; Senior Research Fellows with IFPRI's Markets, Trade,
and Institutions Division; 4-12-2022; "Do No Harm: Measured policy responses are key to
addressing food security impacts of the Ukraine crisis", INTERNATIONAL FOOD POLICY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE; https://www.ifpri.org/blog/do-no-harm-measured-policy-responses-are-
key-addressing-food-security-impacts-ukraine-crisis, accessed 4-20-2022; RG]

Even before the crisis, agricultural commodity supplies were tight and market prices were at (nominal)
record levels. Prices for most grains and oilseeds (figure 1) have risen sharply since the war began in late
February. Russia and Ukraine together supply about 12% of global agricultural exports on a caloric basis,
and over 30% of global wheat exports. The two countries command even higher shares in the wheat-dependent economies of the
Middle East and North Africa, where wheat prices have risen over 30% compared to pre-war levels. Fertilizer and energy markets
have seen rising prices and supply disruptions as well.

Figure 1

Chart: David Laborde Source: IFPRI based on CBOT quotation and US Bureau of Labor statistics

Given the potential food security impacts, particularly for the most vulnerable, many countries
face difficult decisions. What approaches are best to limit impacts on the poor, maintain food
availability, and cushion the blow of rising global prices —and what should be avoided?

In the short term, the primary message to policymakers should be "do no harm." Countries should
refrain from enacting policies that could exacerbate price volatility and global shortages, or
take precipitous actions that risk creating far more detrimental impacts in the long term. In particular,
the price spikes of 2007/08 and 2010/11 and the more recent experience of the COVID
pandemic have shown that policies designed to insulate domestic markets from external disruptions can have
serious adverse consequences for others, particularly the most vulnerable.

Groundwater overuse destroys wetlands.

USGS ’18 [U.S. Geological Survey, Water Science School; scientific agency of the United
States government to study the landscape of the United States, its natural resources, and the
natural hazards that threaten it; 6-6-2018; "Groundwater Decline and Depletion", USGS.gov;
https://www.usgs.gov/special-topics/water-science-school/science/groundwater-decline-
and-depletion, accessed 4-12-2022; RG]
Groundwater pumping can alter how water moves between an aquifer and a stream, lake, or
wetland by either intercepting groundwater flow that discharges into the surface-water
body under natural conditions, or by increasing the rate of water movement from the surface-water body into an aquifer. A
related effect of groundwater pumping is the lowering of groundwater levels below the
depth that streamside or wetland vegetation needs to survive. The overall effect is a loss of
riparian vegetation and wildlife habitat.

Decreased wetlands create dead zones.

Moser ’19 (Kelly Moser, 19 – senior attorney for the Southern Environmental Law Center; letter submitted on behalf of
40 environmental organizations, Re: Revised Definition of Waters of the United States Docket No. EPA-HQ-OW-2018-0149,
4/15, https://www.southernenvironment.org/uploads/words_docs/SELC_Replacement_Rule_Comments.pdf //DH)

2. Lossof protections over wetlands guarantees downstream pollution, more flooding, and
the loss of fisheries. Wetlands would be particularly hard hit by this proposal . The agencies have
proposed to limit jurisdiction to those wetlands that directly touch a jurisdictional stream or river or have a surface water
connection to a covered stream or river. Because wetland jurisdiction is also dependent on streams, loss of stream jurisdiction
would make wetland losses even more extreme. Estimates show that most of the 110 million acres of wetlands
across the contiguous United States could lose protection under the extreme limits in this proposal.419
At-risk wetlands provide essential functions such as improving water quality, recharging
groundwater, augmenting low flow for nearby streams, storing floodwater, and providing
habitat for threatened and endangered aquatic species, such as amphibians. Wetlands often
provide these benefits because they lack permanent surface water, a characteristic that
would eliminate existing protections under the proposed rule.420 Moreover, more distant
wetlands—unprotected under this proposal—can have higher connectivity than wetlands that are
closer to downstream waters due to variability in factors such as topography, slope, and soil
permeability. For example, in the prairie pothole region, an area dominated by flat, open basins and lakes, small changes
in surface-water levels can consolidate wetlands that were previously disconnected by distances more than 1 km; these
wetlands connect to one another first, forming wetland complexes, prior to connecting to a stream channel.421 Should the
agencies impose a limit on the distance beyond which wetlands would no longer be jurisdictional, they would ignore the
connectivity of wetlands to each other and to downstream waters. Unless the agencies protect all wetlands within a “complex
of wetlands,” they effectively are not protecting any.422 As EPA has acknowledged: “ If
wetlands are destroyed or
damaged, it can be difficult or impossible to replace all of these functions.”423 The agencies’
misguided proposal could result in the loss of over 50 percent of our Nation’s wetlands .
Unregulated and uncontrolled destruction of wetlands would adversely affect water quality
and flood control for the rivers and streams downstream, and would destroy valuable fish
and wildlife habitat.424 In the absence of wetlands, increased levels of agricultural run-off
and other pollutant-saturated wastewater make their way directly into tributaries and then
into larger downstream waters, including rivers, lakes, and estuaries. The effects of nutrient pollution
can be devastating. A striking example is where nutrient-rich runoff from the Mississippi
River has caused the Gulf of Mexico’s “dead zone,” a vast oxygen-depleted area that damages
biodiversity and commercial fisheries, with major economic and social costs.425 According to EPA, over 166 dead zones have
been documented nationwide, affecting waterbodies like the Chesapeake Bay.426 Pocosins, Carolina bays, and similar
wetlands, are all at-risk under the agencies’ proposal, as are the biologically diverse species that depend on them. Out of the
total of 274 atrisk plant and animal species supported by non-floodplain wetlands, 35 percent are not known to be supported
by any other type of habitat. 427 Additionally, 86 plant and animal species that have been identified as “threatened,”
“endangered,” or candidates for listing under the Endangered Species Act are found in non-floodplain wetland habitats,428
including the endangered Venus flytrap. Finally, the
revised exclusion for prior converted cropland
creates a significant loophole that allows the development or further degradation of these
converted wetlands without obtaining a 404 permit. Under the proposed rule, the only way for prior
converted cropland to lose its status as an excluded water under the Act is when the area is abandoned (i.e., not in the
previous five years “used for, or in support of, agricultural purposes”429) and has reverted to a wetland meeting the
regulatory definition of “wetlands.”430 That means, according to the agencies, the “majority” of these converted wetlands
would never regain protection, even after abandoned, because of their “altered nature.”431 That this
provision opens
the door for development of these converted wetlands without a 404 permit is signaled by the
fact that the National Association of Realtors lists “Discussions with the Environmental Protection Agency regarding the
Waters of the U.S. (WOTUS) rule and the prior converted cropland exclusion” as one if its key lobbying interests for 2019.432
The agencies must disclose and address the impacts of this proposed change and what it means for the integrity of the Nation’s
waters.

The Gulf of Mexico is key, reductions in runoff are sufficient.

LSU 18 ScienceDaily, Study by Louisiana State University, Gulf of Mexico 'dead zone'
forecasted to exceed the size of Connecticut, 2018,
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/06/180607120724.htm
Scientists have predicted the dead zone, or area with little to no oxygen in the northern Gulf of Mexico,
will become larger than the state of Connecticut by the end of July. The dead zone will cover about
6,620 square miles of the bottom of the continental shelf off Louisiana and Texas. While there
are more than 500 dead zones around the world, the northern Gulf of Mexico dead zone is the second
largest human-caused coastal hypoxic area in the world. Although this forecast has been the average size for the
past 31 years, it is about three and a half times larger than the goal outlined by the Hypoxia Action Plan,
which is about 1,930 square miles. Efforts to reduce the nitrate loading have not yet demonstrated success at the watershed scale.
Every year LSU Department of Oceanography & Coastal Sciences professors and Louisiana Universities Marine Consortium
scientists Nancy Rabalais and Eugene Turner conduct a research cruise to measure the dead zone, which has little or
no oxygen in the bottom waters. Turner and Rabalais then use these data in their computer models to predict its size in the
summer. The new report and forecast will be available June 7. "The oceans warm a little more each year and currents change,
making new observations a necessity. Model calibration is not a fixed phenomenon," Turner said. Nutrients from the
Mississippi River watershed, particularly nitrogen and phosphorus, fertilize the Gulf of
Mexico's surface waters to create excessive amounts of algae. When the algae decomposes in the
deepest parts of the ocean, it leads to oxygen distress and can even kill organisms in the Gulf of Mexico's
richest waters. These low oxygen conditions threaten living resources including fish, shrimp and
crabs, which humans depend upon for food and industry. "This means that the impacts of water quality
changes upstream in the Midwest affect our coast -- directly," Rabalais said. The dead zone
occurs year-round, but it is most persistent and severe in spring and summer. Various computer models use
the May nitrogen load of the Mississippi River as the main driving force to predict the
size of this hypoxic zone in late July. If a storm occurs, then the size of the dead zone is predicted to be reduced to
about 6,316 square miles. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration uses the results from the LSU scientists'
computer models as well as several other models to generate its forecast, which is about 5,830 square miles.

There’s scientific consensus that we’re headed for extinction.

Brannen 18 Peter Brannen, citing numerous scientists, science writer for the NYT and
WaPo, When a Killer Climate Catastrophe Struck the World's Oceans, December 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/12/oxygen-loss-during-mass-
extinction/577537/
When the ocean loses its oxygen, it’s something of a great leveler compared with other
hypothesized mass-extinction mechanisms. Ocean acidification, for instance (what happens
when too much CO2 reacts with seawater), has previously been proposed as the great killer of the
end-Permian. But while acidification can have a surprisingly variable effect on the survival of
different kinds of sea life, there is hardly any selectivity at all when oxygen disappears
from an ecosystem. Everyone dies, matching the near-universal signal of slaughter in the
ancient ocean. “This study suggests we should be worrying much more about hypoxia
than about ocean acidification,” Deutsch says. “There’s vastly more resources being put into [studying]
organisms’ responses to pH in seawater than there is into understanding temperature-dependent hypoxia. I think that the field
has basically allocated those resources in exactly the wrong way.” The
modern oceans have already lost 2
percent of their oxygen since 1960, a remarkable loss driven mostly by coastal
nutrient pollution and global warming. It’s an environmental problem that promises to worsen
in the warmer world of the coming centuries, just like it did in the end-Permian. And if Earth’s past is
any indication of its future, this asphyxiation could be truly world changing. The prospect
has led dozens of paleoclimatologists, geochemists, and oceanographers to sign the
Kiel Declaration on Ocean Deoxygenation, developed this September to raise global awareness of a
problem with increasingly worrying geological precedent. “This study shows that we’re on
that same road toward extinction, and the question is how far down it we go,” Penn says.

