Issue no.

Before advancing to the arguments, let us get a true picture of what the original Act provides
for and what the Act intends to provide for. Under the Act of 1920, the term “measurements”
has been defined to include finger impression and foot-print impressions. However, keeping in
mind the advancement in scientific and technological fields, the Act has expanded this inclusive
list to provide for finger-impression, palm-print impressions, foot-print impressions,
photographs, iris and retina scan, physical, biological samples and their analysis, behavioral
attributes including signatures, handwriting or any other examination referred to in sec. 53 or
sec. 53A of the Cr.P.C.
It has been contended that coercing an individual (whether convicted or otherwise) to give
measurements in a criminal investigation and/ or trial will result in a violation of the individual’s
right against self-incrimination enshrined under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. This
right entails that no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. These arguments are flawed and based on incorrect appreciation of judicial
precedents.
First, several judgments have categorically held that measurements such as finger-impression,
voice-samples, etc. are not in the nature of a “personal testimony.” The kind of measurements
covered under the Act cannot be intrinsically changed and are used only as materials of
comparison to lend assurance to a court that its inference based on other pieces of evidence is
reliable. These are neither oral nor documentary evidence and fall outside the ambit of
testimony.
In State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad Case, the XI Judge Bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court has
held that “giving thumb impressions or foot or palm or fingers or specimen writings or showing
parts of the body by way of identification are not included in the expression “to be a witness.”
Secondly, most of the specified measurements under the Act are already covered under
different stages of criminal investigation and trial under the Cr.P.C. For example, under Sec. 53,
a medical practitioner is authorized to conduct an examination on an arrested person and such
examination “ includes the examination of blood, blood stains, semen, swabs in case of sexual
offences, sputum and sweat, hair samples and finger nail clippings by the use of modern and
scientific techniques including DNA profiling and such other tests which the registered medical
practitioner thinks necessary in a particular case.” Under Section 311A of the Cr.P.C., the
Magistrate is empowered to order a person to give specimen signatures or handwriting during
investigation or proceedings under the Cr.P.C. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, while
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India conferred powers on the
Magistrate to order any person to give voice samples until explicit provisions are engrafted
under the Cr.P.C. The Act simply consolidates and updates the various legal provisions and
judicial precedents in one common legislative framework.
Further the proportionality and reasonableness of the Act is justified by the following:

1) Unlike the old Act, this Act of 2022 imposes an obligation to share measurements with a
police officer for grave offences committed against a woman or a child or for any
 offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not less than 7 years. Under the Act,
convicted persons and persons who had been arrested for offences punishable with
rigorous imprisonment for a term of 1 year or upwards were required to give their
measurements to police officers.
2) The law as it stands under the Act, does not provide the manner of collecting the
measurements by police officers. It merely provides that measurements are to be
collected by police officers in the “prescribed manner.” Several judicial decisions have
discussed the import of “prescribed manner” and whether it entails a requirement of an
executive rule for implementation. However, necessary safeguards have been provided
for in the Act, which provides that police or prison officers can take measurements as
may be prescribed by the Central Government or State Government, thereby
mandatorily requiring executive checks and balances.
3) The measurements collected by police officers are not considered as gospel truth either
under the Act or Bill. A police officer can either collect the measurements on his own or
approach a Magistrate to pass necessary orders for taking of measurements. In the
event police officers take the measurements on their own, they bear the burden to
dispel doubts as to its bonafides and to rule out fabrication. Hence, the Act continues to
encourage police officers to take measurements by approaching a Magistrate.

Thus Appellant no. 1(Eleven) is obliged to furnish measurements to prescribed authorities u/s 3
of Cr. P (Identification) Act, 2022.

Pertaining to right to privacy u/art. 21-

In Kharak Singh’s Case, Jeevan Reddy J. Held that in the context of anti-terrorism enactment,
the right to privacy was subservient to the security of the state and withholding information
relevant for the detention of crime cannot be nullified on the grounds of right to privacy.

Issue no. 2

It has been contended that sec. 50 of PMLA is unconstitutional because it is violative of Art.
20(3) (right against self-incrimination). The issue raised is baseless and lacks ground to be
challenged against PMLA.

Sec. 50 of the PMLA confers power on the Directorate of Enforcement [ED] to summon any
person for the purpose of giving evidence. Sec. 50(3) compels such a person to answer
truthfully. Non-compliance with section 50(3) is penalized through sec. 63 of the PMLA.