The Court’s upcoming apportionment in Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado is a

window of opportunity.
Prokop ’21 (Danielle Prokop; journalist for El Paso Matters; 8-31-2021; "Catch up on the big Supreme Court water case
involving Texas and New Mexico"; Source NM; https://sourcenm.com/2021/08/31/catch-up-on-the-big-supreme-court-water-case-
involving-texas-and-new-mexico/; Accessed 12-25-2021; RD)

The Rio Grande supplies water to millions of people and wildlife along its shores in Colorado, New
Mexico, Texas and Mexico. Nearly 80% of its water is used in agriculture , but it’s also a major source of water for
cities like Albuquerque and El Paso. An 8-year-old U.S. Supreme Court fight between Texas and New
Mexico over water from the Rio Grande will go to trial in the next couple of months, Special Master
Michael Melloy ruled on Aug. 27. Lawyers representing Texas filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court against New Mexico and Colorado
in 2013, alleging that New Mexico violated the agreement the states made about Rio Grande water and took
more than its fair share. An acre-foot is a measurement of water equivalent to about 325,851 gallons. New Mexico
farmers’ pump groundwater, using wells hydrologically connected to the Rio Grande south of
Elephant Butte, according to the complaint, and they cut into the amount Texas is entitled to by “tens of
thousands” of acre-feet each year. Texas called on the Supreme Court to order New Mexico to pay back the debt in cash
for water owed over decades — a judgment which could top $1 billion. If New Mexico loses, that might also curtail
groundwater pumping and jeopardize some Southern New Mexicans’ water rights. Colorado is named as a defendant only
because it is a signatory on the Rio Grande Compact. What is the Rio Grande Compact The compact was ratified by all three states
and Congress 82 years ago in 1939. It lays out how much water each state gets. Colorado is required to deliver the water to the state
line. New Mexico is to deliver the water into Elephant Butte Reservoir, where the water stored there is used for irrigation districts in
New Mexico and Texas. New
Mexico sends an allocation 120 miles downstream to Texas, which then
provides Mexico its share of Rio Grande water. Who will decide? The case is solely before the U.S.
Supreme Court instead of being heard first in lower courts because it involves two states and a dispute over water. Reed
Benson, a law professor at the University of New Mexico with decades of experience in water management, said the Supreme Court
uses “special masters” to conduct extensive research, establish a record and make recommendations to the court in these water
management cases. “The Supreme Court is not set up to hold trials,” Benson said. “So, they need special masters to essentially play
the role of a trial judge to tee up an interstate water dispute for the Supreme Court.” Michael Melloy Special Master Michael Melloy
Special Master Melloy is a senior appellate judge for the 8th U.S. Circuit Court based in Cedar Rapids, Iowa. He was appointed to this
case in 2018, after the U.S. Supreme Court discharged Gregory Grimsal, a New Orleans-based attorney, without explanation. Unlike a
trial judge however, the special master does not make decisions but only advises the court. “The special master conducts the
proceedings, but he can’t actually decide anything. Only the Supreme Court itself has the power to decide these cases,” Benson said.
After the trial, the special master will file a report, which will be open to responses from the parties involved. Once the report and all
the replies are submitted — if there’s no settlement — the parties would eventually present oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme
Court and await its decision. Benson said even without the uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic, that process takes a lot of time.
“It is very difficult to predict when that report might be issued,” he said. “These cases tend to lend themselves to a lot of delays.”
Water in the desert This isn’t the first fight New Mexico and Texas had over the Rio Grande. The
Supreme Court case
originates from a deal hammered out between two irrigation districts and the federal
government during the drought of the early 2000s. Elephant Butte Irrigation District and El Paso County Water Improvement
District No. 1 agreed to share water throughout the drought. In 2008, the two irrigation districts entered into an agreement with the
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. Neither Texas nor New Mexico were parties to the agreement. The 2008 operating agreement was the
subject of a 2011 federal District Court lawsuit that then-New Mexico Attorney General Gary King brought against Texas. King
alleged the agreement gave too much water to Texas and shorted New Mexico. Two years later, Texas filed the lawsuit in the
Supreme Court, which agreed to take up the case in 2014, and granted New Mexico the opportunity to file a motion to dismiss the
case. Attorneys for New Mexico filed for a dismissal, denying the claims. Water marks are visible on the rock formation that gave
Elephant Butte its name. Years of drought have greatly lowered water levels. (Corrie Boudreaux/El Paso Matters) In 2014, the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation, the federal agency that operates reservoirs and built Elephant Butte as part of the Rio Grande Project, asked
to intervene in the lawsuit. The federal agency sided with Texas, claiming New Mexico’s groundwater activity
depleted water, both threatening the United States’ ability to fulfill the treaty obligation to
Mexico and harming the agency’s ability to deliver water to irrigation districts. Grimsal, the then-special master, finalized his first
report in 2016, recommending the court reject New Mexico’s motion for dismissal, allow the federal government to join the lawsuit
and reject irrigation districts joining as members to the suit. In March 2018, the
U.S. Supreme Court issued a
unanimous opinion granting the federal agency’s request to be party to the lawsuit, and rejected New Mexico’s
motion for dismissal and the irrigation district’s request to participate. The court’s opinion, written by Justice Neil
Gorsuch, was limited to arguing who could participate — not the finer points of each party’s arguments . After
the decision, New Mexico filed counterclaims in 2018 against Texas and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. New Mexico attorneys said
the federal government failed to allocate water fairly and alleged accounting issues about water allocations for Texas and Mexico.
New Mexico alleged Texas’ groundwater pumping allowed Texas to take more surface water than its share and violated the
compact. New Mexico also said Texas’ pumping requires greater releases from the Rio Grande to offset their groundwater use,
causing indirect harm. New Mexico asked the court to award damages. In an unusual order in April 2020, Melloy summed up his
understanding of the case’s complexities, and what issues he thought would be determined at trial. They included: state
laws governing water are inapplicable to the case; the exact amounts of river water each state should get ;
how much has groundwater development impacted the Rio Grande deliveries in the past or
present; and how much water New Mexico can and cannot capture downstream of Elephant
Butte Dam. What happens now? In an Aug. 19 filing, the Texas Attorney General’s Office wrote that the lead counsel for Texas,
Stuart Somach, had an “unexpected, personal family emergency,” preventing him from attending the trial over several months. The
office asked for the start date to be pushed back to March 2022, allowing Somach to attend in person or prepare another attorney.
The office also wrote “considering the COVID-19 protocols discussed for in-person trial, additional time may provide better
conditions for trial presentation.” Attorneys representing New Mexico objected to the delay, saying other attorneys representing
Texas could fill in. They also cited costs and scheduling issues they would incur if the trial’s start date were pushed back. Special
Master Melloy ruled Friday, Aug. 27, to split the trial in half, and it will include testimony from a list of witnesses that have
yet to be selected by the parties. He decided the trial will be pushed back but only by a few weeks. It will be a virtual trial
with testimony from a list of witnesses that have yet to be selected by the parties. The second half of the trial , with in-
person testimony from experts on the technical aspects of the case, will take place in the spring, in Cedar Rapids, Iowa.
Melloy described the compromise as “splitting the baby a little bit,” because both parties would have to show pieces of their case to
their opponents. “I do think we could separate out the issues in a way that we could, over the next two or three months, get a
number of weeks of testimony concluded this fall and leave the more complex testimony for the spring,” Melloy said. The changes
will also address worries over the increase of COVID-19 cases, Melloy said, because it would allow for witnesses concerned about
the nationwide rise in infections to testify virtually. Melloy said he would determine a date for the virtual portion of the trial at a
hearing this week on Thursday, Sept. 2. Benson said it’s
typical for U.S. Supreme Court cases, especially water
disputes with their technical issues, to drag out over years. “If this case doesn’t settle, then this
litigation is certainly going to go on, many years into the future,” Benson said. “I would anticipate anyway,
that this case could still have quite a ways to go.”
Bifurcating the litigation process codifies a significant harm analysis to
reconfigure equitable apportionment and minimize technicalities in judicial
adjudication.
Nelson ‘20 [Bernadette R; J.D. Candidate, The University of Iowa College of Law; B.S.,
Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service; 2020; “Muddy Water Blues: How the
Murky Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment Should Be Refined”; Iowa Law Review, Vol.
L05:1827, page 1851-1855; downloaded 8-9-2021; RG]

The junctions at each point in the litigation process would first provide an organizational structure to
manage what is typically very lengthy, technical litigation. Additionally, the bifurcation of issues would provide parties
with the opportunity to manage discrete issues at play in large-scale conflicts. For example, parties may
find some aspects of the conflict amenable to interstate compact or some aspects more amenable to
judicial apportionment. Finally, the bifurcated system would provide the Court with opportunities to
apply different standards and different balance of harms analyses depending upon the unique factual circumstances
of the conflict. Overall, the bifurcation system would create smaller pieces for the Court to bite off rather
than forcing it to tackle all the components of a water issue at once in order to prevent the creation of
confusing precedent. This system would have the added bonus of providing clarity about each
unique case before the Court rather than lumping all interstate water conflicts together as one conflict
type.

The proceedings in this

proposed solution would be broken into two components . The first part of the
bifurcated litigation would demand parties demonstrate which type of interstate water conflict the
dispute is about. The conflict-type question would require the parties to establish the conflict was
either (a) a prior-use conflict type, where both states already used a common water source or (b) a new-use conflict
type, where one state used a common water source and the second state wanted access (like that in Colorado v. New Mexico). In
addition, the conflict-type part of the litigation would provide parties with the opportunity to illustrate for the Special Master and
the Court the technical components of the water-use involved in the conflict as part of the demonstration of the conflict type. The
parties would present their arguments to the appointed Special Master, who would in turn, present his or her recommendation to
the Court, at which point the Court would confirm the conflict type. Additionally, at this point in the litigation process the Court
could certify to the parties particular questions or elements of fact pertaining to the nuanced technical elements of the case that it
could anticipate requiring at the second stage of the litigation.

In part two of the litigation process, the parties would present the balance of harms argument to the
Special Master who would in turn submit his or her recommendation to the Court. The balance of harms argument
would invariably include arguments pertaining to the waste and beneficial use of the water. At this
juncture, the Court would adopt Justice O'Connor's waste test in order to provide sufficient structural
guidance for parties to build their arguments. Additionally, the adoption of Justice O'Connor's test would give the
Court more objective, law driven factors with which to make their determinations. At this point in the
litigation, the Court would have the opportunity to post additional requests or questions for findings of fact to the Special Master.
The parties would present their responses to the Special Master, who would submit a final report to the Court at which point the
Court would hand down the final order regarding the equitable apportionment of the common waterway.

In concert with the conflict-type determination would be the determination of the evidentiary
bar the Court would require from parties at the balance of harms stage of the litigation. For example, if the conflict was
determined to be a new-use conflict, then the Colorado v. New Mexico requirement of a clear and convincing demonstration of the
proposed-use benefit would guide the parties in their argument and the Court in its decision. Alternatively, if the Court determined
the conflict was a prior-use conflict, the emphasis would be on the balance of harms and factors to demonstrate how the change to
the prior use would affect the water source and both users.
When a state desires to divert water from an interstate stream from which it has not used water before, but
from which a neighboring state does withdraw water , the rigorous evidentiary standard for
demonstrating a benefit rises to meet the tough balance of harms equation the Court must produce in
creating an equitable apportionment. As the Court noted in the second Colorado v. New Mexico case, "a proposed diverter should
bear most, though not all, of the risks" because a new diversion could cause serious problems for senior users.'50
This statement rings true because the new diverter is adding a completely new strain on the water system and
should bear the burden of proof that such a strain more greatly benefits it than the previous users in the neighboring
state. Similarly, in a prior-use conflict the need for such a strong showing of benefit is not as critical because the parties have already
been using the common water source, and the change to the status quo will not be as striking as adding a new user to a water
system.

The conflict-type determination has the dual benefit of (a) streamlining the focus and
technicalities of the litigation and (b) eliminating the confusion regarding the evidentiary demonstration.
Clarifying the type of water conflict prior to the balance of harms analysis has two major
benefits to the parties and two benefits to the Court . For the parties, it provides the evidentiary
bar they must maintain, and it narrows the focus of the final part of the litigation to the heart of the equitable
apportionment doctrine: the balance of harms analysis. For the Court, determining the water conflict type
provides them with a first instance to understand the context , technicalities and general issues of the
interstate water conflict. The conflict-type litigation allows the Court to gain a sense of the case prior to making the balance of
harms decision. Because interstate water conflicts are technical and involved, the first look at the issue is an opportunity for the
Court to get acquainted with the nuances of the case. Secondly, clarifying the conflict type guides the Court's decision regarding the
evidentiary bar it will require in the second part of the litigation.

In the second part of the bifurcated proceedings the Court would turn its focus to the balance of
harms analysis, which is the core of the equitable apportionment doctrine. Currently, the Court uses the
elements listed in Nebraska v. Wyoming and balances the harms against the benefits. This long entrenched
analytical framework would not be altered by this proposed solution. Rather, the focused setting
of the balance of harms litigation juncture would provide the Court the opportunity to solely focus on
balancing the harms and benefits of waterways, and it would allow a stronger discussion about the balancing
analysis by eliminating confusing technicalities and streamlining the focus of the litigation .

In addition to the traditional Nebraska factors, which emphasize the negative effects to both parties
from a change to the waterway use, the Court should consider a final component to the balance of harms analysis. This
component would be a same-variable balancing equation that broke variables into factor-buckets including: (1) economic
harms and benefits; (2) environmental harms and benefits; and (3) human harms and benefits. In each
bucket the advantages and disadvantages for each party would be analyzed equally from both perspectives of the
dispute. The equation would compare the benefits of the status quo to the benefits of the
proposed change, and the status quo harms with the harms resulting from the change to the
status quo. Currently, in order to assess how the change to the stream will positively and negatively affect the conflicting states,
the Court balances the benefits of the diversion for the diverting state against the harms of the diversion to the non-
diverting state. Although this analysis is in line with the equitable apportionment precedent and the Court's historical system of
analyses in balancing factor tests, in contemporary water conflicts, this balancing equation alone fails to take into account many
specifics of how critical a certain amount of water may be to either state. By rounding out the equation with a same-variable
balancing test, the Court would ensure that the same factors are properly weighed against one another in
making, what could be, an acute change to the distribution of a common waterway.

For example, had the Court applied the proposed same-variable balancing test in New Jersey v. New York it
would have compared the benefit for New Jersey of maintaining the status quo (i.e., New Jersey would not have to alter any of its
use because it would have access to the same amount of water) to the benefit for New York in having access to this water (i.e.,
drinking water for the city and people of New York). Then it would have compared the harm to New Jersey by altering the status quo
(i.e., less water for New Jersey citizens and likely an alteration in New Jersey regarding its water use) against the harm to New York
of not changing the status quo (i.e., lack of drinking water for the city and people of New York). The
court could have also
included the pollution component as a weighted factor in the environmental factor-bucket .
The same-variable test would be done in conjunction with the balance of harms analysis to understand more fully the benefits of the
proposed water use change. It would create a more nuanced balancing test that takes into account the
myriad of interests at play in interstate water conflicts . Populations are growing, climatic
conditions are changing, and water resources are becoming increasingly critical for maintenance
and continued development of urban and rural areas, so an articulation of balancing factors that takes into
account as many perspectives as possible is essential to adequately account for the various interests at stake in an
interstate water conflict.
 1AC – International Water Law
Advantage two is international water law [IWL] –
Its significant harm principle guides the resolution of freshwater disputes.
Meshel ’20 [Tamar; Assistant Professor, University of Alberta Faculty of Law; Winter 2020;
"Swimming Against the Current: Revisiting the Principles of International Water Law in the
Resolution of Fresh Water Disputes", Volume 61, Number 1;
https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/61.1-Meshel.pdf, accessed 9-5-2021; RG]

In the context of international fresh water resources, the due diligence standard of the no
significant harm principle requires states to “take all appropriate measures to prevent the causing of
significant harm to other watercourse States .”180 Diligent conduct to prevent or minimize such harm in this context
takes into account generally accepted global and/or regional standards, the magnitude of the harm, as well as the capabilities of the
state concerned.181 The UNECE Water Convention further provides that in carrying out their due diligence obligations, states
must use “best available technology” and “best environmental practices,” define “water-quality objectives,”
and adopt “water-quality criteria.”182 Thus, due diligence entails not only consultation and negotiation, but also

the adoption of appropriate rules and measures . . . [and] a certain level of vigilance in their
enforcement and the exercise of administrative control applicable to public and private operators, such as the monitoring
of activities undertaken by such operators, to safeguard the rights of the other party.183

Viewed in this way, the due diligence nature of no significant harm clarifies , first, that this principle
does not serve as a rigid blanket prohibition of all harm, but rather as a more flexible rule184 intended
to enable states to prevent significant harm by requiring them to take concrete steps in accordance with a basic standard of
conduct.185 Such requirement is necessary since “[a] state wishing to do that which will affect an international watercourse cannot
decide whether another state’s interests will be affected.”186 Second, the
no significant harm principle satisfies, to
some extent, the goal of the equitable and reasonable utilization principle —to achieve reasonable
use of shared fresh water resources.187 However, this “reasonableness” of the no significant harm principle
is couched in objectively assessable criteria of “harm” and “due diligence” obligations. These criteria
provide states with reciprocal commitments and a common language that can guide them in
the resolution of fresh water disputes.

In addition to its due diligence nature, the

ability of the no significant harm principle to objectively balance
states’ competing interests in the use of shared fresh water resources further supports its treatment as a
guiding principle in the resolution of interstate fresh water disputes. In contrast to a widespread
misperception of this principle, it is not designed to unilaterally protect against significant harm caused to a state’s (usually located
downstream) prior uses by the new activities of another state (usually located upstream). Rather, the no significant harm
principle is aimed at striking a balance between one state’s development possibilities and another
state’s existing uses, regardless of geographic location.188 It is able to achieve such a balance, moreover, by
focusing on the mutual goal of avoiding the greater harm.

But it’s obscured by contradictory interpretations.

Meshel ’20 [Tamar; Assistant Professor, University of Alberta Faculty of Law; Winter 2020;
"Swimming Against the Current: Revisiting the Principles of International Water Law in the
Resolution of Fresh Water Disputes", Volume 61, Number 1;
https://harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/15/61.1-Meshel.pdf, accessed 9-5-2021; RG]
Whereas in the early days of international water law no significant harm was considered the
leading principle, it is now predominantly seen as either subordinate to the equitable and reasonable
utilization principle or equal to it. Partially driving this shift are perceptions of equitable and reasonable
utilization as the more flexible and fair principle, as well as misperceptions of the no significant harm
principle as designed to unilaterally and unconditionally protect prior uses, or as relevant only to
issues of water quality, such as pollution, rather than to issues of water quantity, such as allocation and use. The
position that equitable and reasonable utilization should serve as the leading principle of international water law is reflected in the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (“UNWC”)26 and in some
decisions of the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).27 Other international instruments28 and some commentators29 consider the
two principles as complementary.

Despite these efforts to clarify the relationship between no significant harm and equitable and reasonable utilization, the
two
principles continue to be susceptible to contradictory interpretations. As a result, their practical
application in the resolution of interstate fresh water disputes remains uncertain and confused.
Indeed, states sharing fresh water resources frequently exhibit a “weak understanding” of these principles, “leading to difficulties in
executing” them.30 This is evident, for instance, in the GERD dispute described above. As is frequently the case in disputes between
upstream and downstream states, the upstream state (in this case Ethiopia) claims an equitable and reasonable right to build the
GERD, while the downstream state (in this case Egypt) maintains its right to be free from significant harm that it claims would be
caused to it by the dam. The potential for the no significant harm and equitable and reasonable utilization principles in their current
formulation to effectively guide the resolution of this, and other, interstate fresh water disputes is therefore questionable.31

Absent clarification, states default to unsuccessful arbitration.