Sec. 50 of the PMLA does not violate Article 20(3) of the Constitution, that is, the right against
self-incrimination. Here are the reasons:
 1. Under Art. 20(3) which says that “no person accused of an offence shall be compelled to
be a witness against himself”. It is based on the legal maxim ‘nemo teneteur prodre
accussare seipsum’, which means ‘No man is obliged to be a witness against himself’.
The key word here is “accused”. As long as a person is not legally accused of an offence,
he or she does not enjoy the protection of Article 20(3).
2. A statement made under section 50 of the PMLA would not infringe the fundamental
right contained in Art. 20(3) in as much as the person making the statement is not an
accused at the time when the statement under sec. 50 is made. A person, when
summoned under section 50 of the PMLA to give evidence or produce record, cannot
claim protection under Article 20(3) for two reasons. One, since the complaint is not
filed by the prosecution or two, because they are merely suspects at the time they are
summoned.

In this case also the prosecution had not filed complaint to the ED and there were no formal
accusation against them by the prosecution . They took cognizance when money trails were
found. There upon an ECIR was registered.

In Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited and ORs. vs Asst. Director of Enforcement Directorate and
Ors.,the petitioners had challenged the summons under sec. 50 of the PMLA by claiming it to be
violative of the constitutional protection and guarantee under Article 20(3). The Court went on
to hold that the summons issued under section 50 was not violative of the constitutional
protection and guarantee under Article 20(3) as no formal accusation was made when the
summons was issued. It was argued by the Petitioners that the ECIR (Enforcement Case
Information Report) was registered and thus the Petitioners were standing in the capacity of
accused persons. The counter-argument to this by the Enforcement Directorate (hereinafter
'ED') was that the Petitioners were not accused and were merely suspects. The Court, however,
while observing that an ECIR would not be akin to an FIR, held that since only an ECIR was
registered, the Petitioners could not be said to persons accused of an offence. The Court
further observed that until the complaint under section 44 of the PMLA was filed by the ED, the
Petitioners could not be said to have been standing in the capacity of accused persons in order
to afford the constitutional protection under Art. 20(3).

Also in B. Narayanswamy v. Deputy Directorr, Enforcement Directorate Chennai , the Court

held that at the time of making enquiry under section 50(2) and 50(3) of the PMLA, the persons
so summoned cannot be treated as an accused person unless they are found to have been
involved in money laundering. It was specifically argued by the prosecution that summoning
persons under sec. 50 was only for the purposes of collecting evidence and then on the basis of
the evidence collected and the statements recorded, if it was established that the person is
involved in money laundering, only then would he be treated as an accused and a complaint
would be filed against him.

Thus sec. 50 of PMLA is not violative of Art. 20(3). Thus not inconsistent to constitution of
Hawkins.
In this case Appellant no. 1 upon showing the account transaction admitted that she has raised
money through various transaction. Also earlier to this her friends also disclosed about the
same. Further she remained silent over the details of other transactions apart from her uncle
Appellant no. 2. It is pertinent to mention that there was no coercion upon her by the
investigating authority to disclose the same.

Issue no. 3
The Constitution of Hawkins indeed under Art. 19(1)(c) provides right to peaceably assemble
allows people to question and object to acts of the government by demonstrations,
agitations and public meetings, to launch sustained protest movements. But at the same
time imposes reasonable restriction thereto protect Sovereignty and integrity of India,
Security of the State and some among them are Public order, Decency or morality,
Incitement to an offence. Further, resorting to violence during the protest is a violation of a
key fundamental duty of citizens. Under , the Constitution makes it a fundamental duty of
every citizen “to safeguard public property and to abjure violence”.
This is what happened in the present case. Under the garb of peaceful protest criminal
agenda was purported.
There are several instances which proves that it was not a peaceful protest.
The Appellant no. 1 knowing that she has massive following and influence on social
media. Held a an outrageous protest and incessantly Incited people to carry on the
protest. She gave several speeches at the protest site. She said- “we should keep fighting
at all costs and must do whatever it takes.” Further she also promised that she will provide
all logistical support to protestors. These statements clearly shows that rather than
presenting discontent to the impugned laws she was more mendacious endeavored to
incite the protestors to destroy peace and to cause violence which in the same. This is the
flagrant violation of public order, Decency or Morality and Incitement to an offence.
Consequently she was convicted u/s 13,16,17, 18 of UAPA; sec. 124A and 120B; and sec.
4 of PMLA.
Conviction under UAPA