McIntyre ’20 [Owen McIntyre; Professor of Law at University of College Cork, Cork, Ireland; 9-
9-2020; “The current state of development of the no significant harm principle: How far have we
come?”; Cork Open Research Archive;
https://cora.ucc.ie/bitstream/handle/10468/10575/Schmeier_-
_The_Current_State_of_Development_of_the_No_Significant_Harm_Principle_-
_Intl_Env_Agreements_-_short_draft.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; Accessed 2/12/22; JW]

Despite universal support in judicial deliberation and in the treaty and declarative practice of States,
however, the no-harm rule tends to be formulated in a rather general manner, so that its legal and

practical implications for States in seeking to comply with the requirements of international environmental
and natural resources law have remained somewhat unclear. In the specific context of international

watercourses, articulations of the principle tend to be vague regarding its precise normative
requirements for watercourse States in the utilisation and environmental protection of shared
waters and associated aquatic ecosystems (Handl, 1975). In particular, international treaty instruments
provide little guidance as to the nature or extent of the due diligence obligations that they impose upon basin
States, or as to the precise categories of harm covered by the no-harm rule. It is telling that formal findings of
State responsibility are something of a rarity in cases of harm to the sovereign interests of watercourse States, or to transboundary watercourse
systems, despite the fact that such harm tends to produce immediate and obvious effects and to allow relatively easy identification of the State that is
the source of such harm. In fact, it appears that uncertainty regarding the precise normative implications of the key
substantive rules
and principles of international water law, including the ‘no harm’ rule , has led
disputing States to seek to rely upon alternative legal means for the resolution of water-related
disputes (McIntyre, 2018). These have included the negotiation of ad hoc inter-State settlement arrangements, reliance
upon compliance mechanisms established under international water resources agreements or
multilateral environmental agreements, or the establishment of specialised treaty-based civil liability
regimes for certain classes of hazardous activity. Nevertheless, such initiatives have had very limited success in
addressing what is likely in the near future to become an increasingly common source of inter-
State disagreement.
Supreme Court adoption of the significant harms test can affirm a new model
for international water law.
Tarlock ’10 [Dan; LL.B Stanford Law School, Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent
College of Law, UNESCO Centre for Water Law, Science and Policy; 2010; “Four Challenges for
International Water Law”; TULANE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL; Vol. 23:369; pages 375-
376; downloaded 9-17-2021; recut-RG]

International water law is said to be derived from United States Supreme Court jurisprudence.28
Article III of the United States Constitution gives the Supreme Court the power to hear water
disputes among the states because they cannot make war against each other.29 When the Supreme Court
decided it would use its original jurisdiction to apportion interstate streams, ironically, it relied on the
international rule that all states are of equal dignity to support the principle that all riparian states are entitled to an equitable
apportionment of an interstate river.30 Whatever the source of the original principle, international
water law used the
concept of equitable apportionment to provide the legal basis to constrain unilateral action,
positing that all states are entitled to make equitable and reasonable utilization of international rivers.
Equitable apportionment rejects the argument frequently asserted by headwaters nations that they have the privilege to use all the
water which originates within their territory. It equally rejects the argument of downstream states that they are entitled to the
natural or unaltered flow of an international river.31

New precedents are taken as a guide.

Meshel ’22 [Tamar; Assistant Professor, University of Alberta Faculty of Law; 2-5-2022; "The
Harmon Doctrine is Dead, Long Live the Harmon Doctrine!", Virginia Journal of International
Law, Vol. 63, No. 1, 2022; https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4034984,
accessed 3-26-2022; RG]

Nonetheless, when resolving transboundary water disputes the Supreme Court is “working out
rules of law for problems in economics and politics not unsimilar to those found in international law.” 30 Moreover,
useful parallels may be drawn between interstate water disputes in the U nited States and
internationally because the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this area has both drawn from
international law31 and guided it.32

—Footnote 32—

32 Trail Smelter Arbitral Decision, 35 AM. J. INT’L L. 684, 714 (1941) (noting that with respect to “both air pollution
and water pollution, [there are] certain decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States which
may legitimately be taken as a guide in this field of international law, for it is reasonable to follow by
analogy, in international cases, precedents established by that court in dealing with controversies
between States of the Union or with other controversies concerning the quasi-sovereign rights of such States.”).
See also, MCCAFFREY, supra note 4, at 291 (“The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in apportionment
disputes between U.S. states comprise what is probably the richest body of practice in the field of
equitable utilization that exists on either the national or the international level.”).

Clarifying the provisions of the no-harm principle solves Central Asia conflict.
Ziganshina et al. ’20 [Dinara Ziganshina and Barbara Janusz-Pawletta; Researcher at
scientific Information Centre of Interstate Commission for Water Coordination in Central Asia,
Tashkent, Uzbekistan and Kazakh-German University, Almaty, Kazakhstan;10/31/20; “The
principle of no significant harm in the Central Asian Context”; International Environmental
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics; https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10784-
020-09509-0; Accessed 12/23/21; JW]

This analysis of the no-harm principle in treaties applied to shared waters in CA allows us to draw some conclusions. First, while
references to “harm,” “transboundary impact,” “negative transboundary impact” can be found
in regional agreements, these fall short of providing definitions of these terms which might lead to
conflicting interpretations, if and when such issues arise. Treaties under consideration could be further
improved to better capture the causes of harm, the interests protected and the adverse effects. Thus, the causes
of an adverse effect are not specified in the treaties, for example, in the form of a list of potential human
activities, which might cause significant harm. Interests/objects, which shall be protected from harm, are defined
very broadly (from water quality to quality of life) and less linked to the condition of transboundary waters. Finally, the
threshold of the adverse effect falling under the scope of obligation is not clearly defined. The harm
threshold also fails to address the issue of cumulative harm, which is low impact damage that accumulates over
time and creates significant impact, especially important from the point of view of climate change adaptation and mitigation
(Viñuales 2015). Therefore, the countries—individually or within the framework of treaties—may find
it useful to adopt,
at least, a list of activities , with thresholds where appropriate, that require notification . Second, most
treaties under consideration incorporate the no-harm principle as a due diligence obligation, with the exception of the 1992 Almaty
Agreement that imposes strict obligations related to states’ activities, which may cause harm. To avoid stagnation and allow for
change the whole set of the provisions related to the obligation
of harm should be linked to other principles
and norms, the most essential of which is equitable and reasonable utilization. However, the CA
agreements do not contain detailed provisions on equitable and reasonable utilization and its
relationship with no-harm, only making general reference to equity and reasonableness. In
practice, this leads to static and rigid legal frameworks. Only few recent bilateral agreements try to bridge this gap.
The region would benefit from improved basin-wide legal regimes but also from more proactive
cooperation under the frame of the UN Convention, UNECE Convention and other MEAs. Third, the no-
harm principle and the provision on environmental protection in regional agreements are of a general nature. A signifcantly stronger
legal protection of the environment has been included into the 2006 Sustainable Development Convention, which is still not in force
(Janusz-Pawletta 2014). All existing agreements could be further developed to introduce a broader
spectrum of cooperation reflecting an integrated and ecosystembased approach to water
management as well as adaptive management and basin planning (Ziganshina 2018). More active
participation of the countries in MEAs related to biodiversity, wetlands, climate change and
pollution could provide a frame of reference for the legal grounding of their cooperation on
transboundary river basins. Fourth, going beyond this paper, the no-harm rule cannot be implemented
without procedural obligations such as information exchange, consultations, notifications, scientific
cooperation as well as the operation of joint bodies. The heads of national water management agencies of CA
countries recognized the utmost importance of information exchange and science-based decision-
making while establishing the Scientifc Information Centre at the ICWC in 1992. Over the years of its cooperation with key
scientifc institutions of CA and the world, SIC has introduced best practices and latest scientifc achievements into the work of the
Commission on future development and water policy, improving water management and use for harm avoidance, as well as
improving the environmental situation in the basin. Similarly, the Chu-Talas Commission through activities of its working groups is
playing an important role. Finally, China and Kazakhstan have both articulated the noharm principle in the
treaties and design the activities of their joint working groups in a way to avoid and prevent harm. Fifth, one can also
observe diferences in transboundary water dynamics in the three basins under consideration. Thus, in the Aral Sea basin, CA
countries started with signing a multilateral
agreement (1992 Almaty Agreement) and establishing a joint commission
(ICWC) to regulate their relations over waters, with bilateral arrangements playing a supplementary role. In contrast,
Kazakhstan, Russia and China, the riparian countries of the Irtysh basin, develop their transboundary relations on a bilateral basis, as
per request of China. This approach has its advantages in speeding up the process of negotiation and
enabling a more practical orientation of the activities of the bilateral commissions. But it also puts Kazakhstan in a
disadvantageous position due to the need to balance between the interests of two powerful states. Legal regulation in the Chu-Talas
basin is also based on pre-independence arrangements on water allocation supplemented by an agreement on the use of water
management facilities. It is interesting to note that although the UNECE has been supporting Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in
developing the 2000 Chu-Talas Agreement, none of its provisions contain explicit reference to transboundary impact, except in the
case of emergency (Article 8). Finally, the understanding
of the no-harm principle in the Central Asian
context could be further enriched through much needed research on how harm-related
provisions reviewed in this paper work in practice. This can significantly improve law application and
development practices in the region.

IWL is adopted but lacks clarity.

Ziganshina ’11 (Dinara Ziganshina; law degree from Tashkent State Institute of Law, and Master of Laws degree in
Environmental and Natural Resources, PhD, Joint Tufts University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Harvard Program,
worked at Scientific Information Center of Interstate Commission for Water Coordination in Central Asia; 9-6-2011; "International
Water Law in Central Asia: The Nature of Substantive Norms and what Flows from It"; Asian Journal of International Law, Vol. 2, Iss.
1; https://sci-hub.se/10.1017/S2044251311000087; Accessed 2-14-2022; RD)

In the switch towards independent political, social, and economic development, the
Central Asian republics confirmed
their commitment to international law as the basis of their relations. Over the past two decades, the
countries have entered into a variety of bilateral, subregional, regional, and global water-related
agreements and reaffirmed their adherence to the principles of international water law,
including that of equitable and reasonable use, no significant harm, and the duty to co-operate,
notify, and consult.8 At a subregional level, the countries concluded the 1992 Almaty Agreement that recognizes
regional water resources as ‘‘common and integral’’ and validates the Soviet management status quo over
shared waters across Central Asia,9 the 1993 Kzyl-Orda Agreement that defines the ‘‘common objectives’’ to be pursued to mitigate
the Aral Sea crisis,10 and the 1998 Syrdarya Agreement regarding the use of the water and energy resources in the Syrdarya river
basin, and many others.11 Some of these states have also joined agreements at a regional level under the
auspices of the Commonwealth of Independent States (the Commonwealth)12 and under the auspices of United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE).13 At a global level, Uzbekistan became a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses [1997 UN Convention],14 a framework instrument that—although not yet in
force—has already had a positive impact on the international legal environment through the process of codification and
crystallization of the customary rules of international water law.15 All five states are also parties to a range of
multilateral environmental agreements which cover water-related issues to different extents.16

Despite the intensity of legal development, the role of international law as it relates to transboundary
waters has met a mixed response in the region. The states themselves acknowledge the positive
implications of the legal framework for transboundary co-operation and stress the need for
strengthening compliance with existing agreements and developing more effective legal and institutional
mechanisms.17 Some external observers consider these legal developments an important step in promoting co-
operation over transboundary waters in the Aral Sea Basin while pointing out their low efficacy in dealing with
environmental, economic, and social challenges .18 Others appear even less optimistic and note that existing
regional agreements and institutions are weak and that the level of co-operation over shared waters is
unsatisfactory.19 Some regional commentators further claim that one of the difficulties in establishing an effective
regulatory regime for transboundary waters in Central Asia is that international water law lacks
clarity in guiding the states’ course of action.20 Finally, the 2003 United Nations Development Programme’s
Mission Report considers the irresponsible intervention of donors to be ‘‘a dramatic example of legal malpractice’’ and largely
responsible for the ‘‘current confusion about international water law in Central Asia’’.21
Water shortages inflame population, ethnic, and border disputes – collapse
regional stability. The problem is access, not scarcity.
Rheinbay et al. ’21 [Sebastian Mayer, Associate Professor of International Relations at the
Kazakh-German University in Almaty, Kazakhstan; Janna Rheinbay, researcher at the Potsdam
Institute for Climate Impact Research; Stefanie Wesch, researcher and doctoral candidate at the
Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research; Kira Vinke, co-chair of the Advisory Board to the
Federal German Government on Civilian Crisis Prevention and Peacebuilding; 4-1-2021;
"Regional Stability Threats: Water & Conflict in Central Asia", https://peacelab.blog/2021/04/a-
threat-to-regional-stability-water-and-conflict-in-central-asia, accessed 4-18-2022; RG]

Central Asia is prone to climate-related conflict risk . The most visible conflict drivers are climate
impacts on water availability, with regional demands exceeding accessible amounts . For instance,
previously the fourth-largest lake globally, the Aral Sea has now largely dried up, primarily due to
industrial and agricultural over-exploitation . Conflicting interests over water access has recurrently
led to violence in the region. Examples include violent clashes between the Kyrgyz and Tajik military
in 2014 over a sluice in the Kyrgyz Ak-Sai village and Uzbek-Kyrgyz border clashes in 2016 also
related to water. Climate projections and growing demands indicate that regional water scarcity will
further increase unless appropriate countermeasures are taken.

Water Availability Currently Hinges on Access, Not Scarcity

Given that Central Asia is abundant in water, with its mountains serving as main water towers, water availability
is currently rather a question of access than of scarcity. Access is distributed along the river banks
of the two main rivers: the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. The flow from their sources in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan's
mountain ranges through Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan towards the Aral Sea.

Recent studies show that mean annual temperatures in Central Asia are expected to rise , while mean
monthly river discharge will decrease in the summer months over the course of this century. Climate impacts are
thus likely to further reduce water availability due to evaporation as well as the disappearance of
glaciers which currently feed into rivers. Scarcity may not be a problem now, but could turn into one as climate impacts
intensify. This development will increase the potential for conflict over available water resources.

Unequal Access to Water Can Lead to Violent Conflict in Unstable Border Regions

Particularly the southern part of Central Asia is severely affected by climate impacts on water
availability. For instance, the fertile Ferghana Valley, spread across Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan, is dependent on access to water from the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya. It is now at risk of
drying up, mainly due to excessive water usage, especially for cotton production, that is aggravated by rising
temperatures. The valley is particularly prone to violent conflict over water: an increasing lack of water
availability intersects with dense and yet fast-growing populations, ethnic fragmentation,
disputed borders, and numerous exclaves within the three countries.

As a result, violent
clashes are quite common. In the two decades since Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan became
independent, hundreds of people have been killed in disputes over shared water resources in the Ferghana Valley.
The region is still not considered stable, and recurring disputes are to be expected unless a sustainable
solution can be agreed upon and effectively implemented.

Diverging Interests of Upstream and Downstream Countries Pose a Risk for Regional Stability
Central Asian water wars escalate and draw-in regional powers.
Helf ’20 [Gavin; senior expert on Central Asia for the U.S. Institute of Peace, worked as a senior
democracy and governance advisor in the USAID Asia and Middle East bureaus, taught Russian
and Soviet foreign policy, comparative politics, and security studies at Notre Dame, Cornell, The
George Washington University and Moscow's International University; 11-18-2020; "Looking for
Trouble: Sources of Violent Conflict in Central Asia", US Institute of Peace;
https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/11/looking-trouble-sources-violent-conflict-central-
asia, accessed 2-14-2022; RG] *Box 2 was inserted from a different page of the publication, as
Box 2 is a floating informational footnote corresponding to the ‘Water Resources and Climate
Change’ section
Water Resources and Climate Change

Long-term trends affect Central Asia in ways that could exacerbate or provoke violent conflict in
the decades ahead, including competition for scarce resources. The region has water problems. The one
that has played out since independence is that the mountainous upstream states , which have water but do not
have hydrocarbon sources of energy (Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan), prefer to use water to generate
electricity in the winter. The downstream states, which are rich in hydrocarbons (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan), prefer to use the water during the summer for agriculture . Amid fits and starts and occasional
misunderstandings, the downstream states agree to sell the upstream states natural gas in the winter for heating in exchange for
releasing most water during the summer for irrigation. The Soviet practice
of balancing water and electricity needs
was complicated on independence by the privatization of electricity and disagreements about the
relative value of natural resource commodities. Water has been at the heart of many diplomatic
disputes in the region. Agricultural overuse of water has stressed the region’s supply and led to the
precipitous shrinkage of the Aral Sea over the last few decades. Kazakhstan’s decision to put state resources into
saving the small North Aral Sea led to damming that body of water and accelerating the decline of the larger South Aral Sea.

Climate change further compounds the water resource challenge. The glaciers in Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan that supply Central Asia with water are now melting rapidly.23 Water disputes
are therefore taking place in an era with higher than average river flow . Although predictions about timing
may differ, the likely scenario is that in the short term, glacial melt will increase available water for
the next decade or two—until it is gone. The urban, agricultural, and energy infrastructure of the region is
being built around an existing supply of water that will not be available in a generation. This situation
is very likely to become a source of interstate and communal conflict.

Preventing conflict around resource issues, which often flare up in the context of the enclaves and exclaves that dot the region ( see
box 2), is a natural fit for a regional policy dialogue.

—Insert Box 2—

The Odd Case of Enclaves and Exclaves Resource conflict, state sovereignty, and ethnic identity clash in
violent flare-ups in Central Asia around the eight Ferghana Valley enclaves and exclaves that are vestiges of
the administrative breakup of the Soviet Union. Small pockets of one country completely surrounded by a neighboring country
are sprinkled throughout the Ferghana Valley. Local squabbles over access, land use, and resources have
erupted into intercommunal violence and often then drawn in border guards from one or both
sides and escalated to armed clashes that have to be controlled by intervention of the central
authorities from each side. Although the uncertain nature of the borders between the Central Asian countries lead
to occasionally violent clashes, they have been particularly prevalent around the enclaves and exclaves.

Conflict will go nuclear – undermines strategic deterrence and triggers nuclear

first use.
McDermott ’11 [Roger; Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, The Jamestown
Foundation, Washington DC, Senior International Research Fellow for the Foreign Military
Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute
for International Studies, Copenhagen. McDermott is on the editorial board of Central Asia and
the Caucasus and the scientific board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet
Societies; 12-6-2011; "General Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear Conflict", The
Jamestown Foundation Global Research and Analysis; https://jamestown.org/program/general-
makarov-highlights-the-risk-of-nuclear-conflict/, accessed 2-14-2022; RG]
Russian media coverage was largely dismissive of Makarov’s observations, focusing on the idea that he may have represented the
country as being surrounded by enemies. According to Kommersant, claiming to have seen the materials used during his
presentation, armed confrontation with the West could occur partly based on the “anti-Russian policy”
pursued by the Baltic States and Georgia, which may equally undermine Moscow’s future relations with NATO. Military conflict
may erupt in Central Asia, caused by instability in Afghanistan or Pakistan; or western intervention against a nuclear
Iran or North Korea; energy competition in the Arctic or foreign inspired “color revolutions” similar to the
Arab Spring and the creation of a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that could undermine Russia’s
strategic nuclear deterrence also featured in this assessment of the strategic environment (Kommersant, November 18).

Since the reform of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces began in late 2008, Makarov has
consistently promoted
adopting network-centric capabilities to facilitate the transformation of the military and develop
modern approaches to warfare. Keen to displace traditional Russian approaches to warfare, and harness military assets in a
fully integrated network, Makarov possibly more than any senior Russian officer appreciates that the means and methods of modern
warfare have changed and are continuing to change (Zavtra, November 23; Interfax, November 17).

The contours of this evolving and unpredictable strategic environment, with the distinctions
between war and peace often blurred, interface precisely in the general’s expression of concern about
nuclear conflict: highlighting the risk of escalation. However, such potential escalation is linked to the
reduced time involved in other actors deciding to intervene in a local crisis as well as the presence of
network-centric approaches among western militaries and being developed by China and Russia. From Moscow’s
perspective, NATO “out of area operations” from Kosovo to Libya blur the traditional red lines in escalation;
further complicated if any power wishes to pursue intervention in complex cases such as Syria. Potential
escalation resulting from local conflict, following a series of unpredictable second and third
order consequences, makes Makarov’s comments seem more understandable; it is not so much a portrayal of Russia
surrounded by “enemies,” as a recognition that, with weak conventional Armed Forces, in certain crises Moscow may have
few options at its disposal (Interfax, November 17).

There is also the added complication of a possibly messy aftermath of the US and NATO drawdown
from Afghanistan and signs that the Russian General Staff takes Central Asian security much more
seriously in this regard. The General Staff cannot know whether the threat environment in the region
may suddenly change. Makarov knows the rather limited conventional military power Russia currently possesses, which
may compel early nuclear first use likely involving sub-strategic weapons , in an effort to “de-escalate”
an escalating conflict close to Russia’s borders. Moscow no longer primarily fears a theoretical threat of facing
large armies on its western or eastern strategic axes; instead the information-era reality is that smaller-scale intervention in areas
vital to its strategic interests may bring the country face-to-face with a network-centric adversary capable of rapidly exploiting its
conventional weaknesses. As Russia plays catch-up in this technological and revolutionary shift in modern warfare capabilities, the
age-old problem confronts the General Staff: the fastest to act is the victor (See EDM, December 1). Consequently, Makarov once
again criticized the domestic defense industry for offering the military inferior quality weapons systems. Yet, as
speed and
harnessing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance)
become increasingly decisive factors in modern warfare, the risks for conflict escalation demand
careful attention – especially when the disparate actors possess varied capabilities.

Unlike other nuclear powers, Russia has to consider the proximity of several nuclear actors close to its
borders. In the coming decade and beyond, Moscow may pursue dialogue with other nuclear actors on the nature of conflict
escalation and de-escalation. However, with a multitude of variables at play ranging from BMD, US Global Strike
capabilities, uncertainty surrounding the “reset” and the emergence of an expanded nuclear club, and several potential
sources of instability and conflict, any dialogue must consider escalation in its widest possible context.
Makarov’s message during his presentation, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, was therefore a much tougher bone than the
old dogs of the Cold War would wish to chew on.

Broadly, interstate water conflict unleashes a nuclear winter.

Klare ’20 [Michael; Professor in World Security studies at 5 colleges; 2020; “Climate Change,
Water Scarcity, and the Potential for Interstate Conflict in South Asia”, Journal of Strategic
Security , 2020, Vol. 13, No. 4, Climate Change and Global Security (2020), pp. 109-122;
University of South Florida Board of Trustees; https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26965521;
Accessed 9/8/21; JW]

Water scarcity continues to figure in DoD studies of the links between climate change and conflict, but analysts’
assumption that fighting over scarce water supplies would be confined to intrastate conflict has been challenged over time. This was
first evident in an Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in 2012. Released to
the public as Global Water Security, the 2012 ICA reaffirmed the centrality of water in international security affairs but raised the
specter of water conflicts arising between as well as within states. As in earlier IC reports, the 2012 ICA concluded that water
issues, in combination with pre—existing factors like poverty and social discord, could contribute to internal unrest
and state failure.15 However, the report went on to consider a range of circumstances in which such issues could also provoke
tensions and conflict between states. Interstate conflict over water might occur, the ICA indicated, when
several states rely on a shared river system for much of their water supply and one or more of the
riparian states sought to maximize the river’s flow for their own benefit at the expense of
other states in the basin, amplifying any scarcities already present there. “We judge that as water shortages become
more acute beyond the next ten years, water in shared basins will increasingly be used as leverage,” the ICA stated. An upstream
state enjoying superior control over a river’s flow might exploit its advantage, say, to extract advantage in
international negotiations or to attract international aid for infrastructure projects. As the ICA further noted, “…we assess that states
will also use their inherent ability to construct and support major water projects to obtain regional influence or preserve their water
interests.”16 The Utilization of a state’s superior position in a shared river system to extract political or
economic advantage can prove especially destabilizing, the ICA suggested, when weaker states in the system (typically
the downstream countries) are especially vulnerable to water scarcity because of long—standing social, economic, and
political conditions. Without identifying any particular states by name, the study suggested that this could occur when downstream
states suffer from endemic corruption, poor water management practices, and systemic favoritism when it comes to the allocation
of scarce water supplies. In such cases, any reduction in the flow of water by an upstream country
could easily combine with internal factors in a downstream country to provoke widespread unrest and conflict.
“Water shortages, and government failures to manage them, are likely to lead to social disruptions, pressure on
national and local leaders, and potentially political instability,” the report noted.17 Although most discussion of the climate
and water security nexus has continued to emphasize the risk of internal conflict arising from warming—related water scarcities,
some analysts have pursued the line of inquiry introduced by the 2012 ICA, focusing on interstate tensions arising within shared river
basins. This was a prominent theme, for example, of a 2013 study conducted by the National Research Council (NRC) on behalf of
the IC. Entitled Climate and Social Stress: Implications for Security Analysis, the 2013 NRC report sought to better identify the links
between global warming, pre—existing social vulnerabilities, and the likelihood of conflict. While it echoed earlier studies by the
CNA and NIC in identifying internal factors like poverty, ethnic discord, and governmental ineptitude as likely pre—conditions for
climate—related conflict, it also examined dangers arising from dependence on shared river systems, especially in cases where
cooperation among the riparian powers in managing the system is limited and global warming is expected to reduce future water
flows.18 For the NRC, the river systems of greatest concern in this respect were those that originate in the Himalayan Mountains
and depend, for a significant share of the annual flow, on meltwater from the Himalayan glaciers. These glaciers are an
important source of meltwater for many of Asia’s major rivers , including the Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra,
and Mekong Rivers. These rivers originate in China but travel through India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Laos,
Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam– countries with a combined population of over 3.4 billion people, or approximately
44 percent of the world’s total population.19 A large share of the population in these countries depends on
agriculture for its livelihood, so ensuring access to adequate supplies of water is a prime local and
national priority. During the monsoon season, heavy rains provide these rivers with abundant water, but during dry seasons
they are dependent on glacial meltwater–and, with the rise in global temperatures, the Himalayan glaciers are melting, jeopardizing
future water availability in these river basins. Given a history of ethnic and social discord within many of these countries and long-
standing tensions among them, analysts fear that such shortages
could aggravate both internal and external
tensions and ignite interstate as well as intrastate conflict.20 As was the case of previous IC-initiated studies,
the authors of the 2013 NRC report were reluctant to identify specific countries in their findings, referring again to “countries of
security concern” or other such euphemisms. However, they did select one of these countries in particular: Pakistan. They chose that
country for special analysis, the report indicated, because “Pakistan
presents a clear example of a country where
social dynamics and susceptibility to harm from climate events combine to create a potentially unstable
situation.”21 Pakistan was said to suffer from multiple risk factors: Its economy is largely dependent on
agriculture; much of the water used for irrigation purposes comes from just one source, the Indus
River; control over the allocation of irrigation waters is often exercised by privileged elites, leaving millions of
Pakistanis vulnerable to water shortages ; and much of the water flowing into the Indus comes from China or from
tributaries originating in India, leaving Pakistan in an unfavorable (downstream) position in the system. These
conditions have led, in the past, to internal squabbles over water rights and to tensions with India over control of the Indus; now,
with the likelihood of diminished meltwater from the Himalayan glaciers, the risk of water scarcity triggering violent
conflict of one sort or another becomes that much greater.22 There is no doubt that Pakistan is considered by
U.S. security analysts as a “state important to U .S. national security interests,” the term used by the
Defense Intelligence Agency to describe countries of concern in the 2012 ICA on water. Not only is Pakistan a critical–if not
always wholehearted– partner in the global war on terror, but it also possesses a substantial arsenal of nuclear
weapons whose security is a matter of enormous concern to American leaders. 23 Should those
munitions wind up with rogue elements of the Pakistani military (some of whose members are believed to maintain clandestine links
to radical Islamic organizations), or even worse, should Pakistan
descend into civil war and the weapons fall
into untrustworthy or hostile hands, the safety of India and other US allies–as well as of
American forces deployed in the region–would be at grave risk.24 Ensuring Pakistan’s stability
therefore, has long been a major U.S. security objective, prompting regular deliveries of American arms and other military
aid. Yet, despite billions of dollars in American aid, Pakistan remains vulnerable to social and ethnic internal strife.25 As noted,
farming is the principal economic activity in Pakistan , and ensuring access to water is an
overarching public and government concern. This means, above all, managing the use of the Indus–the country’s
main source of water for irrigation and its major source of power for electricity generation. Pakistan’s rising population and growing
cities, with their rings of factories, are placing an immense strain on the Indus, leading to competition between farmers,
industrialists, and urban consumers. With water and power shortages becoming an increasingly frequent aspect of daily life, public
protests–sometimes turning violent– have erupted across the country. In one particularly intense bout of rioting, following a
prolonged power outage in June 2012, protestors burned trains, blocked roads, looted shops, and damaged banks and gas
stations.26 However bad things might be in Pakistan today, climate change is likely to make conditions far worse in the years ahead.
Prolonged droughts, climate scientists believe, will occur with increasing regularity, posing a severe threat to the nation’s
agricultural sector and further reducing the supply of hydroelectric power. At the same time, warming is expected to increase the
intensity of monsoon downpours, resulting in massive flooding (asoccurred in 2010) and the loss of valuable topsoil, further adding
to Pakistan’s woes. As the Himalayan glaciers melt, moreover, water flow through the Indus will diminish. 27 With the
competition for land and water resources bound to increase and with Pakistan already divided along ethnic and religious lines,
widespread civil strife will become ever more likely, possibly jeopardizing the survival of the
state. It is impossible to predict exactly how the United States might respond to a systemic breakdown of state governance in
Pakistan. One thing is clear, however: At the earliest sign that the country’s nuclear weapons are at risk of falling
into the hands of hostile parties, the American military would respond with decisive force. In fact, research conducted
by the nonpartisan Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) has revealed that the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and specialized
Army units have been training for such contingencies for some time and have deployed all the necessary gear to the region. In the
event of a coup or crisis, the NTI revealed, “U.S. forces would rush into the country, crossing borders, rappelling down from
helicopters, and parachuting out of airplanes, so they can secure known or suspected nuclear—storage sites.” Recognizing that any
such actions by American forces could trigger widespread resistance by the Pakistani army and/or various jihadist groups, the U.S.
Central Command, which has authority over all American forces in the region, has developed plans for backing up JSOC personnel
with full— scale military support.28 Another scenario that has some analysts worried is the possibility that a time of sharply reduced
water flow through the Indus will coincide with efforts by India to exploit its advantageous position as the upper riparian on three
key tributaries of the Indus–the Ravi, the Beas, and the Sutlej–to divert water for its own use, thereby depriving downstream
Pakistan of vital supplies and provoking a war between these two countries. India was granted control over the three tributaries
under the Indus Water Treat of 1960, and various Indian leaders have threatened at times to dam the rivers
or otherwise reduce their flow into Pakistan as a reprisal for Pakistani attacks on Indian bases in the disputed
territory of Kashmir (through which the tributaries flow); this, in turn, has provoked counter— threats from Pakistani
leaders.29 What analysts fear most, in such a situation, is that India, possessing superior conventional forces,
would overpower Pakistan’s equivalent armies , leading Pakistan’s leaders to order the use of nuclear
weapons against India, igniting a regional nuclear war. Such a conflict, scientists have
calculated, would result in 50 to 125 million fatalities , and produce a dust cloud covering much
of the Earth, decimating global agriculture–an outcome with enormous implications for
American national security.30The potential for interstate conflict–even nuclear conflict–over
shared water supplies arises in the case of another major river at risk from climate change: The
Brahmaputra, which originates in China and traverses much of northeastern India before merging with the
Ganges in Bangladesh and emptying into the Bay of Bengal. The fifth—largest river in the world by volume of water flow, the
Brahmaputra starts on the northern slopes of the Himalayas and flows easterly across the southern Tibetan plateau (where it is
known as the Yarlung Tsangpo) before making a nearly 180—degree turn and crossing into the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh;
from there, it flows in a southwesterly direction towards its confluence with the Ganges and thence its exit into the Bay of Bengal.
For the Chinese, the Brahmaputra is an important engine of hydroelectric power ; they have already
installed one dam on the river, at Zangmu, and have announced plans for at least three more. For the Indians, it is a
valuable source of irrigation water, especially in agriculture—dependent regions of the northeast. Leaders of both
countries are fully aware of their counterparts’ interests and concerns over the river but have made little effort to reach a mutual
understanding–let alone any formal agreements–regarding its future development.31 Several factors make the future status of
the Brahmaputra a matter of deep concern to security analysts. To begin with, the river enters India through
the state of Arunachal Pradesh, an area of northeastern India abutting Tibet that is claimed by both countries. Beijing insists that this
region was once part of the kingdom of Tibet, and so belongs to China; New Delhi claims it is a legitimate part of India under a 1914
treaty between Tibet and Great Britain. The two sides fought a war here in 1962, with India suffering significant battlefield
setbacks but China agreeing to restore the status quo ante. The countries have not been able to resolve the
ownership dispute in subsequent years, despite intermittent negotiations, and both continue to maintain
substantial military forces in the region. To this day, discord over Arunachal Pradesh remains a continuing
source of friction in Sino—Indian relations and a potential spark for violent conflict.32 Another potential
source of friction between China and India arises from Chinese plans (or rumors of such plans) to divert water from the
upper Brahmaputra and funnel it via a series of tunnels and canals to northeastern China, where existing supplies are hugely
inadequate.33 While dismissed by many Chinese experts as overly ambitious and costly, the notion of diverting water from the
Brahmaputra has generated considerable anxiety in India, where experts fear that the resulting decline in water
flow into the Indian section of the river would threaten agricultural productivity. Given the centrality of
farming in the Indian economy and political system, any Chinese
move to proceed with such a diversion project
could lead to increased tension between the two countries . 34 Few analysts believe that a Sino—Indian
conflict over the Brahmaputra is likely in the years immediately ahead. Both countries have strong
motives for maintaining friendly–if not necessarily, warm–relations between them, and water issues have not yet dominated the
bilateral agenda. This, however, is where global warming enters the picture. The Brahmaputra, like the Indus, draws much of its flow
during dry seasons from the melting of Himalayan glaciers–and these, as has already been noted, are melting as a result of
climate change, and could eventually disappear. For both China and India, the melting of the Himalayan glaciers will have
momentous consequences. Given the Brahmaputra’s critical importance to agriculture and economic
activity in both countries, any significant long— term decline in its flow would be highly disruptive, causing widespread
hardship and social unrest. 35 Under these more stressful conditions, the Chinese leadership, desperate to provide
additional supply to China’s water—starved northeast, might be more inclined to proceed with water diversion
projects on the Brahmaputra and other shared river systems.36 Coming at a time of equivalent water scarcity in India, such an
effort is almost certain to trigger a harsh Indian response. “The most salient climate—related point of conflict
[between China and India] could be China’s move to divert the upstream waters of rivers originating in the
Himalayan watershed,” the NIC warned in a special report on climate change and India. “If China was determined to move forward
with such a scheme, it could become a major element in pushing China and India towards an adversarial
rather than simply a competitive relationship. Border clashes related to control of the rivers are not out of the question.”37 Any
conflict between China and India over the waters of the Brahmaputra, should one occur, is most likely to remain a localized affair,
without provoking a full—scale mobilization of forces on both sides. During the 1962 war over Arunachal Pradesh, Chinese army
troops engaged their Indian counterparts in disputed areas along the border, but neither side escalated to large—scale combat.
However, once fighting breaks out, it is impossible to predict the succeeding chain of events , and any
outcome is conceivable. A minor skirmish along the Indo—Chinese border might not be a cause for alarm in the
United States, but a larger war between those two countries undoubtedly would be . Both are armed
with nuclear weapons, and Washington views India as a strategic counterweight to China.38 A crushing defeat of India
would be viewed as a potential threat to American national interests and might conceivably precipitate U.S. military intervention.
Where that might lead is anyone’s guess, but the mere possibility of such combat has made this scenario a matter
of deep concern for security analysts in Washington .39

India and Pakistan utilize IWL.

Qureshi ’17 [Dr. Waseem Ahmad; Advocate Supreme Court of Pakistan.; “Equitable
Apportionment of Shared Transboundary River Waters: A Case Study of Modifications of the
Indus Waters Treaty”; 2017; SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.;
https://digital.sandiego.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=ilj; Accessed 11/22/21;
NT]

The Indus Waters Treaty, signed in 1960, proved to be a landmark in resolving the water conflict
between India and Pakistan. The treaty acted as a principal formula of water apportionment between the two
states and, to a great extent, resolved the water conflict between them.133 Before this treaty, the main contention between the
two countries was the use of the waters of the six shared rivers, which flowed from India to the Pakistani province of Punjab and
were part of a common Indus River basin.134

These rivers irrigated major crops that were vital for the economic and food sustenance of Pakistan.135
Pakistan adopted the stance that the major portion of the Indus basin—which includes the streams of five other shared rivers, the
Sutlej, Beas, Ravi, Chenab, and Jhelum Rivers—is situated in Pakistani territory and, therefore, Pakistan has the natural right to use
the water from the Indus basin and its connected river streams.136 However, on the other hand, India exercised larger
control over these rivers owing to its upper riparian position,137 and it wanted the sole right of ownership over the waters of
these rivers based on the territorial supremacy principle.138
Overriding the implications of the territorial supremacy and territorial integrity principles, which were used by
both riparian countries, the Indus Waters Treaty allocated the water of the Indus basin on the basis of the principle
of equity in a very reasonable and equitable manner that appealed to both states.139 In this regard, the World Bank
played the role of a mediator between India and Pakistan and its efforts were highly regarded in brokering the
IWT and in finalizing the equitable and reasonable water-sharing framework in it.140 Since then, the treaty has stood
as the sole guide and standard for the sharing of river waters between the states.

China settles disputes with IWL.

Fry et. al. ’16 [James D.; Associate Professor of Law and Director of the LL.M. Program at the
University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law, as well as a Visiting Associate Professor of International
Law at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University; 2016; "INTERNATIONAL
WATER LAW AND CHINA’S MANAGEMENT OF ITS INTERNATIONAL RIVERS", Boston College;
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1767&context=iclr, accessed 11-22-2021; RG]

Abstract: This Article explores China’s management of its international rivers. China
has various domestic pieces of
legislation, including the Water Law of 2002, to regulate the uses and protection of its
international rivers. It is clear that international water law influenced China inasmuch as there are
similarities between the 1997 Watercourses Convention and the Water Law of 2002, and even
China has recognized the influence of international law in the formation of its Water Law of
2002. This runs contrary to the widespread belief among Western commentators that China
generally does not engage in these types of matters with international water law in mind. As
evidence, these commentators point to China’s objection to signing the 1997 Watercourses
Convention and its refusal to join any river-basin commissions for any of its international rivers. This Article, however, shows
how China has been strongly influenced by the international water-law regime and has engaged
with other states in the management of its international rivers, albeit with a limited number of states. This
Article posits that China can further benefit from engaging in international fora when trying to manage its domestic water issues.

Nuclear war causes extinction.

Starr ’17 [Steven; director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program,
senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility, Associate member of the Nuclear Age
Peace Foundation, expert in the environmental consequences of nuclear war; 1/9/17; “Turning a
Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S. Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies”;
https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-
winter-studies/; Federation of American Scientists; accessed 11/24/18; TV]

The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will instantly ignite fires over a surface area of
three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the blast, fire, and
radiation from a war fought with 100 atomic bombs could produce direct fatalities comparable to
all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a “counterforce” nuclear war
between the superpowers. However, the long-term environmental effects of the war could significantly disrupt
the global weather for at least a decade, which would likely result in a vast global famine. The scientists
predicted that nuclear firestorms in the burning cities would cause at least five million tons of black carbon
smoke to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could not be rained out. The
smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks and would form a global stratospheric smoke
layer that would remain for more than a decade. The smoke would absorb warming sunlight,
which would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing ozone losses
of 20 to 50 percent over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most
populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human history. In North America
and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at mid-day in June could decrease to as little as
six minutes for fair-skinned individuals. As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from reaching the Earth’s
surface, it would produce the coldest average surface temperatures in the last 1,000 years. The scientists
calculated that global food production would decrease by 20 to 40 percent during a five-year period following
such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of growing seasons and corresponding decreases in
agricultural production could cause up to two billion people to perish from famine. The climatologists
also investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful modern
thermonuclear weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France, and England. Some
of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an
atomic bomb. During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet
today, each of the approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven
to 80 times more powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study. The smallest
strategic nuclear weapon has an explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT , compared to an atomic bomb with an
average explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT. Strategic nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic
bombs. For example, a standard Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to
152 square miles. A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons
would ignite immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of
thousands of square miles. The scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to 180 million tons
of black carbon soot and smoke, which would form a dense, global stratospheric smoke layer. The
smoke would remain in the stratosphere for 10 to 20 years, and it would block as much as 70 percent of
sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So
much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight. Under
such conditions, it would only require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum temperatures to fall below
freezing in the largest agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere, where freezing temperatures would occur every day
for a period of between one to more than two years. Average surface temperatures would become colder than
those experienced 18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age , and the prolonged cold would cause average
rainfall to decrease by up to 90%. Growing seasons would be completely eliminated for more than a decade; it would
be too cold and dark to grow food crops, which would doom the majority of the human population.
NUCLEAR WINTER IN BRIEF The profound cold and darkness following nuclear war became known as nuclear winter and was first
predicted in 1983 by a group of NASA scientists led by Carl Sagan. During the mid-1980s, a large body of research was done by such
groups as the Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment (SCOPE), the World Meteorological Organization, and the U.S.
National Research Council of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences; their work essentially supported the initial findings of the 1983
studies. The idea of nuclear winter, published and supported by prominent scientists, generated extensive public alarm and put
political pressure on the United States and Soviet Union to reverse a runaway nuclear arms race, which, by 1986, had created a
global nuclear arsenal of more than 65,000 nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this created a backlash among many powerful military
and industrial interests, who undertook an extensive media campaign to brand nuclear winter as “bad science” and the scientists
who discovered it as “irresponsible.” Critics used various uncertainties in the studies and the first climate models (which are
primitive by today’s standards) as a basis to criticize and reject the concept of nuclear winter. In 1986, the Council on Foreign
Relations published an article by scientists from the National Center for Atmospheric Research, who predicted drops in global
cooling about half as large as those first predicted by the 1983 studies and described this as a “nuclear autumn.” The nuclear
autumn studies were later shown to be deeply flawed, but the proof came too late to stop a massive smear campaign that
effectively discredited the initial studies. Nuclear winter was subject to criticism and damning articles in the Wall Street Journal and
Time magazine. In 1987, the National Review called nuclear winter a “fraud.” In 2000, Discover Magazine published an article that
described nuclear winter as one of “The Twenty Greatest Scientific Blunders in History.” The endless smear campaign was successful;
the general public, and even most anti-nuclear activists, were left with the idea that nuclear winter had been scientifically disproved.
REJECTION BY LEADERS Yet the scientists did not give up. In 2006, they returned to their labs to perform the research I have
previously described. Their new research not only upheld the previous findings but also found that the earlier studies actually
underestimated the environmental effects of nuclear war. Dr. Robock of Rutgers and Dr. Toon of the University of Colorado have
spent years attempting to bring official attention to their work and get follow-up research studies done by appropriate agencies in
the federal government. In a recent (2016) interview, Dr. Toon stated: The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense,
which should be investigating this problem, have done absolutely nothing. They have not published a single paper, in the open
literature, analyzing this problem … We have made a list of where we think the important issues are, and we have gone to every
[federal] agency we can think of with these lists, and said “Don’t you think someone should study this?” Basically, everyone we have
tried so far has said, “Well that’s not my job.” In the same interview, Dr. Robock also noted: The Department of Homeland Security
really should fund this. They will fund you to study one terrorist bomb in New York City. When you explain to them that a war
between India and Pakistan is a much greater threat to the U.S. homeland than one terrorist bomb, as horrible as that is, they
respond with “Oh, well that’s not my job, go talk to some other program manager” — who, of course, doesn’t exist. After the more
recent series of studies were published in 2007 and 2008, Drs. Robock and Toon also made a number of requests to meet with
members of the Obama administration. The scientists offered to brief Cabinet members and the White House staff about their
findings, which they assumed would have a great impact upon nuclear weapons policy. Their offers were met with indifference.
Finally, after several years of trying, Drs. Robock and Toon were allowed an audience with John Holdren, Senior Advisor to President
Barack Obama on Science and Technology. Dr. Robock also eventually met with Rose Gottemoeller, then Under Secretary of State
for Arms Control and International Security. Dr. Robock has written to me that, after these meetings, he and Dr. Toon were left with
the impression that neither Holdren nor Gottemoeller think the nuclear winter research “is correct.” But it is not only Holdren and
Gottemoeller who reject the nuclear winter research. Greg Mello, of the Los Alamos Study Group, cites a source who confirms that
the group that determines the “full range of activities related to the development, production, maintenance (upkeep) and
elimination (retirement, disassembly and disposal) of all United States nuclear weapons — the members of the U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Council — have stated that “the predictions of nuclear winter were disproved years ago.” The members of the U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Council include: Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff Under Secretary for Nuclear Security of the Department of Energy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Commander of the
United States Strategic Command It is important to understand that some members of this group — especially the Commander of
the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) — also develop the policies that guide the use of nuclear weapons. Perhaps General
John Hyten, Head of USSTRATCOM, who is in charge of the U.S. nuclear triad, and General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the second highest ranking officer in the United States, have never seen or heard of the 21st century nuclear winter
studies. Perhaps when they hear a question about “nuclear winter,” they only remember the smear campaigns done against the
early studies. Or, maybe, they just choose not to accept the new scientific research on nuclear winter, despite the fact that it has
withstood the criticism of the global scientific community. Regardless, the rejection of nuclear winter research by the top leaders of
the United States raises some profoundly important questions: Do U.S. military and political leaders fully understand the
consequences of nuclear war? Do they realize that even a “successful” nuclear first-strike against Russia could cause most Americans
to die from nuclear famine? In 2010, Drs. Toon and Robock wrote in Physics Today: We estimate that the direct effects of using the
2012 arsenals would lead to hundreds of millions of fatalities. The indirect effects would likely eliminate the majority of the human
population. In 2013, Drs. Toon and Robock wrote in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that: Anuclear war between Russia
and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear
winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in Self-Assured Destruction. RENEWED COLD WAR
Although president-elect Trump appears to favor a return to the policy of détente with Russia, many if not most U.S. political
leaders appear to support the Obama administration’s policies of direct confrontation with Putin’s Russia.
Mainstream corporate media, including the editorial boards of The New York Times and The Washington Post, routinely
engage in anti-Russian and anti-Putin rhetoric that surpasses the hate speech of the McCarthy era. Under
President Obama, the United States has renewed the Cold War with Russia, with little or no debate or protest,
and has subsequently engaged in proxy wars with Russia in Ukraine and Syria, as well as threatening
military action against China in the South China Sea. In response to what NATO leaders describe as
Russia’s “dangerous and aggressive actions,” NATO has built up a “rapid-response force” of
40,000 troops on the Russian border in the Baltic States and Poland. This force includes hundreds of tanks, armored
vehicles, and heavy artillery. NATO troops stationed in Estonia are within artillery range of St. Petersburg, the
second largest city of Russia. The U nited States has deployed its Aegis Ashore Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) system in Romania and is constructing another such BMD system in Poland. The Mark 41 launch system
used in the Aegis Ashore systems can be used to launch a variety of missiles, including long-range nuclear-armed cruise missiles. In
other words, the United States has built and is building launch sites for nuclear missiles on the Russian
border. This fact has been widely reported on Russian TV and has infuriated the Russian public. In June, Russian President Putin
specifically warned that Russia would be forced to retaliate against this threat. While Russian officials
maintain that its actions are normal and routine, Russia now appears to be preparing for war. On October 5, 2016,
Russia conducted a nation-wide civil defense drill that included 40 million of its people being directed
to fallout shelters. Reuters reported two days later that Russia had moved its Iskander nuclear-capable missiles to Kaliningrad,
which borders Poland. While the United States ignores the danger of nuclear war, Russian scholar Stephen Cohen reports that the
danger of war with the United States is the leading news story in Russia. Cohen states: Just as there is no
discussion of the most existential question of our time, in the American political class — the possibility of war with Russia — it is the
only thing being discussed in the Russian political class . . . These are two different political universes. In Russia, all the discussion in
the newspapers, and there is plenty of free discussion on talk show TV, which echoes what the Kremlin is thinking, online, in the elite
newspapers, and in the popular broadcasts, the number 1, 2, 3, and 4 topics of the day are the possibility of war with the United
States. Cohen goes on to say: I conclude from this that the leadership of Russia actually believes now, in reaction to
what the United States and NATO have said and done over the last two years, and particularly in reaction to the
breakdown of the proposed cooperation in Syria, and the rhetoric coming out of Washington, that war is a real
possibility. I can’t remember when, since the Cuban Missile Crisis, that the Moscow leadership came to this conclusion in its
collective head. Perhaps this narrative will change under president-elect Trump. However, he is inheriting a situation
fraught with danger, which retains the possibility of direct military conflict with Russia in Ukraine
and Syria, as well as increasingly militarized confrontation with China in the South China Sea. My own
personal assessment of the state of the nuclear danger today is that it is profound. The United States is sleepwalking
towards nuclear war. Our leaders have turned a blind eye to the scientifically predicted consequences of nuclear war, and
our military appears to be intent on making “Russia back down.” This is a recipe for unlimited human disaster. It is
still not too late to seek dialogue, diplomacy, and détente with Russia and China, and to create a global dialogue about the
existential dangers of nuclear war. We must return to the understanding that nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought.
This can be achieved if our political and military leaders listen to the warnings from the scientific community about the long-term
global environmental consequences of nuclear war. President-elect Trump and President Putin must publically acknowledge and
discuss the peer-reviewed studies that predict a U.S.-Russian nuclear war will likely wipe out most of the human
race. All nations and peoples have a vested interest in eliminating the nuclear arsenals that continue to threaten their existence.